{ "meta": { "dataset": "State Habeas / Post-Conviction Limitations Periods, All Fifty States", "publisher": "Georgia Prisoners' Speak (The GDC Accountability Project, Inc.)", "generated": "2026-08-31", "license": "Public records analysis; free to use for journalistic, research, and policy purposes with attribution to Georgia Prisoners' Speak (gps.press).", "contact": "https://gps.press/contact/", "human_readable_companion": "https://gps.press/post-conviction-fifty-states/", "methodology": "A deadline-specific pass, separate from the 7-dimension survey, built because deadline comparisons across states compare different legal instruments: some states time the writ of habeas corpus itself, others time a statutory post-conviction remedy. Each row names the operative instrument before any number. Every row carries a verbatim quote and a retrievable URL for both routes where they exist.", "citable_headline_figures": { "no_limitations_period_at_all": { "value": 11, "states": [ "California", "Hawaii", "Indiana", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "New Mexico", "New York", "Rhode Island", "Vermont", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin" ], "note": "A state counts only when BOTH routes (habeas and any post-conviction remedy) are untimed. Established by reading each state individually (2026-08-07). A keyword pass said 16 and the raw deadline_character column says 13 — both over-count; cite 11." }, "period_that_cannot_be_excused": { "value": 4, "states": [ "Georgia (4 years — the longest)", "South Dakota (2 years)", "Virginia (2 years)", "Washington (1 year)" ], "note": "The raw deadline_character column says hard_bar=34; most of those regimes deny equitable tolling while still carrying statutory exceptions, and an excusing clause is an exception. The citable count is 4." } }, "data_dictionary": { "slug": "state slug (join key with the survey dataset)", "state": "state name", "operative": "which route is the operative collateral remedy in practice: habeas | post_conviction | both", "habeas_status": "the writ's condition: available | narrow | subsumed | abolished", "habeas_deadline_days": "time limit on the WRIT in days; null when none or writ not operative", "habeas_no_deadline": "1 = the WRIT itself carries no time limit. NOT the no-limitations headline count — see meta.citable_headline_figures and meta.warnings.", "habeas_authority": "authority for the habeas columns", "habeas_quote": "verbatim supporting quote", "habeas_url": "retrievable source URL", "pc_vehicle": "the separate statutory post-conviction remedy, if any", "pc_deadline_days": "time limit on that remedy in days; null when none", "pc_no_deadline": "1 = the post-conviction remedy carries no time limit", "pc_authority": "authority for the post-conviction columns", "pc_quote": "verbatim supporting quote", "pc_url": "retrievable source URL", "deadline_character": "RAW classification of the operative period (hard_bar | no_period | good_cause_excusable | discretionary | rebuttable_presumption). Raw column only — the citable aggregate figures differ; see meta.citable_headline_figures.", "equitable_tolling": "whether equitable tolling is available, per authority", "who_must_raise": "who must raise untimeliness (state / court sua sponte / etc.)", "character_basis": "authority basis for deadline_character", "character_instrument": "which instrument deadline_character describes", "status": "verified | unverified", "notes": "researcher notes" }, "warnings": [ "DO NOT re-derive headline counts from the flag columns. The per-route flags describe individual instruments; the citable aggregate figures (11 states with no limitations period at all; 4 states whose period cannot be excused) were established by reading each state individually and are reproduced with their caveats in meta.citable_headline_figures. Naive column arithmetic yields 13/12/16 or 34 depending on the flags chosen, and each of those is wrong.", "Deadline numbers are comparable only within the same operative instrument. Compare a writ limit with a writ limit, an act limit with an act limit." ] }, "states": [ { "slug": "alabama", "state": "Alabama", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (subsumption); Ala. Code § 15-21-1 to -34 (habeas chapter, which contains no limitations period)", "habeas_quote": "A proceeding under this rule displaces all post-trial remedies except posttrial motions under Rule 24 and appeal. Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule.", "habeas_url": "https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr32_4.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief (Ala. R. Crim. P. 32)", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) (LIMITATIONS PERIOD)", "pc_quote": "the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed ... within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment", "pc_url": "https://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/rules/cr32_2.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed ... within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment", "character_instrument": "Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)", "status": "verified", "notes": "THE STATUTE HAS NO DEADLINE, BUT THAT IS A TRAP. Alabama's habeas chapter (Ala. Code Title 15, ch. 21) is still on the books and, having read every section heading from § 15-21-1 through § 15-21-34, I confirm it contains no limitations period of any kind. But habeas cannot be used to attack a conviction: Rule 32.4 converts any such filing into a Rule 32 proceeding, which then takes Rule 32.2(c)'s one-year bar. Salter v. State, 606 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992): 'A petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the requirements of Rule 32.' Still applied: Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) ('Bagley's petition must be treated as a Rule 32 petition attacking his 1995 convictions and sentences'). Independently, § 15-21-23 forbids habeas inquiry 'into the regularity or justice of any order, judgment, decree or process of any court legally constituted,' and § 15-21-24 limits discharge to six jurisdictional/void-process grounds — so even pre-Rule 32, statutory habeas reached only void judgments. Habeas does survive in Alabama for NON-conviction custody questions (bail, extradition, prison discipline/good-time, expired sentence), which is why the writ still appears in Alabama reports; those are not conviction challenges. SECOND CRITICAL POINT: Rule 32's one-year bar is not universal. By its own terms 32.2(c) reaches only grounds under Rule 32.1(a) [constitutional], (e) [newly discovered facts], and (f) [out-of-time appeal]. Grounds (b) (court without jurisdiction), (c) (sentence exceeds/not authorized by law), and (d) (held past sentence expiration) carry NO deadline and may be raised at any time — that untimed jurisdictional route is functionally where Alabama's common-law habeas went. Sub-deadlines: 32.1(f) out-of-time-appeal petitions from denial of a prior Rule 32 petition get six months from discovery; 32.1(e) newly-discovered-facts petitions get the later of the one year or six months after discovery. The one year runs from issuance of the certificate of judgment on direct appeal (Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P.), or from lapse of the time to appeal if no appeal was taken; it cannot begin before April 1, 1987. The period was two years until amended to one year effective Aug. 1, 2002 (Salter's text still says two). CAPITAL CASES: I found no separate capital deadline — Rule 32 by its terms applies to 'any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense,' and the reviewed capital Rule 32 litigation (e.g. Ex parte Land) proceeds under the same rule; I did not separately verify Ala. Code § 15-18-200 DNA-testing procedure, so treat any capital-specific carve-out as unverified. 365 days is the calendar-year period expressed in days; the rule says 'one (1) year,' not a day count." }, { "slug": "alaska", "state": "Alaska", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Alaska R. Civ. P. 86(m) (habeas rule, amended through SCO 1829 eff. 10/15/2014); AS 12.75.020; AS 12.75.110; Fisher v. State, 315 P.3d 686 (Alaska App. 2013); Hertz v. State, 8 P.3d 1144 (Alaska App. 2000)", "habeas_quote": "This rule does not apply to any post-conviction proceeding that could be brought under Criminal Rule 35.1. The court shall treat such a complaint as an application for post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35.1.", "habeas_url": "https://courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/civ.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Application for post-conviction relief, AS 12.72.010-.040 / Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A); construed in Geisinger v. State, 334 P.3d 1241 (Alaska App. 2014)", "pc_quote": "(A) if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure", "pc_url": "https://www.akleg.gov/basis/statutes.asp?media=print&secStart=12.72.010&secEnd=12.72.040", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) ... 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final", "character_instrument": "AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS IS NOT AN OPEN-ENDED ROUTE TO A CONVICTION IN ALASKA. Alaska never repealed habeas: AS ch. 12.75 and Civil Rule 86 are both in force, and I read the entire chapter (AS 12.75.010-.230, akleg print view) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. But it is closed as a conviction-attack vehicle by three independent locks. (1) Civil Rule 86(m), captioned 'Superseded By Post-Conviction Relief Procedure Under Criminal Rule 35.1,' makes conversion mandatory; Fisher, 315 P.3d 686, calls it a 'clear and mandatory directive' and reversed a court that dismissed rather than converted a habeas petition. (2) AS 12.75.020 bars the writ to 'A person properly imprisoned or restrained by virtue of the legal judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and AS 12.75.110 forbids inquiry 'into the legality or justice of any order, judgment, or process specified in AS 12.75.020.' (3) AS 12.72.010(6) sweeps into PCR any claim 'subject to collateral attack upon any ground or alleged error previously available under the common law, statutory law, or other writ.' Net effect: a habeas petition attacking a conviction is re-labeled a PCR application and inherits AS 12.72.020's deadline — so filing in habeas buys no extra time. Hertz, 8 P.3d at 1147-48, conceded in dicta 'that a person held under a void judgment can seek redress in habeas corpus' and said a procedural bar 'might be unconstitutional' as to such a claim, but held Hertz's claims were cognizable under Rule 35.1 and rejected his Alaska Const. art. I, sec. 13 suspension-clause argument; McLaughlin, 214 P.3d 386, then held a defendant cannot escape the AS 12.72.020 limitation by styling the attack as one on a void judgment. So the void-judgment escape hatch is reserved, not established — I found no Alaska decision actually granting habeas relief from a conviction outside Rule 35.1. Habeas does remain a live, deadline-free remedy for restraint NOT resting on a criminal judgment (pretrial custody, extradition, child custody under Rule 86(l)). PC DEADLINE MECHANICS: 365 days is the figure for anyone who took a direct appeal — Geisinger, 334 P.3d 1241, holds 'a defendant who appeals his conviction or sentence, or both, has one year from the date the decision on appeal is final.' A defendant who took NO appeal gets 18 months (about 548 days) from entry of judgment. EXCEPTIONS: no time limit at all if the applicant claims the sentence was illegal (AS 12.72.020(a)(3), narrowly construed to sentences unauthorized by the judgment); AS 12.72.020(b) allows late claims on due diligence plus physical/mental incapacity or state obstruction, or newly discovered evidence proving innocence by clear and convincing evidence; AS 12.72.025 gives one year from finality of a prior PCR decision for a claim that PCR counsel was ineffective; AS 12.72.020(a)(6) otherwise bars any second application; post-conviction DNA testing has its own exclusive vehicle, AS ch. 12.73. No capital variation — Alaska has no death penalty. Caveat: courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/crpro.pdf (Criminal Rule 35.1 itself) timed out repeatedly and I could not read it directly; Rule 35.1's content here rests on the akleg statutory text and on verbatim quotation in Hertz, McLaughlin and Fisher." }, { "slug": "arizona", "state": "Arizona", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "A.R.S. § 13-4121 (Prosecution of writ); habeas article A.R.S. §§ 13-4121 to 13-4147 contains no filing deadline. Narrowed by A.R.S. §§ 13-4131(B), 13-4132(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3; Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964).", "habeas_quote": "A person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may petition for and prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.", "habeas_url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04121.htm", "pc_vehicle": "Post-Conviction Relief, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 32 (defendants sentenced after trial or contested probation violation, and all capital cases) / Rule 33 (defendants who pled guilty or no contest)", "pc_deadline_days": 90, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020); parallel provision Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A)", "pc_quote": "A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.", "pc_url": "https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1B9BE930F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.", "character_instrument": "Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(A)", "status": "verified", "notes": "THE HEADLINE FINDING: Arizona's habeas corpus statute carries NO filing deadline of any kind. I read every section of the habeas article, A.R.S. Title 13, ch. 39, art. 26 (§§ 13-4121 through 13-4147, index at https://www.azleg.gov/arsDetail/?title=13), and no provision imposes a time bar on petitioning. The only timing language runs against the court, not the petitioner: § 13-4124(A) ('shall grant it without delay'), and § 13-4142(A) ('Any writ or process authorized by this article may be issued and served on any day or at any time', https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04142.htm). § 13-4123(B) restricts SUCCESSIVE writs (no discharge on a second writ 'unless upon some ground not existing at the time of issuing the prior writ, or unless upon some point of law not raised at the hearing upon the return of the prior writ') but that is a repetitiveness bar, not a clock. The writ is constitutionally protected: Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 14 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended by the authorities of the state' (https://www.azleg.gov/const/2/14.htm). || WHY 'NARROW' AND NOT 'AVAILABLE': the deadline-free writ is not a usable route to attack a conviction. Three primary sources close it. (1) A.R.S. § 13-4131(B) bars discharge of a person detained 'by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, or of any process issued upon such judgment or decree' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04131.htm). (2) § 13-4132 permits discharge of a prisoner held on state-court process only in enumerated cases 'subject to the restrictions of section 13-4131' — case 1 being 'When the jurisdiction of the court or officer has been exceeded' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04132.htm). So what survives is the jurisdictional/facially-void sliver. (3) The Arizona Supreme Court states the same rule: 'In Arizona, the writ of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction.' Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964), read at https://static.case.law/ariz/95/cases/0292-01.json (that JSON encodes the apostrophe in 'court's' as \\u2019). || WHY NOT 'SUBSUMED': Rule 32 does NOT absorb habeas by its own terms. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3(a): 'A post-conviction proceeding is part of the original criminal action and is not a separate action. It displaces and incorporates all trial court post-trial remedies except those obtainable by Rule 24 motions and habeas corpus.' (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N282598E0F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). That express carve-out is why 'subsumed' would be wrong. BUT the very next subsection is what makes habeas non-operative for conviction challenges — Rule 32.3(b): 'If a court receives any type of application or request for relief--however titled--that challenges the validity of the defendant's conviction or sentence following a trial, it must treat the application as a petition for post-conviction relief.' A pleading captioned 'petition for writ of habeas corpus' that attacks the conviction is therefore re-characterized as a Rule 32 petition and inherits Rule 32's 90-day clock and preclusion rules. Habeas retains independent force for restraint claims that do NOT attack the judgment's validity — e.g. sentence-computation and release-date disputes; see State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 82 P.3d 369 (App. 2004), No. 1 CA-HC 02-0013, a habeas appeal over community-supervision calculation (https://static.case.law/ariz/207/cases/0008-01.json). || ON THE 90 DAYS: the deadline is a two-step notice-then-petition system. The 90 days is for the NOTICE, not the petition, and it runs from oral pronouncement of sentence OR 30 days after the direct-appeal mandate, whichever is later — so a defendant who appeals effectively gets mandate + 30 days. Critically, the 90 days applies only to Rule 32.1(a) claims (conviction or sentence obtained in violation of the U.S. or Arizona constitutions — this is where ineffective-assistance claims live). Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) — no subject-matter jurisdiction, sentence not authorized by law, custody beyond expiration of sentence, newly discovered material facts, no-fault failure to file a timely notice of appeal, significant change in the law, and actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence (Rule 32.1, https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1ABBE970F08511E99BA696ECB1FD62B1?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) — have NO fixed deadline: Rule 32.4(b)(3)(B), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) within a reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.' Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D) also requires the court to excuse an untimely 32.1(a) notice 'if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to timely file a notice was not the defendant's fault.' || PLEADING DEFENDANTS (the large majority of Arizona convictions) use Rule 33, not Rule 32, and get a shorter effective window because they have no direct appeal: Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 33.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence' — no mandate alternative (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N71DBAF40F0AA11E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). Rule 33.4(b)(3)(C) additionally allows a successive Rule 33 notice for ineffective assistance of Rule 33 counsel filed within 30 days of the first proceeding's final order or mandate. || CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: a death-sentenced defendant proceeds under Rule 32 even if he pled guilty (Rule 32.3(c)), and the 90-day clock does not apply to him — under Rule 32.4(b)(3)(C) 'the Supreme Court clerk must expeditiously file a notice requesting post-conviction relief with the trial court upon the issuance of the mandate' on direct appeal, i.e. the notice is filed for him automatically. || PRECLUSION (separate from the deadline, and often the real bar): Rule 32.2(a), amended effective April 14, 2025, precludes Rule 32.1(a) relief on any ground still raiseable on direct appeal or in a Rule 24 motion, finally adjudicated on the merits previously, or waived — and a court 'may determine by a preponderance of the evidence that an issue is precluded, even if the State does not raise preclusion.' || Rules cited are the restyled Rules 32 and 33 added Aug. 29, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020, which split the former single Rule 32 into trial-conviction (32) and plea (33) tracks; the Westlaw azrules pages state currency through amendments received May 1, 2026. Sources fetched and read directly: azleg.gov (statutes/constitution), govt.westlaw.com/azrules (official free unannotated Arizona court rules), static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project), courtlistener.com search API. CourtListener's /opinion/ HTML pages returned HTTP 202 and its /api/rest/v4/opinions/ endpoint returned 401 from this host, so case text was read from static.case.law instead." }, { "slug": "arkansas", "state": "Arkansas", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999) (Ark. Sup. Ct.), construing Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123 and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11; reaffirmed in Fields v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 39", "habeas_quote": "neither the Arkansas Constitution nor the state statutes place a time limit on pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, to do so would contravene the proscription against suspending the right to habeas corpus.", "habeas_url": "https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/supremecourt/en/277982/1/document.do", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (Rule 37)", "pc_deadline_days": 90, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(i) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Arkansas Judiciary official text, current to 06/12/2025)", "pc_quote": "a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment.", "pc_url": "https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/cr/en/1879/1/document.do", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment", "character_instrument": "Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(i)", "status": "verified", "notes": "Arkansas is a NO-DEADLINE-HABEAS state. The common-law/statutory writ (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123) was never abolished or absorbed into Rule 37, and Renshaw holds a filing deadline on it would be an unconstitutional suspension under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11. Read the whole subchapter (§§ 16-112-101 through -123 section list plus §§ 16-112-103, -115): no limitations period appears anywhere. But the writ is NARROW, not general: Crockett v. Payne, 2026 Ark. 62 (Apr. 16, 2026) — 'A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause,' and 'The circuit court's inquiry into the validity of the judgment is limited to the face of the commitment order.' Ineffective assistance, defective information, trial error and due-process claims are expressly NOT cognizable in habeas (Crockett, citing True v. Payne, 2021 Ark. 154; Mitchell v. State, 2018 Ark. 331). Crockett himself filed habeas in 2025 on a 1983 guilty plea and was rejected on scope, never on timeliness — the no-deadline rule in operation. Rule 37 side: 37.2(c)(ii) gives 60 days from the appellate mandate where a direct appeal was taken (90 days only for guilty pleas / unappealed convictions); (c)(iii) 60 days from dismissal of an appeal. Rule 37.2(b) is a partial exclusivity clause — 'All grounds for postconviction relief from a sentence imposed by a circuit court, including claims that a sentence is illegal or was illegally imposed, must be raised in a petition under this rule' — which narrows, but on the Supreme Court's own 2026 practice does not eliminate, the habeas route for facially void judgments and jurisdictional defects. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 37.5(e) — a death-sentenced person files 'within ninety (90) days after the entry of the order' appointing (or declining to appoint) postconviction counsel under 37.5(b)(2), not from the judgment or mandate. Separate trap for the comparison: Arkansas has a SECOND thing labeled habeas — Act 1780, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208, 'Writ of Habeas Corpus — New Scientific Evidence' (DNA/actual innocence). Despite the habeas label it carries its own timing rule, § 16-112-202(10): a rebuttable presumption of timeliness within 36 months of conviction and a rebuttable presumption AGAINST timeliness after 36 months, rebuttable on newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, new technology, incompetence, or good cause. That 36-month figure is not the general habeas deadline and must not be reported as one. Sources fetched and read: Rules of Criminal Procedure PDF from the Arkansas Judiciary court-rules database; Renshaw, Fields and Crockett opinion PDFs from opinions.arcourts.gov (official Arkansas Supreme Court publisher); statutory text from law.onecle.com Arkansas Code Title 16 (2016 replacement volume, the same 'Repl. 2016' the court cites in Fields)." }, { "slug": "california", "state": "California", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, slip op. pp. 1, 13 (Cal. Supreme Ct., No. S228137); statutory basis Cal. Penal Code § 1473(a)", "habeas_quote": "Generally, under California law, there are no fixed, determinate deadlines. Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.", "habeas_url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/07/20/robinson_v._lewis.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Motion to vacate a conviction or sentence, Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7 (available only to a person no longer in criminal custody); companion motion to vacate under § 1473.6. California has NO general post-conviction act analogous to Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61.", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(b)(1), (c)", "pc_quote": "Except as provided in paragraph (2), a motion pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody.", "pc_url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=1473.7.", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard.", "character_instrument": "STATE HABEAS CORPUS", "status": "verified", "notes": "CALIFORNIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly, not implied. Penal Code § 1473(a) preserves the writ ('A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), and habeas is the ordinary, primary route for collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence; it was never abolished or folded into a post-conviction act. The Supreme Court in Robinson v. Lewis confirmed at p. 13: 'There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard.' Timeliness is instead governed by an indeterminate doctrine, not a clock: a claim must be presented 'without substantial delay,' measured (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, read at static.case.law/cal-4th/18/cases/0770-01.json) 'from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.' Substantial delay is excused for good cause, or under three exceptions in noncapital cases (fundamentally unfair trial from constitutional error; actual innocence; conviction or sentence under an invalid statute). So there is no date on which a noncapital petition becomes time-barred — only a fact-specific diligence inquiry. Robinson also created one bright line in the petitioner's favor: a 'safe harbor' gap period between courts that will never count as substantial delay. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND DO HAVE A HARD DEADLINE. Penal Code § 1509 (added by Proposition 66, Nov. 8, 2016) makes habeas 'the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death,' and § 1509(c) provides: 'Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code' — i.e. 365 days from the order appointing counsel, not from finality. An untimely initial capital petition, or any successive one, is dismissed unless the court finds actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence (§ 1509(d)). Robinson expressly limits itself to noncapital procedure (fn. 1, citing Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808). The § 1473.7 motion is NOT a PCRA analogue and is not an alternative for a person in prison: by its terms it is open only to 'A person who is no longer in criminal custody,' and it carries no fixed period — § 1473.7(b)(1) deems it timely 'at any time' out of custody, subject only to a 'reasonable diligence' rule after immigration notice (§ 1473.7(b)(2)) and an 'without undue delay' rule for innocence and racial-bias claims (§ 1473.7(c)). The one genuine one-year figure outside the capital context is Penal Code § 1473.6(d), also limited to persons 'no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained': 'A motion pursuant to this section must be filed within one year of the later of' discovery of the government misconduct or the section's effective date. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: California's one-year figures (§ 1509 capital habeas, § 1473.6) are easy to mistake for a general habeas deadline. They are not. For a noncapital petitioner in custody challenging a conviction today, habeas under § 1473 is the operative vehicle and no filing deadline applies. Note also that the federal one-year AEDPA clock (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)) runs regardless — that federal limit, not state law, is the practical time pressure on California prisoners, and it is the reason the Ninth Circuit certified the question answered in Robinson. § 1473 was amended by Stats. 2025, ch. 784 (SB 734), effective January 1, 2026; the amendments expand grounds (including Racial Justice Act claims under § 745) and add no deadline." }, { "slug": "colorado", "state": "Colorado", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "C.R.S. § 13-45-103(2) (Habeas Corpus Act, §§ 13-45-101 to -119); construed in Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1994) and Gottorff v. Lengerich, 2026 CO 37 (June 1, 2026)", "habeas_quote": "If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction", "habeas_url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-13.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction review (statutory counterpart, C.R.S. § 18-1-410)", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1); Colo. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I); applied People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8", "pc_quote": "no person who has been convicted as an adult ... shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period ... All class 1 felonies: No limit ... All other felonies: Three years", "pc_url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-16.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "no person who has been convicted as an adult ... shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period ... All other felonies: Three years", "character_instrument": "C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1); Colo. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. I read the entire Habeas Corpus Act, C.R.S. §§ 13-45-101 through 13-45-119 (2024 official CRS, Office of Legislative Legal Services printout): it contains no limitation period of any kind. The writ is not abolished and not formally subsumed — it remains a separate statutory civil action with its own parties (custodian only, not 'the People'), its own venue (any district court, petitioner's choice), and its own appellate route directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, § 13-4-102(1)(e) excluding habeas from court of appeals jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court decided a habeas appeal on the merits on June 1, 2026 (Gottorff, 2026 CO 37), citing § 13-45-101(1) as current law. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo. 1994): 'This is not to say, however, that Crim.P. 35(c) motions and habeas corpus petitions are interchangeable. Rather, each remedy has its own distinctive procedures.' WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': two independent narrowings. (1) Statutory — § 13-45-103(3): 'No court on the return of a habeas corpus shall inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment or decree of a court legally constituted, in any other manner.' Coupled with § 13-45-103(2), a prisoner held under process of a legally constituted court may be discharged only on jurisdictional/facially-void grounds. (2) Judicial exhaustion rule — Duran, 868 P.2d at 377: habeas 'is only an appropriate remedy to redress an unlawful restraint on one's liberty when no other form of relief is available.' CRITICAL INTERACTION — habeas cannot be used to evade the post-conviction deadline. A habeas petition raising claims cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) is converted by the court into a Rule 35(c) motion and transferred to the sentencing court (Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 1993); Duran, 868 P.2d at 378), whereupon § 16-5-402 applies. Johnson expressly warned, footnote: 'in the future, district courts must be cognizant of the applicability of section 16-5-402 to pro se habeas petitions.' Duran, footnote: 'Crim.P. 35(c) motions are collateral attacks on criminal convictions and are therefore subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 16-5-402. