The Case for Monitor-Not-Block: How Georgia Can Stop Prison Fraud, Save $73.5 Million, and Require No New Legislation

Executive Summary

Georgia’s prison phone-blocking systems have failed to prevent over $5 million in documented fraud against victims nationwide — including 440+ military members, 119 people targeted by spoofed police calls, and countless others harmed by scams the state’s technology was supposed to stop. Despite Mobile Access Solutions (MAS) blocking hardware installed at 35 facilities, every major fraud operation was discovered only after the damage was done.

• The state’s blocking-only approach produces zero intelligence. None of the major scam operations — totaling over $5 million in documented losses — were prevented by MAS blocking systems. All were discovered after victims had already been defrauded.
• Monitoring costs only ~$90-100 more per person per year than current blocking (~$583-646/person/year vs. ~$443-556/person/year), but delivers real-time intelligence, scam detection, gang network mapping, and suicide prevention capabilities.
• Even a conservative 5% recidivism reduction would save Georgia $73.5 million annually, dwarfing the $5-7 million marginal cost of system-wide monitoring.
• No new legislation is required. Under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18, wardens already have statutory authority to authorize telecommunications devices — the same authority used at all 13 Transitional Centers since July 1, 2016.
• Georgia already permits personal cell phones for ~2,344 people in state custody at Transitional Centers, and GDC research shows those residents are up to 1/3 more likely to succeed in crime-free life.

Key Takeaway: Georgia spends millions on phone-blocking technology that fails to prevent fraud; for ~$90-100 more per person per year, the state could switch to monitoring that generates intelligence, protects victims, and saves an estimated $73.5 million annually through reduced recidivism.

Fiscal Impact

Current Expenditure vs. Proposed Monitoring

Taxpayer Losses from Blocking Failure

The state’s blocking-only approach has failed to prevent documented fraud totaling over $5 million:

• $3.5 million stolen by a single individual at Telfair State Prison
• $560,000+ extorted from 440+ military members in a sextortion ring
• $500,000+ stolen in Iowa romance scams traced to Calhoun State Prison
• $464,920 stolen from 119 identified victims across 6+ states from Calhoun State Prison

Recidivism Cost Savings

Research shows family contact reduces recidivism by 13-25%. Even using a conservative 5% reduction estimate, Georgia would save $73.5 million per year — a return of more than 10:1 on the $5-7 million marginal investment.

Contraband Economy the State Fails to Disrupt

The blocking approach does nothing to disrupt a contraband delivery economy worth $67,000-93,000 per drone drop. Georgia recorded 283 drone incidents in 2024 — a 600% increase since 2019. Contraband phones sell for $800-1,200 inside facilities. Monitoring would allow AI to detect drop coordination calls in real time, disrupting a multi-million-dollar illegal supply chain that blocking ignores entirely.

Key Takeaway: For a marginal investment of $5-7 million annually, Georgia could generate $73.5 million in recidivism savings, produce actionable intelligence on fraud and contraband networks, and protect victims from ongoing scam operations the current system fails to stop.

Key Findings

1. Blocking Technology Fails to Protect People from Prison-Based Fraud

Calhoun State Prison — which has both the highest contraband rate in the state (62 mentions in GDC press releases) and an installed Trace-Tek MAS system — was the origin point of multiple sophisticated fraud operations. Joey Amour Jackson and Lance Riddle were convicted on January 9, 2026 for conspiracy to commit wire fraud using contraband phones and VOIP technology to spoof police numbers nationwide, victimizing 119 people for $464,920 in documented losses.

At Autry State Prison, 50+ individuals were indicted in a jury duty scam — including 15 corrections officers, revealing the depth of staff corruption in facilitating contraband phone access. A single individual at Telfair State Prison stole $3.5 million. None of these operations were detected or prevented by MAS blocking.

2. Georgia Already Allows Personal Phones in State Prisons

Since July 1, 2016, all 13 Transitional Centers housing approximately 2,344 residents have allowed personal cell phones. Residents purchase their own phones, staff can search them at any time under signed waivers, and records are maintained of phone numbers, SIM cards, and carriers. Commissioner Homer Bryson stated the policy helps residents “begin learning the responsible use of technology.” GDC’s own research shows TC residents are up to 1/3 more likely to succeed in crime-free life.

When GDC attempted to restrict TC phones in May 2022, the backlash forced a reversal — personal phones are currently allowed again.

3. Existing Law Already Authorizes Warden-Approved Phones

O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18 — titled “Items prohibited for possession by inmates; warden’s authorization; penalty” — contains key language: “without the authorization of the warden or superintendent or his or her designee.” The statute does not absolutely prohibit phones; it prohibits unauthorized phones. Wardens already possess statutory authority to authorize telecommunications devices. This is exactly the legal framework under which Transitional Centers have operated since 2016.

