$50 Million Cell Phone Crackdown Coincides with Record Prison Deaths: A Fiscal and Public Safety Analysis of Georgia’s Managed Access Systems

Executive Summary

Georgia has invested approximately $50 million through FY2026 in Managed Access Systems (MAS) designed to block contraband cell phones across 27 prison facilities. Despite this massive expenditure, every measurable public safety indicator has worsened during the deployment period:

• Homicides more than doubled during MAS rollout, rising from 31 in 2022 to 66 in 2024. Total deaths in Georgia’s prisons reached a record 333 in 2024.
• Contraband phones increased, not decreased. Phone-related incidents rose from 8,966 in 2019 to a record 11,880 in 2024. An estimated 20,000+ phones remain in circulation despite 37,000+ confiscations since 2022.
• Every confirmed MAS activation was followed by significant violence within 2–7 weeks, including a five-death outbreak at Washington State Prison just 3–5 days after a statewide communication blackout on January 6, 2026.
• No procurement records exist on Georgia’s official registries for 35 facility contracts worth tens of millions of dollars—raising serious questions about fiscal accountability and vendor oversight.
• The staffing crisis remains unaddressed. GDC has 2,600 vacant security positions out of 7,587 authorized (a 34% vacancy rate), and 82.7% of correctional officers leave within their first year. Evidence from comparable states shows staffing shortages—not contraband phones—are the primary driver of prison violence.

Key Takeaway: Georgia spent approximately $50 million on cell phone blocking technology that coincided with record prison deaths, doubled homicides, and increased contraband—while 2,600 security positions remain vacant.

Fiscal Impact

Current MAS and Contraband Technology Spending

Context Within GDC Budget

The GDC’s total FY2026 budget stands at $1.62 billion, a 44% increase from FY2022. The Governor has committed $603 million over 18 months to the prison system. Yet during this period of historic investment, homicides increased 113% (31 to 66), total deaths reached record levels (333), and contraband phone incidents hit an all-time high (11,880).

Comparison: Georgia vs. South Carolina

South Carolina’s MAS program costs approximately $550,000 per year under a Tecore contract valued at $1.5–$1.65 million over three years. That program has disabled 800+ phones since July 2023 and produced a 68% increase in legitimate calls. Georgia is spending roughly 90 times more annually on MAS technology while experiencing dramatically worse outcomes.

Vendor Concentration and Procurement Gaps

Three vendors hold FCC Contraband Interdiction System (CIS) licenses at 35 Georgia facilities. One vendor—Trace-Tek/ShawnTech—operates at 28 facilities and claims to hold 86% of all FCC CIS licenses nationally. No Request for Proposal (RFP), sole-source justification, or contract award documentation appears on the Georgia DOAS registry or Team Georgia Marketplace for any of these contracts. This represents tens of millions of taxpayer dollars spent with zero procurement transparency.

The Unaddressed Cost: Staffing

GDC faces 2,600 vacancies out of 7,587 authorized security positions. With 82.7% of correctional officers leaving within their first year, the state is investing in technology while failing to maintain the human infrastructure necessary for safe facility operations. South Carolina’s experience is instructive: its own review found that a 25% guard vacancy rate was the primary driver of violence—not contraband phones.

Key Takeaway: Georgia spends roughly 90 times more than South Carolina on MAS technology with worse results, while tens of millions in vendor contracts lack any procurement documentation on state registries.

Key Findings

1. Violence Escalated Dramatically During MAS Deployment

The data directly contradicts the premise that blocking contraband phones reduces violence:

The GPS homicide database has confirmed 244 homicides, with 170 reclassified using Atlanta Journal-Constitution data. GDC reported 66 homicides in 2024, but GPS has confirmed only 45—leaving approximately 21 Q4 homicides unidentified due to information suppression.

Total deaths in 2024 reached a record 333 people.

2. MAS Activations Correlate with Violent Outbreaks

Every confirmed MAS activation was followed by significant violence within 2–7 weeks:

• Dooly State Prison: MAS activated approximately July 26, 2025 → riot on September 11 (47 days later)
• Washington State Prison: MAS activated late December 2025 → statewide WiFi cutoff January 6 → homicide January 9 → gang war/riot January 11 — 5 people killed in 3 days

The January 6, 2026 statewide WiFi cutoff eliminated the last communication workaround for hundreds of people whose phones had been blacklisted. Five days later, the deadliest single incident in recent Georgia prison history unfolded.

