# Who Is Responsible > Accountability Who Is Responsible Georgia's prison crisis was manufactured by elected officials. The Department of Corrections did not build it — but GDC runs it, GDC has … **Published**: 2026-07-14 **Source**: https://gps.press/who-is-responsible/ **Author**: Georgia Prisoners' Speak --- Accountability # Who Is Responsible Georgia's prison crisis was **manufactured by elected officials**. The Department of Corrections did not build it — but GDC runs it, GDC has refused reforms that cost nothing, and **GDC has priced the evidence out of reach**. Four institutions. None of them get to hide behind the others. [01 The General Assembly & the Governor Built the population. Spent $12.2 billion running it since 2020. Reduced it by nothing.](#legislature) [02 The Board of Pardons and Paroles Decides who leaves. Grants parole in 4.5% of life cases.](#parole) [03 The Department of Corrections Runs it. Refused to separate 315 gangs — a reform that costs nothing.](#gdc) [04 And GDC Priced the Proof $96,715.79 quoted to look at its own records.](#obstruction) 01 · The General Assembly & the Governor ## They Built This Population. Then They Paid to Manage It. GDC does not charge, convict, sentence, or release anyone. **The size of Georgia's prison population is a political decision** — made in statute, signed by governors, and funded by appropriation. Georgia built a system it cannot staff, and has spent **$12.2 billion running it since 2020** — managing the consequences rather than reducing them. $12.2B Spent since 2020 Total corrections spending, FY2020–FY2027 30 yrs Before parole eligibility Life sentences, post-2006. Was 14. $82M Federal money taken To adopt Truth in Sentencing, 1996–2001 $2.4B Of that was NEW money Added above the FY2021 baseline — and it bought nothing ### The architecture was built in three deliberate steps **1995 — the "Seven Deadly Sins."** Seven offenses given mandatory minimums of 10 to 25 years with *no parole eligibility whatsoever*. Georgia collected **$82 million in federal Truth in Sentencing grants** for doing it. **1997 — the 90% policy.** Twenty more offenses required to serve 90% of sentence. Between January 1998 and June 2001 the Parole Board deviated from it in **10 cases out of 8,664** — a rate of 0.12%. **2006 — HB 1059.** Signed by Governor Sonny Perdue, it raised parole eligibility on life sentences from **14 years to 30**. A person convicted at 25 in 1992 could be home by 37. A person convicted at 25 today walks out at *56*. ### Eight flat years. Then an explosion that bought nothing. GDC ran on roughly **$1.2 billion a year for eight straight years** — FY2014 through FY2021, a total increase of 2.9%, below inflation. The prisons did not collapse in that window. Then the money came. **Since 2020, Georgia has spent $12.2 billion running its prison system.** Of that, **$2,394,494,976 was new money** — added on top of what the state was already spending, in the largest corrections funding increase in Georgia history. Across the same years: **the correctional officer vacancy rate did not move**. Deaths reached a record. The Justice Department found the agency had lost control of its facilities. *Georgia spent $12.2 billion — $2.4 billion of it new — and bought the deadliest years in the history of its prison system.* "We are under-resourced" is not available as a defense. **You cannot answer $12.2 billion by asking for more. And you cannot answer "$2.4 billion in new money changed nothing" at all.** ### And look at what they chose to buy with it Across the two most recent budget cycles, Georgia added roughly **$89.7 million in health contracts** and **$49 million in officer pay and staffing**. In the same budgets, it *cut substance abuse programming by $8,273,423* and *cut education by a net $104,000*. Georgia is buying more guards and more medicine for a population it will not reduce — while defunding the two things that would reduce it. Go deeper [End the Warehouse](/end-the-warehouse/) [GDC budget, FY2014–FY2027](/budget-data/) [Follow the Money](/follow-the-money/) [What Georgia pays in settlements](/what-georgia-pays/) 02 · The State Board of Pardons and Paroles ## They Decide Who Leaves. They Have Largely Stopped. The Parole Board is constitutionally independent of GDC. When it declines to release parole-eligible people, the population accumulates **no matter what GDC does**. The legislature holds the front door open. **The Board holds the back door shut.** 4.5% Life cases granted parole 93 of 2,046 considered, FY2024 34.3% Parole release rate, 2024 It was 69.9% in 1993 31.1 Years served by lifers It was 12.7 in 1993 37% Of "paroles" are near max-out Released within 12 months of walking out anyway ### A thirty-year collapse, in the Board's own numbers Parole release has fallen **51% since 1993**. Average time served is up **158%**. Time served by people with life sentences is up **148%** — from 12.7 years to 31.1. None of that was a change in law. *It was a change in practice*, made by a board that does not have to explain itself. ### And the release numbers overstate what the Board actually grants Of the people currently on parole in Georgia, **37% were released within twelve months of their maximum release date** — let out just before they were going to walk out anyway. Nearly 23% within six months. Of **13,724 people released from Georgia prisons in 2025, 54.55% served their entire sentence with no parole at all.** Only 31.21% received parole — and a third of those were near max-out. *A 4.5% grant rate on life cases and a 37% near-max-out rate is not clemency. It is paperwork.