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).' So the no-deadline finding is real but confined to the residual core for which habeas properly lies — void judgment / entitlement to immediate release (Johnson: 'habeas corpus is appropriate to review whether a conviction is void'). Those claims are untimed under both routes anyway, because § 16-5-402(2)(a)-(b) exempts want of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction from the time bar. POST-CONVICTION TIERS (§ 16-5-402(1), verbatim table): class 1 felonies — No limit; all other felonies — Three years (1095 days, the figure reported above); misdemeanors — Eighteen months (~547 days); petty offenses — Six months (~182 days). CAPITAL/CLASS 1 DIFFERENCE: there is no deadline at all for class 1 felonies, so a person serving life for first-degree murder faces no post-conviction time bar (Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020; class 1 remains the top tier). The three years runs from when the conviction becomes final, i.e. issuance of the mandate on direct appeal (People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8, citing People v. Prendergast, 2024 COA 127, ¶ 28; People v. Parks, No. 25CA0519 (Colo. App. Feb. 26, 2026), ¶ 16). Statutory exceptions, § 16-5-402(2): lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; lack of personal jurisdiction; incompetence or mental-health commitment; and 'justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.' Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), as adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Rule Change 2008(18): 'Any motion filed outside of the time limits set forth in § 16-5-402, 6 C.R.S., shall allege facts which, if true, would establish one of the exceptions listed in § 16-5-402 (2), 6 C.R.S.' Currency of the rule text was confirmed against the Judicial Branch's own Form 4 (Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c), Appendix to Chapter 29), which reprints the same four-tier table. COMPARATIVE CAUTION for the Chief Justice's answer: Colorado has no one-year post-conviction clock. Its three-year felony period is materially longer than the one-year PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 deadlines in states that abolished habeas for conviction challenges, and unlike those states Colorado never repealed its habeas remedy — it narrowed it judicially and by § 13-45-103. Sources fetched and read: CRS 2024 Titles 13 and 16 (leg.colorado.gov); Rule Change 2008(18) and Form 4 (coloradojudicial.gov); Gottorff, 2026 CO 37 (coloradojudicial.gov); Duran v. Price and Johnson v. Gunter full text (static.case.law); Becker and Parks (storage.courtlistener.com)." }, { "slug": "connecticut", "state": "Connecticut", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 1825, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(c) (habeas jurisdiction: § 52-466; deadline added by P.A. 12-115, eff. Oct. 1, 2012); quoted verbatim in Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction, AC48638 (Conn. App. Apr. 21, 2026)", "habeas_quote": "there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment", "habeas_url": "https://law.onecle.com/connecticut/title-52/52-470.html", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for a new trial (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-270), limitation at § 52-582(a)", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-582(a), quoted as currently in force in Carter v. State, AC40914 (Conn. App. Nov. 5, 2019); still operative per Jones v. State, AC47824 (Conn. App. Feb. 17, 2026)", "pc_quote": "No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment . . . except that a petition . . . based on DNA . . . or other newly discovered evidence . . . may be brought at any time", "pc_url": "https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP194/194AP12.pdf", "deadline_character": "rebuttable_presumption", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "respondent", "character_basis": "there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment", "character_instrument": "STATE HABEAS CORPUS", "status": "verified", "notes": "Connecticut did NOT abolish or subsume habeas. Chapter 915 (§§ 52-466 to 52-470) is intact and habeas remains the general collateral vehicle for attacking a conviction, including ineffective-assistance claims; Conn. App. decisions in 2025-2026 adjudicate such petitions routinely. There is no PCRA-style exclusive post-conviction act. CRITICAL QUALIFIER ON THE 5-YEAR FIGURE: § 52-470(c)-(e) is NOT a statute of limitations and is not jurisdictional. It creates a REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION of delay without good cause. It bites only if the respondent requests relief: under (e) the court, 'upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause,' and dismisses only 'If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay.' Good cause expressly 'includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence.' A late petition is thus dismissible, not barred. Precise trigger: presumption arises after the LATER of (1) five years after the conviction became final on conclusion/expiration of appellate review, (2) October 1, 2017, or (3) two years after a new retroactive constitutional/statutory right was recognized. The Oct. 1, 2017 floor (which protected pre-2012 convictions) has now passed, so the 5-year period governs today. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS are shorter: § 52-470(d) presumes delay two years (730 days) after final judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, or Oct. 1, 2014, whichever is later; withdrawal of a prior petition is not a 'judgment.' Under both (c) and (d), time is NOT tolled during the pendency of another petition challenging the same conviction. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE AT ALL for three categories: § 52-470(f) provides that subsections (b) through (e) 'shall not apply to (1) a claim asserting actual innocence, (2) a petition filed to challenge the conditions of confinement, or (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed.' An actual-innocence habeas claim therefore faces no filing deadline whatsoever. (The practical scope of the capital carve-out was not verified here.) Before P.A. 12-115 (effective Oct. 1, 2012, applicable to petitions filed on or after that date) Connecticut habeas had no deadline of any kind. Appeal from a habeas judgment requires certification petitioned within ten days, § 52-470(g). ON THE POST-CONVICTION COLUMN: the petition for a new trial is not a general post-conviction act — it is ground-specific (newly discovered evidence, mispleading, want of notice, or 'other reasonable cause' construed as fraud, accident or mistake). Its three-year clock runs from rendition of judgment, but criminal petitions resting on DNA or other newly discovered evidence unavailable at trial may be filed AT ANY TIME, so the 1095-day figure binds only ordinary grounds. Also uncapped: Practice Book § 43-22 lets 'The judicial authority . . . at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition' — no deadline, but confined to sentence illegality, verified at https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf. SOURCING CAVEAT: law.onecle.com carries the 2016 revision. It is accurate for § 52-470 (verbatim-matched against the 2026 Hobby opinion's quotation of subsection (c), so no amendment since), but STALE for § 52-582, which has since been subdivided and broadened beyond DNA to 'other newly discovered evidence' — the current text was therefore taken from the Appellate Court's quotation in Carter, not from onecle. cga.ct.gov was unreachable from this host throughout." }, { "slug": "delaware", "state": "Delaware", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "10 Del. C. §§ 6901–6918 (Chapter 69, Habeas Corpus); construed by Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954) and Holloman v. State, No. 372, 2022 (Del. Feb. 6, 2023)", "habeas_quote": "Every person imprisoned or restrained of liberty ... shall have remedy by the writ of habeas corpus, and may obtain relief, except: (1) Persons committed or detained on a charge of treason or felony, the species whereof is plainly and fully set forth in the commitment", "habeas_url": "https://delcode.delaware.gov/title10/c069/index.html", "pc_vehicle": "Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 — Postconviction remedy", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Superior Court of Delaware, 2026 Edition; Rule 61 last amended Dec. 15, 2023, eff. Jan. 1, 2024)", "pc_quote": "A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized ... more than one year after the right is first recognized", "pc_url": "https://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=304498", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final", "character_instrument": "Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "NO DEADLINE ON HABEAS — EXPLICIT FINDING. I read all of 10 Del. C. ch. 69 (§§ 6901-6918). It contains no filing deadline of any kind for a habeas petitioner; the only time figures in the chapter run against the custodian (§ 6907: produce the body 'within 3 days'; § 6914: deliver a copy of the warrant within 6 hours). Delaware habeas is not abolished and not fully subsumed — the Superior Court still entertains and decides petitions from convicted prisoners on the merits — but it is NARROW. Del. Supreme Court, Holloman v. State (Feb. 6, 2023): 'Under Delaware law, the writ of habeas corpus provides relief on a very limited basis. Habeas corpus only \"provides an opportunity for one illegally confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the commitment.\" Where the commitment is regular on its face and the court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter, habeas corpus does not afford a remedy' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=343610). The controlling rule is Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954), quoted verbatim in Chambers v. Emig, C.A. No. N25M-04-068 (Del. Super. Apr. 14, 2025): 'After a judgment of conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction and a subsequent commitment pursuant thereto, a prisoner may not obtain his discharge by a writ of habeas corpus no matter how illegal or erroneous the judgment of conviction might have been, if the judgment of the court is legal on its face' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=378190). Chambers also illustrates the absence of a habeas deadline in practice: a petition filed in 2025 attacking a Jan. 2007 sentence — roughly 18 years out — was reached and denied for facial regularity, with no timeliness bar invoked. TWO INDEPENDENT NARROWING SOURCES: (a) the statutory carve-out, 10 Del. C. § 6902(1), quoted above, which by its terms excludes felony commitments regular on their face; and (b) Rule 61(a)(2) 'Exclusiveness of remedy. The remedy afforded by this rule may not be sought by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or in any manner other than as provided herein.' So the merits of a conviction go to Rule 61 and its 1-year clock; habeas reaches only jurisdiction and facial validity of the commitment, without a clock. Practical effect: the timeless remedy is also the one that almost never yields relief. RULE 61 DETAIL. Deadline is stated in years, not days; 365 is my conversion of 'one year' and Delaware fixes no day-count. Finality trigger, Rule 61(m)(1): 30 days after sentencing if no direct appeal; otherwise the Supreme Court's mandate on direct review, or the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate if certiorari is sought. Rule 61(b)(4): a motion 'may not be filed until the judgment of conviction is final,' so the window opens at finality. EXCEPTIONS: Rule 61(i)(5) — the time bar, the successive bar, procedural default and former adjudication 'shall not apply either to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d)' — i.e. new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence, or a new retroactive rule of constitutional law. Those two gateways are also the only escape from Rule 61(d)(2), under which second or subsequent motions 'shall be summarily dismissed,' and the innocence gateway is available only to movants convicted after trial, not by plea. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 61(l) displaces the one-year clock for a defendant seeking to set aside a death sentence — one postconviction proceeding as of right, with the motion due 'within 60 days of the date of the scheduling order' entered after direct review concludes, submitted for decision within 270 days, extendable by up to 60 days for compelling cause; failure to comply can bar or dismiss the motion with prejudice. Delaware has had no valid death penalty statute since Rauf v. State (2016) and Powell (2016), so § 61(l) is largely dormant, but I did not verify that point from a primary source and flag it as outside this finding." }, { "slug": "florida", "state": "Florida", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(o); Fla. Stat. ch. 79", "habeas_quote": "The remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850.", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/so2d/878/cases/1236-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 — Motion to Vacate; Set Aside; or Correct Sentence", "pc_deadline_days": 730, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, July 13, 2026, p. 340)", "pc_quote": "A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final", "pc_url": "https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2026/07/2026_01-JUL-Criminal-Procedure-Rules-7-13-2026-1.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final", "character_instrument": "Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)", "status": "verified", "notes": "The writ itself carries NO deadline and cannot be abolished — Fla. Const. art. I, s. 13: 'The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost'; Fla. Stat. s. 79.01 directs the court to 'grant the writ forthwith,' and ch. 79 (read in full) contains no limitations period. Fla. Stat. s. 79.071 still expressly contemplates habeas attacking 'the validity of any statute, criminal law proceeding or conviction.' BUT that no-deadline writ is NOT an escape hatch from the 2-year clock, which is the trap in this comparison. Rule 3.850(o) provides: 'An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule must not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court that sentenced the applicant or that the court has denied the applicant relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the applicant's detention.' Baker (Fla. 2004) closed the loophole explicitly, announcing the Florida Supreme Court would 'dismiss as unauthorized, habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants that seek the kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850' (also barring claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, and successive claims). Baker quotes State v. Bolyea that rule 3.850 'is a procedural vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus' — i.e. classic subsumption, not a parallel track. Classified 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow' because the residue is defined by inadequacy of the 3.850 remedy, not by claim type: jurisdictional claims are themselves cognizable under 3.850(a)(2)-(3), so Florida is not a state where habeas survives as the jurisdictional-claim vehicle. Baker cited the provision as 3.850(h); it is renumbered (o) in the current rule with materially identical text, which I confirmed against the July 13, 2026 rules. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 730 DAYS, all in 3.850(b): a motion to vacate a sentence exceeding the legal maximum may be filed at any time (see also Rule 3.800(a)); plus 2-year-from-discovery windows for newly discovered facts, newly announced retroactive constitutional rights, and neglect by retained counsel who failed to file. CAPITAL CASES DIFFER IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: death-sentenced defendants proceed under Rule 3.851, not 3.850, and get only 1 year — 3.851(d)(1): 'Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final' (365 days); but habeas remains a live, authorized remedy for them in the Florida Supreme Court, subject to a filing trigger rather than a period — 3.851(d)(3): 'All petitions for extraordinary relief in which the Supreme Court of Florida has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writs of habeas corpus, must be filed simultaneously with the initial brief filed on behalf of the death-sentenced defendant in the appeal of the circuit court's order on the initial motion for postconviction relief filed under this rule.' Separately, ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel — historically raised by habeas petition in the appellate court, per the Rule 9.140 committee note ('The former was previously applied for by a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court') — is now governed by Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5), which sets 2 years from finality on direct review, extendable only on a sworn showing that counsel affirmatively misled the petitioner about the appeal's result, and 'In no case may a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than 4 years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review.' Belated appeals go under 9.141(c). Bottom line for the legislator's comparison: Florida should be scored as a 2-year state, and it belongs in the column of states where a facially unlimited habeas remedy has been rendered unavailable for conviction challenges by an exclusive post-conviction rule — not in the column of states where habeas genuinely lies without a deadline." }, { "slug": "georgia", "state": "Georgia", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 1461, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c), quoted verbatim in Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 357-358 (840 S.E.2d 407) (2020)", "habeas_quote": "Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor ... or within four years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed", "habeas_url": "https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/s19a1253.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Extraordinary motion for new trial, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41 (Georgia has NO PCRA-style post-conviction act; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq., is itself the post-conviction remedy)", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41(a)-(b), quoted in Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878, 880-881 (834 S.E.2d 65) (2019)", "pc_quote": "Except for the requirement in OCGA § 5-5-41 (a) that the moving party show a \"good reason\" for not seeking a new trial within 30 days of the judgment, the requirements for extraordinary motions for new trial are not specified by statute", "pc_url": "https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/s19a0554.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "An untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling'", "character_instrument": "State habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "INSTRUMENT CHECK — Georgia is the inverse of the PCRA pattern. It never abolished or subsumed habeas; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 (O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq.) IS Georgia's post-conviction act, and the limitation period was added directly onto the writ by Ga. L. 2004, p. 917, § 1. So the four-year figure is a true HABEAS deadline and is directly comparable to other states' habeas deadlines, not to a PCRA one. CAPITAL CASES HAVE NO DEADLINE: § 9-14-42(c) expressly excepts a petition 'challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death,' so death-sentenced petitioners face no filing period at all. DEADLINE TIERS: felony 4 years; misdemeanor 1 year; misdemeanor TRAFFIC 180 days under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33, and that one is jurisdictional ('Failure to file the challenge within the time prescribed in this Code section shall divest the court of jurisdiction'). DAYS FIGURE IS MY ARITHMETIC — the statute says 'four years,' not a day count; 1461 = four calendar years including one leap day. ACCRUAL: § 9-14-42(c)(1)-(4) gives four alternative start dates (finality, removal of state-created impediment, newly recognized retroactive right, discovery of facts by due diligence), so it functions like a discovery rule, not a flat run from finality. NO TOLLING: Stubbs v. Hall holds an untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling' and declined to adopt equitable tolling; there is also no remedy for a sentencing court's failure to give the § 9-14-42(d) advisement. But Phagan v. State, 287 Ga. 856 (2010), holds § 9-14-42(c) is not a statute of repose, so civil renewal after dismissal is available. SEPARATE LACHES BAR: § 9-14-48(e) permits dismissal on a particularized showing of prejudice from delay, but applies only to convictions had before July 1, 2004, and not to death cases. THE EMNT IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: Mitchum holds an extraordinary motion for new trial 'was not the proper vehicle' and that constitutional claims 'could be pursued only through habeas corpus'; § 5-5-41 carries no fixed filing deadline (only a 'good reason' showing for delay past 30 days) and only one such motion is allowed, but it reaches newly discovered evidence and other non-constitutional grounds, not constitutional deprivation. Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), then abolished the trial-court motion for out-of-time appeal, pushing still more claims into habeas as 'the exclusive post-appeal procedure.' PRACTICAL UPSHOT FOR THE COMPARISON: a non-capital Georgia felony petitioner gets four years — longer than the one-year PCRA-type deadlines in Pennsylvania, Alabama and Delaware, and longer than the federal one-year AEDPA period — but unlike states that keep an untimed habeas beside a short post-conviction motion, Georgia has no untimed fallback for constitutional claims. ⚠ CURRENCY CAVEAT (added 2026-07-30): the Cook v. State point above is NO LONGER a complete statement of Georgia law. HB 176, signed 2025-05-14, enacted O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39.1 specifically to undo Cook — it restores a statutory out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 100 days of the missed deadline (state consent, excusable neglect, ineffective assistance, or other good cause), and § 5-6-39.1(a)(3) gives an indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel to seek it. Confirmed verbatim in Owenby v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2026-05-22) and applied in Barrionuevo v. State (2026-05-27). The separate § 5-6-39.1(b) window for defendants whose motions were DISMISSED under Cook ran only until June 30, 2026 and has now closed. NOTE FOR THE COUNSEL COLUMN: Georgia now guarantees counsel for this STATUTORY route while Gibson v. Turpin (4-3) still denies it for the WRIT — same state, opposite answers depending on the instrument." }, { "slug": "hawaii", "state": "Hawaii", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a) (eff. 01/01/2026)", "habeas_quote": "The post-conviction proceeding established by this rule shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis", "habeas_url": "https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm", "pc_vehicle": "HRPP Rule 40 post-conviction proceeding (Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Form A)", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a)(1)", "pc_quote": "At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction", "pc_url": "https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/hrpp.htm", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "At any time but not prior to final judgment", "character_instrument": "Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a)(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HAWAII HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. HRPP Rule 40 is the operative vehicle and it expressly absorbs habeas corpus for conviction/sentence challenges ('shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis'), while imposing no limitations period at all — the text reads 'At any time but not prior to final judgment.' I read Rule 40(a)-(i) in full; there is no time bar anywhere in it. The independent habeas statute, HRS ch. 660, also survives and likewise contains no limitations period: I read §660-3 ('The supreme court, the justices thereof, and the circuit courts may issue writs of habeas corpus in cases in which persons are unlawfully restrained of their liberty...') and §660-5 (complaint contents) verbatim at law.onecle.com/hawaii/title-36/660-3.html and /660-5.html, and reviewed the full §§660-1 through 660-33 section list — no section imposes a deadline. Ch. 660 habeas remains live for restraint NOT based on a judgment of conviction (Martinez v. Kawamura, Haw. 2023, notes such petitions 'are governed by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 660'); for conviction challenges it is folded into Rule 40 (Turner v. Hawai'i Paroling Authority: relief sought 'under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40, which incorporates inter alia remedies afforded' by habeas) — case snippets via CourtListener API search, full opinion texts not retrieved (CourtListener opinion endpoint returned 401/202), so the two cases are corroborative only; the classification rests on the rule text itself. WHAT ACTUALLY BARS A HAWAII PETITIONER IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME: Rule 40(a)(3) denies relief 'where the issues sought to be raised have been previously ruled upon or were waived,' with a rebuttable presumption that failure to appeal or raise an issue was knowing — except claims of illegal sentence, which cannot be waived. Two routing rules to note: Rule 35(a) provides 'A motion made by a defendant to correct an illegal sentence more than 90 days after the sentence is imposed shall be made pursuant to Rule 40' — the 90 days is a routing line between rules, NOT an outer deadline, since Rule 40 itself is open-ended; and Rule 40(c)(2) requires a nonconforming petition alleging illegality of judgment or custody to be 'accepted for filing and ... treated as a petition under this rule,' so a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction is converted rather than dismissed. No capital-case variation exists: Hawaii has no death penalty. Rule 32(d) also channels post-sentence plea withdrawal into Rule 40 ('only by petition pursuant to Rule 40'), subject to a manifest-injustice standard. Caution for the comparison the legislator is drawing: Hawaii belongs in the 'no deadline' column, and the contrast with one-year states (PCRA, Ala. R. 32.2(c), Del. R. 61(i)(1)) is a contrast in KIND, not degree." }, { "slug": "idaho", "state": "Idaho", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Idaho Code § 19-4203(4) (Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation Procedures Act, I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42); accord I.C. § 19-4901(b); Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997)", "habeas_quote": "Habeas corpus shall not be used as a substitute for, or in addition to, a direct appeal of a criminal conviction or proceedings under Idaho criminal rule 35 or the uniform post-conviction procedures act, chapter 49, title 19, Idaho Code", "habeas_url": "https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH42/SECT19-4203/", "pc_vehicle": "Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) application, Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 to 19-4911", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Idaho Code § 19-4902(a)", "pc_quote": "An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.", "pc_url": "https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH49/SECT19-4902/", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.", "character_instrument": "Idaho Code § 19-4902(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "IMPORTANT — do NOT read Idaho as a no-deadline habeas state. Idaho's habeas act (I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42) genuinely contains NO filing deadline: I read the entire chapter PDF (legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH42.pdf) and the only limitations language anywhere in it is the cross-reference in § 19-4203(4) to the UPCPA's period; the sole 30-day figure is the respondent's response deadline in § 19-4209. But that open-ended habeas does not reach convictions. Idaho habeas survives as a real, live remedy for a closed list of NON-conviction claims only — § 19-4203(2) permits an in-state prisoner to raise (a) conditions of confinement, (b) parole revocation, (c) miscalculation of sentence, (d) loss of good time credits, (e) a detainer; § 19-4203(3) limits out-of-state prisoners to conditions of confinement alone and expressly bars 'any issue concerning the legality of his out-of-state conviction or sentence.' For the validity of a conviction or sentence, the UPCPA is exclusive: § 19-4901(b) — 'Except as otherwise provided in this act, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' Confirmed by controlling case law read in full: Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997) (static.case.law/idaho/130/cases/0861-01.json) — 'The UPCPA comprehends and replaces all other common law, statutory or other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus, that were previously available to collaterally challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. ... A writ of habeas corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement.' Eubank also rejected the argument that the one-year UPCPA bar unconstitutionally suspends habeas under Idaho Const. art. I, § 5, holding 'there has been no constitutional violation of Eubank's right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Idaho Constitution, art. I, § 5.' So the practical answer to the legislator's question for a non-capital Idaho prisoner is ONE YEAR, running from expiration of the time for appeal / determination of the appeal, whichever is later — not from finality of conviction, and not tolled by a discovery rule on the face of the statute. CAPITAL CASES ARE FAR SHORTER — 42 days. I.C. § 19-2719(3) requires the defendant to file 'any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known' within 42 days of the judgment imposing death, and § 19-2719(4) sweeps habeas into that same window: 'Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time limitations of subsection (3) of this section.' Section 19-2719(5) makes untimely claims waived and strips the courts of power to hear them. ONE EXCEPTION TO THE ONE-YEAR RULE: § 19-4902(b) permits a fingerprint/forensic DNA testing petition 'at any time' where the technology was unavailable at trial (available even to defendants who pleaded guilty, § 19-4902(d)); § 19-2719(4) makes that DNA route applicable in capital cases too. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (illegal sentence) is a further separate route preserved by § 19-4203(4); I did not read ICR 35 itself, so its timing is unverified here and no figure above rests on it. § 19-4224 provides that ch. 42 'sets forth the exclusive procedures and remedies in habeas corpus actions.' Idaho case law also permits a court to treat a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction as a UPCPA application, which subjects it to the § 19-4902 one-year bar rather than reviving an untimed remedy." }, { "slug": "illinois", "state": "Illinois", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008), construing the Habeas Corpus Act, 735 ILCS 5/10-101 to 10-137 (esp. 10-124)", "habeas_quote": "an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction ... or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/ill-2d/231/cases/0051-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.", "pc_deadline_days": 180, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)", "pc_quote": "No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.", "pc_url": "https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ILCS/details?MajorTopic=&Chapter=&ActName=Code+of+Criminal+Procedure+of+1963.&ActID=1966&ChapterID=54&ChapAct=725+ILCS+5%2F&SeqStart=38400000&SeqEnd=39499999", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.", "character_instrument": "725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Illinois never abolished or subsumed state habeas: Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-101 through 10-137) is intact and was amended as recently as P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24 (10-103). I read all 37 sections at the ILGA text (https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ILCS/details?ActName=Code+of+Civil+Procedure.&ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&ChapAct=735+ILCS+5%2F&SeqStart=75500000&SeqEnd=79300000). No section imposes any limitations period on filing; the only time figures in the entire article are unrelated procedural ones — a 6-hour deadline for a custodian to furnish a copy of the commitment (10-105) and a 15-day removal rule (10-130). 