3. The Most Violent Facilities All Have CIS Vendors

All four CellBlox/Securus facilities experienced major institutional failures: Macon SP recorded 9+ homicides in 2024 alone, Smith SP’s warden was arrested for running a smuggling ring, and Telfair SP’s warden was stabbed in March 2024.

4. Contraband Phones Increased Despite $50 Million Investment

Phone-related incidents rose from 8,966 in 2019 to 11,880 in 2024—a record. Despite confiscating 37,000+ phones since 2022 (averaging 1,300 per month), an estimated 20,000+ contraband phones remain in Georgia’s prisons at any given time. The technology has not reduced supply.

5. Drone Smuggling Surged 600%

Drone incidents increased from 43 in 2019 to 297 in 2023 and 283 in 2024—a 600% increase. Over 1,000 drone incidents have occurred since 2022. Operation Skyhawk resulted in 150 arrests (including 8 GDC staff members), seizure of 87 drones, 273 phones, and 185 pounds of tobacco. Washington State Prison alone recorded 17 drone incidents since end of 2023 before experiencing 5 deaths in January 2026.

6. MAS Exploited to Shut Down 911 for 13 Counties

At Macon State Prison, people exploited the MAS system’s federally required 911 passthrough feature, making 204 emergency calls in 2024—none legitimate. This overwhelmed and shut down the 911 center serving 13 Georgia counties, creating a direct public safety threat to surrounding communities.

7. Medical Equipment Interference Raises Constitutional Concerns

Phase 2 of MAS deployment affects medical equipment: heart monitors and wireless medical devices cease to function. This raises Eighth Amendment concerns under Estelle v. Gamble (1976), which established that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of incarcerated people constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

8. C-DOS Technology Raises Fourth Amendment Questions

ShawnTech/Trace-Tek’s C-DOS (Cellular Denial of Service) system permanently disables contraband devices and claims to bypass the warrant process. Over 4,000 devices have been destroyed. The permanent destruction of property without judicial oversight raises significant Fourth Amendment questions.

9. Vendor Due Diligence Failures

Hawks Ear Communications, which holds CIS licenses at 3 Georgia facilities (Hancock SP, Phillips SP, Valdosta SP), is a 2-person operation with no physical office. Its Fort Lauderdale address is an entertainment lawyer’s office (Concept Law Group). Its Atlanta address is a Regus virtual office. The company has no website and no track record in corrections technology. Hawks Ear received FCC experimental authorization in 2019 but the license was never granted; CIS Phase One certification did not come until March 2025—meaning the company operated without FCC certification for years at state facilities.

10. Information Suppression

GDC reported 66 homicides in 2024, but GPS has been able to confirm and identify only 45 of those individuals. Approximately 21 people were killed in Q4 2024 whose identities remain unknown to the public due to information suppression by the department.

Key Takeaway: Homicides more than doubled during MAS deployment, every confirmed activation preceded violence, the deadliest facilities all have CIS vendors, and contraband phone incidents actually reached record levels.

Comparable States

South Carolina

South Carolina deployed MAS following the 2018 Lee Correctional riot that killed 7 people and injured 17—the deadliest U.S. prison riot in a quarter century. The state contracted with Tecore at a cost of $1.5–$1.65 million over 3 years ($550,000/year). Results include 800+ phones disabled since July 2023 and a 68% increase in legitimate calls after deployment.

However, South Carolina’s experience also reveals the limits of technology: assaults rose 68% (2013–2017), and homicides increased from 1 to 12 during the period. The state’s own analysis concluded that 25% guard vacancy was the primary driver of violence—not contraband phones. Georgia’s 34% vacancy rate substantially exceeds this threshold.

Mississippi

Mississippi deployed the first MAS nationally in 2010 at Parchman using Tecore’s iNAC system. Results were initially dramatic: 10,600 unauthorized connection attempts blocked in the first 24 hours, a 60% reduction in unauthorized attempts by end of the first month, and a decline from 20,043 calls in Year 1 to 393 in Year 3 (SMS fell from 2,282 to 162). Mississippi’s experience demonstrates that MAS technology can work when properly implemented—raising questions about why Georgia’s far more expensive program has not achieved comparable results.