* Go deeper [The Illusion of Parole](/the-illusion-of-parole/) [Release statistics](/release-statistics-data/) [Vision 2027](/vision2027/) 03 · The Georgia Department of Corrections ## GDC Did Not Build This. GDC Runs It — and Refuses to Fix What It Can. The crisis GDC inherited does not excuse the crisis GDC administers. The agency does not control who comes in or who goes out. **It does control who sleeps in which dorm, what people eat, and which of its own employees it fires.** And there is one reform available to it that requires no money, no staff, and no act of the legislature — **which GDC has refused six times while people were being killed.** 315 Gangs operating inside ~15,200 validated members — 31% of the population 0 Gang separation policy No separation. No exit program. No strategy. 6 Statewide lockdowns GPS has demanded separation 5 times since Feb 2025 49.8% Officer posts empty 2,985 vacant of 5,991 budgeted ### Gang separation costs nothing. GDC will not do it. Georgia has identified **315 gangs** and validated roughly **15,200 people** as gang-affiliated — **31% of the incarcerated population**, against a national average near 13%. GDC's Security Threat Group Unit *validates and gathers intelligence.* That is an intelligence function. *It is not a management function.* Georgia has no systematic gang separation housing policy, no structured exit program, and no operational strategy for keeping rival factions apart. Texas, Arizona, and California built all three decades ago. Separating rival sets and unaffiliated people into different dorms **inside the same prison** requires no construction, no hiring, and no legislation. **It is a housing assignment** — names moved on a roster, work GDC's own classification officers are already paid to do. *GDC's answer, six times, has been the statewide lockdown.* A statewide lockdown is not a strategy. It is a confession. Georgia Prisoners' Speak ### Four "medium security" prisons that are nothing of the kind Through its own Open Records request, GPS obtained GDC data showing four medium-security prisons quietly filled with close-security men — people GDC's own system classifies as requiring supervision at all times. **Wilcox 29.7%. Calhoun 29.4%. Dooly 28.6%. Washington 27.7%.** Every other Georgia medium-security facility: **0–3%**. Those four carry homicide rates *four to five times higher* than properly classified prisons. In one twelve-month stretch they recorded **37 deaths**. At least 12 were homicides. **Twenty-one sit in a column the state simply labels "unknown."** ### Housing assignment is used as a weapon A structured review of every submission and case entry in GPS's files identified **at least eleven distinct, independently sourced accounts** of retaliatory housing transfer, across at least ten facilities, spanning 2017 to 2026. **Every one of the eleven states a trigger** — a grievance filed, a lawsuit, a PREA report, contact with a lawyer or a reporter, or reporting staff misconduct. **Five describe being beaten, raped, or stabbed after the move.** Nine name or identifiably describe the staff involved. **One is independently corroborated by outside documentary records.** We state that limit plainly rather than bury it — and we state plainly what would close it: *the corroborating records are GDC's transfer orders and grievance logs. We have asked. GDC has priced them out of reach.* A beating leaves a body. A retaliatory transfer leaves a transfer order — and a transfer order looks like routine administration. In a Georgia prison, a housing assignment is a currency. Staff spend it, gangs spend it, and GDC has ceded control of the mint. Georgia Prisoners' Speak ### A leadership pipeline that is sealed shut **All 43 currently active state-prison wardens were promoted from inside GDC.** Across the combined warden and deputy-warden tier, **87 of 88** rose through the agency's own ranks. *Zero* came from outside. No healthcare administrators. No educators. No rehabilitation specialists. No federal corrections experience. Roughly 64% of wardens nationally hold at least a bachelor's degree. One Georgia warden was appointed in 2025 to run a prison of nearly 1,600 people **without one**. In May 2026, a former Smith State Prison warden — a 26-year GDC employee — was indicted on racketeering, bribery, and evidence tampering. Prosecutors allege he took bribes from a prison gang to admit contraband and *to move the gang's leader out of solitary confinement*. He is charged, not convicted. Note what he is alleged to have sold. **A housing assignment.** ### What people are fed Georgia's prison food budget is roughly **$31 million a year for 53,000 adults** — about **$0.53 to $0.60 per meal**. That line has moved **1% in four years**. Prison medical spending rose **33%** over the same period. Georgia spends roughly **$8,074 per person per year treating illness** and about **$583 feeding them**. *A 14-to-1 ratio.* And when the tray isn't enough, families pay. The prison commissary is a **$47 million annual market** selling food at premium prices to a captive population. It does not fix the nutrition crisis. *It monetizes it.* The leadership of the Georgia Department of Corrections has lost control of its facilities. U.S. Department of Justice, October 1, 2024 Go deeper [Who runs Georgia's prisons](/intelligence/accountability/) [The accountability roster](/intelligence/personnel/accountability/) [Separate the gangs](/separate-the-gangs-or-keep-burying-the-dead/) [The classification crisis](/the-classification-crisis-how-four-medium-security-prisons-are-killing-people/) [What Georgia feeds them](/food/) [Every death, by facility](/mortality-data/) 04 · And GDC Priced the Proof ## They Made It Unaffordable to Check Their Work. Georgia's Open Records Act requires a response within three business days. **GDC's practice is to delay, to price, and to exempt.** This is not a complaint about paperwork. It is the finding on which every other finding depends — because **every claim on this page that we cannot prove, GDC has made unprovable.