10-102 is unconditioned as to time: 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty ... may apply for habeas corpus.' BUT THE PRICE OF THAT OPEN WINDOW IS SCOPE. 735 ILCS 5/10-124 permits discharge 'only' on seven enumerated causes, the operative ones being that 'the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction' or that 'by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged.' 10-124(7) adds: 'No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.' 10-123(2) separately bars discharge of anyone held 'By virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court ... unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired.' Beacham drives the point home on the very next line after the quoted passage: 'A complaint for order of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of these defects, even though the alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights.' So a person raising ineffective assistance, Brady, or any ordinary trial-error claim cannot use habeas at all, no matter how timely. Beacham cites the 1996 West version of 10-124; I confirmed the current ILGA text of 10-124 is word-for-word identical (still sourced to P.A. 82-280). OPERATIVE VEHICLE IS THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT, and its clock is the answer to the legislator's question. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) sets three alternative outer limits: 6 months after conclusion of U.S. Supreme Court proceedings; if no cert petition is filed, 6 months from the date for filing one; and if the defendant took no direct appeal at all, 'no later than 3 years from the date of conviction' (1,095 days). I coded pc_deadline_days as 180 for the governing 6-month period; the statute says 'months,' not days, so 180 is a conversion, and the 3-year figure is the correct one for the no-direct-appeal subset. Every one of the three is excused where 'the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence' — a real and frequently litigated escape hatch, so the Illinois deadline is materially softer than a flat one-year bar. Two further carve-outs: (c) provides 'This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence,' and 122-1(f) allows only one petition without leave of court, successive petitions requiring cause and prejudice. CAPITAL: none — Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011, and in the current text 122-1(a)(2) (capital actual-innocence), (a)(3), and (e) all read '(blank).' Note a live drafting artifact: subsection (a-5) still says 'A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the person's conviction,' but (a)(2) is now blank, leaving that cross-reference dangling; the actual-innocence exception survives through the standalone sentence in (c). THIRD ROUTE, for completeness: 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (petition for relief from judgment), whose subsection (c) requires that 'the petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment' (730 days), tolled for legal disability, and which is the usual vehicle for void-judgment attacks that habeas will not reach. COMPARISON CAUTION: an Illinois answer of '6 months' and a Pennsylvania answer of '1 year' are commensurable — both are purpose-built post-conviction acts. Neither is a habeas figure. Illinois habeas itself is untimed and would be miscounted as either '0' or 'unlimited' by any table that does not separate the two instruments." }, { "slug": "indiana", "state": "Indiana", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(b) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026); see also §1(c); Ind. Code § 34-25.5 (habeas chapter, no limitations period)", "habeas_quote": "Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them.", "habeas_url": "https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(a) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026)", "pc_quote": "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief.", "pc_url": "https://rules.incourts.gov/Content/post-conviction/rule1/current.htm", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief.", "character_instrument": "Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "NO DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT — Indiana is a no-time-limit state on both tracks. (1) HABEAS: the writ is expressly NOT suspended, but is mechanically converted when used to attack a conviction. PC Rule 1 §1(c): 'This Rule does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but if a person applies for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the person is incarcerated and challenges the validity of his conviction or sentence, that court shall transfer the cause to the court in which the conviction took place, and the latter court shall treat it as a petition for relief under this Rule.' Hence 'subsumed,' not 'abolished': habeas survives intact for a claim of entitlement to immediate release that does NOT attack the conviction's validity. Controlling case law, Manley v. Butts, 71 N.E.3d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (published), quoting Partlow v. Superintendent, 756 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) and Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 374 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1978): 'One is entitled to habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from unlawful custody' and '[a] petitioner may not file a writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/03/10/james_e._manley_v._keith_butts.pdf) Statutory narrowing to the same effect: Ind. Code § 34-25.5-5-1(a)(2) — the habeas court 'shall not inquire into the legality of any judgment or process by which the party is in custody … Upon any process issued on a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction' (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-5-1.html). (2) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I fetched and read all 24 sections of the habeas chapter, Ind. Code §§ 34-25.5-1-1 through 34-25.5-7-1; the chapter contains no limitations period, no filing deadline, and no laches provision. The sole occurrence of 'within' is geographic (§ 34-25.5-3-3, judges 'issue writs of habeas corpus within their respective counties'). Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 grants the writ to 'Every person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever,' with no temporal condition (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-1-1.html). Currency caveat: the onecle text is a 2006 snapshot of a chapter added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.21 with no amendment notations; text confirmed unchanged by the Indiana Court of Appeals quoting § 34-25.5-1-1 verbatim in 2017 (Manley) and 2020 (Willet v. State, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/07/31/shawn_g._willet_v._state_of_indiana.pdf). (3) NO PCR DEADLINE: 'at any time' in PC Rule 1 §1(a) is the current operative text — the most recent amendment (Order Amending Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies, Cause No. 26S-MS-8, filed Jan. 20, 2026, eff. Feb. 2, 2026, https://secure.in.gov/courts/files/order-rules-2026-0120-pcr.pdf) altered only §§ 2 and 9, on indigent-counsel referral, and touched nothing time-related. (4) THE REAL TIME CONSTRAINT IS LACHES, NOT A DEADLINE. Indiana bars stale petitions only through an equitable affirmative defense the State must plead and prove. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677 (Ind. 2017): 'For laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and, second, that the State has been prejudiced by the delay.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/05/05/trondo_l._humphrey_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) This is a fact-specific, State-borne burden, not a period that runs against the petitioner — the correct comparison point against a PCRA-style one-year bar. (5) OTHER LIMITS THAT ARE NOT DEADLINES: successive petitions require advance authorization from the Indiana Supreme Court or Court of Appeals on a showing of 'a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief' (PC Rule 1 §12); claims not raised in the original petition are waived (PC Rule 1 §8). Neither is a clock. (6) CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: death-sentenced cases carry a scheduling regime absent from non-capital cases. Ind. Crim. Rule 6.1(H) (formerly Crim. R. 24; renumbered eff. Jan. 1, 2024): 'Within thirty days following completion of rehearing,' counsel must enter an appearance, advise the trial court of intent to petition for post-conviction relief, and request extension of the stay; the Supreme Court then 'will direct the trial court to submit a case management schedule consistent with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) for approval' (https://rules.incourts.gov/pdf/PDF%20-%20Criminal/criminal.pdf). That 30 days is a deadline for counsel's appearance and notice of intent, not for the petition itself; the petition's due date is set by court order. I did not read Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) directly — the content of that scheduling statute is unverified here. (7) SCOPE NOTE: PC Rule 2 (belated notice of appeal) is a distinct vehicle for restoring a direct appeal and was not examined; PC Rule 1 §1(d) folds Ind. Code § 35-38-7-5 DNA-testing petitions into Rule 1." }, { "slug": "iowa", "state": "Iowa", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Iowa Code § 822.1 (2026); construed in State v. Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d 122, 127-28 (Iowa 2015); Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1974)", "habeas_quote": "The provisions of sections 663.1 through 663.44, inclusive, shall not apply to persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense.", "habeas_url": "https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/822.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Application for postconviction relief, Iowa Code ch. 822 (Iowa's enactment of the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, formerly ch. 663A)", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Iowa Code § 822.3 (2026)", "pc_quote": "All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.", "pc_url": "https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/822.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.", "character_instrument": "Iowa Code § 822.3 (2026)", "status": "verified", "notes": "Iowa's habeas chapter (ch. 663) is still on the books and contains NO limitation period — I read all 44 sections and none imposes one — but that fact confers nothing on a convicted person, because § 822.1 switches the entire chapter off for them. Do not score Iowa as an untimed-habeas state. The Iowa Supreme Court: 'pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.1, the legislature foreclosed habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense' (Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 127, citing 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1276, § 1). Exclusivity is also stated affirmatively in § 822.2(2): the ch. 822 remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies formerly available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' § 822.2(1)(g) sweeps in any ground 'formerly available under any common law, statutory or other writ.' So the operative period is the three years in § 822.3, not a habeas period. Exceptions and edges: (1) § 822.3 carries a broad statutory escape — 'this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period' — with DNA results under § 81.10 expressly a qualifying ground of fact; the same sentence bars using ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel to toll or relate back (2019 amendment). (2) A different, much shorter 90-day deadline runs from a final disciplinary decision for good-time-forfeiture claims under § 822.2(1)(f), filed in the county of confinement — not a conviction challenge, but easy to conflate. (3) Ch. 663 habeas remains live for people OUTSIDE § 822.1's phrase 'convicted of, or sentenced for.' Hernandez-Galarza holds a deferred judgment is not a conviction, so such a person falls between the two chapters and ch. 663 'might be available' — though the court denied relief there for failure to meet § 663.1's mandatory pleading requirements and absence of any State restraint. Habeas also still lies in Iowa for non-conviction matters (extradition, pretrial detention, child custody). (4) I did not find, and do not assert, any Iowa holding on whether a residual constitutional writ survives § 822.1 for purely jurisdictional claims; Iowa Const. art. I, § 13 protects the writ but qualifies it — 'refused when application is made as required by law' — and Hernandez-Galarza treated the 1970 Act as a valid legislative limitation without reaching a suspension-clause challenge. Treat that narrow question as unverified. (5) No capital variation: Iowa has no death penalty. Ch. 663 text read at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/663.pdf; case text at https://static.case.law/nw2d/864/html/0122-01.html." }, { "slug": "kansas", "state": "Kansas", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "K.S.A. 60-1507(e) ('Exclusiveness of remedy'); K.S.A. 60-1501(a)-(c); Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202, 708 P.2d 977 (1985)", "habeas_quote": "An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced said applicant ... unless ... the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective ...", "habeas_url": "https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html", "pc_vehicle": "K.S.A. 60-1507 motion attacking sentence (Kansas analogue of 28 U.S.C. § 2255)", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)-(2)", "pc_quote": "Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (A) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction", "pc_url": "https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_015_0007.html", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit", "character_instrument": "K.S.A. 60-1507", "status": "verified", "notes": "INSTRUMENT TRAP. The one-year figure is NOT a habeas deadline. K.S.A. 60-1507 is physically located inside Chapter 60, Article 15 — the habeas corpus article (60-1501 through 60-1507, verified from the article index at kslegislature.gov) — and Kansas bar literature calls it habeas ('Habeas Corpus in Kansas: The Great Writ Affords Postconviction Relief at K.S.A. 60-1507,' 67 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 16 (1998), listed in the revisor's annotations). But 60-1507 is captioned 'Prisoner in custody under sentence; motion attacking sentence' and is a motion filed in the sentencing court, modeled on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, complete with a § 2255(e)-style savings clause. The writ itself is 60-1501 to 60-1506. HABEAS DEADLINE: the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit — 'any person in this state who is detained, confined or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus.' The only deadlines in the habeas statute are in (b) and (c), each 30 days, and each is confined to a specific population and prefaced by an express carve-out: '(b) Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507 ... an inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections shall file a petition for writ pursuant to subsection (a) within 30 days from the date the action was final, but such time is extended during the pendency of the inmate's timely attempts to exhaust such inmate's administrative remedies'; (c) is the parallel rule for patients of the secretary for aging and disability services. That 30-day clock runs from 'the date the action was final' — the challenged administrative action — which is why 60-1501's case annotations are almost entirely prison discipline, segregation, good-time, and parole (Murphy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589 (1996), read: administrative segregation). It is not a conviction-challenge clock, and by its own terms it does not apply where 60-1507 governs. So where habeas does still reach a conviction in Kansas, there is NO filing deadline. WHERE IT STILL REACHES A CONVICTION: two routes. (1) The savings clause quoted above — habeas lies if the 60-1507 remedy 'is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of said applicant's detention.' (2) Where 60-1507 does not apply at all. The Kansas Supreme Court entertained a 60-1501 writ attacking a municipal-court conviction on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel grounds in Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202 (1985), holding: 'K.S.A. 60-1507 was not available to petitioner since it may be used only by a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction. A municipal court is not a court of general jurisdiction.' No time bar was applied, and the court rejected the argument that failure to take a direct appeal barred the writ: 'It is generally held if the constitutional rights of the accused are at issue, habeas corpus is available as a remedy under certain circumstances even though no direct appeal was taken' (fetched from static.case.law/kan/238/cases/0202-01.json). Note this residual habeas is limited by FORUM and ADEQUACY, not by claim type — it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims, which is why the status here is 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow.' OPERATIVE FOR AN ORDINARY FELONY CONVICTION: 60-1507, one year. 60-1501(a) opens 'Subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507,' and 60-1507(e) is captioned 'Exclusiveness of remedy.' A person in Kansas Department of Corrections custody under a district-court sentence must use 60-1507. TRIGGERS AND EXTENSION: the year runs from the later of (A) the final direct-appeal order or termination of appellate jurisdiction, (B) denial of certiorari or the Supreme Court's final order after granting it, or (C) the decision on a prior 60-1507 motion. It 'may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice,' and since the 2016 amendment (L. 2016, ch. 58, § 2) that inquiry is statutorily narrowed: 'the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence,' with actual innocence requiring a showing that 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.' Untimely motions must be dismissed sua sponte under (f)(3). CUSTODY REQUIREMENT: 60-1507 reaches only 'a prisoner in custody under sentence,' so it is unavailable to someone who has fully discharged the sentence; whether habeas or another vehicle fills that gap is unverified here. CAPITAL: the statutory text draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the one-year rule applies uniformly. NO-DEADLINE NEIGHBOR: K.S.A. 22-3504(a) (verified at ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch22/022_035_0004.html) provides 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time while the defendant is serving such sentence,' with no deadline, and the revisor's annotations record that the one-year limit 'does not procedurally bar the bringing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence' (State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380 (2007)). But 22-3504 reaches only sentences — defined in (c)(1) as imposed without jurisdiction, not conforming to the applicable statutory provision, or ambiguous as to time and manner — never the conviction itself, and expressly not sentences rendered erroneous by a later change in the law. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a modern published Kansas decision construing the scope of the 60-1507(e) savings clause; CourtListener's Kansas full-text coverage is thin and returned no on-point hits. I also could not fetch Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183 (kscourts.gov returned 403) or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights habeas suspension clause, so neither is relied on above." }, { "slug": "kentucky", "state": "Kentucky", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "KRS 419.020 (habeas statute), construed in Brumley v. Seabold, 885 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. App. 1994); scope set by Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994)", "habeas_quote": "KRS 419.020 fails to address any time constraints with regard to a petitioner's right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, the phrase \"on any day at any time\" would seem to indicate that there are no time constraints", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/sw2d/885/cases/0954-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10), quoted verbatim in Bush v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 621 (Ky. App. 2007)", "pc_quote": "Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant", "pc_url": "https://static.case.law/sw3d/236/cases/0621-01.json", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant", "character_instrument": "Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS IS NOT ABOLISHED AND CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE. Ky. Const. sec. 16 preserves the writ; KRS ch. 419 implements it. I read every section of KRS 419.020-.130 (apps.legislature.ky.gov, chapter id=39274, updated 07/30/2026): none imposes any period for FILING a petition. The only period in the chapter is KRS 419.130(1) -- thirty (30) days to APPEAL a habeas judgment -- which is not a filing limit. KRS 419.020 makes the writ issuable 'on any day at any time.' BUT habeas is narrow as a route to attack a conviction. Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994) (Ky. Supreme Court, controlling): 'we recognize as the general rule that the RCr 11.42 procedure is adequate for a collateral attack by a prisoner in custody under a judgment which he believes to be defective for one reason or another. But we recognize as an exception that the prompt relief available by writ of habeas corpus remains for a prisoner who can establish in a summary procedure that the judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio.' Marcum calls that exception 'narrowly circumscribed' and says petitions beyond its scope 'will be disposed of summarily.' Earlier: Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964) -- 'There being no showing that the remedy by motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 is inadequate to test the legality of appellant's detention, his petition was properly dismissed' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/377/cases/0154-01.json). Second narrowing: the petitioner must seek IMMEDIATE RELEASE. Graham v. O'Dea, 876 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. App. 1994): 'The statute applies only to individuals who can demonstrate that they are entitled to release from custody' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/876/cases/0621-01.json); accord Fryrear v. Parker, 920 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1996) (Ky. Supreme Court) (https://static.case.law/sw2d/920/cases/0519-01.json). So habeas is 'narrow,' not 'subsumed': RCr 11.42 has not been made the exclusive remedy -- Marcum expressly holds a court rule 'cannot supplant the right to a writ of habeas corpus, a fundamental right guaranteed by Sec. 16 of our Kentucky Constitution.' IMPORTANT CAVEAT ON 'NO DEADLINE': there is no statutory limitations period, but LACHES can bar a stale habeas petition. Brumley v. Seabold (the same case quoted above) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition filed nine years after the challenged proceeding, holding 'the prisoner cannot be allowed to sit on a claim of right while the evidence available to the Commonwealth to support the action taken disintegrates.' That is an equitable, fact-specific bar, not a fixed period. RCr 11.42 DETAIL: three years runs from finality of the judgment (final appellate judgment, or trial-court judgment if no direct appeal -- Palmer v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Ky. App. 1999), quoted in Bush). Two statutory exceptions, quoted in Bush: (a) facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; (b) a fundamental constitutional right not established within the period and held retroactive. RCr 11.42(1) requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence' or on probation, parole or conditional discharge. CURRENCY: RCr 11.42(10) is unamended -- the Kentucky Supreme Court's 2024 (2024-17) and 2025 (2025-02) omnibus rules orders on kycourts.gov contain no reference to Rule 11.42; the Kentucky Dept. of Public Advocacy packet revised Dec. 2019 quotes the same clause ('within three years after the judgment becomes final,' RCr 11.42(10), https://dpa.ky.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/RCr-11-42-December-2019.doc.pdf); and the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to RCr 11.42 as a live remedy on 06/25/2026 in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2023-SC-0513. NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE FOUND: RCr 11.42(10) draws no distinction for capital cases, and I found none in the cases read. THIRD VEHICLE, PARTLY UNVERIFIED: Kentucky also has CR 60.02, reserved for 'extraordinary situations when relief is not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42' (Commonwealth v. Taylor, 06/25/2026, quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997), https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2026/06/25/commonwealth_of_kentucky_v._victor_d._taylor.pdf). I did not read CR 60.02's own text, so its time limits are UNVERIFIED here and no figure is asserted. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE COMPARISON: a Kentuckian challenging a conviction today is governed by the three-year RCr 11.42 deadline, not by any habeas deadline; Kentucky's habeas remedy has no filing deadline but reaches only judgments void ab initio where the petitioner would be entitled to immediate release." }, { "slug": "louisiana", "state": "Louisiana", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 351 (Title IX, Habeas Corpus), amended by Acts 1980, No. 429, §2; construed in State ex rel. Glover v. State, 660 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1995)", "habeas_quote": "The provisions of this Title are not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief under Title XXXI-A.", "habeas_url": "https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112473", "pc_vehicle": "Application for Post Conviction Relief, La. Code Crim. Proc. Title XXXI-A, arts. 924-930.8", "pc_deadline_days": 730, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8(A) (Acts 1990, No. 1023; Acts 1999, No. 1262; Acts 2004, No. 401; Acts 2013, No. 251; Acts 2021, No. 104; Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 10; Acts 2025, No. 393)", "pc_quote": "No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922", "pc_url": "https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112949", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.", "character_instrument": "La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8(A)", "status": "verified", "notes": "INSTRUMENT WARNING: Louisiana's habeas corpus statute itself carries NO filing deadline — Title IX (arts. 351-370) contains no time-limitation article at all (verified against the Code of Criminal Procedure table of contents: 351 definition, 352 venue, 353 form/contents, 354-370 procedure; art. 354's 'time' is the custodian's answer time, not a petitioner deadline). But habeas is NOT a route to a conviction today: art. 351's third paragraph closes Title IX to anyone 'entitled to file' post-conviction relief. The La. Supreme Court in Glover: art. 351 'states unambiguously that habeas corpus relief is not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief,' and Official Revision Comment (c) to art. 351 'Habeas corpus relief is not the proper procedural device for petitioners who may file applications for post conviction relief. Essentially, habeas corpus deals with pre-conviction complaints concerning custody.' Glover also held the PCR time bar does not suspend the writ under La. Const. art. I, sec. 21, reasoning that sec. 21 protects 'the traditional common law writ' and art. 930.8 'lies outside' it. The legislature made the absorption explicit in 2025: art. 924(4) now defines post conviction relief as 'a form of post conviction habeas corpus.' So the operative number is 2 years / 730 days from finality under art. 914 or 922 — not the 1 year common in PCRA-style states, and not an open-ended habeas. Hardening: art. 930.8(F) 'All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.' Exceptions in art. 930.8(A): (1) facts unknown to petitioner/prior counsel with subjective 'diligence' — new facts must be submitted within two years of discovery, and a guilty/nolo pleader seeking art. 926.2 relief loses this exception after five years; (2) previously unknown facts under a clear-and-convincing 'manifest injustice' test; (3) a newly announced retroactive constitutional interpretation, filed within one year of that ruling's finality; (4) a transitional grandfather — an otherwise-barred application is heard if filed on or before August 1, 2027 and within two years of finality; (5)-(6) art. 926.1 DNA and art. 926.2 factual innocence. CAUTION on factual innocence: art. 926.2's standalone escape from arts. 930.4/930.8 required filing on or before December 31, 2022 after a trial to verdict — that window has closed, so such claims now run through the ordinary 2-year bar, and a petitioner who pled guilty on or after August 1, 2025 'shall not be entitled to assert a claim of factual innocence.' CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: art. 930.8(B) — post-conviction appellate review in death cases goes directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and once an execution warrant issues any application containing a new claim must be filed no later than 45 days before the execution date, with a ruling 21 days out and a 7-day writ window. CUSTODY GATE: art. 926(F) limits eligibility to those currently serving a sentence or on probation/parole and requires dismissal of an application filed after the sentence is completed; art. 924.1 bars PCR while direct appeal is available or pending. Practical effect: a person off supervision has neither remedy — PCR is closed by art. 926(F)(2) and habeas by its own custody requirement (art. 351). Text current through the 2025 First Extraordinary Session per legis.la.gov; art. 930.8 as shown reflects Acts 2025, No. 393. Unverified: I did not locate a post-2025 Louisiana appellate decision on CourtListener applying art. 351 to a mislabeled habeas petition (CourtListener's Louisiana intermediate-appellate coverage is sparse); the subsumption finding rests on the statute plus Glover, which remains the controlling Louisiana Supreme Court authority." }, { "slug": "maine", "state": "Maine", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "15 M.R.S. § 2122 (Purpose), Title 15 ch. 305-A; and 14 M.R.S. § 5502 (\"Post-conviction habeas corpus\") REPEALED by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2", "habeas_quote": "It replaces the remedies available pursuant to post-conviction habeas corpus, to the extent that review of a criminal conviction or proceedings were reviewable, the remedies available pursuant to common law habeas corpus, including habeas corpus as recognized in Title 14", "habeas_url": "https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2122.html", "pc_vehicle": "Post-conviction review, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (§§ 2121-2132)", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) (Time for filing; PL 2011, c. 601, § 11)", "pc_quote": "A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A.", "pc_url": "https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/15/title15sec2128-B.