# Post-Conviction Procedure in All Fifty States: The Full Record > This page holds the underlying evidence for How Georgia Compares: Post-Conviction Procedure in All Fifty States. It is a reference table, not an argument. Every cell was checked against a primary lega… **Published**: 2026-08-01 **Source**: https://gps.press/post-conviction-fifty-states-data/ **Author**: Georgia Prisoners' Speak --- This page holds the underlying evidence for [How Georgia Compares: Post-Conviction Procedure in All Fifty States](https://gps.press/post-conviction-fifty-states/). It is a reference table, not an argument. Every cell was checked against a primary legal authority and quoted verbatim; the standard, the checking method, and the cells we could not verify are all described on the analysis page. ## How this survey was built These sections were moved here from [the findings page](https://gps.press/post-conviction-fifty-states/) so that the method sits with the evidence it describes. ## What the table covers For each of the fifty states, the table answers seven questions: | | | | --- | --- | | | Question | | **Where an ineffective-assistance claim must be raised** | On direct appeal, in post-conviction, or either — and what happens if you pick wrong | | **The time limit for challenging a conviction** | How long you have to bring the challenge your state provides — in Georgia, a petition for habeas corpus — what starts the clock, and what excuses a late filing | | **Screening of self-represented petitions** | How a state identifies a meritorious petition from someone with no lawyer | | **Counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding** | Whether a lawyer is appointed, and whether that depends on the sentence | | **Where the petition is filed** | The court of conviction, the county of confinement, or elsewhere | | **The bar on second petitions** | What blocks a successive petition, and what excuses it | | **Judicial reassignment** | Whether the original trial judge hears the challenge to their own case | Two of these are questions Georgia is actively considering: where a claim of ineffective assistance must be raised, and how long a person has to challenge the lawfulness of their conviction. The last is not a question anyone has asked. It follows from a proposal that has been made — that a first habeas petition be heard in the court that entered the conviction — and it is the least documented rule in American post-conviction procedure. Fifty states, seven questions, **350 cells**. ### The time limit, separately The time limit is also examined on its own, because it is the question most often answered inaccurately in fifty-state comparisons. The states do not all use the same instrument. A person in Georgia challenges a conviction by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, and the four-year limit in O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) is a limit on that writ. Most states no longer proceed that way: they enacted a purpose-built post-conviction statute or rule that displaced habeas for this purpose, and the one-year figure usually quoted for those states is the limit in that act. Alabama's year is Rule 32.2(c); Pennsylvania's is the Post Conviction Relief Act. Neither is a habeas deadline. Set side by side in a single column and ranked, those numbers compare a writ with a statute and report the difference as though it were a difference in generosity. A separate pass therefore establishes, for each state and from primary sources: whether habeas corpus still lies to challenge a conviction and on what deadline; what separate post-conviction remedy exists and on what deadline; and which of the two is the operative route today. Georgia is compared on the deadline only against states where the instrument is the same. That pass also answers a question the single column could not. A state recorded as allowing 90 days may have an untimed habeas route running alongside it — Arkansas does — in which case the short number badly understates what is actually available there. --- ## The standard **Every cell must terminate in a primary source a reader can pull.** A statute section, a court rule, or a controlling case — plus a short verbatim quote from that source showing it says what we claim. No cell rests on a secondary summary, a practice guide, or a law-review footnote. Where a primary source could not be reached, the cell is marked **unverified** and says what was looked for, rather than being filled in with something plausible. An unverified cell is an acceptable outcome. A confidently wrong cell is not. --- ## How each cell was checked **Citations are re-fetched and searched for their quoted language**, so that a citation which resolves but does not contain what it is cited for cannot survive. That pass has now completed, and the figure is 339 of 350 cells. The eleven that did not pass are not failures of research: most are the judicial-reassignment question, which the method expected to be unverifiable in many states because most states have never legislated the point. A separate and larger table described below was checked the same way, at 543 of 550. Both numbers were arrived at by counting the verification marks recorded against each cell, not by reading a summary line — a distinction worth stating plainly, because an earlier draft of this work reported the researchers' own certification as though it were the independent retrieval. The two figures happened to be close. They were not the same measurement, and only the second is evidence. **Every cited opinion was read in full** — 201 of them, start to finish — to establish facts a quotation cannot show on its own: whether the quoted passage is the court's holding or merely dictum, whether it sits in the majority opinion rather than a concurrence or dissent, and how the court actually voted. Where a decision was not unanimous, the table says so. **Twenty-eight cells rest on divided courts.** Georgia's rule that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in habeas is one of them: *Gibson v. Turpin* (1999) was decided 4–3, with the Chief Justice, the Presiding Justice and one other Justice dissenting on precisely that point, and the dissent recording that Georgia was then the only jurisdiction in the country without such a right. A rule carried by one vote is stated here as a rule carried by one vote. **Later decisions citing each case were read** — 2,519 opinions across 160 cases — to ask a question a keyword search cannot answer: has a later court undermined this? Where one has, the cell says so. Rhode Island's screening rule rests on *Shatney v. State* (2000), which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held "shall be deemed abrogated and inapplicable" in *Motyka v. State* (2017) for initial post-conviction applications by applicants sentenced to life without parole; the table records that limit alongside the rule. **Enacted legislation was screened against every cell.** A court can be overtaken by a legislature as readily as by a later court, and no amount of reading the decisions will show it: a statute that displaces a case is usually written into a different part of the code and need not mention the case at all. So the enactments of each state were collected from its own legislative record — 684 of them — and each was tested not against the general subject of the question, but against the specific statute section or case that the individual cell rests on. Two cells were set aside for closer reading. In both, the legislation left the stated rule standing: Nevada's 2025 amendment to NRS 34.738 changed where a petition challenging the computation of time served is filed, not where a challenge to a conviction is filed, and Utah's 2026 capital-case act changed which court appoints counsel for a death-sentenced petitioner, not whether counsel is appointed at all. **Every question was answered twice, independently.** A second researcher answered each question from scratch without seeing the first answer, and the two were compared. Where both reached the same rule from overlapping authority, that agreement stands behind the cell. Where they diverged, the disagreement was referred out and settled directly against the primary sources. Missouri is an example of why this matters: post-conviction there is governed by Supreme Court Rules 29.15 and 24.035, not by RSMo § 547.360, because *Schleeper v. State* (Mo. banc 1998) holds that the statute codified the rule almost verbatim and — the enacting bill not having expressly referred to the rule — "did not create a second and independent avenue for post-conviction relief." --- ## What we could not verify **The table states rules, not outcomes.** How a rule is written and how it works in practice are different questions. This table answers the first. A state whose statute promises appointed counsel and a state whose courts actually appoint one will look identical here. **The screen of enacted legislation is a screen, not a guarantee.** It reads what the states publish of their own sessions, so a very recent enactment that has not yet reached the public record, or one that changes a rule without naming the authority it changes, could pass it. Where that risk is highest — a rule resting on a single case rather than on a statute — the table says which case, so the check can be repeated. **Deadlines are compared only against deadlines of the same kind.** Georgia's four years runs against the writ of habeas corpus itself; most states' periods run against a statute enacted to replace the writ. Those numbers are not interchangeable, and where they are set beside each other on this page the instrument is named alongside the number. --- ## Corrections If you find an error, we want to know. Every cell carries its source, so a disagreement can be resolved by reading the same document we read. Write to [accountability@gps.press](mailto:accountability@gps.press) and we will correct the table and note the correction here. *Compiled by The GDC Accountability Project, Inc. (Georgia Prisoners' Speak). Verified as at 30 July 2026.* --- ## State by state The first column is the instrument a conviction challenge travels on today. “No limit” means the state sets no filing period for that route. | State | Habeas corpus | Separate post-conviction remedy | Detail | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (subsumption); Ala. Code § 15-21-1 to -34 (habeas chapter, which contains no limitations period) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief (Ala. R. Crim. P. 32) · Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) (LIMITATIONS PERIOD) | Detail **Habeas:** > A proceeding under this rule displaces all post-trial remedies except posttrial motions under Rule 24 and appeal. Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule. **Post-conviction remedy:** > the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed ... within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment **On excusing a late filing:** the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed ... within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment THE STATUTE HAS NO DEADLINE, BUT THAT IS A TRAP. Alabama's habeas chapter (Ala. Code Title 15, ch. 21) is still on the books and, having read every section heading from § 15-21-1 through § 15-21-34, I confirm it contains no limitations period of any kind. But habeas cannot be used to attack a conviction: Rule 32.4 converts any such filing into a Rule 32 proceeding, which then takes Rule 32.2(c)'s one-year bar. Salter v. State, 606 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992): 'A petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the requirements of Rule 32.' Still applied: Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) ('Bagley's petition must be treated as a Rule 32 petition attacking his 1995 convictions and sentences'). Independently, § 15-21-23 forbids habeas inquiry 'into the regularity or justice of any order, judgment, decree or process of any court legally constituted,' and § 15-21-24 limits discharge to six jurisdictional/void-process grounds — so even pre-Rule 32, statutory habeas reached only void judgments. Habeas does survive in Alabama for NON-conviction custody questions (bail, extradition, prison discipline/good-time, expired sentence), which is why the writ still appears in Alabama reports; those are not conviction challenges. SECOND CRITICAL POINT: Rule 32's one-year bar is not universal. By its own terms 32.2(c) reaches only grounds under Rule 32.1(a) [constitutional], (e) [newly discovered facts], and (f) [out-of-time appeal]. Grounds (b) (court without jurisdiction), (c) (sentence exceeds/not authorized by law), and (d) (held past sentence expiration) carry NO deadline and may be raised at any time — that untimed jurisdictional route is functionally where Alabama's common-law habeas went. Sub-deadlines: 32.1(f) out-of-time-appeal petitions from denial of a prior Rule 32 petition get six months from discovery; 32.1(e) newly-discovered-facts petitions get the later of the one year or six months after discovery. The one year runs from issuance of the certificate of judgment on direct appeal (Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P.), or from lapse of the time to appeal if no appeal was taken; it cannot begin before April 1, 1987. The period was two years until amended to one year effective Aug. 1, 2002 (Salter's text still says two). CAPITAL CASES: I found no separate capital deadline — Rule 32 by its terms applies to 'any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense,' and the reviewed capital Rule 32 litigation (e.g. Ex parte Land) proceeds under the same rule; I did not separately verify Ala. Code § 15-18-200 DNA-testing procedure, so treat any capital-specific carve-out as unverified. 365 days is the calendar-year period expressed in days; the rule says 'one (1) year,' not a day count. [View the habeas source](https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr32_4.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr32_2.pdf) | | Alaska | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Alaska R. Civ. P. 86(m) (habeas rule, amended through SCO 1829 eff. 10/15/2014); AS 12.75.020; AS 12.75.110; Fisher v. State, 315 P.3d 686 (Alaska App. 2013); Hertz v. State, 8 P.3d 1144 (Alaska App. 2000) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Application for post-conviction relief, AS 12.72.010-.040 / Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1 · AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A); construed in Geisinger v. State, 334 P.3d 1241 (Alaska App. 2014) | Detail **Habeas:** > This rule does not apply to any post-conviction proceeding that could be brought under Criminal Rule 35.1. The court shall treat such a complaint as an application for post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35.1. **Post-conviction remedy:** > (A) if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure **On excusing a late filing:** AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) ... 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final HABEAS IS NOT AN OPEN-ENDED ROUTE TO A CONVICTION IN ALASKA. Alaska never repealed habeas: AS ch. 12.75 and Civil Rule 86 are both in force, and I read the entire chapter (AS 12.75.010-.230, akleg print view) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. But it is closed as a conviction-attack vehicle by three independent locks. (1) Civil Rule 86(m), captioned 'Superseded By Post-Conviction Relief Procedure Under Criminal Rule 35.1,' makes conversion mandatory; Fisher, 315 P.3d 686, calls it a 'clear and mandatory directive' and reversed a court that dismissed rather than converted a habeas petition. (2) AS 12.75.020 bars the writ to 'A person properly imprisoned or restrained by virtue of the legal judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and AS 12.75.110 forbids inquiry 'into the legality or justice of any order, judgment, or process specified in AS 12.75.020.' (3) AS 12.72.010(6) sweeps into PCR any claim 'subject to collateral attack upon any ground or alleged error previously available under the common law, statutory law, or other writ.' Net effect: a habeas petition attacking a conviction is re-labeled a PCR application and inherits AS 12.72.020's deadline — so filing in habeas buys no extra time. Hertz, 8 P.3d at 1147-48, conceded in dicta 'that a person held under a void judgment can seek redress in habeas corpus' and said a procedural bar 'might be unconstitutional' as to such a claim, but held Hertz's claims were cognizable under Rule 35.1 and rejected his Alaska Const. art. I, sec. 13 suspension-clause argument; McLaughlin, 214 P.3d 386, then held a defendant cannot escape the AS 12.72.020 limitation by styling the attack as one on a void judgment. So the void-judgment escape hatch is reserved, not established — I found no Alaska decision actually granting habeas relief from a conviction outside Rule 35.1. Habeas does remain a live, deadline-free remedy for restraint NOT resting on a criminal judgment (pretrial custody, extradition, child custody under Rule 86(l)). PC DEADLINE MECHANICS: 365 days is the figure for anyone who took a direct appeal — Geisinger, 334 P.3d 1241, holds 'a defendant who appeals his conviction or sentence, or both, has one year from the date the decision on appeal is final.' A defendant who took NO appeal gets 18 months (about 548 days) from entry of judgment. EXCEPTIONS: no time limit at all if the applicant claims the sentence was illegal (AS 12.72.020(a)(3), narrowly construed to sentences unauthorized by the judgment); AS 12.72.020(b) allows late claims on due diligence plus physical/mental incapacity or state obstruction, or newly discovered evidence proving innocence by clear and convincing evidence; AS 12.72.025 gives one year from finality of a prior PCR decision for a claim that PCR counsel was ineffective; AS 12.72.020(a)(6) otherwise bars any second application; post-conviction DNA testing has its own exclusive vehicle, AS ch. 12.73. No capital variation — Alaska has no death penalty. Caveat: courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/crpro.pdf (Criminal Rule 35.1 itself) timed out repeatedly and I could not read it directly; Rule 35.1's content here rests on the akleg statutory text and on verbatim quotation in Hertz, McLaughlin and Fisher. [View the habeas source](https://courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/civ.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=12.72.010&secEnd=12.72.040) | | Arizona | No limit habeas survives narrowly · A.R.S. § 13-4121 (Prosecution of writ); habeas article A.R.S. §§ 13-4121 to 13-4147 contains no filing deadline. Narrowed by A.R.S. §§ 13-4131(B), 13-4132(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3; Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964). | 90 days no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Relief, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 32 (defendants sentenced after trial or contested probation violation, and all capital cases) / Rule 33 (defendants who pled guilty or no contest) · Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020); parallel provision Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A) | Detail **Habeas:** > A person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may petition for and prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. **On excusing a late filing:** A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. THE HEADLINE FINDING: Arizona's habeas corpus statute carries NO filing deadline of any kind. I read every section of the habeas article, A.R.S. Title 13, ch. 39, art. 26 (§§ 13-4121 through 13-4147, index at https://www.azleg.gov/arsDetail/?title=13), and no provision imposes a time bar on petitioning. The only timing language runs against the court, not the petitioner: § 13-4124(A) ('shall grant it without delay'), and § 13-4142(A) ('Any writ or process authorized by this article may be issued and served on any day or at any time', https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04142.htm). § 13-4123(B) restricts SUCCESSIVE writs (no discharge on a second writ 'unless upon some ground not existing at the time of issuing the prior writ, or unless upon some point of law not raised at the hearing upon the return of the prior writ') but that is a repetitiveness bar, not a clock. The writ is constitutionally protected: Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 14 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended by the authorities of the state' (https://www.azleg.gov/const/2/14.htm). || WHY 'NARROW' AND NOT 'AVAILABLE': the deadline-free writ is not a usable route to attack a conviction. Three primary sources close it. (1) A.R.S. § 13-4131(B) bars discharge of a person detained 'by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, or of any process issued upon such judgment or decree' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04131.htm). (2) § 13-4132 permits discharge of a prisoner held on state-court process only in enumerated cases 'subject to the restrictions of section 13-4131' — case 1 being 'When the jurisdiction of the court or officer has been exceeded' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04132.htm). So what survives is the jurisdictional/facially-void sliver. (3) The Arizona Supreme Court states the same rule: 'In Arizona, the writ of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction.' Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964), read at https://static.case.law/ariz/95/cases/0292-01.json (that JSON encodes the apostrophe in 'court's' as u2019). || WHY NOT 'SUBSUMED': Rule 32 does NOT absorb habeas by its own terms. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3(a): 'A post-conviction proceeding is part of the original criminal action and is not a separate action. It displaces and incorporates all trial court post-trial remedies except those obtainable by Rule 24 motions and habeas corpus.' (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N282598E0F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). That express carve-out is why 'subsumed' would be wrong. BUT the very next subsection is what makes habeas non-operative for conviction challenges — Rule 32.3(b): 'If a court receives any type of application or request for relief--however titled--that challenges the validity of the defendant's conviction or sentence following a trial, it must treat the application as a petition for post-conviction relief.' A pleading captioned 'petition for writ of habeas corpus' that attacks the conviction is therefore re-characterized as a Rule 32 petition and inherits Rule 32's 90-day clock and preclusion rules. Habeas retains independent force for restraint claims that do NOT attack the judgment's validity — e.g. sentence-computation and release-date disputes; see State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 82 P.3d 369 (App. 2004), No. 1 CA-HC 02-0013, a habeas appeal over community-supervision calculation (https://static.case.law/ariz/207/cases/0008-01.json). || ON THE 90 DAYS: the deadline is a two-step notice-then-petition system. The 90 days is for the NOTICE, not the petition, and it runs from oral pronouncement of sentence OR 30 days after the direct-appeal mandate, whichever is later — so a defendant who appeals effectively gets mandate + 30 days. Critically, the 90 days applies only to Rule 32.1(a) claims (conviction or sentence obtained in violation of the U.S. or Arizona constitutions — this is where ineffective-assistance claims live). Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) — no subject-matter jurisdiction, sentence not authorized by law, custody beyond expiration of sentence, newly discovered material facts, no-fault failure to file a timely notice of appeal, significant change in the law, and actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence (Rule 32.1, https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1ABBE970F08511E99BA696ECB1FD62B1?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) — have NO fixed deadline: Rule 32.4(b)(3)(B), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) within a reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.' Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D) also requires the court to excuse an untimely 32.1(a) notice 'if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to timely file a notice was not the defendant's fault.' || PLEADING DEFENDANTS (the large majority of Arizona convictions) use Rule 33, not Rule 32, and get a shorter effective window because they have no direct appeal: Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 33.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence' — no mandate alternative (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N71DBAF40F0AA11E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). Rule 33.4(b)(3)(C) additionally allows a successive Rule 33 notice for ineffective assistance of Rule 33 counsel filed within 30 days of the first proceeding's final order or mandate. || CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: a death-sentenced defendant proceeds under Rule 32 even if he pled guilty (Rule 32.3(c)), and the 90-day clock does not apply to him — under Rule 32.4(b)(3)(C) 'the Supreme Court clerk must expeditiously file a notice requesting post-conviction relief with the trial court upon the issuance of the mandate' on direct appeal, i.e. the notice is filed for him automatically. || PRECLUSION (separate from the deadline, and often the real bar): Rule 32.2(a), amended effective April 14, 2025, precludes Rule 32.1(a) relief on any ground still raiseable on direct appeal or in a Rule 24 motion, finally adjudicated on the merits previously, or waived — and a court 'may determine by a preponderance of the evidence that an issue is precluded, even if the State does not raise preclusion.' || Rules cited are the restyled Rules 32 and 33 added Aug. 29, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020, which split the former single Rule 32 into trial-conviction (32) and plea (33) tracks; the Westlaw azrules pages state currency through amendments received May 1, 2026. Sources fetched and read directly: azleg.gov (statutes/constitution), govt.westlaw.com/azrules (official free unannotated Arizona court rules), static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project), courtlistener.com search API. CourtListener's /opinion/ HTML pages returned HTTP 202 and its /api/rest/v4/opinions/ endpoint returned 401 from this host, so case text was read from static.case.law instead. [View the habeas source](https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04121.htm) [View the post-conviction source](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1B9BE930F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999) (Ark. Sup. Ct.), construing Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123 and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11; reaffirmed in Fields v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 39 | 90 days Petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (Rule 37) · Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(i) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Arkansas Judiciary official text, current to 06/12/2025) | Detail **Habeas:** > neither the Arkansas Constitution nor the state statutes place a time limit on pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, to do so would contravene the proscription against suspending the right to habeas corpus. **Post-conviction remedy:** > a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment. **On excusing a late filing:** a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment Arkansas is a NO-DEADLINE-HABEAS state. The common-law/statutory writ (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123) was never abolished or absorbed into Rule 37, and Renshaw holds a filing deadline on it would be an unconstitutional suspension under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11. Read the whole subchapter (§§ 16-112-101 through -123 section list plus §§ 16-112-103, -115): no limitations period appears anywhere. But the writ is NARROW, not general: Crockett v. Payne, 2026 Ark. 62 (Apr. 16, 2026) — 'A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause,' and 'The circuit court's inquiry into the validity of the judgment is limited to the face of the commitment order.' Ineffective assistance, defective information, trial error and due-process claims are expressly NOT cognizable in habeas (Crockett, citing True v. Payne, 2021 Ark. 154; Mitchell v. State, 2018 Ark. 331). Crockett himself filed habeas in 2025 on a 1983 guilty plea and was rejected on scope, never on timeliness — the no-deadline rule in operation. Rule 37 side: 37.2(c)(ii) gives 60 days from the appellate mandate where a direct appeal was taken (90 days only for guilty pleas / unappealed convictions); (c)(iii) 60 days from dismissal of an appeal. Rule 37.2(b) is a partial exclusivity clause — 'All grounds for postconviction relief from a sentence imposed by a circuit court, including claims that a sentence is illegal or was illegally imposed, must be raised in a petition under this rule' — which narrows, but on the Supreme Court's own 2026 practice does not eliminate, the habeas route for facially void judgments and jurisdictional defects. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 37.5(e) — a death-sentenced person files 'within ninety (90) days after the entry of the order' appointing (or declining to appoint) postconviction counsel under 37.5(b)(2), not from the judgment or mandate. Separate trap for the comparison: Arkansas has a SECOND thing labeled habeas — Act 1780, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208, 'Writ of Habeas Corpus — New Scientific Evidence' (DNA/actual innocence). Despite the habeas label it carries its own timing rule, § 16-112-202(10): a rebuttable presumption of timeliness within 36 months of conviction and a rebuttable presumption AGAINST timeliness after 36 months, rebuttable on newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, new technology, incompetence, or good cause. That 36-month figure is not the general habeas deadline and must not be reported as one. Sources fetched and read: Rules of Criminal Procedure PDF from the Arkansas Judiciary court-rules database; Renshaw, Fields and Crockett opinion PDFs from opinions.arcourts.gov (official Arkansas Supreme Court publisher); statutory text from law.onecle.com Arkansas Code Title 16 (2016 replacement volume, the same 'Repl. 2016' the court cites in Fields). [View the habeas source](https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/supremecourt/en/277982/1/document.do) [View the post-conviction source](https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/cr/en/1879/1/document.do) | | California | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, slip op. pp. 1, 13 (Cal. Supreme Ct., No. S228137); statutory basis Cal. Penal Code § 1473(a) | No limit Motion to vacate a conviction or sentence, Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7 (available only to a person no longer in criminal custody); companion motion to vacate under § 1473.6. California has NO general post-conviction act analogous to Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61. · Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(b)(1), (c) | Detail **Habeas:** > Generally, under California law, there are no fixed, determinate deadlines. Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Except as provided in paragraph (2), a motion pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody. **On excusing a late filing:** There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard. CALIFORNIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly, not implied. Penal Code § 1473(a) preserves the writ ('A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), and habeas is the ordinary, primary route for collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence; it was never abolished or folded into a post-conviction act. The Supreme Court in Robinson v. Lewis confirmed at p. 13: 'There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard.' Timeliness is instead governed by an indeterminate doctrine, not a clock: a claim must be presented 'without substantial delay,' measured (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, read at static.case.law/cal-4th/18/cases/0770-01.json) 'from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.' Substantial delay is excused for good cause, or under three exceptions in noncapital cases (fundamentally unfair trial from constitutional error; actual innocence; conviction or sentence under an invalid statute). So there is no date on which a noncapital petition becomes time-barred — only a fact-specific diligence inquiry. Robinson also created one bright line in the petitioner's favor: a 'safe harbor' gap period between courts that will never count as substantial delay. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND DO HAVE A HARD DEADLINE. Penal Code § 1509 (added by Proposition 66, Nov. 8, 2016) makes habeas 'the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death,' and § 1509(c) provides: 'Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code' — i.e. 365 days from the order appointing counsel, not from finality. An untimely initial capital petition, or any successive one, is dismissed unless the court finds actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence (§ 1509(d)). Robinson expressly limits itself to noncapital procedure (fn. 1, citing Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808). The § 1473.7 motion is NOT a PCRA analogue and is not an alternative for a person in prison: by its terms it is open only to 'A person who is no longer in criminal custody,' and it carries no fixed period — § 1473.7(b)(1) deems it timely 'at any time' out of custody, subject only to a 'reasonable diligence' rule after immigration notice (§ 1473.7(b)(2)) and an 'without undue delay' rule for innocence and racial-bias claims (§ 1473.7(c)). The one genuine one-year figure outside the capital context is Penal Code § 1473.6(d), also limited to persons 'no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained': 'A motion pursuant to this section must be filed within one year of the later of' discovery of the government misconduct or the section's effective date. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: California's one-year figures (§ 1509 capital habeas, § 1473.6) are easy to mistake for a general habeas deadline. They are not. For a noncapital petitioner in custody challenging a conviction today, habeas under § 1473 is the operative vehicle and no filing deadline applies. Note also that the federal one-year AEDPA clock (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)) runs regardless — that federal limit, not state law, is the practical time pressure on California prisoners, and it is the reason the Ninth Circuit certified the question answered in Robinson. § 1473 was amended by Stats. 2025, ch. 784 (SB 734), effective January 1, 2026; the amendments expand grounds (including Racial Justice Act claims under § 745) and add no deadline. [View the habeas source](https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/07/20/robinson_v._lewis.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=1473.7.) | | Colorado | No limit habeas survives narrowly · C.R.S. § 13-45-103(2) (Habeas Corpus Act, §§ 13-45-101 to -119); construed in Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1994) and Gottorff v. Lengerich, 2026 CO 37 (June 1, 2026) | 3 years no excuse for a late filing Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction review (statutory counterpart, C.R.S. § 18-1-410) · C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1); Colo. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I); applied People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8 | Detail **Habeas:** > If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction **Post-conviction remedy:** > no person who has been convicted as an adult ... shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period ... All class 1 felonies: No limit ... All other felonies: Three years **On excusing a late filing:** no person who has been convicted as an adult ... shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period ... All other felonies: Three years HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. I read the entire Habeas Corpus Act, C.R.S. §§ 13-45-101 through 13-45-119 (2024 official CRS, Office of Legislative Legal Services printout): it contains no limitation period of any kind. The writ is not abolished and not formally subsumed — it remains a separate statutory civil action with its own parties (custodian only, not 'the People'), its own venue (any district court, petitioner's choice), and its own appellate route directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, § 13-4-102(1)(e) excluding habeas from court of appeals jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court decided a habeas appeal on the merits on June 1, 2026 (Gottorff, 2026 CO 37), citing § 13-45-101(1) as current law. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo. 1994): 'This is not to say, however, that Crim.P. 35(c) motions and habeas corpus petitions are interchangeable. Rather, each remedy has its own distinctive procedures.' WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': two independent narrowings. (1) Statutory — § 13-45-103(3): 'No court on the return of a habeas corpus shall inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment or decree of a court legally constituted, in any other manner.' Coupled with § 13-45-103(2), a prisoner held under process of a legally constituted court may be discharged only on jurisdictional/facially-void grounds. (2) Judicial exhaustion rule — Duran, 868 P.2d at 377: habeas 'is only an appropriate remedy to redress an unlawful restraint on one's liberty when no other form of relief is available.' CRITICAL INTERACTION — habeas cannot be used to evade the post-conviction deadline. A habeas petition raising claims cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) is converted by the court into a Rule 35(c) motion and transferred to the sentencing court (Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 1993); Duran, 868 P.2d at 378), whereupon § 16-5-402 applies. Johnson expressly warned, footnote: 'in the future, district courts must be cognizant of the applicability of section 16-5-402 to pro se habeas petitions.' Duran, footnote: 'Crim.P. 35(c) motions are collateral attacks on criminal convictions and are therefore subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 16-5-402. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).' So the no-deadline finding is real but confined to the residual core for which habeas properly lies — void judgment / entitlement to immediate release (Johnson: 'habeas corpus is appropriate to review whether a conviction is void'). Those claims are untimed under both routes anyway, because § 16-5-402(2)(a)-(b) exempts want of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction from the time bar. POST-CONVICTION TIERS (§ 16-5-402(1), verbatim table): class 1 felonies — No limit; all other felonies — Three years (1095 days, the figure reported above); misdemeanors — Eighteen months (~547 days); petty offenses — Six months (~182 days). CAPITAL/CLASS 1 DIFFERENCE: there is no deadline at all for class 1 felonies, so a person serving life for first-degree murder faces no post-conviction time bar (Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020; class 1 remains the top tier). The three years runs from when the conviction becomes final, i.e. issuance of the mandate on direct appeal (People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8, citing People v. Prendergast, 2024 COA 127, ¶ 28; People v. Parks, No. 25CA0519 (Colo. App. Feb. 26, 2026), ¶ 16). Statutory exceptions, § 16-5-402(2): lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; lack of personal jurisdiction; incompetence or mental-health commitment; and 'justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.' Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), as adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Rule Change 2008(18): 'Any motion filed outside of the time limits set forth in § 16-5-402, 6 C.R.S., shall allege facts which, if true, would establish one of the exceptions listed in § 16-5-402 (2), 6 C.R.S.' Currency of the rule text was confirmed against the Judicial Branch's own Form 4 (Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c), Appendix to Chapter 29), which reprints the same four-tier table. COMPARATIVE CAUTION for the Chief Justice's answer: Colorado has no one-year post-conviction clock. Its three-year felony period is materially longer than the one-year PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 deadlines in states that abolished habeas for conviction challenges, and unlike those states Colorado never repealed its habeas remedy — it narrowed it judicially and by § 13-45-103. Sources fetched and read: CRS 2024 Titles 13 and 16 (leg.colorado.gov); Rule Change 2008(18) and Form 4 (coloradojudicial.gov); Gottorff, 2026 CO 37 (coloradojudicial.gov); Duran v. Price and Johnson v. Gunter full text (static.case.law); Becker and Parks (storage.courtlistener.com). [View the habeas source](https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-13.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-16.pdf) | | Connecticut | 5 years ★ lateness raises a presumption the petitioner may rebut habeas still lies · Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(c) (habeas jurisdiction: § 52-466; deadline added by P.A. 12-115, eff. Oct. 1, 2012); quoted verbatim in Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction, AC48638 (Conn. App. Apr. 21, 2026) | 3 years Petition for a new trial (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-270), limitation at § 52-582(a) · Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-582(a), quoted as currently in force in Carter v. State, AC40914 (Conn. App. Nov. 5, 2019); still operative per Jones v. State, AC47824 (Conn. App. Feb. 17, 2026) | Detail **Habeas:** > there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment **Post-conviction remedy:** > No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment . . . except that a petition . . . based on DNA . . . or other newly discovered evidence . . . may be brought at any time **On excusing a late filing:** there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment Connecticut did NOT abolish or subsume habeas. Chapter 915 (§§ 52-466 to 52-470) is intact and habeas remains the general collateral vehicle for attacking a conviction, including ineffective-assistance claims; Conn. App. decisions in 2025-2026 adjudicate such petitions routinely. There is no PCRA-style exclusive post-conviction act. CRITICAL QUALIFIER ON THE 5-YEAR FIGURE: § 52-470(c)-(e) is NOT a statute of limitations and is not jurisdictional. It creates a REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION of delay without good cause. It bites only if the respondent requests relief: under (e) the court, 'upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause,' and dismisses only 'If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay.' Good cause expressly 'includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence.' A late petition is thus dismissible, not barred. Precise trigger: presumption arises after the LATER of (1) five years after the conviction became final on conclusion/expiration of appellate review, (2) October 1, 2017, or (3) two years after a new retroactive constitutional/statutory right was recognized. The Oct. 1, 2017 floor (which protected pre-2012 convictions) has now passed, so the 5-year period governs today. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS are shorter: § 52-470(d) presumes delay two years (730 days) after final judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, or Oct. 1, 2014, whichever is later; withdrawal of a prior petition is not a 'judgment.' Under both (c) and (d), time is NOT tolled during the pendency of another petition challenging the same conviction. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE AT ALL for three categories: § 52-470(f) provides that subsections (b) through (e) 'shall not apply to (1) a claim asserting actual innocence, (2) a petition filed to challenge the conditions of confinement, or (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed.' An actual-innocence habeas claim therefore faces no filing deadline whatsoever. (The practical scope of the capital carve-out was not verified here.) Before P.A. 12-115 (effective Oct. 1, 2012, applicable to petitions filed on or after that date) Connecticut habeas had no deadline of any kind. Appeal from a habeas judgment requires certification petitioned within ten days, § 52-470(g). ON THE POST-CONVICTION COLUMN: the petition for a new trial is not a general post-conviction act — it is ground-specific (newly discovered evidence, mispleading, want of notice, or 'other reasonable cause' construed as fraud, accident or mistake). Its three-year clock runs from rendition of judgment, but criminal petitions resting on DNA or other newly discovered evidence unavailable at trial may be filed AT ANY TIME, so the 1095-day figure binds only ordinary grounds. Also uncapped: Practice Book § 43-22 lets 'The judicial authority . . . at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition' — no deadline, but confined to sentence illegality, verified at https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf. SOURCING CAVEAT: law.onecle.com carries the 2016 revision. It is accurate for § 52-470 (verbatim-matched against the 2026 Hobby opinion's quotation of subsection (c), so no amendment since), but STALE for § 52-582, which has since been subdivided and broadened beyond DNA to 'other newly discovered evidence' — the current text was therefore taken from the Appellate Court's quotation in Carter, not from onecle. cga.ct.gov was unreachable from this host throughout. [View the habeas source](https://law.onecle.com/connecticut/title-52/52-470.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP194/194AP12.pdf) | | Delaware | No limit habeas survives narrowly · 10 Del. C. §§ 6901–6918 (Chapter 69, Habeas Corpus); construed by Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954) and Holloman v. State, No. 372, 2022 (Del. Feb. 6, 2023) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 — Postconviction remedy · Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Superior Court of Delaware, 2026 Edition; Rule 61 last amended Dec. 15, 2023, eff. Jan. 1, 2024) | Detail **Habeas:** > Every person imprisoned or restrained of liberty ... shall have remedy by the writ of habeas corpus, and may obtain relief, except: (1) Persons committed or detained on a charge of treason or felony, the species whereof is plainly and fully set forth in the commitment **Post-conviction remedy:** > A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized ... more than one year after the right is first recognized **On excusing a late filing:** A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final NO DEADLINE ON HABEAS — EXPLICIT FINDING. I read all of 10 Del. C. ch. 69 (§§ 6901-6918). It contains no filing deadline of any kind for a habeas petitioner; the only time figures in the chapter run against the custodian (§ 6907: produce the body 'within 3 days'; § 6914: deliver a copy of the warrant within 6 hours). Delaware habeas is not abolished and not fully subsumed — the Superior Court still entertains and decides petitions from convicted prisoners on the merits — but it is NARROW. Del. Supreme Court, Holloman v. State (Feb. 6, 2023): 'Under Delaware law, the writ of habeas corpus provides relief on a very limited basis. Habeas corpus only "provides an opportunity for one illegally confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the commitment." Where the commitment is regular on its face and the court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter, habeas corpus does not afford a remedy' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=343610). The controlling rule is Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954), quoted verbatim in Chambers v. Emig, C.A. No. N25M-04-068 (Del. Super. Apr. 14, 2025): 'After a judgment of conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction and a subsequent commitment pursuant thereto, a prisoner may not obtain his discharge by a writ of habeas corpus no matter how illegal or erroneous the judgment of conviction might have been, if the judgment of the court is legal on its face' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=378190). Chambers also illustrates the absence of a habeas deadline in practice: a petition filed in 2025 attacking a Jan. 2007 sentence — roughly 18 years out — was reached and denied for facial regularity, with no timeliness bar invoked. TWO INDEPENDENT NARROWING SOURCES: (a) the statutory carve-out, 10 Del. C. § 6902(1), quoted above, which by its terms excludes felony commitments regular on their face; and (b) Rule 61(a)(2) 'Exclusiveness of remedy. The remedy afforded by this rule may not be sought by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or in any manner other than as provided herein.' So the merits of a conviction go to Rule 61 and its 1-year clock; habeas reaches only jurisdiction and facial validity of the commitment, without a clock. Practical effect: the timeless remedy is also the one that almost never yields relief. RULE 61 DETAIL. Deadline is stated in years, not days; 365 is my conversion of 'one year' and Delaware fixes no day-count. Finality trigger, Rule 61(m)(1): 30 days after sentencing if no direct appeal; otherwise the Supreme Court's mandate on direct review, or the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate if certiorari is sought. Rule 61(b)(4): a motion 'may not be filed until the judgment of conviction is final,' so the window opens at finality. EXCEPTIONS: Rule 61(i)(5) — the time bar, the successive bar, procedural default and former adjudication 'shall not apply either to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d)' — i.e. new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence, or a new retroactive rule of constitutional law. Those two gateways are also the only escape from Rule 61(d)(2), under which second or subsequent motions 'shall be summarily dismissed,' and the innocence gateway is available only to movants convicted after trial, not by plea. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 61(l) displaces the one-year clock for a defendant seeking to set aside a death sentence — one postconviction proceeding as of right, with the motion due 'within 60 days of the date of the scheduling order' entered after direct review concludes, submitted for decision within 270 days, extendable by up to 60 days for compelling cause; failure to comply can bar or dismiss the motion with prejudice. Delaware has had no valid death penalty statute since Rauf v. State (2016) and Powell (2016), so § 61(l) is largely dormant, but I did not verify that point from a primary source and flag it as outside this finding. [View the habeas source](https://delcode.delaware.gov/title10/c069/index.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=304498) | | Florida | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(o); Fla. Stat. ch. 79 | 2 years no excuse for a late filing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 — Motion to Vacate; Set Aside; or Correct Sentence · Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, July 13, 2026, p. 340) | Detail **Habeas:** > The remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final **On excusing a late filing:** No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final The writ itself carries NO deadline and cannot be abolished — Fla. Const. art. I, s. 13: 'The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost'; Fla. Stat. s. 79.01 directs the court to 'grant the writ forthwith,' and ch. 79 (read in full) contains no limitations period. Fla. Stat. s. 79.071 still expressly contemplates habeas attacking 'the validity of any statute, criminal law proceeding or conviction.' BUT that no-deadline writ is NOT an escape hatch from the 2-year clock, which is the trap in this comparison. Rule 3.850(o) provides: 'An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule must not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court that sentenced the applicant or that the court has denied the applicant relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the applicant's detention.' Baker (Fla. 2004) closed the loophole explicitly, announcing the Florida Supreme Court would 'dismiss as unauthorized, habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants that seek the kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850' (also barring claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, and successive claims). Baker quotes State v. Bolyea that rule 3.850 'is a procedural vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus' — i.e. classic subsumption, not a parallel track. Classified 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow' because the residue is defined by inadequacy of the 3.850 remedy, not by claim type: jurisdictional claims are themselves cognizable under 3.850(a)(2)-(3), so Florida is not a state where habeas survives as the jurisdictional-claim vehicle. Baker cited the provision as 3.850(h); it is renumbered (o) in the current rule with materially identical text, which I confirmed against the July 13, 2026 rules. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 730 DAYS, all in 3.850(b): a motion to vacate a sentence exceeding the legal maximum may be filed at any time (see also Rule 3.800(a)); plus 2-year-from-discovery windows for newly discovered facts, newly announced retroactive constitutional rights, and neglect by retained counsel who failed to file. CAPITAL CASES DIFFER IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: death-sentenced defendants proceed under Rule 3.851, not 3.850, and get only 1 year — 3.851(d)(1): 'Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final' (365 days); but habeas remains a live, authorized remedy for them in the Florida Supreme Court, subject to a filing trigger rather than a period — 3.851(d)(3): 'All petitions for extraordinary relief in which the Supreme Court of Florida has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writs of habeas corpus, must be filed simultaneously with the initial brief filed on behalf of the death-sentenced defendant in the appeal of the circuit court's order on the initial motion for postconviction relief filed under this rule.' Separately, ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel — historically raised by habeas petition in the appellate court, per the Rule 9.140 committee note ('The former was previously applied for by a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court') — is now governed by Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5), which sets 2 years from finality on direct review, extendable only on a sworn showing that counsel affirmatively misled the petitioner about the appeal's result, and 'In no case may a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than 4 years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review.' Belated appeals go under 9.141(c). Bottom line for the legislator's comparison: Florida should be scored as a 2-year state, and it belongs in the column of states where a facially unlimited habeas remedy has been rendered unavailable for conviction challenges by an exclusive post-conviction rule — not in the column of states where habeas genuinely lies without a deadline. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/so2d/878/cases/1236-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2026/07/2026_01-JUL-Criminal-Procedure-Rules-7-13-2026-1.pdf) | | Georgia | 4 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c), quoted verbatim in Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 357-358 (840 S.E.2d 407) (2020) | No limit Extraordinary motion for new trial, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41 (Georgia has NO PCRA-style post-conviction act; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq., is itself the post-conviction remedy) · O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41(a)-(b), quoted in Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878, 880-881 (834 S.E.2d 65) (2019) | Detail **Habeas:** > Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor ... or within four years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed **Post-conviction remedy:** > Except for the requirement in OCGA § 5-5-41 (a) that the moving party show a "good reason" for not seeking a new trial within 30 days of the judgment, the requirements for extraordinary motions for new trial are not specified by statute **On excusing a late filing:** An untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling' INSTRUMENT CHECK — Georgia is the inverse of the PCRA pattern. It never abolished or subsumed habeas; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 (O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq.) IS Georgia's post-conviction act, and the limitation period was added directly onto the writ by Ga. L. 2004, p. 917, § 1. So the four-year figure is a true HABEAS deadline and is directly comparable to other states' habeas deadlines, not to a PCRA one. CAPITAL CASES HAVE NO DEADLINE: § 9-14-42(c) expressly excepts a petition 'challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death,' so death-sentenced petitioners face no filing period at all. DEADLINE TIERS: felony 4 years; misdemeanor 1 year; misdemeanor TRAFFIC 180 days under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33, and that one is jurisdictional ('Failure to file the challenge within the time prescribed in this Code section shall divest the court of jurisdiction'). DAYS FIGURE IS MY ARITHMETIC — the statute says 'four years,' not a day count; 1461 = four calendar years including one leap day. ACCRUAL: § 9-14-42(c)(1)-(4) gives four alternative start dates (finality, removal of state-created impediment, newly recognized retroactive right, discovery of facts by due diligence), so it functions like a discovery rule, not a flat run from finality. NO TOLLING: Stubbs v. Hall holds an untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling' and declined to adopt equitable tolling; there is also no remedy for a sentencing court's failure to give the § 9-14-42(d) advisement. But Phagan v. State, 287 Ga. 856 (2010), holds § 9-14-42(c) is not a statute of repose, so civil renewal after dismissal is available. SEPARATE LACHES BAR: § 9-14-48(e) permits dismissal on a particularized showing of prejudice from delay, but applies only to convictions had before July 1, 2004, and not to death cases. THE EMNT IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: Mitchum holds an extraordinary motion for new trial 'was not the proper vehicle' and that constitutional claims 'could be pursued only through habeas corpus'; § 5-5-41 carries no fixed filing deadline (only a 'good reason' showing for delay past 30 days) and only one such motion is allowed, but it reaches newly discovered evidence and other non-constitutional grounds, not constitutional deprivation. Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), then abolished the trial-court motion for out-of-time appeal, pushing still more claims into habeas as 'the exclusive post-appeal procedure.' PRACTICAL UPSHOT FOR THE COMPARISON: a non-capital Georgia felony petitioner gets four years — longer than the one-year PCRA-type deadlines in Pennsylvania, Alabama and Delaware, and longer than the federal one-year AEDPA period — but unlike states that keep an untimed habeas beside a short post-conviction motion, Georgia has no untimed fallback for constitutional claims. ⚠ CURRENCY CAVEAT (added 2026-07-30): the Cook v. State point above is NO LONGER a complete statement of Georgia law. HB 176, signed 2025-05-14, enacted O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39.1 specifically to undo Cook — it restores a statutory out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 100 days of the missed deadline (state consent, excusable neglect, ineffective assistance, or other good cause), and § 5-6-39.1(a)(3) gives an indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel to seek it. Confirmed verbatim in Owenby v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2026-05-22) and applied in Barrionuevo v. State (2026-05-27). The separate § 5-6-39.1(b) window for defendants whose motions were DISMISSED under Cook ran only until June 30, 2026 and has now closed. NOTE FOR THE COUNSEL COLUMN: Georgia now guarantees counsel for this STATUTORY route while Gibson v. Turpin (4-3) still denies it for the WRIT — same state, opposite answers depending on the instrument. [View the habeas source](https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/s19a1253.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/s19a0554.pdf) | | Hawaii | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a) (eff. 01/01/2026) | No limit no filing period HRPP Rule 40 post-conviction proceeding (Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Form A) · Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a)(1) | Detail **Habeas:** > The post-conviction proceeding established by this rule shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis **Post-conviction remedy:** > At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction **On excusing a late filing:** At any time but not prior to final judgment HAWAII HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. HRPP Rule 40 is the operative vehicle and it expressly absorbs habeas corpus for conviction/sentence challenges ('shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis'), while imposing no limitations period at all — the text reads 'At any time but not prior to final judgment.' I read Rule 40(a)-(i) in full; there is no time bar anywhere in it. The independent habeas statute, HRS ch. 660, also survives and likewise contains no limitations period: I read §660-3 ('The supreme court, the justices thereof, and the circuit courts may issue writs of habeas corpus in cases in which persons are unlawfully restrained of their liberty...') and §660-5 (complaint contents) verbatim at law.onecle.com/hawaii/title-36/660-3.html and /660-5.html, and reviewed the full §§660-1 through 660-33 section list — no section imposes a deadline. Ch. 660 habeas remains live for restraint NOT based on a judgment of conviction (Martinez v. Kawamura, Haw. 2023, notes such petitions 'are governed by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 660'); for conviction challenges it is folded into Rule 40 (Turner v. Hawai'i Paroling Authority: relief sought 'under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40, which incorporates inter alia remedies afforded' by habeas) — case snippets via CourtListener API search, full opinion texts not retrieved (CourtListener opinion endpoint returned 401/202), so the two cases are corroborative only; the classification rests on the rule text itself. WHAT ACTUALLY BARS A HAWAII PETITIONER IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME: Rule 40(a)(3) denies relief 'where the issues sought to be raised have been previously ruled upon or were waived,' with a rebuttable presumption that failure to appeal or raise an issue was knowing — except claims of illegal sentence, which cannot be waived. Two routing rules to note: Rule 35(a) provides 'A motion made by a defendant to correct an illegal sentence more than 90 days after the sentence is imposed shall be made pursuant to Rule 40' — the 90 days is a routing line between rules, NOT an outer deadline, since Rule 40 itself is open-ended; and Rule 40(c)(2) requires a nonconforming petition alleging illegality of judgment or custody to be 'accepted for filing and ... treated as a petition under this rule,' so a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction is converted rather than dismissed. No capital-case variation exists: Hawaii has no death penalty. Rule 32(d) also channels post-sentence plea withdrawal into Rule 40 ('only by petition pursuant to Rule 40'), subject to a manifest-injustice standard. Caution for the comparison the legislator is drawing: Hawaii belongs in the 'no deadline' column, and the contrast with one-year states (PCRA, Ala. R. 32.2(c), Del. R. 61(i)(1)) is a contrast in KIND, not degree. [View the habeas source](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Idaho Code § 19-4203(4) (Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation Procedures Act, I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42); accord I.C. § 19-4901(b); Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) application, Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 to 19-4911 · Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) | Detail **Habeas:** > Habeas corpus shall not be used as a substitute for, or in addition to, a direct appeal of a criminal conviction or proceedings under Idaho criminal rule 35 or the uniform post-conviction procedures act, chapter 49, title 19, Idaho Code **Post-conviction remedy:** > An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. **On excusing a late filing:** An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. IMPORTANT — do NOT read Idaho as a no-deadline habeas state. Idaho's habeas act (I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42) genuinely contains NO filing deadline: I read the entire chapter PDF (legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH42.pdf) and the only limitations language anywhere in it is the cross-reference in § 19-4203(4) to the UPCPA's period; the sole 30-day figure is the respondent's response deadline in § 19-4209. But that open-ended habeas does not reach convictions. Idaho habeas survives as a real, live remedy for a closed list of NON-conviction claims only — § 19-4203(2) permits an in-state prisoner to raise (a) conditions of confinement, (b) parole revocation, (c) miscalculation of sentence, (d) loss of good time credits, (e) a detainer; § 19-4203(3) limits out-of-state prisoners to conditions of confinement alone and expressly bars 'any issue concerning the legality of his out-of-state conviction or sentence.' For the validity of a conviction or sentence, the UPCPA is exclusive: § 19-4901(b) — 'Except as otherwise provided in this act, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' Confirmed by controlling case law read in full: Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997) (static.case.law/idaho/130/cases/0861-01.json) — 'The UPCPA comprehends and replaces all other common law, statutory or other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus, that were previously available to collaterally challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. ... A writ of habeas corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement.' Eubank also rejected the argument that the one-year UPCPA bar unconstitutionally suspends habeas under Idaho Const. art. I, § 5, holding 'there has been no constitutional violation of Eubank's right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Idaho Constitution, art. I, § 5.' So the practical answer to the legislator's question for a non-capital Idaho prisoner is ONE YEAR, running from expiration of the time for appeal / determination of the appeal, whichever is later — not from finality of conviction, and not tolled by a discovery rule on the face of the statute. CAPITAL CASES ARE FAR SHORTER — 42 days. I.C. § 19-2719(3) requires the defendant to file 'any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known' within 42 days of the judgment imposing death, and § 19-2719(4) sweeps habeas into that same window: 'Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time limitations of subsection (3) of this section.' Section 19-2719(5) makes untimely claims waived and strips the courts of power to hear them. ONE EXCEPTION TO THE ONE-YEAR RULE: § 19-4902(b) permits a fingerprint/forensic DNA testing petition 'at any time' where the technology was unavailable at trial (available even to defendants who pleaded guilty, § 19-4902(d)); § 19-2719(4) makes that DNA route applicable in capital cases too. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (illegal sentence) is a further separate route preserved by § 19-4203(4); I did not read ICR 35 itself, so its timing is unverified here and no figure above rests on it. § 19-4224 provides that ch. 42 'sets forth the exclusive procedures and remedies in habeas corpus actions.' Idaho case law also permits a court to treat a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction as a UPCPA application, which subjects it to the § 19-4902 one-year bar rather than reviving an untimed remedy. [View the habeas source](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH42/SECT19-4203/) [View the post-conviction source](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH49/SECT19-4902/) | | Illinois | No limit habeas survives narrowly · Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008), construing the Habeas Corpus Act, 735 ILCS 5/10-101 to 10-137 (esp. 10-124) | 6 months no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. · 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) | Detail **Habeas:** > an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction ... or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release **Post-conviction remedy:** > No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. **On excusing a late filing:** No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Illinois never abolished or subsumed state habeas: Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-101 through 10-137) is intact and was amended as recently as P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24 (10-103). I read all 37 sections at the ILGA text (https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ILCS/details?ActName=Code+of+Civil+Procedure.&ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&ChapAct=735+ILCS+5%2F&SeqStart=75500000&SeqEnd=79300000). No section imposes any limitations period on filing; the only time figures in the entire article are unrelated procedural ones — a 6-hour deadline for a custodian to furnish a copy of the commitment (10-105) and a 15-day removal rule (10-130). 10-102 is unconditioned as to time: 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty ... may apply for habeas corpus.' BUT THE PRICE OF THAT OPEN WINDOW IS SCOPE. 735 ILCS 5/10-124 permits discharge 'only' on seven enumerated causes, the operative ones being that 'the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction' or that 'by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged.' 10-124(7) adds: 'No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.' 10-123(2) separately bars discharge of anyone held 'By virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court ... unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired.' Beacham drives the point home on the very next line after the quoted passage: 'A complaint for order of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of these defects, even though the alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights.' So a person raising ineffective assistance, Brady, or any ordinary trial-error claim cannot use habeas at all, no matter how timely. Beacham cites the 1996 West version of 10-124; I confirmed the current ILGA text of 10-124 is word-for-word identical (still sourced to P.A. 82-280). OPERATIVE VEHICLE IS THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT, and its clock is the answer to the legislator's question. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) sets three alternative outer limits: 6 months after conclusion of U.S. Supreme Court proceedings; if no cert petition is filed, 6 months from the date for filing one; and if the defendant took no direct appeal at all, 'no later than 3 years from the date of conviction' (1,095 days). I coded pc_deadline_days as 180 for the governing 6-month period; the statute says 'months,' not days, so 180 is a conversion, and the 3-year figure is the correct one for the no-direct-appeal subset. Every one of the three is excused where 'the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence' — a real and frequently litigated escape hatch, so the Illinois deadline is materially softer than a flat one-year bar. Two further carve-outs: (c) provides 'This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence,' and 122-1(f) allows only one petition without leave of court, successive petitions requiring cause and prejudice. CAPITAL: none — Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011, and in the current text 122-1(a)(2) (capital actual-innocence), (a)(3), and (e) all read '(blank).' Note a live drafting artifact: subsection (a-5) still says 'A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the person's conviction,' but (a)(2) is now blank, leaving that cross-reference dangling; the actual-innocence exception survives through the standalone sentence in (c). THIRD ROUTE, for completeness: 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (petition for relief from judgment), whose subsection (c) requires that 'the petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment' (730 days), tolled for legal disability, and which is the usual vehicle for void-judgment attacks that habeas will not reach. COMPARISON CAUTION: an Illinois answer of '6 months' and a Pennsylvania answer of '1 year' are commensurable — both are purpose-built post-conviction acts. Neither is a habeas figure. Illinois habeas itself is untimed and would be miscounted as either '0' or 'unlimited' by any table that does not separate the two instruments. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/ill-2d/231/cases/0051-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ILCS/details?MajorTopic=&Chapter=&ActName=Code+of+Criminal+Procedure+of+1963.&ActID=1966&ChapterID=54&ChapAct=725+ILCS+5%2F&SeqStart=38400000&SeqEnd=39499999) | | Indiana | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(b) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026); see also §1(c); Ind. Code § 34-25.5 (habeas chapter, no limitations period) | No limit no filing period Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1 · Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(a) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026) | Detail **Habeas:** > Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. **On excusing a late filing:** Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. NO DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT — Indiana is a no-time-limit state on both tracks. (1) HABEAS: the writ is expressly NOT suspended, but is mechanically converted when used to attack a conviction. PC Rule 1 §1(c): 'This Rule does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but if a person applies for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the person is incarcerated and challenges the validity of his conviction or sentence, that court shall transfer the cause to the court in which the conviction took place, and the latter court shall treat it as a petition for relief under this Rule.' Hence 'subsumed,' not 'abolished': habeas survives intact for a claim of entitlement to immediate release that does NOT attack the conviction's validity. Controlling case law, Manley v. Butts, 71 N.E.3d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (published), quoting Partlow v. Superintendent, 756 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) and Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 374 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1978): 'One is entitled to habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from unlawful custody' and '[a] petitioner may not file a writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/03/10/james_e._manley_v._keith_butts.pdf) Statutory narrowing to the same effect: Ind. Code § 34-25.5-5-1(a)(2) — the habeas court 'shall not inquire into the legality of any judgment or process by which the party is in custody … Upon any process issued on a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction' (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-5-1.html). (2) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I fetched and read all 24 sections of the habeas chapter, Ind. Code §§ 34-25.5-1-1 through 34-25.5-7-1; the chapter contains no limitations period, no filing deadline, and no laches provision. The sole occurrence of 'within' is geographic (§ 34-25.5-3-3, judges 'issue writs of habeas corpus within their respective counties'). Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 grants the writ to 'Every person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever,' with no temporal condition (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-1-1.html). Currency caveat: the onecle text is a 2006 snapshot of a chapter added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.21 with no amendment notations; text confirmed unchanged by the Indiana Court of Appeals quoting § 34-25.5-1-1 verbatim in 2017 (Manley) and 2020 (Willet v. State, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/07/31/shawn_g._willet_v._state_of_indiana.pdf). (3) NO PCR DEADLINE: 'at any time' in PC Rule 1 §1(a) is the current operative text — the most recent amendment (Order Amending Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies, Cause No. 26S-MS-8, filed Jan. 20, 2026, eff. Feb. 2, 2026, https://secure.in.gov/courts/files/order-rules-2026-0120-pcr.pdf) altered only §§ 2 and 9, on indigent-counsel referral, and touched nothing time-related. (4) THE REAL TIME CONSTRAINT IS LACHES, NOT A DEADLINE. Indiana bars stale petitions only through an equitable affirmative defense the State must plead and prove. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677 (Ind. 2017): 'For laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and, second, that the State has been prejudiced by the delay.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/05/05/trondo_l._humphrey_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) This is a fact-specific, State-borne burden, not a period that runs against the petitioner — the correct comparison point against a PCRA-style one-year bar. (5) OTHER LIMITS THAT ARE NOT DEADLINES: successive petitions require advance authorization from the Indiana Supreme Court or Court of Appeals on a showing of 'a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief' (PC Rule 1 §12); claims not raised in the original petition are waived (PC Rule 1 §8). Neither is a clock. (6) CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: death-sentenced cases carry a scheduling regime absent from non-capital cases. Ind. Crim. Rule 6.1(H) (formerly Crim. R. 24; renumbered eff. Jan. 1, 2024): 'Within thirty days following completion of rehearing,' counsel must enter an appearance, advise the trial court of intent to petition for post-conviction relief, and request extension of the stay; the Supreme Court then 'will direct the trial court to submit a case management schedule consistent with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) for approval' (https://rules.incourts.gov/pdf/PDF%20-%20Criminal/criminal.pdf). That 30 days is a deadline for counsel's appearance and notice of intent, not for the petition itself; the petition's due date is set by court order. I did not read Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) directly — the content of that scheduling statute is unverified here. (7) SCOPE NOTE: PC Rule 2 (belated notice of appeal) is a distinct vehicle for restoring a direct appeal and was not examined; PC Rule 1 §1(d) folds Ind. Code § 35-38-7-5 DNA-testing petitions into Rule 1. [View the habeas source](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) [View the post-conviction source](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Iowa Code § 822.1 (2026); construed in State v. Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d 122, 127-28 (Iowa 2015); Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1974) | 3 years no excuse for a late filing Application for postconviction relief, Iowa Code ch. 822 (Iowa's enactment of the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, formerly ch. 663A) · Iowa Code § 822.3 (2026) | Detail **Habeas:** > The provisions of sections 663.1 through 663.44, inclusive, shall not apply to persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense. **Post-conviction remedy:** > All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. **On excusing a late filing:** All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. Iowa's habeas chapter (ch. 663) is still on the books and contains NO limitation period — I read all 44 sections and none imposes one — but that fact confers nothing on a convicted person, because § 822.1 switches the entire chapter off for them. Do not score Iowa as an untimed-habeas state. The Iowa Supreme Court: 'pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.1, the legislature foreclosed habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense' (Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 127, citing 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1276, § 1). Exclusivity is also stated affirmatively in § 822.2(2): the ch. 822 remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies formerly available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' § 822.2(1)(g) sweeps in any ground 'formerly available under any common law, statutory or other writ.' So the operative period is the three years in § 822.3, not a habeas period. Exceptions and edges: (1) § 822.3 carries a broad statutory escape — 'this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period' — with DNA results under § 81.10 expressly a qualifying ground of fact; the same sentence bars using ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel to toll or relate back (2019 amendment). (2) A different, much shorter 90-day deadline runs from a final disciplinary decision for good-time-forfeiture claims under § 822.2(1)(f), filed in the county of confinement — not a conviction challenge, but easy to conflate. (3) Ch. 663 habeas remains live for people OUTSIDE § 822.1's phrase 'convicted of, or sentenced for.' Hernandez-Galarza holds a deferred judgment is not a conviction, so such a person falls between the two chapters and ch. 663 'might be available' — though the court denied relief there for failure to meet § 663.1's mandatory pleading requirements and absence of any State restraint. Habeas also still lies in Iowa for non-conviction matters (extradition, pretrial detention, child custody). (4) I did not find, and do not assert, any Iowa holding on whether a residual constitutional writ survives § 822.1 for purely jurisdictional claims; Iowa Const. art. I, § 13 protects the writ but qualifies it — 'refused when application is made as required by law' — and Hernandez-Galarza treated the 1970 Act as a valid legislative limitation without reaching a suspension-clause challenge. Treat that narrow question as unverified. (5) No capital variation: Iowa has no death penalty. Ch. 663 text read at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/663.pdf; case text at https://static.case.law/nw2d/864/html/0122-01.html. [View the habeas source](https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/822.