Federal Landscape

Georgia Commissioner Carr leads a 23-state coalition advocating for federal approval of cell phone and drone jamming in prisons. The FCC adopted a jamming proposal in September 2025. However, the evidence from Georgia’s own experience suggests that blocking technology without addressing staffing and conditions may worsen outcomes.

Key Takeaway: South Carolina spent $550,000/year and achieved measurable results; Mississippi’s pioneering program saw dramatic call reductions—Georgia spent roughly 90 times more than South Carolina with worse outcomes on every metric.

Policy Recommendations

1. Mandate Independent Audit of MAS Procurement and Expenditures

Direct the Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts to conduct a comprehensive audit of all MAS-related contracts, expenditures, and vendor relationships. No RFP, sole-source justification, or contract award documentation currently exists on state procurement registries for 35 facility contracts worth approximately $50 million. The audit should specifically examine Hawks Ear Communications’ years of operation without FCC certification and ShawnTech’s 86% national market share.

2. Require Violence Impact Assessments Before MAS Activation

Legislate a mandatory 90-day violence impact assessment protocol before any new MAS activation. Every confirmed activation has been followed by significant violence within 2–7 weeks. Require GDC to demonstrate adequate staffing levels (below 25% vacancy at the specific facility) before deploying communication-disrupting technology.

3. Prioritize Staffing Over Technology

Redirect a portion of contraband technology funding toward addressing the 2,600-position security staffing shortage and the 82.7% first-year officer attrition rate. South Carolina’s analysis concluded that guard vacancy—not contraband phones—was the primary driver of violence. Georgia’s 34% vacancy rate exceeds South Carolina’s 25% threshold.

4. Investigate Medical Equipment Interference

Direct the Senate Health and Human Services Committee to investigate MAS interference with medical devices in Georgia prisons. Heart monitors and wireless medical devices cease to function during Phase 2 of MAS deployment, raising Eighth Amendment concerns under Estelle v. Gamble (1976). Require GDC to implement protocols ensuring no medical device disruption occurs during MAS deployment.

5. Restore Procurement Transparency

Require all corrections technology contracts exceeding $100,000 to follow standard state procurement procedures, including public posting on Team Georgia Marketplace, competitive bidding or documented sole-source justification, and legislative notification. Currently, tens of millions in contracts bypass standard procurement oversight.

6. Mandate Safe Communication Alternatives

Require GDC to provide affordable, accessible communication alternatives (regulated tablets, expanded phone access, video visitation) before activating MAS at any facility. The evidence strongly suggests that abruptly cutting off all communication channels—as occurred with the January 6, 2026 statewide WiFi cutoff—triggers dangerous instability. People in prison who can communicate with families and legal counsel through sanctioned channels have less incentive to obtain contraband phones.

7. Address 911 System Vulnerability

Direct the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency (GEMA/HS) to develop protocols preventing MAS 911 passthrough exploitation. The 204 fraudulent emergency calls from Macon SP in 2024 that shut down services for 13 counties represent a direct public safety threat to Georgia communities.

8. Require Warrant Process for Device Destruction

Legislate that any permanent destruction of personal property (including contraband phones) within GDC custody requires judicial authorization. ShawnTech’s C-DOS system claims to bypass warrant requirements and has permanently disabled over 4,000 devices—raising Fourth Amendment concerns that expose the state to litigation.

9. Establish Legislative Oversight Committee

Create a standing joint committee with subpoena authority to provide ongoing oversight of GDC’s technology deployments, vendor contracts, and safety outcomes. The Senate Study Committee (2024) identified critical issues—49,000 people incarcerated, 31% gang-validated, 7 maximum-security prisons over 30 years old (designed for 15–20 year lifespans)—but standing oversight is needed to ensure accountability.

10. Commission Independent Study of MAS-Violence Correlation

Fund an independent academic study examining the relationship between MAS deployment and institutional violence in Georgia prisons. The correlation evidence is compelling but requires rigorous analysis to establish or rule out causation. Legislators should not approve additional MAS expansion until this study is complete.

Key Takeaway: The legislature should mandate a procurement audit, require violence impact assessments before MAS activation, prioritize staffing over technology, and establish standing oversight of GDC’s technology spending.

Read the Source Document

Read the full GPS research document: Georgia Managed Access System (MAS) Deep Research (PDF)

Other Versions

• Public Version — Plain-language summary for families and community members
• Media Version — Press-ready brief with key findings and context
• Advocate Version — Detailed analysis for attorneys, organizers, and policy advocates