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review", "character_instrument": "15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "Maine is a clean 'subsumed' state, and the habeas_no_deadline=false coding needs explanation. Title 14 ch. 609 (habeas corpus) still exists and § 5501 ('Right to writ') contains no time limit of any kind — but it is NOT an open deadline-free route to challenge a conviction. Two independent primary sources close it: (1) 14 M.R.S. § 5502, captioned 'Post-conviction habeas corpus,' reads in full '(REPEALED)' — repealed by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2, the same act that enacted ch. 305-A; and (2) § 2122 names Title 14 §§ 5501 and 5509 to 5546 specifically as remedies ch. 305-A replaces, and calls ch. 305-A the 'comprehensive and, except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment, exclusive method of review.' So the residual writ has no deadline but no reach into conviction challenges; do not tabulate Maine as unlimited-habeas. § 2122 states the chapter is construed to provide relief to persons required to use it 'as required by the Constitution of Maine, Article I, Section 10' (the writ-suspension clause) — i.e. the statute was drafted to occupy the constitutional guarantee rather than leave a parallel habeas route. The one year runs from the LATEST of three triggers (§ 2128-B(1)(A)-(C)): final disposition of direct appeal or expiry of appeal time; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right; or discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence — so it is a discovery-style limit, not a flat year from judgment. Time while a properly filed U.S. Supreme Court cert petition on the same judgment is pending is excluded. § 2128-B(1) contains no equitable-tolling clause on its face; I did not verify judicial tolling doctrine from a controlling case. Separate one-year clocks apply to post-sentencing proceedings (§ 2128-B(2)) and to indirect impediments (§ 2128-B(3)); § 2128-B(3) also sets a 60-DAY limit for noncitizens seeking relief under § 2124(3)(E), running from when the noncitizen became or should have become aware that deportation proceedings were initiated as a consequence of the plea — the shortest deadline in the chapter. Jurisdictional gate: § 2124 requires a 'present restraint or other specified impediment' (incarceration, probation/parole, unconditional discharge, unpaid fine or restitution, unperformed community service, future-served sentence, NCR commitment). A petitioner with no qualifying restraint is outside ch. 305-A, and habeas has been replaced — a standing gap, not an alternative writ; I did not find a controlling case resolving what remedy such a person has. DNA testing is a separate chapter, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-B (§§ 2136-2138), and I found no limitation period in § 2138 — that route appears untimed. No capital variant exists; ch. 305-A draws no capital/non-capital distinction. Confirming Law Court case law could not be read: CourtListener opinion pages returned HTTP 202/401 challenges and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked, so every figure above rests on the statutes themselves, which are dispositive and controlling here." }, { "slug": "maryland", "state": "Maryland", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(a) (whole subtitle, §§ 3-701 to 3-707, read; contains no limitations period); confirmed as a surviving remedy by Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011)", "habeas_quote": "A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus", "habeas_url": "https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=3-702&enactments=false", "pc_vehicle": "Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (UPPA), Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101 to 7-301", "pc_deadline_days": 3650, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b)", "pc_quote": "Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.", "pc_url": "https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Laws/StatuteText?article=gcp§ion=7-103&enactments=false", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.", "character_instrument": "Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none, at any point in Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-701 to 3-707, all of which I read. Two clocks in that subtitle are decoys and must not be reported as filing deadlines: § 3-706(a) gives a judge 5 days to file a memorandum after discharging someone on unconstitutionality grounds, and § 3-707(b)(1) gives 10 days to apply for leave to appeal in BAIL habeas cases. Neither limits when a petition may be filed. Habeas is NOT subsumed and NOT abolished. Crim. Proc. § 7-107(b)(1) expressly contemplates 'a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus' — and takes away only the appeal, providing such a person 'may not appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland or the Appellate Court of Maryland.' That is a preclusion of appellate review, not a limitations period; a comparison that reads § 7-107 as a habeas deadline is wrong. Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019) (slip op. 29), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011): 'The UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies.' Accord Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447 (1960) (UPPA 'did not abrogate the remedies formerly available under the writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis... it clearly took away the right of appeal'); Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658 (1990) ('for constitutional reasons the General Assembly did not restrict the authority of judges to issue writs of habeas corpus'). WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': Maryland's narrowing is not the survey's canonical jurisdictional/facially-void shape, so flagging the mismatch. Habeas survives with full force and no deadline where the UPPA provides no remedy (e.g. parole, diminution credits, conditions and duration of confinement — Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502 (2001); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 (1994)). But as a route to attack a CONVICTION it is doubly constrained: (1) zero appellate review under § 7-107(b)(1), so relief depends on a single circuit judge with no error correction, and (2) the UPPA was enacted, per Gluckstern at 658, 'in place of the common law habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and sentences,' and courts route such claims there — see Simms v. Shearin, 221 Md. App. 460 (2015) (dismissing appeal; petitioner 'did not file his petition for writ of habeas corpus for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of his conviction'); Green v. Hutchinson, 158 Md. App. 168 (2004). Also, § 3-703(a) makes issuance discretionary where the petitioner has already had a hearing on a prior petition under the same commitment. UPPA DETAILS: the 10 years runs from IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE, not from finality of direct appeal — a materially earlier trigger than the federal AEDPA clock, worth flagging for any legislator comparison. Subject to an 'extraordinary cause' escape (§ 7-103(b)); only one petition per trial or sentence (§ 7-103(a)); a concluded proceeding may be reopened 'if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice' (§ 7-104) with no time limit on reopening. § 7-102(a) otherwise permits filing 'at any time' subject to §§ 7-103 and 7-104. UPPA covers persons 'confined under sentence of imprisonment' or 'on parole or probation' (§ 7-101, as quoted in Sabisch slip op. 30). CAPITAL: no capital-specific deadline exists; Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013, so the distinction is now moot. NOT VERIFIED: Md. Rule 15-303 (habeas procedure) — the Maryland Judiciary publishes the Rules only through Westlaw, which is paywalled and unfetchable, so I could not read the rule text. Maryland cases cite Rule 15-303(e)(3) as a ground for summary denial (successive/no-relief-warranted petitions), and nothing in the cases citing it suggests it imposes a filing deadline, but I did not confirm the rule's text firsthand. Adjacent statutory remedies exist outside the UPPA — Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (post-conviction DNA testing) and § 8-301 (writ of actual innocence), both referenced in Simms — but I did not read them and make no claim about their deadlines." }, { "slug": "massachusetts", "state": "Massachusetts", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "G. L. c. 248, § 25 (as appearing in St. 1979, c. 344, § 12); see also G. L. c. 248, § 1; Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992); Soura, petitioner, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002)", "habeas_quote": "The court shall have no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, at its discretion for—...a person who is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction.", "habeas_url": "https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIII/TitleIV/Chapter248/Section25", "pc_vehicle": "Motion for postconviction relief / new trial, Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)–(b)", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), amended Sept. 6, 2001, eff. Oct. 1, 2001", "pc_quote": "Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to correct the sentence then being served", "pc_url": "http://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://www.mass.gov/rules-of-criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-rule-30-postconviction-relief", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion", "character_instrument": "Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "MASSACHUSETTS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. Rule 30(a) and 30(b) both say relief may be sought 'at any time'; c. 248 contains no limitations section (all 40 section headings inspected). (1) Habeas is subsumed, not merely narrowed, as to conviction challenges. G. L. c. 248, § 1 grants the writ 'unless— ... Second, He has been convicted or is in execution upon legal process, civil or criminal,' and § 25 removes the discretionary power for anyone 'imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction.' Rule 30's Reporter's Notes to subdivision (a): 'When originally adopted in 1979, this subdivision consolidated the previously distinct procedures of habeas corpus and writ of error.' (2) Habeas survives — with no deadline — only for claims OUTSIDE the conviction: Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992): 'Rule 30 encompasses all motions for postconviction relief that challenge the sentence, conviction, or confinement imposed... a petition for habeas corpus relief does not lie... He must proceed under rule 30'; habeas lies where 'the term of a lawfully imposed sentence has expired' and the petitioner would get immediate release (Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30–31 (1989), good-time forfeiture). Soura, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002): claims centering 'on the indictment, trial, conviction, and sentencing stages' — 'Our habeas corpus statute does not apply in these circumstances. See G. L. c. 248, § 25.' So habeas is not a route to challenge a conviction at all — not even for jurisdictional/void claims. (3) Constitutional caveat: Mass. Const. Pt. II, c. 6, art. 7 guarantees habeas 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner'; Averett (quoting Hennessy, 386 Mass. 848, 852 n.3 (1982)) warned that § 25's total elimination 'may run afoul of' that article, but McCastle, petitioner, 401 Mass. 105, 107 (1987) held 'there is no constitutional impediment to restricting [the petitioner] to rule 30 relief' for a conviction attack. (4) The real Massachusetts limit is waiver, not a clock: Rule 30(c)(2) waives claims not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior Rule 30 motion. (5) No death penalty. Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, a 'capital case' means a murder-in-the-first-degree conviction or a third habitual-offender conviction; after rescript, 'no appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice... on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question' — a gatekeeper, still not a deadline. (6) Reporter's Notes add two boundaries: Rule 30(a) is unavailable to contest a sentence already completed, and an illegally-IMPOSED (as opposed to illegal) sentence must be corrected within Rule 29(a)'s 60 days. (7) mass.gov returns HTTP 403 to non-browser clients; Rule 30 text was read from the Internet Archive capture of the official mass.gov rule page, which shows effective date 10/01/2001 and no amendment since, and the operative wording matches the version quoted by the SJC." }, { "slug": "michigan", "state": "Michigan", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "MCL 600.4307 (Revised Judicature Act of 1961, ch. 43, Habeas Corpus) — right to bring; no period prescribed. Narrowed by MCL 600.4310(3) and Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 485-486 (2007) (published).", "habeas_quote": "An action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on the behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this state under any pretense whatsoever, except as specified in section 4310.", "habeas_url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-600-4307", "pc_vehicle": "Motion for relief from judgment, MCR subchapter 6.500 (Postappeal Relief), MCR 6.501-6.509", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "MCR 6.502(G)(1), Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026) — the only limitation on the motion is numerical, not temporal", "pc_quote": "Except as provided in subrule (G)(2), regardless of whether a defendant has previously filed a motion for relief from judgment, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction.", "pc_url": "https://www.courts.michigan.gov/siteassets/rules-instructions-administrative-orders/michigan-court-rules/michigan-court-rules.pdf", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "no subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal", "character_instrument": "MCR 6.502(G)(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "MICHIGAN HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER TRACK. This is the headline: unlike PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 states, Michigan's post-conviction vehicle carries no one-year (or any) clock, and habeas carries none either. (1) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I read the entire RJA habeas chapter index (MCL 600.4301-600.4370) and the full text of MCR 3.303(A)-(M). Neither prescribes any period for filing. MCL 600.4307 grants the action to any person restrained 'under any pretense whatsoever,' qualified only by subject-matter exclusions in MCL 600.4310, never by time. The writ is constitutionally protected: Const 1963, art 1, Sec 12 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.' (2) WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE': MCL 600.4310 provides that habeas 'may not be brought by or on behalf of ... (3) Persons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.' Published Court of Appeals precedent preserves one lane through that bar. Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 486 (2007), verbatim: 'while plaintiff may not use a habeas proceeding as a substitute for an appeal or to review the merits of his criminal conviction, plaintiff may assert a radical defect in the jurisdiction of the court in which his conviction was obtained.' Moses also states, quoting People v Price, 23 Mich App 663, 669-671 (1970), that relief 'is open to a convicted person in one narrow instance, ... where the convicting court was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime in question,' and that the defect must be 'radical, rendering the conviction absolutely void.' Habeas is thus NOT subsumed or abolished — Moses (2007) postdates the 1989 adoption of subchapter 6.500 and granted the writ to reach the merits of a jurisdictional claim — but it reaches only jurisdictional/void-judgment claims. Moses also notes habeas may be denied in the court's discretion where full relief is available in a more appropriate proceeding. (3) NO POST-CONVICTION DEADLINE: I read MCR 6.501 through 6.509 in full in the official Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026). No subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal: MCR 6.502(G)(1) allows 'one and only one motion' (exceptions in (G)(2) for retroactive change in law, newly discovered evidence including new scientific evidence per (G)(3), or a vacated predicate conviction; plus an innocence waiver), and MCR 6.508(D)(3) bars grounds 'other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal ... unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause ... and (b) actual prejudice.' A person sentenced decades ago may file a first 6.500 motion today; the obstacle is the one-motion rule and the cause-and-prejudice showing, not a clock. (4) EXCLUSIVITY / OPERATIVE: MCR 6.501 — 'Unless otherwise specified by these rules, a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the circuit court not subject to appellate review under subchapters 7.200 or 7.300 may be reviewed only in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.' For an ordinary conviction challenge the 6.500 motion is therefore the operative vehicle; habeas is operative only for a radical jurisdictional defect, where it runs in parallel and is not subject to the one-motion rule. (5) NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Michigan has no death penalty. Const 1963, art 4, Sec 46 — 'No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death.' (6) COMPARISON CAUTION: Michigan is a state where habeas survives with no deadline sitting beside a post-conviction motion that ALSO has no deadline — so the common '1 year' figure quoted for PCRA-type states has no Michigan counterpart on either instrument. Sources fetched and read: legislature.mi.gov (MCL 600.4301 chapter index, 600.4307, 600.4310, Const art 1 Sec 12, Const art 4 Sec 46); courts.michigan.gov official Michigan Court Rules PDF (MCR 3.303, MCR 6.501-6.509); static.case.law/mich-app/274/cases/0481-01.json (Moses full text)." }, { "slug": "minnesota", "state": "Minnesota", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2025); construed in Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979)", "habeas_quote": "A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction ... may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.", "habeas_url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/589.01", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for postconviction relief, Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (Minnesota postconviction remedy act)", "pc_deadline_days": 730, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2025)", "pc_quote": "No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal.", "pc_url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/590.01", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal.", "character_instrument": "Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Minnesota habeas was never abolished and remains a live statutory civil remedy (ch. 589, §§ 589.01-589.30). I read the entire chapter: it contains no limitations period of any kind. Its only time provisions govern the return of the writ (24 hours plus travel time) and the appeal schedule (§ 589.30) — none limit when a petition may be filed. Habeas is nonetheless NARROW as a route to attack a conviction, for two independent reasons. First, § 589.01 by its own terms excludes 'persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal,' and § 589.04(c) requires the petition to affirmatively 'state that the restrained person is not committed or detained under process, judgment, decree, or execution, as specified in section 589.01.' Second, § 590.01, subd. 2 is an express exclusivity clause: the postconviction remedy 'takes the place of any other common law, statutory or other remedies which may have been available for challenging the validity of a conviction, sentence, or other disposition and must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective.' Kelsey (Minn. 1979) states the surviving residue: 'habeas corpus would not be available to a prison inmate who was confined pursuant to a final judgment unless the inmate challenged the jurisdiction of the court rendering the final judgment or the legality of his sentence.' Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) confirms the subsumption is complete and current, describing the habeas route in the past tense: 'Before the Legislature passed the postconviction statute in 1967, we allowed prisoners to bring writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis to challenge their convictions,' and calling subd. 2 an 'exclusivity provision' showing 'the postconviction statute merely codified or replaced preexisting remedies.' Loyd v. Fabian (Minn. App. 2004) states the modern scope: 'limited to constitutional issues, jurisdictional challenges, claims that confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and claims that confinement violates applicable statutes.' In practice habeas today carries execution-of-sentence and custody matters (good time, parole/supervised release, conditions of confinement) rather than conviction validity — the cases I read (Guth 2006, Rud 2007) are all of that type. So the deadline-free habeas route is real but does not reach ordinary trial-error, ineffective-assistance, plea-validity or Brady claims. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: Minnesota's ch. 590 is a purpose-built postconviction act, not habeas, so its 2-year period is a postconviction deadline — the same instrument-mismatch trap as Pennsylvania's PCRA. Note also that the legislature expressly modeled the 2-year period on the federal 1-year habeas limit under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), per legislative history recounted in Carlton — further reason not to read it as a state habeas deadline. THE 2-YEAR BAR IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL: Carlton holds 'the time limitation in subdivision 4(c) does not operate as a jurisdictional bar, and that it therefore is subject to waiver' — the State waives it by failing to plead untimeliness — and that it is 'a statute of limitations subject to equitable principles.' Carlton separately upheld subd. 4(a) as constitutional as applied, 'a reasonable limitation' even assuming a state due process right to one review. PC EXCEPTIONS: § 590.01, subd. 4(b) lists five (disability/mental disease, newly discovered evidence including scientific evidence, new retroactive interpretation of law, pre-May-1-1980 offenses under subd. 3, and a catch-all for petitions that are 'not frivolous and ... in the interests of justice'), but subd. 4(c) imposes a secondary 2-year clock: any petition invoking an exception 'must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.' Separately, subd. 1 codifies a Knaffla-type bar: a petition after a completed direct appeal 'may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal.' THIRD, DEADLINE-FREE VEHICLE FOR ILLEGAL SENTENCES: Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 provides 'The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law,' and Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016) held that 'applying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, to a Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion violates the separation of powers.' The Revisor prints this as a standing note to subd. 4. So a Minnesota prisoner attacking an unauthorized sentence has an untimed route, but it is a rule-based sentence-correction motion, not habeas. CAPITAL: ch. 590 draws no capital/non-capital distinction — no separate capital track or deadline appears anywhere in the statute. Sources read in full text: revisor.mn.gov for §§ 589.01, ch. 589 complete, 590.01, and Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03; static.case.law for Kelsey (283 N.W.2d 892), Loyd (682 N.W.2d 688), Guth (716 N.W.2d 23), Rud (743 N.W.2d 295), Carlton (816 N.W.2d 590), and Reynolds (888 N.W.2d 125)." }, { "slug": "mississippi", "state": "Mississippi", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Laws 1984, ch. 378, § 2), quoted and applied in Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA (Miss. Ct. App.)", "habeas_quote": "abolishes the common law writs relating to post-conviction collateral relief, including by way of illustration but not limitation, error coram nobis, error coram vobis, and post-conviction habeas corpus, as well as statutory post-conviction habeas corpus", "habeas_url": "https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO182639.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to 99-39-29", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)", "pc_quote": "A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi", "pc_url": "https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-ms/transforms/ms/ocms/r73/gov.ms.code.title.99.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi", "character_instrument": "Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)", "status": "verified", "notes": "Mississippi is the opposite of the no-deadline-habeas states. State habeas does NOT lie to challenge a conviction or sentence: § 99-39-3(1) makes the UPCCRA the 'exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences' and expressly abolishes BOTH common-law and statutory post-conviction habeas. Habeas survives only outside collateral attack — the general writ, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-1 ('shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention'), carries no filing deadline anywhere in ch. 11-43, but the 1984 Act (which itself amended § 11-43-9) removed conviction challenges from it; Walker v. State, 555 So. 2d 738 (Miss. 1990) leaves habeas for pre-conviction/bail matters and calls the UPCCRA 'post-conviction habeas corpus renamed.' Courts recharacterize habeas petitions as PCR motions and apply the 3-year bar: Carter v. State, No. 2024-CP-01328-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2025) (petition 'labeled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' treated as PCR, time-barred), https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO187475.pdf. Clock runs from the direct-appeal ruling, or if no appeal from expiration of the appeal time, or for guilty pleas from entry of the judgment of conviction. CAPITAL CASES ARE SHORTER, NOT LONGER: § 99-39-5(2) — 'Likewise excepted are filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases which shall be made within one (1) year after conviction' (365 days). Statutory exceptions to the 3-year bar: intervening Mississippi/U.S. Supreme Court decision; newly discovered, practically conclusive evidence; untested or retestable biological/DNA evidence; expired sentence or unlawfully revoked probation/parole. The bar hardened recently — Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶8) (Miss. 2023) overruled the judicially crafted 'fundamental-rights exception,' so illegal-sentence and fundamental-constitutional-right claims no longer escape the 3 years; only the express statutory exceptions remain. One unverified point: 2026 H.B. 1751 (Corrections Omnibus Act) brought §§ 99-39-5 and 99-39-27 forward 'for purposes of possible amendments'; billstatus.ls.state.ms.us was unreachable (TLS chain error) so I could not confirm from a primary source whether it was enacted or whether it altered the period. The introduced version was a bring-forward with no change to the three-year language, and the most recent primary source read — the Oct. 28, 2025 Carter opinion citing § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020) — applies three years. Statutory text cross-validated against courts.ms.gov opinions quoting §§ 99-39-3(1) and 99-39-5(2) verbatim." }, { "slug": "missouri", "state": "Missouri", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91.01(b) (habeas rule; no limitations period anywhere in Rule 91's 21 subsections or in RSMo ch. 532); narrowed by State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) and State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010)", "habeas_quote": "Any person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint.", "habeas_url": "https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/383941561647affc86256ca600521382?OpenDocument", "pc_vehicle": "Motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment or sentence — Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (conviction after trial) and Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (conviction after guilty plea)", "pc_deadline_days": 180, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b) (identical text in R. 24.035(b))", "pc_quote": "If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered.", "pc_url": "https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/89f239ab81bc1c9686256ca60052147d?OpenDocument", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered.", "character_instrument": "Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b) (identical text in R. 24.035(b))", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE — stated explicitly. No filing time limit appears in Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91 (read all 21 subsection headings, 91.01, 91.02, 91.04 in full) or in RSMo ch. 532 (read the full chapter index and 532.010, 532.040). R. 91.04(a) lists the required contents of a petition and includes no timeliness allegation. Concrete proof it is not merely theoretical: in State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010) (unanimous), the Missouri Supreme Court discharged a petitioner in 2010 on a March 2003 guilty plea — roughly seven years after the 180-day Rule 24.035 window closed. Missouri's high court still entertains original Rule 91 petitions today (e.g. State ex rel. Dorsey v. Vandergriff, decided 2024-03-20; In re Branson v. Shewmaker, 2025-04-29). WHY 'narrow', NOT 'available': Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) (unanimous) holds 'habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction proceedings. Habeas corpus may be used to challenge a final judgment after an individual's failure to pursue appellate and post-conviction remedies only to raise jurisdictional issues or in circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results.' Zinna restates the modern gateway test, quoting Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2002): default is excused only on '(1) a claim of actual innocence or (2) a jurisdictional defect or (3)(a) that the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense ... and (b) prejudice ...'. This is broader than pure jurisdictional/facially-void review but is clearly not a general route. WHY NOT 'subsumed': R. 29.15(a) and 24.035(a) say the motion is 'the exclusive procedure by which such person may seek relief IN THE SENTENCING COURT' (emphasis added) — a court-specific exclusivity. R. 91.02(a) directs the habeas petition to the circuit or associate circuit judge 'for the county in which the person is held in custody,' a different court, which is why the post-conviction rules did not extinguish the writ. Zinna nonetheless describes R. 24.035/29.15 as intended to be a 'single, unitary, post-conviction remedy, to be used in place of other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus' — so the two coexist in tension, with habeas as the residual. SECOND PC DEADLINE: the same rules impose 90 days after the appellate mandate issues if a direct appeal was taken ('If an appeal of the judgment or sentence sought to be vacated, set aside or corrected is taken, the motion shall be filed within 90 days after the date the mandate of the appellate court issues affirming such judgment or sentence.'). The 180-day figure reported here is the no-appeal track. Missed deadlines are fatal: 'Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver.' VERSION CAVEAT: the current rule runs 180 days from 'the date the sentence is entered.' Older versions ran 180 days from delivery to the Department of Corrections (Zinna recites that formulation), and R. 29.15(m)/24.035(m) preserve the pre-2018 version for sentences pronounced before Jan. 1, 2018. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but R. 91.02(b) lets a person 'held in custody pursuant to a conviction for a capital crime and a sentence of death' whose conviction the Supreme Court has affirmed file the Rule 91 petition 'in this Court in the first instance,' and deems any such petition filed elsewhere to have been filed there. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003) — a 4-3 decision — first recognized a freestanding actual-innocence habeas claim, framed as whether 'a Missouri prisoner sentenced to death can obtain habeas relief on a claim of actual innocence alone'; Zinna and Brown state actual innocence as a gateway without a capital limitation. SUCCESSIVE-WRIT RULE, NOT A DEADLINE: RSMo 532.040 bars an inferior court from entertaining an application already refused by a superior court. ONE MORE NO-DEADLINE ROUTE (not defendant-initiated): RSMo 547.031.1 (2021, am. 2024) lets a prosecuting or circuit attorney 'file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time' on information of possible innocence — the vehicle in the Lamar Johnson, Christopher Dunn and Marcellus Williams proceedings. Sources read in full: revisor.mo.gov (ch. 532 index, 532.010, 532.040, 547.031); courts.mo.gov Supreme Court Rules (91.01, 91.02, 91.04, 29.15, 24.035); static.case.law (Simmons 866 S.W.2d 443, Jaynes 63 S.W.3d 210, Zinna 301 S.W.3d 510, Amrine 102 S.W.3d 541)." }, { "slug": "montana", "state": "Montana", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, ¶ 22, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337 (construing Mont. Code Ann. § 46-22-101(2) against Mont. Const. art. II, § 19)", "habeas_quote": "as applied to a facially invalid sentence--a sentence which, as a matter of law, the court had no authority to impose--the procedural bar created by § 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/mont/334/cases/0270-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for postconviction relief, Montana Postconviction Hearing Act, Mont. Code Ann. tit. 46, ch. 21", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1) (2025)", "pc_quote": "a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final", "pc_url": "https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0460/chapter_0210/part_0010/section_0020/0460-0210-0010-0020.