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/822.pdf) | | Kansas | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · K.S.A. 60-1507(e) ('Exclusiveness of remedy'); K.S.A. 60-1501(a)-(c); Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202, 708 P.2d 977 (1985) | 1 year no filing period K.S.A. 60-1507 motion attacking sentence (Kansas analogue of 28 U.S.C. § 2255) · K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)-(2) | Detail **Habeas:** > An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced said applicant ... unless ... the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective ... **Post-conviction remedy:** > Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (A) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction **On excusing a late filing:** the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit INSTRUMENT TRAP. The one-year figure is NOT a habeas deadline. K.S.A. 60-1507 is physically located inside Chapter 60, Article 15 — the habeas corpus article (60-1501 through 60-1507, verified from the article index at kslegislature.gov) — and Kansas bar literature calls it habeas ('Habeas Corpus in Kansas: The Great Writ Affords Postconviction Relief at K.S.A. 60-1507,' 67 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 16 (1998), listed in the revisor's annotations). But 60-1507 is captioned 'Prisoner in custody under sentence; motion attacking sentence' and is a motion filed in the sentencing court, modeled on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, complete with a § 2255(e)-style savings clause. The writ itself is 60-1501 to 60-1506. HABEAS DEADLINE: the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit — 'any person in this state who is detained, confined or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus.' The only deadlines in the habeas statute are in (b) and (c), each 30 days, and each is confined to a specific population and prefaced by an express carve-out: '(b) Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507 ... an inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections shall file a petition for writ pursuant to subsection (a) within 30 days from the date the action was final, but such time is extended during the pendency of the inmate's timely attempts to exhaust such inmate's administrative remedies'; (c) is the parallel rule for patients of the secretary for aging and disability services. That 30-day clock runs from 'the date the action was final' — the challenged administrative action — which is why 60-1501's case annotations are almost entirely prison discipline, segregation, good-time, and parole (Murphy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589 (1996), read: administrative segregation). It is not a conviction-challenge clock, and by its own terms it does not apply where 60-1507 governs. So where habeas does still reach a conviction in Kansas, there is NO filing deadline. WHERE IT STILL REACHES A CONVICTION: two routes. (1) The savings clause quoted above — habeas lies if the 60-1507 remedy 'is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of said applicant's detention.' (2) Where 60-1507 does not apply at all. The Kansas Supreme Court entertained a 60-1501 writ attacking a municipal-court conviction on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel grounds in Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202 (1985), holding: 'K.S.A. 60-1507 was not available to petitioner since it may be used only by a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction. A municipal court is not a court of general jurisdiction.' No time bar was applied, and the court rejected the argument that failure to take a direct appeal barred the writ: 'It is generally held if the constitutional rights of the accused are at issue, habeas corpus is available as a remedy under certain circumstances even though no direct appeal was taken' (fetched from static.case.law/kan/238/cases/0202-01.json). Note this residual habeas is limited by FORUM and ADEQUACY, not by claim type — it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims, which is why the status here is 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow.' OPERATIVE FOR AN ORDINARY FELONY CONVICTION: 60-1507, one year. 60-1501(a) opens 'Subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507,' and 60-1507(e) is captioned 'Exclusiveness of remedy.' A person in Kansas Department of Corrections custody under a district-court sentence must use 60-1507. TRIGGERS AND EXTENSION: the year runs from the later of (A) the final direct-appeal order or termination of appellate jurisdiction, (B) denial of certiorari or the Supreme Court's final order after granting it, or (C) the decision on a prior 60-1507 motion. It 'may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice,' and since the 2016 amendment (L. 2016, ch. 58, § 2) that inquiry is statutorily narrowed: 'the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence,' with actual innocence requiring a showing that 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.' Untimely motions must be dismissed sua sponte under (f)(3). CUSTODY REQUIREMENT: 60-1507 reaches only 'a prisoner in custody under sentence,' so it is unavailable to someone who has fully discharged the sentence; whether habeas or another vehicle fills that gap is unverified here. CAPITAL: the statutory text draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the one-year rule applies uniformly. NO-DEADLINE NEIGHBOR: K.S.A. 22-3504(a) (verified at ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch22/022_035_0004.html) provides 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time while the defendant is serving such sentence,' with no deadline, and the revisor's annotations record that the one-year limit 'does not procedurally bar the bringing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence' (State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380 (2007)). But 22-3504 reaches only sentences — defined in (c)(1) as imposed without jurisdiction, not conforming to the applicable statutory provision, or ambiguous as to time and manner — never the conviction itself, and expressly not sentences rendered erroneous by a later change in the law. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a modern published Kansas decision construing the scope of the 60-1507(e) savings clause; CourtListener's Kansas full-text coverage is thin and returned no on-point hits. I also could not fetch Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183 (kscourts.gov returned 403) or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights habeas suspension clause, so neither is relied on above. [View the habeas source](https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html) | | Kentucky | No limit habeas survives narrowly · KRS 419.020 (habeas statute), construed in Brumley v. Seabold, 885 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. App. 1994); scope set by Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994) | 3 years no excuse for a late filing RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence · Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10), quoted verbatim in Bush v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 621 (Ky. App. 2007) | Detail **Habeas:** > KRS 419.020 fails to address any time constraints with regard to a petitioner's right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, the phrase "on any day at any time" would seem to indicate that there are no time constraints **Post-conviction remedy:** > Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant **On excusing a late filing:** Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant HABEAS IS NOT ABOLISHED AND CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE. Ky. Const. sec. 16 preserves the writ; KRS ch. 419 implements it. I read every section of KRS 419.020-.130 (apps.legislature.ky.gov, chapter id=39274, updated 07/30/2026): none imposes any period for FILING a petition. The only period in the chapter is KRS 419.130(1) -- thirty (30) days to APPEAL a habeas judgment -- which is not a filing limit. KRS 419.020 makes the writ issuable 'on any day at any time.' BUT habeas is narrow as a route to attack a conviction. Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994) (Ky. Supreme Court, controlling): 'we recognize as the general rule that the RCr 11.42 procedure is adequate for a collateral attack by a prisoner in custody under a judgment which he believes to be defective for one reason or another. But we recognize as an exception that the prompt relief available by writ of habeas corpus remains for a prisoner who can establish in a summary procedure that the judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio.' Marcum calls that exception 'narrowly circumscribed' and says petitions beyond its scope 'will be disposed of summarily.' Earlier: Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964) -- 'There being no showing that the remedy by motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 is inadequate to test the legality of appellant's detention, his petition was properly dismissed' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/377/cases/0154-01.json). Second narrowing: the petitioner must seek IMMEDIATE RELEASE. Graham v. O'Dea, 876 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. App. 1994): 'The statute applies only to individuals who can demonstrate that they are entitled to release from custody' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/876/cases/0621-01.json); accord Fryrear v. Parker, 920 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1996) (Ky. Supreme Court) (https://static.case.law/sw2d/920/cases/0519-01.json). So habeas is 'narrow,' not 'subsumed': RCr 11.42 has not been made the exclusive remedy -- Marcum expressly holds a court rule 'cannot supplant the right to a writ of habeas corpus, a fundamental right guaranteed by Sec. 16 of our Kentucky Constitution.' IMPORTANT CAVEAT ON 'NO DEADLINE': there is no statutory limitations period, but LACHES can bar a stale habeas petition. Brumley v. Seabold (the same case quoted above) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition filed nine years after the challenged proceeding, holding 'the prisoner cannot be allowed to sit on a claim of right while the evidence available to the Commonwealth to support the action taken disintegrates.' That is an equitable, fact-specific bar, not a fixed period. RCr 11.42 DETAIL: three years runs from finality of the judgment (final appellate judgment, or trial-court judgment if no direct appeal -- Palmer v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Ky. App. 1999), quoted in Bush). Two statutory exceptions, quoted in Bush: (a) facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; (b) a fundamental constitutional right not established within the period and held retroactive. RCr 11.42(1) requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence' or on probation, parole or conditional discharge. CURRENCY: RCr 11.42(10) is unamended -- the Kentucky Supreme Court's 2024 (2024-17) and 2025 (2025-02) omnibus rules orders on kycourts.gov contain no reference to Rule 11.42; the Kentucky Dept. of Public Advocacy packet revised Dec. 2019 quotes the same clause ('within three years after the judgment becomes final,' RCr 11.42(10), https://dpa.ky.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/RCr-11-42-December-2019.doc.pdf); and the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to RCr 11.42 as a live remedy on 06/25/2026 in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2023-SC-0513. NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE FOUND: RCr 11.42(10) draws no distinction for capital cases, and I found none in the cases read. THIRD VEHICLE, PARTLY UNVERIFIED: Kentucky also has CR 60.02, reserved for 'extraordinary situations when relief is not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42' (Commonwealth v. Taylor, 06/25/2026, quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997), https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2026/06/25/commonwealth_of_kentucky_v._victor_d._taylor.pdf). I did not read CR 60.02's own text, so its time limits are UNVERIFIED here and no figure is asserted. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE COMPARISON: a Kentuckian challenging a conviction today is governed by the three-year RCr 11.42 deadline, not by any habeas deadline; Kentucky's habeas remedy has no filing deadline but reaches only judgments void ab initio where the petitioner would be entitled to immediate release. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/sw2d/885/cases/0954-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://static.case.law/sw3d/236/cases/0621-01.json) | | Louisiana | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 351 (Title IX, Habeas Corpus), amended by Acts 1980, No. 429, §2; construed in State ex rel. Glover v. State, 660 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1995) | 2 years no excuse for a late filing Application for Post Conviction Relief, La. Code Crim. Proc. Title XXXI-A, arts. 924-930.8 · La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8(A) (Acts 1990, No. 1023; Acts 1999, No. 1262; Acts 2004, No. 401; Acts 2013, No. 251; Acts 2021, No. 104; Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 10; Acts 2025, No. 393) | Detail **Habeas:** > The provisions of this Title are not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief under Title XXXI-A. **Post-conviction remedy:** > No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922 **On excusing a late filing:** All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney. INSTRUMENT WARNING: Louisiana's habeas corpus statute itself carries NO filing deadline — Title IX (arts. 351-370) contains no time-limitation article at all (verified against the Code of Criminal Procedure table of contents: 351 definition, 352 venue, 353 form/contents, 354-370 procedure; art. 354's 'time' is the custodian's answer time, not a petitioner deadline). But habeas is NOT a route to a conviction today: art. 351's third paragraph closes Title IX to anyone 'entitled to file' post-conviction relief. The La. Supreme Court in Glover: art. 351 'states unambiguously that habeas corpus relief is not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief,' and Official Revision Comment (c) to art. 351 'Habeas corpus relief is not the proper procedural device for petitioners who may file applications for post conviction relief. Essentially, habeas corpus deals with pre-conviction complaints concerning custody.' Glover also held the PCR time bar does not suspend the writ under La. Const. art. I, sec. 21, reasoning that sec. 21 protects 'the traditional common law writ' and art. 930.8 'lies outside' it. The legislature made the absorption explicit in 2025: art. 924(4) now defines post conviction relief as 'a form of post conviction habeas corpus.' So the operative number is 2 years / 730 days from finality under art. 914 or 922 — not the 1 year common in PCRA-style states, and not an open-ended habeas. Hardening: art. 930.8(F) 'All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.' Exceptions in art. 930.8(A): (1) facts unknown to petitioner/prior counsel with subjective 'diligence' — new facts must be submitted within two years of discovery, and a guilty/nolo pleader seeking art. 926.2 relief loses this exception after five years; (2) previously unknown facts under a clear-and-convincing 'manifest injustice' test; (3) a newly announced retroactive constitutional interpretation, filed within one year of that ruling's finality; (4) a transitional grandfather — an otherwise-barred application is heard if filed on or before August 1, 2027 and within two years of finality; (5)-(6) art. 926.1 DNA and art. 926.2 factual innocence. CAUTION on factual innocence: art. 926.2's standalone escape from arts. 930.4/930.8 required filing on or before December 31, 2022 after a trial to verdict — that window has closed, so such claims now run through the ordinary 2-year bar, and a petitioner who pled guilty on or after August 1, 2025 'shall not be entitled to assert a claim of factual innocence.' CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: art. 930.8(B) — post-conviction appellate review in death cases goes directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and once an execution warrant issues any application containing a new claim must be filed no later than 45 days before the execution date, with a ruling 21 days out and a 7-day writ window. CUSTODY GATE: art. 926(F) limits eligibility to those currently serving a sentence or on probation/parole and requires dismissal of an application filed after the sentence is completed; art. 924.1 bars PCR while direct appeal is available or pending. Practical effect: a person off supervision has neither remedy — PCR is closed by art. 926(F)(2) and habeas by its own custody requirement (art. 351). Text current through the 2025 First Extraordinary Session per legis.la.gov; art. 930.8 as shown reflects Acts 2025, No. 393. Unverified: I did not locate a post-2025 Louisiana appellate decision on CourtListener applying art. 351 to a mislabeled habeas petition (CourtListener's Louisiana intermediate-appellate coverage is sparse); the subsumption finding rests on the statute plus Glover, which remains the controlling Louisiana Supreme Court authority. [View the habeas source](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112473) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112949) | | Maine | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (Purpose), Title 15 ch. 305-A; and 14 M.R.S. § 5502 ("Post-conviction habeas corpus") REPEALED by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2 | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Post-conviction review, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (§§ 2121-2132) · 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) (Time for filing; PL 2011, c. 601, § 11) | Detail **Habeas:** > It replaces the remedies available pursuant to post-conviction habeas corpus, to the extent that review of a criminal conviction or proceedings were reviewable, the remedies available pursuant to common law habeas corpus, including habeas corpus as recognized in Title 14 **Post-conviction remedy:** > A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A. **On excusing a late filing:** A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review Maine is a clean 'subsumed' state, and the habeas_no_deadline=false coding needs explanation. Title 14 ch. 609 (habeas corpus) still exists and § 5501 ('Right to writ') contains no time limit of any kind — but it is NOT an open deadline-free route to challenge a conviction. Two independent primary sources close it: (1) 14 M.R.S. § 5502, captioned 'Post-conviction habeas corpus,' reads in full '(REPEALED)' — repealed by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2, the same act that enacted ch. 305-A; and (2) § 2122 names Title 14 §§ 5501 and 5509 to 5546 specifically as remedies ch. 305-A replaces, and calls ch. 305-A the 'comprehensive and, except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment, exclusive method of review.' So the residual writ has no deadline but no reach into conviction challenges; do not tabulate Maine as unlimited-habeas. § 2122 states the chapter is construed to provide relief to persons required to use it 'as required by the Constitution of Maine, Article I, Section 10' (the writ-suspension clause) — i.e. the statute was drafted to occupy the constitutional guarantee rather than leave a parallel habeas route. The one year runs from the LATEST of three triggers (§ 2128-B(1)(A)-(C)): final disposition of direct appeal or expiry of appeal time; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right; or discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence — so it is a discovery-style limit, not a flat year from judgment. Time while a properly filed U.S. Supreme Court cert petition on the same judgment is pending is excluded. § 2128-B(1) contains no equitable-tolling clause on its face; I did not verify judicial tolling doctrine from a controlling case. Separate one-year clocks apply to post-sentencing proceedings (§ 2128-B(2)) and to indirect impediments (§ 2128-B(3)); § 2128-B(3) also sets a 60-DAY limit for noncitizens seeking relief under § 2124(3)(E), running from when the noncitizen became or should have become aware that deportation proceedings were initiated as a consequence of the plea — the shortest deadline in the chapter. Jurisdictional gate: § 2124 requires a 'present restraint or other specified impediment' (incarceration, probation/parole, unconditional discharge, unpaid fine or restitution, unperformed community service, future-served sentence, NCR commitment). A petitioner with no qualifying restraint is outside ch. 305-A, and habeas has been replaced — a standing gap, not an alternative writ; I did not find a controlling case resolving what remedy such a person has. DNA testing is a separate chapter, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-B (§§ 2136-2138), and I found no limitation period in § 2138 — that route appears untimed. No capital variant exists; ch. 305-A draws no capital/non-capital distinction. Confirming Law Court case law could not be read: CourtListener opinion pages returned HTTP 202/401 challenges and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked, so every figure above rests on the statutes themselves, which are dispositive and controlling here. [View the habeas source](https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2122.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2128-B.html) | | Maryland | No limit habeas survives narrowly · Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(a) (whole subtitle, §§ 3-701 to 3-707, read; contains no limitations period); confirmed as a surviving remedy by Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011) | 10 years no excuse for a late filing Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (UPPA), Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101 to 7-301 · Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b) | Detail **Habeas:** > A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus **Post-conviction remedy:** > Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. **On excusing a late filing:** Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none, at any point in Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-701 to 3-707, all of which I read. Two clocks in that subtitle are decoys and must not be reported as filing deadlines: § 3-706(a) gives a judge 5 days to file a memorandum after discharging someone on unconstitutionality grounds, and § 3-707(b)(1) gives 10 days to apply for leave to appeal in BAIL habeas cases. Neither limits when a petition may be filed. Habeas is NOT subsumed and NOT abolished. Crim. Proc. § 7-107(b)(1) expressly contemplates 'a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus' — and takes away only the appeal, providing such a person 'may not appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland or the Appellate Court of Maryland.' That is a preclusion of appellate review, not a limitations period; a comparison that reads § 7-107 as a habeas deadline is wrong. Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019) (slip op. 29), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011): 'The UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies.' Accord Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447 (1960) (UPPA 'did not abrogate the remedies formerly available under the writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis... it clearly took away the right of appeal'); Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658 (1990) ('for constitutional reasons the General Assembly did not restrict the authority of judges to issue writs of habeas corpus'). WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': Maryland's narrowing is not the survey's canonical jurisdictional/facially-void shape, so flagging the mismatch. Habeas survives with full force and no deadline where the UPPA provides no remedy (e.g. parole, diminution credits, conditions and duration of confinement — Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502 (2001); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 (1994)). But as a route to attack a CONVICTION it is doubly constrained: (1) zero appellate review under § 7-107(b)(1), so relief depends on a single circuit judge with no error correction, and (2) the UPPA was enacted, per Gluckstern at 658, 'in place of the common law habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and sentences,' and courts route such claims there — see Simms v. Shearin, 221 Md. App. 460 (2015) (dismissing appeal; petitioner 'did not file his petition for writ of habeas corpus for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of his conviction'); Green v. Hutchinson, 158 Md. App. 168 (2004). Also, § 3-703(a) makes issuance discretionary where the petitioner has already had a hearing on a prior petition under the same commitment. UPPA DETAILS: the 10 years runs from IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE, not from finality of direct appeal — a materially earlier trigger than the federal AEDPA clock, worth flagging for any legislator comparison. Subject to an 'extraordinary cause' escape (§ 7-103(b)); only one petition per trial or sentence (§ 7-103(a)); a concluded proceeding may be reopened 'if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice' (§ 7-104) with no time limit on reopening. § 7-102(a) otherwise permits filing 'at any time' subject to §§ 7-103 and 7-104. UPPA covers persons 'confined under sentence of imprisonment' or 'on parole or probation' (§ 7-101, as quoted in Sabisch slip op. 30). CAPITAL: no capital-specific deadline exists; Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013, so the distinction is now moot. NOT VERIFIED: Md. Rule 15-303 (habeas procedure) — the Maryland Judiciary publishes the Rules only through Westlaw, which is paywalled and unfetchable, so I could not read the rule text. Maryland cases cite Rule 15-303(e)(3) as a ground for summary denial (successive/no-relief-warranted petitions), and nothing in the cases citing it suggests it imposes a filing deadline, but I did not confirm the rule's text firsthand. Adjacent statutory remedies exist outside the UPPA — Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (post-conviction DNA testing) and § 8-301 (writ of actual innocence), both referenced in Simms — but I did not read them and make no claim about their deadlines. [View the habeas source](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=3-702&enactments=false) [View the post-conviction source](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcp§ion=7-103&enactments=false) | | Massachusetts | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · G. L. c. 248, § 25 (as appearing in St. 1979, c. 344, § 12); see also G. L. c. 248, § 1; Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992); Soura, petitioner, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002) | No limit no filing period Motion for postconviction relief / new trial, Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)–(b) · Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), amended Sept. 6, 2001, eff. Oct. 1, 2001 | Detail **Habeas:** > The court shall have no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, at its discretion for—...a person who is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to correct the sentence then being served **On excusing a late filing:** Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion MASSACHUSETTS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. Rule 30(a) and 30(b) both say relief may be sought 'at any time'; c. 248 contains no limitations section (all 40 section headings inspected). (1) Habeas is subsumed, not merely narrowed, as to conviction challenges. G. L. c. 248, § 1 grants the writ 'unless— ... Second, He has been convicted or is in execution upon legal process, civil or criminal,' and § 25 removes the discretionary power for anyone 'imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction.' Rule 30's Reporter's Notes to subdivision (a): 'When originally adopted in 1979, this subdivision consolidated the previously distinct procedures of habeas corpus and writ of error.' (2) Habeas survives — with no deadline — only for claims OUTSIDE the conviction: Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992): 'Rule 30 encompasses all motions for postconviction relief that challenge the sentence, conviction, or confinement imposed... a petition for habeas corpus relief does not lie... He must proceed under rule 30'; habeas lies where 'the term of a lawfully imposed sentence has expired' and the petitioner would get immediate release (Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30–31 (1989), good-time forfeiture). Soura, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002): claims centering 'on the indictment, trial, conviction, and sentencing stages' — 'Our habeas corpus statute does not apply in these circumstances. See G. L. c. 248, § 25.' So habeas is not a route to challenge a conviction at all — not even for jurisdictional/void claims. (3) Constitutional caveat: Mass. Const. Pt. II, c. 6, art. 7 guarantees habeas 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner'; Averett (quoting Hennessy, 386 Mass. 848, 852 n.3 (1982)) warned that § 25's total elimination 'may run afoul of' that article, but McCastle, petitioner, 401 Mass. 105, 107 (1987) held 'there is no constitutional impediment to restricting [the petitioner] to rule 30 relief' for a conviction attack. (4) The real Massachusetts limit is waiver, not a clock: Rule 30(c)(2) waives claims not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior Rule 30 motion. (5) No death penalty. Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, a 'capital case' means a murder-in-the-first-degree conviction or a third habitual-offender conviction; after rescript, 'no appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice... on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question' — a gatekeeper, still not a deadline. (6) Reporter's Notes add two boundaries: Rule 30(a) is unavailable to contest a sentence already completed, and an illegally-IMPOSED (as opposed to illegal) sentence must be corrected within Rule 29(a)'s 60 days. (7) mass.gov returns HTTP 403 to non-browser clients; Rule 30 text was read from the Internet Archive capture of the official mass.gov rule page, which shows effective date 10/01/2001 and no amendment since, and the operative wording matches the version quoted by the SJC. [View the habeas source](https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIII/TitleIV/Chapter248/Section25) [View the post-conviction source](http://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief) | | Michigan | No limit habeas survives narrowly · MCL 600.4307 (Revised Judicature Act of 1961, ch. 43, Habeas Corpus) — right to bring; no period prescribed. Narrowed by MCL 600.4310(3) and Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 485-486 (2007) (published). | No limit no filing period Motion for relief from judgment, MCR subchapter 6.500 (Postappeal Relief), MCR 6.501-6.509 · MCR 6.502(G)(1), Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026) — the only limitation on the motion is numerical, not temporal | Detail **Habeas:** > An action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on the behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this state under any pretense whatsoever, except as specified in section 4310. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Except as provided in subrule (G)(2), regardless of whether a defendant has previously filed a motion for relief from judgment, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. **On excusing a late filing:** no subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal MICHIGAN HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER TRACK. This is the headline: unlike PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 states, Michigan's post-conviction vehicle carries no one-year (or any) clock, and habeas carries none either. (1) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I read the entire RJA habeas chapter index (MCL 600.4301-600.4370) and the full text of MCR 3.303(A)-(M). Neither prescribes any period for filing. MCL 600.4307 grants the action to any person restrained 'under any pretense whatsoever,' qualified only by subject-matter exclusions in MCL 600.4310, never by time. The writ is constitutionally protected: Const 1963, art 1, Sec 12 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.' (2) WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE': MCL 600.4310 provides that habeas 'may not be brought by or on behalf of ... (3) Persons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.' Published Court of Appeals precedent preserves one lane through that bar. Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 486 (2007), verbatim: 'while plaintiff may not use a habeas proceeding as a substitute for an appeal or to review the merits of his criminal conviction, plaintiff may assert a radical defect in the jurisdiction of the court in which his conviction was obtained.' Moses also states, quoting People v Price, 23 Mich App 663, 669-671 (1970), that relief 'is open to a convicted person in one narrow instance, ... where the convicting court was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime in question,' and that the defect must be 'radical, rendering the conviction absolutely void.' Habeas is thus NOT subsumed or abolished — Moses (2007) postdates the 1989 adoption of subchapter 6.500 and granted the writ to reach the merits of a jurisdictional claim — but it reaches only jurisdictional/void-judgment claims. Moses also notes habeas may be denied in the court's discretion where full relief is available in a more appropriate proceeding. (3) NO POST-CONVICTION DEADLINE: I read MCR 6.501 through 6.509 in full in the official Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026). No subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal: MCR 6.502(G)(1) allows 'one and only one motion' (exceptions in (G)(2) for retroactive change in law, newly discovered evidence including new scientific evidence per (G)(3), or a vacated predicate conviction; plus an innocence waiver), and MCR 6.508(D)(3) bars grounds 'other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal ... unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause ... and (b) actual prejudice.' A person sentenced decades ago may file a first 6.500 motion today; the obstacle is the one-motion rule and the cause-and-prejudice showing, not a clock. (4) EXCLUSIVITY / OPERATIVE: MCR 6.501 — 'Unless otherwise specified by these rules, a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the circuit court not subject to appellate review under subchapters 7.200 or 7.300 may be reviewed only in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.' For an ordinary conviction challenge the 6.500 motion is therefore the operative vehicle; habeas is operative only for a radical jurisdictional defect, where it runs in parallel and is not subject to the one-motion rule. (5) NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Michigan has no death penalty. Const 1963, art 4, Sec 46 — 'No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death.' (6) COMPARISON CAUTION: Michigan is a state where habeas survives with no deadline sitting beside a post-conviction motion that ALSO has no deadline — so the common '1 year' figure quoted for PCRA-type states has no Michigan counterpart on either instrument. Sources fetched and read: legislature.mi.gov (MCL 600.4301 chapter index, 600.4307, 600.4310, Const art 1 Sec 12, Const art 4 Sec 46); courts.michigan.gov official Michigan Court Rules PDF (MCR 3.303, MCR 6.501-6.509); static.case.law/mich-app/274/cases/0481-01.json (Moses full text). [View the habeas source](https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-600-4307) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/michigan-court-rules.pdf) | | Minnesota | No limit habeas survives narrowly · Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2025); construed in Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979) | 2 years no excuse for a late filing Petition for postconviction relief, Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (Minnesota postconviction remedy act) · Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2025) | Detail **Habeas:** > A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction ... may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint. **Post-conviction remedy:** > No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. **On excusing a late filing:** No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Minnesota habeas was never abolished and remains a live statutory civil remedy (ch. 589, §§ 589.01-589.30). I read the entire chapter: it contains no limitations period of any kind. Its only time provisions govern the return of the writ (24 hours plus travel time) and the appeal schedule (§ 589.30) — none limit when a petition may be filed. Habeas is nonetheless NARROW as a route to attack a conviction, for two independent reasons. First, § 589.01 by its own terms excludes 'persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal,' and § 589.04(c) requires the petition to affirmatively 'state that the restrained person is not committed or detained under process, judgment, decree, or execution, as specified in section 589.01.' Second, § 590.01, subd. 2 is an express exclusivity clause: the postconviction remedy 'takes the place of any other common law, statutory or other remedies which may have been available for challenging the validity of a conviction, sentence, or other disposition and must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective.' Kelsey (Minn. 1979) states the surviving residue: 'habeas corpus would not be available to a prison inmate who was confined pursuant to a final judgment unless the inmate challenged the jurisdiction of the court rendering the final judgment or the legality of his sentence.' Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) confirms the subsumption is complete and current, describing the habeas route in the past tense: 'Before the Legislature passed the postconviction statute in 1967, we allowed prisoners to bring writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis to challenge their convictions,' and calling subd. 2 an 'exclusivity provision' showing 'the postconviction statute merely codified or replaced preexisting remedies.' Loyd v. Fabian (Minn. App. 2004) states the modern scope: 'limited to constitutional issues, jurisdictional challenges, claims that confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and claims that confinement violates applicable statutes.' In practice habeas today carries execution-of-sentence and custody matters (good time, parole/supervised release, conditions of confinement) rather than conviction validity — the cases I read (Guth 2006, Rud 2007) are all of that type. So the deadline-free habeas route is real but does not reach ordinary trial-error, ineffective-assistance, plea-validity or Brady claims. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: Minnesota's ch. 590 is a purpose-built postconviction act, not habeas, so its 2-year period is a postconviction deadline — the same instrument-mismatch trap as Pennsylvania's PCRA. Note also that the legislature expressly modeled the 2-year period on the federal 1-year habeas limit under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), per legislative history recounted in Carlton — further reason not to read it as a state habeas deadline. THE 2-YEAR BAR IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL: Carlton holds 'the time limitation in subdivision 4(c) does not operate as a jurisdictional bar, and that it therefore is subject to waiver' — the State waives it by failing to plead untimeliness — and that it is 'a statute of limitations subject to equitable principles.' Carlton separately upheld subd. 4(a) as constitutional as applied, 'a reasonable limitation' even assuming a state due process right to one review. PC EXCEPTIONS: § 590.01, subd. 4(b) lists five (disability/mental disease, newly discovered evidence including scientific evidence, new retroactive interpretation of law, pre-May-1-1980 offenses under subd. 3, and a catch-all for petitions that are 'not frivolous and ... in the interests of justice'), but subd. 4(c) imposes a secondary 2-year clock: any petition invoking an exception 'must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.' Separately, subd. 1 codifies a Knaffla-type bar: a petition after a completed direct appeal 'may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal.' THIRD, DEADLINE-FREE VEHICLE FOR ILLEGAL SENTENCES: Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 provides 'The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law,' and Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016) held that 'applying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, to a Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion violates the separation of powers.' The Revisor prints this as a standing note to subd. 4. So a Minnesota prisoner attacking an unauthorized sentence has an untimed route, but it is a rule-based sentence-correction motion, not habeas. CAPITAL: ch. 590 draws no capital/non-capital distinction — no separate capital track or deadline appears anywhere in the statute. Sources read in full text: revisor.mn.gov for §§ 589.01, ch. 589 complete, 590.01, and Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03; static.case.law for Kelsey (283 N.W.2d 892), Loyd (682 N.W.2d 688), Guth (716 N.W.2d 23), Rud (743 N.W.2d 295), Carlton (816 N.W.2d 590), and Reynolds (888 N.W.2d 125). [View the habeas source](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/589.01) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/590.01) | | Mississippi | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Laws 1984, ch. 378, § 2), quoted and applied in Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA (Miss. Ct. App.) | 3 years no excuse for a late filing Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to 99-39-29 · Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) | Detail **Habeas:** > abolishes the common law writs relating to post-conviction collateral relief, including by way of illustration but not limitation, error coram nobis, error coram vobis, and post-conviction habeas corpus, as well as statutory post-conviction habeas corpus **Post-conviction remedy:** > A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi **On excusing a late filing:** A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi Mississippi is the opposite of the no-deadline-habeas states. State habeas does NOT lie to challenge a conviction or sentence: § 99-39-3(1) makes the UPCCRA the 'exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences' and expressly abolishes BOTH common-law and statutory post-conviction habeas. Habeas survives only outside collateral attack — the general writ, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-1 ('shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention'), carries no filing deadline anywhere in ch. 11-43, but the 1984 Act (which itself amended § 11-43-9) removed conviction challenges from it; Walker v. State, 555 So. 2d 738 (Miss. 1990) leaves habeas for pre-conviction/bail matters and calls the UPCCRA 'post-conviction habeas corpus renamed.' Courts recharacterize habeas petitions as PCR motions and apply the 3-year bar: Carter v. State, No. 2024-CP-01328-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2025) (petition 'labeled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' treated as PCR, time-barred), https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO187475.pdf. Clock runs from the direct-appeal ruling, or if no appeal from expiration of the appeal time, or for guilty pleas from entry of the judgment of conviction. CAPITAL CASES ARE SHORTER, NOT LONGER: § 99-39-5(2) — 'Likewise excepted are filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases which shall be made within one (1) year after conviction' (365 days). Statutory exceptions to the 3-year bar: intervening Mississippi/U.S. Supreme Court decision; newly discovered, practically conclusive evidence; untested or retestable biological/DNA evidence; expired sentence or unlawfully revoked probation/parole. The bar hardened recently — Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶8) (Miss. 2023) overruled the judicially crafted 'fundamental-rights exception,' so illegal-sentence and fundamental-constitutional-right claims no longer escape the 3 years; only the express statutory exceptions remain. One unverified point: 2026 H.B. 1751 (Corrections Omnibus Act) brought §§ 99-39-5 and 99-39-27 forward 'for purposes of possible amendments'; billstatus.ls.state.ms.us was unreachable (TLS chain error) so I could not confirm from a primary source whether it was enacted or whether it altered the period. The introduced version was a bring-forward with no change to the three-year language, and the most recent primary source read — the Oct. 28, 2025 Carter opinion citing § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020) — applies three years. Statutory text cross-validated against courts.ms.gov opinions quoting §§ 99-39-3(1) and 99-39-5(2) verbatim. [View the habeas source](https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO182639.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r73/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91.01(b) (habeas rule; no limitations period anywhere in Rule 91's 21 subsections or in RSMo ch. 532); narrowed by State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) and State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010) | 6 months Motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment or sentence — Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (conviction after trial) and Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (conviction after guilty plea) · Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b) (identical text in R. 24.035(b)) | Detail **Habeas:** > Any person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint. **Post-conviction remedy:** > If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. **On excusing a late filing:** If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE — stated explicitly. No filing time limit appears in Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91 (read all 21 subsection headings, 91.01, 91.02, 91.04 in full) or in RSMo ch. 532 (read the full chapter index and 532.010, 532.040). R. 91.04(a) lists the required contents of a petition and includes no timeliness allegation. Concrete proof it is not merely theoretical: in State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010) (unanimous), the Missouri Supreme Court discharged a petitioner in 2010 on a March 2003 guilty plea — roughly seven years after the 180-day Rule 24.035 window closed. Missouri's high court still entertains original Rule 91 petitions today (e.g. State ex rel. Dorsey v. Vandergriff, decided 2024-03-20; In re Branson v. Shewmaker, 2025-04-29). WHY 'narrow', NOT 'available': Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) (unanimous) holds 'habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction proceedings. Habeas corpus may be used to challenge a final judgment after an individual's failure to pursue appellate and post-conviction remedies only to raise jurisdictional issues or in circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results.' Zinna restates the modern gateway test, quoting Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2002): default is excused only on '(1) a claim of actual innocence or (2) a jurisdictional defect or (3)(a) that the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense ... and (b) prejudice ...'. This is broader than pure jurisdictional/facially-void review but is clearly not a general route. WHY NOT 'subsumed': R. 29.15(a) and 24.035(a) say the motion is 'the exclusive procedure by which such person may seek relief IN THE SENTENCING COURT' (emphasis added) — a court-specific exclusivity. R. 91.02(a) directs the habeas petition to the circuit or associate circuit judge 'for the county in which the person is held in custody,' a different court, which is why the post-conviction rules did not extinguish the writ. Zinna nonetheless describes R. 24.035/29.15 as intended to be a 'single, unitary, post-conviction remedy, to be used in place of other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus' — so the two coexist in tension, with habeas as the residual. SECOND PC DEADLINE: the same rules impose 90 days after the appellate mandate issues if a direct appeal was taken ('If an appeal of the judgment or sentence sought to be vacated, set aside or corrected is taken, the motion shall be filed within 90 days after the date the mandate of the appellate court issues affirming such judgment or sentence.'). The 180-day figure reported here is the no-appeal track. Missed deadlines are fatal: 'Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver.' VERSION CAVEAT: the current rule runs 180 days from 'the date the sentence is entered.' Older versions ran 180 days from delivery to the Department of Corrections (Zinna recites that formulation), and R. 29.15(m)/24.035(m) preserve the pre-2018 version for sentences pronounced before Jan. 1, 2018. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but R. 91.02(b) lets a person 'held in custody pursuant to a conviction for a capital crime and a sentence of death' whose conviction the Supreme Court has affirmed file the Rule 91 petition 'in this Court in the first instance,' and deems any such petition filed elsewhere to have been filed there. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003) — a 4-3 decision — first recognized a freestanding actual-innocence habeas claim, framed as whether 'a Missouri prisoner sentenced to death can obtain habeas relief on a claim of actual innocence alone'; Zinna and Brown state actual innocence as a gateway without a capital limitation. SUCCESSIVE-WRIT RULE, NOT A DEADLINE: RSMo 532.040 bars an inferior court from entertaining an application already refused by a superior court. ONE MORE NO-DEADLINE ROUTE (not defendant-initiated): RSMo 547.031.1 (2021, am. 2024) lets a prosecuting or circuit attorney 'file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time' on information of possible innocence — the vehicle in the Lamar Johnson, Christopher Dunn and Marcellus Williams proceedings. Sources read in full: revisor.mo.gov (ch. 532 index, 532.010, 532.040, 547.031); courts.mo.gov Supreme Court Rules (91.01, 91.02, 91.04, 29.15, 24.035); static.case.law (Simmons 866 S.W.2d 443, Jaynes 63 S.W.3d 210, Zinna 301 S.W.3d 510, Amrine 102 S.W.3d 541). [View the habeas source](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/383941561647affc86256ca600521382?OpenDocument) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d?OpenDocument) | | Montana | No limit habeas survives narrowly · Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, ¶ 22, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337 (construing Mont. Code Ann. § 46-22-101(2) against Mont. Const. art. II, § 19) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Petition for postconviction relief, Montana Postconviction Hearing Act, Mont. Code Ann. tit. 46, ch. 21 · Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1) (2025) | Detail **Habeas:** > as applied to a facially invalid sentence--a sentence which, as a matter of law, the court had no authority to impose--the procedural bar created by § 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ **Post-conviction remedy:** > a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final **On excusing a late filing:** a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly because it is the finding most easily lost. Title 46, ch. 22 contains no limitations period anywhere: I read the section lists for all three parts (Part 1 Availability, Part 2 Issuance, Part 3 Return/Hearing/Appeal) and no section imposes one. Section 46-22-204 runs the other way: 'The writ of habeas corpus or any associated process may be issued and served on any day or at any time.' Lott itself is the proof — the court granted the writ in 2006 on a sentence imposed in 1992, fourteen years earlier, expressly acknowledging both the appeal and postconviction windows had long closed. But the remedy is NARROW, not open. Section 46-22-101(2) provides: 'The writ of habeas corpus is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal. The relief under this chapter is not available to attack the legality of an order revoking a suspended or deferred sentence.' Lott held that bar unconstitutional ONLY as applied to a facially invalid sentence, and was careful to distinguish sentence from conviction (¶ 23: 'Since Lott has challenged his sentence and not the underlying conviction, he is not entitled to be released but only to be resentenced'). So a person attacking the CONVICTION itself has no habeas route at all once appeal is exhausted — hence operative = post_conviction. A person attacking a facially invalid SENTENCE has a live, deadline-free habeas route. Lott is current law, not a historical artifact: the Montana Supreme Court applied it and granted the writ in Bokma v. Olsen, 2025 MT 37, ¶¶ 11-12, 15, which also holds that denial of earned credit for time served or elapsed time 'creates a facially invalid sentence which we may review in a habeas corpus proceeding.' Habeas also remains unrestricted by § 46-22-101(2) for restraint not resting on a court-of-record conviction — pretrial detention, bail (§ 46-22-103), and petitioners who have not yet exhausted appeal. POST-CONVICTION EXCEPTIONS: § 46-21-102(2) allows a newly-discovered-evidence-of-innocence claim within 1 year of the date the petitioner discovers or reasonably should have discovered the evidence, whichever is later — a discovery-rule extension, not a suspension. Section 46-21-101(1) additionally requires that the petitioner have 'no adequate remedy of appeal.' TRANSITIONAL: the 1-year period is not universal — Lott n.2 records that it 'went into effect on April 24, 1997, and applies to all persons convicted on or after April 24, 1996,' with a 5-year deadline for earlier convictions (citing State v. Wright, 2001 MT 247, ¶ 9, and Hawkins v. Mahoney, 1999 MT 82, ¶ 9). Nearly all live cases now fall under the 1-year rule. CAPITAL: § 46-21-102 as read draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the 1-year period is uniform on its face. I did not separately verify whether other chapter 21 provisions alter capital timing, so treat any capital-specific variation as unverified. Also unverified: judicially created equitable exceptions to the § 46-21-102 bar (Montana case law recognizes a narrow fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice escape) — I did not read those cases, so that point rests on no primary source here. COMPARISON WARNING for the legislator's question: quoting '1 year' as Montana's habeas deadline would be wrong twice over. The 1-year figure belongs to a separate statutory remedy in a different chapter, and Montana's habeas remedy — unlike Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61 model, where habeas was fully subsumed — was never abolished and carries no time limit, because Mont. Const. art. II, § 19 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended') sets a constitutional floor the legislature cannot statutorily close. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/mont/334/cases/0270-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0010/section_0020/0460-0210-0010-0020.html) | | Nebraska | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824 (habeas corpus article — contains no limitations period); Tyrrell v. Frakes, 309 Neb. 85, 958 N.W.2d 673 (2021) | 1 year Nebraska Postconviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 · Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) (added by Laws 2011, LB137, § 1; amended Laws 2023, LB50, § 18) | Detail **Habeas:** > In the case of a prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of conviction, habeas corpus is available as a remedy only upon a showing that the judgment, sentence, and commitment are void. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: (a) The date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal **On excusing a late filing:** A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Nebraska's habeas article (Ch. 29, art. 28) runs §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824; I read the Legislature's full Chapter 29 section index and every heading in that range, and no section imposes a limitations period on filing the writ. The article's only 'limitation' heading, § 29-2813, is a two-year bar on DAMAGES actions for false imprisonment ('shall be sued or molested for any offense against the provisions of said sections, unless within two years after the time when such offense shall have been committed'), not on the petition (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-2813). Section 29-2801 directs that on a proper application it is the judge's 'duty forthwith to allow a writ of habeas corpus' — no timing precondition. NARROWING: § 29-2801 by its own terms excludes 'persons convicted of some crime or offense for which they stand committed.' Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 384 (2016) (official PDF, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2016/12/23/sanders_v._frakes.pdf): 'unless the conviction is void, those who "stand committed" pursuant to a final conviction are excluded from the scope of the relief afforded by the writ of habeas corpus in Nebraska.' Sanders also holds habeas will NOT reach a claim that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional. So the no-deadline writ buys a petitioner only jurisdictional/facially-void claims. NOT SUBSUMED — this is the key structural finding. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3003 ('Postconviction remedy; cumulative'): 'The remedy provided by sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 is cumulative and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state. Any proceeding filed under [the Act] which states facts which if true would constitute grounds for relief under another remedy shall be dismissed without prejudice.' (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3003). State v. Boeggeman, 316 Neb. 581, 596-97 (2024) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00011033PUB): 'Although many states have adopted a unitary postconviction remedy that has replaced all existing procedures and encompasses all claims ... Nebraska has not. "The remedy provided by [the Nebraska Postconviction Act] is cumulative ...." ... For example, Nebraska statutes still provide for motions for a new trial and writs of habeas corpus.' Boeggeman is the cleanest illustration of the contrast: sentenced 2/6/2017, postconviction motion filed 12/21/2020 and held time-barred with no equitable tolling — yet the court said 'At a minimum, an application for a writ of habeas corpus is available to Boeggeman should he continue to be confined beyond the completion date of his Nebraska sentences.' OPERATIVE: for an ordinary constitutional challenge (ineffective assistance, Brady, involuntary plea), the Postconviction Act is the route and the clock is 365 days — Boeggeman calls the Act 'the primary procedure for bringing collateral attacks on final judgments in criminal cases based upon constitutional principles.' Habeas is independently operative, with no deadline, for the narrower void-judgment/jurisdictional set; § 29-3003 affirmatively channels claims out of postconviction when another remedy fits. Hence 'both.' PC LIMIT DETAILS: it is a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional (State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (2015)); it governs successive motions (State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70 (2017)); retroactive application is not ex post facto (Amaya); per the Legislature's official annotation to § 29-3001, for convictions already final when the limit took effect the year ran from 8/27/2011 and expired 8/27/2012 (State v. Smith, 286 Neb. 77 (2013)) — annotation read, case text not read. CAPITAL: no longer window. State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84 (2025) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00012173PUB), syllabus pt. 5: the 1-year limit 'governs all postconviction motions, including successive motions and those challenging a death sentence,' and 'even in capital cases, § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling.' Separately, § 29-2801's own text excludes from the writ 'persons committed for treason or felony, the punishment whereof is capital, plainly and specially expressed in the warrant of commitment.' OTHER CUMULATIVE REMEDIES named by Boeggeman and left in force: motion for new trial (§§ 29-2101 to 29-2103), writ of error coram nobis, and plea withdrawal — their deadlines were not established here and are unverified. [View the habeas source](https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewOpinion?docId=N00007804PUB) [View the post-conviction source](https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3001) | | Nevada | 1 year ★ late filing excusable for good cause habeas still lies · Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (time limit), read with § 34.720 (scope) and § 34.724(2)(b) (exclusivity); bars held mandatory in State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225 (2005) | — None · Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.724(2)(b) — cited to establish that NO separate post-conviction act exists; the former Post-Conviction Relief Act (NRS 177.315–177.385) was repealed in 1991 and Chapter 177 now contains only appeal provisions (NRS 177.015–177.305) | Detail **Habeas:** > Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or ... within 1 year after ... remittitur. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Comprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them. **On excusing a late filing:** Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year CRITICAL FOR THE COMPARISON — Nevada's 1-year figure IS a habeas deadline, not a PCRA-style substitute-act deadline. Nevada took the opposite path from Pennsylvania/Alabama/Delaware: instead of abolishing habeas and replacing it with a separate act, it kept habeas as the sole vehicle and put the deadline on habeas itself. NRS 34.720 confirms the post-conviction subchapter 'appl[ies] only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus in which the petitioner: 1. Requests relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence; or 2. Challenges the computation of time.' So a conviction challenge is a habeas petition and is subject to NRS 34.726's 1-year bar; there is no deadline-free general-habeas route sitting beside it. NRS 34.390(1) makes this explicit by carving the post-conviction subchapter out of the ordinary duty to grant the writ ('shall grant the writ without delay, except as otherwise provided in NRS 34.720 to 34.830'). RUNNING OF THE YEAR: from entry of the judgment of conviction, or, if a direct appeal was taken, from issuance of the appellate court's remittitur. STATUTORY EXCEPTION: 'good cause shown for delay,' which NRS 34.726(1)(a)-(b) defines as delay not the petitioner's fault AND undue prejudice from dismissal; Riker adds that good cause requires 'an impediment external to the defense.' The bars are not discretionary — Riker, 121 Nev. 225: 'Application of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory,' and 'the statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State.' ADDITIONAL BARS BEYOND THE YEAR: NRS 34.800(2) creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice (laches) once 5 years pass from the judgment or the direct-appeal decision, but the State must specifically plead it; NRS 34.810 separately mandates dismissal of successive petitions and of guilty-plea petitions not alleging an involuntary/unknowing plea or ineffective assistance. CAPITAL CASES: no longer deadline, and Riker rejects any capital softening — 'the f[act] that a habeas petitioner faces a death sentence does not somehow lessen the effect of procedural bars.' NRS 34.820 supplies only a separate counsel-appointment and procedural track for death-sentenced petitioners. NARROW SURVIVING NON-HABEAS ROUTES, each carved out of exclusivity as 'incident to the proceedings in the trial court' under NRS 34.724(2)(a): (1) NRS 176.555 — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' — genuinely no deadline, but it reaches only a facially illegal sentence, not a conviction challenge; (2) NRS 176.165 motion to withdraw a plea, which NRS 34.724(3) (added 2019) permits post-sentence only if it is a first such motion, filed within 1 year of conviction, by a person NOT incarcerated on that charge, and not barred by laches (rebuttable presumption at 5 years) — so it is unavailable to the incarcerated petitioner this comparison concerns. VENUE: NRS 34.738 requires filing in the district court of the county where the conviction occurred. Every figure above was read in the NRS text at the fetched leg.state.nv.us URLs; the Riker quotes were read in the full opinion text at https://static.case.law/nev/121/cases/0225-01.json. [View the habeas source](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-034.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-177.html) | | New Hampshire | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Mallard v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, No. 2021-0357, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Jan. 4, 2023) (quoting State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974)); see RSA ch. 534 | 3 years Petition for a new trial, RSA ch. 526 (RSA 526:1) · RSA 526:4 (Time) | Detail **Habeas:** > In contrast, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time." State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974) (quotation and ellipsis omitted). **Post-conviction remedy:** > A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit. **On excusing a late filing:** a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 'provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time.' NEW HAMPSHIRE HAS NO POST-CONVICTION ACT AND HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE OF ANY KIND. NH never enacted a PCRA/Rule-32-style exclusive remedy, so nothing was subsumed. Three independent routes coexist and Mallard (2023) expressly rejected the Warden's argument that the new-trial motion and habeas are 'functionally equivalent': 'he was permitted to move for a new trial under RSA chapter 526, and he was entitled to collaterally attack trial errors by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if harmful constitutional error could be established.' Within 3 years both vehicles are open; after 3 years habeas alone remains, with no outer limit. || HABEAS SCOPE. RSA ch. 534 (read in full) contains no limitations period at all — RSA 534:2 is a subject-matter carve-out, not a clock, and RSA 534:31's 2-year bar applies only to suits for the chapter's penalties, not to the petition. Habeas is constitutionally entrenched: N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 91, quoted in Mallard, guarantees it 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner.' A caution for readers of the bare statute: RSA 534:2 says persons 'imprisoned upon legal process, civil or criminal, in which the cause of the imprisonment is distinctly expressed' are 'not entitled of right to such writ,' and the historic standard was purely jurisdictional (Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 505). Case law removed that as a practical bar — jurisdiction is 'lost' on constitutional error. Bonser v. Courtney, 124 N.H. 796, 807-08 (1984) (read at static.case.law/nh/124/cases/0796-01.json): 'a plaintiff by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may collaterally attack that proceeding, after the time for direct appeal has expired, if harmful constitutional error can be established.' Mallard confirms ineffective-assistance claims need not be raised on direct appeal and are properly brought in habeas, and granted relief on a 2013 conviction attacked in 2020. Classified 'available,' not 'narrow.' || NON-TIME LIMITS (these are what actually bar late petitioners, not a clock). Habeas is not a substitute for direct appeal, so a claim that could have been raised on appeal may be procedurally defaulted — Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988) (read at static.case.law/nh/131/cases/0138-01.json); Sleeper v. Warden, 155 N.H. 160, 162-63 (2007) (cited in Mallard, not separately read). Res judicata does not apply to habeas (Gobin v. Hancock, 96 N.H. 450), so successive petitions raising different issues survive. LACHES: the superior court in Mallard acknowledged 'no statute of limitations for habeas petitions' in NH but dismissed a 9-year-old petition as 'untimely under something akin to laches'; the Supreme Court REVERSED, assuming without deciding that laches could apply and holding the State bears the burden of showing delay that was both unreasonable and prejudicial. Delay alone is therefore not a bar, and laches remains formally undecided. || RSA 526:4 REACHES CRIMINAL CASES. Two primary confirmations: Mallard applied RSA ch. 526 to a criminal new-trial motion, and RSA 651-D:2, I permits a DNA petition 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4, at any time after conviction' — a carve-out only needed because 526:4 otherwise binds post-conviction petitioners. || OTHER. Post-conviction DNA testing, RSA 651-D:2 (gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/651-D/651-D-mrg.htm), has no deadline. CAPITAL: no separate capital post-conviction track was located in the NH statutes; not independently verified, treat as unverified. Note courts.nh.gov 403s datacenter requests; the Mallard slip opinion was retrieved from CourtListener's storage mirror of the court's own PDF. [View the habeas source](https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2023/01/04/marc_mallard_v._warden_new_hampshire_state_prison.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LIII/526/526-mrg.htm) | | New Jersey | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · N.J.S.A. 2A:67-14(b) (Habeas Corpus Act, L.1951 (1st SS), c.344); accompanied by N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d); applied in Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958) | 5 years no excuse for a late filing Petition for post-conviction relief under N.J. Ct. R. 3:22 (court rule, not a statute — New Jersey has no post-conviction statute) · N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1) (official text, njcourts.gov, amendments through June 1, 2026) | Detail **Habeas:** > The persons hereinafter specified shall not be entitled to prosecute writ of habeas corpus: ... b. Any person committed or restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction **Post-conviction remedy:** > Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of this rule, no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged **On excusing a late filing:** no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry INSTRUMENT WARNING. New Jersey is the mirror image of the trap in the question. Its habeas act has NO filing deadline — the Habeas Corpus Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:67-1 to -36, contains no limitations period on the writ (the only 'Limitation' section, 2A:67-11, is a 2-year limit on damages actions for offenses against the chapter, not on filing). But that costs the state nothing, because the writ is statutorily unavailable to the very people who would use it: 2A:67-14(b) bars habeas to anyone 'restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.' A no-deadline habeas that a convicted person may not file is not a route. Do not score New Jersey as 'habeas, unlimited.' THREE INDEPENDENT LOCKS, all read verbatim. (1) Statute: 2A:67-14(b), above. (2) Rule, exclusivity — R. 3:22-3, official njcourts.gov text, unchanged since Sept. 1, 2009: 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey, a petition pursuant to this rule is the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime.' (3) Rule, absorption — R. 3:22-2(d) makes cognizable on PCR 'Any ground heretofore available as a basis for collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common-law or statutory remedy.' Case application: Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958) quotes 2A:67-14(b) and holds 'habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy in this State where a person confined as an habitual criminal seeks to attack an underlying conviction on the ground that the court in which such conviction took place had no jurisdiction to try or convict him.' State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992): 'Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.' State v. Staruch, 326 N.J. Super. 245, 249 (App. Div. 1999) quotes R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d) verbatim. WHY NOT 'NARROW'. New Jersey does not leave the usual jurisdictional/void-judgment residue outside the rule. Jurisdictional attacks are themselves a PCR ground — R. 3:22-2(b), 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon defendant's conviction' — and so carry the same 5-year bar. Habeas does still lie in New Jersey for NON-conviction restraint: 2A:67-13(a)-(e) reaches persons held for a criminal matter, on civil process, under any pretense, pretrial for bail purposes, or confined in a psychiatric facility. Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2000) is a live modern application of 2A:67-14 — in a civil matter, where the court noted the petitioner's reliance on R. 3:22 was misplaced because that rule governs criminal post-conviction relief. So the writ is alive; it just does not reach convictions. RESIDUAL CARVE-OUT, FLAGGED NOT ASSERTED. R. 3:22-3 opens 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey.' The natural referent is the state suspension clause (N.J. Const. art. I, para. 14). I could NOT retrieve the constitutional text from any primary source reachable from this host (njleg.state.nj.us returns a bot wall), so I do not assert its wording, and I found no modern New Jersey decision using that clause to permit a free-standing habeas attack on a conviction. Treat it as a theoretical reservation, not a working route. PCR DEADLINE DETAIL. 5 years is a calendar-year period, not a day count; 1825 = 5 x 365 and is an approximation supplied only to fill the integer field. Two features make it less generous than 5 years sounds: (a) it runs from ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION under R. 3:21-5, not from finality of direct appeal, so the clock runs throughout the direct appeal; and (b) R. 3:22-3 forbids filing PCR while a direct appeal or trial-court motion is pending. R. 3:22-12(a)(3) softens this by treating a petition dismissed without prejudice for that reason as a first petition if refiled within 90 days of the direct-appeal judgment (or within the 5 years). Escapes from the bar are only R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) — excusable neglect for the delay PLUS a reasonable probability that enforcing the bar would work a fundamental injustice — and (a)(1)(B), 'it alleges a claim for relief as set forth in paragraph (a)(2)(A) or paragraph (a)(2)(B) of this rule and is filed within the one-year period set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this rule' (i.e., a new retroactive constitutional right, or a factual predicate not earlier discoverable through reasonable diligence). R. 3:22-12(b): 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein.' Second or subsequent petitions: 1 year from the latest of the three triggers in R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A)-(C), plus the gatekeeping of R. 3:22-4(b). CORRECTION TO WIDELY-CIRCULATED STALE TEXT. Two post-2010 changes defeat most secondary summaries and every free full-text reproduction of R. 3:22 I could find (courtcaddy.com's copy stops at the Feb. 1, 2010 version). Per the rule's own official Note: 'paragraph (a)(1) amended, paragraph (b) deleted, and paragraph (c) redesignated paragraph (b) July 28, 2017 to be effective September 1, 2017.' So (i) subparagraphs (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) were added in 2017, codifying State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 399-400 (App. Div. 2013); and (ii) the old capital-causes provision — 30 days from denial of certiorari in death-penalty cases — was DELETED effective Sept. 1, 2017. There is now NO capital/non-capital difference in the New Jersey deadline; New Jersey repealed capital punishment in 2007. Separately, R. 3:22-2(e) (IAC for failure to file a requested direct appeal) was added effective Sept. 1, 2018. TWO GENUINELY UNLIMITED ROUTES that a comparison should not miss, both read in full from the official rule text. R. 3:21-10(b): 'A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time ... (5) correcting a sentence not authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice' — illegal-sentence correction has no deadline, and R. 3:22-2(c) expressly routes such claims there when not paired with another PCR ground. R. 3:20-2: 'A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made at any time.' So a New Jersey petitioner outside the 5 years is not necessarily remediless; the relief just is not called habeas and is not PCR. SOURCING. Court rules were read from njcourts.gov's own content API (jsonapi/taxonomy_term/rules_of_court), which returns the canonical rule body that the public rules pages render only in JavaScript; the page banner states 'Includes amendments effective on or before June 1, 2026.' Human-readable equivalents: /attorneys/rules-of-court/322-3-exclusiveness-of-remedy-not-substitute-appeal-or-motion, /322-2-grounds, /322-12-limitations, /321-10-reduction-or-change-of-sentence, /320-2-time-making-motion. The 5-year period was additionally confirmed against the Supreme Court's own adopting order (njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2010/01/n100119c.pdf) and against Appellate Division opinions from 2024 (a0324-22) and 2026 (a0124-24), both of which block-quote the rule. Statutes were read on law.onecle.com, whose Title 2A text is a snapshot last modified October 11, 2016 and does reflect the 2013 amendment to 2A:67-13 (P.L.2013, c.103); 2A:67-14 shows no amendment since L.1951 (1st SS), c.344. I could not reach an official New Jersey statute database from this host (njleg.state.nj.us serves a bot wall; the LIS gateway is a session-based frameset), so a hypothetical amendment to 2A:67-14 after October 2016 would not be reflected here — though P.L.2023, c.250 amended a neighboring section (2A:67-8) without disturbing the chapter, indicating Chapter 67 remains live law. Case text from the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law); case identification via CourtListener's HTML search (its API and opinion pages return 403/202 to this host). Justia, FindLaw, casetext, courtrules.net and casemine were unreachable or barred and are not relied on anywhere above. [View the habeas source](https://law.onecle.com/new-jersey/title-2a/2a-67-14.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://njcourts.gov/jsonapi/taxonomy_term/rules_of_court?filter%5Bname%5D=Limitations) | | New Mexico | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 (N.M. Sup. Ct.); accord Rule 5-802 NMRA (habeas corpus), which contains no filing deadline for conviction/sentence challenges | No limit NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6 'Post-conviction remedy' (a § 2255-style motion to vacate, preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA); separately, Rule 5-803 NMRA 'post-sentence relief' for petitioners who have completed their sentences · NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6(A) | Detail **Habeas:** > Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners and since this is not a successive habeas petition, these cases are inapposite. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A motion for such relief may be made at any time. **On excusing a late filing:** Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners NEW MEXICO IS A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE, AND HABEAS IS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE — the opposite of the PCRA pattern. New Mexico never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act; instead its § 2255-style post-conviction statute was preempted BY habeas. The NMSA annotations to § 31-11-6 state: 'Preemption by Rule 5-802 NMRA. — This section has been preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA, which governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Peppers, 1990-NMCA-057' and 'Habeas corpus. — An inmate may not resort to this section when the relief sought can be obtained directly by writ of habeas corpus... Cummings v. State, 2007-NMSC-048' (same URL as pc_url). Note that even the preempted statute carried no deadline (§ 31-11-6(A), quoted above). SCOPE OF HABEAS: Rule 5-802(A) NMRA — 'This rule governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody or under restraint for a determination that such custody or restraint is, or will be, in violation of the constitution or laws of the State of New Mexico or of the United States; that the district court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or that the sentence was illegal or in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.' Not narrowed to jurisdictional/void claims — it reaches ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, illegal search, etc. Source read: https://twelfthdistrict.