4. MAS Infrastructure Can Be Reconfigured, Not Replaced

Hardware is already installed at 35 Georgia facilities. Existing MAS technology like Tecore iNAC already distinguishes between authorized and unauthorized devices. The system modification is a configuration change — registering authorized phones on a whitelist, routing them through a monitoring/recording layer, and applying AI analysis — not a system redesign. Unauthorized devices would remain blocked.

5. The Drone Contraband Economy Is Thriving Because Blocking Creates Artificial Scarcity

Drone operators are paid $4,000-5,000 per drop. Drones carry 10 pounds and make 4 drops per night. A 6oz tobacco can that costs $50 on the street sells for $800-2,000 inside. Marijuana sells for $10,000/pound inside. A mixed 10-pound drop is worth $67,000-93,000. Georgia experienced 283 drone incidents in 2024, a 600% increase since 2019. If phone coordination calls were monitored, AI could detect drop coordination in real time.

6. Monitoring Produces Criminal Cases; Blocking Produces Nothing

Georgia is already contracted with LEO Technologies, which provides AI-powered speech-to-text, semantic analysis, and machine learning capabilities hosted on AWS cloud. This technology has solved cold homicides, prevented suicides, disrupted trafficking, and built RICO cases in other jurisdictions. As the source document states: “Blocking gives a phone number; monitoring gives a criminal case.”

Key Takeaway: Phone-blocking technology at Georgia’s prisons fails to prevent fraud, generates no intelligence, and cannot disrupt a contraband economy worth tens of thousands of dollars per drone drop — while monitoring would provide real-time scam detection, criminal case-building capability, and suicide prevention.

Comparable States and International Models

International Jurisdictions

U.S. State Models

Georgia’s Own Precedent

Georgia does not need to look to other states for proof of concept. All 13 Transitional Centers (~2,344 residents) have allowed personal cell phones since July 1, 2016. GDC research shows TC residents are up to 1/3 more likely to succeed in crime-free life. The state has nearly a decade of operational experience with authorized phone access in its own corrections system.

Key Takeaway: The UK, Finland, Norway, Connecticut, and Georgia’s own Transitional Centers all demonstrate that monitored or expanded phone access reduces recidivism and improves outcomes — Georgia need not pioneer this approach; it need only extend what it already does.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations require no new legislation. Authority already exists under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18 and GDC operational precedent.

1. Direct the Commissioner to Issue a Monitor-Not-Block Policy Directive

The GDC Commissioner should issue a policy directive authorizing a phased transition from phone blocking to phone monitoring at facilities with existing MAS infrastructure. This mirrors the operational framework in use at Transitional Centers since 2016.

2. Launch a Single-Facility Pilot

Select one facility with high contraband rates and existing MAS hardware (e.g., Calhoun State Prison, which has 62 contraband mentions in GDC press releases) for a monitored phone pilot. Measure scam detection rates, intelligence yield, contraband phone seizure trends, and incident rates over 12 months.

3. Require Public Reporting of MAS Effectiveness

The legislature should require GDC to publish annual data on: MAS system costs, number of phones blocked vs. fraud operations prevented, contraband seizure rates at MAS-equipped facilities, and drone incident trends. Current blocking failures are invisible without mandatory transparency.

4. Appropriate Marginal Funding for AI Monitoring Layer

The estimated system-wide marginal cost is $5-7 million annually — roughly $90-100 per person per year above current blocking costs. Georgia is already contracted with LEO Technologies. Legislators should ensure this funding is available within the GDC budget to support the transition.

5. Mandate a Cost-Benefit Analysis of Blocking vs. Monitoring

Require the GDC or an independent body to produce a formal cost-benefit analysis comparing the current blocking approach to monitored access, incorporating: fraud prevention, intelligence value, recidivism reduction (research supports 13-25% reduction from family contact), contraband economy disruption, and victim protection.

6. Protect the Transitional Center Phone Program

The legislature should codify the TC phone access program to prevent future administrative reversals. GDC’s 2022 attempt to restrict TC phones — subsequently reversed after backlash — demonstrates the program’s value and vulnerability to unilateral administrative action.

7. Expand Family Contact as a Reentry Strategy

With even a conservative 5% recidivism reduction saving $73.5 million annually, monitored phone access should be positioned as a core component of Georgia’s reentry strategy, not merely a security accommodation. The $73.5 million savings dwarfs the $5-7 million marginal cost by more than 10:1.

Key Takeaway: No new legislation is required — wardens already have statutory authority under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18 to authorize monitored phones, and existing MAS infrastructure at 35 facilities can be reconfigured from blocking to monitoring through a Commissioner policy directive.

Read the Source Document

Read the full GPS research document: Georgia Prison Scamming and The Case for Monitor-Not-Block (PDF)

Other Versions

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• Media Version — Press-ready summary with key data points
• Advocate Version — Organizing toolkit with action items and talking points