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final", "character_instrument": "Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly because it is the finding most easily lost. Title 46, ch. 22 contains no limitations period anywhere: I read the section lists for all three parts (Part 1 Availability, Part 2 Issuance, Part 3 Return/Hearing/Appeal) and no section imposes one. Section 46-22-204 runs the other way: 'The writ of habeas corpus or any associated process may be issued and served on any day or at any time.' Lott itself is the proof — the court granted the writ in 2006 on a sentence imposed in 1992, fourteen years earlier, expressly acknowledging both the appeal and postconviction windows had long closed. But the remedy is NARROW, not open. Section 46-22-101(2) provides: 'The writ of habeas corpus is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal. The relief under this chapter is not available to attack the legality of an order revoking a suspended or deferred sentence.' Lott held that bar unconstitutional ONLY as applied to a facially invalid sentence, and was careful to distinguish sentence from conviction (¶ 23: 'Since Lott has challenged his sentence and not the underlying conviction, he is not entitled to be released but only to be resentenced'). So a person attacking the CONVICTION itself has no habeas route at all once appeal is exhausted — hence operative = post_conviction. A person attacking a facially invalid SENTENCE has a live, deadline-free habeas route. Lott is current law, not a historical artifact: the Montana Supreme Court applied it and granted the writ in Bokma v. Olsen, 2025 MT 37, ¶¶ 11-12, 15, which also holds that denial of earned credit for time served or elapsed time 'creates a facially invalid sentence which we may review in a habeas corpus proceeding.' Habeas also remains unrestricted by § 46-22-101(2) for restraint not resting on a court-of-record conviction — pretrial detention, bail (§ 46-22-103), and petitioners who have not yet exhausted appeal. POST-CONVICTION EXCEPTIONS: § 46-21-102(2) allows a newly-discovered-evidence-of-innocence claim within 1 year of the date the petitioner discovers or reasonably should have discovered the evidence, whichever is later — a discovery-rule extension, not a suspension. Section 46-21-101(1) additionally requires that the petitioner have 'no adequate remedy of appeal.' TRANSITIONAL: the 1-year period is not universal — Lott n.2 records that it 'went into effect on April 24, 1997, and applies to all persons convicted on or after April 24, 1996,' with a 5-year deadline for earlier convictions (citing State v. Wright, 2001 MT 247, ¶ 9, and Hawkins v. Mahoney, 1999 MT 82, ¶ 9). Nearly all live cases now fall under the 1-year rule. CAPITAL: § 46-21-102 as read draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the 1-year period is uniform on its face. I did not separately verify whether other chapter 21 provisions alter capital timing, so treat any capital-specific variation as unverified. Also unverified: judicially created equitable exceptions to the § 46-21-102 bar (Montana case law recognizes a narrow fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice escape) — I did not read those cases, so that point rests on no primary source here. COMPARISON WARNING for the legislator's question: quoting '1 year' as Montana's habeas deadline would be wrong twice over. The 1-year figure belongs to a separate statutory remedy in a different chapter, and Montana's habeas remedy — unlike Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61 model, where habeas was fully subsumed — was never abolished and carries no time limit, because Mont. Const. art. II, § 19 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended') sets a constitutional floor the legislature cannot statutorily close." }, { "slug": "nebraska", "state": "Nebraska", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824 (habeas corpus article — contains no limitations period); Tyrrell v. Frakes, 309 Neb. 85, 958 N.W.2d 673 (2021)", "habeas_quote": "In the case of a prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of conviction, habeas corpus is available as a remedy only upon a showing that the judgment, sentence, and commitment are void.", "habeas_url": "https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewOpinion?docId=N00007804PUB", "pc_vehicle": "Nebraska Postconviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) (added by Laws 2011, LB137, § 1; amended Laws 2023, LB50, § 18)", "pc_quote": "A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: (a) The date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal", "pc_url": "https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3001", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief.", "character_instrument": "Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Nebraska's habeas article (Ch. 29, art. 28) runs §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824; I read the Legislature's full Chapter 29 section index and every heading in that range, and no section imposes a limitations period on filing the writ. The article's only 'limitation' heading, § 29-2813, is a two-year bar on DAMAGES actions for false imprisonment ('shall be sued or molested for any offense against the provisions of said sections, unless within two years after the time when such offense shall have been committed'), not on the petition (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-2813). Section 29-2801 directs that on a proper application it is the judge's 'duty forthwith to allow a writ of habeas corpus' — no timing precondition. NARROWING: § 29-2801 by its own terms excludes 'persons convicted of some crime or offense for which they stand committed.' Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 384 (2016) (official PDF, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2016/12/23/sanders_v._frakes.pdf): 'unless the conviction is void, those who \"stand committed\" pursuant to a final conviction are excluded from the scope of the relief afforded by the writ of habeas corpus in Nebraska.' Sanders also holds habeas will NOT reach a claim that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional. So the no-deadline writ buys a petitioner only jurisdictional/facially-void claims. NOT SUBSUMED — this is the key structural finding. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3003 ('Postconviction remedy; cumulative'): 'The remedy provided by sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 is cumulative and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state. Any proceeding filed under [the Act] which states facts which if true would constitute grounds for relief under another remedy shall be dismissed without prejudice.' (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3003). State v. Boeggeman, 316 Neb. 581, 596-97 (2024) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00011033PUB): 'Although many states have adopted a unitary postconviction remedy that has replaced all existing procedures and encompasses all claims ... Nebraska has not. \"The remedy provided by [the Nebraska Postconviction Act] is cumulative ....\" ... For example, Nebraska statutes still provide for motions for a new trial and writs of habeas corpus.' Boeggeman is the cleanest illustration of the contrast: sentenced 2/6/2017, postconviction motion filed 12/21/2020 and held time-barred with no equitable tolling — yet the court said 'At a minimum, an application for a writ of habeas corpus is available to Boeggeman should he continue to be confined beyond the completion date of his Nebraska sentences.' OPERATIVE: for an ordinary constitutional challenge (ineffective assistance, Brady, involuntary plea), the Postconviction Act is the route and the clock is 365 days — Boeggeman calls the Act 'the primary procedure for bringing collateral attacks on final judgments in criminal cases based upon constitutional principles.' Habeas is independently operative, with no deadline, for the narrower void-judgment/jurisdictional set; § 29-3003 affirmatively channels claims out of postconviction when another remedy fits. Hence 'both.' PC LIMIT DETAILS: it is a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional (State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (2015)); it governs successive motions (State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70 (2017)); retroactive application is not ex post facto (Amaya); per the Legislature's official annotation to § 29-3001, for convictions already final when the limit took effect the year ran from 8/27/2011 and expired 8/27/2012 (State v. Smith, 286 Neb. 77 (2013)) — annotation read, case text not read. CAPITAL: no longer window. State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84 (2025) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00012173PUB), syllabus pt. 5: the 1-year limit 'governs all postconviction motions, including successive motions and those challenging a death sentence,' and 'even in capital cases, § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling.' Separately, § 29-2801's own text excludes from the writ 'persons committed for treason or felony, the punishment whereof is capital, plainly and specially expressed in the warrant of commitment.' OTHER CUMULATIVE REMEDIES named by Boeggeman and left in force: motion for new trial (§§ 29-2101 to 29-2103), writ of error coram nobis, and plea withdrawal — their deadlines were not established here and are unverified." }, { "slug": "nevada", "state": "Nevada", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 365, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (time limit), read with § 34.720 (scope) and § 34.724(2)(b) (exclusivity); bars held mandatory in State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225 (2005)", "habeas_quote": "Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or ... within 1 year after ... remittitur.", "habeas_url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-034.html", "pc_vehicle": null, "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.724(2)(b) — cited to establish that NO separate post-conviction act exists; the former Post-Conviction Relief Act (NRS 177.315–177.385) was repealed in 1991 and Chapter 177 now contains only appeal provisions (NRS 177.015–177.305)", "pc_quote": "Comprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them.", "pc_url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-177.html", "deadline_character": "good_cause_excusable", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "respondent", "character_basis": "Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "CRITICAL FOR THE COMPARISON — Nevada's 1-year figure IS a habeas deadline, not a PCRA-style substitute-act deadline. Nevada took the opposite path from Pennsylvania/Alabama/Delaware: instead of abolishing habeas and replacing it with a separate act, it kept habeas as the sole vehicle and put the deadline on habeas itself. NRS 34.720 confirms the post-conviction subchapter 'appl[ies] only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus in which the petitioner: 1. Requests relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence; or 2. Challenges the computation of time.' So a conviction challenge is a habeas petition and is subject to NRS 34.726's 1-year bar; there is no deadline-free general-habeas route sitting beside it. NRS 34.390(1) makes this explicit by carving the post-conviction subchapter out of the ordinary duty to grant the writ ('shall grant the writ without delay, except as otherwise provided in NRS 34.720 to 34.830'). RUNNING OF THE YEAR: from entry of the judgment of conviction, or, if a direct appeal was taken, from issuance of the appellate court's remittitur. STATUTORY EXCEPTION: 'good cause shown for delay,' which NRS 34.726(1)(a)-(b) defines as delay not the petitioner's fault AND undue prejudice from dismissal; Riker adds that good cause requires 'an impediment external to the defense.' The bars are not discretionary — Riker, 121 Nev. 225: 'Application of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory,' and 'the statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State.' ADDITIONAL BARS BEYOND THE YEAR: NRS 34.800(2) creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice (laches) once 5 years pass from the judgment or the direct-appeal decision, but the State must specifically plead it; NRS 34.810 separately mandates dismissal of successive petitions and of guilty-plea petitions not alleging an involuntary/unknowing plea or ineffective assistance. CAPITAL CASES: no longer deadline, and Riker rejects any capital softening — 'the f[act] that a habeas petitioner faces a death sentence does not somehow lessen the effect of procedural bars.' NRS 34.820 supplies only a separate counsel-appointment and procedural track for death-sentenced petitioners. NARROW SURVIVING NON-HABEAS ROUTES, each carved out of exclusivity as 'incident to the proceedings in the trial court' under NRS 34.724(2)(a): (1) NRS 176.555 — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' — genuinely no deadline, but it reaches only a facially illegal sentence, not a conviction challenge; (2) NRS 176.165 motion to withdraw a plea, which NRS 34.724(3) (added 2019) permits post-sentence only if it is a first such motion, filed within 1 year of conviction, by a person NOT incarcerated on that charge, and not barred by laches (rebuttable presumption at 5 years) — so it is unavailable to the incarcerated petitioner this comparison concerns. VENUE: NRS 34.738 requires filing in the district court of the county where the conviction occurred. Every figure above was read in the NRS text at the fetched leg.state.nv.us URLs; the Riker quotes were read in the full opinion text at https://static.case.law/nev/121/cases/0225-01.json." }, { "slug": "new-hampshire", "state": "New Hampshire", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Mallard v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, No. 2021-0357, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Jan. 4, 2023) (quoting State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974)); see RSA ch. 534", "habeas_quote": "In contrast, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus \"provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time.\" State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).", "habeas_url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2023/01/04/marc_mallard_v._warden_new_hampshire_state_prison.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for a new trial, RSA ch. 526 (RSA 526:1)", "pc_deadline_days": 1095, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "RSA 526:4 (Time)", "pc_quote": "A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit.", "pc_url": "https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LIII/526/526-mrg.htm", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 'provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time.'", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "NEW HAMPSHIRE HAS NO POST-CONVICTION ACT AND HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE OF ANY KIND. NH never enacted a PCRA/Rule-32-style exclusive remedy, so nothing was subsumed. Three independent routes coexist and Mallard (2023) expressly rejected the Warden's argument that the new-trial motion and habeas are 'functionally equivalent': 'he was permitted to move for a new trial under RSA chapter 526, and he was entitled to collaterally attack trial errors by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if harmful constitutional error could be established.' Within 3 years both vehicles are open; after 3 years habeas alone remains, with no outer limit. || HABEAS SCOPE. RSA ch. 534 (read in full) contains no limitations period at all — RSA 534:2 is a subject-matter carve-out, not a clock, and RSA 534:31's 2-year bar applies only to suits for the chapter's penalties, not to the petition. Habeas is constitutionally entrenched: N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 91, quoted in Mallard, guarantees it 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner.' A caution for readers of the bare statute: RSA 534:2 says persons 'imprisoned upon legal process, civil or criminal, in which the cause of the imprisonment is distinctly expressed' are 'not entitled of right to such writ,' and the historic standard was purely jurisdictional (Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 505). Case law removed that as a practical bar — jurisdiction is 'lost' on constitutional error. Bonser v. Courtney, 124 N.H. 796, 807-08 (1984) (read at static.case.law/nh/124/cases/0796-01.json): 'a plaintiff by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may collaterally attack that proceeding, after the time for direct appeal has expired, if harmful constitutional error can be established.' Mallard confirms ineffective-assistance claims need not be raised on direct appeal and are properly brought in habeas, and granted relief on a 2013 conviction attacked in 2020. Classified 'available,' not 'narrow.' || NON-TIME LIMITS (these are what actually bar late petitioners, not a clock). Habeas is not a substitute for direct appeal, so a claim that could have been raised on appeal may be procedurally defaulted — Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988) (read at static.case.law/nh/131/cases/0138-01.json); Sleeper v. Warden, 155 N.H. 160, 162-63 (2007) (cited in Mallard, not separately read). Res judicata does not apply to habeas (Gobin v. Hancock, 96 N.H. 450), so successive petitions raising different issues survive. LACHES: the superior court in Mallard acknowledged 'no statute of limitations for habeas petitions' in NH but dismissed a 9-year-old petition as 'untimely under something akin to laches'; the Supreme Court REVERSED, assuming without deciding that laches could apply and holding the State bears the burden of showing delay that was both unreasonable and prejudicial. Delay alone is therefore not a bar, and laches remains formally undecided. || RSA 526:4 REACHES CRIMINAL CASES. Two primary confirmations: Mallard applied RSA ch. 526 to a criminal new-trial motion, and RSA 651-D:2, I permits a DNA petition 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4, at any time after conviction' — a carve-out only needed because 526:4 otherwise binds post-conviction petitioners. || OTHER. Post-conviction DNA testing, RSA 651-D:2 (gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/651-D/651-D-mrg.htm), has no deadline. CAPITAL: no separate capital post-conviction track was located in the NH statutes; not independently verified, treat as unverified. Note courts.nh.gov 403s datacenter requests; the Mallard slip opinion was retrieved from CourtListener's storage mirror of the court's own PDF." }, { "slug": "new-jersey", "state": "New Jersey", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "N.J.S.A. 2A:67-14(b) (Habeas Corpus Act, L.1951 (1st SS), c.344); accompanied by N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d); applied in Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958)", "habeas_quote": "The persons hereinafter specified shall not be entitled to prosecute writ of habeas corpus: ... b. Any person committed or restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction", "habeas_url": "https://law.onecle.com/new-jersey/title-2a/2a-67-14.html", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for post-conviction relief under N.J. Ct. R. 3:22 (court rule, not a statute — New Jersey has no post-conviction statute)", "pc_deadline_days": 1825, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1) (official text, njcourts.gov, amendments through June 1, 2026)", "pc_quote": "Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of this rule, no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged", "pc_url": "https://njcourts.gov/jsonapi/taxonomy_term/rules_of_court?filter%5Bname%5D=Limitations", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry", "character_instrument": "N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "INSTRUMENT WARNING. New Jersey is the mirror image of the trap in the question. Its habeas act has NO filing deadline — the Habeas Corpus Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:67-1 to -36, contains no limitations period on the writ (the only 'Limitation' section, 2A:67-11, is a 2-year limit on damages actions for offenses against the chapter, not on filing). But that costs the state nothing, because the writ is statutorily unavailable to the very people who would use it: 2A:67-14(b) bars habeas to anyone 'restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.' A no-deadline habeas that a convicted person may not file is not a route. Do not score New Jersey as 'habeas, unlimited.'\n\nTHREE INDEPENDENT LOCKS, all read verbatim. (1) Statute: 2A:67-14(b), above. (2) Rule, exclusivity — R. 3:22-3, official njcourts.gov text, unchanged since Sept. 1, 2009: 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey, a petition pursuant to this rule is the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime.' (3) Rule, absorption — R. 3:22-2(d) makes cognizable on PCR 'Any ground heretofore available as a basis for collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common-law or statutory remedy.' Case application: Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958) quotes 2A:67-14(b) and holds 'habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy in this State where a person confined as an habitual criminal seeks to attack an underlying conviction on the ground that the court in which such conviction took place had no jurisdiction to try or convict him.' State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992): 'Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.' State v. Staruch, 326 N.J. Super. 245, 249 (App. Div. 1999) quotes R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d) verbatim.\n\nWHY NOT 'NARROW'. New Jersey does not leave the usual jurisdictional/void-judgment residue outside the rule. Jurisdictional attacks are themselves a PCR ground — R. 3:22-2(b), 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon defendant's conviction' — and so carry the same 5-year bar. Habeas does still lie in New Jersey for NON-conviction restraint: 2A:67-13(a)-(e) reaches persons held for a criminal matter, on civil process, under any pretense, pretrial for bail purposes, or confined in a psychiatric facility. Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2000) is a live modern application of 2A:67-14 — in a civil matter, where the court noted the petitioner's reliance on R. 3:22 was misplaced because that rule governs criminal post-conviction relief. So the writ is alive; it just does not reach convictions.\n\nRESIDUAL CARVE-OUT, FLAGGED NOT ASSERTED. R. 3:22-3 opens 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey.' The natural referent is the state suspension clause (N.J. Const. art. I, para. 14). I could NOT retrieve the constitutional text from any primary source reachable from this host (njleg.state.nj.us returns a bot wall), so I do not assert its wording, and I found no modern New Jersey decision using that clause to permit a free-standing habeas attack on a conviction. Treat it as a theoretical reservation, not a working route.\n\nPCR DEADLINE DETAIL. 5 years is a calendar-year period, not a day count; 1825 = 5 x 365 and is an approximation supplied only to fill the integer field. Two features make it less generous than 5 years sounds: (a) it runs from ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION under R. 3:21-5, not from finality of direct appeal, so the clock runs throughout the direct appeal; and (b) R. 3:22-3 forbids filing PCR while a direct appeal or trial-court motion is pending. R. 3:22-12(a)(3) softens this by treating a petition dismissed without prejudice for that reason as a first petition if refiled within 90 days of the direct-appeal judgment (or within the 5 years). Escapes from the bar are only R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) — excusable neglect for the delay PLUS a reasonable probability that enforcing the bar would work a fundamental injustice — and (a)(1)(B), 'it alleges a claim for relief as set forth in paragraph (a)(2)(A) or paragraph (a)(2)(B) of this rule and is filed within the one-year period set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this rule' (i.e., a new retroactive constitutional right, or a factual predicate not earlier discoverable through reasonable diligence). R. 3:22-12(b): 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein.' Second or subsequent petitions: 1 year from the latest of the three triggers in R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A)-(C), plus the gatekeeping of R. 3:22-4(b).\n\nCORRECTION TO WIDELY-CIRCULATED STALE TEXT. Two post-2010 changes defeat most secondary summaries and every free full-text reproduction of R. 3:22 I could find (courtcaddy.com's copy stops at the Feb. 1, 2010 version). Per the rule's own official Note: 'paragraph (a)(1) amended, paragraph (b) deleted, and paragraph (c) redesignated paragraph (b) July 28, 2017 to be effective September 1, 2017.' So (i) subparagraphs (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) were added in 2017, codifying State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 399-400 (App. Div. 2013); and (ii) the old capital-causes provision — 30 days from denial of certiorari in death-penalty cases — was DELETED effective Sept. 1, 2017. There is now NO capital/non-capital difference in the New Jersey deadline; New Jersey repealed capital punishment in 2007. Separately, R. 3:22-2(e) (IAC for failure to file a requested direct appeal) was added effective Sept. 1, 2018.\n\nTWO GENUINELY UNLIMITED ROUTES that a comparison should not miss, both read in full from the official rule text. R. 3:21-10(b): 'A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time ... (5) correcting a sentence not authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice' — illegal-sentence correction has no deadline, and R. 3:22-2(c) expressly routes such claims there when not paired with another PCR ground. R. 3:20-2: 'A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made at any time.' So a New Jersey petitioner outside the 5 years is not necessarily remediless; the relief just is not called habeas and is not PCR.\n\nSOURCING. Court rules were read from njcourts.gov's own content API (jsonapi/taxonomy_term/rules_of_court), which returns the canonical rule body that the public rules pages render only in JavaScript; the page banner states 'Includes amendments effective on or before June 1, 2026.' Human-readable equivalents: /attorneys/rules-of-court/322-3-exclusiveness-of-remedy-not-substitute-appeal-or-motion, /322-2-grounds, /322-12-limitations, /321-10-reduction-or-change-of-sentence, /320-2-time-making-motion. The 5-year period was additionally confirmed against the Supreme Court's own adopting order (njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2010/01/n100119c.pdf) and against Appellate Division opinions from 2024 (a0324-22) and 2026 (a0124-24), both of which block-quote the rule. Statutes were read on law.onecle.com, whose Title 2A text is a snapshot last modified October 11, 2016 and does reflect the 2013 amendment to 2A:67-13 (P.L.2013, c.103); 2A:67-14 shows no amendment since L.1951 (1st SS), c.344. I could not reach an official New Jersey statute database from this host (njleg.state.nj.us serves a bot wall; the LIS gateway is a session-based frameset), so a hypothetical amendment to 2A:67-14 after October 2016 would not be reflected here — though P.L.2023, c.250 amended a neighboring section (2A:67-8) without disturbing the chapter, indicating Chapter 67 remains live law. Case text from the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law); case identification via CourtListener's HTML search (its API and opinion pages return 403/202 to this host). Justia, FindLaw, casetext, courtrules.net and casemine were unreachable or barred and are not relied on anywhere above." }, { "slug": "new-mexico", "state": "New Mexico", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 (N.M. Sup. Ct.); accord Rule 5-802 NMRA (habeas corpus), which contains no filing deadline for conviction/sentence challenges", "habeas_quote": "Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners and since this is not a successive habeas petition, these cases are inapposite.", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/nm/142/cases/0191-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6 'Post-conviction remedy' (a § 2255-style motion to vacate, preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA); separately, Rule 5-803 NMRA 'post-sentence relief' for petitioners who have completed their sentences", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6(A)", "pc_quote": "A motion for such relief may be made at any time.", "pc_url": "https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/4379/1/document.do", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners", "character_instrument": "State Habeas Corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "NEW MEXICO IS A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE, AND HABEAS IS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE — the opposite of the PCRA pattern. New Mexico never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act; instead its § 2255-style post-conviction statute was preempted BY habeas. The NMSA annotations to § 31-11-6 state: 'Preemption by Rule 5-802 NMRA. — This section has been preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA, which governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Peppers, 1990-NMCA-057' and 'Habeas corpus. — An inmate may not resort to this section when the relief sought can be obtained directly by writ of habeas corpus... Cummings v. State, 2007-NMSC-048' (same URL as pc_url). Note that even the preempted statute carried no deadline (§ 31-11-6(A), quoted above). SCOPE OF HABEAS: Rule 5-802(A) NMRA — 'This rule governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody or under restraint for a determination that such custody or restraint is, or will be, in violation of the constitution or laws of the State of New Mexico or of the United States; that the district court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or that the sentence was illegal or in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.' Not narrowed to jurisdictional/void claims — it reaches ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, illegal search, etc. Source read: https://twelfthdistrict.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2024/01/Rule-5-802-Habeas-Corpus.pdf. NO-DEADLINE CONFIRMED TWICE: the official committee commentary published with Rule 5-802 (2009 amendments) states 'Although there is no time limit for filing a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the date of filing can have an impact on the deadline for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,' and later 'Because there are no filing deadlines for filing state habeas petitions by unrepresented inmates in New Mexico...' (same Rule 5-802 PDF). NO LACHES EITHER: Sutphin ¶ 15 — 'We expressly join those jurisdictions that have declined to apply laches to habeas proceedings' (habeas_url). TWO NUMBERS IN RULE 5-802 THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE DEADLINES AND MUST NOT BE MISCODED AS SUCH: (1) Rule 5-802(C)(1)(b) gives a NMCD inmate one (1) year to petition challenging a prison DISCIPLINARY decision — a conditions-of-confinement claim, filed in a separate case in the county of confinement (Rule 5-802(E)(2)); it has nothing to do with attacking a conviction, and is waived if NMCD fails to give written notice of the limit. (2) Rule 5-802(L)(3) — in DEATH PENALTY cases, 'unless an extension of time is granted for good cause shown, within one-hundred eighty (180) days after appointment, the defendant shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' That 180-day capital provision is the only fixed habeas filing deadline in the rule; New Mexico's repeal of capital punishment and the current absence of death-sentenced prisoners was NOT verified from a primary source in this run, so treat the practical reach of (L)(3) as unverified. THE OUT-OF-CUSTODY TRACK: habeas requires custody or restraint, so someone who has finished the sentence uses Rule 5-803 NMRA instead (successor to coram nobis; superseded Rule 1-060(B) for post-sentence criminal matters). Rule 5-803(C) has a timeliness standard but no fixed period. Quoted verbatim in State v. Otero, 2020-NMCA-030 ¶ 8: a motion must be brought 'within a reasonable time after the completion of the petitioner's sentence[.]' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/February-25-2020-State-of-New-Mexico-v.-Miguel-Otero-No.-A-1-CA-37742.pdf), and in Pruit v. State, No. A-1-CA-38370 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2022) ¶ 7: filed 'within a reasonable time' unless the district court 'finds good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/August-18-2022-Randal-K.-Pruit-v.-State-of-New-Mexico-No.