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2024/01/Rule-5-802-Habeas-Corpus.pdf. NO-DEADLINE CONFIRMED TWICE: the official committee commentary published with Rule 5-802 (2009 amendments) states 'Although there is no time limit for filing a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the date of filing can have an impact on the deadline for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,' and later 'Because there are no filing deadlines for filing state habeas petitions by unrepresented inmates in New Mexico...' (same Rule 5-802 PDF). NO LACHES EITHER: Sutphin ¶ 15 — 'We expressly join those jurisdictions that have declined to apply laches to habeas proceedings' (habeas_url). TWO NUMBERS IN RULE 5-802 THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE DEADLINES AND MUST NOT BE MISCODED AS SUCH: (1) Rule 5-802(C)(1)(b) gives a NMCD inmate one (1) year to petition challenging a prison DISCIPLINARY decision — a conditions-of-confinement claim, filed in a separate case in the county of confinement (Rule 5-802(E)(2)); it has nothing to do with attacking a conviction, and is waived if NMCD fails to give written notice of the limit. (2) Rule 5-802(L)(3) — in DEATH PENALTY cases, 'unless an extension of time is granted for good cause shown, within one-hundred eighty (180) days after appointment, the defendant shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' That 180-day capital provision is the only fixed habeas filing deadline in the rule; New Mexico's repeal of capital punishment and the current absence of death-sentenced prisoners was NOT verified from a primary source in this run, so treat the practical reach of (L)(3) as unverified. THE OUT-OF-CUSTODY TRACK: habeas requires custody or restraint, so someone who has finished the sentence uses Rule 5-803 NMRA instead (successor to coram nobis; superseded Rule 1-060(B) for post-sentence criminal matters). Rule 5-803(C) has a timeliness standard but no fixed period. Quoted verbatim in State v. Otero, 2020-NMCA-030 ¶ 8: a motion must be brought 'within a reasonable time after the completion of the petitioner's sentence[.]' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/February-25-2020-State-of-New-Mexico-v.-Miguel-Otero-No.-A-1-CA-37742.pdf), and in Pruit v. State, No. A-1-CA-38370 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2022) ¶ 7: filed 'within a reasonable time' unless the district court 'finds good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/August-18-2022-Randal-K.-Pruit-v.-State-of-New-Mexico-No.-A-1-CA-38370.pdf). Pruit and McGarrh v. State (A-1-CA-39044, Apr. 26, 2022) reject the argument that a fundamental-error claim escapes the reasonable-time requirement. So: for a person still in custody, filing today, there is NO deadline whatsoever; for a person off paper, the bar is a discretionary reasonableness standard, not a clock. OTHER NUMBERS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, ALSO NOT HABEAS DEADLINES: Rule 5-801 NMRA gives 90 days to move to REDUCE a sentence (discretionary leniency, not a validity challenge); its committee commentary says 'Motions challenging the legal validity of a conviction or a sentence should be brought under Rule 5-802 or Rule 5-803 NMRA.' The 120/90/45-day figures in Rule 5-802(H) are court- and counsel-side processing deadlines running from the file-stamp date after a petition arrives, not filing deadlines for the petitioner. Statutory habeas also survives independently at NMSA 1978 §§ 44-1-1 to 44-1-38 (Ch. 44, art. 1); § 44-1-1 — 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty, except in the cases in the following section specified, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus... to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful' — with no limitations period, and the compilation's own annotation to § 44-1-1 reads 'New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitioners. State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045' (https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/4388/1/document.do). Practical caveat for the comparison: the real limits on a stale New Mexico petition are the successive-petition discretion in Rule 5-802(I) and fundamental-error review for claims that could have been raised on direct appeal (Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021; Sutphin ¶ 10) — merits doctrines, not a filing clock. Sources fetched and read: static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project) for Sutphin; nmonesource.com (New Mexico Compilation Commission, official publisher) for NMSA chs. 31 and 44; nmcourts.gov domains for Rule 5-802 and the Court of Appeals opinions. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/nm/142/cases/0191-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/4379/1/document.do) | | New York | No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7002(a) (art. 70, Habeas Corpus); construed in People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966) | No limit no filing period CPL article 440 motion — CPL 440.10 (motion to vacate judgment); CPL 440.20 (motion to set aside sentence) · N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(1) | Detail **Habeas:** > A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state ... may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance. **Post-conviction remedy:** > At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that: **On excusing a late filing:** At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE, AND NEITHER DOES THE POST-CONVICTION MOTION. New York is a two-track no-deadline state; nothing here resembles a one-year PCRA-style bar. (1) Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed. CPLR art. 70 remains in force and contains exactly twelve sections, 7001-7012 (Application of article; Petition; When the writ shall be issued; Content of writ; Service; Obedience; Warrant; Return; Hearing; Determination; Appeal; Redetention) — verified against the current 2026 section list. None is a limitations provision, and no temporal condition appears in 7002(a). Keitt expressly held the CPLR did not narrow the writ: the Legislature 'did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available under the now repealed Civil Practice Act.' (2) Habeas is 'narrow' rather than 'available' for CONVICTION challenges because of judge-made limits, not a clock. Keitt: habeas tests 'a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right,' but 'Departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated ... by reason of practicality and necessity,' and 'the writ may not be utilized as a substitute for appeal or to again review the errors already passed on in an earlier appeal.' The decisive practical limit is the immediate-release rule: People ex rel. Douglas v. Vincent, 50 N.Y.2d 901 (1980) — no habeas relief 'because the only remedy he seeks would provide him a new trial or new appeal, and not a direction that he be immediately released from custody'; reaffirmed verbatim in People ex rel. Kaplan v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 N.Y.2d 648 (1983). Since almost every conviction challenge seeks retrial rather than release, habeas is not the working vehicle even though it is open indefinitely. (3) CPL 440.10 carries procedural bars, not a time bar. Subd. 2 (mandatory denial: claim already decided on appeal; record-based claim reviewable on a pending appeal; unjustifiable failure to appeal) and subd. 3 (discretionary denial) channel record-based claims to direct appeal. The only timing rules inside the statute are diligence standards, not fixed periods: (1)(g) newly discovered evidence 'must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence,' and (1)(i) trafficking-victim vacatur 'shall be made with due diligence.' CPL 440.20(1) likewise runs 'At any time after the entry of a judgment,' and adds death-sentence-specific grounds — with no deadline attached. (4) Not established here from primary sources: New York's judge-made writ of error coram nobis, the vehicle for ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel (a gap CPL art. 440 does not reach, as the Douglas dissent discusses at length). It is generally understood to carry no time limit, but I did not read the controlling case, so treat that as unverified. (5) Sourcing: quoted text was cross-checked against the current statute as published by the NY Senate (CPL 440.10 updated Feb. 11, 2022; CPLR 7002 updated Aug. 13, 2021) via newyork.public.law, since nysenate.gov returns 403 to this client; the quoted sentences are identical in both. The current CPL 440.10 includes post-2019 amendments (2021 trafficking/misdemeanor paragraphs, ineffective-assistance carve-outs in subd. 2) that the onecle snapshot lacks, but the operative opening phrase 'At any time after the entry of a judgment' is unchanged. Case texts are Harvard CAP scans via static.case.law; CourtListener was rate-limited (HTTP 429) throughout, so no post-1983 confirming decision was read. [View the habeas source](http://law.onecle.com/new-york/civil-practice-law-rules/CVP07002_7002.html) [View the post-conviction source](http://law.onecle.com/new-york/criminal-procedure/CPL0440.10_440.10.html) | | North Carolina | No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17-4(2) (habeas denied where detention rests on a final judgment of a competent tribunal); scope confirmed by In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962), quoted in In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976) | 7.0 years no excuse for a late filing Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR), N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 15A, art. 89 (§§ 15A-1411 to 15A-1422) · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a1) (noncapital, seven years), added by S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a); § 15A-1415(a) (capital, 120 days) | Detail **Habeas:** > Application to prosecute the writ shall be denied in the following cases: ... (2) Where persons are committed or detained by virtue of the final order, judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction **Post-conviction remedy:** > In a noncapital case, a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) **On excusing a late filing:** a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. All 46 sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 17 were read (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByChapter/Chapter_17.html); no section imposes any time limit on applying for the writ. § 17-3 lets 'Every person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within this State, for any criminal or supposed criminal matter... prosecute a writ of habeas corpus,' with no temporal condition. The only time-flavored provision is § 17-4(3), which bars habeas 'in vacation time' for one who 'willfully neglected, for the space of two whole sessions after his imprisonment' to apply — that removes the vacation-time writ only, not the writ itself. NOT SUBSUMED. This is the key structural point for the comparison: § 15A-1411(c) states verbatim that 'The relief formerly available by motion in arrest of judgment, motion to set aside the verdict, motion for new trial, post-conviction proceedings, coram nobis and all other post-trial motions is available by motion for appropriate relief. The availability of relief by motion for appropriate relief is not a bar to relief by writ of habeas corpus.' So unlike PA's PCRA, AL Rule 32, or DE Rule 61, the NC MAR is expressly NOT the exclusive remedy; the writ survives beside it. WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE.' § 17-4(2) denies the writ to anyone held under a final judgment of a competent tribunal, which is nearly every convicted person. In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976), quoting In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962): 'The only questions open to inquiry are whether on the record the court which imposed the sentence had jurisdiction of the matter or had exceeded its powers.' Stevens adds that the writ 'is not appropriately... a substitute for appeal,' and that § 17-33(2) extends jurisdiction to cases where 'though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission or event, which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be discharged' (read at https://static.case.law/nc-app/28/html/0471-01.html; § 17-33 at https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_17/GS_17-33.html). Dantzic v. State, 279 N.C. 212, 218 (1971) recites the same § 17-4(2) bar. Net: habeas lies with no deadline, but only for a void/jurisdictionally defective judgment or a post-judgment entitlement to release — not for trial error, IAC, or Brady. RECENT AND MATERIAL CHANGE — READ THIS BEFORE COMPARING NC TO OTHER STATES. Until 1 Dec 2025 the NC noncapital MAR had NO deadline at all: the repealed text of § 15A-1415(a) read 'At any time after verdict, a noncapital defendant by motion may seek appropriate relief upon any of the grounds enumerated in this section.' S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a) struck that and added the seven-year § 15A-1415(a1). Its effective-date clause, s. 15(c), reads verbatim: 'This section becomes effective December 1, 2025, and applies to verdicts entered on or after that date' (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/2025-2026/SL2025-70.html). BOTH REGIMES ARE THEREFORE LIVE TODAY (30 Jul 2026): a noncapital verdict entered before 1 Dec 2025 — i.e. essentially the entire current prison population — still has NO MAR deadline; only verdicts from 1 Dec 2025 forward carry the seven-year clock. A one-number answer for NC will be wrong for most petitioners. The 2557 figure is 7 x 365.25 rounded; the statute speaks in years, not days, and runs from the latest of the five events in § 15A-1415(a)(1)-(5), not from conviction. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: § 15A-1415(a) gives capital defendants 120 days from the latest of those events (or from appointment of postconviction counsel, (a)(6)); S.L. 2025-93, s. 6(a) also now requires the hearing within 24 months absent written findings of extraordinary circumstances. EXCEPTIONS TO THE MAR CLOCK: § 15A-1415(c) permits filing 'at any time after verdict' for newly discovered evidence bearing on guilt/innocence or death-penalty eligibility (itself subject to a 'reasonable time of its discovery' rule), a retroactive significant change in law, a fully served sentence, and — noncapital only — good cause plus actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under § 15A-1419(c). § 15A-1415(c1) allows filing at any time with the district attorney's consent, and § 15A-1415(d) allows extensions for good cause. § 15A-1415(b) separately limits which grounds may be raised more than 10 days after entry of judgment. S.L. 2025-70 also repealed grounds (b)(7) and (b)(9) effective 1 Dec 2025. OPERATIVE: the MAR. A person challenging a conviction today files an MAR; habeas will be denied under § 17-4(2) unless the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. But the untimed habeas remedy is a genuine residual backstop, and it matters more after the 2025 amendment: for a post-1 Dec 2025 verdict, a jurisdictional claim under § 15A-1415(b)(2) becomes time-barred by MAR at seven years, while the same defect remains reachable by habeas with no deadline. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a post-amendment NC appellate decision construing § 15A-1415(a1) or its interaction with habeas — none should be expected yet given the 1 Dec 2025 effective date. State v. Daw (N.C. 2024) surfaced as a recent habeas-adjacent NC Supreme Court decision but CourtListener returned HTTP 202/401 on the opinion body and it is outside case.law's coverage, so it is not relied on here. [View the habeas source](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_17/GS_17-4.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1415.html) | | North Dakota | No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.D. Cent. Code § 32-22-02 (Habeas Corpus — Who not entitled to relief); ch. 32-22 entire | 2 years no excuse for a late filing Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D. Cent. Code ch. 29-32.1 · N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-01(2) | Detail **Habeas:** > [N]ot entitled to relief from imprisonment or restraint under a writ of habeas corpus ... whenever it appears: ... Except as provided in section 32-22-17, that the person is detained in custody by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction **Post-conviction remedy:** > Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. **On excusing a late filing:** an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read all 43 sections of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-22 and there is no limitations period of any kind — no year/month/day filing bar anywhere in the chapter. North Dakota's short clock lives entirely in the post-conviction act, not in habeas. But habeas is NARROW as a conviction challenge, not a free alternative route: § 32-22-02(2) denies relief to anyone held 'by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction' except on § 32-22-17 grounds, which are jurisdictional/void-process only ('When the jurisdiction of such court or officer has been exceeded'; 'When the process is defective in some matter of substance required by law rendering such process void'; 'When the process is not authorized by any order or judgment of any court nor by any provisions of law') and are themselves 'subject to the restrictions of section 32-22-02.' EXCLUSIVITY: § 29-32.1-01(4) — 'a proceeding under this chapter replaces all other common law, statutory, or other remedies available before July 1, 1985, for collaterally challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence. It is to be used exclusively in place of them.' HABEAS NOT ABOLISHED: § 29-32.1-02 — 'A court in which original jurisdiction in habeas corpus is vested may entertain a habeas corpus proceeding under chapter 32-22 or this chapter. This chapter, to the extent appropriate, governs the proceeding.' Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1985) (read in full at https://static.case.law/nw2d/373/cases/0894-01.json) holds the UPPA cannot abolish habeas: cases finding the Act exclusive 'do not hold that the Uniform Act creates a new remedy and that habeas corpus is abolished. Such a construction of the statute would be blatantly violative of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution,' and 'The right of the people to seek an original writ of habeas corpus in this Court remains ... a cumulative remedy available to those incarcerated in this State.' Jensen construed the predecessor 1969 act (ch. 29-32) but rests on ND Const. art. I, § 14 and art. VI, § 2; still cited, e.g. Jensen v. Little, 459 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1990). UNVERIFIED POINT: because § 29-32.1-02 makes the UPPA govern a habeas proceeding 'to the extent appropriate,' the two-year bar may reach a habeas petition used as a conviction challenge. I found no North Dakota decision applying the two-year bar to a habeas petition, and no modern (post-2013) ND case entertaining habeas as a conviction challenge — so whether the deadline travels into habeas is open. Do not report ND as an unlimited-time habeas state without this caveat. THE 2-YEAR CLOCK IS RECENT: Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶ 12 (read at https://static.case.law/nw2d/882/cases/0724-01.json) — 'Section 29-32,1-01, N.D.C.C., was amended in 2013 to include the two-year statute of limitations and to make the state post-conviction relief process similar to federal habeas corpus.' Before 2013 the UPPA had no filing deadline either. FINALITY (§ 29-32.1-01(2)): runs from expiration of time to appeal to the ND Supreme Court; if appealed, from expiration of time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court; if certiorari sought, from that Court's final order. EXCEPTIONS (§ 29-32.1-01(3)): newly discovered evidence including DNA that would establish the petitioner did not engage in the conduct; a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely filing; or a new retroactively applicable interpretation of federal or state constitutional/statutory law by the U.S. Supreme Court or a ND appellate court — each carrying its own two-year clock from discovery, cessation of the disability, or the retroactive law's effective date. Venue is the court of conviction (§ 29-32.1-03(1)). NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: North Dakota has no death penalty; the maximum is 'Class AA felony, for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed' (§ 12.1-32-01(1), https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t12-1c32.pdf), so no separate capital track exists. [View the habeas source](https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t32c22.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t29c32-1.pdf) | | Ohio | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, ¶ 8-9 (Ohio Sup. Ct.); R.C. 2725.05; R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01-2725.28, no limitations period); Ohio Const. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c) | 1 year Petition for postconviction relief, R.C. 2953.21 · Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a) (current version eff. Apr. 12, 2021, H.B. 136) | Detail **Habeas:** > there is a limited exception to the adequate-remedy requirement: 'when a court's judgment is void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.' **Post-conviction remedy:** > a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal **On excusing a late filing:** a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key finding. Ohio never abolished or subsumed habeas: Ohio Const. art. I, § 8 forbids suspending the writ and art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c) vests courts of appeals with ORIGINAL jurisdiction in habeas corpus, so the statutory exclusivity clause below cannot displace it. I read every section heading of R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01 through 2725.28) on the official Ohio Laws chapter page (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/chapter-2725) and read R.C. 2725.04 in full, which exhaustively prescribes what a habeas petition must specify — nothing in the chapter imposes any filing period. The only time limits anywhere in the chapter are collateral: six hours to hand over a copy of the commitment warrant on demand (2725.22) and a two-year limit on CIVIL actions to recover forfeitures from officials who disobey the writ (2725.27). Neither is a habeas filing deadline. Leyman itself confirms the practice: 1999 conviction, habeas petition filed 2014, decided on the merits in 2016 with no timeliness bar raised or applied. BUT THE WRIT IS NARROW. R.C. 2725.05 (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2725.05): 'If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court... and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed.' Leyman ¶ 8 adds that the writ is 'generally available only when the petitioner's maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully' (quoting Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213), that the petitioner must be entitled to immediate release, and that 'habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law' — with the void-for-lack-of-jurisdiction exception quoted above. So habeas reaches jurisdictional/facially-void judgments and expired-sentence detention, not ordinary constitutional trial error. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE. R.C. 2953.21(K): 'Subject to the appeal of a sentence for a felony that is authorized by section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, the remedy set forth in this section is the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case...' This is why the 365-day postconviction petition, not habeas, is the operative route for an ordinary claim (ineffective assistance, Brady, etc.) — but it does not and constitutionally cannot extinguish the narrow habeas remedy the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Leyman in 2016. CLOCK MECHANICS. The 365 days runs from the date the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal — not from conviction or from finality — and if no appeal is taken, from expiration of the time to appeal. The figure was 180 days until H.B. 663 (eff. Mar. 23, 2015) raised it to 365; a comparison drawn from older sources will show 180. EXCEPTIONS. R.C. 2953.23(A) (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.23) permits an untimely or successive petition only if the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts, or a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right applies, AND shows by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty; or on qualifying DNA results establishing actual innocence. CAPITAL DIFFERENCES. Same 365 days, but measured from transcript filing in the Ohio Supreme Court rather than the court of appeals; capital petitioners get appointed Rule 20-certified counsel, postconviction discovery, no page limits, and 180 days to amend as of right. The separate serious-mental-illness petition under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv) had its own 365-day window running from the amendment's effective date (Apr. 12, 2021), which has since closed. UNVERIFIED: I did not read the Ohio Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court or the Rules of Appellate Procedure, so I cannot rule out a court-rule timing provision for original actions by primary source; the no-deadline finding rests on the absence of any period in Chapter 2725 plus the Ohio Supreme Court reaching the merits of a 15-year-late petition in Leyman. CourtListener returned HTTP 429 throughout, so no case-law corroboration beyond the Leyman slip opinion was obtainable. [View the habeas source](https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2016/2016-Ohio-1093.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.21) | | Oklahoma | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080 (as amended by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2022) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Application for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1089 · Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080.1(A) (added by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2022) | Detail **Habeas:** > Excluding a timely appeal, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence including, but not limited to, writs of habeas corpus. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: **On excusing a late filing:** this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction OKLAHOMA FLIPPED IN 2022. Before Nov. 1, 2022 the non-capital Post-Conviction Procedure Act had NO filing deadline, and § 1080 said only that the Act 'encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods' of attack. Laws 2022, c. 144 did two things: (1) amended § 1080 to name 'writs of habeas corpus' expressly among the replaced remedies, and (2) added § 1080.1, a one-year limitation. So a person filing a state habeas petition to challenge an Oklahoma conviction today is filing a PCPA application, and it is time-barred after one year. NO UNTIMED HABEAS ROUTE SURVIVES for conviction challenges. Trigger is the latest of five dates (§ 1080.1(A)(1)-(5)): finality of direct review in the OCCA or expiration of time to seek it; gubernatorial revocation of parole/conditional release; removal of a state-created impediment; recognition of a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right; or the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence. § 1080.1(B) closes the jurisdictional escape hatch verbatim: 'this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.' § 1080.1(C) applies it to applications filed on or after Nov. 1, 2022. Companion amendment, 22 O.S. § 1086, now requires that 'All grounds for relief available to an applicant under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, including claims challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court, must be raised in his or her original, supplemental or amended application.' THE HABEAS CHAPTER ITSELF (12 O.S. §§ 1331-1355, R.L. 1910) contains no filing deadline of any kind — I read all 25 sections in the current official Title 12 (https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os12.pdf) and there is no limitation period. But it never reached a final conviction anyway: 12 O.S. § 1342 provides 'No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process, whereby the party is in custody... Second. Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.' Habeas therefore survives in Oklahoma only for custody NOT resting on a final conviction — e.g. 22 O.S. § 1079 (review of denial of bail on appeal 'by habeas corpus proceedings before the appellate court'), pretrial detention, extradition, and custody disputes under 12 O.S. § 1354. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND SHORTER: 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(1) requires the capital application be 'filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety (90) days from the date the appellee's brief on direct appeal is filed or, if a reply brief is filed, ninety (90) days from the filing of that reply brief' — 90 days, filed in the OCCA rather than the district court, and § 1089(C) limits capital claims to those that could not have been raised on direct appeal. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION LEFT OPEN — UNVERIFIED: Okla. Const. art. II, § 10 reads 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this State' (verified verbatim from https://www.oklegislature.gov/OKStatutes/CompleteTitles/AllOKConstitutionArticles.rtf). Whether § 1080.1 suspends the writ as to jurisdictional claims is a live question I could not resolve from a primary source. CORROBORATION, NOT AUTHORITY: CourtListener's search API confirms the OCCA is applying § 1080.1 — Hammon v. State, 2023 OK CR 19, 540 P.3d 486 (matched snippet: 'remained the case until November 1, 2022, when Section 1080.1 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes became effective') and Acosta v. State, 2026 OK CR 9 (Feb. 24, 2026) (matched snippet: 'Section 1080.1(A)(1) states: A. A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application'). I could NOT retrieve either full opinion — oscn.net returns HTTP 201 to automated requests and CourtListener's opinion pages return HTTP 202 — so I have not read those opinions and do not rest any figure on them. Every number above comes from statutory text I read in full. [View the habeas source](https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os22.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os22.pdf) | | Oregon | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · ORS 34.330 (Who may not prosecute writ), read with ORS 138.540(1) and Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 364-66 (1992) | 2 years no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition, ORS 138.510-138.680 · ORS 138.510(3) | Detail **Habeas:** > A person may not prosecute a writ of habeas corpus if: ... (3) Except as provided in ORS 138.530, the person is eligible to obtain post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition: **On excusing a late filing:** A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — but it is not a route to a conviction challenge in Oregon, so the no-deadline fact does not create an unlimited attack on a judgment. I read all of ORS ch. 34 (2025 text, includes 2025 c.476): the habeas sections, ORS 34.310-34.730, contain no limitation period of any kind. The only 60-day limit in chapter 34 is ORS 34.030, which governs the WRIT OF REVIEW (ORS 34.010-34.100), a different writ; the 21-day limit is mandamus (ORS 34.130); the 7-day limit in ORS 34.370 is the court's deadline to rule on a show-cause order, not a petitioner's filing deadline. Habeas is expressly NOT abolished: ORS 138.540(1) ends, 'With the exception of habeas corpus, all common law post-conviction remedies, including the motion to correct the record, coram nobis, the motion for relief in the nature of coram nobis and the motion to vacate the judgment, are abolished in criminal cases.' WHY 'SUBSUMED' RATHER THAN 'NARROW': three primary sources close the conviction-challenge route. (1) ORS 138.540(1): a PCR petition 'shall be the exclusive means, after judgment rendered upon a conviction for a crime, for challenging the lawfulness of such judgment or the proceedings upon which it is based.' (2) ORS 34.330(2)-(3) bars the writ to a person restrained 'by virtue of the judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction' and to any person 'eligible to obtain post-conviction relief.' (3) Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353 (1992) (read in full via static.case.law/or/314/cases/0353-01.json): 'If the procedures provided by that act are a reasonable substitute for the writ of habeas corpus, they are constitutional... Persons desiring that same opportunity, but asserting substantive grounds established in the PCHA, must utilize the procedures set out in that act.' Bartz upheld the PCR limitation period against Or Const Art I, sec 23 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion, or invasion the public safety require it'). NO JURISDICTIONAL CARVE-OUT SURVIVES OUTSIDE PCR: ORS 138.530(1)(b) makes 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon petitioner's conviction' a PCR ground, so even facially-void/jurisdictional attacks are PCR claims. Mueller v. Benning, 314 Or 615, 620 n 2 (1992) (read in full): 'In the statutory scheme, if post-conviction relief is available, habeas corpus generally is not. ORS 34.330(3); ORS 138.540(1).' Twitty v. Maass, 95 Or App 715 (1989) (read in full) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction because PCR was available, and held a petitioner must first litigate that PCR is unavailable before claiming habeas. TWO NARROW RESIDUAL CHANNELS, both deadline-free but not general routes: ORS 138.530(3) provides the PCR act 'shall not be construed to limit the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas corpus as provided in the Constitution of this state' — Or Const Art VII (Amended), sec 2: 'the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in... habeas corpus proceedings' (discretionary, rarely exercised); and ORS 138.530(2) preserves relief 'available prior to May 26, 1959, under the writ of habeas corpus,' but as a rule of construction applied INSIDE a PCR proceeding, not as a separate action. WHERE HABEAS IS STILL FULLY LIVE (no deadline): ORS 138.540(2) — a person restrained under a conviction who 'asserts the illegality of the restraint upon grounds other than the unlawfulness of such judgment' must proceed 'by habeas corpus or other remedies,' expressly including 'unlawful revocation of parole or conditional pardon or completed service of the sentence imposed'; and conditions of confinement under ORS 34.362, which requires facts showing deprivation of a constitutional right 'that requires immediate judicial attention and for which no other timely remedy is practicably available' (Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or 21 (1978); Barrett v. Belleque, 344 Or 91 (2008), both read). PCR DEADLINE MECHANICS: 730 days runs from, per ORS 138.510(3)(a)-(c), entry of judgment in the register if no appeal; the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts; or, if certiorari is sought, the later of denial of certiorari or entry of final state judgment after remand. ESCAPE CLAUSE: the two years does not bar grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition' (ORS 138.510(3)) — a genuine safety valve, not a formality. Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or App 295 (1998) (read in full) upheld the separate retroactive one-year period in ORS 138.510(4) (pre-Aug 5, 1989 convictions; expired Nov 4, 1994) even though it carries NO escape clause, rejecting the argument that a short PCR bar suspends habeas. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but ORS 138.510(2) permits a next-friend petition on behalf of a person convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death on a preponderance showing of mental incapacity or lack of court access plus a significant relationship. EXPIRED SPECIAL WINDOW: Or Laws 2023, ch 368, sec 1 (printed as a note to ORS 138.510) reopened filing 'at any time before December 30, 2024' for nonunanimous-jury-verdict claims notwithstanding ORS 138.510(3) and (4); that window has closed. Text verified against the Oregon Legislature's official ORS pages current through the 2025 session (ORS ch. 138 carries 2025 c.268 amendments; ORS ch. 34 carries 2025 c.476). [View the habeas source](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors034.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (Ch. 65, §§ 6501–6505, read in full, contains no limitations period); Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546 · 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); accord Pa.R.Crim.P. 901(A) | Detail **Habeas:** > Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: **On excusing a late filing:** Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: PENNSYLVANIA'S HABEAS STATUTE CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE — 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 65 (§§ 6501 Writ not to be suspended, 6502 Power to issue writ, 6503 Right to apply for writ, 6504 Return on writ, 6505 Interference with writ prohibited) was read in full and contains no limitations period of any kind. That fact is, however, almost entirely inoperative for a conviction challenge, and a comparison that stops there would mislead. TWO STATUTES CLOSE THE DOOR. (1) § 6503(b), quoted above, withdraws habeas wherever 'a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.' (2) 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (fetched: https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.042.000..HTM): 'The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.' CASE LAW READ (Caselaw Access Project full text): Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016) (https://static.case.law/a3d/136/cases/0493-01.json) — 'this Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review,' quoting Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013): 'The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.' Descardes holds the bar applies even where the petitioner is INELIGIBLE for PCRA relief (sentence completed) and even where the legal basis for the claim did not exist until after the one-year window closed — cognizability, not eligibility, is the test, so there is no fallback writ. THE RESIDUAL HABEAS IS REAL BUT NARROW AND IS NOT A CONVICTION CHALLENGE. Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007) (https://static.case.law/a2d/938/cases/1034-01.json): 'Despite our prior indications that all claims that can be channeled into the PCRA should be so channeled, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended in this Commonwealth... we have never held that the remedy of habeas corpus does not exist for the rare instance where the PCRA offers no remedy.' West allowed habeas for a substantive-due-process challenge to a nine-year delay in EXECUTING a valid sentence; Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007), discussed at length in West, allowed it for an international-law challenge to carrying out a death sentence. Both attack the continuing validity of custody, not the conviction. Claims that DO attack a conviction — including want of jurisdiction, § 9543(a)(2)(viii), and illegal sentence, § 9543(a)(2)(vii) — are expressly enumerated PCRA grounds and must go through the PCRA. So Pennsylvania is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state for this comparison; it is the opposite of one. THE ONE-YEAR PCRA BAR IS JURISDICTIONAL, not a statute of limitations: Descardes holds that where the petition is untimely or the petitioner ineligible, 'both the PCRA court and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.' § 9545(a) adds that 'No court shall have authority to entertain a request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a petition under this subchapter.' EXCEPTIONS to the year, § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii): governmental interference; facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; a newly recognized constitutional right held by the U.S. or Pennsylvania Supreme Court to apply retroactively. A petition invoking an exception must itself be filed 'within one year of the date the claim could have been presented,' § 9545(b)(2) — this was 60 days until Act 146 of Oct. 24, 2018; the statutory note states the amendment 'shall apply only to claims arising one year before the effective date of section 3 or thereafter.' 'Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review... or at the expiration of time for seeking the review,' § 9545(b)(3). CAPITAL CASES GET NO LONGER PERIOD: § 9542 provides 'Except as specifically provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to capital and noncapital cases'; the capital-specific provisions in § 9545(c) concern stays of execution, not the filing deadline. STANDING: § 9543(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.000..HTM) requires the petitioner to be 'currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole,' awaiting execution, serving a sentence that must expire first, or — subparagraph (iv), added after Descardes — to have 'completed a sentence... and is seeking relief based upon DNA evidence obtained under section 9543.1(d).' ONE GENUINELY UNTIMED ROUTE EXISTS: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.001..HTM) — a convicted person 'may apply by making a written motion to the sentencing court at any time for the performance of forensic DNA testing'; § 9543.1(a)(4) repeats that 'DNA testing may be sought at any time.' That is a testing motion inside the PCRA scheme, not habeas. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE LEGISLATOR: a Pennsylvanian challenging a conviction today has one year from finality under the PCRA, enforced as a jurisdictional bar, with three narrow exceptions each carrying their own one-year clock; state habeas corpus, though never repealed and never subject to any deadline, is unavailable to him because his claim is cognizable under the PCRA. [View the habeas source](https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.065.003.000..HTM) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.045.000..HTM) | | Rhode Island | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9-1 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 1), as construed in DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 600 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Grieco, 430 A.2d 412, 413 n.1 (R.I. 1981)) | No limit dismissal for delay is discretionary Post Conviction Remedy, R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 10-9.1 · R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 3) | Detail **Habeas:** > Every person imprisoned in any correctional institution or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus **Post-conviction remedy:** > A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the appropriate court. An application may be filed at any time. **On excusing a late filing:** laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense' Rhode Island is the inverse of the PCRA-type states: the purpose-built post-conviction act is the one with NO deadline, and habeas is the remedy that was taken away. Both moves came from one session law, P.L. 1974, ch. 220 — § 1 rewrote the habeas statute to carve out convicted prisoners, § 3 created ch. 10-9.1. HABEAS: § 10-9-1 by its own terms excludes 'persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding.' DiLibero holds a habeas petition was therefore 'an inappropriate avenue for relief from imprisonment' for a petitioner 'imprisoned as a result of a final judgment of conviction.' § 10-9.1-1(b) reinforces this: the post-conviction remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' CAUTION ON habeas_no_deadline=true: ch. 10-9 (read in full via its section index, §§ 10-9-1 to 10-9-32) contains no limitations provision of any kind, so the field is literally true — but it is true because no deadline was ever needed, not because a convicted person has an open-ended habeas route. Habeas in RI survives intact and untimed for people NOT held under a final criminal judgment (pretrial detention, extradition, other restraint); it is simply not a conviction-challenge vehicle. Do not tabulate RI as 'habeas available, no deadline.' Also, § 10-9-22 makes denial of a habeas petition non-appealable (confirmed in DiLibero). POST-CONVICTION: 'at any time' is real statutory text but is judicially narrowed. Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005): 'we construe the statutory term as meaning at any reasonable time,' holding laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense.' The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance both unreasonable delay and prejudice — so the practical bar is fact-specific and party-raised, not a fixed clock. There is thus no number to report for RI; a legislator comparing RI to Pennsylvania's one-year PCRA should be told RI has no limitations period at all on either instrument. DNA-testing petitions under § 10-9.1-12 likewise carry no deadline. Ch. 10-9.1 contains no capital-case variation. NOT VERIFIED: I read § 10-9.1-8's title ('Waiver of or failure to assert claims') from the chapter index but not its text, so I make no claim about how RI bars successive applications; and I did not test whether any residual state-constitutional habeas survives the § 10-9-1 carve-out, though DiLibero and Grieco give no hint of one. [View the habeas source](http://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9/10-9-1.htm) [View the post-conviction source](http://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-3.htm) | | South Carolina | No limit habeas survives narrowly · Moore v. Stirling, Op. No. 28088 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2022) (orig. juris. habeas; quoting Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008)); S.C. Const. art. I, § 18 & art. V, § 5; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200 | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act — application for post-conviction relief (PCR), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 · S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A) | Detail **Habeas:** > Notwithstanding the exhaustion of appellate review, including all direct appeals and PCR, habeas corpus relief remains available to prisoners in South Carolina. **Post-conviction remedy:** > An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal... **On excusing a late filing:** An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal... HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key comparison point. No limitations period appears anywhere in the habeas chapter (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200, read in full; every time limit there governs how fast officials must act AFTER the writ issues, not when a prisoner may file), and none in Rule 245, SCACR (original jurisdiction, last amended Apr. 30, 2024) or Rule 240, SCACR (extraordinary-writ petitions). The one-year period is textually confined to PCR: § 17-27-45(A) limits 'An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter,' i.e. Chapter 27 only. Demonstrated in practice: Moore was convicted and sentenced to death in 2001, exhausted PCR, filed federal habeas in 2015, and filed this state habeas petition in 2020 (App. Case No. 2020-001519); the Court ordered briefing, heard argument, and denied on the merits — no timeliness bar raised or applied. Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 495 S.E.2d 426 (1998), reached 1976 convictions attacked by habeas in 1995 on the same footing. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': South Carolina splits the writ in two. (1) The STATUTORY writ is superseded. Gibson: 'The availability of habeas corpus has been severely limited by the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act... Thus, this Act supersedes and encompasses the habeas corpus procedure provided by statute.' Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 495 S.E.2d 429 (1998) (decided the same day) holds 'a matter which is cognizable under the Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the circuit or other lower courts.' (2) The CONSTITUTIONAL writ expressly survives § 17-27-20(B)'s exclusivity clause. Gibson: 'habeas corpus continues to be available as a constitutional remedy provided a petitioner qualifies for this extraordinary relief and clears the procedural hurdles.' Simpson n.4: 'Under art. 5, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution, this Court retains the ability to entertain writs of habeas corpus in our original jurisdiction.' Simpson expressly denied that this curtailment suspends the writ under art. I, § 18: 'our action today does not suspend the writ, but merely curtails its use to those situations where the Act would not be applicable.' GATES ON THE SURVIVING WRIT (all from Moore, quoting Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990)): the petitioner must plead exhaustion of all other remedies, and must prove '(1) the existence of a constitutional violation; and (2) the denial of fundamental fairness which, in the setting, is shocking to the universal sense of justice.' 'Habeas relief is seldom used and acts as an ultimate ensurer of fundamental constitutional rights,' and 'a defendant bears a much higher burden of proof in a habeas proceeding.' Hamm v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 744 S.E.2d 503 (2013), and In re Chapman, 419 S.C. 172, 796 S.E.2d 843 (2017), restate the rule as current: 'habeas relief is only available when other remedies, such as PCR, are inadequate or unavailable.' So the no-deadline writ is not an escape hatch from the one-year PCR bar — Hamm holds that blowing the § 17-27-45 deadline is itself a failure to exhaust that BARS habeas ('Because Hamm failed to exhaust all other remedies, he is barred from habeas corpus relief'). A legislator comparing states should note that South Carolina's practical deadline for challenging a conviction is one year, and the timeless writ behind it is reserved for the gravest constitutional violations. OTHER PCR TIMING: § 17-27-45(B) gives one year from recognition of a new retroactive constitutional right; § 17-27-45(C) gives one year from actual discovery of new material facts, or when they could have been found by reasonable diligence. § 17-27-90 separately bars successive applications absent 'sufficient reason' for the omission. CAPITAL: no different deadline — the same one-year § 17-27-45(A) applies; § 17-27-160 (S.C. Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) adds only expedited procedures (30-day return, status conference within 30 days, merits hearing within 180 days) plus two appointed counsel and full civil discovery (§ 17-27-150(B)). ARCHAIC PROVISION, NOT A DEADLINE: § 17-17-20, descended from the 1679 English act, forfeits habeas 'to be granted in vacation time' for one who 'wilfully neglected by the space of two whole terms after his imprisonment to pray a habeas corpus.' It restricts only vacation-time writs under Chapter 17, does not bar a term-time or original-jurisdiction petition, and no modern SC decision found here applies it; it should not be reported as a filing deadline. NOT VERIFIED: whether any unpublished or post-2022 SC decision has narrowed this further — a CourtListener sweep of published SC opinions filed after Jan. 1, 2018 returned nothing altering the rule, and Moore (2022) is the most recent controlling statement located. [View the habeas source](https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/28088.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota | 2 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · SDCL 21-27-3.3 (Two-year statute of limitation), enacted SL 2012, ch 118, § 3; read with SDCL 21-27-1 and Asmussen v. Young, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶¶ 4, 6 | — None · SDCL ch. 23A-34 (Post-Conviction Proceedings) — repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15; South Dakota has had no separate post-conviction act since | Detail **Habeas:** > A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. This limitation period shall run from the latest of: (1) The date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review... **Post-conviction remedy:** > CHAPTER 23A-34 POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS [REPEALED] [Repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15] **On excusing a late filing:** A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. South Dakota is the inverse of the PCRA-style states: it kept habeas corpus as the collateral remedy and put the one-year-style deadline ON the habeas writ itself. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act (SDCL ch. 23A-34) was repealed in 1983 by the same act that recodified habeas (SL 1983, ch 169), so ch. 21-27 habeas is the sole general vehicle. Do NOT report SD as 'no habeas deadline' — since 2012 there is a two-year limit, and the statute is patterned on AEDPA with nearly verbatim trigger language, but it gives two years where the federal act gives one (Asmussen, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶ 8). Deadline is stated as 'two-year' in the text; 730 is my day conversion, not a statutory figure. Four alternative accrual dates: finality of direct review; removal of unconstitutional state-created impediment; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right (requires recognition by BOTH the U.S. and S.D. Supreme Courts); discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence. 'Factual predicate' is objective — knowing the facts starts the clock even if the prisoner does not understand their legal significance (Asmussen ¶¶ 9-10). Transitional rule: for judgments final before July 1, 2012, the two years ran from July 1, 2012, i.e. expired July 1, 2014 (Hughbanks v. Dooley, 2016 S.D. 76, ¶ 22, as applied in Asmussen ¶ 6 — I read this holding as recited in Asmussen, not in Hughbanks itself). Predecessor SDCL 21-27-3.2 (repealed 2012) was not a limitations period at all but a rebuttable five-year presumption of prejudice to the State (Davis v. Weber, 2013 S.D. 88, ¶ 10) — do not carry that five-year figure into a current comparison. Scope, not timing, is the other narrowing: habeas reaches only (1) the court's jurisdiction, (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law, and (3) in certain cases deprivation of basic constitutional rights (Davis ¶ 9) — broad enough for ineffective-assistance claims, which SDCL 21-27-4 expressly contemplates, so I classify it 'available' rather than 'narrow.' Other limits: custody is required (SDCL 21-27-1); no application may be maintained while a direct appeal is pending or during the time to perfect one (SDCL 21-27-3.1); successive applications require circuit-court leave and are confined to newly discovered evidence of actual innocence or a new retroactive constitutional rule (SDCL 21-27-5.1); the writ is unavailable for penal disciplinary sanctions (SDCL 21-27-1.1); appellate review requires a certificate of probable cause (SDCL 21-27-18.1). The felony DNA-testing chapter (SDCL ch. 23-5B) is an adjunct motion, not a post-conviction act, and SDCL 23-5B-17 states 'Nothing in this chapter provides a basis for relief in any state or federal habeas corpus proceeding.' No capital carve-out found: ch. 21-27's section list contains no death-penalty provision and 21-27-3.3 applies to 'all applications for relief under this chapter.' Currency check: the SDLRC source line for 21-27-3.3 shows only 'SL 2012, ch 118, § 3' with no later amendment, and a CourtListener search returned Lee v. Weber, 2023 S.D. 54 applying it, though I did not read that opinion. [View the habeas source](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/21-27-3.3.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/23A-34.html?all=true) | | Tennessee | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (Tenn. Supreme Court, construing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130) | 1 year Post-Conviction Procedure Act petition, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to -122 · Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) | Detail **Habeas:** > Although there is no habeas corpus statute of limitations, the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow. **Post-conviction remedy:** > a person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken **On excusing a late filing:** The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity HABEAS IS NOT SUBSUMED AND HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Tennessee keeps two parallel routes: Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 19 — 'In Tennessee, two distinct procedural avenues are available to collaterally attack a final judgment in a criminal case — habeas corpus and post-conviction petitions.' The writ is constitutionally entrenched (Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15) and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130; I read every section heading in ch. 21 in the official code XML (release 76, 2021-05-21) and there is no limitations provision anywhere in the chapter. What limits habeas is the CLAIM, not the clock: relief lies 'only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired' (Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164, quoted in the Tenn. Crim. App.'s Keel v. Adams, No. W2025-00356-CCA-R3-HC, filed 07/02/2026, at 4). Voidable claims — ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, denial of counsel not shown on the judgment's face — are NOT cognizable in habeas and must go to post-conviction. Practical confirmation that no deadline operates: Alvin Dean Shaver v. Sean Phillips, No. E2024-01385-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2025), at 2 — 'Twenty-eight years later, in July 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus' from a 1996 guilty plea; the court reached the merits and never raised timeliness (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2025/01/31/alvin_dean_shaver_v._sean_phillips_warden.pdf). STATUTORY NARROWING: § 29-21-101(b), added by Acts 2009, ch. 420 and applicable to petitions filed on or after June 11, 2009, strips habeas from guilty-plea/negotiated-sentence petitioners raising concurrent-vs-consecutive sentencing or release-eligibility-percentage claims. § 29-21-102 excludes persons held under federal process. POST-CONVICTION SIDE: the one-year period is jurisdictional and expressly non-tollable — § 40-30-102(a): 'The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity'; the code's annotation to that section cites Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) for due-process tolling where the statute would deny 'a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in a meaningful time and manner' (I read the annotation, not the Seals opinion itself). § 40-30-102(b) allows three late-filing exceptions — new retroactive constitutional right (1 year from the ruling), new scientific evidence of actual innocence (no period stated), and invalidated prior conviction used to enhance (1 year from that ruling) — and § 40-30-102(c) permits only one petition per judgment, with reopening under § 40-30-117. A THIRD, UNLIMITED ROUTE: the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, § 40-30-303, lets a person convicted of enumerated offenses 'at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis' — also no deadline. CAPITAL: I found no capital-specific variation in either the habeas chapter or § 40-30-102; the one-year period applies to capital cases on its face — treat any capital carve-out as unverified. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 (motion to correct an illegal sentence) is a further possible route I did not read and do not assert. CURRENCY: statutory text taken from the official Tennessee Code XML transform, release 76 (2021-05-21); § 29-21-101 last amended 2009, § 40-30-102 last amended 1996, and Tenn. Crim. App. opinions filed through July 2026 apply both in identical terms. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/sw3d/153/cases/0016-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-tn/transforms/tn/octn/r76/gov.tn.tca.title.40.html) | | Texas | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (article contains no filing deadline), as rewritten by Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, sec. 5 (S.B. 440); Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (majority footnote) | — None · Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, Sec. 5 (exclusivity clause), read in S.B. 440 enrolled text, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) — Texas enacted no PCRA-style post-conviction act; habeas is itself the post-conviction remedy | Detail **Habeas:** > The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims. **Post-conviction remedy:** > After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner. **On excusing a late filing:** The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims. TEXAS IS A HABEAS-ONLY STATE, AND NON-CAPITAL STATE HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE AT ALL. Texas never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act, so there is no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue and no one-year period to report; pc_vehicle is null and the pc_* deadline fields are inapplicable rather than 'no deadline' findings. Art. 11.07 IS the state habeas statute and is simultaneously the exclusive post-conviction vehicle for a final felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death (Sec. 1: 'This article establishes the procedures for an application for writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death'). I read all seven sections of Art. 11.07 as rewritten in 1995 and none imposes any time limit. Art. 11.07 Sec. 4 is a subsequent-application / abuse-of-the-writ bar (new factual or legal basis, or actual innocence), NOT a limitations period — do not code it as a deadline. The only temporal bar is the EQUITABLE doctrine of laches, which is fact-specific and has no fixed period: Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoted above); Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (read in full at https://static.case.law/sw3d/398/cases/0206-01.json), which broadened prejudice to a totality-of-the-circumstances test and expressly REJECTED a proposed presumption of prejudice after five years; Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (court may raise laches sua sponte). Perez's own survey footnote confirms Texas is on the no-limitations side: 'Over half of all states now employ statutes of limitation for state post-conviction relief, thus making the equitable doctrine of laches largely inapplicable in those states.' The Carrio dissent states the legislative inference directly: 'While the Legislature specifically provided time requisites for filing petitions in death penalty cases under article 11.071, it chose not to impose timeliness requirements for filing petitions in other felony cases under article 11.07.' CAPITAL CASES DIFFER SHARPLY: Art. 11.071 Sec. 4(a) does carry a deadline. As amended by S.B. 1728, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (read at https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/75R/billtext/html/SB01728F.htm): an application 'must be filed in the convicting court not later than the 180th day after the date the court of criminal appeals appoints counsel under Section 2 or not later than the 45th day after the date the appellee's original brief is filed on direct appeal with the court of criminal appeals' (current law runs the 180 days from appointment by the convicting court and adds 'whichever date is later'). Sec. 4(b) presumes later filings untimely absent good cause shown by 'particularized justifying circumstances,' and Sec. 4(f) forecloses good cause entirely after the 91st day past the filing date. So the correct comparative statement is: Texas habeas = no deadline for non-capital felonies, 180/45 days for capital. Other Chapter 11 vehicles are also habeas: Art. 11.072 (community supervision / probated sentences, where the conviction is not final), Arts. 11.08-11.09 (pretrial). Chapter 64 post-conviction DNA testing is a separate limited-purpose proceeding, not a conviction-challenge substitute, and habeas does not lie for errors in it (Ex parte Baker, 185 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Texas Const. art. I, sec. 12 makes the writ 'a writ of right' that 'shall never be suspended.' SOURCING CAVEAT: statutes.capitol.texas.gov was rebuilt as a JavaScript single-page app and returns only a navigation shell to non-browser clients for every Docs/GetStatute/PDF path, so the article text could not be read from the official codification. I therefore read the statutory language in the enrolled bill text on capitol.texas.gov (S.B. 440 for the 1995 Art. 11.07 rewrite and the enactment of Art. 11.071; S.B. 1728 for the 1997 amendment to Art. 11.071 Sec. 4). Confirmed that no deadline has since been added to Art. 11.07 by (a) the CCA's continuing 1999-2021 laches jurisprudence, which would be unnecessary if a limitations period existed, and (b) the Court of Criminal Appeals staff paper 'Article 11.07 Writs of Habeas Corpus' hosted on the official judiciary site (https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1457413/1107-paper-53123-update.pdf), whose 'Delay, Laches, & Waiver' section identifies laches as the sole temporal defense and cites Ex parte Hill, 632 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); I did not read Hill itself, so it is cited here only as reported by that source. [View the habeas source](https://static.case.law/sw2d/992/cases/0486-01.json) [View the post-conviction source](https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/74R/billtext/html/SB00440F.htm) | | Utah | Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Utah Code § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (Post-Conviction Remedies Act), Replacement of prior remedies (eff. 5/9/2017) | 1 year no excuse for a late filing Petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C · Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1) (eff. 5/4/2022) | Detail **Habeas:** > This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal... This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. **On excusing a late filing:** A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. Utah is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state. Habeas corpus survives in Utah, but only for restraints that do not challenge a conviction: § 78B-9-102(2)(a) exempts from the PCRA only 'habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.' Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1) (extraordinary relief for 'wrongful restraints on personal liberty') applies only 'Except for instances governed by Rule 65C,' and Rule 65C(a) governs 'all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65B and =65C). So for a conviction challenge the writ route is closed and the PCRA's one-year bar is the only deadline. RESIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT AUTHORITY, but it carries no separate/longer deadline. Utah Const. art. I, § 5: 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/ArticleI/UC_AI_S5_1800010118000101.html); art. VIII, §§ 3, 5 give the courts power to issue all extraordinary writs. In Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 174, the Utah Supreme Court held: 'we exercise our writ power independent of the PCRA. But that independent exercise is largely hidden from view because Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C—which incorporates the PCRA—governs the exercise of that power. And we exercise that power in total harmony with the PCRA.' And at ¶ 194: 'under the current version of rule 65C, we can only hear a time-barred case, like Patterson's, when failure to do so would violate a petitioner's constitutional rights' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Patterson%20v.%20State20210826.pdf). Patterson expressly rejected the free-standing common-law 'egregious injustice' exception floated in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, and Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 ('We eliminated any such exception when we adopted rule 65C,' ¶ 192), and upheld the one-year bar against Open Courts and Suspension Clause challenges. WATCH FOR A STALE CITE: Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) said 'no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition' — that is no longer Utah law. Patterson ¶¶ 200-04 rejected it, and Nunez v. State, 2026 UT 25 (filed 2026-07-30) declined again to 'reinstate the now defunct interests of justice exception to the PCRA's time bar' (¶ 28), reaffirming 'we have incorporated the PCRA through rule 65C—including the PCRA's one-year statute of limitation' (¶ 26) (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Nunez%20v.%20State20260730.pdf). Patterson ¶ 212 left open that some future petitioner might show the bar unconstitutional as applied; no one has yet. ACCRUAL AND TOLLING soften the one year: § 78B-9-107(2) runs it from the LATER of six dates, including '(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based,' and § 78B-9-107(3)(a) tolls for periods the petitioner was prevented from filing 'due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, due to physical or mental incapacity,' or, for human-trafficking claims, force/fraud/coercion. CAPITAL CASES get no longer deadline — the same one year applies, and Utah Code § 78B-9-202(5) provides that appointment of capital post-conviction counsel 'does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 78B-9-107' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S202_2026050620260506.html). CARVE-OUTS: § 78B-9-107(6) provides the one-year bar 'does not apply to a petition filed under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence'; § 78B-9-102(2) also exempts Rule 22(e) motions to correct an illegal sentence and Board of Pardons and Parole actions (the latter reachable under Rule 65B(d)(2)(D)). le.utah.gov section URLs render via JavaScript; the versioned C78B-9-S###_.html URLs cited above are the pages that carry the actual statutory text. [View the habeas source](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S102_2017050920170509.html) [View the post-conviction source](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S107_2022050420220504.html) | | Vermont | No limit habeas survives narrowly · 13 V.S.A. § 7136 (Priority of procedure); habeas remedy itself at 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985 | No limit no filing period Post-conviction relief / petition for review, 13 V.S.A. §§ 7131-7137 · 13 V.S.A. § 7131 (Prisoner in custody under sentence) | Detail **Habeas:** > An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner entitled to move for relief under sections 7131-7135 ... shall not be entertained ... unless ... the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A prisoner who is in custody under sentence of a court and claims the right to be released ... may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. **On excusing a late filing:** A prisoner ... may at any time move ... to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. NEITHER REMEDY HAS ANY FILING DEADLINE. This is the headline: Vermont has no analogue to the one-year bars of Pennsylvania's PCRA, Alabama's Rule 32, or Delaware's Rule 61. (1) PCR: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 affirmatively says 'at any time.' I read all of §§ 7131-7137 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/13/221); the only limit is § 7134, which is discretionary, not temporal: 'The court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' (2) HABEAS: I read all 35 sections of 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/12/143). The chapter contains no limitation period; a grep of the full chapter text for 'year,' 'month,' 'day,' 'limitation,' and 'barred' returns zero hits. The writ is granted on the terms of § 3952 -- a person 'otherwise restrained of his or her liberty ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus' -- with no time condition attached. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': Vermont did NOT abolish or repeal habeas -- ch. 143 stands in full force as a separate writ, separately docketed in the civil division of the superior court, and still actively litigated (recent Vermont Supreme Court habeas dockets include Perron v. Menard, Davey v. Baker, Aguiar v. Williams, In re Fredrick). But § 7136 makes PCR a condition precedent for anyone within § 7131's reach. The Vermont Supreme Court applies this by conversion rather than dismissal: Coyle v. Hofmann, 2009 VT 46, ¶ 5, 186 Vt. 525 (https://static.case.law/vt/186/cases/0525-01.json) -- 'We treat petitions for habeas corpus challenging sentences as petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR) under 13 V.S.A. § 7136.' Coyle ¶ 6, quoting Berard v. Moeykens, 132 Vt. 597, adds that such a petition 'could be dismissed out of hand under 13 V.S.A. § 7136, which requires initial resort to a petition for post-conviction review ... as a condition precedent to habeas corpus.' So habeas survives as a route to a conviction/sentence challenge only where the PCR motion is 'inadequate or ineffective' -- narrowing, not exclusivity. This is the federal 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) savings-clause model, which is no accident: Coyle ¶ 5 records that § 7131 'was patterned after the federal PCR statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.' Note that the narrowing is NOT the jurisdictional-claims-only kind seen in some states -- In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 356, quoted in Coyle ¶ 5, holds the scope of habeas relief EXPANDED under these statutes to 'a wide range [of relief], ... including remedies short of full release.' PRACTICAL EFFECT FOR THE LEGISLATOR'S QUESTION: because § 7131 itself has no deadline, the § 7136 channeling rule costs a Vermont petitioner nothing in time -- it routes them to a vehicle that is equally open-ended. A Vermont prisoner challenging a conviction today files under § 7131, at any time. GATING CONDITION THAT DOES BITE: § 7131 requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence,' and habeas requires present restraint, so neither remedy reaches a person who has fully discharged the sentence. That custody requirement, not any clock, is Vermont's real limit. CAPITAL: none of the provisions read draws any capital/non-capital distinction, and no capital-specific deadline appears anywhere in 13 V.S.A. ch. 221 or 12 V.S.A. ch. 143. RELATED, ALSO NO DEADLINE: 13 V.S.A. § 5561 (postconviction DNA testing, Title 13 ch. 182 'Innocence Protection') -- 'A person convicted of a qualifying crime may at any time file a petition requesting forensic DNA testing.' SOURCE CAVEAT, stated for candor: the legislature's own site labels Vermont Statutes Online 'an unofficial copy of the Vermont Statutes Annotated that is provided as a convenience.' It is nonetheless the State of Vermont's own publication of its code, current through the 2025 session, and § 7131 and § 7136 there carry their original 1966 enactment credits with no subsequent amendment adding a time bar. [View the habeas source](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07136) [View the post-conviction source](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07131) | | Virginia | 2 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (Code 1950, § 8-596; as amended through 2021 Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345) | No limit Writ of actual innocence — Va. Code ch. 19.2 (§ 19.2-327.2, biological evidence, Supreme Court of Virginia) and ch. 19.3 (§ 19.2-327.10, nonbiological evidence, Court of Appeals). Innocence-only; NOT a general post-conviction act. Virginia has no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue. · Va. Code § 19.2-327.10 (nonbiological); § 19.2-327.2 (biological); contents provision § 19.2-327.11 — no filing period appears anywhere in either chapter | Detail **Habeas:** > A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from ... final disposition of the direct appeal in state court ..., whichever is later. **Post-conviction remedy:** > Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, upon a petition of a person who was convicted of a felony ... the Court of Appeals shall have the authority to issue writs of actual innocence under this chapter. **On excusing a late filing:** The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face. Virginia is the INVERSE of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 pattern: it never replaced habeas with a post-conviction act, so state habeas corpus ad subjiciendum remains the general vehicle for challenging a conviction or sentence — and the legislature put the deadline INSIDE the habeas statute. Do not code Virginia as 'no habeas deadline'; it has one. THE DEADLINE IS COMPOUND, and 730 days is a floor, not a ceiling: § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets two years from final trial-court judgment OR one year from final disposition of the direct appeal (or expiry of the time to appeal), 'whichever is later.' For anyone who appeals, the one-year-post-appeal prong usually controls and runs longer than 730 days from judgment. A single-integer cell will misstate Virginia unless footnoted. Note also that § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets a separate one-year period for non-conviction habeas ('other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction or sentence ... within one year after the cause of action accrues') — that is the detention-only figure, not the conviction figure, and the two are easy to swap. Structure confirmed by § 8.01-658(B), which is written entirely around petitions that 'challenge[] a criminal conviction or sentence.' The writ is constitutionally protected from suspension by Va. Const. art. I, § 9. OTHER LIMITS: § 8.01-654(B)(2) imposes a strict successive-petition bar — a petition must contain all facts then known, and 'No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition' — with a carve-out for a first petition whose sole claim is deprivation of the right to appeal. The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face. CAPITAL: there is no longer a special capital habeas track — §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654.2 (the death-penalty habeas filing and counsel provisions) were 'Repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2021,' alongside abolition of the death penalty; the same 2021 acts amended § 8.01-654 itself. Older sources citing a 60-day capital habeas deadline are dead law. SIDE REMEDIES: the actual-innocence writs carry no filing deadline but reach only freestanding innocence (§ 19.2-327.11 bars human biological evidence as the sole basis under the nonbiological writ, and requires evidence that would leave no rational trier of fact finding guilt); they cannot carry ordinary ineffective-assistance or Brady claims, which must go in habeas within § 8.01-654(A)(2). § 8.01-677 (motion in lieu of coram vobis) is confined to 'any clerical error or error in fact' and is not a general post-conviction route. VERIFICATION LIMIT: every figure above is from the statutory text on the official Virginia legislature site, each page stamped current as of 7/30/2026. I did NOT confirm from a read case how Virginia courts treat the (A)(2) period (jurisdictional vs. affirmative defense, availability of equitable tolling) — CourtListener returned HTTP 429 on repeated attempts and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked. Treat that one sub-point as unverified; it does not affect the deadline figures. [View the habeas source](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-654/) [View the post-conviction source](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title19.2/chapter19.3/section19.2-327.10/) | | Washington | 1 year ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (one-year bar; definition expressly names habeas); RCW 7.36.130(1) (habeas chapter cross-references the same limit); RCW 7.36.010, .040 (writ still granted by superior court); RAP 16.3(b) (superior-court habeas expressly NOT superseded) | 1 year Personal restraint petition (RAP 16.3-16.15), with trial-court motions for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8 transferred to the Court of Appeals to be treated as PRPs · RAP 16.4(d); RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (which names 'a personal restraint petition' first in the definition of collateral attack); CrR 7.8(b), (c)(2) | Detail **Habeas:** > No petition or motion for collateral attack ... may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final ... 'Collateral attack' ... includes ... a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition ... **Post-conviction remedy:** > The appellate court will only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances and if such relief may be granted under RCW 10.73.090, or .100. **On excusing a late filing:** No petition or motion for collateral attack ... may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final ... 'Collateral attack' ... includes ... a habeas corpus petition WASHINGTON IS NOT A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE — this is the inverse of the pattern the comparison usually turns on. RCW 10.73.090(2) names 'a habeas corpus petition' by name inside the definition of 'collateral attack,' so the one-year clock reaches habeas directly rather than only reaching a substitute remedy. Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed: ch. 7.36 RCW remains in force (RCW 7.36.010: 'Every person restrained of his or her liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), RCW 7.36.040 still empowers superior courts to grant it, and RAP 16.3(b) states the PRP rules 'do not supersede and do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings initiated in the superior court.' RAP 16.3(b) DOES supersede habeas procedure in the APPELLATE courts, so the split is: superior-court habeas survives intact; appellate habeas is replaced by the PRP. Both carry the identical one-year period, so the answer to the legislator's question is one year regardless of which instrument is named. The 1989 act (1989 c 395) created RCW 10.73.090 and amended RCW 7.36.130 in the same breath — a deliberate choice to keep habeas alive but time-bar it. RCW 7.36.130(1) now bars inquiry into 'any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction except where it is alleged in the petition that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution ... have been violated and the petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.' The Supreme Court reads it the same way: Ruiz-Sanabria, 184 Wn.2d 632, 635 (2015) (per curiam), cites 'RCW 7.36.130(1) (no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody unless a petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100).' TWO ROUTES ESCAPE THE DEADLINE ENTIRELY. (1) Facial-invalidity/jurisdiction: the bar applies by its terms only 'if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction' (RCW 10.73.090(1)); a facially invalid judgment, or one from a court without competent jurisdiction, is subject to NO time limit at all. (2) The seven RCW 10.73.100 exemptions: newly discovered evidence (with reasonable diligence), statute unconstitutional facially or as applied, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence after a not-guilty plea, sentence in excess of the court's jurisdiction, modification of community-custody conditions under RCW 9.94A.703/.709, and significant retroactive change in law. Critically, the petition must be 'based solely on' those grounds — a mixed petition loses the exemption. Clock start: RCW 10.73.090(3) — the LAST of trial-court filing of the judgment, issuance of the appellate mandate on a timely direct appeal, or U.S. Supreme Court denial of timely cert (a motion to reconsider cert denial does not extend finality). Channeling in practice: CrR 7.8(c)(2) requires the superior court to transfer a defendant's postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals as a PRP 'unless the court determines that the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that they are entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.' So the PRP is the dominant working vehicle even when the filing starts elsewhere; superior-court habeas is a preserved but rarely-used alternative. A separate successive-petition restriction (RCW 10.73.140, referenced in CrR 7.8(b) and RAP 16.4(d)'s 'no more than one petition for similar relief ... without good cause shown') operates independently of the time bar; I did not read RCW 10.73.140's full text directly, so treat its precise scope as unverified. No capital difference exists: RCW 10.95.030(1) now prescribes life without release or parole for aggravated first degree murder, so RAP 16.3(c)'s reservation of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction over death-sentence PRPs is vestigial. [View the habeas source](https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.090) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/RAP/APP_RAP_16_04_00.pdf) | | West Virginia | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) (Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, Ch. 53 Art. 4A); confirmed by W. Va. Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Rules 1-10 (no limitations period) | No limit None · W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) — establishes there is NO separate post-conviction vehicle; the Art. 4A habeas writ is the exclusive remedy | Detail **Habeas:** > A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed **Post-conviction remedy:** > such writ comprehends and takes the place of all other common law and statutory remedies ... which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence and shall be used exclusively in lieu thereof **On excusing a late filing:** A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence WEST VIRGINIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none in the statute, none in the court rules. This is the inverse of the PCRA pattern: WV did not replace habeas with a purpose-built act. Its post-conviction act IS habeas corpus — Ch. 53, Art. 4A is literally titled 'POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS' — so there is no separate one-year-style vehicle to confuse it with. Art. 4A contains only §§ 53-4A-1 through -11 (verified against the official code's article index); no limitations section exists. The Supreme Court of Appeals' Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, read in full, impose no deadline either: Rule 3 ('Filing Petition') governs only venue and filing fee. THE REAL LIMIT IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME. § 53-4A-1(b)-(c) bars any contention 'previously and finally adjudicated' or 'waived,' and creates a 'rebuttable presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to advance' any ground not raised before trial, at trial, or on direct appeal. Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762 (1981) (read via static.case.law) construes the Act to give each prisoner 'one omnibus post-conviction habeas corpus hearing.' So a legislator should understand WV as unlimited in time but essentially one-shot in substance. 2021 CARVE-OUT: HB 2888 added § 53-4A-1(b)(1) and the closing sentence of (c), providing that a contention is neither finally adjudicated nor waived where new or undermined 'forensic scientific evidence' exists and there is a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome. RELATIONSHIP TO GENERAL HABEAS: the ordinary writ under § 53-4-1 (Art. 4, no deadline, granted on 'probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority') still exists, but § 53-4A-1(f) displaces it for conviction/sentence challenges while preserving it for habeas sought 'for any purpose other than to challenge the legality of a criminal conviction or sentence.' DEADLINED MOTIONS THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE VEHICLES — do not substitute these in a cross-state table: W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(b) sentence reduction, 120 days; Rule 35(a) correction of an illegal sentence, 'at any time'; W. Va. Code § 15-2B-14 post-conviction DNA testing motion, no stated deadline but limited to testing. CAPITAL: the Act draws no capital/non-capital distinction. CURRENCY: § 53-4A-1's bill history on the official code site shows its last amendment was 2021 (HB 2888); I searched the full bill lists for the 2025 and 2026 Regular Sessions (2,808 bills in 2026) and found zero bills mentioning habeas or 53-4A, so no deadline has been enacted since. Not established from a primary source: whether WV courts apply laches to bar a stale Art. 4A petition — I found no controlling case either way, so treat that as unverified rather than assuming delay is costless. [View the habeas source](https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-1/) [View the post-conviction source](https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-1/) | | Wisconsin | No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, ¶21 (Wis. Sup. Ct.), construing Wis. Stat. ch. 782 and § (Rule) 809.51 | No limit Motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (collateral attack on sentence/conviction) · Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2) | Detail **Habeas:** > Smalley's imposition of a "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement for habeas claims is unsupported either by the statutory text or Wisconsin cases. **Post-conviction remedy:** > A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time. **On excusing a late filing:** HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 ... it contains no limitations period whatsoever ... Rule 809.51 ... likewise contains no filing deadline ... THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove HEADLINE: Wisconsin imposes NO filing deadline on EITHER route. This is the opposite of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 one-year model. (1) HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 (782.01-782.46, published 7-1-26): it contains no limitations period whatsoever — the chapter's single occurrence of 'day' is the return date in § 782.07, not a filing period. Rule 809.51, the vehicle for a habeas petition filed in the court of appeals, likewise contains no filing deadline (its only time limit, 14 days, runs against the State's response). Lopez-Quintero, 2019 WI 58, ¶10, expressly OVERRULED State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, which had read a 'prompt and speedy' timeliness pleading requirement into Rule 809.51: 'We hold that the court of appeals may not deny a habeas petition ex parte on the ground the petitioner failed to demonstrate he sought relief in a prompt and speedy manner. We overrule Smalley.' The petitioner there had delayed nearly ten years. (2) THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove, including prejudice, not a clock the petitioner must beat: 'Any equitable concerns regarding substantial delays... are properly raised not sua sponte by the court of appeals but instead by the State asserting the defense of laches and establishing prejudice resulting from the delay' (¶10). (3) HABEAS IS NARROWED IN SCOPE, NOT IN TIME. § 782.01(1): 'Every person restrained of personal liberty may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint subject to ss. 782.02 and 974.06.' § 782.02 then bars the writ to anyone 'committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or order of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and § 974.06(8) bars a habeas petition by a person who could move under § 974.06 'unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention.' Per the official annotation to § 782.01 citing State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, habeas requires restraint, restraint contrary to constitutional protections or by a body lacking jurisdiction, AND no other adequate remedy at law. I classified this 'available' rather than 'narrow' because it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims — see (4). (4) HABEAS IS THE MANDATORY, EXCLUSIVE VEHICLE FOR ONE MAJOR CLASS OF CONVICTION CHALLENGE. State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶35 (read in full): 'A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under § 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus.' That is the Knight petition, State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520 (1992) (read in full): 'to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus.' Knight rested precisely on § 974.06(8)'s 'inadequate or ineffective' escape hatch. By contrast, ineffective assistance of POSTCONVICTION counsel goes to the circuit court, 'either as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' (Starks ¶35, citing State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry). So a Wisconsin prisoner's route depends on which counsel failed — and neither route has a deadline. (5) § 974.06 IS NOT A ONE-YEAR ACT. It is the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act analogue and 'may be made at any time,' § 974.06(2). It opens only once the direct route closes: § 974.06(1) applies 'After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired.' Its real constraint is issue preclusion, not time: § 974.06(4) bars grounds not raised in an original motion 'unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised,' enforced by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168 (1994) (read in full). A legislator comparing states must not mistake that bar for a deadline — a 30-year-old conviction can still be attacked under § 974.06 if 'sufficient reason' excuses the omission. (6) THE 60-DAY FIGURE BELONGS TO THE DIRECT APPEAL, NOT COLLATERAL REVIEW. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b) requires a notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing, and § 809.30(2)(h) requires the postconviction motion or notice of appeal 'within 60 days after the later of the service of the transcript or circuit court case record.' § 974.02(1) channels all non-§ 974.06 postconviction motions into that timetable. If a survey cell reports '60 days' for Wisconsin, it has captured the direct-appeal clock and missed both collateral remedies. (7) OTHER REMEDIES: § 974.07(2) DNA-testing motion — 'At any time after being convicted' (no deadline). Sentence modification under § 973.19 carries a 90-day limit as described in Starks ¶50 (I did not read § 973.19 itself; treat that one figure as unverified). (8) CAPITAL: no capital-specific variation appears anywhere in ch. 782, § 974.06, or Rule 809.30. (9) OPERATIVE = BOTH: § 974.06 for most conviction/sentence attacks; habeas, exclusively, for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and wherever the § 974.06 motion is inadequate or ineffective. [View the habeas source](https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=241338) [View the post-conviction source](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/974/06) | | Wyoming | No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2002) (construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134); accord Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, ¶ 11; Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 14; statutory narrowing at Wyo. Stat. § 1-27-125 | 5 years Post-conviction relief, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (Title 7, ch. 14, "Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights") · Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d), quoted verbatim in Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, n.5 (Wyo. 2019) | Detail **Habeas:** > Review in a state habeas corpus action is not time limited, but is seriously limited in scope so that defendants may only raise a claim going to the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court. **Post-conviction remedy:** > No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. **On excusing a late filing:** No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the headline finding. Wyoming never abolished or absorbed habeas: the post-conviction act expressly preserves it (§ 7-14-108: 'W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 shall not repeal any existing laws'), and Nixon ¶11 treats §§ 1-27-101 to 134 and §§ 7-14-101 to 108 as two parallel avenues. I read the entire habeas chapter (§§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134, wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/title01.pdf) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. The price of that open window is scope: § 1-27-125 provides 'Habeas corpus is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner,' and Parkhurst (2019) describes §§ 1-27-101 through 134 as '(limiting state habeas corpus relief to jurisdictional claims).' So habeas reaches only subject-matter/personal jurisdiction defects — hence 'narrow,' not 'available.' OPERATIVE SPLIT: a garden-variety conviction challenge (IAC, Brady, trial error) must go under ch. 7-14 and dies at 5 years; a jurisdictional/void-judgment claim can go by habeas at any time. Deadline math: statute says '5 years,' converted at 365 d/yr = 1825; it runs from entry of the judgment of conviction, not from finality of appeal. Additional ch. 7-14 traps beyond the clock: § 7-14-103(a) makes claims that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal 'procedurally barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim' (exceptions in § 7-14-103(b) for newly available facts, ineffective appellate counsel, and same counsel at trial and on appeal); § 7-14-104(c) denies appointed counsel to indigent petitioners; review is by certiorari, not appeal of right (§ 7-14-107). TWO OTHER UNTIMED ROUTES, both verified: W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' (wyocourts.gov/app/uploads/2026/06/WRCrP-with-bond-schedule.pdf) — and the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, §§ 7-12-401 through 7-12-407, which carries no filing deadline (only internal response deadlines of 120/30/150 days) but is confined to newly-discovered-evidence claims of actual innocence (Parkhurst ¶14). CAPITAL: I found no separate capital post-conviction track or differing deadline in ch. 7-14; I did not independently verify whether one exists elsewhere, so treat capital differences as unverified. Nixon's 'not time limited' holding rests on Hovey v. Sheffner, 93 P. 305 (Wyo. 1908), which I did not read directly; Nixon itself is confirmed still-current by Saunders (2015) and by Parkhurst (2019), both read in full. [View the habeas source](https://stwjbopinions.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/wsc-opinions/2002WY118.pdf) [View the post-conviction source](https://www.wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/title07.pdf) | ★ marks the states where habeas corpus, rather than a statute enacted to replace it, is the operative route today. --- ## The table All 350 cells are below, grouped by question so the states can be compared on the same rule. Each answer carries the source it rests on — open *Source* to see the statute or case, the quoted language, and a link to the document itself. Cells we could not verify are marked as such. **Key:** Verified — the cited source was retrieved and confirmed to contain the quoted language. Unverified — no primary source squarely answering the question could be reached; the cell says what was looked for. ## Where an ineffective-assistance claim must be raised *Whether a claim that your trial lawyer failed you belongs on direct appeal or in a later post-conviction proceeding — and what happens if you choose wrong.* 50 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Earliest opportunity verified | Either stage is possible but tightly constrained: an ineffective-assistance claim is reviewable on direct appeal only if it was first presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial filed within Rule 24.1(b)'s 30-day jurisdictional window; when that is not reasonably possible, the proper vehicle is a Rule 32 petition (Ex parte Ingram, overruling Ex parte Jackson). Rule 32.2(d) adds a forfeiture rule: 'Any claim that counsel was ineffective must be raised as soon as practicable, either at trial, on direct appeal, or in the first Rule 32 petition, whichever is applicable' (verbatim text verified in V.R. v. State, 852 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002),.json). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(d); Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1(b) **Case:** Ex parte Ingram, 675 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1996) > an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be presented in a new trial motion filed before the 30-day jurisdictional time limit set by Rule 24.1(b), Ala. R.Crim.P., expires, in order for that claim to be properly preserved for review upon direct appeal [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/675/cases/0863-01.json) | | Alaska Post-conviction only verified | IAC claims must be litigated first in the trial court — by new-trial motion or post-conviction application — and, absent plain error, Alaska's appellate courts will not entertain an IAC claim raised for the first time on direct appeal. AS 12.72.010(9) expressly makes ineffective assistance of counsel 'at trial or on direct appeal' a post-conviction ground, so the consequence of choosing the wrong stage is non-review on appeal, not forfeiture of the collateral claim. | Source**Statute / rule:** AS 12.72.010(9) **Case:** Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292 (Alaska App. 1984) > In the absence of plain error, we will henceforth require that the question of ineffective assistance of counsel be argued first to the trial judge either in a motion for a new trial or an application for post-conviction relief. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20170816023641/https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/court-of-appeals/1984/7195-0.html) | | Arizona Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a Rule 32/33 post-conviction proceeding, not on direct appeal; since 2002, appellate courts will not address an IAC claim raised on direct appeal regardless of merit, though improvidently raising it there carries no preclusive effect. However, an IAC claim that was raised or could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 proceeding is deemed waived and precluded in later proceedings. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) **Case:** State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (Ariz. 2002) > we reiterate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by appellate courts regardless of merit. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ariz/202/cases/0001-01.json) | | Arkansas Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be brought in a postconviction petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 in the circuit court; the Arkansas Supreme Court will not reach IAC on direct appeal unless the claim was first presented to and ruled on by the trial court (e.g., in a Rule 33.3(b) new-trial motion) with the facts fully developed. Raising it prematurely on direct appeal is not a forfeiture — the court simply declines to reach it and the defendant may proceed under Rule 37 — but a ground 'finally adjudicated... in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction' cannot be relitigated under Rule 37.2(b) (McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 941 S.W.2d 397 (1997)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1; Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3(b) **Case:** Ratchford v. State, 357 Ark. 27, 159 S.W.3d 304 (2004) > It is well settled that this court will not consider ineffective assistance as a point on direct appeal unless that issue has been considered by the trial court. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/357/html/0027-01.html) | | California Post-conviction preferred verified | Either stage, with habeas corpus the preferred and usually required forum: an IAC claim fails on direct appeal unless the record itself shows counsel could have had no satisfactory explanation, and there is no forfeiture for bypassing the appeal — the Dixon/Waltreus bars on claims that could have been raised on appeal expressly do not apply to IAC claims brought first on habeas. | Source**Case:** People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 > Because claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal [View the source document](https://static.case.law/cal-4th/15/cases/0264-01.json) | | Colorado Post-conviction preferred verified | Colorado routes ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review: a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in the trial court is the preferred and presumptive vehicle, and appellate courts have long discouraged litigating IAC on direct appeal. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal — the supreme court struck down a statute (former § 16-5-402(3)) that barred collateral attacks after an unsuccessful appeal, People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1994). The penalty runs the other way: an IAC claim raised and resolved on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) (People v. Versteeg, 165 P.3d 760 (Colo. App. 2007)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c); C.R.S. § 18-1-410 **Case:** Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) > In light of the considerations potentially involved in determining ineffective assistance, defendants have regularly been discouraged from attempting to litigate their counsels' effectiveness on direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/69/html/0073-01.html) | | Connecticut Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be pursued on collateral review (habeas corpus or petition for a new trial), not direct appeal; since Leecan the Supreme Court declines to review IAC on direct appeal even where the record arguably supports it. There is no waiver penalty for omitting IAC from direct appeal — Leecan expressly lowered the deliberate-bypass barrier so all IAC claims, record-based or not, are heard in one evidentiary habeas proceeding. | Source**Case:** State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 (1986) > a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly pursued on a petition for new trial or on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal [View the source document](https://static.case.law/conn/198/cases/0517-01.json) | | Delaware Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims must be raised collaterally in a Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 motion, not on direct appeal; the Delaware Supreme Court will not consider an IAC claim on direct appeal unless the trial court decided it on the merits (Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994)). There is no forfeiture penalty for withholding IAC from direct appeal — because the claim cannot be raised there, it is neither 'repetitive' nor procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i) when first raised on collateral review. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Urquhart v. State was not unanimous — VAUGHN, Justice, dissenting.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61; Rule 61(i)(2)-(3) **Case:** Urquhart v. State, 203 A.3d 719, 726-27 (Del. 2019); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994) > a Sixth Amendment claim arguing ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal and thus his motion is not repetitive or procedurally defaulted [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/203/html/0719-01.html) | | Florida Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised by motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 in the sentencing court, not on direct appeal; when raised on direct appeal the appellate court rejects them without prejudice to a later 3.850 motion, so there is no forfeiture. The narrow exception cuts the other way: where the ineffectiveness was apparent on the face of the record so the claim was properly raisable on direct appeal, and it was raised there and ruled on, re-raising it in postconviction is procedurally barred (Loren, 601 So. 2d at 273). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: McKinney v. State was not unanimous — McDONALD, J., concurs in the conviction, but dissents to the sentence. OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c) ("This rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence.") **Case:** McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1991); see also Loren v. State, 601 So. 2d 271, 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) > Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not reviewable on direct appeal but are more properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/579/html/0080-01.html) | | Georgia Earliest opportunity verified | A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised at the earliest practicable moment — by motion for new trial or on direct appeal — whenever new counsel appears at that stage; if new post-trial or appellate counsel fails to raise it then, the claim is waived and procedurally defaulted on state habeas absent cause and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice. Where the same lawyer represented the defendant at trial and on appeal, habeas is the first available forum and no default attaches; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) conditions the habeas default expressly on whether 'the petitioner had new counsel subsequent to trial.' | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) **Case:** White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 (1991); see also Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183 (1996) > New counsel must raise the ineffectiveness of previous counsel at the first possible stage of post-conviction review. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ga/261/html/0032-01.html) | | Hawaii Either forum verified | Either forum. The Hawaii Supreme Court entertains ineffective-assistance claims for the first time on direct appeal, and where the appellate record is insufficient it affirms without prejudice to a later HRPP Rule 40 petition; Rule 40(f) expressly contemplates IAC as a Rule 40 ground. There is a forfeiture consequence, however: under Rule 40(a)(3) an issue that could have been raised on appeal is waived absent proof of extraordinary circumstances, with a rebuttable presumption that the failure was knowing. | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(3), 40(f) **Case:** State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 864 P.2d 583 (1993) > shall continue to entertain ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on appeal. ... the appellate court may affirm defendant's conviction without prejudice to a subsequent Rule 40 petition on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim [View the source document](https://static.case.law/haw/75/cases/0419-01.json) | | Idaho Either forum verified | Either — an ineffective-assistance claim may be raised on direct appeal or reserved for a petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, but not both; if raised and decided on direct appeal it becomes res judicata and cannot be relitigated in post-conviction. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) forfeits any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, yet IAC claims resting on matters outside the trial record fall outside that bar, and IAC of appellate counsel is never forfeited because it could not have been raised on direct appeal. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) **Case:** State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1995); Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992); Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 521-22 (2015) > A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial may raise the issue on direct appeal or reserve it for post-conviction proceedings, but he may not do both. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/idaho/127/html/0107-01.html) | | Illinois Direct appeal required verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must generally be raised on direct appeal in Illinois; a claim that could have been resolved on the trial record but was not raised is forfeited/procedurally defaulted on collateral review. The exception is narrow and record-based: procedural default does not bar an IAC claim that depends on facts outside the record, which is properly reserved for a post-conviction petition. Veach rejected the appellate court's 'categorical approach' and requires case-by-case assessment of record sufficiency. | Source**Case:** People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶¶ 46-48 (citing People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 14) > Thus, in Illinois, a defendant must generally raise a constitutional claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review or risk forfeiting the claim. [View the source document](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10952697883230152190) | | Indiana Either forum verified | Either forum, at the defendant's election: a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel need not be raised on direct appeal and is fully available in post-conviction, but if it IS raised on direct appeal (by the Davis/Hatton procedure or otherwise) the entire issue is foreclosed from collateral review. There is no forfeiture penalty for waiting, but the supporting contentions may not be split between the two proceedings — the defendant must pick one forum for the whole claim. | Source**Case:** Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind. 1998) > we hold that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may be presented for the first time in a petition for postconviction relief. However, if ineffective assistance of trial counsel is raised on direct appeal, it will be foreclosed in postconviction proceedings. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ne2d/701/html/1208-01.html) | | Iowa Post-conviction only verified | Post-conviction only. Since July 1, 2019, Iowa Code § 814.7 requires every ineffective-assistance claim in a criminal case to be brought as a chapter 822 postconviction application and forbids appellate courts from deciding it on direct appeal; State v. Treptow holds the supreme court is "without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal." There is no forfeiture for not raising it on direct appeal — the statute says the claim "need not be raised on direct appeal... in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief purposes." | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 814.7 (rewritten by 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 31, eff. 7/1/2019) **Case:** State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 103-06, 110 (Iowa 2021); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 152 (Iowa 2021) > An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. . . . [T]he claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241108125349/https://casetext.com/statute/code-of-iowa/title-xvi-criminal-law-and-procedure/chapter-814-appeals-from-the-district-court/section-8147-ineffective-assistance-claim-on-appeal-in-a-criminal-case) | | Kansas Post-conviction only verified | Trial-counsel ineffectiveness must first be presented to the district court; Kansas appellate courts will not decide an IAC claim for the first time on direct appeal. The two routes are a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or a discretionary motion to remand the pending direct appeal for an evidentiary hearing (a "Van Cleave hearing"), so failing to raise IAC on direct appeal forfeits nothing; conversely, a claim actually decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under 60-1507, which "ordinarily may not be used as a substitute for direct appeal... or as a substitute for a second appeal" (Rule 183(c)(3)), and all IAC grounds must be asserted together in the first 60-1507 motion or later ones are an abuse of remedy. | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 60-1507(a); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(c)(3) **Case:** State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 119-21, 716 P.2d 580 (1986) > An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be considered for the first time on appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/kan/239/html/0117-01.html) | | Kentucky Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective-assistance claims are ordinarily raised collaterally by motion under RCr 11.42 in the sentencing court, not on direct appeal, because there is usually no record or trial-court ruling to review; direct-appeal review is permitted only where a record exists and the trial court actually ruled (e.g., on a new-trial motion). There is no forfeiture for withholding the claim from direct appeal — unpreserved IAC claims remain available collaterally, and an unsuccessful palpable-error claim on direct appeal does not preclude a later RCr 11.42 IAC claim resting on the same underlying error (Martin). The converse does bite: an issue actually raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated under RCr 11.42 by recasting it as ineffective assistance (Sanborn). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42; RCr 10.26 **Case:** Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998); Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998) > As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment, because there is usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can be properly considered. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw2d/962/html/0870-01.html) | | Louisiana Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective-assistance claims are routed by jurisprudence to post-conviction relief (PCR) in the district court of conviction, because that forum permits a full evidentiary hearing; the Louisiana Supreme Court has said the appropriate avenue is PCR "not by direct appeal." A direct-appeal court may nonetheless reach the claim when the existing record suffices (State v. Ratcliff: "in the interest of judicial economy we will address the issue now"). Consequences attach at the wrong stage in both directions: La. C. Cr. P. art. 924.1 bars a PCR application while direct appeal is available or pending, and art. 930.4(A) provides that a claim "fully litigated in an appeal... shall not be considered" in PCR, while art. 930.4(C) directs denial of a claim raised in the trial court but "inexcusably" not pursued on appeal. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Truitt was not unanimous — MARCUS, J., concurs with the affirmance of the conviction but dissents from the reversal of the sentence. LEMMON, J., dissents in part from reversal of the sentence, believing that a fifteen-year sentence for participation in a gang rape (now punishable under La.R.S. 14:42 as aggravated rape with a. | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 924.1; La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4(A), (C) **Case:** State v. Truitt, 500 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1987); State v. Ratcliff, 416 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) > The appropriate avenue for asserting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is through postconviction relief, not by direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/500/html/0355-01.html) | | Maine Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a post-conviction review petition under 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A; the Law Court categorically will not consider IAC on direct appeal and reaches such claims only after issuing a certificate of probable cause from a PCR judgment. Raising IAC on direct appeal forfeits nothing but produces no review; the operative waiver risk is 15 M.R.S. § 2128(3), which requires all grounds — IAC included — to be raised in a single PCR action. | Source**Statute / rule:** 15 M.R.S. §§ 2122, 2128(1), (3) **Case:** State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d 521 (reaffirmed in State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20, and State v. Troy, 2014 ME 65, ¶ 3, 91 A.3d 1064) > Today we make clear that we will not consider a claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; henceforth, we will consider such a contention only after we issue a certificate of probable cause following a hearing on a post-conviction petition. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a2d/698/html/0521-01.html) | | Maryland Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be raised in a Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPPA) proceeding, not on direct appeal; the Supreme Court of Maryland (then Court of Appeals) recognizes a narrow exception where the critical facts are undisputed and the trial record permits fair evaluation. Consequences run both ways: a claim an appellate court decides on the merits on direct appeal is 'finally litigated' and cannot be relitigated collaterally (Crim. Proc. § 7-106(a)(1)(i)), while a claim the petitioner could have raised earlier is waived if the failure was intelligent and knowing, with a rebuttable presumption of knowing waiver (§ 7-106(b)(1)(i)3, (b)(2)) excused only by 'special circumstances' (§ 7-106(b)(1)(ii)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-106(a)(1)(i), (b)(1)-(2) **Case:** Robinson v. State, 404 Md. 208 (2008) > We have held repeatedly that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a post-conviction proceeding, subject to a few exceptions. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/md/404/cases/0208-01.json) | | Massachusetts Post-conviction preferred verified | Massachusetts routes ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review: the Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) motion for a new trial in the trial court is the 'preferred method,' and direct appeal is available only under the narrow Adamides exception where the factual basis 'appears indisputably on the trial record.' There is no forfeiture penalty for holding an IAC claim for collateral review — Zinser found no waiver where the claim could not have been resolved on the trial record, and expressly left open whether a record-based claim is waived by omission on direct appeal (adding that even a waived claim gets substantial-risk-of-miscarriage-of-justice review). The waiver risk runs the other way: Rule 30(c)(2) waives grounds not raised in the first Rule 30 motion. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), (c)(2) **Case:** Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807 (2006) > We begin with the well-established principle that the preferred method for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for a new trial. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/mass/446/cases/0807-01.json) | | Michigan Either forum verified | Either forum, but with a cause-and-prejudice forfeiture. IAC is normally raised on direct appeal, where a defendant whose claim depends on facts outside the record must obtain a trial-court evidentiary (Ginther) hearing, sought by motion to remand under MCR 7.211(C)(1); it may also be raised in a MCR 6.500 motion for relief from judgment. But MCR 6.508(D)(3) bars relief on any non-jurisdictional ground that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the defendant shows both good cause for the omission and actual prejudice, and MCR 6.508(D)(2) separately bars grounds already decided against the defendant absent a retroactive change in law. | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.508(D)(3); see also MCR 6.508(D)(2), MCR 7.211(C)(1) **Case:** People v. Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973) > alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Earliest opportunity verified | Split by record-dependence: a trial-counsel IAC claim that can be resolved on the trial record must be raised on direct appeal and is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla if first raised in postconviction, while a claim that requires evidence outside the record (e.g. attorney-client communications) may be brought in a postconviction petition. The forfeiture is codified for post-appeal petitions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 ('may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal'). Appellate-counsel IAC is not Knaffla-barred in a first postconviction petition because, as Onyelobi states, such claims 'could not have been brought at any earlier time.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 **Case:** Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2019); Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) > A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/932/cases/0272-01.json) | | Mississippi Either forum verified | Either forum, but with a conditional forfeiture: under M.R.A.P. 22(b) an IAC claim that rests on facts fully apparent from the trial record may be raised on direct appeal, and where appellate counsel did not represent the defendant at trial, failure to raise such a record-apparent claim on direct appeal waives it for post-conviction review. Claims resting on facts outside the record are not waived and belong in a UPCCRA motion; independently, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) procedurally bars any claim 'capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal' absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. R. App. P. 22(b); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-21(1), 99-39-3(2) > Where the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issues in post-conviction proceedings. [View the source document](https://law-db.mc.edu/mlr/rules.php?r=appellate) | | Missouri Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective assistance of trial AND appellate counsel must be raised by motion in the sentencing court under Rule 29.15 (conviction after trial) or Rule 24.035 (guilty plea), each of which is by its terms 'the exclusive procedure' for those claims; IAC is not cognizable on direct appeal. Raising IAC on direct appeal carries no forfeiture — the claim is simply not reviewed — but the bar runs the other way as well: Rule 29.15 'is not a substitute for direct appeal,' so trial error that could have been raised on appeal is not cognizable in post-conviction absent rare circumstances requiring fundamental fairness (McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Mo. banc 2013)). Rule 29.15(d)/24.035(d) separately waive any claim known to the movant that is omitted from the motion. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(a), (d); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(a), (d) **Case:** State v. Nettles, 481 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) > Missouri courts have held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, even if compelling, is not cognizable on direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/481/html/0062-01.html) | | Montana Earliest opportunity verified | Routing is claim-specific: a record-based IAC claim must be raised on direct appeal, and a claim that cannot be documented from the trial record must be raised in a Title 46, ch. 21 postconviction petition. The consequence is statutory forfeiture — § 46-21-105(2), MCA bars postconviction review of grounds that 'were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal' — but raising record-based IAC on direct appeal does not foreclose non-record IAC in postconviction, and a non-record claim wrongly brought on direct appeal is dismissed without prejudice rather than forfeited (State v. White, ¶¶ 12, 31). | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-105(2), MCA **Case:** State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 12, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340 (adopting the rule of Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8); restated in State v. Hooper, 2016 MT 237, ¶ 5 > they must be raised in the direct appeal and, conversely, where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case, those claims must be raised by petition for post-conviction relief [View the source document](https://static.case.law/mont/306/cases/0058-01.json) | | Nebraska Direct appeal required verified | Routing depends on counsel identity and record sufficiency. Because § 29-3003 makes the Postconviction Act's remedy "cumulative and … not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy" — a phrase the Nebraska Supreme Court reads to include direct appeal — an IAC claim known to the defendant or apparent from the record must be raised on direct appeal when appellate counsel differs from trial counsel, or it is procedurally barred in a § 29-3001 motion. Where the same counsel served at trial and on appeal, or where the direct-appeal record is insufficient to resolve the claim, the claim is preserved for postconviction and is not forfeited by having been raised (or not resolved) on appeal. | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3003, 29-3001(1) **Case:** State v. Molina, 271 Neb. 488, 713 N.W.2d 412 (2006) (quoted); State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014) (modern statement of the rule) > a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues already litigated on direct appeal or which were known to the defendant and counsel at the time of the trial [View the source document](https://static.case.law/neb/271/html/0488-01.html) | | Nevada Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims belong in a post-conviction habeas petition; the Nevada Supreme Court will not entertain them on direct appeal unless an evidentiary hearing on the claim has already been held (or, per Pellegrini, would be unnecessary). There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal: Nevada applies a bright-line rule that IAC claims brought in a timely first post-conviction petition escape the NRS 34.810(1)(b) waiver bar even if they could have been raised on appeal. Conversely, an IAC claim actually decided on appeal cannot be relitigated in habeas under the law-of-the-case doctrine. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.810(1)(b) **Case:** Feazell v. State, 111 Nev. 1446, 1449 (1995); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883-84 (2001) > claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought in a timely first post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus are not subject to dismissal on grounds of waiver, regardless of whether the claims could have been appropriately raised on direct appeal [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nev/117/html/0860-01.html) | | New Hampshire Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims are litigated in the superior court on a petition/motion for a new trial (RSA 526:1, :2) or a habeas petition, not resolved on direct appeal; when a defendant raises IAC against a public defender while appealing, the appeal is stayed and the claim remanded to superior court (State v. Veale, 154 N.H. 730, 741 (2007): 'a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will maintain its proper place as a method of collateral review'). There is no forfeiture for failing to raise IAC on direct appeal. But the underlying non-IAC claim itself is procedurally waived for collateral review if the defendant knew of it and could have raised it on direct appeal (Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-43 (1988)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Avery v. Cunningham is cited for background only. In State v. Kinne, 161 N.H. 41 (2010), the court recorded that Pepin “determined that our subsequent decisions had undercut the holding in Avery” and concluded that “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon alleged trial errors are not procedurally barred by the failure to raise those errors on direct appeal.” Pepin, not Avery, is the operative authority for the no-forfeiture rule stated here. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 526:1; RSA 526:2 **Case:** State v. Pepin, 159 N.H. 310, 312-13 (2009); State v. Veale, 154 N.H. 730, 741 (2007); Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-44 (1988) > the broad language of Avery has been significantly undermined so that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon alleged trial errors are not procedurally barred by the failure to raise those errors on direct appeal [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nh/159/cases/0310-01.json) | | New Jersey Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims are ordinarily raised on collateral review by petition for post-conviction relief, not on direct appeal; New Jersey courts have a declared general policy against entertaining IAC claims on direct appeal because they rest on facts outside the trial record. Failing to raise IAC on direct appeal is therefore not a forfeiture: R. 3:22-4(a)(1) exempts grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' in a prior proceeding and R. 3:22-4(a)(2) separately excepts enforcement of the bar 'to preclude claims, including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,' that would cause fundamental injustice. Conversely, an IAC ground actually adjudicated on the merits on direct appeal is conclusively barred on PCR by R. 3:22-5. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-4(a); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-5 **Case:** State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992) > Our courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nj/129/html/0451-01.html) | | New Mexico Post-conviction preferred verified | Either forum is open, but habeas corpus under Rule 5-802 NMRA is the declared preferred vehicle because the trial record usually cannot support an IAC determination. Rejection of an IAC claim on direct appeal does not automatically bar it in habeas: preclusion is an equitable, discretionary doctrine, and it does not apply where the facts supporting the claim could not or customarily would not be developed at trial. A claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not remains cognizable in habeas, but is reviewed only for fundamental error. | Source**Statute / rule:** Rule 5-802 NMRA (rule text itself not retrievable — see notes) **Case:** Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344, 851 P.2d 466 (1993); State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 (fundamental-error limit, ¶ 10) > Two New Mexico cases endorse SCRA 1986, 5-802 habeas corpus proceedings as the preferred avenue for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nm/115/html/0344-01.html) | | New York Either forum verified | Either. A trial-counsel ineffective-assistance claim may be raised on direct appeal where the record permits, or by a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate, and since L 2021, ch 501 (A2653, signed 10/25/2021, effective immediately) the mandatory bars in CPL 440.10(2)(b) and (2)(c) expressly do NOT apply to ineffective assistance — so failing to raise a record-based IAC claim on direct appeal no longer forfeits it on collateral review. Residual limits remain: CPL 440.10(2)(a) still mandates denial of a ground actually determined on the merits on direct appeal, and ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel is not a 440 claim at all — it must be raised by common-law coram nobis in the appellate court that heard the appeal (People v. Bachert). | Source**Statute / rule:** CPL 440.10(2)(b), (2)(c), as amended by L 2021, ch 501 §§ 1-2; cf. CPL 440.10(2)(a), 440.10(3)(a) **Case:** People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852, 853-854 (1978); People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987) > adequate review thereof upon such an appeal unless the issue raised upon such motion is ineffective assistance of counsel [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250804161100/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/440.10) | | North Carolina Either forum verified | Either forum, but routing is record-dependent: an IAC claim must be brought on direct appeal when the cold record alone permits decision, while a claim requiring investigation or an evidentiary hearing is premature on appeal and is dismissed without prejudice to reassertion in a motion for appropriate relief (MAR). Failure to raise a claim that could adequately have been raised on direct appeal is a mandatory ground for denying a later MAR under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), but § 15A-1419(c)(1) expressly lists ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel as 'good cause' excusing that default on a showing of actual prejudice. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), (b), (c)(1) **Case:** State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001) > IAC claims brought on direct review will be decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nc/354/cases/0131-01.json) | | North Dakota Either forum verified | Either forum, with no forfeiture for choosing direct appeal. The North Dakota Supreme Court says an ineffective-assistance claim "should not be brought on direct appeal" but will review the record for plain defectiveness if it is; where the record is inadequate the claim may still be pursued in post-conviction. The consequence attaches only afterward: a claim actually "fully and finally determined" on direct appeal is res judicata under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), and a claim inexcusably omitted from an earlier proceeding is a misuse of process under § 29-32.1-12(2)(a) (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 13-16, 928 N.W.2d 441). | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), (2)(a) **Case:** State v. Strutz, 2000 ND 22, ¶¶ 26-27, 606 N.W.2d 886 (reaffirmed in State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 3, 928 N.W.2d 441) > When the record on direct appeal is inadequate to determine whether the defendant received ineffective assistance, the defendant may pursue the ineffectiveness claim at a post-conviction proceeding where an adequate record can be made. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/606/html/0886-01.html) | | Ohio Earliest opportunity verified | Ohio routes ineffective-assistance claims by whether the claim can be decided on the trial record. An IAC claim that could fairly be determined without evidence outside the record must be raised on direct appeal by new appellate counsel; raising it later in an R.C. 2953.21 petition is barred by res judicata (State v. Perry; State v. Cole). An IAC claim resting on evidence dehors the record is properly brought in the postconviction petition and escapes the res judicata bar; Cole also recognizes a qualification where the same lawyer represented the defendant at trial and on appeal. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(1)(a) **Case:** State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (applying State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175) > Generally, the introduction in an R.C. 2953.21 petition of evidence dehors the record of ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient, if not to mandate a hearing, at least to avoid dismissal on the basis of res judicata. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ohio-st-3d/2/cases/0112-01.json) | | Oklahoma Direct appeal required verified | Ineffective assistance of TRIAL counsel must be raised on direct appeal — OCCA Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b) supplies a direct-appeal application-for-evidentiary-hearing vehicle for claims resting on facts outside the record — and a trial-IAC claim not raised there is waived on post-conviction under 22 O.S. § 1086 (Logan waived his trial-IAC ground on exactly this basis). Ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel is the exception: it may be raised for the first time on post-conviction. A claim already raised and rejected on direct appeal is barred by res judicata. | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1086; Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b), Rules of the Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. **Case:** Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, 293 P.3d 969, ¶¶ 3-5 > Issues that were previously raised and ruled upon by this Court are procedurally barred from further review under the doctrine of res judicata; and issues that were not raised previously on direct appeal, but which could have been raised, are waived for further review. [View the source document](https://okcca.net/cases/2013/OK-CR-2/) | | Oregon Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance ('inadequate assistance') claims are raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding under Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ORS 138.510–138.680; the Court of Appeals holds the issue can be resolved on direct appeal only 'in rare instances' because it ordinarily requires evidence outside the trial record. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC on direct appeal: ORS 138.550(2) bars only grounds that 'could reasonably have been asserted' on direct review, and Turner v. Cupp holds a record-dependent IAC claim could not reasonably have been asserted there. Conversely, a ground actually asserted and decided on direct appeal may not be relitigated in post-conviction under ORS 138.550(2). | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.550(2) **Case:** State v. Robinson, 25 Or App 675, 550 P2d 758 (1976); Turner v. Cupp, 1 Or App 596, 465 P2d 249 (1970) > Defendant, having been convicted of murder upon trial by jury, contends on appeal that his trial counsel was incompetent. This issue, except in rare instances, is one which can be properly resolved only in a post-conviction proceeding in which evidence can be taken. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/or-app/25/cases/0675-01.json) | | Pennsylvania Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must generally be deferred to collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act; IAC is an enumerated PCRA ground under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Raising IAC on direct appeal is not a forfeiture — under Grant such claims are dismissed WITHOUT prejudice to reassertion in a first PCRA petition — but a defendant who declines to raise IAC on direct appeal suffers no waiver penalty either, which is the point of the deferral rule. Commonwealth v. Holmes (2013) preserves narrow trial-court discretion to reach IAC pre-PCRA (claim apparent from the record and meritorious, or good cause plus an express waiver of PCRA review), and Commonwealth v. Delgros (2018) adds a third exception where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining PCRA review at all. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Commonwealth v. Grant was not unanimous — Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion. Justice CASTILLE files a concurring and dissenting opinion.. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: the Grant deferral rule has recognised exceptions beyond Holmes. In Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009), the court addressed a Superior Court holding that “creates an exception to the Grant rule.” Grant remains the governing rule; it is not absolute. | Source**Statute / rule:** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) **Case:** Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) > We now hold that, as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/pa/572/html/0048-01.html) | | Rhode Island Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be raised in an application for post-conviction relief under R.we. Gen. Laws ch. 10-9.1, not on direct appeal, because on direct appeal the Supreme Court reviews only specific rulings of the trial justice. There is one narrow exception: an IAC claim that rests on a specific ruling of the trial justice (e.g., denial of counsel's motion to withdraw) may be entertained on direct review. Omitting IAC from a direct appeal carries no forfeiture; the statutory bar (§ 10-9.1-8) operates against grounds finally adjudicated or omitted from a prior post-conviction application, absent an interest-of-justice finding. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1(b) (post-conviction remedy "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review") **Case:** State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 371 A.2d 596 (1977); State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rondeau, 480 A.2d 398 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1994) > The defendant therefore must raise this claim by means of a petition for post-conviction relief. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ri/118/cases/0032-01.json) | | South Carolina Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims are routed to collateral review under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, not direct appeal; the Supreme Court of South Carolina holds PCR is 'the proper avenue' and declines to reach IAC raised for the first time on appeal because it was never presented to or ruled on by the trial court. Raising it on appeal is not a forfeiture — the appellate court simply refuses to reach it and the applicant proceeds by PCR — but the mirror-image bar is real: under § 17-27-90 a ground 'finally adjudicated' cannot support a later application, and non-IAC issues that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal cannot be asserted in PCR absent an IAC framing (Drayton v. Evatt, as restated in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000)). Rule 71.1(b), SCRCP separately forbids filing a PCR application while a direct appeal is pending or during the time an appeal may be perfected. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(B); Rule 71.1(b), SCRCP **Case:** State v. Felder, 290 S.C. 521, 351 S.E.2d 852 (1986) > we hold that post-conviction relief rather than a direct appeal is the proper avenue of relief in this case [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sc/290/html/0521-01.html) | | South Dakota Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims belong in a state habeas corpus proceeding under SDCL ch. 21-27, not on direct appeal; the South Dakota Supreme Court will not reach an IAC claim on direct appeal absent exceptional circumstances (counsel so ineffective and representation 'so casual' as to be a 'manifest usurpation' of constitutional rights). Declining to reach it is without prejudice — Dillon says the Court 'decline[s] to address' the claims 'at this time,' so raising IAC on direct appeal carries no forfeiture; the claim is simply deferred to habeas. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-3.1 (habeas 'cannot be maintained while an appeal from the applicant's conviction and sentence is pending or during the time within which such appeal may be perfected') **Case:** State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 28, 632 N.W.2d 37 > Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. [View the source document](https://storage.courtlistener.com/html/2001/07/25/state_v._dillon.html) | | Tennessee Either forum verified | Either forum: Tennessee has no rule compelling an ineffective-assistance claim onto direct appeal, and the Post-Conviction Procedure Act expressly contemplates competency-of-counsel claims being heard post-conviction (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105(b)). But raising it on direct appeal carries a real forfeiture: IAC is a single ground for relief, so once adjudicated it is 'previously determined' under § 40-30-106(h) and cannot be relitigated post-conviction on new factual allegations; Tennessee courts call the practice 'fraught with peril.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(g), (h) **Case:** Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) > It is true that ineffective assistance is a single ground for relief and a petitioner may not relitigate the issue by presenting new and different factual allegations in a subsequent proceeding. [View the source document](https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/thompson-v-state-889950755) | | Texas Either forum verified | Either forum is available: an IAC claim may be raised on direct appeal, but because the trial record is usually undeveloped the Article 11.07 writ is the ordinary vehicle, and a rejection on direct appeal for an inadequate record does not bar habeas relitigation with new evidence (Ex parte Torres). The res judicata consequence runs the other way: a specific allegation of deficient performance that was rejected on the merits on an adequate direct-appeal record is not cognizable on habeas unless the applicant offers additional evidence (Ex parte Nailor). | Source**Case:** Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) > specific allegations of deficient attorney performance that were rejected on direct appeal are not cognizable on habeas corpus as a part of a larger ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the defendant does not offer additional evidence to support that specific claim of deficient performance [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/149/cases/0125-01.json) | | Utah Either forum verified | Either forum, but with a real forfeiture consequence. IAC is an enumerated PCRA ground (§ 78B-9-104(1)(d)), and Utah litigates IAC on direct appeal too, with Utah R. App. P. 23B permitting remand for findings on facts outside the record. But § 78B-9-106(1) makes a petitioner ineligible for PCRA relief on a ground that (a) may still be raised on direct appeal, (b) was raised or addressed on appeal, or (c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal — so a record-based IAC claim omitted from direct appeal is defaulted. The sole statutory escape is § 78B-9-106(3)(a): the default is excused if the failure to raise the ground was itself due to ineffective assistance of counsel. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(a)-(c), (3)(a); § 78B-9-104(1)(d); Utah R. App. P. 23B > a petitioner may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised in the trial court, at trial, or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. [View the source document](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S106_2021050520210505.html) | | Vermont Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be brought by post-conviction relief petition under 13 V.S.A. § 7131, not on direct appeal; the Supreme Court declines to reach IAC on direct appeal because the trial record is inadequate. There is no forfeiture penalty — declining review on direct appeal leaves the claim fully available in PCR, and failure to raise IAC on direct appeal does not bar it later. Reaffirmed in State v. Tobin, 2018 VT 108, ¶ 10 ('we generally do not consider an argument based on ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal'). | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7131 **Case:** State v. Gabaree, 149 Vt. 229, 232-33, 542 A.2d 272, 274 (1988); accord State v. Tobin, 2018 VT 108, ¶ 10, 199 A.3d 1069; State v. Judkins, 161 Vt. 593, 594 (1993) (mem.) > We have held that the proper avenue of raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for post-conviction relief, and not through a direct appeal of a conviction. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/vt/149/cases/0229-01.json) | | Virginia Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a state habeas corpus petition and cannot be raised on direct appeal; a Virginia appellate court will not reach them on direct review. Because the claim is unavailable on direct appeal, there is no forfeiture for omitting it there — but the converse default rule applies to other claims: under Slayton v. Parrigan a non-jurisdictional claim that could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal is barred in habeas. Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(6) presupposes habeas as the forum by deeming attorney-client privilege waived when 'inadequacy of counsel' is alleged as a habeas ground. | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(6) **Case:** Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 S.E.2d 299 (2001); see also Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) > Claims raising ineffective assistance of counsel must be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding and are not cognizable on direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/va/261/html/0451-01.html) | | Washington Either forum verified | Either. Ineffective-assistance claims are regularly decided on direct appeal, but review there is confined to the trial record, so a personal restraint petition (PRP) is the required vehicle for any IAC claim depending on facts outside the record — and it may be filed concurrently with the direct appeal. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal (a petitioner 'may raise new issues' in a PRP), but an issue actually raised and rejected on direct appeal cannot be renewed in a PRP unless the interests of justice require relitigation (In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 303 (1994)). | Source**Case:** State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335 & n.5, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) > There is nothing intrinsic in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that requires it to be considered only in a collateral proceeding such as a personal restraint petition. We regularly consider such claims on direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/wash-2d/127/html/0322-01.html) | | West Virginia Post-conviction preferred verified | Ineffective assistance may technically be assigned as error on direct appeal, but West Virginia strongly channels it to post-conviction habeas under W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1 et seq., because the appellate record will not contain trial counsel's explanation. There is no forfeiture for skipping direct appeal: Losh v. McKenzie treats incompetency of counsel as a 'classic collateral issue' that 'must be litigated in a collateral proceeding,' and State v. Miller expressly held that rejecting an IAC claim on a deficient direct-appeal record 'does not foreclose further development of the ineffectiveness of counsel issue on a post-conviction collateral attack.' | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c) **Case:** State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760, 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992); State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995); Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981) > it is the extremely rare case when this Court will find ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/w-va/187/html/0760-01.html) | | Wisconsin Post-conviction only verified | Ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised first by a postconviction motion in the circuit court (the court of conviction) under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) / § 974.02; it cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal, because the appellate record must contain trial counsel's testimony from a 'Machner' hearing. Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) excuses a prior motion only where the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised. A claim that could have been raised in that motion or on direct appeal is barred from a later § 974.06 collateral motion absent a 'sufficient reason' (§ 974.06(4); State v. Escalona-Naranjo), so raising it at the wrong stage carries a real forfeiture penalty. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h); Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) **Case:** State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979); State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675 (Ct. App. 1996) > We hold that it is a prerequisite to a claim of ineffective representation on appeal to preserve the testimony of trial counsel. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/wis-2d/92/html/0797-01.html) | | Wyoming Direct appeal required verified | Ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised on direct appeal (the record is developed by a W.R.A.P. 21 motion for remand); a trial-IAC claim not raised there is procedurally barred in post-conviction and the court loses jurisdiction over it under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i). The only escapes are § 7-14-103(b): facts not known or reasonably available at the time of direct appeal, constitutionally ineffective appellate counsel, or (added in 2018, codifying Keats) that the petitioner was represented by the same attorney in the trial and appellate courts. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal and is therefore not subject to the waiver rule. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i), (b)(i)-(iii) **Case:** Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 2005) > a petitioner cannot raise the issue of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief because that issue could have been raised in the direct appeal and is therefore foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/115/html/1110-01.html) | ## The time limit for challenging the lawfulness of a conviction *How long a person has to bring the challenge their state provides — in Georgia, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — together with what starts the clock and whether a late filing can be excused. The states do not all use the same instrument, so the periods are not directly comparable; they are set against each other, with the instrument named, in the section on the time limit above.* 50 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama 1 year verified | One year for claims under Rule 32.1(a) and (f): for a conviction that was appealed, one year from the Court of Criminal Appeals' issuance of the certificate of judgment; for a conviction not appealed, one year from the lapse of the time to appeal (Rule 32.2(c)). A newly-discovered-material-facts petition under Rule 32.1(e) must be filed within the one-year period or within six months after discovery of the facts, whichever is later. Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888 (Ala. 2007) holds the limitations provision 'is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar' and that equitable tolling is available 'in extraordinary circumstances that are beyond the petitioner's control and that are unavoidable even with the exercise of diligence' (verified at.json). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) **Case:** Kuenzel v. State, 204 So. 3d 910 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015); Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888 (Ala. 2007) > within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, Ala. R.App. P. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so3d/204/cases/0910-01.json) | | Alaska 18 months verified | For conviction-related claims, the later of 18 months after entry of the judgment or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the appellate decision is final; illegal-sentence claims have no time limit. AS 12.72.020(b) allows late claims on due diligence where disability or state interference prevented timely filing, or on newly discovered, non-cumulative, non-impeachment evidence establishing innocence by clear and convincing evidence; no general equitable-tolling doctrine appears in the statute. | Source**Statute / rule:** AS 12.72.020(a)(3), (b) > if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure [View the source document](https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=12.72.010&secEnd=12.72.040) | | Arizona 90 days verified | For trial convictions, the notice for a constitutional claim under Rule 32.1(a) is due within 90 days after oral pronouncement of sentence or 30 days after issuance of the direct-appeal mandate, whichever is later; pleading defendants under Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A) have 90 days after oral pronouncement of sentence. Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) — including newly discovered material facts (e) and actual innocence (h) — may be filed 'within a reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.' The court must excuse an untimely Rule 32.1(a) notice if the defendant adequately explains the delay was not the defendant's fault (Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3); accord A.R.S. § 13-4234(C) > A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1B9BE930F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas 90/60 days verified | Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), a petition must be filed within ninety (90) days of entry of judgment where the conviction rested on a guilty plea or no appeal was taken (ninety days from pronouncement if judgment was not entered of record within ten days), and within sixty (60) days of the appellate mandate — or of dismissal of the appeal — where an appeal was taken. These limits are jurisdictional; there is no equitable tolling and no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception inside Rule 37 (counsel's failure to notify the petitioner that the mandate issued did not excuse untimeliness, O'Brien v. State, 339 Ark. 138, 3 S.W.3d 332 (1999)). Actual-innocence relief lies outside Rule 37: coram nobis, whose availability is not governed by Rule 37's time limits but requires due diligence (Larimore v. State, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000)), and Act 1780 of 2001, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208, for new scientific evidence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) **Case:** Shoemate v. State, 339 Ark. 403, 5 S.W.3d 446 (1999) > The time limitations imposed in Rule 37 are jurisdictional in nature, and the circuit court may not grant relief on a untimely petition for postconviction relief. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/339/html/0403-01.html) | | California Reasonable time verified | Non-capital: no fixed statutory deadline; a judge-made reasonableness standard requires filing 'without substantial delay' measured from when the petitioner or counsel knew or should have known the claim's basis, with delay excusable for good cause and untimely claims still heard under narrow exceptions including actual innocence (fundamental miscarriage of justice). Capital: Penal Code § 1509(c) requires the initial petition within one year of the Government Code § 68662 counsel-appointment order, and § 1509(d) excuses untimeliness only on a preponderance showing of actual innocence or death-ineligibility. The statutory new-evidence ground likewise requires presentation 'without substantial delay' (Pen. Code § 1473(b)(1)(C)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 was not unanimous — Mosk, J., concurring in the result; Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting; Brown, J., concurring and dissenting. Mosk, J., and Brown, J., would deny the petition solely on the merits.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Penal Code § 1509(c)-(d) (capital); § 1473(b)(1)(C) **Case:** In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 > Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/cal-4th/18/cases/0770-01.json) | | Colorado 3 years verified | C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1) sets the collateral-attack deadlines: no limit for class 1 felonies, three years for all other felonies, eighteen months for misdemeanors, six months for petty offenses. The period runs from 'the date of said conviction,' which the supreme court holds means after the direct appeal is exhausted — People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. 