** $96,715 Quoted to see public records And that figure is a floor $88,944 To audit the inmate trust fund Retrieval only. Review not even estimated. $1,320 For one page of calories Bundled with 630 pages of recipes 3 days The legal deadline One request: "at least a month before I can start" ### $88,944 to look at money taken from prisoners' families GPS asked for the income and expenditures of the **Inmate Welfare Fund** — an account funded by money that incarcerated people and their families put in, administered by GDC. GDC quoted **$88,944.00**, and stated that this covered *retrieval only*. It expressly declined to estimate the cost of review and redaction at all. **The real figure is unbounded.** No newsroom, no family, and no legislator's constituent pays that. *The fee is the denial.* ### $45 million nobody can account for GPS asked what happened to the **$45,000,000** the legislature appropriated for more than 700 new correctional officer positions — how much went to hires, how much to overtime, how much was transferred elsewhere, **how much simply lapsed back to the General Fund.** GPS is a 501(c)(3) newsroom and requested a public-interest fee waiver. **GDC denied the waiver in the same message acknowledging receipt** — before it had calculated any cost. The estimate arrived at **$6,370.54, prepayment required**. GDC's own itemized line items sum to **$6,086.90**. *The agency demanded prepayment of a figure its own arithmetic does not produce.* And the same estimate indicts them: GDC stated its HR division needs **three hours** to produce the officer hiring and separation data. *That data exists. It is three hours from daylight. GDC has never published it.* ### They denied the release data — while publishing the release data GPS requested a de-identified dataset of everyone released from GDC custody between 2015 and 2024, expressly excluding medical, disciplinary, and PREA records. GDC's General Counsel denied it in full, on the theory that the information lives in offender files and is therefore **categorically exempt.** Applied literally, that theory exempts every fact GDC holds about every person in its custody. *GDC refutes its own theory by publishing.* The agency's own Length of Stay report publishes parole release rates, average years served, and years served by lifers — **the exact offender-file data it declared exempt.** ### The control case that destroys the excuse In October 2025, GPS asked GDC for the Master Commissary File — every item sold across the system, with wholesale cost and retail price. **GDC produced it. Promptly. At no cost.** GDC can comply. *The variable is not capacity. The variable is the subject matter.* Money, food, and release get priced or exempted. Everything else moves. We have the testimony. GDC has the timestamps — and will not produce them. Georgia Prisoners' Speak ### What this costs the public When this page says the retaliation finding rests on single-source testimony — **that is not a gap in our rigor. It is a gap GDC engineered and invoiced.** The transfer orders are GDC's. The officer separation records are GDC's. The accounting for the $45 million is GDC's. The caloric value of a Georgia prison meal is GDC's. **An agency that makes the cost of verifying its conduct prohibitive has asserted that no one is entitled to check its work.** Go deeper [How we count the dead](/how-we-count/) [GDC's own policies](/GDC-Policy-Library/) [The full data](/statistics-data/) The Test ## How to Tell Whose Fault It Is Two stories about Georgia's prisons are easy and both are wrong. One says GDC is the villain — and lets the people who built this walk. The other says GDC is helpless — and excuses an agency that watched people die rather than move names on a roster. **Here is the question that separates them.** Could GDC have done this differently, today, with what it already has? If yes **GDC owns it.** No excuse survives — not the vacancy rate, not the budget, not the population. If no **Name the institution that could have.** Sentencing is the legislature's. Release is the Parole Board's. Don't leave it hanging on GDC by default. And if GDC could have said something — and didn't **GDC owns that too.** The Commissioner testifies before the General Assembly every year. GDC has never once said *stop sending us people.* **When you can't tell, use this:** is the failure more like *gang separation* — zero cost, refused six times, entirely within GDC's power — or more like the *vacancy rate*, a hole GDC inherited and cannot dig out of alone? Most failures sit somewhere between. **Say where.** ## Every Voice Matters. Every Life Counts. None of this changes because an agency decides to be better. It changes when Georgians who did not know decide they cannot un-know it. [Contact your legislator](/become-an-advocate/) [Share what you know](/tell-my-story/) **Every figure on this page is checkable.** Budget figures come from the Georgia Governor's Budget Reports, each year cross-referenced against a second Office of Planning and Budget document. Parole and sentencing figures come from GDC's own Length of Stay report and the Board of Pardons and Paroles' annual reports. Findings on conditions, staffing, gang control, and mortality reporting come from the [U.S. Department of Justice's October 2024 findings report](https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/findings_report_-_investigation_of_georgia_prisons.pdf) — the conclusion of an eight-year federal civil rights investigation. Classification data and the Open Records record come from GPS's own correspondence with GDC. **No GPS article is cited as a source for any fact on this page.** Live figures — deaths, fees, retaliation accounts — are floors, not totals, and they rise. See [how we count the dead](/how-we-count/).