-A-1-CA-38370.pdf). Pruit and McGarrh v. State (A-1-CA-39044, Apr. 26, 2022) reject the argument that a fundamental-error claim escapes the reasonable-time requirement. So: for a person still in custody, filing today, there is NO deadline whatsoever; for a person off paper, the bar is a discretionary reasonableness standard, not a clock. OTHER NUMBERS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, ALSO NOT HABEAS DEADLINES: Rule 5-801 NMRA gives 90 days to move to REDUCE a sentence (discretionary leniency, not a validity challenge); its committee commentary says 'Motions challenging the legal validity of a conviction or a sentence should be brought under Rule 5-802 or Rule 5-803 NMRA.' The 120/90/45-day figures in Rule 5-802(H) are court- and counsel-side processing deadlines running from the file-stamp date after a petition arrives, not filing deadlines for the petitioner. Statutory habeas also survives independently at NMSA 1978 §§ 44-1-1 to 44-1-38 (Ch. 44, art. 1); § 44-1-1 — 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty, except in the cases in the following section specified, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus... to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful' — with no limitations period, and the compilation's own annotation to § 44-1-1 reads 'New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitioners. State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045' (https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/4388/1/document.do). Practical caveat for the comparison: the real limits on a stale New Mexico petition are the successive-petition discretion in Rule 5-802(I) and fundamental-error review for claims that could have been raised on direct appeal (Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021; Sutphin ¶ 10) — merits doctrines, not a filing clock. Sources fetched and read: static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project) for Sutphin; nmonesource.com (New Mexico Compilation Commission, official publisher) for NMSA chs. 31 and 44; nmcourts.gov domains for Rule 5-802 and the Court of Appeals opinions." }, { "slug": "new-york", "state": "New York", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7002(a) (art. 70, Habeas Corpus); construed in People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966)", "habeas_quote": "A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state ... may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance.", "habeas_url": "http://law.onecle.com/new-york/civil-practice-law-rules/CVP07002_7002.html", "pc_vehicle": "CPL article 440 motion — CPL 440.10 (motion to vacate judgment); CPL 440.20 (motion to set aside sentence)", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(1)", "pc_quote": "At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that:", "pc_url": "http://law.onecle.com/new-york/criminal-procedure/CPL0440.10_440.10.html", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment", "character_instrument": "N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE, AND NEITHER DOES THE POST-CONVICTION MOTION. New York is a two-track no-deadline state; nothing here resembles a one-year PCRA-style bar. (1) Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed. CPLR art. 70 remains in force and contains exactly twelve sections, 7001-7012 (Application of article; Petition; When the writ shall be issued; Content of writ; Service; Obedience; Warrant; Return; Hearing; Determination; Appeal; Redetention) — verified against the current 2026 section list. None is a limitations provision, and no temporal condition appears in 7002(a). Keitt expressly held the CPLR did not narrow the writ: the Legislature 'did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available under the now repealed Civil Practice Act.' (2) Habeas is 'narrow' rather than 'available' for CONVICTION challenges because of judge-made limits, not a clock. Keitt: habeas tests 'a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right,' but 'Departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated ... by reason of practicality and necessity,' and 'the writ may not be utilized as a substitute for appeal or to again review the errors already passed on in an earlier appeal.' The decisive practical limit is the immediate-release rule: People ex rel. Douglas v. Vincent, 50 N.Y.2d 901 (1980) — no habeas relief 'because the only remedy he seeks would provide him a new trial or new appeal, and not a direction that he be immediately released from custody'; reaffirmed verbatim in People ex rel. Kaplan v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 N.Y.2d 648 (1983). Since almost every conviction challenge seeks retrial rather than release, habeas is not the working vehicle even though it is open indefinitely. (3) CPL 440.10 carries procedural bars, not a time bar. Subd. 2 (mandatory denial: claim already decided on appeal; record-based claim reviewable on a pending appeal; unjustifiable failure to appeal) and subd. 3 (discretionary denial) channel record-based claims to direct appeal. The only timing rules inside the statute are diligence standards, not fixed periods: (1)(g) newly discovered evidence 'must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence,' and (1)(i) trafficking-victim vacatur 'shall be made with due diligence.' CPL 440.20(1) likewise runs 'At any time after the entry of a judgment,' and adds death-sentence-specific grounds — with no deadline attached. (4) Not established here from primary sources: New York's judge-made writ of error coram nobis, the vehicle for ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel (a gap CPL art. 440 does not reach, as the Douglas dissent discusses at length). It is generally understood to carry no time limit, but I did not read the controlling case, so treat that as unverified. (5) Sourcing: quoted text was cross-checked against the current statute as published by the NY Senate (CPL 440.10 updated Feb. 11, 2022; CPLR 7002 updated Aug. 13, 2021) via newyork.public.law, since nysenate.gov returns 403 to this client; the quoted sentences are identical in both. The current CPL 440.10 includes post-2019 amendments (2021 trafficking/misdemeanor paragraphs, ineffective-assistance carve-outs in subd. 2) that the onecle snapshot lacks, but the operative opening phrase 'At any time after the entry of a judgment' is unchanged. Case texts are Harvard CAP scans via static.case.law; CourtListener was rate-limited (HTTP 429) throughout, so no post-1983 confirming decision was read." }, { "slug": "north-carolina", "state": "North Carolina", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17-4(2) (habeas denied where detention rests on a final judgment of a competent tribunal); scope confirmed by In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962), quoted in In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976)", "habeas_quote": "Application to prosecute the writ shall be denied in the following cases: ... (2) Where persons are committed or detained by virtue of the final order, judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction", "habeas_url": "https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_17/GS_17-4.html", "pc_vehicle": "Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR), N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 15A, art. 89 (§§ 15A-1411 to 15A-1422)", "pc_deadline_days": 2557, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a1) (noncapital, seven years), added by S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a); § 15A-1415(a) (capital, 120 days)", "pc_quote": "In a noncapital case, a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed in subdivisions (1) through (5)", "pc_url": "https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_15A/GS_15A-1415.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed", "character_instrument": "N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. All 46 sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 17 were read (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByChapter/Chapter_17.html); no section imposes any time limit on applying for the writ. § 17-3 lets 'Every person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within this State, for any criminal or supposed criminal matter... prosecute a writ of habeas corpus,' with no temporal condition. The only time-flavored provision is § 17-4(3), which bars habeas 'in vacation time' for one who 'willfully neglected, for the space of two whole sessions after his imprisonment' to apply — that removes the vacation-time writ only, not the writ itself. NOT SUBSUMED. This is the key structural point for the comparison: § 15A-1411(c) states verbatim that 'The relief formerly available by motion in arrest of judgment, motion to set aside the verdict, motion for new trial, post-conviction proceedings, coram nobis and all other post-trial motions is available by motion for appropriate relief. The availability of relief by motion for appropriate relief is not a bar to relief by writ of habeas corpus.' So unlike PA's PCRA, AL Rule 32, or DE Rule 61, the NC MAR is expressly NOT the exclusive remedy; the writ survives beside it. WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE.' § 17-4(2) denies the writ to anyone held under a final judgment of a competent tribunal, which is nearly every convicted person. In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976), quoting In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962): 'The only questions open to inquiry are whether on the record the court which imposed the sentence had jurisdiction of the matter or had exceeded its powers.' Stevens adds that the writ 'is not appropriately... a substitute for appeal,' and that § 17-33(2) extends jurisdiction to cases where 'though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission or event, which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be discharged' (read at https://static.case.law/nc-app/28/html/0471-01.html; § 17-33 at https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_17/GS_17-33.html). Dantzic v. State, 279 N.C. 212, 218 (1971) recites the same § 17-4(2) bar. Net: habeas lies with no deadline, but only for a void/jurisdictionally defective judgment or a post-judgment entitlement to release — not for trial error, IAC, or Brady. RECENT AND MATERIAL CHANGE — READ THIS BEFORE COMPARING NC TO OTHER STATES. Until 1 Dec 2025 the NC noncapital MAR had NO deadline at all: the repealed text of § 15A-1415(a) read 'At any time after verdict, a noncapital defendant by motion may seek appropriate relief upon any of the grounds enumerated in this section.' S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a) struck that and added the seven-year § 15A-1415(a1). Its effective-date clause, s. 15(c), reads verbatim: 'This section becomes effective December 1, 2025, and applies to verdicts entered on or after that date' (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/2025-2026/SL2025-70.html). BOTH REGIMES ARE THEREFORE LIVE TODAY (30 Jul 2026): a noncapital verdict entered before 1 Dec 2025 — i.e. essentially the entire current prison population — still has NO MAR deadline; only verdicts from 1 Dec 2025 forward carry the seven-year clock. A one-number answer for NC will be wrong for most petitioners. The 2557 figure is 7 x 365.25 rounded; the statute speaks in years, not days, and runs from the latest of the five events in § 15A-1415(a)(1)-(5), not from conviction. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: § 15A-1415(a) gives capital defendants 120 days from the latest of those events (or from appointment of postconviction counsel, (a)(6)); S.L. 2025-93, s. 6(a) also now requires the hearing within 24 months absent written findings of extraordinary circumstances. EXCEPTIONS TO THE MAR CLOCK: § 15A-1415(c) permits filing 'at any time after verdict' for newly discovered evidence bearing on guilt/innocence or death-penalty eligibility (itself subject to a 'reasonable time of its discovery' rule), a retroactive significant change in law, a fully served sentence, and — noncapital only — good cause plus actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under § 15A-1419(c). § 15A-1415(c1) allows filing at any time with the district attorney's consent, and § 15A-1415(d) allows extensions for good cause. § 15A-1415(b) separately limits which grounds may be raised more than 10 days after entry of judgment. S.L. 2025-70 also repealed grounds (b)(7) and (b)(9) effective 1 Dec 2025. OPERATIVE: the MAR. A person challenging a conviction today files an MAR; habeas will be denied under § 17-4(2) unless the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. But the untimed habeas remedy is a genuine residual backstop, and it matters more after the 2025 amendment: for a post-1 Dec 2025 verdict, a jurisdictional claim under § 15A-1415(b)(2) becomes time-barred by MAR at seven years, while the same defect remains reachable by habeas with no deadline. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a post-amendment NC appellate decision construing § 15A-1415(a1) or its interaction with habeas — none should be expected yet given the 1 Dec 2025 effective date. State v. Daw (N.C. 2024) surfaced as a recent habeas-adjacent NC Supreme Court decision but CourtListener returned HTTP 202/401 on the opinion body and it is outside case.law's coverage, so it is not relied on here." }, { "slug": "north-dakota", "state": "North Dakota", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "N.D. Cent. Code § 32-22-02 (Habeas Corpus — Who not entitled to relief); ch. 32-22 entire", "habeas_quote": "[N]ot entitled to relief from imprisonment or restraint under a writ of habeas corpus ... whenever it appears: ... Except as provided in section 32-22-17, that the person is detained in custody by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction", "habeas_url": "https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t32c22.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D. Cent. Code ch. 29-32.1", "pc_deadline_days": 730, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-01(2)", "pc_quote": "Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final.", "pc_url": "https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t29c32-1.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final.", "character_instrument": "N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-01(2)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read all 43 sections of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-22 and there is no limitations period of any kind — no year/month/day filing bar anywhere in the chapter. North Dakota's short clock lives entirely in the post-conviction act, not in habeas. But habeas is NARROW as a conviction challenge, not a free alternative route: § 32-22-02(2) denies relief to anyone held 'by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction' except on § 32-22-17 grounds, which are jurisdictional/void-process only ('When the jurisdiction of such court or officer has been exceeded'; 'When the process is defective in some matter of substance required by law rendering such process void'; 'When the process is not authorized by any order or judgment of any court nor by any provisions of law') and are themselves 'subject to the restrictions of section 32-22-02.' EXCLUSIVITY: § 29-32.1-01(4) — 'a proceeding under this chapter replaces all other common law, statutory, or other remedies available before July 1, 1985, for collaterally challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence. It is to be used exclusively in place of them.' HABEAS NOT ABOLISHED: § 29-32.1-02 — 'A court in which original jurisdiction in habeas corpus is vested may entertain a habeas corpus proceeding under chapter 32-22 or this chapter. This chapter, to the extent appropriate, governs the proceeding.' Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1985) (read in full at https://static.case.law/nw2d/373/cases/0894-01.json) holds the UPPA cannot abolish habeas: cases finding the Act exclusive 'do not hold that the Uniform Act creates a new remedy and that habeas corpus is abolished. Such a construction of the statute would be blatantly violative of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution,' and 'The right of the people to seek an original writ of habeas corpus in this Court remains ... a cumulative remedy available to those incarcerated in this State.' Jensen construed the predecessor 1969 act (ch. 29-32) but rests on ND Const. art. I, § 14 and art. VI, § 2; still cited, e.g. Jensen v. Little, 459 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1990). UNVERIFIED POINT: because § 29-32.1-02 makes the UPPA govern a habeas proceeding 'to the extent appropriate,' the two-year bar may reach a habeas petition used as a conviction challenge. I found no North Dakota decision applying the two-year bar to a habeas petition, and no modern (post-2013) ND case entertaining habeas as a conviction challenge — so whether the deadline travels into habeas is open. Do not report ND as an unlimited-time habeas state without this caveat. THE 2-YEAR CLOCK IS RECENT: Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶ 12 (read at https://static.case.law/nw2d/882/cases/0724-01.json) — 'Section 29-32,1-01, N.D.C.C., was amended in 2013 to include the two-year statute of limitations and to make the state post-conviction relief process similar to federal habeas corpus.' Before 2013 the UPPA had no filing deadline either. FINALITY (§ 29-32.1-01(2)): runs from expiration of time to appeal to the ND Supreme Court; if appealed, from expiration of time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court; if certiorari sought, from that Court's final order. EXCEPTIONS (§ 29-32.1-01(3)): newly discovered evidence including DNA that would establish the petitioner did not engage in the conduct; a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely filing; or a new retroactively applicable interpretation of federal or state constitutional/statutory law by the U.S. Supreme Court or a ND appellate court — each carrying its own two-year clock from discovery, cessation of the disability, or the retroactive law's effective date. Venue is the court of conviction (§ 29-32.1-03(1)). NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: North Dakota has no death penalty; the maximum is 'Class AA felony, for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed' (§ 12.1-32-01(1), https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t12-1c32.pdf), so no separate capital track exists." }, { "slug": "ohio", "state": "Ohio", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, ¶ 8-9 (Ohio Sup. Ct.); R.C. 2725.05; R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01-2725.28, no limitations period); Ohio Const. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c)", "habeas_quote": "there is a limited exception to the adequate-remedy requirement: 'when a court's judgment is void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.'", "habeas_url": "https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2016/2016-Ohio-1093.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for postconviction relief, R.C. 2953.21", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a) (current version eff. Apr. 12, 2021, H.B. 136)", "pc_quote": "a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal", "pc_url": "https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.21", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal", "character_instrument": "Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key finding. Ohio never abolished or subsumed habeas: Ohio Const. art. I, § 8 forbids suspending the writ and art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c) vests courts of appeals with ORIGINAL jurisdiction in habeas corpus, so the statutory exclusivity clause below cannot displace it. I read every section heading of R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01 through 2725.28) on the official Ohio Laws chapter page (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/chapter-2725) and read R.C. 2725.04 in full, which exhaustively prescribes what a habeas petition must specify — nothing in the chapter imposes any filing period. The only time limits anywhere in the chapter are collateral: six hours to hand over a copy of the commitment warrant on demand (2725.22) and a two-year limit on CIVIL actions to recover forfeitures from officials who disobey the writ (2725.27). Neither is a habeas filing deadline. Leyman itself confirms the practice: 1999 conviction, habeas petition filed 2014, decided on the merits in 2016 with no timeliness bar raised or applied. BUT THE WRIT IS NARROW. R.C. 2725.05 (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2725.05): 'If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court... and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed.' Leyman ¶ 8 adds that the writ is 'generally available only when the petitioner's maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully' (quoting Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213), that the petitioner must be entitled to immediate release, and that 'habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law' — with the void-for-lack-of-jurisdiction exception quoted above. So habeas reaches jurisdictional/facially-void judgments and expired-sentence detention, not ordinary constitutional trial error. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE. R.C. 2953.21(K): 'Subject to the appeal of a sentence for a felony that is authorized by section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, the remedy set forth in this section is the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case...' This is why the 365-day postconviction petition, not habeas, is the operative route for an ordinary claim (ineffective assistance, Brady, etc.) — but it does not and constitutionally cannot extinguish the narrow habeas remedy the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Leyman in 2016. CLOCK MECHANICS. The 365 days runs from the date the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal — not from conviction or from finality — and if no appeal is taken, from expiration of the time to appeal. The figure was 180 days until H.B. 663 (eff. Mar. 23, 2015) raised it to 365; a comparison drawn from older sources will show 180. EXCEPTIONS. R.C. 2953.23(A) (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.23) permits an untimely or successive petition only if the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts, or a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right applies, AND shows by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty; or on qualifying DNA results establishing actual innocence. CAPITAL DIFFERENCES. Same 365 days, but measured from transcript filing in the Ohio Supreme Court rather than the court of appeals; capital petitioners get appointed Rule 20-certified counsel, postconviction discovery, no page limits, and 180 days to amend as of right. The separate serious-mental-illness petition under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv) had its own 365-day window running from the amendment's effective date (Apr. 12, 2021), which has since closed. UNVERIFIED: I did not read the Ohio Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court or the Rules of Appellate Procedure, so I cannot rule out a court-rule timing provision for original actions by primary source; the no-deadline finding rests on the absence of any period in Chapter 2725 plus the Ohio Supreme Court reaching the merits of a 15-year-late petition in Leyman. CourtListener returned HTTP 429 throughout, so no case-law corroboration beyond the Leyman slip opinion was obtainable." }, { "slug": "oklahoma", "state": "Oklahoma", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": 365, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080 (as amended by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2022)", "habeas_quote": "Excluding a timely appeal, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence including, but not limited to, writs of habeas corpus.", "habeas_url": "https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os22.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Application for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1089", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080.1(A) (added by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2022)", "pc_quote": "A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:", "pc_url": "https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os22.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction", "character_instrument": "Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080.1(A)", "status": "verified", "notes": "OKLAHOMA FLIPPED IN 2022. Before Nov. 1, 2022 the non-capital Post-Conviction Procedure Act had NO filing deadline, and § 1080 said only that the Act 'encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods' of attack. Laws 2022, c. 144 did two things: (1) amended § 1080 to name 'writs of habeas corpus' expressly among the replaced remedies, and (2) added § 1080.1, a one-year limitation. So a person filing a state habeas petition to challenge an Oklahoma conviction today is filing a PCPA application, and it is time-barred after one year. NO UNTIMED HABEAS ROUTE SURVIVES for conviction challenges. Trigger is the latest of five dates (§ 1080.1(A)(1)-(5)): finality of direct review in the OCCA or expiration of time to seek it; gubernatorial revocation of parole/conditional release; removal of a state-created impediment; recognition of a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right; or the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence. § 1080.1(B) closes the jurisdictional escape hatch verbatim: 'this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.' § 1080.1(C) applies it to applications filed on or after Nov. 1, 2022. Companion amendment, 22 O.S. § 1086, now requires that 'All grounds for relief available to an applicant under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, including claims challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court, must be raised in his or her original, supplemental or amended application.' THE HABEAS CHAPTER ITSELF (12 O.S. §§ 1331-1355, R.L. 1910) contains no filing deadline of any kind — I read all 25 sections in the current official Title 12 (https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os12.pdf) and there is no limitation period. But it never reached a final conviction anyway: 12 O.S. § 1342 provides 'No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process, whereby the party is in custody... Second. Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.' Habeas therefore survives in Oklahoma only for custody NOT resting on a final conviction — e.g. 22 O.S. § 1079 (review of denial of bail on appeal 'by habeas corpus proceedings before the appellate court'), pretrial detention, extradition, and custody disputes under 12 O.S. § 1354. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND SHORTER: 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(1) requires the capital application be 'filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety (90) days from the date the appellee's brief on direct appeal is filed or, if a reply brief is filed, ninety (90) days from the filing of that reply brief' — 90 days, filed in the OCCA rather than the district court, and § 1089(C) limits capital claims to those that could not have been raised on direct appeal. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION LEFT OPEN — UNVERIFIED: Okla. Const. art. II, § 10 reads 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this State' (verified verbatim from https://www.oklegislature.gov/OKStatutes/CompleteTitles/AllOKConstitutionArticles.rtf). Whether § 1080.1 suspends the writ as to jurisdictional claims is a live question I could not resolve from a primary source. CORROBORATION, NOT AUTHORITY: CourtListener's search API confirms the OCCA is applying § 1080.1 — Hammon v. State, 2023 OK CR 19, 540 P.3d 486 (matched snippet: 'remained the case until November 1, 2022, when Section 1080.1 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes became effective') and Acosta v. State, 2026 OK CR 9 (Feb. 24, 2026) (matched snippet: 'Section 1080.1(A)(1) states: A. A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application'). I could NOT retrieve either full opinion — oscn.net returns HTTP 201 to automated requests and CourtListener's opinion pages return HTTP 202 — so I have not read those opinions and do not rest any figure on them. Every number above comes from statutory text I read in full." }, { "slug": "oregon", "state": "Oregon", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "ORS 34.330 (Who may not prosecute writ), read with ORS 138.540(1) and Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 364-66 (1992)", "habeas_quote": "A person may not prosecute a writ of habeas corpus if: ... (3) Except as provided in ORS 138.530, the person is eligible to obtain post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680.", "habeas_url": "https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors034.html", "pc_vehicle": "Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition, ORS 138.510-138.680", "pc_deadline_days": 730, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "ORS 138.510(3)", "pc_quote": "A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition:", "pc_url": "https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors138.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition", "character_instrument": "ORS 138.510(3)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — but it is not a route to a conviction challenge in Oregon, so the no-deadline fact does not create an unlimited attack on a judgment. I read all of ORS ch. 34 (2025 text, includes 2025 c.476): the habeas sections, ORS 34.310-34.730, contain no limitation period of any kind. The only 60-day limit in chapter 34 is ORS 34.030, which governs the WRIT OF REVIEW (ORS 34.010-34.100), a different writ; the 21-day limit is mandamus (ORS 34.130); the 7-day limit in ORS 34.370 is the court's deadline to rule on a show-cause order, not a petitioner's filing deadline. Habeas is expressly NOT abolished: ORS 138.540(1) ends, 'With the exception of habeas corpus, all common law post-conviction remedies, including the motion to correct the record, coram nobis, the motion for relief in the nature of coram nobis and the motion to vacate the judgment, are abolished in criminal cases.' WHY 'SUBSUMED' RATHER THAN 'NARROW': three primary sources close the conviction-challenge route. (1) ORS 138.540(1): a PCR petition 'shall be the exclusive means, after judgment rendered upon a conviction for a crime, for challenging the lawfulness of such judgment or the proceedings upon which it is based.' (2) ORS 34.330(2)-(3) bars the writ to a person restrained 'by virtue of the judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction' and to any person 'eligible to obtain post-conviction relief.' (3) Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353 (1992) (read in full via static.case.law/or/314/cases/0353-01.json): 'If the procedures provided by that act are a reasonable substitute for the writ of habeas corpus, they are constitutional... Persons desiring that same opportunity, but asserting substantive grounds established in the PCHA, must utilize the procedures set out in that act.' Bartz upheld the PCR limitation period against Or Const Art I, sec 23 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion, or invasion the public safety require it'). NO JURISDICTIONAL CARVE-OUT SURVIVES OUTSIDE PCR: ORS 138.530(1)(b) makes 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon petitioner's conviction' a PCR ground, so even facially-void/jurisdictional attacks are PCR claims. Mueller v. Benning, 314 Or 615, 620 n 2 (1992) (read in full): 'In the statutory scheme, if post-conviction relief is available, habeas corpus generally is not. ORS 34.330(3); ORS 138.540(1).' Twitty v. Maass, 95 Or App 715 (1989) (read in full) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction because PCR was available, and held a petitioner must first litigate that PCR is unavailable before claiming habeas. TWO NARROW RESIDUAL CHANNELS, both deadline-free but not general routes: ORS 138.530(3) provides the PCR act 'shall not be construed to limit the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas corpus as provided in the Constitution of this state' — Or Const Art VII (Amended), sec 2: 'the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in... habeas corpus proceedings' (discretionary, rarely exercised); and ORS 138.530(2) preserves relief 'available prior to May 26, 1959, under the writ of habeas corpus,' but as a rule of construction applied INSIDE a PCR proceeding, not as a separate action. WHERE HABEAS IS STILL FULLY LIVE (no deadline): ORS 138.540(2) — a person restrained under a conviction who 'asserts the illegality of the restraint upon grounds other than the unlawfulness of such judgment' must proceed 'by habeas corpus or other remedies,' expressly including 'unlawful revocation of parole or conditional pardon or completed service of the sentence imposed'; and conditions of confinement under ORS 34.362, which requires facts showing deprivation of a constitutional right 'that requires immediate judicial attention and for which no other timely remedy is practicably available' (Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or 21 (1978); Barrett v. Belleque, 344 Or 91 (2008), both read). PCR DEADLINE MECHANICS: 730 days runs from, per ORS 138.510(3)(a)-(c), entry of judgment in the register if no appeal; the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts; or, if certiorari is sought, the later of denial of certiorari or entry of final state judgment after remand. ESCAPE CLAUSE: the two years does not bar grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition' (ORS 138.510(3)) — a genuine safety valve, not a formality. Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or App 295 (1998) (read in full) upheld the separate retroactive one-year period in ORS 138.510(4) (pre-Aug 5, 1989 convictions; expired Nov 4, 1994) even though it carries NO escape clause, rejecting the argument that a short PCR bar suspends habeas. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but ORS 138.510(2) permits a next-friend petition on behalf of a person convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death on a preponderance showing of mental incapacity or lack of court access plus a significant relationship. EXPIRED SPECIAL WINDOW: Or Laws 2023, ch 368, sec 1 (printed as a note to ORS 138.510) reopened filing 'at any time before December 30, 2024' for nonunanimous-jury-verdict claims notwithstanding ORS 138.510(3) and (4); that window has closed. Text verified against the Oregon Legislature's official ORS pages current through the 2025 session (ORS ch. 138 carries 2025 c.268 amendments; ORS ch. 34 carries 2025 c.476)." }, { "slug": "pennsylvania", "state": "Pennsylvania", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (Ch. 65, §§ 6501–6505, read in full, contains no limitations period); Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007)", "habeas_quote": "Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.", "habeas_url": "https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.065.003.000..HTM", "pc_vehicle": "Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); accord Pa.R.Crim.P. 901(A)", "pc_quote": "Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:", "pc_url": "https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.045.000..HTM", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:", "character_instrument": "42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (PCRA)", "status": "verified", "notes": "PENNSYLVANIA'S HABEAS STATUTE CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE — 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 65 (§§ 6501 Writ not to be suspended, 6502 Power to issue writ, 6503 Right to apply for writ, 6504 Return on writ, 6505 Interference with writ prohibited) was read in full and contains no limitations period of any kind. That fact is, however, almost entirely inoperative for a conviction challenge, and a comparison that stops there would mislead. TWO STATUTES CLOSE THE DOOR. (1) § 6503(b), quoted above, withdraws habeas wherever 'a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.' (2) 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (fetched: https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.042.000..HTM): 'The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.' CASE LAW READ (Caselaw Access Project full text): Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016) (https://static.case.law/a3d/136/cases/0493-01.json) — 'this Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review,' quoting Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013): 'The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.' Descardes holds the bar applies even where the petitioner is INELIGIBLE for PCRA relief (sentence completed) and even where the legal basis for the claim did not exist until after the one-year window closed — cognizability, not eligibility, is the test, so there is no fallback writ. THE RESIDUAL HABEAS IS REAL BUT NARROW AND IS NOT A CONVICTION CHALLENGE. Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007) (https://static.case.law/a2d/938/cases/1034-01.json): 'Despite our prior indications that all claims that can be channeled into the PCRA should be so channeled, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended in this Commonwealth... we have never held that the remedy of habeas corpus does not exist for the rare instance where the PCRA offers no remedy.' West allowed habeas for a substantive-due-process challenge to a nine-year delay in EXECUTING a valid sentence; Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007), discussed at length in West, allowed it for an international-law challenge to carrying out a death sentence. Both attack the continuing validity of custody, not the conviction. Claims that DO attack a conviction — including want of jurisdiction, § 9543(a)(2)(viii), and illegal sentence, § 9543(a)(2)(vii) — are expressly enumerated PCRA grounds and must go through the PCRA. So Pennsylvania is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state for this comparison; it is the opposite of one. THE ONE-YEAR PCRA BAR IS JURISDICTIONAL, not a statute of limitations: Descardes holds that where the petition is untimely or the petitioner ineligible, 'both the PCRA court and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.' § 9545(a) adds that 'No court shall have authority to entertain a request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a petition under this subchapter.' EXCEPTIONS to the year, § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii): governmental interference; facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; a newly recognized constitutional right held by the U.S. or Pennsylvania Supreme Court to apply retroactively. A petition invoking an exception must itself be filed 'within one year of the date the claim could have been presented,' § 9545(b)(2) — this was 60 days until Act 146 of Oct. 24, 2018; the statutory note states the amendment 'shall apply only to claims arising one year before the effective date of section 3 or thereafter.' 'Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review... or at the expiration of time for seeking the review,' § 9545(b)(3). CAPITAL CASES GET NO LONGER PERIOD: § 9542 provides 'Except as specifically provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to capital and noncapital cases'; the capital-specific provisions in § 9545(c) concern stays of execution, not the filing deadline. STANDING: § 9543(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.000..HTM) requires the petitioner to be 'currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole,' awaiting execution, serving a sentence that must expire first, or — subparagraph (iv), added after Descardes — to have 'completed a sentence... and is seeking relief based upon DNA evidence obtained under section 9543.1(d).' ONE GENUINELY UNTIMED ROUTE EXISTS: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.001..HTM) — a convicted person 'may apply by making a written motion to the sentencing court at any time for the performance of forensic DNA testing'; § 9543.1(a)(4) repeats that 'DNA testing may be sought at any time.' That is a testing motion inside the PCRA scheme, not habeas. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE LEGISLATOR: a Pennsylvanian challenging a conviction today has one year from finality under the PCRA, enforced as a jurisdictional bar, with three narrow exceptions each carrying their own one-year clock; state habeas corpus, though never repealed and never subject to any deadline, is unavailable to him because his claim is cognizable under the PCRA." }, { "slug": "rhode-island", "state": "Rhode Island", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9-1 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 1), as construed in DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 600 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Grieco, 430 A.2d 412, 413 n.1 (R.I. 1981))", "habeas_quote": "Every person imprisoned in any correctional institution or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus", "habeas_url": "http://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9/10-9-1.htm", "pc_vehicle": "Post Conviction Remedy, R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 10-9.1", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 3)", "pc_quote": "A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the appropriate court. An application may be filed at any time.", "pc_url": "http://webserver.rilegislature.gov/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-3.htm", "deadline_character": "discretionary", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "respondent", "character_basis": "laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense'", "character_instrument": "R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3", "status": "verified", "notes": "Rhode Island is the inverse of the PCRA-type states: the purpose-built post-conviction act is the one with NO deadline, and habeas is the remedy that was taken away. Both moves came from one session law, P.L. 1974, ch. 220 — § 1 rewrote the habeas statute to carve out convicted prisoners, § 3 created ch. 10-9.1. HABEAS: § 10-9-1 by its own terms excludes 'persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding.' DiLibero holds a habeas petition was therefore 'an inappropriate avenue for relief from imprisonment' for a petitioner 'imprisoned as a result of a final judgment of conviction.' § 10-9.1-1(b) reinforces this: the post-conviction remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' CAUTION ON habeas_no_deadline=true: ch. 10-9 (read in full via its section index, §§ 10-9-1 to 10-9-32) contains no limitations provision of any kind, so the field is literally true — but it is true because no deadline was ever needed, not because a convicted person has an open-ended habeas route. Habeas in RI survives intact and untimed for people NOT held under a final criminal judgment (pretrial detention, extradition, other restraint); it is simply not a conviction-challenge vehicle. Do not tabulate RI as 'habeas available, no deadline.' Also, § 10-9-22 makes denial of a habeas petition non-appealable (confirmed in DiLibero). POST-CONVICTION: 'at any time' is real statutory text but is judicially narrowed. Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005): 'we construe the statutory term as meaning at any reasonable time,' holding laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense.' The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance both unreasonable delay and prejudice — so the practical bar is fact-specific and party-raised, not a fixed clock. There is thus no number to report for RI; a legislator comparing RI to Pennsylvania's one-year PCRA should be told RI has no limitations period at all on either instrument. DNA-testing petitions under § 10-9.1-12 likewise carry no deadline. Ch. 10-9.1 contains no capital-case variation. NOT VERIFIED: I read § 10-9.1-8's title ('Waiver of or failure to assert claims') from the chapter index but not its text, so I make no claim about how RI bars successive applications; and I did not test whether any residual state-constitutional habeas survives the § 10-9-1 carve-out, though DiLibero and Grieco give no hint of one." }, { "slug": "south-carolina", "state": "South Carolina", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Moore v. Stirling, Op. No. 28088 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2022) (orig. juris. habeas; quoting Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008)); S.C. Const. art. I, § 18 & art. V, § 5; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200", "habeas_quote": "Notwithstanding the exhaustion of appellate review, including all direct appeals and PCR, habeas corpus relief remains available to prisoners in South Carolina.", "habeas_url": "https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/28088.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act — application for post-conviction relief (PCR), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A)", "pc_quote": "An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal...", "pc_url": "https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t17c027.php", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "null", "character_basis": "An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal...", "character_instrument": "S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key comparison point. No limitations period appears anywhere in the habeas chapter (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200, read in full; every time limit there governs how fast officials must act AFTER the writ issues, not when a prisoner may file), and none in Rule 245, SCACR (original jurisdiction, last amended Apr. 30, 2024) or Rule 240, SCACR (extraordinary-writ petitions). The one-year period is textually confined to PCR: § 17-27-45(A) limits 'An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter,' i.e. Chapter 27 only. Demonstrated in practice: Moore was convicted and sentenced to death in 2001, exhausted PCR, filed federal habeas in 2015, and filed this state habeas petition in 2020 (App. Case No. 2020-001519); the Court ordered briefing, heard argument, and denied on the merits — no timeliness bar raised or applied. Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 495 S.E.2d 426 (1998), reached 1976 convictions attacked by habeas in 1995 on the same footing. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': South Carolina splits the writ in two. (1) The STATUTORY writ is superseded. Gibson: 'The availability of habeas corpus has been severely limited by the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act... Thus, this Act supersedes and encompasses the habeas corpus procedure provided by statute.' Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 495 S.E.2d 429 (1998) (decided the same day) holds 'a matter which is cognizable under the Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the circuit or other lower courts.' (2) The CONSTITUTIONAL writ expressly survives § 17-27-20(B)'s exclusivity clause. Gibson: 'habeas corpus continues to be available as a constitutional remedy provided a petitioner qualifies for this extraordinary relief and clears the procedural hurdles.' Simpson n.4: 'Under art. 5, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution, this Court retains the ability to entertain writs of habeas corpus in our original jurisdiction.' Simpson expressly denied that this curtailment suspends the writ under art. I, § 18: 'our action today does not suspend the writ, but merely curtails its use to those situations where the Act would not be applicable.' GATES ON THE SURVIVING WRIT (all from Moore, quoting Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990)): the petitioner must plead exhaustion of all other remedies, and must prove '(1) the existence of a constitutional violation; and (2) the denial of fundamental fairness which, in the setting, is shocking to the universal sense of justice.' 'Habeas relief is seldom used and acts as an ultimate ensurer of fundamental constitutional rights,' and 'a defendant bears a much higher burden of proof in a habeas proceeding.' Hamm v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 744 S.E.2d 503 (2013), and In re Chapman, 419 S.C. 172, 796 S.E.2d 843 (2017), restate the rule as current: 'habeas relief is only available when other remedies, such as PCR, are inadequate or unavailable.' So the no-deadline writ is not an escape hatch from the one-year PCR bar — Hamm holds that blowing the § 17-27-45 deadline is itself a failure to exhaust that BARS habeas ('Because Hamm failed to exhaust all other remedies, he is barred from habeas corpus relief'). A legislator comparing states should note that South Carolina's practical deadline for challenging a conviction is one year, and the timeless writ behind it is reserved for the gravest constitutional violations. OTHER PCR TIMING: § 17-27-45(B) gives one year from recognition of a new retroactive constitutional right; § 17-27-45(C) gives one year from actual discovery of new material facts, or when they could have been found by reasonable diligence. § 17-27-90 separately bars successive applications absent 'sufficient reason' for the omission. CAPITAL: no different deadline — the same one-year § 17-27-45(A) applies; § 17-27-160 (S.C. Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) adds only expedited procedures (30-day return, status conference within 30 days, merits hearing within 180 days) plus two appointed counsel and full civil discovery (§ 17-27-150(B)). ARCHAIC PROVISION, NOT A DEADLINE: § 17-17-20, descended from the 1679 English act, forfeits habeas 'to be granted in vacation time' for one who 'wilfully neglected by the space of two whole terms after his imprisonment to pray a habeas corpus.' It restricts only vacation-time writs under Chapter 17, does not bar a term-time or original-jurisdiction petition, and no modern SC decision found here applies it; it should not be reported as a filing deadline. NOT VERIFIED: whether any unpublished or post-2022 SC decision has narrowed this further — a CourtListener sweep of published SC opinions filed after Jan. 1, 2018 returned nothing altering the rule, and Moore (2022) is the most recent controlling statement located." }, { "slug": "south-dakota", "state": "South Dakota", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 730, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "SDCL 21-27-3.3 (Two-year statute of limitation), enacted SL 2012, ch 118, § 3; read with SDCL 21-27-1 and Asmussen v. Young, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶¶ 4, 6", "habeas_quote": "A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. This limitation period shall run from the latest of: (1) The date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review...", "habeas_url": "https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/21-27-3.3.html", "pc_vehicle": null, "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "SDCL ch. 23A-34 (Post-Conviction Proceedings) — repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15; South Dakota has had no separate post-conviction act since", "pc_quote": "CHAPTER 23A-34 POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS [REPEALED] [Repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15]", "pc_url": "https://sdlegislature.gov/api/Statutes/23A-34.html?all=true", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter.", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "South Dakota is the inverse of the PCRA-style states: it kept habeas corpus as the collateral remedy and put the one-year-style deadline ON the habeas writ itself. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act (SDCL ch. 23A-34) was repealed in 1983 by the same act that recodified habeas (SL 1983, ch 169), so ch. 21-27 habeas is the sole general vehicle. Do NOT report SD as 'no habeas deadline' — since 2012 there is a two-year limit, and the statute is patterned on AEDPA with nearly verbatim trigger language, but it gives two years where the federal act gives one (Asmussen, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶ 8). Deadline is stated as 'two-year' in the text; 730 is my day conversion, not a statutory figure. Four alternative accrual dates: finality of direct review; removal of unconstitutional state-created impediment; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right (requires recognition by BOTH the U.S. and S.D. Supreme Courts); discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence. 'Factual predicate' is objective — knowing the facts starts the clock even if the prisoner does not understand their legal significance (Asmussen ¶¶ 9-10). Transitional rule: for judgments final before July 1, 2012, the two years ran from July 1, 2012, i.e. expired July 1, 2014 (Hughbanks v. Dooley, 2016 S.D. 76, ¶ 22, as applied in Asmussen ¶ 6 — I read this holding as recited in Asmussen, not in Hughbanks itself). Predecessor SDCL 21-27-3.2 (repealed 2012) was not a limitations period at all but a rebuttable five-year presumption of prejudice to the State (Davis v. Weber, 2013 S.D. 88, ¶ 10) — do not carry that five-year figure into a current comparison. Scope, not timing, is the other narrowing: habeas reaches only (1) the court's jurisdiction, (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law, and (3) in certain cases deprivation of basic constitutional rights (Davis ¶ 9) — broad enough for ineffective-assistance claims, which SDCL 21-27-4 expressly contemplates, so I classify it 'available' rather than 'narrow.' Other limits: custody is required (SDCL 21-27-1); no application may be maintained while a direct appeal is pending or during the time to perfect one (SDCL 21-27-3.1); successive applications require circuit-court leave and are confined to newly discovered evidence of actual innocence or a new retroactive constitutional rule (SDCL 21-27-5.1); the writ is unavailable for penal disciplinary sanctions (SDCL 21-27-1.1); appellate review requires a certificate of probable cause (SDCL 21-27-18.1). The felony DNA-testing chapter (SDCL ch. 23-5B) is an adjunct motion, not a post-conviction act, and SDCL 23-5B-17 states 'Nothing in this chapter provides a basis for relief in any state or federal habeas corpus proceeding.' No capital carve-out found: ch. 21-27's section list contains no death-penalty provision and 21-27-3.3 applies to 'all applications for relief under this chapter.' Currency check: the SDLRC source line for 21-27-3.3 shows only 'SL 2012, ch 118, § 3' with no later amendment, and a CourtListener search returned Lee v. Weber, 2023 S.D. 54 applying it, though I did not read that opinion." }, { "slug": "tennessee", "state": "Tennessee", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (Tenn. Supreme Court, construing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130)", "habeas_quote": "Although there is no habeas corpus statute of limitations, the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow.", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/sw3d/153/cases/0016-01.json", "pc_vehicle": "Post-Conviction Procedure Act petition, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to -122", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a)", "pc_quote": "a person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken", "pc_url": "https://unicourt.github.io/cic-code-tn/transforms/tn/octn/r76/gov.tn.tca.title.40.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity", "character_instrument": "Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS IS NOT SUBSUMED AND HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Tennessee keeps two parallel routes: Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 19 — 'In Tennessee, two distinct procedural avenues are available to collaterally attack a final judgment in a criminal case — habeas corpus and post-conviction petitions.' The writ is constitutionally entrenched (Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15) and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130; I read every section heading in ch. 21 in the official code XML (release 76, 2021-05-21) and there is no limitations provision anywhere in the chapter. What limits habeas is the CLAIM, not the clock: relief lies 'only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired' (Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164, quoted in the Tenn. Crim. App.'s Keel v. Adams, No. W2025-00356-CCA-R3-HC, filed 07/02/2026, at 4). Voidable claims — ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, denial of counsel not shown on the judgment's face — are NOT cognizable in habeas and must go to post-conviction. Practical confirmation that no deadline operates: Alvin Dean Shaver v. Sean Phillips, No. E2024-01385-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2025), at 2 — 'Twenty-eight years later, in July 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus' from a 1996 guilty plea; the court reached the merits and never raised timeliness (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2025/01/31/alvin_dean_shaver_v._sean_phillips_warden.pdf). STATUTORY NARROWING: § 29-21-101(b), added by Acts 2009, ch. 420 and applicable to petitions filed on or after June 11, 2009, strips habeas from guilty-plea/negotiated-sentence petitioners raising concurrent-vs-consecutive sentencing or release-eligibility-percentage claims. § 29-21-102 excludes persons held under federal process. POST-CONVICTION SIDE: the one-year period is jurisdictional and expressly non-tollable — § 40-30-102(a): 'The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity'; the code's annotation to that section cites Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) for due-process tolling where the statute would deny 'a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in a meaningful time and manner' (I read the annotation, not the Seals opinion itself). § 40-30-102(b) allows three late-filing exceptions — new retroactive constitutional right (1 year from the ruling), new scientific evidence of actual innocence (no period stated), and invalidated prior conviction used to enhance (1 year from that ruling) — and § 40-30-102(c) permits only one petition per judgment, with reopening under § 40-30-117. A THIRD, UNLIMITED ROUTE: the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, § 40-30-303, lets a person convicted of enumerated offenses 'at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis' — also no deadline. CAPITAL: I found no capital-specific variation in either the habeas chapter or § 40-30-102; the one-year period applies to capital cases on its face — treat any capital carve-out as unverified. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 (motion to correct an illegal sentence) is a further possible route I did not read and do not assert. CURRENCY: statutory text taken from the official Tennessee Code XML transform, release 76 (2021-05-21); § 29-21-101 last amended 2009, § 40-30-102 last amended 1996, and Tenn. Crim. App. opinions filed through July 2026 apply both in identical terms." }, { "slug": "texas", "state": "Texas", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (article contains no filing deadline), as rewritten by Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, sec. 5 (S.B. 440); Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (majority footnote)", "habeas_quote": "The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims.", "habeas_url": "https://static.case.law/sw2d/992/cases/0486-01.json", "pc_vehicle": null, "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, Sec. 5 (exclusivity clause), read in S.B. 440 enrolled text, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) — Texas enacted no PCRA-style post-conviction act; habeas is itself the post-conviction remedy", "pc_quote": "After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.", "pc_url": "https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/74R/billtext/html/SB00440F.htm", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims.", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "TEXAS IS A HABEAS-ONLY STATE, AND NON-CAPITAL STATE HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE AT ALL. Texas never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act, so there is no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue and no one-year period to report; pc_vehicle is null and the pc_* deadline fields are inapplicable rather than 'no deadline' findings. Art. 11.07 IS the state habeas statute and is simultaneously the exclusive post-conviction vehicle for a final felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death (Sec. 1: 'This article establishes the procedures for an application for writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death'). I read all seven sections of Art. 11.07 as rewritten in 1995 and none imposes any time limit. Art. 11.07 Sec. 4 is a subsequent-application / abuse-of-the-writ bar (new factual or legal basis, or actual innocence), NOT a limitations period — do not code it as a deadline. The only temporal bar is the EQUITABLE doctrine of laches, which is fact-specific and has no fixed period: Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoted above); Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (read in full at https://static.case.law/sw3d/398/cases/0206-01.json), which broadened prejudice to a totality-of-the-circumstances test and expressly REJECTED a proposed presumption of prejudice after five years; Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (court may raise laches sua sponte). Perez's own survey footnote confirms Texas is on the no-limitations side: 'Over half of all states now employ statutes of limitation for state post-conviction relief, thus making the equitable doctrine of laches largely inapplicable in those states.' The Carrio dissent states the legislative inference directly: 'While the Legislature specifically provided time requisites for filing petitions in death penalty cases under article 11.071, it chose not to impose timeliness requirements for filing petitions in other felony cases under article 11.07.' CAPITAL CASES DIFFER SHARPLY: Art. 11.071 Sec. 4(a) does carry a deadline. As amended by S.B. 1728, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (read at https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/75R/billtext/html/SB01728F.htm): an application 'must be filed in the convicting court not later than the 180th day after the date the court of criminal appeals appoints counsel under Section 2 or not later than the 45th day after the date the appellee's original brief is filed on direct appeal with the court of criminal appeals' (current law runs the 180 days from appointment by the convicting court and adds 'whichever date is later'). Sec. 4(b) presumes later filings untimely absent good cause shown by 'particularized justifying circumstances,' and Sec. 4(f) forecloses good cause entirely after the 91st day past the filing date. So the correct comparative statement is: Texas habeas = no deadline for non-capital felonies, 180/45 days for capital. Other Chapter 11 vehicles are also habeas: Art. 11.072 (community supervision / probated sentences, where the conviction is not final), Arts. 11.08-11.09 (pretrial). Chapter 64 post-conviction DNA testing is a separate limited-purpose proceeding, not a conviction-challenge substitute, and habeas does not lie for errors in it (Ex parte Baker, 185 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Texas Const. art. I, sec. 12 makes the writ 'a writ of right' that 'shall never be suspended.' SOURCING CAVEAT: statutes.capitol.texas.gov was rebuilt as a JavaScript single-page app and returns only a navigation shell to non-browser clients for every Docs/GetStatute/PDF path, so the article text could not be read from the official codification. I therefore read the statutory language in the enrolled bill text on capitol.texas.gov (S.B. 440 for the 1995 Art. 11.07 rewrite and the enactment of Art. 11.071; S.B. 1728 for the 1997 amendment to Art. 11.071 Sec. 4). Confirmed that no deadline has since been added to Art. 11.07 by (a) the CCA's continuing 1999-2021 laches jurisprudence, which would be unnecessary if a limitations period existed, and (b) the Court of Criminal Appeals staff paper 'Article 11.07 Writs of Habeas Corpus' hosted on the official judiciary site (https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1457413/1107-paper-53123-update.pdf), whose 'Delay, Laches, & Waiver' section identifies laches as the sole temporal defense and cites Ex parte Hill, 632 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); I did not read Hill itself, so it is cited here only as reported by that source." }, { "slug": "utah", "state": "Utah", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "subsumed", "habeas_deadline_days": 365, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Utah Code § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (Post-Conviction Remedies Act), Replacement of prior remedies (eff. 5/9/2017)", "habeas_quote": "This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal... This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs.", "habeas_url": "https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S102_2017050920170509.html", "pc_vehicle": "Petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1) (eff. 5/4/2022)", "pc_quote": "A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued.", "pc_url": "https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S107_2022050420220504.html", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued.", "character_instrument": "Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1)", "status": "verified", "notes": "Utah is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state. Habeas corpus survives in Utah, but only for restraints that do not challenge a conviction: § 78B-9-102(2)(a) exempts from the PCRA only 'habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.' Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1) (extraordinary relief for 'wrongful restraints on personal liberty') applies only 'Except for instances governed by Rule 65C,' and Rule 65C(a) governs 'all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65B and =65C). So for a conviction challenge the writ route is closed and the PCRA's one-year bar is the only deadline. RESIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT AUTHORITY, but it carries no separate/longer deadline. Utah Const. art. I, § 5: 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/ArticleI/UC_AI_S5_1800010118000101.html); art. VIII, §§ 3, 5 give the courts power to issue all extraordinary writs. In Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 174, the Utah Supreme Court held: 'we exercise our writ power independent of the PCRA. But that independent exercise is largely hidden from view because Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C—which incorporates the PCRA—governs the exercise of that power. And we exercise that power in total harmony with the PCRA.' And at ¶ 194: 'under the current version of rule 65C, we can only hear a time-barred case, like Patterson's, when failure to do so would violate a petitioner's constitutional rights' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Patterson%20v.%20State20210826.pdf). Patterson expressly rejected the free-standing common-law 'egregious injustice' exception floated in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, and Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 ('We eliminated any such exception when we adopted rule 65C,' ¶ 192), and upheld the one-year bar against Open Courts and Suspension Clause challenges. WATCH FOR A STALE CITE: Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) said 'no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition' — that is no longer Utah law. Patterson ¶¶ 200-04 rejected it, and Nunez v. State, 2026 UT 25 (filed 2026-07-30) declined again to 'reinstate the now defunct interests of justice exception to the PCRA's time bar' (¶ 28), reaffirming 'we have incorporated the PCRA through rule 65C—including the PCRA's one-year statute of limitation' (¶ 26) (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Nunez%20v.%20State20260730.pdf). Patterson ¶ 212 left open that some future petitioner might show the bar unconstitutional as applied; no one has yet. ACCRUAL AND TOLLING soften the one year: § 78B-9-107(2) runs it from the LATER of six dates, including '(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based,' and § 78B-9-107(3)(a) tolls for periods the petitioner was prevented from filing 'due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, due to physical or mental incapacity,' or, for human-trafficking claims, force/fraud/coercion. CAPITAL CASES get no longer deadline — the same one year applies, and Utah Code § 78B-9-202(5) provides that appointment of capital post-conviction counsel 'does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 78B-9-107' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S202_2026050620260506.html). CARVE-OUTS: § 78B-9-107(6) provides the one-year bar 'does not apply to a petition filed under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence'; § 78B-9-102(2) also exempts Rule 22(e) motions to correct an illegal sentence and Board of Pardons and Parole actions (the latter reachable under Rule 65B(d)(2)(D)). le.utah.gov section URLs render via JavaScript; the versioned C78B-9-S###_.html URLs cited above are the pages that carry the actual statutory text." }, { "slug": "vermont", "state": "Vermont", "operative": "post_conviction", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "13 V.S.A. § 7136 (Priority of procedure); habeas remedy itself at 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985", "habeas_quote": "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner entitled to move for relief under sections 7131-7135 ... shall not be entertained ... unless ... the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention.", "habeas_url": "http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07136", "pc_vehicle": "Post-conviction relief / petition for review, 13 V.S.A. §§ 7131-7137", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "13 V.S.A. § 7131 (Prisoner in custody under sentence)", "pc_quote": "A prisoner who is in custody under sentence of a court and claims the right to be released ... may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.", "pc_url": "http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/13/221/07131", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A prisoner ... may at any time move ... to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.", "character_instrument": "13 V.S.A. § 7131", "status": "verified", "notes": "NEITHER REMEDY HAS ANY FILING DEADLINE. This is the headline: Vermont has no analogue to the one-year bars of Pennsylvania's PCRA, Alabama's Rule 32, or Delaware's Rule 61. (1) PCR: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 affirmatively says 'at any time.' I read all of §§ 7131-7137 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/13/221); the only limit is § 7134, which is discretionary, not temporal: 'The court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' (2) HABEAS: I read all 35 sections of 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/12/143). The chapter contains no limitation period; a grep of the full chapter text for 'year,' 'month,' 'day,' 'limitation,' and 'barred' returns zero hits. The writ is granted on the terms of § 3952 -- a person 'otherwise restrained of his or her liberty ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus' -- with no time condition attached. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': Vermont did NOT abolish or repeal habeas -- ch. 143 stands in full force as a separate writ, separately docketed in the civil division of the superior court, and still actively litigated (recent Vermont Supreme Court habeas dockets include Perron v. Menard, Davey v. Baker, Aguiar v. Williams, In re Fredrick). But § 7136 makes PCR a condition precedent for anyone within § 7131's reach. The Vermont Supreme Court applies this by conversion rather than dismissal: Coyle v. Hofmann, 2009 VT 46, ¶ 5, 186 Vt. 525 (https://static.case.law/vt/186/cases/0525-01.json) -- 'We treat petitions for habeas corpus challenging sentences as petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR) under 13 V.S.A. § 7136.' Coyle ¶ 6, quoting Berard v. Moeykens, 132 Vt. 597, adds that such a petition 'could be dismissed out of hand under 13 V.S.A. § 7136, which requires initial resort to a petition for post-conviction review ... as a condition precedent to habeas corpus.' So habeas survives as a route to a conviction/sentence challenge only where the PCR motion is 'inadequate or ineffective' -- narrowing, not exclusivity. This is the federal 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) savings-clause model, which is no accident: Coyle ¶ 5 records that § 7131 'was patterned after the federal PCR statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.' Note that the narrowing is NOT the jurisdictional-claims-only kind seen in some states -- In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 356, quoted in Coyle ¶ 5, holds the scope of habeas relief EXPANDED under these statutes to 'a wide range [of relief], ... including remedies short of full release.' PRACTICAL EFFECT FOR THE LEGISLATOR'S QUESTION: because § 7131 itself has no deadline, the § 7136 channeling rule costs a Vermont petitioner nothing in time -- it routes them to a vehicle that is equally open-ended. A Vermont prisoner challenging a conviction today files under § 7131, at any time. GATING CONDITION THAT DOES BITE: § 7131 requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence,' and habeas requires present restraint, so neither remedy reaches a person who has fully discharged the sentence. That custody requirement, not any clock, is Vermont's real limit. CAPITAL: none of the provisions read draws any capital/non-capital distinction, and no capital-specific deadline appears anywhere in 13 V.S.A. ch. 221 or 12 V.S.A. ch. 143. RELATED, ALSO NO DEADLINE: 13 V.S.A. § 5561 (postconviction DNA testing, Title 13 ch. 182 'Innocence Protection') -- 'A person convicted of a qualifying crime may at any time file a petition requesting forensic DNA testing.' SOURCE CAVEAT, stated for candor: the legislature's own site labels Vermont Statutes Online 'an unofficial copy of the Vermont Statutes Annotated that is provided as a convenience.' It is nonetheless the State of Vermont's own publication of its code, current through the 2025 session, and § 7131 and § 7136 there carry their original 1966 enactment credits with no subsequent amendment adding a time bar." }, { "slug": "virginia", "state": "Virginia", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 730, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (Code 1950, § 8-596; as amended through 2021 Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345)", "habeas_quote": "A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from ... final disposition of the direct appeal in state court ..., whichever is later.", "habeas_url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title8.01/chapter25/section8.01-654/", "pc_vehicle": "Writ of actual innocence — Va. Code ch. 19.2 (§ 19.2-327.2, biological evidence, Supreme Court of Virginia) and ch. 19.3 (§ 19.2-327.10, nonbiological evidence, Court of Appeals). Innocence-only; NOT a general post-conviction act. Virginia has no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue.", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Va. Code § 19.2-327.10 (nonbiological); § 19.2-327.2 (biological); contents provision § 19.2-327.11 — no filing period appears anywhere in either chapter", "pc_quote": "Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, upon a petition of a person who was convicted of a felony ... the Court of Appeals shall have the authority to issue writs of actual innocence under this chapter.", "pc_url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title19.2/chapter19.3/section19.2-327.10/", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "no", "who_must_raise": "court", "character_basis": "The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face.", "character_instrument": "STATE HABEAS CORPUS", "status": "verified", "notes": "Virginia is the INVERSE of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 pattern: it never replaced habeas with a post-conviction act, so state habeas corpus ad subjiciendum remains the general vehicle for challenging a conviction or sentence — and the legislature put the deadline INSIDE the habeas statute. Do not code Virginia as 'no habeas deadline'; it has one. THE DEADLINE IS COMPOUND, and 730 days is a floor, not a ceiling: § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets two years from final trial-court judgment OR one year from final disposition of the direct appeal (or expiry of the time to appeal), 'whichever is later.' For anyone who appeals, the one-year-post-appeal prong usually controls and runs longer than 730 days from judgment. A single-integer cell will misstate Virginia unless footnoted. Note also that § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets a separate one-year period for non-conviction habeas ('other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction or sentence ... within one year after the cause of action accrues') — that is the detention-only figure, not the conviction figure, and the two are easy to swap. Structure confirmed by § 8.01-658(B), which is written entirely around petitions that 'challenge[] a criminal conviction or sentence.' The writ is constitutionally protected from suspension by Va. Const. art. I, § 9. OTHER LIMITS: § 8.01-654(B)(2) imposes a strict successive-petition bar — a petition must contain all facts then known, and 'No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition' — with a carve-out for a first petition whose sole claim is deprivation of the right to appeal. The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face. CAPITAL: there is no longer a special capital habeas track — §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654.2 (the death-penalty habeas filing and counsel provisions) were 'Repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2021,' alongside abolition of the death penalty; the same 2021 acts amended § 8.01-654 itself. Older sources citing a 60-day capital habeas deadline are dead law. SIDE REMEDIES: the actual-innocence writs carry no filing deadline but reach only freestanding innocence (§ 19.2-327.11 bars human biological evidence as the sole basis under the nonbiological writ, and requires evidence that would leave no rational trier of fact finding guilt); they cannot carry ordinary ineffective-assistance or Brady claims, which must go in habeas within § 8.01-654(A)(2). § 8.01-677 (motion in lieu of coram vobis) is confined to 'any clerical error or error in fact' and is not a general post-conviction route. VERIFICATION LIMIT: every figure above is from the statutory text on the official Virginia legislature site, each page stamped current as of 7/30/2026. I did NOT confirm from a read case how Virginia courts treat the (A)(2) period (jurisdictional vs. affirmative defense, availability of equitable tolling) — CourtListener returned HTTP 429 on repeated attempts and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked. Treat that one sub-point as unverified; it does not affect the deadline figures." }, { "slug": "washington", "state": "Washington", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": 365, "habeas_no_deadline": 0, "habeas_authority": "RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (one-year bar; definition expressly names habeas); RCW 7.36.130(1) (habeas chapter cross-references the same limit); RCW 7.36.010, .040 (writ still granted by superior court); RAP 16.3(b) (superior-court habeas expressly NOT superseded)", "habeas_quote": "No petition or motion for collateral attack ... may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final ... 'Collateral attack' ... includes ... a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition ...", "habeas_url": "https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.73.090", "pc_vehicle": "Personal restraint petition (RAP 16.3-16.15), with trial-court motions for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8 transferred to the Court of Appeals to be treated as PRPs", "pc_deadline_days": 365, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "RAP 16.4(d); RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (which names 'a personal restraint petition' first in the definition of collateral attack); CrR 7.8(b), (c)(2)", "pc_quote": "The appellate court will only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances and if such relief may be granted under RCW 10.73.090, or .100.", "pc_url": "https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/RAP/APP_RAP_16_04_00.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "No petition or motion for collateral attack ... may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final ... 'Collateral attack' ... includes ... a habeas corpus petition", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "WASHINGTON IS NOT A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE — this is the inverse of the pattern the comparison usually turns on. RCW 10.73.090(2) names 'a habeas corpus petition' by name inside the definition of 'collateral attack,' so the one-year clock reaches habeas directly rather than only reaching a substitute remedy. Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed: ch. 7.36 RCW remains in force (RCW 7.36.010: 'Every person restrained of his or her liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), RCW 7.36.040 still empowers superior courts to grant it, and RAP 16.3(b) states the PRP rules 'do not supersede and do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings initiated in the superior court.' RAP 16.3(b) DOES supersede habeas procedure in the APPELLATE courts, so the split is: superior-court habeas survives intact; appellate habeas is replaced by the PRP. Both carry the identical one-year period, so the answer to the legislator's question is one year regardless of which instrument is named. The 1989 act (1989 c 395) created RCW 10.73.090 and amended RCW 7.36.130 in the same breath — a deliberate choice to keep habeas alive but time-bar it. RCW 7.36.130(1) now bars inquiry into 'any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction except where it is alleged in the petition that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution ... have been violated and the petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.' The Supreme Court reads it the same way: Ruiz-Sanabria, 184 Wn.2d 632, 635 (2015) (per curiam), cites 'RCW 7.36.130(1) (no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody unless a petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100).' TWO ROUTES ESCAPE THE DEADLINE ENTIRELY. (1) Facial-invalidity/jurisdiction: the bar applies by its terms only 'if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction' (RCW 10.73.090(1)); a facially invalid judgment, or one from a court without competent jurisdiction, is subject to NO time limit at all. (2) The seven RCW 10.73.100 exemptions: newly discovered evidence (with reasonable diligence), statute unconstitutional facially or as applied, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence after a not-guilty plea, sentence in excess of the court's jurisdiction, modification of community-custody conditions under RCW 9.94A.703/.709, and significant retroactive change in law. Critically, the petition must be 'based solely on' those grounds — a mixed petition loses the exemption. Clock start: RCW 10.73.090(3) — the LAST of trial-court filing of the judgment, issuance of the appellate mandate on a timely direct appeal, or U.S. Supreme Court denial of timely cert (a motion to reconsider cert denial does not extend finality). Channeling in practice: CrR 7.8(c)(2) requires the superior court to transfer a defendant's postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals as a PRP 'unless the court determines that the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that they are entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.' So the PRP is the dominant working vehicle even when the filing starts elsewhere; superior-court habeas is a preserved but rarely-used alternative. A separate successive-petition restriction (RCW 10.73.140, referenced in CrR 7.8(b) and RAP 16.4(d)'s 'no more than one petition for similar relief ... without good cause shown') operates independently of the time bar; I did not read RCW 10.73.140's full text directly, so treat its precise scope as unverified. No capital difference exists: RCW 10.95.030(1) now prescribes life without release or parole for aggravated first degree murder, so RAP 16.3(c)'s reservation of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction over death-sentence PRPs is vestigial." }, { "slug": "west-virginia", "state": "West Virginia", "operative": "habeas", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) (Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, Ch. 53 Art. 4A); confirmed by W. Va. Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Rules 1-10 (no limitations period)", "habeas_quote": "A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed", "habeas_url": "https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-1/", "pc_vehicle": null, "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) — establishes there is NO separate post-conviction vehicle; the Art. 4A habeas writ is the exclusive remedy", "pc_quote": "such writ comprehends and takes the place of all other common law and statutory remedies ... which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence and shall be used exclusively in lieu thereof", "pc_url": "https://code.wvlegislature.gov/53-4A-1/", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence", "character_instrument": "STATE HABEAS CORPUS", "status": "verified", "notes": "WEST VIRGINIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none in the statute, none in the court rules. This is the inverse of the PCRA pattern: WV did not replace habeas with a purpose-built act. Its post-conviction act IS habeas corpus — Ch. 53, Art. 4A is literally titled 'POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS' — so there is no separate one-year-style vehicle to confuse it with. Art. 4A contains only §§ 53-4A-1 through -11 (verified against the official code's article index); no limitations section exists. The Supreme Court of Appeals' Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, read in full, impose no deadline either: Rule 3 ('Filing Petition') governs only venue and filing fee. THE REAL LIMIT IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME. § 53-4A-1(b)-(c) bars any contention 'previously and finally adjudicated' or 'waived,' and creates a 'rebuttable presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to advance' any ground not raised before trial, at trial, or on direct appeal. Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762 (1981) (read via static.case.law) construes the Act to give each prisoner 'one omnibus post-conviction habeas corpus hearing.' So a legislator should understand WV as unlimited in time but essentially one-shot in substance. 2021 CARVE-OUT: HB 2888 added § 53-4A-1(b)(1) and the closing sentence of (c), providing that a contention is neither finally adjudicated nor waived where new or undermined 'forensic scientific evidence' exists and there is a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome. RELATIONSHIP TO GENERAL HABEAS: the ordinary writ under § 53-4-1 (Art. 4, no deadline, granted on 'probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority') still exists, but § 53-4A-1(f) displaces it for conviction/sentence challenges while preserving it for habeas sought 'for any purpose other than to challenge the legality of a criminal conviction or sentence.' DEADLINED MOTIONS THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE VEHICLES — do not substitute these in a cross-state table: W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(b) sentence reduction, 120 days; Rule 35(a) correction of an illegal sentence, 'at any time'; W. Va. Code § 15-2B-14 post-conviction DNA testing motion, no stated deadline but limited to testing. CAPITAL: the Act draws no capital/non-capital distinction. CURRENCY: § 53-4A-1's bill history on the official code site shows its last amendment was 2021 (HB 2888); I searched the full bill lists for the 2025 and 2026 Regular Sessions (2,808 bills in 2026) and found zero bills mentioning habeas or 53-4A, so no deadline has been enacted since. Not established from a primary source: whether WV courts apply laches to bar a stale Art. 4A petition — I found no controlling case either way, so treat that as unverified rather than assuming delay is costless." }, { "slug": "wisconsin", "state": "Wisconsin", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "available", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, ¶21 (Wis. Sup. Ct.), construing Wis. Stat. ch. 782 and § (Rule) 809.51", "habeas_quote": "Smalley's imposition of a \"prompt and speedy\" pleading requirement for habeas claims is unsupported either by the statutory text or Wisconsin cases.", "habeas_url": "https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=241338", "pc_vehicle": "Motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (collateral attack on sentence/conviction)", "pc_deadline_days": null, "pc_no_deadline": 1, "pc_authority": "Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2)", "pc_quote": "A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time.", "pc_url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/974/06", "deadline_character": "no_period", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": "respondent", "character_basis": "HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 ... it contains no limitations period whatsoever ... Rule 809.51 ... likewise contains no filing deadline ... THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove", "character_instrument": "state habeas corpus", "status": "verified", "notes": "HEADLINE: Wisconsin imposes NO filing deadline on EITHER route. This is the opposite of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 one-year model. (1) HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 (782.01-782.46, published 7-1-26): it contains no limitations period whatsoever — the chapter's single occurrence of 'day' is the return date in § 782.07, not a filing period. Rule 809.51, the vehicle for a habeas petition filed in the court of appeals, likewise contains no filing deadline (its only time limit, 14 days, runs against the State's response). Lopez-Quintero, 2019 WI 58, ¶10, expressly OVERRULED State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, which had read a 'prompt and speedy' timeliness pleading requirement into Rule 809.51: 'We hold that the court of appeals may not deny a habeas petition ex parte on the ground the petitioner failed to demonstrate he sought relief in a prompt and speedy manner. We overrule Smalley.' The petitioner there had delayed nearly ten years. (2) THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove, including prejudice, not a clock the petitioner must beat: 'Any equitable concerns regarding substantial delays... are properly raised not sua sponte by the court of appeals but instead by the State asserting the defense of laches and establishing prejudice resulting from the delay' (¶10). (3) HABEAS IS NARROWED IN SCOPE, NOT IN TIME. § 782.01(1): 'Every person restrained of personal liberty may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint subject to ss. 782.02 and 974.06.' § 782.02 then bars the writ to anyone 'committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or order of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and § 974.06(8) bars a habeas petition by a person who could move under § 974.06 'unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention.' Per the official annotation to § 782.01 citing State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, habeas requires restraint, restraint contrary to constitutional protections or by a body lacking jurisdiction, AND no other adequate remedy at law. I classified this 'available' rather than 'narrow' because it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims — see (4). (4) HABEAS IS THE MANDATORY, EXCLUSIVE VEHICLE FOR ONE MAJOR CLASS OF CONVICTION CHALLENGE. State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶35 (read in full): 'A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under § 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus.' That is the Knight petition, State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520 (1992) (read in full): 'to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus.' Knight rested precisely on § 974.06(8)'s 'inadequate or ineffective' escape hatch. By contrast, ineffective assistance of POSTCONVICTION counsel goes to the circuit court, 'either as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' (Starks ¶35, citing State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry). So a Wisconsin prisoner's route depends on which counsel failed — and neither route has a deadline. (5) § 974.06 IS NOT A ONE-YEAR ACT. It is the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act analogue and 'may be made at any time,' § 974.06(2). It opens only once the direct route closes: § 974.06(1) applies 'After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired.' Its real constraint is issue preclusion, not time: § 974.06(4) bars grounds not raised in an original motion 'unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised,' enforced by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168 (1994) (read in full). A legislator comparing states must not mistake that bar for a deadline — a 30-year-old conviction can still be attacked under § 974.06 if 'sufficient reason' excuses the omission. (6) THE 60-DAY FIGURE BELONGS TO THE DIRECT APPEAL, NOT COLLATERAL REVIEW. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b) requires a notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing, and § 809.30(2)(h) requires the postconviction motion or notice of appeal 'within 60 days after the later of the service of the transcript or circuit court case record.' § 974.02(1) channels all non-§ 974.06 postconviction motions into that timetable. If a survey cell reports '60 days' for Wisconsin, it has captured the direct-appeal clock and missed both collateral remedies. (7) OTHER REMEDIES: § 974.07(2) DNA-testing motion — 'At any time after being convicted' (no deadline). Sentence modification under § 973.19 carries a 90-day limit as described in Starks ¶50 (I did not read § 973.19 itself; treat that one figure as unverified). (8) CAPITAL: no capital-specific variation appears anywhere in ch. 782, § 974.06, or Rule 809.30. (9) OPERATIVE = BOTH: § 974.06 for most conviction/sentence attacks; habeas, exclusively, for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and wherever the § 974.06 motion is inadequate or ineffective." }, { "slug": "wyoming", "state": "Wyoming", "operative": "both", "habeas_status": "narrow", "habeas_deadline_days": null, "habeas_no_deadline": 1, "habeas_authority": "Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2002) (construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134); accord Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, ¶ 11; Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 14; statutory narrowing at Wyo. Stat. § 1-27-125", "habeas_quote": "Review in a state habeas corpus action is not time limited, but is seriously limited in scope so that defendants may only raise a claim going to the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court.", "habeas_url": "https://stwjbopinions.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/wsc-opinions/2002WY118.pdf", "pc_vehicle": "Post-conviction relief, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (Title 7, ch. 14, \"Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights\")", "pc_deadline_days": 1825, "pc_no_deadline": 0, "pc_authority": "Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d), quoted verbatim in Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, n.5 (Wyo. 2019)", "pc_quote": "No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered.", "pc_url": "https://www.wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/title07.pdf", "deadline_character": "hard_bar", "equitable_tolling": "", "who_must_raise": null, "character_basis": "No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered.", "character_instrument": "Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d)", "status": "verified", "notes": "HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the headline finding. Wyoming never abolished or absorbed habeas: the post-conviction act expressly preserves it (§ 7-14-108: 'W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 shall not repeal any existing laws'), and Nixon ¶11 treats §§ 1-27-101 to 134 and §§ 7-14-101 to 108 as two parallel avenues. I read the entire habeas chapter (§§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134, wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/title01.pdf) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. The price of that open window is scope: § 1-27-125 provides 'Habeas corpus is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner,' and Parkhurst (2019) describes §§ 1-27-101 through 134 as '(limiting state habeas corpus relief to jurisdictional claims).' So habeas reaches only subject-matter/personal jurisdiction defects — hence 'narrow,' not 'available.' OPERATIVE SPLIT: a garden-variety conviction challenge (IAC, Brady, trial error) must go under ch. 7-14 and dies at 5 years; a jurisdictional/void-judgment claim can go by habeas at any time. Deadline math: statute says '5 years,' converted at 365 d/yr = 1825; it runs from entry of the judgment of conviction, not from finality of appeal. Additional ch. 7-14 traps beyond the clock: § 7-14-103(a) makes claims that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal 'procedurally barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim' (exceptions in § 7-14-103(b) for newly available facts, ineffective appellate counsel, and same counsel at trial and on appeal); § 7-14-104(c) denies appointed counsel to indigent petitioners; review is by certiorari, not appeal of right (§ 7-14-107). TWO OTHER UNTIMED ROUTES, both verified: W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' (wyocourts.gov/app/uploads/2026/06/WRCrP-with-bond-schedule.pdf) — and the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, §§ 7-12-401 through 7-12-407, which carries no filing deadline (only internal response deadlines of 120/30/150 days) but is confined to newly-discovered-evidence claims of actual innocence (Parkhurst ¶14). CAPITAL: I found no separate capital post-conviction track or differing deadline in ch. 7-14; I did not independently verify whether one exists elsewhere, so treat capital differences as unverified. Nixon's 'not time limited' holding rests on Hovey v. Sheffner, 93 P. 305 (Wyo. 1908), which I did not read directly; Nixon itself is confirmed still-current by Saunders (2015) and by Parkhurst (2019), both read in full." } ] }