1994) ('the time limits of section 16-5-402... do not begin to run until after a defendant's appeal has been exhausted'). There is no express actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception; the statutory safety valves in § 16-5-402(2) are lack of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, an adjudication of incompetence or mental-health commitment, and 'justifiable excuse or excusable neglect' (§ 16-5-402(2)(d)), which functions as the tolling mechanism. | Source**Statute / rule:** C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1), (2) **Case:** People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994) > All class 1 felonies: No limit; All other felonies: Three years; Misdemeanors: Eighteen months; Petty offenses: Six months [View the source document](https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_16-5-402) | | Connecticut No deadline verified | No fixed statute of limitations; instead, P.A. 12-115 (2012) created a rebuttable presumption that a first petition is unreasonably delayed if filed after the latest of five years from finality of the conviction, October 1, 2017, or two years after a newly recognized retroactive right. On the respondent's request the court orders the petitioner to show good cause and dismisses absent it; good cause includes newly discovered material evidence not discoverable with due diligence. Subsections (b)-(e) do not apply to actual-innocence claims, conditions-of-confinement petitions, or capital convictions carrying a death sentence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(c), (e), (f) > has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260418232008/https://www.cga.ct.gov/CURRENT/PUB/chap_915.htm) | | Delaware 1 year verified | Rule 61(i)(1) bars a postconviction motion filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction becomes final, or — for a claim asserting a newly recognized retroactively applicable right — more than one year after that right is first recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. Where a direct appeal was taken, finality runs from issuance of the Delaware Supreme Court's mandate under Supreme Court Rule 19 (Staats v. State, 961 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 2008)). For motions filed on or after June 4, 2014, the Rule's escape hatch is the Rule 61(d)(2) pleading gateway (actual innocence in fact, or a new retroactive constitutional rule); we could not fetch a text-extractable copy of current Rule 61(i)(5) to confirm its exact wording, and we found no Delaware authority recognizing equitable tolling. | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) **Case:** Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1120 (Del. 2010); Staats v. State, 961 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 2008) > A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/12/html/1115-01.html) | | Florida 2 years verified | Two years, running from the date the judgment and sentence become final. Three enumerated exceptions: (b)(1) facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence, with the claim filed within 2 years of discovery; (b)(2) a newly established constitutional right held to apply retroactively, within 2 years of the mandate; and (b)(3) retained counsel's neglect in failing to file a timely motion (the Steele v. Kehoe remedy), itself capped at 2 years. A motion to vacate a sentence exceeding the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. Capital cases run on a separate 1-year clock under Rule 3.851(d)(1). | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (capital: 1 year) **Case:** In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure—2018 Regular-Cycle Report, 265 So. 3d 494, 532-33 (Fla. 2018) (appendix reproducing rule 3.850(b)); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999) > A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so3d/265/html/0494-01.html) | | Georgia 4 years verified | Four years for a felony and one year for a misdemeanor (180 days for misdemeanor traffic convictions under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33), running from any of four statutory dates in § 9-14-42(c): the judgment becoming final on conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek it; removal of a state-created impediment; initial recognition by the U.S. or Georgia Supreme Court of a newly recognized right made retroactive on collateral review; or the date the facts supporting the claim could have been discovered through due diligence. There is no limitation period for petitions challenging a death sentence, and the statute contains no free-standing actual-innocence exception. | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c); O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33(a), (d) > Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 40-13-33, or within four years in the case of a felony [View the source document](https://law.onecle.com/georgia/title-9/9-14-42.html) | | Hawaii No deadline verified | There is no limitations period. HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) permits a petition "at any time" after final judgment, so no deadline runs from anything and no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed. The only temporal limit is a floor, not a ceiling: a petition may not be filed before final judgment (defined as expiration of the Rule 4(b) HRAP appeal period, or termination of the appellate process), and may be filed during a pending direct appeal only by leave of the appellate court. Newly discovered evidence is an independently enumerated ground under Rule 40(a)(1)(iv), not a deadline exception. | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(1) > At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction [View the source document](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho 1 year verified | One year, running from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of an appeal, or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later (the period runs from issuance of the remittitur where a direct appeal was taken). A petition for fingerprint or forensic DNA testing under § 19-4902(b) may be filed at any time. For claims not knowable within the year, Idaho recognizes a 'reasonable time' extension, and equitable tolling is available but narrowly. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4902(a); § 19-4902(b) **Case:** Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 (2007); Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 422 (2017); Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251-53 (2009) > An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. [View the source document](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH49/SECT19-4902/) | | Illinois 6 months verified | Six months after the conclusion of proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court; if no certiorari petition is filed, six months from the date such a petition was due; if the defendant took no direct appeal, three years from the date of conviction. Late filing is excused only if the petitioner pleads facts showing the delay was not due to his or her 'culpable negligence' — the Act's sole tolling mechanism, which the supreme court has construed as 'something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to recklessness.' The limitation expressly does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence. | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) **Case:** People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002) > No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. [View the source document](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-1.htm) | | Indiana No deadline verified | No deadline: Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 1(a) permits a petition to be instituted "at any time," and there is no statute of limitations, so no tolling or actual-innocence exception is needed. Newly discovered material facts are themselves an enumerated ground for relief (§ 1(a)(4)). Delay is policed instead by the State's affirmative defense of laches, which the State must plead and prove (unreasonable delay plus prejudice to the State). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 1(a); § 1(a)(4) **Case:** Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) > may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa 3 years verified | Three years from the date the conviction or decision is final, or, if there was an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo issued; a challenge to a prison-discipline decision under § 822.2(1)(f) must instead be filed within ninety days of the final disciplinary decision. The only statutory escape is "a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period," and the section adds that a ground of fact includes DNA-profiling results ordered under § 81.10. A freestanding actual-innocence claim is not independently exempt; it must come through that ground-of-fact clause (Schmidt; Quinn), and since July 1, 2019 ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel neither tolls the period nor relates back. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 822.3 **Case:** Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 798-99, 802 (Iowa 2018); Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Iowa 2022); Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) > All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact . . . . [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250905132821/https://codes.findlaw.com/ia/title-xvi-criminal-law-and-procedure-chs-687-916/ia-code-sect-822-3/) | | Kansas 1 year verified | One year, running from the later of (A) the final order of the last Kansas appellate court to exercise jurisdiction on direct appeal or termination of that jurisdiction, (B) denial of certiorari or the U.S. Supreme Court's final order, or (C) — added in 2022 — the disposition of a prior 60-1507 motion. The period "may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice," and since the 2016 amendment that inquiry is confined by statute to why the movant filed late or whether the movant makes a colorable claim of actual innocence (more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of new evidence); there is no separate equitable-tolling route in the text. | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)-(3) > For purposes of finding manifest injustice under this section, the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence [View the source document](https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html) | | Kentucky 3 years verified | Three years, running from when the judgment becomes final — which Kentucky construes as the final judgment on direct appeal, or the trial court's judgment if no appeal was taken (Palmer). The rule's only two exceptions are RCr 11.42(10)(a), facts unknown to the movant and not ascertainable by due diligence, and (10)(b), a fundamental constitutional right newly recognized and held retroactive; there is no separate actual-innocence gateway in the rule. Equitable tolling is unsettled: the five-factor test adopted in Robertson was overruled in Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Ky. 2011) ("we overrule Robertson"), and Roach v. Commonwealth (2012) expressly declined to decide whether equitable tolling can ever apply to an untimely RCr 11.42 motion. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Robertson v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10), (10)(a), (10)(b) **Case:** Robertson v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Ky. 2005) (setting out the rule verbatim); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.3d 763, 764 (Ky. App. 1999) (accrual); Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. 2011); Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131 (Ky. 2012) > Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/177/html/0789-01.html) | | Louisiana 2 years verified | Two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final under La. C. Cr. P. art. 914 or 922. Statutory exceptions cover previously unknown facts (with a subjective due-diligence inquiry, and new facts must be submitted within two years of discovery), a retroactively applicable new constitutional interpretation (filed within one year of that ruling's finality), DNA testing under art. 926.1, factual innocence under art. 926.2, and a transitional window for applications filed on or before August 1, 2027. There is no equitable tolling: art. 930.8(F) makes all of the article's limitations "jurisdictional" and provides they "shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney." | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(A), (F) **Case:** State ex rel. Glover v. State, 660 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1995) (upholding the art. 930.8 time bar against federal and state constitutional challenge, when the period was three years) > No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112949) | | Maine 1 year verified | One year, running from the latest of (A) final disposition of the direct appeal or expiration of the time to seek it, (B) initial recognition by the Law Court or U.S. Supreme Court of a newly recognized constitutional right made retroactive on collateral review, or (C) the date the claim's factual predicate could have been discovered through due diligence; time during a pending U.S. Supreme Court certiorari petition on the same judgment is excluded. There is no actual-innocence exception — subparagraph (C) is the only newly-discovered-evidence route — and the Law Court has never adopted equitable tolling in the post-conviction context, expressly leaving the question open in Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 15-16. | Source**Statute / rule:** 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) **Case:** Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 15-16 > A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A. The limitation period runs from the latest of the following: [View the source document](https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2128-B.html) | | Maryland 10 years verified | A UPPA petition may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed, unless extraordinary cause is shown; the period runs from imposition of sentence, not from finality of appeal. Title 7 contains no separate actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception to the 10-year limit — 'extraordinary cause' is the only statutory escape. Newly discovered evidence is instead channelled to a petition for writ of actual innocence under Crim. Proc. § 8-301, which may be filed 'at any time,' or to a new-trial motion under Md. Rule 4-331. | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b) > Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. [View the source document](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcp§ion=7-103&enactments=false) | | Massachusetts No deadline verified | There is no deadline. Rule 30(a) permits a motion to vacate an unlawful restraint or correct a sentence 'at any time, as of right,' and Rule 30(b) permits a new-trial motion 'at any time.' Because no limitations period exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed; the operative limits are instead claim-specific — Rule 30(c)(2) waiver (Rodwell holds the facially unlimited Rule 30(a) is still subject to it) and, for newly discovered evidence, the requirement that the evidence was not discoverable through reasonable pretrial diligence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (b) **Case:** Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016 (2000) > The trial judge upon motion in writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241230120651/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief) | | Michigan No deadline verified | There is no filing deadline. Subchapter 6.500, fetched in full at the cited URL, contains no limitations period: MCR 6.502 sets out the motion's nature, form, and successive-motion limits but prescribes no time within which it must be filed, and MCR 6.431(A)(4) affirmatively channels a defendant whose appeal rights have lapsed into subchapter 6.500. The direct-appeal window closes earlier — a criminal defendant's application for leave to appeal must be filed within 6 months of entry of judgment or the later dates in MCR 7.205(A)(2)(b). Because no limitations period exists, Michigan has no tolling doctrine or newly-discovered-evidence exception to a deadline; innocence and new evidence instead operate on the successive-motion bar (MCR 6.502(G)(2)) and as a waiver of the good-cause requirement (MCR 6.508(D)(3)). | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.431(A)(4); MCR 6.502 (no limitations provision); MCR 7.205(A)(2)(a) > If the defendant is no longer entitled to appeal by right or by leave, the defendant may seek relief pursuant to the procedure set forth in subchapter 6.500. [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota 2 years verified | Two years, running from the later of entry of judgment of conviction or sentence (if no direct appeal was filed) or an appellate court's disposition of the direct appeal. Five exceptions in subd. 4(b) include newly discovered evidence (including scientific evidence) and a catch-all where the petition 'is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice'; but any petition invoking an exception must itself be filed within two years of the date the claim arises (subd. 4(c)). Carlton v. State held the period is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver by the State. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)-(c) **Case:** Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) > No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. [View the source document](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/590.01) | | Mississippi 3 years verified | Three years, running from the date the Mississippi Supreme Court rules on the direct appeal; if no appeal was taken, three years after the time for taking an appeal expired; and for a guilty plea, three years after entry of the judgment of conviction (capital filings are separately stated as one year after conviction). Statutory exceptions: an intervening decision of the Mississippi or United States Supreme Court that would have adversely affected the outcome; evidence not reasonably discoverable at trial that would be 'practically conclusive'; untested or retestable biological/DNA evidence; and claims that the sentence has expired or that probation, parole or conditional release was unlawfully revoked. The Act contains no equitable-tolling provision. | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) > A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri 90/180 days verified | If a direct appeal was taken, the motion is due within 90 days after the appellate mandate issues affirming the judgment or sentence; if no appeal was taken, within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. Failure to file in time is a 'complete waiver' of the right to proceed and of every claim that could have been raised, which the motion court must enforce even if the State never raises it (Dorris). There is no actual-innocence, newly-discovered-evidence, or general equitable-tolling exception: the only recognized excuses for a late INITIAL motion are active interference by a third party where the inmate did all he reasonably could to file on time, and misfiling by the court — abandonment by counsel does not excuse it (Price). | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b), (m); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(b), (m) **Case:** Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 301-02 (Mo. banc 2014); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) > If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. [View the source document](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/clerkhandbooksp2rulesonly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d) | | Montana 1 year verified | One year from the date the conviction becomes final, which is when the time for appeal to the Montana Supreme Court expires; if an appeal was taken, when the time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari expires; or if certiorari was sought, the date of that Court's final order. § 46-21-102(2) creates an actual-innocence/newly-discovered-evidence exception running one year from discovery or reasonable discovery, whichever is later. Equitable tolling is available: Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226 held the one-year bar is not a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction and remanded for the district court to decide whether refusing to toll would work 'a clear miscarriage of justice, one so obvious' that the bar would compromise the integrity of the judicial process. | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-102(1)-(2), MCA **Case:** Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226, ¶¶ 23-25, 344 Mont. 300, 187 P.3d 654 (reversing Petition of Gray, Peña, and Wells to the extent they treated the bar as jurisdictional) > a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final [View the source document](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0010/section_0020/0460-0210-0010-0020.html) | | Nebraska 1 year verified | One year, running from the later of five events in § 29-3001(4): (a) the date the conviction became final by conclusion of direct appeal or expiration of the time to appeal; (b) the date the factual predicate of the constitutional claim could have been discovered through due diligence; (c) removal of a state-created impediment; (d) initial recognition of a constitutional claim made retroactive on collateral review; or (e) denial of certiorari or affirmance, if the prisoner filed notice of the certiorari petition in the district court within thirty days. There is no separate actual-innocence exception, and the Nebraska Supreme Court holds the one-year period is not subject to equitable tolling — expressly including capital cases. | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) **Case:** State v. Boeggeman, 316 Neb. 581, 5 N.W.3d 735 (2024); State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84, 21 N.W.3d 61 (2025) > A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: [View the source document](https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3001) | | Nevada 1 year verified | One year, running from entry of the judgment of conviction or, if a direct appeal was taken, from the appellate court's remittitur, unless the petitioner shows good cause — statutorily defined as delay not the petitioner's fault plus undue prejudice from dismissal. The one-year limit applies to successive as well as first petitions and the statutory bars are mandatory, not discretionary; Nevada has no separate equitable-tolling doctrine, and NRS 34.800 adds laches with a rebuttable presumption of prejudice after five years. A bar may still be excused on a showing that refusing to reach the merits would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which ordinarily requires a colorable showing of actual innocence; separately, a freestanding factual-innocence petition under NRS 34.900–34.990 based on newly discovered evidence has no filing deadline. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.800; NRS 34.960(1) **Case:** State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225 (2005); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887 (2001); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) > Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire 3 years verified | A petition for a new trial — New Hampshire's principal post-conviction vehicle — must be filed within three years after rendition of the judgment complained of; in a criminal case judgment is 'rendered' when the trial court imposes sentence, and the pendency of a direct appeal does not toll the period (State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801, 803-05 (2007)). The only exception located is post-conviction DNA testing: RSA 651-D:2, we permits a petition 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4, at any time after conviction,' and RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) authorizes vacatur or a new trial on favorable results 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4.' Newly discovered non-DNA evidence does not extend the three-year bar (State v. Breest, 169 N.H. 640, 651 (2017)). No equitable-tolling doctrine and no general actual-innocence exception was located; RSA 534 (habeas) contains no limitations period in any of its 32 sections. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 526:4; RSA 651-D:2, I and VI(b) **Case:** State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801 (2007); State v. Breest, 169 N.H. 640 (2017) > A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit. [View the source document](http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LIII/526/526-mrg.htm) | | New Jersey 5 years verified | A first PCR petition must be filed no more than five years after the date of entry, pursuant to R. 3:21-5, of the judgment of conviction being challenged; the escape stated in R. 3:22-12(a)(1) is excusable neglect for the delay plus a reasonable probability that enforcing the time bar would produce a fundamental injustice. A second or subsequent petition gets one year from the latest of a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right, discovery of a factual predicate not discoverable earlier through reasonable diligence, or denial of the prior PCR where prior PCR counsel's ineffectiveness is alleged (R. 3:22-12(a)(2)). There is no general equitable tolling: R. 3:22-12(c) provides that 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein'; newly discovered evidence may instead support a new-trial motion, which R. 3:20-2 permits 'at any time.' | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1), (a)(2), (c); N.J. Ct. R. 3:20-2 **Case:** State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 2013) > Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) sets a five-year time limitation for the filing of a PCR petition, unless the petition itself shows excusable neglect for the late filing and fundamental injustice if defendant's claims are not considered on their merits. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nj-super/429/html/0387-01.html) | | New Mexico No deadline verified | There is no deadline. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that New Mexico imposes no statute of limitations on habeas petitioners, and it expressly declined to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to habeas proceedings, reasoning that the mere passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one deprived of fundamental rights. Because no period runs, no tolling or newly-discovered-evidence exception is needed; free-standing actual-innocence claims based on new evidence are separately cognizable in habeas. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Sutphin was not unanimous — PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Serna concurred with the majority that fundamental error may be corrected in habeas and that laches do not apply, but dissented on the determination that Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, and wou. | Source**Case:** State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶¶ 12, 15, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 > Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners and since this is not a successive habeas petition, these cases are inapposite. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nm/142/html/0191-01.html) | | New York No deadline verified | None. A CPL 440.10 motion to vacate may be made 'at any time after the entry of a judgment' — New York imposes no limitations period on post-conviction motions, so no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed to reach the merits. The only timing constraints are internal to particular grounds: a newly-discovered-evidence motion under CPL 440.10(1)(g) 'must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence,' and CPL 440.30 imposes five-year windows — each with express tolling for diligent pursuit plus extraordinary circumstance, newly-learned facts, or the interests of justice — on post-guilty-plea DNA-testing motions and on requests that the People produce property. | Source**Statute / rule:** CPL 440.10(1); CPL 440.10(1)(g); CPL 440.30(1)(b)(ii); CPL 440.30(1-a)(a)(2)(ii) > At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250804161100/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/440.10) | | North Carolina No deadline verified | Capital: 120 days from the latest of five direct-review completion events or from appointment of postconviction counsel (§ 15A-1415(a)). Noncapital: seven years from the latest of those direct-review events (§ 15A-1415(a1)) — but this deadline was created by S.L. 2025-70, s. 15, which 'becomes effective December 1, 2025, and applies to verdicts entered on or after that date,' so for noncapital verdicts entered before then the prior rule (MAR 'at any time after verdict') still governs. Regardless of the time limits, § 15A-1415(c) permits filing at any time based on newly discovered evidence bearing on guilt/innocence or death eligibility (filed within a reasonable time of discovery), a retroactive significant change in law, a fully served sentence, or a noncapital showing of good cause plus prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice; § 15A-1415(c1) allows any untimely filing with district attorney consent, and § 15A-1415(d) permits a good-cause extension (presumptively up to 30 days). | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a), (a1), (c), (c1), (d); S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(c) > In a noncapital case, a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1415.html) | | North Dakota 2 years verified | Two years, running from the date the conviction becomes final. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a) supplies three exceptions: newly discovered evidence (including DNA) that would establish the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct; a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely assertion; and a new, retroactively applicable interpretation of federal or state law. Each exception carries its own two-year clock — from discovery, from cessation of the disability, or from the effective date of the retroactive law, which Hieb fixes as the date the opinion is distributed or published (§ 29-32.1-01(3)(b); Hieb ¶¶ 10-11). We found no North Dakota authority recognizing equitable tolling outside these enumerated exceptions. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2), (3) **Case:** Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶¶ 7, 10-12, 882 N.W.2d 724 > The petition alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence, including DNA evidence, which if proved and reviewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/882/html/0724-01.html) | | Ohio 1 year verified | A petition must be filed no later than 365 days after the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal (or in the Supreme Court if the direct appeal involves a death sentence); if no appeal is taken, 365 days after the time for filing the appeal expires. R.C. 2953.23(A) supplies the only exceptions: (1) the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts, or a new retroactive federal or state right was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, AND clear-and-convincing proof that but for constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found guilt; or (2) DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71–.81 establishing actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The statute provides no equitable-tolling provision — an untimely petition may not be entertained unless one of those exceptions applies. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2)(a); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A) > a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal [View the source document](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.21) | | Oklahoma 1 year verified | One year, added by Laws 2022, HB 3383 (eff. Nov. 1, 2022) as 22 O.S. § 1080.1; before that Oklahoma had no limitations period. It runs from the latest of five triggers, the default being the date the conviction (or suspended-sentence revocation) became final on conclusion of direct review by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals — the OCCA held in Acosta that the 90 days for U.S. Supreme Court certiorari is NOT added. Other triggers include removal of a state-created impediment, a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right, and the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence; there is no free-standing actual-innocence exception and no statutory equitable tolling. | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1080.1(A); § 1080.1(B) (applies to jurisdictional claims) **Case:** Acosta v. State, 2026 OK CR 9, ¶¶ 4-6; Hammon v. State, 2023 OK CR 19 > A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: [View the source document](https://www.okcca.net/cases/2026/OK-CR-9/) | | Oregon 2 years verified | Two years. ORS 138.510(3) runs the period from (a) entry of the judgment in the register if no appeal is taken, (b) the date the appeal becomes final in the Oregon appellate courts, or (c) if certiorari is sought, the later of denial of certiorari or entry of final state judgment after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. The only statutory exception is the 'escape clause' for grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' earlier — construed in Bartz and Verduzco; the chapter contains no separate actual-innocence exception and no tolling provision. | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.510(3) **Case:** Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992); Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 172 (2015) > A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania 1 year verified | One year from the date the judgment becomes final, which § 9545(b)(3) defines as the conclusion of direct review (including discretionary review in the U.S. and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts) or the expiration of time for seeking that review. Three statutory exceptions exist: governmental interference, previously unknown facts not ascertainable by due diligence, and a newly recognized constitutional right held to apply retroactively; a petition invoking an exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. There is no freestanding actual-innocence exception — newly discovered evidence travels through the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) unknown-facts exception. The deadline is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. | Source**Statute / rule:** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)-(3) **Case:** Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2002) > Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final [View the source document](https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.045.000..HTM) | | Rhode Island No deadline verified | There is no limitations period: § 10-9.1-3 provides that an application may be filed at any time, and newly discovered material facts requiring vacation in the interest of justice are themselves a statutory ground under § 10-9.1-1(a)(4), so no separate actual-innocence exception is needed. The Supreme Court has, however, construed "at any time" to mean at any reasonable time and held that the state may plead laches as an affirmative defense, bearing the burden of proving unreasonable delay plus prejudice by a preponderance. Because no deadline exists, equitable tolling has no role. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 (see also § 10-9.1-1(a)(4); §§ 10-9.1-10 to -12, DNA/innocence protection) **Case:** Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005) > An application may be filed at any time. [View the source document](https://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-3.htm) | | South Carolina 1 year verified | One year, running from entry of the judgment of conviction or from the sending of the remittitur / filing of the final decision on direct appeal, whichever is later. § 17-27-45(B) gives a separate one-year window from the date a newly recognized, retroactively applied constitutional right is determined to exist, and § 17-27-45(C) is the newly-discovered-evidence exception: one year from actual discovery of the material facts or from when they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence — applied by the Supreme Court in Coats v. State, 352 S.C. 500, 575 S.E.2d 557 (2003). There is no freestanding actual-innocence exception. Equitable tolling: the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question in Gary v. State, 347 S.C. 627, 557 S.E.2d 662 (2001) n.2, and the Court of Appeals in Pelzer analyzed the doctrine, called it 'rarely applied in South Carolina' and 'reserved for extraordinary circumstances,' and refused to apply it to a PCR application filed in the wrong place a few days late. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A), (B), (C) **Case:** Coats v. State, 352 S.C. 500, 575 S.E.2d 557 (2003); Pelzer v. State, 378 S.C. 516, 662 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 2008) > An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal [View the source document](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota 2 years verified | Two years, running from the latest of four dates: (1) finality of the judgment on conclusion of direct review or expiration of time to seek it; (2) removal of a state-created impediment; (3) initial recognition of a newly recognized, retroactive constitutional right by the U.S. or South Dakota Supreme Court; or (4) the date the factual predicate could have been discovered through due diligence. Trigger (4) is a discovery rule for newly discovered evidence; the section contains no free-standing actual-innocence exception and no express equitable-tolling clause. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-3.3 (added by SL 2012, ch 118, § 3) > A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. This limitation period shall run from the latest of: [View the source document](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/Statute/21-27-3.3) | | Tennessee 1 year verified | One year from the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or, if no appeal is taken, one year from the date the judgment became final (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a)). The statute says the period 'shall not be tolled for any reason,' and the three exceptions in § 40-30-102(b) are narrow: a new retroactive constitutional right, NEW SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE of actual innocence (not newly discovered evidence generally), and invalidation of a prior conviction used to enhance the sentence. Notwithstanding that text, the Tennessee Supreme Court holds due process requires tolling where an attorney's misconduct or abandonment impedes a diligent petitioner. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), (b) **Case:** Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615 (Tenn. 2013) > must petition for post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20220810074444/https://www.lawserver.com/law/state/tennessee/tn-code/tennessee_code_40-30-102) | | Texas No deadline verified | There is no statute of limitations for a non-capital Article 11.07 application; the Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly declined to impose one and instead bars stale applications through the equitable doctrine of laches, which requires the State to show unreasonable delay plus prejudice. Perez leaves intact escape hatches for justifiable excuse, absence of material prejudice, and 'new evidence that shows he is actually innocent of the offense' (398 S.W.3d at 218). Capital applications under Art. 11.071 § 4(a) have a hard deadline: the later of 180 days after appointment of habeas counsel or 45 days after the State's direct-appeal brief. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Ex parte Perez was not unanimous — MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. JOHNSON, J., concurred.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (no limitations period); art. 11.071 § 4(a) (capital deadline) **Case:** Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) > we have no desire to impose upon defendants the requirement that claims for relief be asserted within a specified period of time [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/398/cases/0206-01.json) | | Utah 1 year verified | One year from accrual. Accrual is the later of six events listed in § 78B-9-107(2), including (b) entry of the appellate decision, (d) denial of certiorari, and (e) the date the petitioner knew or should have known, with reasonable diligence, of the evidentiary facts underlying the petition — which is how newly discovered evidence is accommodated. The period is tolled while the petitioner is prevented from filing by unconstitutional state action, by physical or mental incapacity, or (for § 78B-9-104(1)(h) claims) by force, fraud, or coercion, and during the pendency of a DNA-testing or factual-innocence petition. Part 3 (DNA testing) and Part 4 (factual innocence) petitions are exempt from this limitations period entirely. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1), (2)(e), (3)(a), (4), (6) > A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. [View the source document](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S107_2022050420220504.html) | | Vermont No deadline verified | There is no deadline. Section 7131 permits a prisoner in custody under sentence to move 'at any time,' and the section has not been amended since 1974. Because no limitations period exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed; the Vermont Supreme Court has also held the doctrine of laches inapplicable to PCR proceedings (In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361 (1981), reaffirmed in In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 9-10). | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7131 **Case:** In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 9-10, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210 (citing In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361, 438 A.2d 1106, 1110 (1981)) > or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed [View the source document](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07131) | | Virginia 2 years verified | A habeas petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence must be filed within two years of final judgment in the trial court, or within one year of final disposition of the direct appeal in state court (or expiration of the time to appeal), whichever is later. There is no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception (Brown v. Booker). Equitable tolling and 'conditional filing' were rejected in Lahey, but the general statutory tolling provision of Code § 8.01-229(D) does apply where the Commonwealth's suppression of exculpatory evidence obstructed the filing (Hicks). | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (tolling via Va. Code § 8.01-229(D)) **Case:** Brown v. Booker, 826 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 2019) (no innocence exception); Hicks v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 289 Va. 288, 768 S.E.2d 415 (2015) (§ 8.01-229(D) tolling applies); Lahey v. Johnson, 283 Va. 225, 720 S.E.2d 534 (2012) (no equitable tolling) > shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from either final disposition of the direct appeal in state court or the time for filing such appeal has expired, whichever is later [View the source document](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-654/) | | Washington 1 year verified | One year from the date the judgment becomes final — the latest of filing of the judgment and sentence with the trial court clerk, issuance of the appellate mandate on a timely direct appeal, or denial of a timely certiorari petition (RCW 10.73.090(3)) — and the limit applies only if the judgment is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. RCW 10.73.100 wholly exempts a petition 'based solely on' newly discovered evidence (with reasonable diligence), unconstitutionality of the statute of conviction, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence after a not-guilty plea, a sentence exceeding the court's jurisdiction, a community-custody modification, or a material change in the law given retroactive effect. Equitable tolling exists but is narrow — it requires bad faith, deception, or false assurances plus diligence (In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435, 448-49 (2013)) — and a 'mixed' petition containing even one time-barred claim must be dismissed in its entirety (In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 703 (2003)). | Source**Statute / rule:** RCW 10.73.090(1), (3); RCW 10.73.100 **Case:** In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435 (2013); In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695 (2003) > No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face [View the source document](https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.090) | | West Virginia No deadline verified | There is no limitations period. W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) permits a post-conviction habeas petition to be filed 'at any time' once the conviction and sentence have been entered and the direct-appeal right has expired or been exhausted. Because no deadline exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable-tolling doctrine is needed; nothing in §§ 53-4A-1 through -9 or the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings imposes a time bar or a laches bar. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) > may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed and the time for the taking of an appeal with respect thereto has expired or the right of appeal with respect thereto has been exhausted. [View the source document](https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-1/) | | Wisconsin No deadline verified | There is no limitations period for a collateral postconviction motion: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2) provides that such a motion 'may be made at any time.' Because no deadline exists, Wisconsin needs no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception. The direct-appeal-track motion under Rule 809.30 does have deadlines (notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing, § 809.30(2)(b); motion within 60 days of transcript/record service, § 809.30(2)(h)), but the court of appeals may enlarge them for good cause under Rule 809.82(2)(a), and the bar on enlargement in Rule 809.82(2)(b) expressly excepts § 809.30 appeals. A state habeas petition, being equitable, is subject to laches (State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry). | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2); Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b), (h); Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) **Case:** State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900 > A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time. [View the source document](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/974/06) | | Wyoming 5 years verified | Five years, running from entry of the judgment of conviction. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d). The Act contains no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception to that period: § 7-14-103(b)(i) (facts not known or reasonably available at the time of direct appeal) is expressly 'Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(i)' and so lifts only the direct-appeal procedural bar, not the time bar. The separate Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-401 through 407 (2018), is a distinct remedy limited to factual innocence supported by newly discovered evidence, and Parkhurst held it cannot be read to revive time-barred constitutional claims. No Wyoming authority recognizing equitable tolling of § 7-14-103(d) was located. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) **Case:** Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, 443 P.3d 834, 840 n.5 (Wyo. 2019) > No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/443/html/0834-01.html) | ## Counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding *Whether a lawyer is appointed for someone who cannot afford one, and whether that depends on the sentence.* 50 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Discretionary verified | No automatic right to appointed counsel in a first Rule 32 proceeding. Appointment under Rule 32.7(c) is conditional: it operates only if the court does not summarily dismiss the petition, and requires indigence, the petitioner's desire for counsel, and a judicial finding that counsel is 'necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner.' The Ex parte Allen majority characterizes this as 'a court may appoint counsel in certain situations' — i.e., contingent on the court's own merits screen, not a right (for the 2017 capital-case statute, see notes). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Ex parte Allen was not unanimous — MOORE, C.J., and LYONS and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur. WOODALL, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the result.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) **Case:** Ex parte Allen, 825 So. 2d 271 (Ala. 2002) > if it appears that the petitioner is indigent or otherwise unable to obtain the assistance of counsel and desires the assistance of counsel, and it further appears that counsel is necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner, the court shall appoint counsel [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/825/cases/0271-01.json) | | Alaska Mandatory verified | Yes — mandatory for indigent applicants bringing a timely first application, in all cases (Alaska has no death penalty, so no capital-only track). Grinols v. State holds this right to counsel in a first post-conviction application is of constitutional stature under the Alaska due process clause and includes effective assistance. The statute expressly denies appointed counsel for untimely or successive applications. | Source**Statute / rule:** AS 18.85.100(c) **Case:** Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003) > An indigent person is entitled to representation under (a) and (b) of this section for purposes of bringing a timely application for post-conviction relief under AS 12.72 [View the source document](https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=18.85.100&secEnd=18.85.100) | | Arizona Mandatory verified | Yes, mandatory on request in a first proceeding: within 15 days after a timely first notice, the presiding judge must appoint counsel for a defendant who requests it, is entitled to counsel under Rule 6.1(b), and is indigent (Rule 32.5(a); identically Rule 33.5(a) for pleading defendants). Appointment on all other (successive/untimely) notices is discretionary. In capital cases appointment for state post-conviction proceedings is mandatory by statute after affirmance on direct appeal. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(a), 33.5(a); A.R.S. § 13-4041(B) (capital) > No later than 15 days after the defendant has filed a timely first notice under Rule 32.4, the presiding judge must appoint counsel for the defendant [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N25935540F08511E99BA696ECB1FD62B1?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas Capital only verified | There is no right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital Rule 37 proceeding; the Arkansas Supreme Court holds the right to counsel ends after direct appeal and the State is not obligated to provide counsel, and it has rejected Martinez/Trevino-based demands for appointment (Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259; Ratchford, 357 Ark. at 35). Appointment is mandatory only in capital cases: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(b)(2) requires the circuit court, after a post-mandate hearing, to appoint a qualified attorney if the person under sentence of death is indigent and desires appointed counsel (Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613, 37 S.W.3d 595 (2001)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(b)(2), (c) **Case:** O'Brien v. State, 339 Ark. 138, 3 S.W.3d 332 (1999); Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613, 37 S.W.3d 595 (2001) > the right to counsel ends in Arkansas after the direct appeal of the original criminal trial is completed, and the State is not obligated to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/339/html/0138-01.html) | | California Conditionally mandatory verified | No right to appointed counsel at the filing/screening stage of a non-capital first petition; appointment becomes mandatory for an indigent petitioner once the court issues an order to show cause (rule 4.551(d)(3)). Capital cases: the sentencing court must offer and appoint post-conviction counsel for indigent death-sentenced prisoners (Gov. Code § 68662; Pen. Code § 1509(b)). Racial Justice Act claims have a special earlier trigger: counsel must be appointed for an indigent petitioner whose petition pleads a plausible § 745(a) violation (Pen. Code § 1473(e)(5)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(d)(3); Cal. Gov. Code § 68662; Cal. Penal Code § 1473(e)(5) > On issuing an order to show cause, the court must appoint counsel for any unrepresented petitioner who desires but cannot afford counsel. [View the source document](https://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=four&linkid=rule4_551) | | Colorado Conditionally mandatory verified | No constitutional right, but a limited statutory right in a first Rule 35(c) proceeding: if the motion survives summary denial and the public defender finds arguable merit, counsel is provided, and that counsel must be effective under Strickland. Appointment is not automatic — courts need not appoint counsel for claims that are 'wholly unfounded' (Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 379 (Colo. 1994), quoted in Silva). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Silva v. People was not unanimous — Justice COATS dissents. Justice EID does not participate.. | Source**Statute / rule:** C.R.S. §§ 21-1-103, 21-1-104(1)(b); Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) **Case:** Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Colo. 2007) > We hold that while there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, there exists a limited statutory right to post-conviction counsel in Colorado if a defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion has arguable merit. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/156/html/1164-01.html) | | Connecticut Mandatory verified | Yes — a mandatory statutory right, not limited to capital cases: the court shall designate a public defender for any indigent petitioner in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter. Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 (1992), holds this statutory right embraces effective habeas counsel, enforceable by a subsequent habeas petition; per Gilchrist, appointment attaches once the writ issues, not during pre-issuance screening. | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a) **Case:** Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 (1992) > in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter, in any extradition proceeding, or in any delinquency matter, the court before which the matter is pending shall, if it determines after investigation by the public defender or his office that a defendant is indigent [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260413012635/https://www.cga.ct.gov/CURRENT/PUB/chap_887.htm) | | Delaware Conditionally mandatory verified | Appointment is mandatory for a defined class: the Superior Court shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion, on request, where the motion attacks a judgment of conviction entered after a trial, affirmed on direct appeal, for a class A, B, or C felony under 11 Del. C. § 4205(b). Effective April 6, 2017 that provision was renumbered Rule 61(e)(2) and a new Rule 61(e)(1) requires the request for counsel to be filed contemporaneously with the motion or counsel may be deemed waived. Outside that class (guilty pleas, lesser felonies, untimely or successive motions) we could not verify the current standard from a fetchable primary source. | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2) (formerly 61(e)(1)); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b) **Case:** Baldwin v. State, 166 A.3d 938, 939-40 & n.4 (Del. 2017) > shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel if the motion seeks to set aside ... a judgment of conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/166/html/0938-01.html) | | Florida Capital only verified | Discretionary in non-capital cases, mandatory in capital cases. Rule 3.850(h)(7) says the court "may appoint counsel," listing factors (adversary nature and complexity of the proceeding, complexity of the claims, the defendant's intelligence and education, need for an evidentiary hearing, need for substantial legal research); Graham requires the court to determine the need and resolve doubts in favor of appointment. For a death-sentenced prisoner, counsel is appointed automatically: on issuance of the mandate affirming the death sentence the Supreme Court of Florida appoints the appropriate Capital Collateral Regional Counsel office or directs registry appointment. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(7) (redesignated from 3.850(f)(7) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1); Fla. Stat. §§ 27.7001, 27.710, 27.711 **Case:** Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1365-66 (Fla. 1979) (quoting Hooks v. State, 253 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 1971)) > although there is no absolute right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings, the Court before which the proceedings are pending must determine the need for counsel and resolve any doubts in favor of the appointment of counsel for the defendant [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/372/html/1363-01.html) | | Georgia None verified | None. There is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in a Georgia habeas proceeding, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has held this is true in capital cases as well, expressly leaving creation of any such right to the General Assembly. The habeas article's only funding provision, § 9-14-53, reimburses counties for court costs and does not provide attorney fees; death-sentenced petitioners in Gibson were served, if at all, by volunteer counsel recruited through the Georgia Appellate and Educational Resource Center. Gibson was decided 4-3: Chief Justice Benham, Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears dissented on precisely this point, Fletcher writing that “the state and federal constitutions require appointment of counsel,” and the dissent noting that Georgia was then the only jurisdiction failing to provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction cases. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Gibson v. Turpin was not unanimous — All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J, who dissent.. | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-53 (court costs only; no counsel provision) **Case:** Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855 (1999) > It is well settled that there is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in Georgia habeas corpus proceedings. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ga/270/html/0855-01.html) | | Hawaii Conditionally mandatory verified | Mandatory, subject to a frivolousness screen. If a Rule 40 petition alleges that the petitioner cannot pay the costs of the proceeding or afford counsel, the court "shall" refer the petition to the Public Defender for representation as in other penal cases; the only escape is that no referral need be made if the claim is patently frivolous and without trace of support. Not limited to capital cases and not limited to a first petition — Rule 40(i) is written in terms of any petition under the rule. Note the rule's operative verb is "refer... for representation," not "appoint." | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) > the court shall refer the petition to the public defender for representation as in other penal cases; provided that no such referral need be made if the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and without trace of support [View the source document](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho Discretionary verified | Discretionary in non-capital cases: § 19-4904 says a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an indigent applicant, and the Idaho Supreme Court has held this creates no statutory right to post-conviction counsel. Mandatory in capital cases: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 requires the sentencing judge, immediately after imposing death, to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, who must assign at least two attorneys for post-conviction. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4904; Idaho Code § 19-6010(2); Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 **Case:** Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291 (2000); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616 (2013) > we have held that I.C. § 19-4904 does not create a statutory right to post-conviction counsel [View the source document](https://static.case.law/idaho/156/html/0389-01.html) | | Illinois Conditionally mandatory verified | Mandatory, but conditional and second-stage only: if the petitioner requests counsel, alleges indigency, and the petition is NOT summarily dismissed under section 122-2.1, the court 'shall appoint counsel' on being satisfied he has no means to procure counsel. No counsel is furnished for the first-stage screening. The right is statutory, not constitutional, and entitles the petitioner only to the 'reasonable level of assistance' implemented by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c). | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-4 **Case:** People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007) > If appointment of counsel is so requested, and the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. [View the source document](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-4.htm) | | Indiana Discretionary verified | No right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital post-conviction proceeding; representation by the State Public Defender is discretionary with that office and conditioned on its own merit determination, and the trial court cannot be required to appoint anyone else. Indiana holds there is no Sixth Amendment or state constitutional right to post-conviction counsel. Capital cases differ: Criminal Rule 6.1(H) requires retained counsel or the State Public Defender to enter an appearance in the trial court within thirty days after completion of rehearing on direct appeal and give notice of intent to petition for post-conviction relief. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 9(a); Ind. Criminal Rule 6.1(H) (capital) **Case:** Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind. 1989) > Petitioner retains the right to employ counsel or to proceed pro se, but the court is not required to appoint counsel for a petitioner other than the Public Defender. [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa Discretionary verified | Statutory, not constitutional, and discretionary rather than automatic. Iowa Code § 822.5 makes the costs and expenses of legal representation available to an applicant unable to pay, but the supreme court reads that unqualified "shall" as placing appointment in the district court's sound discretion, with the statutory right attaching when the applicant presents a cognizable claim (Goode), most recently reaffirmed in Smith v. State (Iowa 2026). No capital-case distinction exists — Iowa has no death penalty. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 822.5 **Case:** Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 2006); Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Iowa 2018); Smith v. State, 32 N.W.3d 6, 10 (Iowa 2026) > an indigent's right to counsel in a postconviction relief proceeding is statutorily based; no state or federal constitutional grounds for counsel exist in such proceedings. . . . The determination whether to appoint counsel rests in the district court's sound discretion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/708/html/0066-01.html) | | Kansas Conditionally mandatory verified | Conditionally mandatory, not discretionary: if a first 60-1507 motion presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel for an indigent movant (Rule 183(i); K.S.A. 22-4506(b)), and must also appoint counsel for an indigent movant's appeal (22-4506(c); Rule 183(m)-(n)). There is no appointment where the motion presents no substantial question. For an indigent movant convicted of capital murder and under sentence of death, appointment is mandatory on an indigency finding without any merit screening, and appointed counsel may not be trial or direct-appeal counsel unless both counsel and the movant expressly request it (22-4506(d)(2)-(3)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(i); K.S.A. 22-4506(b), (c), (d)(2)-(3) > If a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel to represent an indigent movant. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260603092535/https://kscourts.gov/Rules-Orders/Rules/Procedure-Under-K-S-A-60-1507) | | Kentucky Conditionally mandatory verified | No general right to appointed counsel in a first RCr 11.42 proceeding. Appointment is mandatory only when an evidentiary hearing is required and the indigent movant specifically requests counsel in writing; if no hearing is required, counsel need not be appointed, though the judge retains discretion to appoint at any stage. Fraser held that RCr 11.42(5) — not KRS 31.110(2)(c) — fixes when a judge must appoint, and to that extent overruled Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980), which had read the statute to require appointment on request. Whether a different rule governs capital post-conviction was not verified here. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Fraser v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part we. KELLER, J., dissents as to Part we by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part II. KELLER, J., concurs as to Part II by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(5); KRS 31.110(2)(c) **Case:** Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453, 455-56 (Ky. 2001), overruling in part Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980) > If an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must be appointed to represent the movant if he/she is indigent and specifically requests such appointment in writing. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/59/html/0448-01.html) | | Louisiana Discretionary verified | No categorical right; appointment is discretionary at the outset and mandatory only at a defined trigger. Under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.7(A) the court "may" appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges a claim that would entitle him to relief, and "may" appoint under (B) for evidence bearing on procedural objections; under (C) the court "shall" appoint counsel once it orders an evidentiary hearing on the merits (or authorizes depositions or requests for admissions for use on the merits). Capital cases are different: within thirty days of a death sentence the court must order the state public defender to enroll at least one separate attorney for state post-conviction proceedings (La. R.S. 15:178; see also R.S. 15:169). | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.7(A), (C); La. R.S. 15:178 > The court shall appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner when it orders an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a claim [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112948) | | Maine Mandatory verified | Mandatory for an indigent petitioner whose petition is not summarily dismissed: on an application for assigned counsel under Rule 69 (affidavit of indigency per 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B)), the court 'shall assign counsel for the indigent petitioner,' and assigned counsel must continue through appeal unless relieved by the court or the Law Court (Rule 69(c)). Counsel is not assigned where the petition is summarily dismissed at the Rule 70(b) screen. No capital-case variation appears in ch. 305-A or Rules 65-75A. | Source**Statute / rule:** M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(c)(2); M.R.U. Crim. P. 69(a)-(c); 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B) **Case:** Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 6, 9 (motion to assign counsel denied because the petition was summarily dismissed) > the court shall provide the nonindigent petitioner the opportunity to retain counsel or shall assign counsel for the indigent petitioner. [View the source document](https://mainecourtrules.org/criminal-procedure/rule-70/) | | Maryland Mandatory verified | Mandatory. A petitioner is statutorily entitled to assistance of counsel (and a hearing) on a first UPPA petition, and Crim. Proc. § 16-204(b)(1)(iii) obliges the Office of the Public Defender to provide representation to indigent petitioners in 'a postconviction proceeding for which the defendant has a right to an attorney under Title 7.' The entitlement is not capital-only; Title 7 contains no capital carve-out. It becomes discretionary on a motion to reopen a concluded proceeding under § 7-104, where the court decides whether counsel or a hearing is granted (§ 7-108(b)(1)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a); § 16-204(b)(1)(iii) > Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is entitled to assistance of counsel and a hearing on a petition filed under this title. [View the source document](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcp§ion=7-108&enactments=false) | | Massachusetts Discretionary verified | None as of right — appointment is discretionary with the judge, even on a first Rule 30 motion. Rule 30(c)(5) commits assignment of counsel to the judge's discretion, and G.L. c. 278A, § 5 does the same for forensic-testing motions. Conceicao holds that neither the federal Constitution nor the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights gives an indigent defendant an absolute right to counsel on a new-trial motion, and that 'the decision whether to appoint counsel on a motion for a new trial properly remains within the discretion of the trial judge.' No statute or rule was found creating a mandatory post-conviction right in first-degree-murder ('capital') cases. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5); G.L. c. 278A, § 5 **Case:** Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261-264 (1983) > The judge in the exercise of discretion may assign or appoint counsel in accordance with the provisions of these rules to represent a defendant in the preparation and presentation of motions filed under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241230120651/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief) | | Michigan Conditionally mandatory verified | Discretionary, with one mandatory trigger. For an indigent defendant who has requested counsel, the court 'may' appoint at any time during a 6.500 proceeding, but appointment becomes mandatory once the court directs that oral argument or an evidentiary hearing be held (MCR 6.505(A)); appointed counsel must then be given 56 days to amend or supplement the motion (MCR 6.505(B)), and the appointment carries through to the application for leave to appeal (MCR 6.509(B)). Appointment is separately mandatory by statute when post-conviction DNA testing shows the defendant is not the source of the biological material (MCL 770.16(8)). There is no capital-case regime: Michigan's constitution forbids the death penalty (Const 1963, art 4, § 46). | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.505(A); see also MCR 6.505(B), MCR 6.509(B), MCL 770.16(8) > the court may appoint counsel for the defendant at any time during the proceedings under this subchapter. Counsel must be appointed if the court directs that oral argument or an evidentiary hearing be held. [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Conditionally mandatory verified | Mandatory for an indigent petitioner who has not already had a direct appeal: § 611.14(2) makes such a person 'entitled to be represented by a public defender,' and § 590.05 says the state public defender 'shall represent' that person. Deegan v. State independently grounds this in Article we, § 6 of the Minnesota Constitution as a right to counsel for one review. For a petitioner who already took a direct appeal, § 590.05 is permissive only — the state public defender 'may represent' such persons — so representation in a later first postconviction petition is discretionary. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 611.14(2); Minn. Stat. § 590.05 **Case:** Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2006) > a person convicted of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor, who is pursuing a postconviction proceeding and who has not already had a direct appeal of the conviction [View the source document](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/611.14) | | Mississippi Discretionary verified | No right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital post-conviction proceeding: appointment is discretionary and arises only if an evidentiary hearing is required, for a petitioner who qualifies for appointment under § 99-15-15. In capital cases appointment is mandatory — upon affirmance of a death sentence the Supreme Court orders the trial court to determine indigence and whether the inmate will accept counsel, and the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel makes the appointment (§ 99-39-23(9)); M.R.A.P. 22(c)(1)(i) requires qualified counsel unless the petitioner makes an informed, voluntary on-the-record election to proceed pro se. | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(1), (9); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1) > If an evidentiary hearing is required, the judge may appoint counsel for a petitioner who qualifies for the appointment of counsel under Section 99-15-15. [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri Mandatory verified | Mandatory, not discretionary, and not limited to capital cases: on the filing of a pro se motion by an indigent movant in a first Rule 29.15 or 24.035 proceeding the court must appoint counsel within 30 days. The right is created by rule, not by the constitution — Price holds a movant has no constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel — and where the movant seeks to set aside a death sentence, appointed successor counsel must meet the qualifications of Rule 29.16 (Rule 24.036 for plea cases). No equivalent appointment right attaches to a Rule 91 habeas petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(e), (f); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e), (f) **Case:** Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 303 (Mo. banc 2014) > Within 30 days after an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall cause counsel to be appointed for the movant. [View the source document](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/clerkhandbooksp2rulesonly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d) | | Montana Discretionary verified | No categorical right in a first noncapital postconviction proceeding. Counsel becomes mandatory only once the court determines a hearing is required or that the interests of justice require it (§ 46-21-201(2)), and § 46-8-104(1)-(2) frames the appointment as discretionary ('may order') and limits 'interests of justice' appointments to 'extraordinary circumstances,' defined to include lack of access to legal materials or a condition preventing the petitioner from reading or writing English. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: within 30 days of finality the sentencing court must notify the prisoner, and within 75 days must order the Office of State Public Defender to assign counsel meeting competency standards, who may not be prior counsel absent express agreement (§ 46-21-201(3)). | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-201(2)-(3), MCA; § 46-8-104, MCA > If the death sentence has not been imposed and a hearing is required or if the interests of justice require, the court shall order the office of state public defender [View the source document](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0020/section_0010/0460-0210-0020-0010.html) | | Nebraska Discretionary verified | There is no right to appointed counsel in a first postconviction motion. Section 29-3004 provides that the district court "may appoint not to exceed two attorneys," and Nebraska treats that power as discretionary, reversible only for abuse of discretion. Appointment becomes obligatory only when the record shows a justiciable issue of law or fact. Capital cases are not treated differently: State v. Victor (a death-penalty postconviction appeal) held neither the Eighth Amendment nor due process requires appointed counsel for death-row inmates seeking state postconviction relief, and affirmed the denial of counsel because the claims were procedurally barred or meritless. | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 **Case:** State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993); State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608, 423 N.W.2d 477 (1988) > Under Nebraska case law, where the record shows that a justiciable issue of law or fact is presented to the court in a postconviction action, an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/neb/242/html/0306-01.html) | | Nevada Discretionary verified | Discretionary in non-capital cases, mandatory in capital ones. On a verified allegation of indigency, and if the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court 'may' appoint counsel, considering the severity of the consequences and whether the issues are difficult, the petitioner cannot comprehend the proceedings, or counsel is needed for discovery. Appointment is mandatory only where the petitioner is under sentence of death and the petition is the first challenging the judgment (NRS 34.820(1)(a)); the Nevada Supreme Court has held there is otherwise no federal constitutional, state constitutional, or statutory right to counsel — or to effective counsel — in post-conviction proceedings. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.750(1); NRS 34.820(1)(a) **Case:** McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 (1996); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) > If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire Discretionary verified | Discretionary, not categorical. RSA 604-A:2, we directs the court, in a post-conviction proceeding attacking the validity of an underlying conviction, to appoint counsel (or approve non-counsel services) 'when the interests of justice or judicial economy require.' Appointment is mandatory only in the RSA 651-D:2 DNA track, once an indigent petitioner satisfies paragraph we (RSA 651-D:2, we-a). When appointment is made, RSA 604-A:2, II sets the order: public defender program first, then contract attorney, then any qualified attorney. There is no separate capital track in operation: RSA 630:1, III now requires life without parole for capital murder. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 604-A:2, I and II; RSA 651-D:2, I-a > In a post-conviction proceeding in which a defendant seeks to attack the validity of an underlying conviction, the court shall appoint counsel or approve a request for services other than counsel when the interests of justice or judicial economy require. [View the source document](http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LIX/604-A/604-A-mrg.htm) | | New Jersey Mandatory verified | Mandatory, by rule, for an indigent defendant's first petition — and without any separate application for counsel. R. 3:22-6(a) directs that on a first petition the court 'shall as of course' assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender for indictable convictions, or assign counsel under R. 3:4-2 for non-indictable convictions, unless the defendant affirmatively elects to proceed pro se. On a second or subsequent petition attacking the same conviction, assignment is discretionary and available 'only upon application therefor and showing of good cause' (R. 3:22-6(b)). Not limited to capital cases. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a), (b) > the court shall as of course, unless defendant affirmatively states an intention to proceed pro se, by order assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender if the defendant's conviction was for an indictable offense [View the source document](https://www.courtcaddy.com/nj/court-rules/r3-22.html) | | New Mexico Conditionally mandatory verified | New Mexico has a statutory (not merely discretionary) entitlement: a 'needy person' — including one detained under a conviction of a serious crime — is entitled to appointed counsel in any postconviction proceeding that counsel or the person considers appropriate, unless the court finds it is not a proceeding a reasonable person with adequate means would bring at their own expense. The entitlement is therefore statutory but subject to that judicial merits screen, and it is not limited to capital cases. We found no reachable opinion construing this subsection specifically in a first habeas proceeding. | Source**Statute / rule:** NMSA 1978, § 31-16-3(A), (B)(3) (Indigent Defense Act) > represented in any other postconviction proceeding that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20230911154408/https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2021/chapter-31/article-16/section-31-16-3/) | | New York Mandatory if hearing verified | No free-standing statutory right to appointed counsel merely to file a first CPL 440.10 motion. Two hooks exist in County Law article 18-B: (1) § 722(4) addresses a judge 'assigning counsel to a defendant when a hearing has been ordered' on an Article 440 motion or coram nobis, directing that such counsel be furnished under the county's 18-B plan; and (2) the final paragraph of § 722 provides that an assignment of appellate counsel in a criminal appeal 'includes authorization for representation by appellate counsel' with respect to preparing and litigating an Article 440 motion or coram nobis. The statute draws no capital/non-capital distinction. We did not reach a controlling New York decision resolving whether assignment becomes mandatory once a hearing is ordered, so that characterization rests on the statutory text alone. | Source**Statute / rule:** County Law § 722(4); County Law § 722 (final unnumbered paragraph) > or in assigning counsel to a defendant when a hearing has been ordered in a proceeding upon a motion, pursuant to article four hundred forty of the criminal procedure law, to vacate a judgment [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250320060747/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CNT/722) | | North Carolina Conditionally mandatory verified | Noncapital: conditionally mandatory rather than automatic — there is no right to counsel merely on filing, but once the screening judge finds the motion presents sufficient information to warrant a hearing or that the interests of justice require it, appointment for an indigent unrepresented movant is mandatory ('shall appoint'), and § 7A-451(a)(3) confirms entitlement for a defendant convicted of a felony, fined $500 or more, or sentenced to imprisonment where Chapter 15A authorizes appointment. Capital: an indigent under a sentence of death who applies to the Office of Indigent Defense Services within 10 days of the specified direct-review triggers is presumed indigent if previously so adjudicated, and IDS 'shall appoint two counsel,' who may not be prior trial or appellate counsel unless the defendant expressly requests it and waives future IAC allegations. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(3); § 15A-1421; § 7A-451(a)(3), (c), (c1), (e) > If the motion presents sufficient information to warrant a hearing or the interests of justice so require, the judge shall appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who is not represented by counsel. [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1420.html) | | North Dakota Discretionary verified | Discretionary, not mandatory — and statutory rather than constitutional. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1) reads that if an applicant requests counsel and the court is satisfied the applicant is indigent, "counsel shall be provided at public expense" (quoted verbatim in State v. McClary, 2016 ND 31, ¢ 8, 876 N.W.2d 29), but North Dakota construes the actual appointment as discretionary: counsel should be appointed where a substantial issue of law or fact may exist, and denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Bell v. State, 2001 ND 188, ¶¶ 1, 20, 636 N.W.2d 438). Wholly failing to rule on a request is itself error (McClary, ¶ 11). Chapter 29-32.1 draws no capital/non-capital distinction. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Woehlhoff v. State was not unanimous — LEVINE, J., concurs in the result.. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1) **Case:** Woehlhoff v. State, 531 N.W.2d 566, 569 (N.D. 1995) (quoting State v. McMorrow, 332 N.W.2d 232, 237 (N.D. 1983)); Bell v. State, 2001 ND 188, 636 N.W.2d 438 > The appointment of counsel is discretionary, but applications should be read in a light most favorable to the applicant. If a substantial issue of law or fact may exist, counsel should be appointed. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/531/html/0566-01.html) | | Ohio Conditionally mandatory verified | There is no constitutional right to counsel in a first Ohio postconviction proceeding. In non-capital cases the entitlement is statutory and conditional: under R.C. 120.16(A)(1) and (D) an indigent petitioner is entitled to representation by the public defender only if the public defender concludes the issues have arguable merit, and Crowder requires the trial court to notify the public defender once it determines an evidentiary hearing is warranted. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: R.C. 2953.21(J)(1) directs the court to appoint counsel (Sup.R. 20-certified, and not trial counsel absent express request) for an indigent person who intends to file a petition. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Crowder (1991) was not unanimous — Moyer, C.J., and Resnick, J., dissent. Moyer, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(J)(1)–(2); Ohio Rev. Code 120.16(A)(1), (D) **Case:** State v. Crowder (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 151, 573 N.E.2d 652 > We agree with the court of appeals that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a postconviction proceeding. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ohio-st-3d/60/cases/0151-01.json) | | Oklahoma Discretionary verified | Non-capital: discretionary, not mandatory. Counsel is made available only after the application is filed and only on a finding by the court that assistance is necessary to a fair determination of meritorious claims; appointed counsel is paid from the court fund (22 O.S. § 1082). Capital: mandatory — the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System 'shall represent' all indigent capital defendants seeking post-conviction relief on appointment by the district court following an indigency hearing (22 O.S. § 1089(B)). | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1082; 22 O.S. § 1089(B) (capital) > Counsel necessary in representation shall be made available to the applicant after filing the application on a finding by the court that such assistance is necessary to provide a fair determination of meritorious claims. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20210110184757/https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=70866) | | Oregon Mandatory verified | Mandatory, not discretionary, and not limited to capital cases: if the circuit court is satisfied the petitioner cannot pay expenses or employ suitable counsel it 'shall order' financial eligibility (ORS 138.590(2)), and in that order 'the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel,' who represents the petitioner throughout the circuit court proceeding (ORS 138.590(4)). Counsel is likewise appointed for a post-conviction appeal on request by an indigent petitioner (ORS 138.500(1)(b)). By contrast, counsel in a true habeas corpus proceeding under ORS chapter 34 is discretionary (ORS 34.355 speaks only to compensation 'if counsel is appointed'). | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.590(2), (4) > In the order to proceed as a financially eligible person, the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel to represent petitioner. Counsel so appointed shall represent petitioner throughout the proceedings in the circuit court. [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania Mandatory verified | Mandatory. On a first PCRA petition the judge must appoint counsel for a defendant who shows inability to afford or otherwise procure counsel — this is a rule-based entitlement, not limited to capital cases. Appointment continues throughout the collateral proceedings including appeal. On a second or subsequent petition, appointment is required only where an evidentiary hearing is required under Rule 908, though the judge may appoint whenever the interests of justice require. In capital cases Rule 904(H) goes further: the trial judge must appoint new counsel at the conclusion of direct review absent a valid waiver. | Source**Statute / rule:** Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), (D), (E), (F)(2), (H) > when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant's first petition for post-conviction collateral relief. [View the source document](https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/234/chapter9/s904.html&d=reduce) | | Rhode Island Mandatory verified | Appointed counsel is mandatory by statute on a first application: an indigent applicant is entitled to be represented by the Public Defender, and if the Public Defender is conflicted or otherwise unable to serve, the court shall assign counsel. The right is statutory legislative grace rather than constitutional, and it cannot be satisfied with anything less than a meaningful attorney-client relationship; counsel may exit only through the Shatney no-merit procedure, after which the applicant proceeds pro se. It is not limited to capital cases (Rhode Island has no death penalty), but an applicant serving life without parole is guaranteed an evidentiary hearing on a first application, and there is no right to appointed counsel to appeal the denial of a successive application the Public Defender has found to lack a reasonable likelihood of success. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 **Case:** Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012); Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000); Louro v. State, 740 A.2d 343 (R.I. 1999); Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012) > An applicant who is indigent shall be entitled to be represented by the public defender. [View the source document](https://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-5.htm) | | South Carolina Conditionally mandatory verified | Mandatory by court rule, but conditional: once the State has filed its return, if the application presents questions of law or fact requiring a hearing, the court 'shall promptly appoint counsel' for an indigent applicant (Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP), and § 17-27-60 makes the costs of representation available to indigents. The condition matters — an application summarily dismissed on the pleadings under § 17-27-70(b) is disposed of without appointed counsel, which is what happened in Odom. Rule 71.1(g) further entitles an indigent applicant to counsel to appeal a PCR denial. In capital cases appointment is unconditional and doubled: § 17-27-160(B) requires two qualified counsel to be 'immediately appointed.' The right is rule- and statute-based, not constitutional — Aice v. State expressly notes there is no constitutional right to counsel in PCR under Pennsylvania v. Finley. | Source**Statute / rule:** Rule 71.1(d), (g), SCRCP; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-60, 17-27-160(B) **Case:** Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753 (1999) > If, after the State has filed its return, the application presents questions of law or fact which will require a hearing, the court shall promptly appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is indigent. [View the source document](https://www.sccourts.org/resources/judicial-community/court-rules/civil/rule-711/) | | South Dakota Discretionary verified | Discretionary, not mandatory, even in a first habeas. Counsel is appointed for an indigent applicant only if the judge additionally finds appointment 'necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding'; fees are charged to the committing county. The same section provides that ineffectiveness of counsel in a collateral post-conviction proceeding is not itself a ground for relief. No separate capital-case post-conviction counsel mandate was found in SDCL ch. 23A-27A. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-4 > the court or judge shall, if the judge finds that such appointment is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding, appoint counsel for the indigent person [View the source document](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/Statute/21-27-4) | | Tennessee Conditionally mandatory verified | Mandatory by statute in a first post-conviction proceeding, but conditioned: the petition must survive preliminary consideration (i.e., not be dismissed under § 40-30-106), the petitioner must be unrepresented and request counsel, and the court must find him indigent under § 40-14-201 — then the court 'shall appoint counsel.' The court may also appoint counsel earlier, in its discretion, to secure the filing of a complete petition (§ 40-30-106(e)). This applies to all cases, not just capital; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 § 1(d)(1)(D) lists post-conviction among covered proceedings. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107(b)(1) > If a petitioner not represented by counsel requests counsel and the court is satisfied that the petitioner is indigent as defined in § 40-14-201, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20151012175907/http://law.justia.com:80/codes/tennessee/2010/title-40/chapter-30/part-1/40-30-107/) | | Texas Capital only verified | Mandatory only in capital cases: art. 11.071 § 2(a) provides an applicant 'shall be represented by competent counsel' unless the applicant validly elects to proceed pro se, and § 2(c) requires the convicting court to appoint the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs or listed counsel within 30 days. In non-capital first habeas proceedings appointment is discretionary under art. 1.051(d)(3) on an interests-of-justice finding. Art. 11.074(b) adds one mandatory non-capital trigger: the court 'shall appoint an attorney' when the State itself represents that an eligible indigent defendant is not guilty, is guilty only of a lesser offense, or was convicted under a law held unconstitutional. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.051(d)(3); art. 11.071 § 2(a), (c); art. 11.074(b) > a habeas corpus proceeding if the court concludes that the interests of justice require representation [View the source document](https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/CR/htm/CR.1.htm) | | Utah Discretionary verified | No right to appointed counsel in a non-capital first petition — appointment is purely discretionary, and available only after the petition survives summary screening. The court 'may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner,' appoint counsel pro bono or from the Indigent Appellate Defense Division, weighing incarceration, likely need for an evidentiary hearing or investigation, and complexity. Trial and direct-appeal counsel are ineligible for the appointment. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: within 30 days after the Supreme Court remits following affirmance, the sentencing court 'shall' appoint qualified post-conviction counsel, subject to knowing waiver. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah Code § 78B-9-109(1)-(2) (non-capital, discretionary); § 78B-9-202(1)(a)(ii), (1)(d)-(e) (capital, mandatory); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(j) > If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis or from the Indigent Appellate Defense Division [View the source document](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S109_2026050620260701.html) | | Vermont Conditionally mandatory verified | There is no constitutional right, but Vermont provides a statutory right to state-funded counsel in a PCR proceeding under 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3), and courts do appoint the Defender General's Prisoners' Rights Office at the outset. Since the 2004 amendment (further amended eff. May 25, 2016) that right is conditioned on the assigned attorney's own judgment that the claims are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument and have evidentiary support; on that showing counsel may withdraw without an Anders brief. In re Bruyette expressly reserved whether that merits condition may cut off counsel in an initial trial-court PCR. Not limited to capital cases — Vermont has no death penalty. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Bruyette was not unanimous — Dooley, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. He concurs in granting counsel's motion to withdraw but dissents from the holding that the Defender General may refuse to appoint new counsel to replace him.. | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3); see also 13 V.S.A. §§ 5232(2), 7137 **Case:** In re Bruyette, 2014 VT 30, ¶¶ 9-10 & n.1, 196 Vt. 261, 96 A.3d 1151; In re Bailey, 2009 VT 122, ¶¶ 11-12; In re Gould, 2004 VT 46, ¶¶ 13-22 > Vermont law does, however, provide a statutory right to state-funded counsel in a PCR proceeding. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/vt/196/cases/0261-01.json) | | Virginia None verified | None as of right. The Supreme Court of Virginia holds there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a state habeas proceeding — neither in the circuit court nor on habeas appeal — and therefore no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel; habeas does not lie to correct a prior habeas counsel's errors. Any appointment is discretionary (the circuit court in Howard did appoint counsel), and no statute confers a right to counsel in a first non-capital habeas. Virginia's only habeas-specific mandatory-counsel provision, former § 19.2-163.7 in Article 4.1 ('Counsel in Capital Cases'), was repealed effective July 1, 2021 with the abolition of capital punishment. | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 (repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, eff. July 1, 2021; formerly Title 19.2, ch. 10, art. 4.1, 'Counsel in Capital Cases'); cf. § 19.2-163.3 (public defender duties reach only persons 'charged with a crime or offense' and direct appeals) **Case:** Howard v. Warden of the Buckingham Correctional Center, 232 Va. 16, 348 S.E.2d 211 (1986) > Because Howard did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his prior habeas proceeding, he could not have been denied the effective assistance of counsel by Maupin's alleged shortcomings in handling that proceeding either in the trial court or on appeal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/va/232/cases/0016-01.json) | | Washington Discretionary verified | No unconditional right; appointment in a first collateral attack is conditional and statutory, not constitutional. For a non-capital indigent petitioner, counsel is provided at state expense only after the Chief Judge determines under RAP 16.11 that the issues raised are not frivolous (RCW 10.73.150(4)); a person under sentence of death was entitled to appointed counsel on request to file and prosecute a collateral attack (RCW 10.73.150(3)). The same statute bars public counsel for a second or subsequent collateral attack in non-capital cases, and the 1995 enacting legislature expressly found there is 'no constitutional right to appointment of counsel at public expense to collaterally attack a judgment and sentence.' | Source**Statute / rule:** RCW 10.73.150(3), (4) > Is not under a sentence of death and requests counsel to prosecute a collateral attack after the chief judge has determined that the issues raised by the petition are not frivolous, in accordance with the procedure contained in rules of appellate procedure 16.11. [View the source document](https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.150) | | West Virginia Conditionally mandatory verified | Appointment in a first post-conviction habeas is mandatory once threshold findings are made, but those findings are discretionary gatekeepers. W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) provides that if the court is satisfied the petitioner is indigent and that the petition was filed in good faith and 'has merit or is not frivolous,' the court 'shall appoint counsel'; if it finds the petition frivolous or without merit, the request 'shall be denied' by a final order. Habeas Rule 4(b) likewise makes appointment mandatory where the petitioner may have grounds but the petition is insufficient. This is statutory, not capital-specific — West Virginia has no capital cases. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) > that the petition was filed in good faith, and has merit or is not frivolous, the court shall order that the petitioner proceed in forma pauperis, and the court shall appoint counsel for the petitioner. [View the source document](https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-4/) | | Wisconsin Conditionally mandatory verified | Two-tiered. For the first-tier postconviction motion on the direct-appeal track (Rule 809.30 — the proceeding in which IAC must be raised), appointment is mandatory for an indigent who requests it: Rule 809.30(2)(e) says the State Public Defender 'shall appoint counsel.' For a truly collateral first petition under § 974.06, there is no entitlement — § 974.06(3)(b) makes court referral conditional ('If it appears that counsel is necessary'), and § 977.05(4)(j) lets the SPD take a postconviction or habeas case only 'if the state public defender determines the case should be pursued.' A separate mandatory referral exists for unrepresented indigent movants seeking postconviction DNA testing (§ 974.07(11)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(e); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3)(b); Wis. Stat. § 977.05(4)(j); Wis. Stat. § 974.07(11) > the state public defender shall appoint counsel for the person and request a transcript [View the source document](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/809/III/30) | | Wyoming None verified | None as of right. Wyoming provides no entitlement to appointed counsel in initial state post-conviction proceedings under the post-conviction relief act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through -108. In Keats — an appeal from the denial of an initial petition for post-conviction relief — the Wyoming Supreme Court quoted ABA Standard 5-6.2's call for counsel at 'postconviction review' and appended footnote 2 stating that Wyoming law 'does not go this far,' citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c) and the public defender statute § 7-6-104(c)(vi), and noting there is no federal constitutional right (Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17). What is verifiable from a fetchable primary source is the absence of an entitlement, not a categorical statutory ban: the State Public Defender's office in fact appeared for the petitioner in capital post-conviction litigation in Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 (appeal from denial of post-conviction relief in a capital murder case). | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(vi) **Case:** Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 15 & n.2, 115 P.3d 1110, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005); Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2005) > Wyoming law does not go this far. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-104(c), 7-6-104(c)(vi) (Lexis-Nexis 2005); Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 838, ¶ 17 (Wyo.2005) (The Constitution does not require counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.). [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/115/html/1110-01.html) | ## How self-represented petitions are screened *How a state tells a meritorious petition from a meritless one when the petitioner has no lawyer.* 49 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Judicial screening verified | No dedicated mechanism — no defender-office intake, counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral; the circuit judge screens petitions on the pleadings. Rule 32.6(b) requires each claim to be pleaded with specific facts, and Rule 32.7(d) authorizes summary dismissal without a response or hearing under the quoted standard; appointment of counsel under Rule 32.7(c) is considered only if the petition survives summary dismissal. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(d); Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b) **Case:** Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) > determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so3d/186/cases/0488-01.json) | | Alaska Mandatory counsel verified | Screening operates through mandatory appointed counsel plus independent judicial review: every indigent first-time applicant receives counsel, who within 60 days must pursue the pro se application, file an amended one, or file a detailed 'no-merit' certificate under Criminal Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B); under Rule 35.1(f)(2) the court may not dismiss until it independently examines the merits, gives notice of intended dismissal, and considers the applicant's response. | Source**Statute / rule:** Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(2), (f)(2); AS 18.85.100(c) **Case:** Griffin v. State, 18 P.3d 71 (Alaska App. 2001) > Even when an attorney files the certificate described in Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B), the trial court is prohibited from allowing the attorney to withdraw until the court has independently examined the potential merits of the case and has likewise concluded that the petitioner has no colorable claim [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20050218185814/http://www.touchngo.com/ap/html/ap-1720.htm) | | Arizona Mandatory counsel verified | Layered screening rather than pure pro se review: counsel is appointed on request for timely first petitions (Rule 32.5(a)); if appointed counsel finds no colorable claim, counsel must file a notice cataloguing the record reviewed and potential issues (including potential IAC claims), then remains as advisory counsel while the defendant may file a petition pro se (Rule 32.6(c)-(e)). The court then reviews the petition, response, and reply and must summarily dismiss if no claim presents a material issue of fact or law (Rule 32.11(a)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a); see also Rules 32.5, 32.6(c)-(e); accord A.R.S. § 13-4236(C) > If, after identifying all precluded and untimely claims, the court determines that no remaining claim presents a material issue of fact or law that would entitle the defendant to relief under this rule, the court must summarily dismiss the petition. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N2F847FC0F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and on the papers: the circuit court reviews the petition against the files and record and, if they conclusively show no entitlement to relief, denies without a hearing but must make written findings specifying the parts of the record relied on (Rule 37.3(a)); otherwise it must serve notice on the prosecutor and grant a prompt reported hearing (Rule 37.3(c)). Failure to make the required written findings is reversible error unless the record conclusively shows the petition is meritless. A second layer of merit screening occurs on appeal, where the Supreme Court dismisses pro se postconviction appeals that are clearly without merit (Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626; Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475 (2007)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(a), (c) **Case:** Wooten v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999); Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259 > If the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/338/html/0691-01.html) | | California Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening under Rule of Court 4.551: the court must rule on every habeas petition within 60 days of filing (rule 4.551(a)(5)(A)), may request an informal response from the state, and must issue an order to show cause if the petition states a prima facie case taking its factual allegations as true; any denial must state reasons. Counsel is then appointed for indigent petitioners on issuance of the order to show cause. | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(5), (c)(1) > court must issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. [View the source document](https://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=four&linkid=rule4_551) | | Colorado Judicial screening verified | Two-tier screening. First, judicial: the trial court reviews the pro se motion and may deny it without a hearing only where the motion, files, and record clearly establish the allegations are without merit (Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV)). Second, defender-office intake: if not summarily denied, the motion is served on the state public defender, which enters only if it finds arguable merit under C.R.S. § 21-1-104 (Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V); Silva v. People). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Silva v. People was not unanimous — Justice COATS dissents. Justice EID does not participate.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV)–(V); C.R.S. § 21-1-104(1)(b), (2) **Case:** Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 (Colo. 2007) > Therefore, the court and the state public defender's office must find that a defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion has arguable merit before the statutory right to post-conviction counsel is triggered. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/156/html/1164-01.html) | | Connecticut Judicial screening verified | A judge screens every petition before the writ issues: under Practice Book § 23-24 the court conducts preliminary review and declines to issue the writ only if it lacks jurisdiction, the petition is wholly frivolous on its face, or the relief sought is unavailable (Gilchrist confirms this pre-issuance screening precedes any appointment of counsel). Petitions that survive proceed with appointed counsel for indigent petitioners under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a), and face a further statutory 'good cause for trial' screen after the close of pleadings under § 52-470(b). | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Practice Book § 23-24; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-470(b), 51-296(a) **Case:** Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 548 (2020) > conduct a preliminary review of the petition, prior to commencement of the habeas action through issuance of the writ, to determine whether the petition is patently defective because the court lacks jurisdiction, the petition is wholly frivolous on its face [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128052511/https://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2020/sc20141.html) | | Delaware Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial: the Superior Court judge reviews the pro se motion and may summarily dismiss it when it plainly appears from the motion and the record of prior proceedings that the movant is not entitled to relief; a qualifying indigent first-time movant who is not summarily dismissed gets appointed counsel on request. Motions are commonly referred to a Superior Court Commissioner, who may hold evidentiary hearings and submit proposed findings on 'applications for postconviction relief,' subject to de novo determination by a judge (10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)b, d). We found no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in Delaware primary law. | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5), 61(e); 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)b **Case:** Baldwin v. State, 166 A.3d 938, 939-42 (Del. 2017) > it plainly appears from the motion for post-conviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the [defendant] is not entitled to relief [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/166/html/0938-01.html) | | Florida Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, and nothing else. On filing, the clerk forwards the motion to the court, which must sort it: untimely and facially insufficient motions are summarily denied with prejudice; a timely but insufficient motion draws a nonfinal order giving the defendant 60 days to amend; a motion stating some sufficient and some insufficient claims draws 60 days to cure the latter; claims conclusively refuted by the record are summarily denied with the record attached; otherwise the state must answer and an evidentiary hearing follows. Spera makes the amendment opportunity mandatory on a first motion. There is no defender-office intake, counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral mechanism for non-capital postconviction. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(1)-(6) (redesignated from 3.850(f)(1)-(6) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. Stat. § 27.51(1) (public defender duties, which do not extend to collateral proceedings) **Case:** Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 2007) > we hold that in dismissing a first postconviction motion based on a pleading deficiency, a court abuses its discretion in failing to allow the defendant at least one opportunity to correct the deficiency unless it cannot be corrected [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/971/html/0754-01.html) | | Georgia No screening verified | Georgia has no merit-screening mechanism for self-represented habeas petitions. The general pre-filing frivolity screen for unrepresented indigent civil filers, O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d), does not apply to habeas petitions, and the merits may be reached only after the petition is filed (Hicks v. Scott). No counsel is appointed on issuance, and the statute instead requires the respondent to answer or move to dismiss within 20 days and the court to set a hearing (§ 9-14-47). The only merit gate is appellate: the Supreme Court of Georgia must issue a certificate of probable cause before an unsuccessful petitioner may appeal (§ 9-14-52(a)–(b)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Hicks v. Scott was not unanimous — All the Justices concur, except Carley and Hines, JJ, who dissent. Carley, J., dissenting, joined by Hines, J., on the ground that this Court lacked jurisdiction because the application for certificate of probable cause was untimely filed.. | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(a)–(b) **Case:** Hicks v. Scott, 273 Ga. 358 (2001) > This Court has previously held, however, that this Code section does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus relief. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ga/273/html/0358-01.html) | | Hawaii Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, mandatory and on the papers: every post-conviction document received by any court must be transmitted to a judge, who determines how it is docketed (HRPP Rule 42.3(a); accord R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 33). A nonconforming pro se petition must still be accepted for filing and treated as a Rule 40 petition (Rule 40(c)(2)), no petition may be dismissed for want of particularity until the petitioner has had an opportunity to clarify it (Rule 40(e)), and a hearing is required unless the claim is "patently frivolous and... without trace of support" (Rule 40(f), 40(g)(2)). Surviving that screen also triggers mandatory referral of an indigent petitioner to the Public Defender (Rule 40(i)). The rules establish no defender-office intake screen and no conviction-integrity referral. | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 42.3(a); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(c)(2), 40(e), 40(f), 40(g)(2), 40(i); R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 33 > All post-conviction documents received by any court shall be transmitted to a judge for processing [View the source document](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening only. Under § 19-4906(b) the court may give notice of its intent to dismiss with its reasons and must allow the applicant 20 days to reply. The court must rule on any request for appointed counsel before reaching the merits, and must appoint counsel if the pro se petition alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim, with every inference running in the unrepresented petitioner's favor. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Charboneau v. State was not unanimous — Justice KIDWELL dissenting, in which Chief Justice SCHROEDER concurs. Justice Kidwell dissents on the grounds that the petition was frivolous and the district court's error in not ruling on counsel was harmless.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4906(b); § 19-4904 **Case:** Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-94 (2004); Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654 (2007) > If he alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/idaho/140/html/0789-01.html) | | Illinois Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening. Within 90 days of docketing, the circuit court must examine every petition on its own and may summarily dismiss it in a written order if it is 'frivolous or is patently without merit' — construed to mean the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. A petition that survives (or that the court fails to rule on within 90 days) is docketed for second-stage proceedings, where indigent counsel is appointed. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral step built into the Act. | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a), (a)(2), (b) **Case:** People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 16 (2009) > Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. [View the source document](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-2.1.htm) | | Indiana Defender intake verified | Defender-office intake plus judicial screening. If the petitioner is indigent, confined in an Indiana penal facility or committed to the DOC, and has requested representation, the clerk must send the petition to the State Public Defender's office (§ 2); that office screens the case and represents the petitioner only if it determines the proceeding is meritorious and in the interests of justice (§ 9(a)). Counsel who later concludes there is no merit must withdraw with a certificate of consultation and investigation (§ 9(c)); the court may separately refer an indigent incarcerated petitioner to the State Public Defender on its own preliminary finding of merit (§ 4(e)), and may deny the petition without further proceedings if the pleadings conclusively show no entitlement to relief (§ 4(f)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 §§ 2, 4(e)–(f), 9(a), 9(c) > the Public Defender may represent any petitioner confined in a penal facility in Indiana or committed to the Indiana Department of Correction in all proceedings under this Rule, including appeal, if the Public Defender determines the proceedings are meritorious and in the interests of justice [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, coupled with discretionary appointment of counsel — there is no defender-office intake gate or conviction-integrity referral required by chapter 822. Under Iowa Code § 822.6(2) the court may screen the application on the pleadings and record and, if it intends to dismiss, must give the applicant its reasons and an opportunity to reply. On the counsel side, Furgison directs judges to read the "often inartfully drawn application in a light most favorable to the applicant" and appoint counsel at once if a substantial issue of law or fact may exist. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 822.6(2); Iowa Code § 822.5 **Case:** Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559-60 (Iowa 2002); Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980); Furgison v. State, 217 N.W.2d 613, 615-16 (Iowa 1974) > it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for dismissal. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/654/html/0555-01.html) | | Kansas Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and on the papers: on a 60-1507 motion filed with a poverty affidavit the court "shall make a preliminary examination of the petition or motion and the supporting papers" (K.S.A. 22-4506(a)), and must grant a prompt hearing unless the motion, files, and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief (K.S.A. 60-1507(b); Rule 183(f)). If the papers present substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact the court must appoint counsel from the Board of Indigents' Defense Services panel and order a transcript (22-4506(b)); Bellamy describes the three permissible dispositions — summary denial, a preliminary hearing held after appointment of counsel, or a full evidentiary hearing. We found no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in K.S.A. 60-1507, 22-4506, or Rule 183. | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 22-4506(a)-(b); K.S.A. 60-1507(b); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(f), (h) **Case:** Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 353-54, 172 P.3d 10 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170-71, 14 P.3d 424 (2000)) > the court shall make a preliminary examination of the petition or motion and the supporting papers [View the source document](http://www.ksrevisor.org/statutes/chapters/ch22/022_045_0006.html) | | Kentucky Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and is done by the judge of the sentencing court on the papers. Under RCr 11.42(2) the judge examines whether the motion is signed, verified, and pleads specific grounds and supporting facts that would warrant relief; if not, it may be summarily dismissed. Only if the Commonwealth's answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved on the face of the record must the court hold a hearing and (on written request) appoint counsel. Separately, Fraser holds that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the Department of Public Advocacy may furnish post-conviction legal services without any judicial appointment, which is Kentucky's defender-office intake path. No conviction-integrity-unit referral mechanism was located. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Fraser v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part we. KELLER, J., dissents as to Part we by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part II. KELLER, J., concurs as to Part II by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(2), (5); KRS 31.110(2)(c) (as construed in Fraser) **Case:** Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001) > shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall warrant a summary dismissal of the motion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/59/html/0448-01.html) | | Louisiana Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, and it is mandatory. La. C. Cr. P. art. 927(A)(1) requires the court to conduct a preliminary review of every PCR petition — for custody, timeliness under art. 930.8, adequacy of factual and legal grounds, record contradiction, and whether each claim is procedurally barred or facially frivolous — and to dismiss if the petition and exhibits show no entitlement to relief; only if it survives does the court order an answer. Art. 930.11(A)(1) gives the court thirty days from filing to complete that review. Petitioners must use the uniform application approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court (art. 926(D)). There is no statewide defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral for non-capital PCR. | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 927(A); see also arts. 926(D), 930.11(A)(1) > The court shall conduct a preliminary review of all petitions for post-conviction relief for compliance with the limitations for relief established in this Title. [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112938) | | Maine Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening. The court must promptly examine every petition and must summarily dismiss it, in whole or part and with stated reasons, if the face of the petition and its exhibits affirmatively disclose no restraint/impediment (§ 2124), waiver (§ 2128) with no § 2128-A exception, untimeliness (§ 2128-B), or no cognizable ground (§ 2125). A petition surviving that screen triggers assignment of counsel for an indigent petitioner, who then has 42 days to file an amended petition. No defender-office intake, innocence-commission, or conviction-integrity referral appears in ch. 305-A or M.R.U. Crim. P. 65-75A. | Source**Statute / rule:** M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(a)-(c); 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1) > The court shall enter an order for the summary dismissal of the petition in whole or in part, stating the reasons for the dismissal, if from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached to it, the petition affirmatively discloses [View the source document](https://mainecourtrules.org/criminal-procedure/rule-70/) | | Maryland Defender intake verified | Maryland uses defender-office intake rather than judicial merits screening: on receipt of any post-conviction petition the clerk must notify the county administrative judge and the State's Attorney, and if the petition alleges indigency must forward a copy to the Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender. There is no threshold merit gate on a first petition — Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a) entitles the petitioner to counsel and a hearing, and Md. Rule 4-406(a) requires a prompt hearing unless the parties stipulate to relief. Discretionary screening applies only to a request to reopen under § 7-104. | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a); Md. Rule 4-403 > If the petition alleges that the petitioner is indigent, the clerk shall promptly notify the Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender by forwarding a copy of the petition. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/ND8C793809CEA11DB9BCF9DAC28345A2A?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Massachusetts Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and done on the papers: under Rule 30(c)(3) the judge decides on the motion and supporting affidavits without a hearing unless a 'substantial issue' is raised, and Rule 30(c)(5) leaves appointment of counsel to the judge's discretion (Conceicao: where a colorable or meritorious issue is presented, 'it is much the better practice to assign counsel'). Post-conviction forensic-testing motions get a parallel judicial gate under G.L. c. 278A, § 3(e), which requires the court to review all motions expeditiously and dismiss facially insufficient ones without a hearing. No defender-office intake, automatic counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral is built into the rules. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(3), (c)(5); G.L. c. 278A, § 3(e) **Case:** Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 262 (1983) > on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or affidavits [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241230120651/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief) | | Michigan Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening by the assigned judge. The court must promptly examine the motion together with all files, records, transcripts and correspondence, and summarily deny it — with a concise statement of reasons — if it plainly appears the defendant is not entitled to relief; otherwise it must order a prosecutor response and further proceedings (MCR 6.504(B)(1)-(4)). Two provisions specifically protect self-represented filers: the court must give notice and 90 days to withdraw or amend before recharacterizing a mis-styled first motion as a motion for relief from judgment, and failure to do so means the filing cannot count against the one-motion limit (MCR 6.502(D)); and counsel must be appointed for an indigent defendant once the court directs oral argument or an evidentiary hearing (MCR 6.505(A)). There is no defender-office intake screen in the rules. | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.504(B)(2); see also MCR 6.502(D), MCR 6.505(A) > If it plainly appears from the face of the materials described in subrule (B)(1) that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the court shall deny the motion without directing further proceedings. [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Judicial screening verified | Two statutory mechanisms operate together: defender-office intake — where the petitioner is unrepresented, the court administrator must forward a copy of the petition to the State Public Defender and tell the petitioner of the referral (§ 590.02, subd. 1(4)) — and judicial screening, under which the court must promptly set an early hearing unless 'the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief' (§ 590.04, subd. 1). Section 590.03 directs the court to 'liberally construe the petition' and waive defects in form. There is no separate merits-triage panel or statutory conviction-integrity referral in ch. 590. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(4); § 590.04, subd. 1; § 590.03 > In the event the petitioner is without counsel, the court administrator shall forthwith transmit a copy of the petition to the state public defender and shall advise the petitioner of such referral. [View the source document](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/590.02) | | Mississippi Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening only, at two levels. In the trial court the judge examines the motion and all related files promptly and may dismiss it summarily if it plainly appears the movant is not entitled to relief (§ 99-39-11(1)-(2)); a clerk returns a non-complying motion if a judge so directs (§ 99-39-9(4)). Where the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court screens the application for leave and must deny it unless the claims are not procedurally barred and 'present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right' (§ 99-39-27(5)); there is no defender-office intake for non-capital post-conviction cases, the Indigent Appeals Division being limited to felony appeals (§ 99-40-1(2)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-11(1)-(2), 99-39-9(4), 99-39-27(5); cf. § 99-40-1(2) > If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri Mandatory counsel verified | There is no merit screen gating access: counsel must be appointed for EVERY indigent pro se movant within 30 days of filing, and appointed counsel must then determine whether the pro se motion pleads sufficient facts and all known claims, filing either an amended motion or a statement in lieu explaining what was done. Merit screening is judicial and comes afterward, on the papers — the court denies without a hearing if the motion, files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. Separately, and outside the movant's control, § 547.031 RSMo permits the prosecuting or circuit attorney to move to vacate at any time on information that the convicted person may be innocent. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(e), (h); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e), (h); § 547.031 RSMo > If the court shall determine the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, a hearing shall not be held. [View the source document](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/clerkhandbooksp2rulesonly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d) | | Montana Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening only. Under § 46-21-201(1)(a) the district court reviews the petition against the files and records; if they conclusively show no entitlement to relief the petition is dismissed without a response being ordered, otherwise the court orders the county attorney and Attorney General to respond and may then dismiss as a matter of law for failure to state a claim. The pleading burden falls on the petitioner: § 46-21-104 requires attached affidavits, records, or other evidence plus a supporting memorandum with citations, and a pro se petition can be dismissed for non-compliance (Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶ 3). We found no statutory defender-office intake, automatic counsel-on-docketing, or conviction-integrity referral anywhere in Title 46, ch. 21 (parts 1 and 2 comprise only §§ 46-21-101 to -105, -110, -111, and -201 to -203). | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-201(1)(a), MCA; § 46-21-104, MCA > Unless the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall cause notice of the petition to be sent to the county attorney [View the source document](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0020/section_0010/0460-0210-0020-0010.html) | | Nebraska Judicial screening verified | Screening is done by the sentencing judge on the papers, not by any defender office, screening panel, or conviction-integrity unit. Under § 29-3001(2) the court must serve the county attorney and grant a prompt hearing unless the motion and the files and records of the case show the prisoner is entitled to no relief; motions alleging only conclusions may be denied without a hearing. Counsel is discretionary, but appointment is required once the record shows a justiciable issue of law or fact (State v. Wiley; State v. Victor). No postconviction unit exists in the Commission on Public Advocacy — § 29-3930 lists capital litigation, appellate, violent crime and drug defense, DNA testing, and major case resource center divisions — and a pro se movant is held to the same standard as one represented by counsel (State v. Parmar). | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(2); see § 29-3930 (Commission on Public Advocacy divisions) **Case:** State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608, 423 N.W.2d 477 (1988) > Unless the motion and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served on the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon [View the source document](https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3001) | | Nevada Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening. A self-represented petitioner must use the mandatory statutory form (NRS 34.735); the clerk presents the petition promptly to a judge, who examines it expeditiously and either orders the prosecuting agency to respond within 45 days or, for a successive petition plainly barred under NRS 34.810(3), enters summary dismissal; after the response the judge decides whether an evidentiary hearing is required, granting the writ and setting a hearing if it is and dismissing without a hearing if it is not. Chapter 34 provides no defender-office intake, conviction-integrity referral, or other non-judicial merit screen; counsel may be appointed by the court once the petition survives summary dismissal (NRS 34.750(1)). | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.735; NRS 34.740; NRS 34.745; NRS 34.770; NRS 34.750(1) > If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, the judge or justice shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing. [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial, done by the superior court on the papers; New Hampshire has no defender-office intake mandate and no statutory conviction-integrity referral that we could locate. Two statutory screens exist: for habeas, RSA 534:5 directs that the writ 'shall not be granted' if the attached copy of the committing process shows the petitioner is lawfully held; and for DNA petitions, RSA 651-D:2, we-a requires appointment of counsel once the court finds an indigent petitioner has met the pleading requirements of paragraph we — counsel on issuance. Outside the DNA track, appointment of counsel is discretionary and is itself the merit signal (RSA 604-A:2, we). | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 651-D:2, I-a; RSA 534:5; RSA 604-A:2, I > If the superior court determines that an indigent petitioner has met the requirements of paragraph I, it shall appoint counsel to represent such petitioner in any further proceedings under this section. [View the source document](http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/651-D/651-D-mrg.htm) | | New Jersey Defender intake verified | Screening is done first by court staff and the Criminal Presiding Judge, then by the defender office. Under R. 3:22-6(a) the criminal division manager's office determines indigency and screens the petition for cognizability under R. 3:22-2 and for compliance with the specificity/verification requirements of R. 3:22-8, and forwards it to the Criminal Presiding Judge, whose assignment order must state the reasons if the petition is not cognizable or is deficient; counsel is then assigned as of course on a first petition and, under R. 3:22-6A(3), must file an amended or new petition within 120 days curing those deficiencies. The Office of the Public Defender's Conviction Integrity Unit separately reviews each referral, orders transcripts, and assigns an experienced attorney who may amend the petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6A(3) > The criminal division manager's office shall determine whether the defendant is indigent and screen the petition to determine whether the petition is cognizable under R. 3:22-2 and, if so, whether the requirements of R. 3:22-8 have been met. [View the source document](https://www.courtcaddy.com/nj/court-rules/r3-22.html) | | New Mexico Judicial screening unverified | Not verified. The screening mechanism lives in Rule 5-802 NMRA, whose text we could not extract. A search-engine-indexed excerpt of the official rule PDF on nmcourts.gov reads that the petition goes 'to a judge presiding in the criminal division' and that 'the clerk of the court shall immediately forward a file-stamped copy of the petition and any attachments to the district attorney and to the public defender department post-conviction unit' — i.e. judicial assignment plus mandatory defender-office intake review — but we could not fetch that text from the document itself and found no statute or reachable opinion reproducing the provision. | Source**Statute / rule:** Rule 5-802 NMRA [View the source document](https://twelfthdistrict.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2024/01/Rule-5-802-Habeas-Corpus.pdf) | | New York Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening on the papers, by the motion court. Under CPL 440.30 the court must summarily deny if a mandatory bar appears from conceded allegations or unquestionable documentary proof; it may deny without a hearing if the papers allege no legal ground, lack sworn factual substantiation, are conclusively refuted by documentary proof, or rest on an unsupported bare allegation with no reasonable possibility of being true; it must grant without a hearing where the sworn allegations are conceded or conclusively documented; and if none of those apply it must conduct a hearing. The statute creates no defender-office intake, screening panel, or conviction-integrity referral; the only statutory routes to counsel we located are the County Law § 722 hooks described under counsel_initial_habeas. | Source**Statute / rule:** CPL 440.30(2), (3), (4), (5) > Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court may deny it without conducting a hearing if: (a) The moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis for the motion [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250909113306/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/440.30) | | North Carolina Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening on the record, with counsel appointed if the motion survives it: the clerk docketalls the MAR and brings it to the senior resident superior court judge (or chief district court judge), who assigns it, and the assigned judge must conduct an initial review, deny the motion if all claims are frivolous, and appoint counsel for an indigent unrepresented movant if the motion warrants a hearing or the interests of justice require. Two supplements exist outside the MAR track: the Office of Indigent Defense Services is statutorily responsible for inmate legal-access services (§ 7A-498.3(a)(2a), contracted in practice to NC Prisoner Legal Services), and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission accepts factual-innocence claims directly from claimants convicted of homicide, robbery, registrable offenses, and Class A–E felonies, with other claims referable by a court, agency, or counsel. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(2)-(3); § 7A-498.3(a)(2a); § 15A-1467(a) > The judge assigned to the motion shall conduct an initial review of the motion. If the judge determines that all of the claims alleged in the motion are frivolous, the judge shall deny the motion. [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1420.html) | | North Dakota Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, paired with a clerk-notification duty. Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(6) the clerk of court must tell a petitioner who files without counsel how to obtain appointed counsel if indigent; the district court then bears the ultimate duty to decide whether counsel should be appointed, which requires it to determine whether "a substantial issue of law or fact may exist" on the application read most favorably to the applicant. Applications lacking such an issue may be summarily disposed of (§§ 29-32.1-09, 29-32.1-09.1). We located no defender-office intake unit, conviction-integrity referral, or other separate merit-screening body in North Dakota. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Woehlhoff v. State was not unanimous — VANDE WALLE, C.J., and SANDSTROM and NEUMANN, JJ., concur. LEVINE, J., concurs in the result.. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(6); §§ 29-32.1-09, 29-32.1-09.1 **Case:** Woehlhoff v. State, 531 N.W.2d 566, 569 (N.D. 1995) > the initial duty on the clerk of court to notify a convict, who petitions for post-conviction relief without assistance of counsel, about the procedure to obtain counsel if indigent, the trial court is delegated the ultimate duty to determine if counsel should be appointed [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/531/html/0566-01.html) | | Ohio Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial, done by the sentencing court on the papers: before granting a hearing the court must determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief, considering the petition, supporting affidavits, documentary evidence and all files and records, and must file findings of fact and conclusions of law if it dismisses. There is no statutory defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral; the county and state public defenders may decline any postconviction matter unless first satisfied there is arguable merit (R.C. 120.16(D); R.C. 120.06(B)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(D) > Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief. [View the source document](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.21) | | Oklahoma Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening only. The district court reviews the application, the State's answer or motion, and the record, and may dismiss without a hearing or grant summary disposition; it must take account of substance regardless of defects of form, and may not dispose on the pleadings if a material issue of fact exists (22 O.S. §§ 1083(B)-(C), 1084). Merit-screening for counsel is the court's own finding under § 1082. There is no defender-office intake, no automatic counsel on issuance, and no conviction-integrity referral for non-capital petitioners; capital petitioners are handled by the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System under § 1089(B). | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1083(B)-(C); § 1084; § 1082 **Case:** Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 21 (construing § 1083(b)-(c)) > When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion of respondent, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may order the application dismissed [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20240602233250/https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=70867) | | Oregon Judicial screening verified | Two statutory mechanisms operate together. The court may enter judgment on its own motion denying a 'meritless petition' — one that, liberally construed, fails to state a claim (ORS 138.525(1)–(2)); such a dismissal is not appealable (138.525(3)) but is without prejudice if entered without a hearing and the petitioner was unrepresented (138.525(4)). Separately, every financially eligible petitioner receives appointed counsel, who must move to amend a defective petition within 15 days or file an affidavit stating that no ground for relief can be pleaded (ORS 138.590(4)–(5)) — so screening is done by appointed counsel plus the judge, not by a defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral. | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.525; ORS 138.590(4), (5) > The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the defendant, enter a judgment denying a meritless petition brought under ORS 138.510 to 138.680. [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening, paired with near-automatic appointment of counsel. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) the judge promptly reviews the petition, any Commonwealth answer, and the record; if satisfied there is no genuine issue of material fact the judge must issue a notice of intent to dismiss stating the reasons, and the petitioner has 20 days to respond before dismissal. In practice the screening rarely falls on an unaided pro se petitioner, because Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) requires counsel be appointed for an indigent defendant's first petition. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in the rules. | Source**Statute / rule:** Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) > the judge shall promptly review the petition, any answer by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other matters of record relating to the defendant's claim(s). [View the source document](https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/234/chapter9/s907.html&d=reduce) | | Rhode Island Mandatory counsel verified | Rhode Island has no separate screening office; screening runs through mandatory counsel. Every indigent applicant is entitled to the Public Defender (or court-assigned counsel), and if appointed counsel concludes the application lacks merit, counsel must move to withdraw with a "no-merit" memorandum detailing the review and listing each issue the applicant wished to raise, after which the hearing justice must hold a hearing with the applicant present and independently determine whether any ground has arguable merit before allowing withdrawal. The court may separately dismiss on the pleadings under § 10-9.1-6(b), but only after notice of its intent and an opportunity for the applicant to reply; for applicants serving life without parole, an evidentiary hearing is required on a first application. ⚠ SCOPE LIMIT: in Motyka v. State, 175 A.3d 1188 (R.we. 2017), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that “from this point forward, Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.we. 2000), shall be deemed abrogated and inapplicable in any case involving both an initial application for postconviction relief and an applicant who has been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,” and directed that counsel be appointed on remand. The Shatney no-merit-withdrawal procedure described above therefore does not govern that class of case; Shatney otherwise remains good law. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5; § 10-9.1-6(b) **Case:** Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000); Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012); Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012) > The court then must conduct a hearing with the applicant present. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a2d/755/cases/0130-01.json) | | South Carolina Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening on the pleadings, followed by mandatory appointment of counsel if the case survives. The State must answer within thirty days; if the court is then satisfied on the application, answer and record that the applicant is not entitled to relief, it issues a conditional order stating its intention to dismiss and its reasons, and the applicant must be given an opportunity to reply before dismissal — and summary disposition is improper if a material issue of fact exists (§ 17-27-70(b)-(c)). If the application instead presents questions of law or fact requiring a hearing, Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP requires the court to appoint counsel for an indigent applicant, and that counsel must ensure all available grounds are pleaded and amend if necessary. There is no defender-office intake screen or conviction-integrity referral. Odom v. State additionally requires PCR judges to advise pro se applicants of their right to appeal and to appellate counsel when an application is summarily dismissed. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b); Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP **Case:** Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753 (1999) > it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. [View the source document](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and is done on the face of the application: the court or judge to whom the application is made must issue the writ unless the application and its attachments show the applicant can get no relief. There is no defender-office intake, conviction-integrity referral, or automatic appointment of counsel on issuance; counsel is separately discretionary under SDCL 21-27-4. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-5 > shall forthwith award the writ, unless it shall appear from the application itself or from any document annexed thereto, that the applicant can neither be discharged nor admitted to bail, nor in any other manner relieved. [View the source document](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/Statute/21-27-5) | | Tennessee Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening. Within 30 days of filing, the assigned judge reviews the petition against the record and decides whether it states a 'colorable claim' — defined as a claim that, taken as true and viewed most favorably to the petitioner, would entitle him to relief (Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H)). If it does, the court must enter a preliminary order appointing counsel for an indigent petitioner; if not, it dismisses with written findings. A pro se petition may not be dismissed for defective form until the petitioner has had a reasonable opportunity to amend with the assistance of counsel (R. 28 § 6(B)(4)(b)). There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral in non-capital cases. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 6(B)(2)-(4); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106 > the judge to whom the case is assigned shall review the petition and all documents related to the judgment and determine whether the petition states a colorable claim [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241204024634/https://www.tncourts.gov/rules/supreme-court/28) | | Texas Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening in the convicting court, followed by mandatory review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The writ issues by operation of law on filing (art. 11.07 § 3(b)), the State must answer within 30 days, and the convicting court then has 20 days to decide whether controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of confinement exist; inaction counts as a finding of none, and the record goes to the CCA, which reviews every application (§ 5). No counsel is appointed on issuance and there is no defender-office intake for non-capital writs. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 3(c); see also art. 11.072 § 7(a) (community supervision: order denying application as frivolous) > it shall be the duty of the convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement [View the source document](https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/CR/htm/CR.11.htm) | | Utah Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening on the pleadings, before any response is required. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h) the assigned judge must review every petition and forthwith dismiss any claim already adjudicated or 'frivolous on its face' — defined as facts that do not support relief as a matter of law, no arguable basis in fact, or an expired sentence. A petition that is not frivolous but merely defective is returned with 21 days' leave to amend. Only if some portion survives is the petition served on the State and counsel possibly appointed. An initial capital petition may not be screened for summary dismissal at all. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)(1)-(4), (i), (j) > The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order [View the source document](https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65C) | | Vermont Judicial screening verified | Two screens operate. Judicially, 13 V.S.A. § 7133 requires the superior court to serve the State and grant a prompt hearing unless the motion, files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. Institutionally, the court appoints the Defender General's Prisoners' Rights Office, and continued state-funded representation depends on a multi-attorney merits review by that office under 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3); if the case survives, counsel proceeds, and a court that later perceives merit may refer it back for reevaluation. Vermont has no statutory conviction-integrity referral mechanism. | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7133; 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3) **Case:** In re Bailey, 2009 VT 122, ¶¶ 5, 11-14, 187 Vt. 176, 992 A.2d 276; In re Bruyette, 2014 VT 30, ¶¶ 3, 13-16, 196 Vt. 261, 96 A.3d 1151 > Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served [View the source document](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07133) | | Virginia Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening only. The petition must be on a form approved and provided by the Attorney General (§ 8.01-655), the court may resolve it on the record without a hearing (§ 8.01-654(B)(4)), and no response from the respondent is required unless the court orders one (§ 8.01-658(A)). No counsel attaches on issuance in habeas, and the statutory duties of public defenders (§ 19.2-163.3) extend only to trial and direct appeal, not collateral proceedings. The one contrast is the separate writ of actual innocence based on nonbiological evidence, where a petition that survives summary dismissal carries an entitlement to counsel (§ 19.2-327.11(E)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code §§ 8.01-655, 8.01-654(B)(4), 8.01-658(A); cf. §§ 19.2-163.3, 19.2-327.11(D)–(E) > no response to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall be required except upon an order of the court [View the source document](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-658/) | | Washington Judicial screening verified | Judicial screening in the intermediate appellate court. Because every PRP is filed in the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge screens it at initial consideration under RAP 16.11(b): frivolous petitions are dismissed, non-frivolous petitions decidable on the record go to a panel of judges, and petitions that cannot be decided on the record are transferred to a superior court for a reference hearing or merits determination. RCW 10.73.140 directs that review on receipt and dismissal on the court's own motion without requiring a State response; the Chief Judge's non-frivolousness finding is also the statutory trigger for appointing counsel (RCW 10.73.150(4)), so counsel screening follows the judicial screen rather than preceding it at intake. | Source**Statute / rule:** RCW 10.73.140; RAP 16.11(b); RCW 10.73.150(4) > Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition, the court of appeals shall, whenever possible, review the petition and determine if the petition is based on frivolous grounds. If frivolous, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion [View the source document](https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.140) | | West Virginia Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial, performed by the circuit judge to whom the petition is assigned. Under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, if initial review shows the petitioner 'may have grounds for relief' but the pro se petition is inadequate, the court must appoint counsel to file an amended petition; under Rule 4(c) the court enters a summary dismissal order with specific findings if the grounds were previously and finally adjudicated or waived. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral in the rules or statute. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-3(a) > the court determines that the petitioner may have grounds for relief but the petition, as filed, is not sufficient for the court to conduct a fair adjudication of the matters raised in the petition, the court shall appoint an attorney [View the source document](https://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/court-rules/rules-governing-post-conviction-habeas-corpus-proceedings) | | Wisconsin Judicial screening verified | Screening is judicial and done on the face of the motion. Under Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3) the circuit court must serve the district attorney, grant a prompt hearing, and make findings unless the motion and record 'conclusively show' no entitlement to relief; under State v. Bentley and State v. Allen, a motion alleging sufficient material facts (the five w's and one h) that would entitle the movant to relief compels an evidentiary hearing, while conclusory motions may be denied without one. There is a counsel hook rather than a defender-intake or conviction-integrity screen: § 974.06(3)(b) directs the court, if counsel appears necessary and the movant appears indigent, to refer the person to the State Public Defender for an indigency determination and appointment. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3), (3)(b) **Case:** State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 > Unless the motion and the files and records of the action conclusively show that the person is entitled to no relief, the court shall: [View the source document](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/974/06) | | Wyoming Judicial screening verified | None beyond judicial screening on the papers. There is no counsel-on-issuance, defender-office intake, or conviction-integrity referral mechanism: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104 is titled 'No right to appointed counsel' and forbids public-defender or appointed representation for indigent petitioners. The clerk docket the petition and brings it promptly to the court (§ 7-14-101(b)); the Attorney General answers or moves to dismiss within thirty days (§ 7-14-105(a)); and the court takes evidence or brings the petitioner in only if it determines that to be necessary (§ 7-14-106(a)). Merit is thus identified by the district judge alone, from the petition, its required supporting affidavits, and the State's response. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-106(a); see also §§ 7-14-104(c), 7-14-105(a) **Case:** Smizer v. State, 835 P.2d 334, 338 (Wyo. 1992) ('The statute does not require that a hearing be held in every case') > The court may, if it determines it to be necessary, receive proof by affidavits, deposition, oral testimony or other evidence and may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20230602214850/https://law.justia.com/codes/wyoming/2021/title-7/chapter-14/section-7-14-106/) | ## Where the petition is filed *The court that convicted you, the county where you are held, or somewhere else.* 50 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Court of conviction verified | The court of conviction. Rule 32.5 requires Rule 32 petitions to be filed in and decided by the convicting court, and a petition filed in another court is transferred there rather than dismissed. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.5 **Case:** Hanna v. State, 841 So. 2d 310 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) > Petitions filed under this rule shall be filed in and decided by the court in which the petitioner was convicted. If a petition is filed in another court, it shall be transferred to the court where the conviction occurred. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/841/cases/0310-01.json) | | Alaska Court of conviction verified | The court of conviction: the application is filed with the clerk at the court location where the underlying criminal case is filed, not the place of confinement. The AS 12.72/Criminal Rule 35.1 application has superseded traditional habeas corpus as Alaska's collateral-attack vehicle (Alaska Civil Rule 86(m), as described in Grinols). | Source**Statute / rule:** AS 12.72.030(a) > An application for post-conviction relief shall be filed with the clerk at the court location where the underlying criminal case is filed [View the source document](https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=12.72.010&secEnd=12.72.040) | | Arizona Court of conviction verified | In the court where the defendant was sentenced (the court of conviction), not the county of confinement (Rule 32.4(b)(1); Rule 33.4(b)(1)). By statute, if a defendant instead files a habeas corpus petition attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence, the receiving court must transfer it to the court where the defendant was convicted or sentenced, to be treated as a post-conviction relief petition (A.R.S. § 13-4233). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(1); A.R.S. §§ 13-4233, 13-4234(A) > A defendant must file a notice requesting post-conviction relief under Rule 32 in the court where the defendant was sentenced. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1B9BE930F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas Split: conviction or confinement verified | Venue splits by remedy. A statutory writ of habeas corpus must be sought in the circuit court of the county where the prisoner is confined — a court lacks personal jurisdiction to issue and make returnable before itself a writ for a prisoner held in another county (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-105). An actual-innocence petition under Act 1780 is the exception and must be filed in the court in which the conviction was entered, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a) (Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626; Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004), quoting § 16-112-202(a)(2): 'The motion shall be filed before the court in which the conviction was entered.'). Rule 37 postconviction petitions are filed in the trial court that imposed the sentence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-105; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a); Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) **Case:** Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475, 255 S.W.3d 832 (2007) > Any petition for writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of a prisoner is properly addressed to the circuit court in the county in which the prisoner is held in custody, unless the petition is filed pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/369/html/0475-01.html) | | California Either verified | The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas jurisdiction, so a petition may be filed at any level; under the transfer doctrine applied in In re Roberts, a petition attacking the validity of a judgment should be transferred to the court that rendered the judgment, while conditions-of-confinement claims go to the county of confinement. Capital: § 1509(a) makes the court that imposed the death sentence the exclusive forum absent good cause. | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Cal. Penal Code § 1509(a) (capital) **Case:** In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575 > The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. [View the source document](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CONS§ionNum=SEC.%2010.&article=VI) | | Colorado Court of conviction verified | A Rule 35(c) motion — Colorado's primary postconviction vehicle — must be filed in the court that imposed the sentence, i.e., the court of conviction. A statutory habeas petition (C.R.S. §§ 13-45-101 to -119) is filed against the custodian in the district court where the prisoner is held, but claims attacking the conviction may not proceed there: the court must convert the petition to a Crim. P. 35(c) motion and transfer it to the sentencing court (Johnson v. Gunter). | Source**Statute / rule:** Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3); C.R.S. § 13-45-101 **Case:** Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d 1263, 1265 n.6 (Colo. 1993) > Venue for any CrimP. 35(c) motion attacking Johnson's 1985 conviction is proper only in the court which imposed the sentence. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p2d/852/html/1263-01.html) | | Connecticut Designated court verified | Neither the court of conviction nor the district of confinement for convicted prisoners: all habeas applications by or on behalf of inmates confined under a criminal conviction must be filed in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Tolland. Other habeas applicants (non-conviction custody) file in the judicial district of claimed confinement under § 52-466(a)(1). | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-466(a)(2) > made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260418232008/https://www.cga.ct.gov/CURRENT/PUB/chap_915.htm) | | Delaware Court of conviction verified | The statutory writ of habeas corpus is awarded and issued by the Superior Court (Family Court only in child-support and certain Family Court matters), 10 Del. C. § 6901. Collateral attacks on convictions proceed instead by motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, filed in the Superior Court criminal case in which the sentence was imposed — the court of conviction, not the county of confinement; every Rule 61 appeal we read (Urquhart, Baldwin, Cannon, Harden) came up from the sentencing court's docket in the underlying criminal case. | Source**Statute / rule:** 10 Del. C. § 6901; Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) > The writ of habeas corpus shall be awarded and issued by the Superior Court except in cases involving child support enforcement in which case the writ shall be awarded and issued by the Family Court. [View the source document](https://delcode.delaware.gov/title10/c069/index.html) | | Florida Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. Rule 3.850 is the exclusive vehicle for collateral attack on a Florida judgment and is filed in the sentencing court; Rule 3.850(o) bars entertaining a habeas application from a prisoner authorized to proceed by motion unless he first sought relief in the sentencing court, and Baker holds habeas simply unavailable as a substitute. Traditional statutory habeas under chapter 79 is filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the county where the prisoner is detained (§ 79.09), but that route cannot be used to obtain relief cognizable under 3.850. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(o) (redesignated from 3.850(m) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. Stat. § 79.09 **Case:** Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004) > The remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/878/html/1236-01.html) | | Georgia County of confinement verified | The superior court of the county in which the petitioner is being detained, and those superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction — not the court of conviction. If the petitioner is not in custody, or is detained by the United States, another state, or a foreign state, the petition must be filed in the superior court of the county where the challenged conviction and sentence were imposed. For traffic-misdemeanor challenges naming the commissioner of driver services, venue is the Superior Court of Fulton County (§ 40-13-33(c)). | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-43; O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33(c) > A petition brought under this article must be filed in the superior court of the county in which the petitioner is being detained. The superior courts of such counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions arising under this article. [View the source document](https://law.onecle.com/georgia/title-9/9-14-43.html) | | Hawaii Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. A post-conviction proceeding is instituted by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place, and it is docketed there as a special proceeding. This governs custody-based claims as well as judgment-based claims, because Rule 40(a) makes the Rule 40 proceeding encompass "all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis" for judgments of conviction and custody based on such judgments. Rule 40(c)(1) confirms it applies in both circuit and district courts. | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 40(b); see also 40(a), 40(c)(1) > A proceeding for post-conviction relief shall be instituted by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place [View the source document](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho Court of conviction verified | A post-conviction petition attacking the conviction or sentence is filed in the court of conviction — with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place. Idaho's separate habeas corpus statute is a different track: a prisoner files in the district court of the county where the alleged confinement violation occurs, and that remedy reaches only conditions of confinement, parole revocation, sentence miscalculation, loss of good time, and detainers. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4902(a); Idaho Code § 19-4205(1)-(2); § 19-4224 > A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place. [View the source document](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH49/SECT19-4902/) | | Illinois Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition is filed with the clerk of the circuit court in which the conviction took place, with a copy served on the State's Attorney. Illinois's separate statutory habeas corpus remedy (735 ILCS 5/10-103) is different and much narrower: it may be brought in the circuit court of the county of confinement OR the county of sentencing, or in the supreme court. | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) > The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. [View the source document](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-1.htm) | | Indiana Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. The verified petition must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place, with one exception: a claim that parole was unlawfully revoked is filed in the county where the petitioner is incarcerated. Rule 1 § 1(c) preserves habeas corpus but requires that a habeas application filed in the county of incarceration which challenges the validity of the conviction or sentence be transferred to the court of conviction and treated as a post-conviction petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 2; § 1(c) > A person who claims relief under this Rule or who otherwise challenges the validity of a conviction or sentence must file a verified petition with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. Iowa Code § 822.3 requires the application to be filed with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction or sentence took place, and § 822.7 requires it to be heard in that same court. The one exception is a challenge to a prison-disciplinary decision under § 822.2(1)(f), which is filed with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the applicant is confined. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code §§ 822.3, 822.7 **Case:** Davis v. State, No. 25-0157 (Iowa May 8, 2026); Sahinovic v. State, 940 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 2020) > A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction or sentence took place. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250905132821/https://codes.findlaw.com/ia/title-xvi-criminal-law-and-procedure-chs-687-916/ia-code-sect-822-3/) | | Kansas Court of conviction verified | A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion attacking the sentence is filed in the court of conviction — the court that imposed the sentence — and that remedy is exclusive unless inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention (60-1507(e); Rule 183(b)). A K.S.A. 60-1501 habeas petition, used for restraints other than the validity of the sentence, is filed instead in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or the district court of the county where the restraint is taking place, subject to a 30-day deadline extended during exhaustion of administrative remedies. | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 60-1507(a), (e); K.S.A. 60-1501(a)-(b) > may, pursuant to the time limitations imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence [View the source document](https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html) | | Kentucky Court of conviction verified | The post-conviction motion is filed in the court of conviction: RCr 11.42(1) lets a prisoner proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence. Kentucky's separate statutory habeas remedy under KRS Chapter 419 lies instead in the circuit court of the county of confinement, but Commonwealth v. Marcum confines it to the narrow case of a judgment void ab initio, treating RCr 11.42 in the sentencing court as the general and adequate route (Marcum himself, held at the reformatory in Oldham County, petitioned the Oldham Circuit Court). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Robertson v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(1); KRS 419.020-.110 **Case:** Robertson v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Ky. 2005); Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 210-12 (Ky. 1994) > though RCr 11.42(1) provides that a prisoner may “proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence” [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw3d/177/html/0789-01.html) | | Louisiana Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. La. C. Cr. P. art. 925 fixes venue in the parish of conviction, and art. 926(A) requires the application to be "by written petition addressed to the district court for the parish in which the petitioner was convicted." Post-conviction relief is the vehicle for a person in custody after sentence; art. 924(4) describes it as "a form of post conviction habeas corpus." Service must be made on both the district attorney for the parish of conviction and the attorney general (art. 926(E)). | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 925; see also art. 926(A), (E) > Applications for post conviction relief shall be filed in the parish in which the petitioner was convicted. [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112935) | | Maine Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Jurisdiction is in the Superior Court (exercisable also by a single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, an Active Retired Justice, or a judge authorized to sit in the Superior Court on post-conviction cases), and venue lies in the county where the criminal judgment was entered, transferable at the assigned justice's or judge's discretion. The action is docketed in the Unified Criminal Docket. | Source**Statute / rule:** 15 M.R.S. § 2123(1), (1-A), (2); see also 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(A); M.R.U. Crim. P. 65, 68 > Venue must be in the county in which the criminal judgment was entered. [View the source document](https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2123.html) | | Maryland Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A UPPA proceeding is commenced in the circuit court of the county where the conviction took place (Md. Rule 4-401(a); Crim. Proc. § 7-102(a)). Common-law/statutory habeas corpus under Courts & Jud. Proc. Title 3, Subtitle 7 is different in form but converges on the same venue: any circuit court judge or appellate judge may grant the writ (§ 3-701), but a judge receiving the petition must refer it to a court in the judicial circuit in which the person confined was convicted (§ 3-702(b)(1)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Rule 4-401(a); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-102(a); Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-701, 3-702(b)(1) > A proceeding under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act is commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court of the county where the conviction took place. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/ND7ABEA509CEA11DB9BCF9DAC28345A2A?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Massachusetts Court of conviction verified | The court of conviction, before the trial judge. Rule 30(a) directs the motion to 'the trial judge,' Rule 30(c)(7) lets the trial judge hear it 'wherever the judge is then sitting,' and G.L. c. 278A, § 3(a) requires forensic-testing motions to be filed 'in the court in which the conviction was entered.' Common-law habeas under G.L. c. 248 is not an alternative for convicted prisoners: § 1 excludes anyone who 'has been convicted or is in execution upon legal process,' and McCastle holds Rule 30 is the exclusive vehicle (though under c. 248, § 2 the writ, where available, may issue irrespective of the county of confinement). | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (c)(7); G.L. c. 278A, § 3(a); G.L. c. 248, §§ 1, 2 **Case:** McCastle, Petitioner, 401 Mass. 105, 106-107 (1987) > If he is limited to his rule 30 remedy, as we hold he is, his remedy lies not with a single justice of this court but with the trial judge. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/mass/401/cases/0105-01.json) | | Michigan Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A motion for relief from judgment is filed with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, and the clerk dockets it under the original conviction's file number (MCR 6.503(A)). Michigan's separate statutory habeas corpus action is venued in the county of confinement (MCR 3.303(A)(2)), but it is closed to this population: MCL 600.4310(3) provides that habeas to inquire into the cause of detention 'may not be brought by or on behalf of... (3) Persons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.' | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.503(A)(1); MCL 600.4310(3); MCR 3.303(A)(2) > A defendant seeking relief under this subchapter must file a motion, and a copy of the motion with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced. [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A ch. 590 postconviction petition is filed in the district court of the county in which the conviction was had (§ 590.01, subd. 1), must be 'addressed to the district court of the judicial district in the county where the conviction took place' (§ 590.02, subd. 3), and is heard in open court in that judicial district — or, at the assigned judge's discretion, in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, or Tenth Judicial Districts (§ 590.04, subd. 2). Common-law habeas under ch. 589 goes to the district court of the county where the petitioner is detained, but is unavailable to persons detained 'by virtue of the final judgment' of a criminal court, and § 590.01, subd. 2 makes the postconviction remedy exclusive. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1; § 590.02, subd. 3; § 590.04, subd. 2; cf. §§ 589.01, 589.02 > may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court in the county in which the conviction was had [View the source document](https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/590.01) | | Mississippi Court of conviction verified | The court of conviction: the motion is filed as an original civil action in the trial court, and the UPCCRA abolished post-conviction habeas corpus (statutory and common law) as a separate route, so there is no county-of-confinement filing for attacking a conviction or sentence (§ 99-39-3(1)). Critical gate: if the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal or the appeal was dismissed, the motion may not be filed in the trial court until a quorum of the Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court grants leave to file, under the procedure in § 99-39-27. | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-7, 99-39-3(1), 99-39-27 > The motion under this article shall be filed as an original civil action in the trial court, except in cases in which the petitioner's conviction and sentence have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and there affirmed or the appeal dismissed. [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri Either verified | Missouri splits by vehicle. A Rule 29.15/24.035 post-conviction motion goes to the COURT OF CONVICTION — relief is sought 'in the sentencing court' and the motion is filed with the clerk of the trial court. A Rule 91 habeas petition instead goes in the first instance to a circuit or associate circuit judge for the COUNTY OF CONFINEMENT, absent good cause for filing higher, except that a petitioner held under a death sentence this Court has affirmed may file directly in the Supreme Court of Missouri. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(a), (c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(a), (c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91.02(a), (b) > Movant shall file the motion and two copies thereof with the clerk of the trial court. [View the source document](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/clerkhandbooksp2rulesonly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d) | | Montana Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction: a postconviction petition under Title 46, ch. 21 is filed with the court that imposed the sentence, not the county of confinement. If the sentence came from a justice's, municipal, or city court, the petitioner must first exhaust all appeal remedies and then file in the district court of the county where that lower court sits (§ 46-21-101(2)). Common-law habeas under Title 46, ch. 22 may be granted by any Supreme Court justice or any district judge over a person restrained within that judge's jurisdiction (§ 46-22-202(1)), but § 46-22-101(2) makes habeas unavailable to attack the validity of a conviction or sentence once the remedy of appeal is exhausted, so the sentencing court is the operative forum for collateral attack. | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-101(1)-(2), MCA; §§ 46-22-101(2), 46-22-202(1), MCA > may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence or revocation order [View the source document](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0010/section_0010/0460-0210-0010-0010.html) | | Nebraska Either verified | A Postconviction Act motion is filed in the court of conviction — the court that imposed the sentence (§ 29-3001(1)); a DNA Testing Act motion likewise goes to "the court that entered the judgment" (§ 29-4120(1)). Common-law habeas corpus is the opposite: an application to release a prisoner held under sentence must be brought in the county where the prisoner is confined, although that is a venue rule the custodian can waive by failing to object (Anderson v. Houston, following Gillard v. Clark). | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(1); § 29-4120(1); §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824 (habeas) **Case:** Anderson v. Houston, 274 Neb. 916, 744 N.W.2d 410 (2008) > may file a verified motion, in the court which imposed such sentence, stating the grounds relied upon and asking the court to vacate or set aside the sentence [View the source document](https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3001) | | Nevada Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A petition challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. Only other petitions — e.g., challenges to the computation of time served — go to the county of incarceration, the county of residence if the petitioner has been released, or the First Judicial District Court in Carson City for petitioners incarcerated or residing outside Nevada; a misfiled petition is deemed filed on receipt and must be transferred by the clerk. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.738 **Case:** Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737 (2006) > A petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire Either verified | Venue depends on the vehicle. A habeas application goes to the superior court in the county of confinement (RSA 534:3, as amended by 1994, 56:1). A petition for a new trial goes to the superior court in the county where the judgment was rendered — the court of conviction (RSA 526:2). A post-conviction DNA petition goes to the superior court in the county of conviction (RSA 651-D:2, we). Because most New Hampshire post-conviction litigation, including ineffective-assistance litigation, proceeds by new-trial petition, it is normally heard in the court of conviction. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 534:3; RSA 526:2; RSA 651-D:2, I > Application for the writ shall be made to the superior court in the county in which the person is imprisoned, by a person so imprisoned or restrained, or by some person in his behalf. [View the source document](http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LV/534/534-mrg.htm) | | New Jersey Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. R. 3:22-1 requires the petition to be filed with the criminal division manager's office of the county in which the conviction took place, captioned in the action in which the conviction was entered. Because R. 3:22-3 makes a PCR petition 'the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime' and R. 3:22-2(d) folds in any ground formerly available by habeas corpus, there is no separate place-of-confinement filing route for a conviction challenge. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-1; N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-3 > Any person convicted of a crime may, pursuant to this rule, file with the criminal division manager's office of the county in which the conviction took place a petition for post-conviction relief captioned in the action in which the conviction was entered. [View the source document](https://www.courtcaddy.com/nj/court-rules/r3-22.html) | | New Mexico Not established verified | Not verified for post-conviction petitions. The general habeas statute makes application to a court or judge 'within the district where the prisoner is detained' (quoted below), but Rule 5-802(E) NMRA supplies the place of filing for post-conviction habeas, and the Judiciary's own official petition form (Form 9-701) instructs petitioners that there are two claim types that 'must file two separate petitions and submit each petition in the location required by Rule 5-802 (E)' — indicating the rule splits venue between the convicting court and the place of confinement. We could not extract Rule 5-802(E) to confirm which claim goes where, so the operative post-conviction venue rule is unverified. | Source**Statute / rule:** NMSA 1978, § 44-1-3; Rule 5-802(E) NMRA (unretrieved) > to the supreme or district court or to any judge thereof, being within the district where the prisoner is detained [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250216131914/https://codes.findlaw.com/nm/chapter-44-miscellaneous-civil-law-matters/nm-st-sect-44-1-3/) | | New York Either verified | Two separate tracks with different venues. The principal post-conviction vehicle, a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate, is made to 'the court in which [the judgment] was entered' — the court of conviction. A CPLR article 70 state habeas petition instead goes to the supreme court in the judicial district, the appellate division in the department, or a county judge in the county, where the person is DETAINED; CPLR 7002(b)(5) adds a special rule sending trial detainees in cities of one million or more to the supreme court in the county where the charge is pending. | Source**Statute / rule:** CPL 440.10(1); CPLR 7002(b) > a petition for the writ shall be made to: 1. the supreme court in the judicial district in which the person is detained; or 2. the appellate division in the department in which the person is detained [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250906142119/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVP/7002) | | North Carolina Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. North Carolina has no separate post-conviction petition: the MAR is 'a motion in the original cause and not a new proceeding' (§ 15A-1411(b)), commenced by filing with the clerk of superior court of the district where the defendant was indicted, and heard by a judge empowered to act in criminal matters in the district where the judgment was entered (§ 15A-1413(a)). Effective December 1, 2025, new § 15A-2007 fixes venue in the county of conviction for any filing, claim, or proceeding relating to the conviction, sentencing, treatment, housing, or execution of a death-sentenced defendant, excepting matters filed directly with the Supreme Court of North Carolina; the separately preserved Chapter 17 writ of habeas corpus (§ 15A-1411(c)) instead goes by written application to any appellate-division justice or judge, or any superior court judge (§ 17-6). | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(1); § 15A-1413(a); § 15A-1411(b)-(c); § 15A-2007; § 17-6 > The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of superior court of the district wherein the defendant was indicted a motion, with service on the district attorney in noncapital cases [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1420.html) | | North Dakota Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement: the application is filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction and sentence took place, and the State is named respondent (N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(1)). It must be a district court — the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is not available in North Dakota municipal courts, and a municipal court judgment on such an application is void (Holbach ¶ 20). A separate action must be commenced rather than a motion filed in the criminal file (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441). | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(1) **Case:** Holbach v. City of Minot, 2012 ND 117, ¶¶ 15, 20, 817 N.W.2d 340 > [a] proceeding is commenced by filing an application with the clerk of the court in which the conviction and sentence took place. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/817/html/0340-01.html) | | Ohio Court of conviction verified | A postconviction petition under R.C. 2953.21 — which R.C. 2953.21(K) makes the exclusive collateral challenge to a conviction or sentence — is filed in the court that imposed sentence, i.e. the court of conviction. Ohio's separate statutory habeas corpus writ (R.C. Chapter 2725) is instead tied to the place of confinement: for an inmate of a state correctional institution, only courts or judges of the county where the institution is located have jurisdiction, and a writ issued by another county's court is void (R.C. 2725.03). That writ is also unavailable where the sentencing court had jurisdiction (R.C. 2725.05). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(1)(a); Ohio Rev. Code 2725.03; Ohio Rev. Code 2725.05 > A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence [View the source document](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.21) | | Oklahoma Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement: the proceeding is instituted in the court that imposed the judgment and sentence (22 O.S. § 1080), by filing a verified application with the clerk of that court (§ 1081). Two carve-outs: an application arising from revocation of parole or conditional release is filed in the district court of the county where the revocation occurred (§ 1081), and a capital post-conviction application is filed directly in the Court of Criminal Appeals (§ 1089(D)(1); OCCA Rule 9.7(A)(2)). The Act 'encompasses and replaces' state habeas corpus for challenges to a conviction or sentence. | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1080; 22 O.S. § 1081; 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(1) (capital) > may institute a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20251219050105/https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=70864) | | Oregon County of confinement verified | County of confinement, not the court of conviction: the petition is filed with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner is imprisoned; if the petitioner is not imprisoned, in the county where the conviction and sentence were rendered (ORS 138.560(1)). A person on parole or post-prison supervision is deemed imprisoned at the institution from which released (138.560(2)). The court of confinement may transfer the case to the county of conviction if the hearing can be more expeditiously conducted there, and that order is not reviewable (138.560(4)). Statutory habeas corpus proper lies in the circuit court of the judicial district where the party is imprisoned or restrained (ORS 34.320); a post-conviction DNA-testing petition, by contrast, is filed in the court of conviction (ORS 138.690(1)). | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.560(1), (2), (4); cf. ORS 34.320; ORS 138.690(1) > A proceeding for post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner is imprisoned [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Original jurisdiction lies in the court of common pleas (42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a)), and Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) directs the clerk to docket the petition at the same term and number as the underlying conviction and sentence and to place it in the existing criminal case file. Separate state habeas corpus is not an alternative route: § 9542 makes the PCRA the sole means of collateral relief and expressly subsumes habeas corpus and coram nobis. | Source**Statute / rule:** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) > make a docket entry, at the same term and number as the underlying conviction and sentence, reflecting the date of receipt, and promptly shall place the petition in the criminal case file. [View the source document](https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/234/chapter9/s903.html&d=reduce) | | Rhode Island Court of conviction verified | The petition is filed in the court of conviction, not the county of confinement; if the conviction was entered in District Court, a denial there is appealable to the Superior Court within twenty days. Common-law state habeas corpus is not an alternative route for convicted prisoners: § 10-9-1 extends the writ only to persons restrained "other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding," and § 10-9.1-1(b) makes the chapter 10-9.1 remedy exclusive of other collateral remedies. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-2(a), (b); § 10-9-1; § 10-9.1-1(b) > An action to secure post conviction relief under this chapter shall be brought in the court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. [View the source document](https://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-2.htm) | | South Carolina Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. The proceeding is commenced by filing the verified application with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place (§ 17-27-40), and § 17-27-80 provides that it 'shall be heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place.' Even a common-law habeas petition by a convicted, confined prisoner is redirected there: § 17-17-100 requires the judge issuing the writ to transfer the matter for hearing 'to any judge of any court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the person was convicted.' In capital cases § 17-27-160(A) fixes venue in the county of indictment. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-40, 17-27-80, 17-27-160(A); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-17-100 > A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place. [View the source document](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota Court of conviction verified | The court of conviction, not the county of confinement: the application must be heard before a judge of the circuit court in which the conviction took place. (SDCL 21-27-1 permits an application to be made to 'the Supreme or circuit court, or any justice or judge thereof,' but SDCL 21-27-14.1 fixes the hearing court for a convicted applicant.) | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-14.1 > The application shall be heard before any judge of the court in which the conviction took place. [View the source document](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/Statute/21-27-14.1) | | Tennessee Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred; if the misdemeanor conviction was not in a court of record, it is filed in a court of record with criminal jurisdiction in the county where the conviction was obtained (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a); accord Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 4(E)). Tennessee's separate and much narrower state habeas corpus remedy has different venue — the court or judge 'most convenient in point of distance to the applicant,' i.e., ordinarily the county of confinement (Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105). | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) > A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred, a written petition naming the state as the respondent. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20160229030350/http://law.justia.com:80/codes/tennessee/2010/title-40/chapter-30/part-1/40-30-104) | | Texas Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. A post-conviction felony application is filed with the clerk of the convicting court, which is where fact development occurs, but the writ is returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin, which alone grants or denies relief (art. 11.07 §§ 3(a), 5). Capital applications are likewise filed in the convicting court (art. 11.071 § 4(a)); community-supervision applications go to the court that imposed supervision (art. 11.072 § 2(a)); post-conviction misdemeanor applications go to the judge of the convicting court (art. 11.09(b)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 3(a)-(b); art. 11.071 § 4(a); art. 11.072 § 2(a); art. 11.09(b) > must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction being challenged was obtained, and the clerk shall assign the application to that court [View the source document](https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/CR/htm/CR.11.htm) | | Utah Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c) requires commencement in the district court of the county where the judgment of conviction was entered, and § 78B-9-104(1) directs the action to 'the district court of original jurisdiction.' If filed in the wrong county the court may change venue on its own motion; a party may also move for a convenience-based transfer. The PCRA is the sole remedy and replaces prior extraordinary and common-law writs, so there is no separate confinement-county habeas route for challenges to a conviction or sentence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c); Utah Code § 78B-9-104(1); § 78B-9-102(1)(a) > The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. [View the source document](https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65C) | | Vermont Court of conviction verified | A PCR petition is filed in the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed — the court of conviction, not the county of confinement. That clause fixes venue only and is not jurisdictional (In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 113 (1993), applied in In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 7), so a misfiled petition is transferable rather than void. Common-law habeas under 12 V.S.A. § 3953 lies in the county of imprisonment, but 13 V.S.A. § 7136 bars entertaining it unless PCR has been sought and shown inadequate or ineffective. | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7131; 13 V.S.A. § 7136; 12 V.S.A. § 3953 **Case:** In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 7, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210; In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 113, 623 A.2d 466, 467 (1993); Shequin v. Smith, 129 Vt. 578, 285 A.2d 708 (1971) > may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence [View the source document](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07131) | | Virginia Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction, not county of confinement. For detention originating under criminal process, only the circuit court that entered the original judgment may issue the writ; if a district court entered the judgment, the circuit court for the city or county where that district court sits. This is expressly made 'subject to the provisions of § 17.1-310,' which preserves the Supreme Court of Virginia's own original jurisdiction to award writs of habeas corpus. Hearings, once granted, may be held at any circuit court within the same circuit, as designated by the judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1); Va. Code § 17.1-310 > only the circuit court that entered the original judgment or order resulting in the detention complained of in the petition shall have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus [View the source document](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-654/) | | Washington Court of Appeals verified | Not the court of conviction. A personal restraint petition is filed in the Court of Appeals (RAP 16.5(a)); a petition by a person under sentence of death was filed in the Supreme Court (RAP 16.5(b)), and a petition filed in the Supreme Court is ordinarily transferred to the Court of Appeals. A CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment is filed in the superior court that entered the judgment, but that court must transfer it to the Court of Appeals for treatment as a PRP unless the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either the defendant makes a substantial showing of entitlement to relief or resolution requires a factual hearing (CrR 7.8(c)(2)); if the appellate court transfers a PRP down, venue is the superior court for the county in which the challenged decision was made (RAP 16.12). | Source**Statute / rule:** RAP 16.5(a)-(b); CrR 7.8(c)(2); RAP 16.12; RCW 7.36.040 > A personal restraint petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20150808045910/http://www.courts.wa.gov:80/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=app&set=RAP&ruleid=apprap16.05) | | West Virginia Either verified | Rule 3(a) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings gives the petitioner a choice of two circuit courts — the county of incarceration or the county of conviction and sentence — and the circuit court may transfer between those venues. By statute the petition may also be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals (which has original habeas jurisdiction), and W. Va. Code § 53-4A-3(b) lets the granting court make the writ returnable to itself, to the circuit court of the county of incarceration, or to the circuit court of conviction. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(a); § 53-4A-3(b) > in the circuit court of the county wherein the petitioner is incarcerated; or (2) in the circuit court of the county wherein the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. If appropriate, the circuit court may transfer a petition to either venue. [View the source document](https://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/court-rules/rules-governing-post-conviction-habeas-corpus-proceedings) | | Wisconsin Court of conviction verified | Venue depends on the vehicle. A § 974.06 postconviction motion — the presumptive route — is filed in the court of conviction: the movant 'may move the court which imposed the sentence.' A true habeas petition under ch. 782 goes to the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the circuit court within the county where the prisoner is detained (§ 782.03), but § 974.06(8) bars entertaining it unless the § 974.06 motion was first pursued or that remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective.' A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the exception: it must be brought by habeas petition in the appellate court that heard the appeal (State v. Knight), while ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel goes back to the circuit court (Rothering). | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1), (8); Wis. Stat. § 782.03 **Case:** State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992); State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675 (Ct. App. 1996) > may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. [View the source document](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/974/06) | | Wyoming Court of conviction verified | Court of conviction. A petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act is commenced by filing with the clerk of the district court where the conviction occurred, with a copy served on the Wyoming Attorney General; the clerk docket it and brings it promptly to the court. Wyoming's separate common-law/statutory habeas corpus remedy, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 134, is a different vehicle limited to jurisdictional claims and was not surveyed for venue here. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b) **Case:** Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 14, 443 P.3d 834, 837-38 (Wyo. 2019) (describing §§ 1-27-101 through 134 as 'limiting state habeas corpus relief to jurisdictional claims') > The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court where the conviction occurred a petition verified by affidavit. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250429182110/https://law.justia.com/codes/wyoming/2023/title-7/chapter-14/section-7-14-101/) | ## The bar on second or successive petitions *What blocks a second attempt, and what excuses it.* 46 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A petition is successive if the petitioner has previously filed any petition challenging a judgment arising out of the same trial or guilty-plea proceeding. Relief may not be granted on a successive petition raising the same or similar grounds. A successive petition on different grounds must be denied unless either (1) the petitioner is entitled to relief because the court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or impose the sentence, or (2) the petitioner shows both good cause why the new grounds were not known and could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, AND that failure to entertain the petition would result in a miscarriage of justice. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) > The court shall not grant relief on a successive petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the same petitioner. A successive petition on different grounds shall be denied unless [View the source document](https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr32_2.pdf) | | Alaska Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A claim is barred if it was decided on the merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding (AS 12.72.020(a)(5)), and any second application is flatly barred once a previous one has been filed ((a)(6)). Excuses: an application alleging ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel filed within one year of the prior decision's finality (AS 12.72.025; constitutionally compelled by Grinols), and certain parole/DOC administrative claims (AS 12.72.020(c)). The newly-discovered-evidence/innocence exception in (b) by its terms lifts only the time bars ('Notwithstanding (a)(3) and (4)'), not the successive-application bar. | Source**Statute / rule:** AS 12.72.020(a)(5)-(6), (c); AS 12.72.025 **Case:** Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003) > a previous application for post-conviction relief has been filed under this chapter or under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure [View the source document](https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=12.72.010&secEnd=12.72.040) | | Arizona Barred, cause and prejudice verified | A defendant is precluded from relief on a Rule 32.1(a) constitutional claim on any ground still raiseable on direct appeal, finally adjudicated on the merits, or waived at trial, on appeal, or in a previous post-conviction proceeding (Rule 32.2(a), amended eff. April 14, 2025, excepting rights waivable only knowingly, voluntarily, and personally). Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) are exempt from waiver-preclusion, but a successive or untimely notice must explain why the claim was not raised earlier, and the court may summarily dismiss if the reasons are insufficient (Rule 32.2(b)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2; accord A.R.S. § 13-4232 > waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous post-conviction proceeding, except when the claim raises a violation of a constitutional right that can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the defendant. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N488BEBB01EA211F084E6FAF595E4E64E?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Rule 37.2(b) requires that all grounds be raised in the original petition, and provides that any ground not so raised, or 'finally adjudicated or intelligently and understandingly waived' in the proceedings that produced the conviction or in any other proceeding taken to secure relief, 'may not be the basis for a subsequent petition.' The only recognized escape is that the first petition was specifically denied without prejudice; amendment of a pending petition requires leave of court (Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b), (e) **Case:** McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 941 S.W.2d 397 (1997) > a petitioner is limited to one petition for postconviction relief unless the first petition was specifically denied without prejudice to allow the filing of a second petition [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/328/html/0046-01.html) | | California Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Judge-made abuse-of-the-writ doctrine: absent a change in law or facts, successive or piecemeal petitions are not entertained unless the petitioner justifies the failure to raise the claims earlier, with an exception for a fundamental miscarriage of justice (including actual innocence). Penal Code § 1475 channels renewed applications on new legal points to a higher court. Capital: § 1509(d) requires dismissal of any successive petition unless the court finds by a preponderance that the petitioner is actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Penal Code § 1475; § 1509(d) (capital) **Case:** In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750 > Before a successive petition will be entertained on its merits the petitioner must explain and justify the failure to present claims in a timely manner in his prior petition or petitions. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/cal-4th/5/cases/0750-01.json) | | Colorado Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Since the July 1, 2004 amendment, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) requires courts to deny any claim raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding, and 35(c)(3)(VII) requires denial of any claim that 'could have been presented in an appeal previously brought' or a prior postconviction proceeding (People v. Versteeg, 165 P.3d 760, 764 (Colo. App. 2007)). Enumerated exceptions include claims based on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive (quoted in Wenzinger); the § 16-5-402 time bar applies independently to successive motions. | Source**Statute / rule:** Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)–(VII); C.R.S. § 16-5-402 **Case:** People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415 (Colo. App. 2006) > shall deny any claim that was raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding on behalf of the same defendant [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/155/html/0415-01.html) | | Connecticut Discretionary verified | No absolute bar. A successive petition is dismissible under Practice Book § 23-29(3) if it 'presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or to proffer new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior petition' (rule text verified as quoted in Gilchrist, n.2), and under § 52-470(d) it carries a rebuttable presumption of unreasonable delay if filed more than two years after the judgment on the prior petition became final (or after October 1, 2014, or two years after a new retroactive right, whichever is latest), with dismissal absent good cause under § 52-470(e). Withdrawal of a prior petition does not count as a judgment triggering the two-year period, and the actual-innocence/conditions/capital-death exemptions of § 52-470(f) apply. | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(d), (e); Conn. Practice Book § 23-29(3) > In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260418232008/https://www.cga.ct.gov/CURRENT/PUB/chap_915.htm) | | Delaware Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A second or subsequent postconviction motion is summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial AND pleads with particularity either (i) new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges, or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court that renders the conviction or death sentence invalid. This regime applies to motions filed on or after June 4, 2014; before that amendment the bar was the far softer 'interest of justice' standard (Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 (Del. 2016)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2), 61(i)(2) **Case:** Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164, 1167 (Del. 2015) > Under Rule 61, the Superior Court will summarily dismiss a second postconviction motion unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the movant either: [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/127/html/1164-01.html) | | Florida Discretionary verified | A second or successive motion is styled an "extraordinary pleading." The court may dismiss it if it fails to allege new or different grounds and the prior determination was on the merits, or, where new grounds are alleged, if the failure to raise them in the prior motion was an abuse of the procedure or there was no good cause for the failure by the defendant or defendant's counsel. The bar is permissive, so good cause excuses it and the determination is reviewed as a matter of trial-court discretion; oversight by prior postconviction counsel is not automatically good cause, and Florida recognizes no remedy for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(j)(2) (redesignated from 3.850(h)(2) eff. Jan. 1, 2026) **Case:** Ruth v. State, 207 So. 3d 970, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) > the judge finds that the failure of the defendant or the attorney to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure or there was no good cause for the failure [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so3d/207/html/0970-01.html) | | Georgia Barred, narrow exceptions verified | All grounds must be raised in the original or amended petition; grounds not so raised are waived. The waiver is excused only where the federal or Georgia Constitution otherwise requires, or where the judge to whom the successive petition is assigned finds grounds asserted in it that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. A petition must itself identify any prior proceedings and, for prior habeas petitions, state which claims were previously raised (§ 9-14-44). | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-44 > Any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of the United States or of this state otherwise requires or unless any judge to whom the petition is assigned, on considering a subsequent petition, finds grounds for relief [View the source document](https://law.onecle.com/georgia/title-9/9-14-51.html) | | Hawaii Barred, narrow exceptions unverified | Rule 40 relief is unavailable where the issues were previously ruled upon or were waived, and waiver expressly reaches issues that could have been raised "in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this rule" — so a second or successive petition raising an omitted claim is barred. A rebuttable presumption treats the earlier omission as knowing and understanding. Two escapes: proof of extraordinary circumstances justifying the failure to raise the issue, and an express carve-out for claims of illegal sentence, which Rule 40(a)(3) exempts from waiver altogether. Rule 40(g)(2) lets the court dismiss on these grounds at any time. | Source**Statute / rule:** Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(3), 40(g)(2) > an issue is waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised ... in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this rule, and the petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances [View the source document](https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm) | | Idaho Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Section 19-4908 requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application; a ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly and intelligently waived cannot support a later application unless the court finds 'sufficient reason' why it was not asserted or was inadequately raised, and the successive petition must also be filed within a reasonable time after the claim became known. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is NOT a sufficient reason — Murphy v. State overruled Palmer v. Dermitt on that point in 2014. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho Code § 19-4908 **Case:** Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014), overruling Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007) > may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application. [View the source document](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH49/SECT19-4908/) | | Illinois Barred, cause and prejudice verified | Only one petition may be filed without leave of court; leave requires a statutory cause-and-prejudice showing — an objective factor that impeded raising the claim initially, plus a claim that so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Separately, section 122-3 waives any claim not raised in the original or an amended petition. A judicially created fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception excuses cause and prejudice entirely where the petitioner states a colorable claim of actual innocence. | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 **Case:** People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 23-24 (following People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 330 (2009)) > Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. [View the source document](https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-1.htm) | | Indiana Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Two layers. Rule 1 § 8 requires all available grounds to be raised in the original petition and bars any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived, unless the court finds a ground that "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition." Independently, § 12 requires advance appellate authorization: the petitioner files a successive-petition form and proposed petition with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Tax Court, and leave issues only on a showing of a reasonable possibility of entitlement to relief; authorization is not a merits ruling and does not preclude summary disposition. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 §§ 8, 12(a)–(c) > The court will authorize the filing of the petition if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief. [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Iowa Code § 822.8 requires all grounds for relief to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application; a ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the earlier proceeding cannot be the basis for a subsequent application unless the court finds "sufficient reason" why it was not asserted or was inadequately raised. Since July 1, 2019, § 822.3 forecloses the principal route around that bar: an allegation that prior postconviction counsel was ineffective neither tolls the limitation period nor relates a late successive application back to the first, abrogating Allison v. State. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 822.8; Iowa Code § 822.3 (no tolling or relation back) **Case:** State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010); Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Iowa 2022) > All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in the applicant's original, supplemental or amended application. . . . unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised . . . . [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20240609142352/https://casetext.com/statute/code-of-iowa/title-xvi-criminal-law-and-procedure/chapter-822-postconviction-procedure/section-8228-grounds-must-be-all-inclusive) | | Kansas Barred, narrow exceptions verified | The sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief (K.S.A. 60-1507(c)), and Rule 183(d) forbids consideration where the ground was determined adversely to the movant on a prior motion, that determination was on the merits, and justice would not be served by reaching the merits again. The bar reaches claims that were raised or could have been raised earlier, so all ineffective-assistance grounds must be brought together in the first motion. It is excused by "exceptional circumstances" — unusual events or intervening changes in law that prevented the movant from raising the claim earlier — and an untimely successive motion additionally requires manifest injustice or a colorable actual-innocence claim under 60-1507(f)(2). | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 60-1507(c), (f)(2); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(d) **Case:** Manco v. State, 51 Kan. App. 2d 733, 736-39, 354 P.3d 551 (2015); State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 868, 872, Syl. ¶ 2, 248 P.3d 1282 (2011) > In other words, K.S.A. 60-1507(c) generally bars successive motions raising claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior motion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/kan-app-2d/51/html/0733-01.html) | | Kentucky Barred, narrow exceptions verified | RCr 11.42(3) requires the motion to state all grounds known to the movant and makes final disposition conclusive as to all issues that could reasonably have been presented, so a second RCr 11.42 motion is barred as to any ground the movant knew or should have known. Gross adds that waiver of the opportunity to file has the same preclusive effect, and that CR 60.02 reaches only grounds unavailable on direct appeal and unavailable under RCr 11.42 — requiring a showing of special, extraordinary circumstances and filing within a reasonable time. The practical excuse is therefore a ground genuinely unavailable earlier, pursued through CR 60.02 rather than a repeat RCr 11.42 motion. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(3); Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 **Case:** Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Ky. 1983) > the motion shall state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge. Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw2d/648/html/0853-01.html) | | Louisiana Barred, narrow exceptions unverified | La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4 supplies the bars, and the court "shall" apply them: a successive application is dismissed if it fails to raise a new or different claim (E), or if it raises a new or different claim "that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application" (F). Related bars reach claims fully litigated on appeal (A), claims known but inexcusably not raised in the proceedings leading to conviction (B), claims raised below but inexcusably not pursued on appeal (C), and claims resting on a rule held nonretroactive (D). The excuse is thus that the omission was not inexcusable; art. 930.4(H) makes these limitations jurisdictional and non-waivable, and any successive or supplemental application must also be served on the attorney general (G). Independent gateways exist under arts. 926.1 (DNA) and 926.2 (factual innocence). | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4(E), (F), (H) > A successive application shall be dismissed if it raises a new or different claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application. [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112945) | | Maine Barred, narrow exceptions verified | All grounds for relief must be raised in a single post-conviction review action; grounds not so raised are waived unless the Maine or U.S. Constitution requires otherwise, or the court determines the ground could not reasonably have been raised in the earlier action. Section 2128(4) applies the same 'could not reasonably have been raised' test to a person who previously challenged the judgment under the former habeas statutes (14 M.R.S. §§ 5502-5508). A successive petition remains subject to the § 2128-B one-year deadline, and Rule 70(b)(2) directs summary dismissal where the face of the petition discloses waiver and no § 2128-A exception. | Source**Statute / rule:** 15 M.R.S. § 2128(3), (4); 15 M.R.S. § 2128-A; M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(b)(2) > any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of Maine or the Constitution of the United States otherwise requires or unless the court determines that the ground could not reasonably have been raised in an earlier action [View the source document](https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2128.html) | | Maryland Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Hard one-petition rule: for each trial or sentence a person may file only one UPPA petition (Crim. Proc. § 7-103(a)), and claims already finally litigated or intelligently and knowingly not raised in a prior petition are barred (§ 7-106(a), (b)(1)(i)6). The only general escape is judicial reopening: the court may reopen a concluded post-conviction proceeding if it determines the action is in the interests of justice (§ 7-104), with counsel and a hearing then discretionary (§ 7-108(b)(1)). Reopening is mandatory, not discretionary, where DNA testing under § 8-201 produced results favorable to the petitioner (Md. Rule 4-401(b)). | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-103(a); § 7-104; § 7-106(b)(1)(i)6; Md. Rule 4-401(b) > For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for relief under this title. [View the source document](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcp§ion=7-103&enactments=false) | | Massachusetts Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Rule 30(c)(2) waiver is the bar: all grounds must be raised in the original or amended motion, and grounds not so raised are waived. Two textual escapes exist — the judge 'in the exercise of discretion' may permit them in a subsequent motion, or the grounds 'could not reasonably have been raised' earlier; a waived claim is still ordinarily reviewed for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. In first-degree-murder cases, G.L. c. 278, § 33E adds a gatekeeper: after rescript, no appeal from denial of a post-conviction motion lies unless a single justice of the SJC allows it as presenting 'a new and substantial question.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(2); G.L. c. 278, § 33E **Case:** Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2000) > If a defendant fails to raise a claim that is generally known and available at the time of trial or direct appeal or in the first motion for postconviction relief, the claim is waived. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/mass/432/cases/1016-01.json) | | Michigan Barred, narrow exceptions verified | One motion only per conviction. MCR 6.502(G)(1) permits, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment regarding a conviction, regardless of prior filings. MCR 6.502(G)(2) allows a second or subsequent motion on three grounds: (a) a retroactive change in law occurring after the first motion was filed; (b) a claim of new evidence not discovered before the first motion — expressly including 'new scientific evidence,' defined by MCR 6.502(G)(3) to cover shifts in a field of scientific knowledge (including scientific consensus), in a testifying expert's own knowledge and opinions, or in the scientific method underlying the trial evidence; and (c) a final court order vacating a conviction described in or underlying the judgment. The clerk refers successive motions to the assigned judge to decide whether an exception applies, and the court may waive the bar entirely if it concludes there is a significant possibility the defendant is innocent. | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.502(G) > regardless of whether a defendant has previously filed a motion for relief from judgment, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Barred, narrow exceptions verified | The Knaffla rule bars claims raised, or known and not raised, in a direct appeal or in an earlier postconviction petition; separately, § 590.04, subd. 3 permits the court to 'summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner' and to summarily deny a petition whose issues an appellate court already decided in the same case. Powers recognizes only two escapes: a novel legal issue, or where the interests of justice require review. The subd. 4 two-year limit applies independently to every petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3; § 590.01, subd. 1 **Case:** Powers v. State, 731 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. 2007); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) > matters raised or known but not raised in an earlier petition for postconviction relief will generally not be considered in subsequent petitions for postconviction relief [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/731/cases/0499-01.json) | | Mississippi Barred, narrow exceptions verified | An order granting relief, dismissing the motion, or otherwise denying relief is a final judgment that bars a second or successive motion (§ 99-39-23(6)); in the appellate posture, denial or dismissal of an application for leave to proceed likewise bars a successive application (§ 99-39-27(9)), and res judicata applies to all issues decided at trial and on direct appeal (§ 99-39-21(3)). The statutory excuses are: an intervening Mississippi or U.S. Supreme Court decision that would have adversely affected the outcome; newly discovered, practically conclusive evidence not reasonably discoverable at trial; an expired sentence or unlawfully revoked probation, parole or conditional release; supervening mental illness before execution under § 99-19-57(2); and new or different DNA-testing grounds or more advanced DNA technology. M.R.A.P. 22(a) warns that successive applications not clearly demonstrating an exception may draw sanctions. | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-23(6), 99-39-27(9), 99-39-21(3); Miss. R. App. P. 22(a) > any order dismissing the petitioner's motion or otherwise denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article. [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A flat statutory-style bar with no exception written into the rule: the circuit court may not entertain successive Rule 29.15 or 24.035 motions. The only escape is a Rule 91 habeas petition, and Missouri confines that to raising jurisdictional issues or 'circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results' — the manifest-injustice gateway being satisfied by cause-and-prejudice or a showing of actual innocence. A petitioner under a sentence of death may additionally bring a freestanding actual-innocence habeas claim on clear and convincing evidence (Amrine). | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(l); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(l) **Case:** State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1993); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. banc 2003) > The circuit court shall not entertain successive motions. [View the source document](https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/clerkhandbooksp2rulesonly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d) | | Montana Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A second or subsequent petition must be dismissed unless it raises grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended original petition; the original petition may be amended only once. Ineffectiveness of counsel in the original or amended original postconviction proceeding is expressly excluded as a ground for a successive petition (§ 46-21-105(2)), and § 46-21-105(3) defines 'grounds for relief' to include all legal and factual issues that were or could have been raised in support of the claim. | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-105(1)(b), (2)-(3), MCA > The court shall dismiss a second or subsequent petition by a person who has filed an original petition unless the second or subsequent petition raises grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition [View the source document](https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0010/section_0050/0460-0210-0010-0050.html) | | Nebraska Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Section 29-3001(3) provides that the court "need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner," and the courts enforce that as a hard bar: a successive motion is entertained only if it affirmatively shows on its face that the basis for relief was not available when the prior motion was filed. Having proceeded pro se in the first motion is no excuse (State v. Parmar; State v. Marshall), and the one-year limitation of § 29-3001(4) applies to successive motions as well (State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70). | Source**Statute / rule:** Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(3) **Case:** State v. Marshall, 272 Neb. 924, 725 N.W.2d 834 (2007); State v. Ortiz, 266 Neb. 959, 670 N.W.2d 788 (2003) > An appellate court will not entertain a successive motion for postconviction relief unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time the movant filed the prior motion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/neb/272/html/0924-01.html) | | Nevada Barred, cause and prejudice verified | A second or successive petition must be dismissed if it alleges no new or different grounds and the prior determination was on the merits, or, if new grounds are alleged, if the failure to assert them earlier was an abuse of the writ; the petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving specific facts showing good cause and actual prejudice, and a judge must summarily dismiss a successive petition plainly barred on the face of the record (NRS 34.745(3)). Successive petitions are additionally subject to the one-year limit of NRS 34.726 and to laches under NRS 34.800. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel supplies good cause only where appointment of that counsel was statutorily mandated — i.e., a capital first petition under NRS 34.820(1)(a) — and must not itself be procedurally defaulted; otherwise a bar is excusable only by a fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice showing, typically colorable actual innocence. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.810(3)-(4); NRS 34.745(3) **Case:** McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 (1996); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) > A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire No express bar unverified | No successive-petition bar was located in New Hampshire primary law. We read all 32 sections of RSA 534 (habeas) and all 6 sections of RSA 526 (new trials): neither contains any second-or-successive provision, and neither states an excuse standard. A the published-opinion record full-text search of the New Hampshire Supreme Court corpus for 'abuse of the writ' returned 0 opinions; a search for 'second petition for habeas corpus' OR 'successive petitions' returned 3 opinions, none announcing a successive-petition bar. The nearest limits found are the three-year bar of RSA 526:4 and the judge-made procedural-default rule of Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-43 (1988) (a claim the petitioner knew of and could have raised on direct appeal is 'procedurally waived for collateral review'), against the background rule that habeas is not a substitute for appeal (Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 505 (1957)). In Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44, 45-46 (2005) a second habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice as premature, not as successive. Whether a claim already decided in a prior collateral petition may be relitigated, and what excuses a repeat filing, is not resolved by any source we reached. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 534 (no successive provision); RSA 526 (no successive provision) **Case:** Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988); Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503 (1957); Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44 (2005) | | New Jersey Barred, narrow exceptions verified | R. 3:22-4(b) requires dismissal of a second or subsequent petition unless it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2) AND alleges on its face one of three things: reliance on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the U.S. or New Jersey Supreme Court and unavailable during prior proceedings; a factual predicate that could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence which, if proven and viewed against the whole record, would raise a reasonable probability of relief; or a prima facie case of ineffective assistance by counsel who represented the defendant on the first or subsequent PCR application. Independently, R. 3:22-5 makes 'a prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief' conclusive. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-4(b); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(2); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-5 > A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief shall be dismissed unless: (1) it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and (2) it alleges on its face either: [View the source document](https://www.courtcaddy.com/nj/court-rules/r3-22.html) | | New Mexico Discretionary verified | No statutory successive-petition bar was located; preclusion is equitable and discretionary. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel may, at the discretion of the later habeas court, prevent relitigation of issues argued and decided on a prior petition where their resolution was necessary to the earlier decision. The Court adopted the Sanders/Kuhlmann framework for petitioner-side preclusion, so a repeat claim must be reached where the 'ends of justice' require it — notably where the constitutional claim is supplemented by a colorable showing of innocence — and it noted that principles of finality have rarely been applied with the same force in habeas as in ordinary litigation. | Source**Case:** Manlove v. Sullivan, 108 N.M. 471, 775 P.2d 237 (1989); described as the successive-petition rule in Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344 (1993) > At least against the state, we believe collateral estoppel principles may, at the discretion of a subsequent habeas corpus court, prevent relitigation of issues argued and decided on a previous habeas corpus petition [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nm/108/html/0471-01.html) | | New York Discretionary verified | Discretionary rather than absolute. CPL 440.10(3)(b) permits denial where the ground was already determined on the merits on a prior motion or proceeding in a state or federal court (unless there has since been a retroactively effective change in the controlling law), and 440.10(3)(c) permits denial where the defendant was in a position to raise the ground on a previous 440 motion but did not. The same subdivision expressly authorizes the court to grant relief anyway 'in the interest of justice and for good cause shown' if the motion is otherwise meritorious. Separately, CPL 440.10(2)(a) is a MANDATORY bar for a ground previously determined on the merits on direct appeal, subject to the same retroactive-change-in-law exception. Successive CPLR article 70 habeas petitions are governed by CPLR 7003(b), under which a court need not issue the writ if legality of detention was determined on a prior habeas proceeding, the petition presents no new ground, and the ends of justice would not be served. | Source**Statute / rule:** CPL 440.10(3)(b), (3)(c) and closing paragraph of 440.10(3); CPL 440.10(2)(a); CPLR 7003(b) > Although the court may deny the motion under any of the circumstances specified in this subdivision, in the interest of justice and for good cause shown it may in its discretion grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250804161100/https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/440.10) | | North Carolina Barred, cause and prejudice verified | A successive MAR must be denied if the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground in a previous MAR but did not (§ 15A-1419(a)(1) — inapplicable where the prior motion was the 10-day motion or was made during the direct appeal), if the ground was already determined on the merits on appeal or in a prior state or federal proceeding absent a retroactively effective change in controlling law ((a)(2)), or if the motion is untimely under § 15A-1415(a) or (a1) ((a)(4)). Denial is mandatory ('shall deny') unless the defendant demonstrates good cause plus actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Good cause is confined to state action (including ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel), a new retroactively applicable right, or a factual predicate not discoverable with reasonable diligence — and ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel is expressly excluded as good cause. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(1)-(2), (a)(4), (b), (c), (d), (e) > Upon a previous motion made pursuant to this Article, the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so. [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1419.html) | | North Dakota Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Two bars, both in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12: res judicata under (1) for claims "fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding," and misuse of process under (2) for a claim the applicant "inexcusably failed to raise" in the proceeding leading to conviction or in a prior post-conviction proceeding, or for multiple applications containing frivolous claims. Clark ¶ 23 identifies three triggering situations, including inexcusable failure to pursue an issue on direct appeal that was litigated at trial. The escape is showing the earlier omission was excusable; and critically both are affirmative defenses the State must plead under § 29-32.1-12(3), so they are waived if not pleaded (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 13, 15, 928 N.W.2d 441). | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), (2), (3) **Case:** Clark v. State, 1999 ND 78, ¶¶ 7, 23, 593 N.W.2d 329 > Presents a claim for relief which the applicant inexcusably failed to raise either in a proceeding leading to judgment of conviction and sentence or in a previous postconviction proceeding [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/593/html/0329-01.html) | | Ohio Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A court may not entertain a second or successive petition (or an untimely first petition) unless R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) or (A)(2) applies. (A)(1) requires BOTH that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts relied on, or that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a new retroactive right, AND clear-and-convincing proof that but for constitutional error at trial no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty (or, for a death sentence, eligible for it). (A)(2) is the DNA-actual-innocence route. Separately, R.C. 2953.21(A)(4) waives any ground for relief not stated in the original or amended petition, except as R.C. 2953.23 provides. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(4) > a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies [View the source document](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.23) | | Oklahoma Barred, narrow exceptions verified | 22 O.S. § 1086 bars any ground finally adjudicated, or not raised in the original/supplemental/amended application, or knowingly and voluntarily waived; the sole statutory excuse is a court finding that the ground 'for sufficient reason' was not asserted or was inadequately raised before. The 2022 amendment expressly extended this to claims challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Independently, § 1080.1(A) applies the one-year limitation to subsequent applications as well as original ones. Capital successive applications face the stricter § 1089(D)(8) gate: legal or factual basis previously unavailable, plus clear and convincing evidence no reasonable factfinder would have convicted or imposed death. | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1086; 22 O.S. § 1080.1(A); 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(8) (capital) **Case:** Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 3 > Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20210110184513/https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=70870) | | Oregon Barred, narrow exceptions verified | ORS 138.550(3) requires all grounds to be asserted in the original or amended petition and deems unasserted grounds waived, excused only if the court on a subsequent petition finds grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' in the original or amended petition — the same escape-clause wording as the two-year deadline, with the burden on the petitioner (Verduzco). A prior petition withdrawn by leave of court before judgment has no effect on the right to file again (138.550(3)); and ORS 138.510(4) absolutely bars a further petition in the same case where a post-conviction petition was dismissed before November 4, 1993. | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.550(3); ORS 138.510(4) **Case:** Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 172 (2015) > must be asserted in the original or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Pennsylvania has no separate successive-petition standard — the same one-year jurisdictional deadline in § 9545(b)(1) applies expressly to 'a second or subsequent petition,' and the only escapes are the same three statutory exceptions (governmental interference, unknown facts, new retroactive constitutional right), each of which must itself be filed within one year of when the claim could have been presented. Independently, § 9543(a)(3) requires that the allegation of error be neither previously litigated nor waived: an issue is previously litigated if the highest court of right ruled on its merits or it was raised and decided in a prior collateral attack (§ 9544(a)), and waived if the petitioner could have raised it earlier and did not (§ 9544(b)). | Source**Statute / rule:** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)-(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) **Case:** Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000) > For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. [View the source document](https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.044.000..HTM) | | Rhode Island Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Section 10-9.1-8 requires all then-available grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application, and bars any ground finally adjudicated, not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the conviction proceeding or any other proceeding taken to secure relief. The Supreme Court treats this as codified res judicata: a merits judgment precludes not only issues actually decided but all issues that might have been raised. The sole escape is a judicial finding that in the interest of justice the applicant should be permitted to assert the ground, an exception the Court describes as very limited and narrow. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-8 **Case:** Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110 (R.I. 2007); Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008) > parties cannot bring forth new claims in subsequent applications that could have been, but were not, raised in the first postconviction-relief application [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a2d/933/cases/1110-01.json) | | South Carolina Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Section 17-27-90 requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental or amended application; grounds finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived cannot support a subsequent application unless the court finds a 'sufficient reason' why the ground was not asserted or was inadequately raised. South Carolina construes 'sufficient reason' narrowly: in Aice v. State the Supreme Court held ineffectiveness of prior PCR counsel is not per se a sufficient reason, and that 'as long as it was possible to raise the argument in his first PCR application, an applicant may not raise it in a successive application.' The one-year limitations period of § 17-27-45(A) applies independently. Recognized escapes are narrow and procedural: Case v. State (first application dismissed with no counsel and no hearing), Carter v. State (PCR counsel was the same as trial counsel), Tilley v. State (ground genuinely could not have been raised earlier), and an Austin v. State belated appeal where the applicant was denied appellate review of the first PCR denial — to which, per Odom, the one-year bar does not apply. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90 **Case:** Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991) > may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application. [View the source document](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A claim already presented in a prior habeas application — or otherwise presented to the courts of this state — must be dismissed, and no second or subsequent application may be filed at all without leave from the circuit court. Leave must be denied unless the applicant identifies (1) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty, or (2) a new, previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral review by both the U.S. and South Dakota Supreme Courts. The grant or denial of leave is not appealable. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-5.1 (added by SL 2012, ch 118, § 5) > A claim presented in a second or subsequent habeas corpus application under this chapter that was presented in a prior application under this chapter or otherwise to the courts of this state by the same applicant shall be dismissed. [View the source document](https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/Statute/21-27-5.1) | | Tennessee Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A strict one-petition rule: only one petition may attack a single judgment, and if a prior petition was resolved on the merits any second or subsequent petition 'shall be summarily dismissed' (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 5(B)). The only escape is a motion to reopen the first petition under § 40-30-117(a), permitted on three grounds — a new retroactive constitutional right (moved within one year of the ruling), new scientific evidence of actual innocence, or invalidation of a prior conviction used to enhance the sentence — and only if the facts, if true, would establish entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c); § 40-30-117(a) > This part contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief. In no event may more than one (1) petition for post-conviction relief be filed attacking a single judgment. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20220810074444/https://www.lawserver.com/law/state/tennessee/tn-code/tennessee_code_40-30-102) | | Texas Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Article 11.07 § 4(a) bars merits consideration of a subsequent non-capital application unless it pleads sufficient specific facts establishing either (1) that the factual or legal basis of the claim was unavailable when the previous application was filed, or (2) that by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a federal constitutional violation, no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsections (b) and (c) define unavailability narrowly; art. 11.073(c) and art. 11.0731(c) supply a changed-science and faulty-DNA-testing route to satisfy the unavailability prong. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 4(a)-(c); art. 11.071 § 5(a) (capital); art. 11.072 § 9(a) (community supervision) > a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that [View the source document](https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/CR/htm/CR.11.htm) | | Utah Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Section 78B-9-106(1)(d) bars any ground raised or addressed in a previous post-conviction request, or that could have been but was not raised there; the one-year limit independently bars under (1)(e). Critically, the ineffective-assistance escape in § 78B-9-106(3)(a) is written to excuse only subsection (1)(c) defaults — it does not reach the successive bar in (1)(d) — and § 78B-9-109(3) provides that ineffectiveness of appointed post-conviction counsel 'cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent postconviction petition.' The only statutory excuse to (1)(d) is § 78B-9-106(3)(b), for grounds not raised because of force, fraud, or coercion as defined in § 76-5-308. Either the State or the court sua sponte may raise the bar at any time. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(d)-(e), (2), (3)(b); § 78B-9-109(3); § 78B-9-202(2) (capital counsel funding) > was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief [View the source document](https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S106_2021050520210505.html) | | Vermont Barred, cause and prejudice verified | 13 V.S.A. § 7134 provides that a court 'is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' Vermont applies two distinct doctrines: § 7134 bars relitigation of claims actually raised and decided on the merits in an earlier PCR, and claims raised for the first time in a later petition are barred as abuse of the writ. To excuse the latter, the State must first plead abuse with clarity and particularity; the burden then shifts to the petitioner to show cause (an objective factor external to the defense) and actual prejudice, per the McCleskey standard adopted in In re Laws. | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7134 **Case:** In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, ¶¶ 21-25, 182 A.3d 1149; In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 11, 20-22, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210; Chandler v. State, 2016 VT 62, ¶ 8 > Then the burden shifts to the petitioner to show cause for failing to raise the claim previously and actual prejudice from the default. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/182/cases/1149-01.json) | | Virginia Barred, narrow exceptions verified | A petition must contain all allegations whose facts are known to the petitioner at filing and must enumerate all previous applications and their disposition; no writ may be granted on any allegation the facts of which the petitioner knew when filing any previous petition. The excuse built into the statute is therefore factual newness — facts genuinely unknown at the time of the earlier petition. One carve-out: the bar does not apply to a first petition whose sole allegation is denial of the right to pursue an appeal, provided it certifies no prior petitions were filed. The § 8.01-654(A)(2) limitations period continues to apply, and there is no innocence exception to it. | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) > No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition. [View the source document](https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-654/) | | Washington Barred, narrow exceptions verified | In the Court of Appeals, RCW 10.73.140 bars a successive PRP that raises grounds already raised, or where the petitioner fails to certify no prior petition on similar grounds and show good cause for not raising the new grounds earlier; the court dismisses on its own motion without a State response. RAP 16.4(d) — 'No more than one petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown' — governs in the Supreme Court, because RCW 10.73.140 by its terms reaches only the Court of Appeals (In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 566 (1997)). 'Similar relief' turns on the grounds asserted rather than the remedy sought, good cause is established by a significant intervening change in the law, and a prior petition dismissed on procedural grounds was never 'heard and determined,' so it does not trigger the bar; the one-year limit of RCW 10.73.090 applies independently. | Source**Statute / rule:** RCW 10.73.140; RAP 16.4(d) **Case:** In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 934 P.2d 1174 (1997); In re Pers. Restraint of Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 502-03 (1984) > the court of appeals will not consider the petition unless the person certifies that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar grounds, and shows good cause why the petitioner did not raise the new grounds in the previous petition [View the source document](https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.140) | | West Virginia Barred, narrow exceptions unverified | A petitioner is ordinarily entitled to one omnibus post-conviction habeas proceeding; claims 'previously and finally adjudicated or waived' are barred, and failure to raise an available ground creates a rebuttable presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver (W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c)). Losh v. McKenzie recognizes three narrow exceptions permitting a successive petition: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus hearing, newly discovered evidence, or a retroactively applicable favorable change in the law. Waiver applies only if the prior proceeding was a true omnibus hearing meeting the four Losh/Gibson criteria, including counsel or a knowing waiver of counsel. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c); § 53-4A-3(a); § 53-4A-7(a) **Case:** Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981); Gibson v. Dale, 173 W. Va. 681, 319 S.E.2d 806 (1984) > These exceptions include: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus habeas corpus hearing; newly discovered evidence; or, a change in the law, favorable to the applicant, which may be applied retroactively. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/w-va/166/html/0762-01.html) | | Wisconsin Barred, cause and prejudice verified | Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended motion; any ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly and intelligently waived cannot support a subsequent motion unless the court finds a 'sufficient reason' for the omission. State v. Escalona-Naranjo extends that bar to grounds that could have been raised in an earlier § 974.02 motion or on direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can supply the sufficient reason, but under State v. Romero-Georgana the movant must plead that the omitted claim was 'clearly stronger' than the claims counsel did raise. No sufficient reason is required at all if the defendant filed neither a § 974.02 motion nor a direct appeal. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Escalona-Naranjo was not unanimous — SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). We am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan joins this dissent.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) **Case:** State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994); State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 > We simply apply the plain language of subsection (4) which requires a sufficient reason to raise a constitutional issue in a sec. 974.06 motion that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a sec. 974.02 motion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/wis-2d/185/html/0168-01.html) | | Wyoming Barred, narrow exceptions verified | Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(ii) strips jurisdiction over any claim 'not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this act,' and (a)(iii) does the same for any claim 'decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which has become final.' The three statutory excuses in § 7-14-103(b) are expressly 'Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(i)' only, so by their terms they do not lift the (a)(ii) or (a)(iii) bars; the five-year limit of § 7-14-103(d) applies independently to any later petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(ii)-(iii), (b) **Case:** Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 55, 105 P.3d 1049, 1071 (Wyo. 2005) (claims 'raised and decided in the direct appeal' are 'procedurally barred from reconsideration in this proceeding') > Was not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this act [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20230529100312/https://law.justia.com/codes/wyoming/2022/title-7/chapter-14/section-7-14-103/) | ## Whether the original trial judge hears the challenge *If a first habeas petition is heard in the court of conviction — as has been proposed for Georgia — may the judge whose trial is being challenged decide that challenge? This is the least documented rule in American post-conviction procedure, and the proposal does not address it.* 44 of 50 states verified. | State | Rule | Source | | --- | --- | --- | | Alabama Reassignment discretionary verified | Expressly addressed by rule, and the original judge is the default: Rule 32.6(d) assigns the Rule 32 proceeding to the sentencing judge 'where possible,' with assignment or transfer to another judge permitted for good cause — reassignment is discretionary, not mandatory. In Ex parte Adkins the Alabama Supreme Court invoked Rule 32.6(d) to require transfer (denying mandamus conditioned on transfer) where the petition's allegations put the trial judge's own impartiality reasonably in question. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(d) **Case:** Ex parte Adkins, 687 So. 2d 155, 156 (Ala. 1996) > The proceeding shall be assigned to the sentencing judge where possible, but for good cause the proceeding may be assigned or transferred to another judge [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so2d/687/cases/0155-01.json) | | Alaska Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is permitted — and in practice assigned — to hear post-conviction applications: Plyler's application was assigned to the judge who presided over his jury trial, and the Court of Appeals held an applicant has no right to peremptorily disqualify that judge, treating the trial judge's familiarity with the case as a reason to keep it. Reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden; AS 12.72.010-.040 contain no judge-assignment provision, and for-cause disqualification was not at issue in Plyler. | Source**Case:** Plyler v. State, 10 P.3d 1173 (Alaska App. 2000) > Because the judge who conducted a defendant's trial would be familiar with the circumstances of the trial, we are persuaded that it would be unwise to allow a defendant to disqualify the judge by means of a peremptory challenge [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20050218054236/http://www.touchngo.com/ap/html/ap-1695.htm) | | Arizona Same judge default verified | Arizona affirmatively requires the original judge where possible: the presiding judge must, if possible, assign the post-conviction proceeding to the sentencing judge (Rule 32.10(a); identically Rule 33.10 track for pleading defendants). The parallel statute adds that if the sentencing judge's testimony appears relevant, that judge shall transfer the case to another judge (A.R.S. § 13-4234(we)); change-of-judge Rules 10.1 and 10.2 apply when the case is assigned to a new judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.10(a); accord A.R.S. § 13-4234(I) > The presiding judge must, if possible, assign a proceeding for post-conviction relief to the sentencing judge. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1C1C15B0F08511E9B190C991AA260383?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Arkansas Same judge permitted verified | Rule 37 proceedings are heard in the court of conviction, and the original trial judge is permitted — not forbidden and not required to step aside — to hear the petition. Reassignment is not mandatory; disqualification is discretionary and reversible only for abuse of discretion, and recusal is not required merely because the judge must pass on the propriety of his or her own trial rulings (Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996), following Travis). No provision of Rule 37 requiring or authorizing reassignment to a different judge was located. | Source**Case:** Travis v. State, 283 Ark. 478, 678 S.W.2d 341 (1984); Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996) > The same judge who presides over a defendant’s trial may also preside over a post-conviction proceeding; disqualification is discretionary and will not justify reversal absent an abuse of discretion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ark/283/html/0478-01.html) | | California Same judge permitted verified | Capital cases: assignment to the original trial judge is statutorily required unless that judge is unavailable or other good cause exists (§ 1509(a), adopted by Proposition 66 in 2016). Non-capital cases: no statute or rule of court either requires or forbids the original trial judge; assignment is unaddressed, but Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962 (read in full) holds a habeas petitioner may peremptorily challenge the judge assigned to rule on the petition under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6, subject to that statute's procedural limits. | Source**Statute / rule:** Cal. Penal Code § 1509(a) **Case:** Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962 > A petition filed in or transferred to the court which imposed the sentence shall be assigned to the original trial judge unless that judge is unavailable or there is other good cause to assign the case to a different judge. [View the source document](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=1509) | | Colorado Same judge permitted verified | Neither Rule 35(c) nor statute addresses which judge hears the motion; the original trial judge is permitted and routinely presides — in Colorado's most prominent capital postconviction case the same judge who presided at trial conducted the 52-day 35(c) hearing (Dunlap). Reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden: it occurs only under the generally applicable disqualification standards of C.R.S. § 16-6-201 and Crim. P. 21(b), which require a showing of actual bias ('bent of mind') even in postconviction proceedings (People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 276-77 (Colo. 1996)). We searched Rule 35 case law and the published-opinion record for any mandatory-reassignment rule and found none. | Source**Statute / rule:** C.R.S. § 16-6-201; Colo. R. Crim. P. 21(b) **Case:** Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1996) > hearing consumed 52 days of court time and was conducted by the same judge who had presided over the guilt and penalty phases of the trial [View the source document](https://static.case.law/p3d/173/html/1054-01.html) | | Connecticut Not applicable verified | The premise does not apply in Connecticut: post-conviction habeas is not heard in the court of conviction, because § 52-466(a)(2) routes every petition by a convicted, confined prisoner to the judicial district of Tolland, so the original trial judge does not hear it as a structural matter. We found no statute or rule that requires, permits, or forbids assignment of the original trial judge to a habeas case; searched the full text of chapter 915 (§§ 52-466 to 52-470), the Practice Book habeas rules as reproduced in Gilchrist, and the published-opinion record for Connecticut Supreme Court opinions pairing habeas with 'original trial judge' and recusal (one immaterial hit, Barlow v. Comm'r of Corr.). Note § 52-466(d) separately lets any judge make the writ returnable before another judge with that judge's consent. | Source**Statute / rule:** Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-466(a)(2) > made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20260418232008/https://www.cga.ct.gov/CURRENT/PUB/chap_915.htm) | | Delaware Same judge default verified | Post-conviction is heard in the court of conviction, and the judge who took the plea or presided at trial and sentencing may hear the Rule 61 motion — reassignment is not required. In Harden the same judge who imposed sentence ruled on the Rule 61 petition after a Commissioner's report, and the Delaware Supreme Court, reversing on the merits, ordered a different judge only for the new sentencing, stating it was doing so 'not because the original trial judge did anything wrong.' we could not verify the text of Rule 61(d)(1), which the Superior Court's 2014 amendment order appears to word as a directive that a first motion be presented promptly to that same judge, because the Judiciary publishes its rules only as non-extractable PDFs. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Harden v. State was not unanimous — VALIHURA, Justice, dissenting, with VAUGHN, Justice, joining. | Source**Statute / rule:** Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(1) (text unverified) **Case:** Harden v. State, 180 A.3d 1037, 1046, 1051 (Del. 2018) > The same judge who presided over Harden's sentencing hearing heard Harden's objections to the Commissioner's recommendation and issued a thorough decision explaining why she agreed that his petition should be dismissed. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a3d/180/html/1037-01.html) | | Florida Reassignment discretionary verified | Permitted, not required, and reassignment is discretionary. For capital collateral proceedings the assignment rule is express: the chief judge must assign a judge qualified under rule 2.215(b)(10), and Rule 3.851(c)(1) requires that assignment within 30 days of the mandate on direct appeal — the trial judge qualifies but has no priority, because in 2001 the Court deleted the former requirement that the judge who presided over a capital trial preside over the collateral proceeding, and in 2008 it deleted rule 2.215(b)(10)(E), which had exempted such a judge from the capital-qualification requirements. For non-capital Rule 3.850 motions we found no rule text addressing which judge hears the motion; assignment falls under the chief judge's general power in rule 2.215(b)(4), and no provision requires or forbids the original trial judge. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Implementation of Judicial Branch Governance Study Group Recommendations—Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration was not unanimous — PARIENTE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(4), (b)(10); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(c)(1) **Case:** In re Implementation of Judicial Branch Governance Study Group Recommendations—Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 121 So. 3d 1, 13 (Fla. 2012) (appendix reproducing rule 2.215(b)(4)); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.215, 992 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 2008) > When assigning a judge to hear any type of postconviction or collateral relief proceeding brought by a defendant who has been sentenced to death, the chief judge shall assign to such cases a judge qualified to conduct such proceedings under subdivision (b)(10) of this rule. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/so3d/121/html/0001-01.html) | | Georgia Reassignment mandatory verified | For Georgia's exclusive collateral remedy — state habeas — the question is largely structural rather than discretionary: because venue lies in the superior court of the county of detention (§ 9-14-43), the original trial judge ordinarily has no role at all. For a petition challenging a death sentence for the first time, reassignment is mandatory and out-of-circuit: the clerk must notify the Council of Superior Court Judges, whose president must assign the case to a judge of a circuit other than the circuit of conviction (§ 9-14-47.1(b)). No statute or rule we could reach addresses whether the original trial judge may preside in the residual situation where § 9-14-43 places venue in the county of conviction because the petitioner is not in custody. | Source**Statute / rule:** O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47.1(b); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-43 > the president of the council shall, under guidelines promulgated by the executive committee of the council, assign the case to a judge of a circuit other than the circuit in which the conviction and sentence were imposed [View the source document](https://law.onecle.com/georgia/title-9/9-14-47.1.html) | | Hawaii Unaddressed unverified | Unaddressed by rule. Hawaii post-conviction is heard in the court of conviction (Rule 40(b)), but no provision we could reach states whether the original trial judge may, must, or must not hear the Rule 40 petition, and none makes reassignment mandatory or discretionary. We read the full text of HRPP Rule 40 (all subsections), HRPP Rule 42.3 (which requires transmittal "to a judge" without identifying which), HRPP Rule 25 (judge disability — trial and post-verdict substitution only), and R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 2 and 33: all silent. Haw. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(6)(D) disqualifies a judge who "on appeal, previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court," which does not reach a Rule 40 petition (neither an appeal nor another court). The only textual acknowledgment that the Rule 40 judge may differ from the trial judge is Rule 40(f), which lists as receivable evidence the "certificate of any judge who presided at any hearing during the course of the proceedings" leading to the judgment — permissive, and not a reassignment rule. the published-opinion record full-text searches across Haw. and Haw. App. for "Rule 40 petition" + "same judge" (4 hits; the only pre-2019 one, Bryant v. State, 6 Haw. App. 331, uses the phrase about voir dire) and "Rule 40 petition" + "recusal" (4 hits: State v. Green (2024), Garcia v. State, 154 Haw. 410 (2024), Karamatsu v. State, 149 Haw. 172 (2021), Rosa v. Kaua'i Police Dep't (2025)) produced no reachable holding; all four recusal hits postdate the digitised case record coverage and exist only as Hawaii Judiciary PDFs, which are published only as image files. | Source*No primary source reached.* | | Idaho Same judge permitted verified | The original trial/sentencing judge is permitted, not forbidden, to hear the post-conviction proceeding, and reassignment is neither mandatory nor available as of right. Because post-conviction is a civil proceeding, Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(a) would ordinarily give each party one disqualification without cause, but Rule 40(a)(8)(B) expressly withdraws that right where the post-conviction case has been assigned to the judge who entered the challenged judgment. Removal is therefore available only for cause under Rule 40(b) — including bias or prejudice — or by the judge's own voluntary disqualification, and the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to adopt any rule automatically disqualifying the sentencing judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(a)(8)(B); Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(b)-(d) **Case:** Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206 (1986) > a judge in a post-conviction proceeding, when that proceeding has been assigned to the judge who entered the judgment of conviction or sentence being challenged by the post-conviction proceeding [View the source document](https://isc.idaho.gov/rules-procedure/ircp) | | Illinois Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is PERMITTED — and by supreme court statement preferred — to hear the post-conviction petition; reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden, and rests with the chief judge's general assignment authority under Ill. S. Ct. R. 21(b). Illinois once had the opposite rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-8 required that every post-conviction proceeding be conducted by 'a judge who was not involved in the original proceeding which resulted in conviction.' That section was held unconstitutional as a separation-of-powers encroachment on judicial assignment authority in People v. Joseph (1986) and was formally repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-2010. The appellate court has held there is likewise no per se rule requiring the original trial judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** 725 ILCS 5/122-8 (repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-2010; held unconstitutional in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36 (1986)) **Case:** People v. Mamolella, 42 Ill. 2d 69, 73 (1969); People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 43-48 (1986); People v. Keener, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8-11 (2d Dist. 1995) > In the absence of a showing that defendant would be substantially prejudiced, the post-conviction petition should be heard by the same judge who rendered the original judgment. [View the source document](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=859435320296977536) | | Indiana Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is permitted to hear the petition and does so by default; reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic. The petitioner's only route is a § 4(b) motion filed within ten days of the petition, supported by an affidavit of the judge's personal bias or prejudice plus counsel's good-faith certificate; the court must take the recited historical facts as true and grant the change only if they support a rational inference of bias or prejudice, and no change of venue from the county is permitted. Section 5 makes § 4(b) the exclusive change-of-judge route (displacing the otherwise-available civil procedures), and for an authorized successive petition § 12(c) sends the case back to the same judge who adjudicated the first petition "if that judge is available." | Source**Statute / rule:** Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 4(b); § 5; § 12(c) **Case:** Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 789–90 (Ind. 1999) > Within ten days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the petitioner. [View the source document](https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm) | | Iowa Same judge permitted verified | Permitted, not required, and reassignment is unaddressed. Iowa Code § 822.7 provides that the application "shall be heard in, and before any judge of the court in which the conviction or sentence took place," so the judge who tried or sentenced the case may hear the postconviction action but no particular judge is designated. We located no Iowa statute, court rule, or decision requiring reassignment to a different judge or barring the original trial judge — the ordinary recusal standards apply, and nothing in chapter 822 addresses the question. | Source**Statute / rule:** Iowa Code § 822.7 **Case:** Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1995) (quoting § 822.7) > The application shall be heard in, and before any judge of the court in which the conviction or sentence took place. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/540/html/0243-01.html) | | Kansas Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is permitted but not required to hear the 60-1507 motion, and reassignment is neither mandatory nor prohibited — it is ordinary district-court docketing. The Court of Appeals squarely rejected the argument that "sentencing court" and "trial court" in K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule 183 mean the specific judge who tried and sentenced the movant, holding any judge of that district court has jurisdiction to hear it; conversely, Kansas appellate deference on 60-1507 review rests on an assumption that the same trial judge is deciding the motion (Gilkey), and displacing that judge requires the general change-of-judge procedure of K.S.A. 20-311d (timely motion, then a legally sufficient affidavit of prejudice ruled on by the chief judge or another judge), which the Supreme Court enforced in Carpenter by reinstating the trial judge's 60-1507 rulings after he was improperly disqualified. | Source**Statute / rule:** K.S.A. 20-311d; Kan. S. Ct. R. 183 (contains no judge-assignment provision) **Case:** Morrow v. State, 18 Kan. App. 2d 236, 238-40, 849 P.2d 1004 (1993) > In K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule 183, the phrases “sentencing court” and “trial court” refer to the district court, not a specific judge. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/kan-app-2d/18/html/0236-01.html) | | Kentucky Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is permitted, not forbidden, to hear the RCr 11.42 motion, and reassignment is not mandatory. In Sanborn the special judge who had presided over the retrial also sat as the judge in the RCr 11.42 proceeding; the Chief Justice denied the motion to recuse him, and the Court held the challenged remarks supplied no legal basis for disqualification, applying the ordinary Marlowe/Liteky standards. Haight likewise notes approvingly that the judge who heard the RCr 11.42 proceeding was the same judge who presided at trial. We found no Kentucky rule or statute addressing reassignment in post-conviction: we read RCr 11.42(1), (2), (3), (5) and (10) as set out verbatim in Fraser, Robertson, Gross and Palmer, and searched the published-opinion record Kentucky opinion corpus for RCr 11.42 together with recuse/disqualify/reassignment; nothing makes reassignment either required or prohibited. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Sanborn v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — STEPHENS, C.J., and COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. STUMBO, J., concurs in result only.. | Source**Case:** Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998); Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001) > Sanborn had sought to disqualify Special Judge Shadoan who had presided over the retrial and served as the judge in the RCr 11.42 proceeding. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw2d/975/html/0905-01.html) | | Louisiana Not established unverified | Not established from a primary source. Louisiana's post-conviction title (La. C. Cr. P. arts. 924–930.11) directs the application to "the district court for the parish in which the petitioner was convicted" and thereafter speaks only of "the court" — it nowhere requires, permits, or forbids the original trial judge specifically, and we found no statute or statewide rule making reassignment mandatory or discretionary. The one express reassignment command in the title is narrower than this dimension: art. 926.2(C)(2) recuses the district judge who granted factual-innocence relief from a subsequent bench retrial, not from the post-conviction proceeding itself. Recusal in a criminal cause otherwise runs through the general grounds in art. 671. What we searched: every article of Title XXXI-A on legis.la.gov (arts. 924 through 930.11) plus arts. 671 and 926.2; Acts 2025 No. 393 and Acts 2024 2nd Ex. Sess. No. 10; and targeted searches for a Louisiana allotment or recusal rule for post-conviction applications. Two source paths failed: lasc.org (Rules for Louisiana District Courts, Title II) is not publicly retrievable, and the published-opinion record search API could not be retrieved. | Source**Statute / rule:** La. C. Cr. P. art. 926.2(C)(2) (closest express provision; governs retrial, not the post-conviction proceeding) > the district judge who granted post conviction relief pursuant to this Article shall be recused and the case shall be allotted to a different judge in accordance with applicable law and rules of court [View the source document](https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=1239817) | | Maine Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is PERMITTED, but not required, to hear the post-conviction petition. The Chief Justice of the Superior Court or a designee assigns every PCR petition; the trial justice or judge who imposed sentence 'may be assigned' unless disqualified or otherwise unavailable, and if the trial judge is not assigned the petition 'may be assigned to any justice or judge.' Reassignment to a different judge is therefore discretionary with the assigning Chief Justice — not mandatory, and not forbidden. | Source**Statute / rule:** M.R.U. Crim. P. 69A(a)-(c); see also 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(C) (clerk forwards the petition to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court) > the trial justice or trial judge who imposed sentence or ordered commitment under 15 M.R.S. § 103 may be assigned to the post-conviction review proceeding unless the trial justice or trial judge is disqualified or is otherwise unavailable [View the source document](https://mainecourtrules.org/criminal-procedure/rule-69a/) | | Maryland Reassignment mandatory verified | Maryland is one of the few states that expressly addresses this, and it forbids the trial judge by default: the post-conviction hearing 'shall not be held by the judge who presided at trial except with the consent of the petitioner' (Md. Rule 4-406(b)). Reassignment to a different judge is therefore the mandatory default, waivable only by the petitioner; Md. Rule 4-403 makes the county administrative judge the assignment authority by requiring the clerk to notify that judge on receipt. The same bar is imposed by statute for habeas corpus: Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(b)(2) forbids referral to the trial judge absent the applicant's written consent. | Source**Statute / rule:** Md. Rule 4-406(b); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(b)(2) > The hearing shall not be held by the judge who presided at trial except with the consent of the petitioner. [View the source document](https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/ND9267C609CEA11DB9BCF9DAC28345A2A?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) | | Massachusetts Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is the presumptive decisionmaker, not a disqualified one: Rule 30(a) directs the motion to 'the trial judge,' Rule 30(b) speaks of 'the trial judge' granting a new trial, and Rule 30(c)(7) contemplates that judge hearing it. Sullivan states that the judge who presided at trial 'normally should hear' the new-trial motion, and reassigns only because that judge had retired. Reassignment is therefore neither mandatory nor forbidden — it is discretionary, and the Reporter's Notes published with the rule direct that recusal 'should thus be liberally exercised, particularly where it is requested by the moving party.' Searched: Rule 30 text and Reporter's Notes; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 385 Mass. 497, 498 n.1; McCastle, Petitioner, 401 Mass. 105; Rodwell (third motion heard by a Superior Court judge who was not the trial judge, without objection); SJC Rule 3:10; G.L. c. 211D. No rule, statute, or standing order requiring a different judge was found. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (b), (c)(7) and Reporter's Notes **Case:** Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 385 Mass. 497, 498 n.1 (1981) > However, for this same reason the trial judge may bring to the hearing a prejudice that another judge would not have. Recusal of the trial judge should thus be liberally exercised, particularly where it is requested by the moving party. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241230120651/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief) | | Michigan Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is REQUIRED to hear it; reassignment is the exception. MCR 6.504(A) directs that the motion 'shall be presented to the judge to whom the case was assigned at the time of the defendant's conviction,' and permits reassignment only where that judge is 'not available' (then under the court's ordinary reassignment procedure) or where the chief judge reassigns to correct docket-control problems. The same design is codified by statute for post-conviction DNA petitions, which 'shall be assigned to the sentencing judge or his or her successor' (MCL 770.16(2)); and a successive motion is referred to 'the judge to whom the case is assigned' for the gatekeeping decision (MCR 6.502(G)(2)). Subchapter 6.500 contains no recusal provision, so the only route to a different judge is the generally applicable disqualification rule, MCR 2.003, which requires a party motion (or the judge raising it) and grounds such as actual bias or a serious risk of actual bias under Caperton. | Source**Statute / rule:** MCR 6.504(A); MCL 770.16(2); MCR 2.003(B)-(C) > The motion shall be presented to the judge to whom the case was assigned at the time of the defendant’s conviction. If the appropriate judge is not available, the motion must be assigned to another judge [View the source document](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/court-rules-book-ch-6-responsive-html5.zip/Court_Rules_Book_Ch_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6/Court_Rules_Chapter_6.htm) | | Minnesota Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is PERMITTED, not required and not forbidden, to hear the postconviction petition, and reassignment to a different judge is nowhere made mandatory. Chapter 590 read in full contains only three references to judge identity — the chief judge 'shall promptly assign the matter to a judge in said district' (§ 590.02, subd. 3) and two references to 'the judge to whom the [matter/proceeding] has been assigned' (§§ 590.03, 590.04, subd. 2) — none naming or excluding the trial judge. Berg v. State, an intermediate appellate decision (review denied), squarely rejected a challenge to the trial judge sitting as the postconviction judge; removal is otherwise available only through the generally applicable bias/disqualification route. | Source**Statute / rule:** Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 3; § 590.04, subd. 2 **Case:** Berg v. State, 403 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1987) > Berg challenges the propriety of the post-conviction judge being the same judge who presided at trial. This is not improper. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nw2d/403/cases/0316-01.json) | | Mississippi Unaddressed verified | Unaddressed. Neither the UPCCRA nor M.R.A.P. 22 names which judge hears a post-conviction motion filed in the court of conviction; the Act speaks only of 'the judge to whom it is assigned' (§ 99-39-11(1)) and of 'the convicting court' (M.R.A.P. 22(c)), so the original trial judge is neither required nor forbidden to hear it and reassignment is neither mandatory nor expressly discretionary. Disqualification is governed by general law rather than any post-conviction-specific provision — Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 bars a judge from presiding where related to a party, interested, or where he 'may have been of counsel.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(1); cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 > The original motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. [View the source document](https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r78/gov.ms.code.title.99.html) | | Missouri Same judge default verified | The original sentencing judge is PERMITTED to hear the post-conviction motion and is the default decisionmaker — Rule 29.15(c)/24.035(c) direct the clerk to notify the sentencing judge, and no rule requires or forbids reassignment. Reassignment is NOT available as of right: Thomas v. State squarely holds that Rule 51.05, which gives civil litigants one change of judge without cause, does not apply in post-conviction proceedings, reasoning that the trial judge is best equipped to assess trial counsel's performance. Disqualification for cause remains available and is not time-limited, and where the motion is supported by an affidavit alleging facts outside the judge's own knowledge, a different judge must be assigned at least to decide the disqualification motion (Ferguson v. Corrigan). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Thomas v. State was not unanimous — RENDLEN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. BILLINGS, J., not sitting.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 51.05(d); §§ 508.090, 508.130 RSMo **Case:** Thomas v. State, 808 S.W.2d 364, 366-67 (Mo. banc 1991); State ex rel. Ferguson v. Corrigan, 959 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 1997) > We hold that Rule 51.05 does not apply in post-conviction proceedings. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/sw2d/808/html/0364-01.html) | | Montana Same judge mandatory verified | The original sentencing judge is required to hear the petition. Reading § 46-21-101(1)'s 'court that imposed the sentence' together with Coleman v. State, the Montana Supreme Court holds that postconviction proceedings must occur before the same judge who presided over sentencing, and that the specific postconviction venue statute overrides the general one-substitution right in § 3-1-804, MCA — so there is no right of judicial substitution in postconviction proceedings. Reassignment occurs only in two situations: the sentencing judge recuses (which requires 'the strongest showing of materiality and unavailability of evidence sought to be adduced from the sentencing judge'), in which case § 3-1-804(8) reinstates each party's substitution right (Patrick, ¶¶ 24-25); or the judge was already substituted out of the underlying criminal case, in which case that substitution carries over and bars him from the postconviction proceeding (Jordan, ¶ 13). | Source**Statute / rule:** § 46-21-101(1), MCA; § 3-1-804, MCA **Case:** Patrick v. State, 2011 MT 169, ¶¶ 15-16, 24-25, 361 Mont. 204 (following Coleman v. State, 194 Mont. 428, 633 P.2d 624 (1981)); Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶¶ 11-13, 338 Mont. 113, 162 P.3d 863 > to require that postconviction proceedings occur in front of the same judge who presided over sentencing [View the source document](https://static.case.law/mont/361/cases/0204-01.json) | | Nebraska Same judge permitted verified | Postconviction is heard in the court of conviction, and the original trial judge is permitted — not forbidden and not required — to hear it. Reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic: the Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Herren that no rule of law automatically disqualifies the judge who presided at trial from later considering the post conviction proceeding, and the movant bears the burden of establishing bias or prejudice, with denial of a disqualification motion affirmed unless the record establishes bias as a matter of law. Sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 contain no provision on which judge hears the motion. | Source**Case:** State v. Herren, 212 Neb. 706, 325 N.W.2d 151 (1982) > There is no rule of law which automatically disqualifies a judge who has presided at a trial from subsequently considering a post conviction proceeding. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/neb/212/html/0706-01.html) | | Nevada Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is not merely permitted but statutorily preferred: a petition attacking the conviction or sentence must be filed with the record of the original proceeding and, 'whenever possible,' assigned to the original judge or court. Chapter 34 contains no provision for reassignment to a different judge, and in capital cases a petitioner who has previously filed in the same court must have the new petition assigned to the judge who considered the previous matter (NRS 34.820(3)). No post-conviction-specific rule making reassignment mandatory or discretionary was found; Nevada's general disqualification grounds appear at NRS 1.230 (actual or implied bias) and are not specific to post-conviction proceedings. | Source**Statute / rule:** NRS 34.730(4)(b); NRS 34.820(3) **Case:** Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737 (2006) > If a petition challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence, it must be: (a) Filed with the record of the original proceeding to which it relates; and (b) Whenever possible, assigned to the original judge or court. [View the source document](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-034.html) | | New Hampshire Unaddressed unverified | Unaddressed, so far as we could verify. RSA 526:2 routes the new-trial petition to 'the superior court in the county where the judgment was rendered' without designating a judge; RSA 534 designates no judge; RSA 651-D:2 designates no judge. We read the titles of all 53 New Hampshire Rules of Criminal Procedure and the full text of Rule 27 (Disability of Judge), Rule 39 (Assignment to Specific Judges) and Rule 40 (Recusal): Rule 39 vests superior court assignment in the chief justice (complex cases) or the clerk (assigned docketing), Rule 40 states a general waiver-based recusal procedure, and none of the three mentions post-conviction proceedings. Two the published-opinion record full-text searches of the New Hampshire Supreme Court corpus returned 0 opinions each: 'different judge' + 'new trial' + 'ineffective assistance', and 'different judge' + 'motion for new trial' + 'ineffective assistance'. Practice in the opinions we read is mixed: in State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 764 (2009) the same justice (Fauver, J.) is identified for both the trial rulings and the denial of the ineffective-assistance new-trial motion, while in Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988) and Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44 (2005) different justices handled the trial and collateral stages. We found no authority making reassignment mandatory, discretionary by rule, or forbidden. Caveat: the official site is not publicly retrievable, so the rule text was read from a archived capture of the official New Hampshire Judicial Branch rules site dated 2019, and Rules 27/39/40 may have been amended since. | Source**Statute / rule:** RSA 526:2; N.H. R. Crim. P. 39; N.H. R. Crim. P. 40 | | New Jersey Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is permitted to hear the PCR petition, and the Supreme Court has described that as the ordinary course in New Jersey. Reassignment is not mandatory and is not addressed by R. 3:22: R. 3:22-7 leaves assignment to the Criminal Presiding Judge, who 'shall forthwith refer the matter for disposition to a trial judge,' without designating or excluding the judge who tried the case. Recusal is discretionary with the judge in the first instance and requires an affirmative showing of bias, potential bias, or an objectively reasonable appearance of bias under R. 1:12-1; Marshall holds that prior adverse rulings, prior participation in the case, and even error in the earlier proceeding do not by themselves disqualify. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Marshall was not unanimous — For affirmance — Justices POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 4. For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER and O'HERN — 2.. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-7; N.J. Ct. R. 1:12-1(d), (f) **Case:** State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 275-80 (1997) > Following the usual practice in this state, the same judge that presided over defendant's trial also heard his PCR petition. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nj/148/html/0089-01.html) | | New Mexico Not established unverified | Unverified, and only half-answerable from sources we could reach. The original trial judge is at least permitted to hear the petition: in Duncan v. Kerby the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed habeas relief granted by the district judge who had also presided over the petitioner's jury trial (quoted below), so there is no disqualification. Whether the trial judge is REQUIRED to hear it, and whether reassignment to a different judge is available or mandatory, we could not establish. Searches run: the published-opinion record full-text opinion search across all courts for "Rule 5-802" + "shall be assigned" (0 results), for "5-802(F)" (5 results, all false positives — the only New Mexico-relevant hit, Baca v. Cosper, 128 F.4th 1319 (10th Cir. 2025), matched "802 F.3d"), and for "pre-appointment review" (no New Mexico hits); DuckDuckGo for "Rule 5-802" with "assigned"/"trial judge"/"assignment" + "district judge" (no results); site-restricted searches of nmcourts.gov. An indexed excerpt of the official rule PDF refers to routing the petition 'to a judge presiding in the criminal division,' which does not resolve whether that is the sentencing judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** Rule 5-802 NMRA (assignment provision not retrievable) **Case:** Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344, 851 P.2d 466 (1993) > District Judge William J. Schnedar, who also had presided over Duncan's jury trial, determined that Duncan had not received effective assistance of counsel at trial, granted the writ of habeas corpus [View the source document](https://static.case.law/nm/115/html/0344-01.html) | | New York Same judge default verified | Unaddressed as such — no New York statute, court rule, or decision we could reach requires, permits by name, or forbids the original trial judge to hear a CPL 440 motion. CPL 440.10(1) designates only 'the court in which it was entered' and names no judge. Under the individual assignment system rule governing criminal actions in Supreme and County Court, the randomly assigned judge 'shall conduct all further proceedings therein,' and transfer of an action or 'any matter relating to an action' from one judge to another is authorized only as the Chief Administrator may allow (22 NYCRR 200.11[d][4]) — so by default the assigned trial judge retains the case. Recusal is otherwise the judge's own call: absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 (party, prior counsel, interest, or consanguinity within the sixth degree — none of which covers having presided at the trial), 'a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal' (People v. Moreno). Reassignment is therefore discretionary, never mandatory. | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 NYCRR 200.11(c), (d)(4); CPL 440.10(1); Judiciary Law § 14 **Case:** People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 405 (1987) > The judge thereby assigned shall be known as the "assigned judge" with respect to such action and, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d) of this section, shall conduct all further proceedings therein [View the source document](https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-york/22-NYCRR-200.11) | | North Carolina Reassignment discretionary verified | The original trial judge is permitted but not required to hear a postconviction MAR, and reassignment to a different judge is discretionary, not mandatory: every MAR filed in superior court is referred on filing to the senior resident superior court judge (chief district court judge in district court), who assigns it, and § 15A-1413(e) makes the assignment of a § 15A-1415 postconviction MAR expressly discretionary with that administrative judge; any judge empowered to act in criminal matters in the district where the judgment was entered may be assigned. By contrast, § 15A-1413(b) directs the trial judge only for the 10-day post-verdict motion under § 15A-1414. The former § 15A-1413(c), which allowed a judge who did not hear the case to refer the matter 'to the judge who heard the case,' was repealed by S.L. 2012-168, s. 2(a), effective December 1, 2012; no statute requires recusal of the trial judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.C.G.S. § 15A-1413(a), (b), (d), (e); former § 15A-1413(c), repealed by S.L. 2012-168, s. 2(a) > The assignment of a motion for appropriate relief filed under G.S. 15A-1415 is in the discretion of the senior resident superior court judge or chief district court judge as appropriate. [View the source document](https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1413.html) | | North Dakota Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is permitted to hear it, and by rule is the presumptive judge; reassignment is neither mandatory nor available on demand. N.D.R.Ct. 3.3 directs that a postjudgment motion or proceeding be heard by the same judge who heard the underlying matter, excepting only where that judge is unable to act, where N.D.C.C. § 29-15-21(3) applies, and in nonfelony and child-support matters. The Act itself permits "any judge of the court in which the conviction took place" to consider the application (§ 29-32.1-03(7), quoted in Holbach v. City of Minot, 2012 ND 117, ¶ 15, 817 N.W.2d 340). There is no peremptory right to a different judge: Falcon holds the § 29-15-21 demand for change of judge does not apply to Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act proceedings, leaving only Code of Judicial Conduct disqualification. | Source**Statute / rule:** N.D.R.Ct. 3.3; N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(7) **Case:** Falcon v. State, 1997 ND 200, ¶¶ 1, 9-11, 570 N.W.2d 719 > Any postjudgment motion or proceeding must be heard by the same judge before whom the underlying matter was heard, subject to the following exceptions: [View the source document](https://ndcourts.gov/legal-resources/rules/ndrct/3-3) | | Ohio Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is permitted to hear the postconviction petition; reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic. The Ohio Supreme Court has held it is well settled that a judge who presided at trial will not be disqualified from hearing a postconviction petition absent evidence of bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest — and specifically that the very nature of a postconviction proceeding requires trial judges to evaluate and pass upon their own actions and conduct (citing R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)); that remains true where the petition alleges counsel was ineffective in not seeking the same judge's recusal. Removal is available only through an affidavit of disqualification filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court under R.C. 2701.03, decided by the Chief Justice, and the affiant bears the burden of specific allegations and supporting facts. We searched the full current text of R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 (no provision addresses which judge hears the petition), R.C. 2701.03, and Ohio Supreme Court disqualification decisions involving postconviction petitions. | Source**Statute / rule:** Ohio Rev. Code 2701.03(A)–(D); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21 (silent on judicial assignment) **Case:** In re Disqualification of Nastoff, 134 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2012-Ohio-6339 (Feb. 16, 2012) > It is well settled that a judge who presided at trial will not be disqualified from hearing a petition for postconviction relief in the absence of evidence of bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/ohio-st-3d/134/cases/1232-01.json) | | Oklahoma Same judge permitted verified | Unaddressed as such: neither the Post-Conviction Procedure Act nor the OCCA Rules requires reassignment away from the original trial judge or forbids that judge from hearing the application, which is filed in the court that imposed judgment. The Act's only judge-specific limits presuppose that the same judge may preside — § 1084 bars a judge from presiding at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing if his own testimony is material, and § 1083(B) forbids the assigned judge from disposing of the application on personal knowledge not in the record. Removal otherwise requires the ordinary criminal disqualification procedure (Rule 15, Rules for District Courts; mandamus review under OCCA Rule 10.6(B)). | Source**Statute / rule:** 22 O.S. § 1084; 22 O.S. § 1083(B); Rule 10.6(B), Rules of the Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals > A judge should not preside at such a hearing if his testimony is material. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20220430133321/https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=70868) | | Oregon Unaddressed unverified | Unaddressed by Oregon authority we could reach. Structurally the question is largely displaced: ORS 138.560(1) places venue in the circuit court of the county of imprisonment, so post-conviction is normally heard by a judge of a different circuit court than the court of conviction (e.g. Malheur County for Snake River, Marion County for the penitentiary). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act says nothing about which judge hears the petition, including where venue is the county of conviction because the petitioner is not imprisoned (138.560(1)) or was transferred there (138.560(4)); it addresses the trial judge only as a potential source of evidence (ORS 138.630, affidavit of 'the judge who presided at the trial'). We searched the full text of ORS 138.510–138.680 and ORS chapter 14 for 'judge,' 'trial judge,' 'same judge,' 'presiding,' 'assigned,' 'reassign,' and 'disqualif'; the only general mechanism found is the party-initiated disqualification of ORS 14.210 and ORS 14.250–14.270 (affidavit of belief that a fair hearing is unavailable, in 'any suit, action, matter or proceeding'), which is not post-conviction-specific. the published-opinion record searches of Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions for 'post-conviction' with 'judge who presided,' 'presided at petitioner's trial,' 'who presided over petitioner,' and 'recusal' returned no case deciding whether the original trial judge may or must hear a post-conviction petition. | Source**Statute / rule:** ORS 138.510 to 138.680 (silent); cf. ORS 138.560(1), (4); ORS 14.210; ORS 14.250 to 14.270 [View the source document](https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html) | | Pennsylvania Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is the default and is PERMITTED — indeed directed — to hear the PCRA petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) requires the clerk to transmit the petition and case file to the trial judge if available, and 903(C) provides that the trial judge shall proceed with and dispose of the petition unless the judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should be disqualified. Reassignment is therefore discretionary with the trial judge (self-disqualification) rather than mandatory; only when the trial judge is unavailable or disqualified does the administrative judge assign the case to another judge under 903(D). The rule's Comment confirms 'trial judge' includes the judge who accepted a guilty or nolo plea. | Source**Statute / rule:** Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A), (C), (D) > The trial judge, if available, shall proceed with and dispose of the petition in accordance with these rules, unless the judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should be disqualified. [View the source document](https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/234/chapter9/s903.html&d=reduce) | | Rhode Island Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is required to hear it. Superior Court Rules of Practice Rule 2.3(d)(4), quoted verbatim by the Supreme Court in Mattatall, directs the clerk to place post-conviction applications on the formal and special cause calendar and directs the calendar justice to submit the application for disposition by the justice who presided at the applicant's trial; only where that trial justice is no longer a member of the court is the application distributed, on a rotational basis, to the trial-calendar justices. Reassignment to a different judge is therefore not discretionary on request — the Court affirmed denial of a motion to recuse and reassign where the same justice had sentenced the applicant as a habitual offender and had already denied his earlier application, applying the ordinary Canon 3E standard placing the burden on the movant to show personal bias. | Source**Statute / rule:** R.I. Super. Ct. R. Prac. 2.3(d)(4) **Case:** Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008) > The justice assigned to the calendar shall submit the application, as the case may be, for disposition by the justice who presided at the trial of the applicant. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/a2d/947/cases/0896-01.json) | | South Carolina Split by case type verified | Split by case type. In capital cases reassignment away from the trial bench is MANDATORY and express: § 17-27-160(A) states that 'the judge assigned as the post-conviction relief judge must not be the original sentencing judge.' In non-capital cases no provision requires, permits by name, or forbids the original trial judge: § 17-27-80 directs only that the application 'shall be heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place,' so any circuit judge sitting in that county may hear it and reassignment is neither mandated nor barred. Searched and found nothing on the non-capital question in: SC Code Title 17 ch. 27 (all sections) and ch. 17; Rule 71.1, SCRCP in full; the SC Judicial Branch full-text opinion search for "same judge who presided"+"post-conviction", "who also presided"+"PCR", "PCR judge"+"presided over his trial", and "recuse"+"post-conviction relief"+"trial judge"; and the SC Supreme Court court-order search for "post-conviction relief"+"assignment" — no rule, order, or opinion on point surfaced. | Source**Statute / rule:** S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(A); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 > The judge assigned as the post-conviction relief judge must not be the original sentencing judge. [View the source document](https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php) | | South Dakota Reassignment mandatory verified | The original trial/sentencing judge is FORBIDDEN to hear the habeas application; reassignment to a different judge of the court of conviction is mandatory by statute. SDCL 21-27-14.1 bars proceedings before 'a judge who imposed sentence' or any judge who 'otherwise denied him relief concerning the subject matter,' which the South Dakota Supreme Court has read to also disqualify a judge who denied the applicant relief in a prior habeas. | Source**Statute / rule:** SDCL 21-27-14.1 **Case:** Goodroad v. Weber, 2003 SD 132, ¶ 8, 671 N.W.2d 838 (also citing State v. Phipps, 406 N.W.2d 146, 150 n.2 (S.D. 1987)) > This Court has recognized that, under SDCL 21-27-14.1, a judge who presides at trial cannot preside at a state habeas corpus hearing. [View the source document](https://storage.courtlistener.com/html/2003/11/05/danny_goodroad_v._doug_weber_warden_south_dakota_state_penitentiary_tim.html) | | Tennessee Same judge default verified | The original trial judge is PERMITTED, not required and not forbidden, and is the default if no one acts. The presiding judge of the court assigns a judge to hear the petition and that judge 'may be the original hearing judge'; the statute adds that competency-of-counsel issues 'may be heard by a judge other than the original hearing judge' — permissive, not mandatory. If the presiding judge fails to assign and the Chief Justice designates no one, Rule 28 § 6(B)(1) directs that the original trial judge hears the petition. Reassignment is therefore discretionary with the presiding judge; nothing in the Act or Rule 28 makes it automatic. | Source**Statute / rule:** Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 6(B)(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105(b) > The presiding judge shall assign a judge to hear the case who may be the original hearing judge. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20241204024634/https://www.tncourts.gov/rules/supreme-court/28) | | Texas Same judge permitted verified | The original trial judge is permitted, and in capital cases statutorily preferred, to hear the post-conviction proceeding; reassignment is nowhere made mandatory. Art. 11.071 § 9(c) is the only provision in Chapter 11 designating which judge presides, and it directs the presiding judge of the convicting court, or the judge who presided over the original capital trial if that was someone else. For non-capital applications the statute is silent on the judge's identity: the clerk assigns the application to the convicting court (art. 11.07 § 3(b)), and § 3(d) lets that court resolve fact issues 'as well as using personal recollection,' which presupposes the judge who tried the case. Art. 11.072 § 6(b) likewise permits the court to 'rely on the court's personal recollection.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 9(c); see also art. 11.07 § 3(b), (d); art. 11.072 § 6(b) > The presiding judge of the convicting court shall conduct a hearing held under this section unless another judge presided over the original capital felony trial [View the source document](https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/CR/htm/CR.11.htm) | | Utah Same judge default verified | The original sentencing judge is REQUIRED to hear the petition by default. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g) directs the clerk to assign and deliver the petition to the judge who sentenced the petitioner; reassignment 'in the normal course' occurs only if that judge is unavailable. Reassignment is therefore neither mandatory nor automatic, and the rule does not carve out cases where the claim is ineffective assistance or otherwise attacks the sentencing judge's own conduct. Because PCRA proceedings are civil and governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure (§ 78B-9-102(1)(a)), the only affirmative route to a different judge is a party's motion to disqualify under Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) on an affidavit showing bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest, filed within 21 days and decided by a reviewing judge. | Source**Statute / rule:** Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); Utah R. Civ. P. 63(a)-(c); Utah Code § 78B-9-102(1)(a) > On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. [View the source document](https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65C) | | Vermont Reassignment mandatory verified | Forbidden by statute. The final sentence of 13 V.S.A. § 7131 disqualifies the judge who presided when the original sentence was imposed from hearing the PCR application, so reassignment to a different judge is mandatory and not discretionary — even though the petition is filed in the court of conviction. The reach of the clause beyond the sentencing judge is unsettled: the Supreme Court has twice declined to hold that it disqualifies a PCR judge who only ruled on pretrial motions in the underlying prosecution (In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, n.14; Towne v. State, No. 2004-390 (Vt. Oct. 28, 2005) (unpub. mem.)). | Source**Statute / rule:** 13 V.S.A. § 7131 **Case:** Shequin v. Smith, 129 Vt. 578, 285 A.2d 708 (1971) (quoting the disqualification clause); In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, ¶ 10 & n.14, 182 A.3d 1149 > However, the Superior or District judge who presided when the original sentence was imposed shall not hear the application. [View the source document](http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07131) | | Virginia Same judge permitted verified | Unaddressed by statute or rule, and reassignment is not mandatory: the original trial judge is permitted, not required, to hear the habeas petition. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1) fixes the court but is silent on the judge — it provides that 'only the circuit court that entered the original judgment or order resulting in the detention complained of in the petition shall have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus' — and Code § 19.2-153 (procuring a substitute judge) is limited by its terms to a circuit court 'in which a prosecution is pending,' not a civil habeas action. In Kozich the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the habeas case 'was assigned to the same judge who had previously presided over Kozich's sentencing hearing,' affirmed issuance of the writ, and — after the Commonwealth declined to object below — expressly declined in footnote 14 to decide whether that practice is proper. Searched: Va. Code §§ 8.01-654, 8.01-655, 8.01-658, 19.2-153, 17.1-105, 17.1-310; and Virginia caselaw for habeas combined with recusal / 'same judge' / 'judge who presided' / disqualification / reassignment — no Virginia authority requiring or forbidding it was found. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Director of the Department of Corrections v. Kozich was not unanimous — Justice POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting.. | Source**Statute / rule:** Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1) (silent as to the judge); cf. Va. Code § 19.2-153 (inapplicable — pending prosecutions) **Case:** Director of the Department of Corrections v. Kozich, 290 Va. 502, 779 S.E.2d 555 (2015) (n.14) > Because the Commonwealth, as appellant, took this position in the habeas court and did not attempt to repudiate it on appeal, we leave for another day the question whether this practice should be encouraged or discouraged. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/se2d/779/html/0555-01.html) | | Washington Reassignment mandatory verified | Washington forbids the original trial judge, by express rule, whenever a post-conviction proceeding reaches the superior court: RAP 16.12 provides that 'the hearing shall be held before a judge who was not involved in the challenged proceeding,' and that applies both to a reference hearing and to a transfer for determination on the merits. Reassignment is therefore mandatory, not discretionary — and it is largely structural besides, because the initial merits screen is made by the Court of Appeals Chief Judge rather than any trial-level judge. The one gap: for a CrR 7.8 motion that the superior court retains instead of transferring, no judge-assignment provision exists in the rule's text. | Source**Statute / rule:** RAP 16.12 > The hearing shall be held before a judge who was not involved [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20150808045920/http://www.courts.wa.gov:80/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=app&set=RAP&ruleid=apprap16.12) | | West Virginia Unaddressed unverified | No West Virginia primary source found that squarely states whether the original trial judge may, must, or may not preside over the post-conviction habeas. Habeas Rule 4(a) routes the petition to the circuit court under that court's ordinary case-assignment procedure and is otherwise silent; nothing in W. Va. Code §§ 53-4A-1 through -9 or in Rules 1-10 addresses the identity of the habeas judge, and no reassignment provision exists. We read the full text of §§ 53-4A-1, -3, -4, -7, -8 and all ten habeas rules; searched the West Virginia Trial Court Rules (which never use the word 'habeas'; TCR 17.01 supplies only the generic motion-to-disqualify route decided by the Chief Justice) and Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11, whose closest ground, Rule 2.11(A)(5)(d), reaches only a judge who 'previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court'; and ran the published-opinion record and web searches for West Virginia opinions on habeas recusal by the trial judge, which returned no case on point. | Source**Statute / rule:** W. Va. Trial Court Rule 17.01; W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(5)(d) > in accordance with the procedure of the court for assignment of its business. The court shall promptly review whether the petition should be transferred to a venue set forth in Rule 3(a). [View the source document](https://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/court-rules/rules-governing-post-conviction-habeas-corpus-proceedings) | | Wisconsin Same judge permitted verified | Postconviction proceedings stay in the court of conviction (§ 974.06(1); a § 974.06 motion 'is a part of the original criminal action'), and the original trial/sentencing judge is PERMITTED — not required by name, and not forbidden — to hear the motion. Rahhal v. State holds the sentencing judge is not disqualified from hearing a postconviction plea-withdrawal motion unless the judge became a material witness or is otherwise disqualified, in which case the judge 'should not hear the motion'; the general disqualification grounds are in Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2). Reassignment is therefore discretionary/for-cause, never automatic. Wisconsin's one-substitution-of-judge right under § 971.20 does not create a postconviction window: § 971.20(1) defines the 'action' as running only to 'final disposition at the trial level,' § 971.20(4) requires the request before arraignment, and § 971.20(7) opens a 20-day window after remittitur only 'if an appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing proceeding.' | Source**Statute / rule:** Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1), (2); Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2); Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1), (4), (7) **Case:** Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971); see also Rainey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 374, 222 N.W.2d 620 (1974) > if a trial judge interjects himself into plea bargaining he may become a material witness or otherwise disqualify himself. Under such circumstances he should not hear the motion. [View the source document](https://static.case.law/wis-2d/52/html/0144-01.html) | | Wyoming Unaddressed verified | Unaddressed by statute or rule, and no reassignment mechanism exists. The petition goes to the court of conviction and the clerk 'shall docket the petition upon receipt and bring it promptly to the attention of the court' (§ 7-14-101(b)); nothing requires, names, or forbids the original trial judge. Wyoming's civil change-of-judge rule, W.R.C.P. 40.1 — which supplies both peremptory disqualification (40.1(b)(1)) and disqualification for cause (40.1(b)(2)) — is one of the rules § 7-14-101(c)(ii) expressly makes inapplicable to proceedings under the Act, so a post-conviction petitioner has no peremptory right to a different judge. This does not speak to recusal obligations arising from the Code of Judicial Conduct or due process, which the Act does not address. | Source**Statute / rule:** Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(c)(ii); cf. § 7-14-101(b) **Case:** Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545, 548-49 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting W.R.C.P. 40.1(b), 'Change of judge — (1) Peremptory Disqualification ... (2) Disqualification for Cause') > Rules 3, 4, 14, 22, 23, 24, 38, 39, 40.1, 42, 47, 48, 51, 55, 59 and 64 through 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to proceedings under this act. [View the source document](https://web.archive.org/web/20250429182110/https://law.justia.com/codes/wyoming/2023/title-7/chapter-14/section-7-14-101/) | --- Table last verified 30 July 2026 — 339 of 350 cells verified against their primary sources. Corrections: [accountability@gps.press](mailto:accountability@gps.press).