GPS Policy Brief

Vision 2027  ›  Bill 3: IAC Process Reform

The IAC Trap

Georgia’s Outlier Doctrine on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Catch-22

Georgia’s IAC timing doctrine, established in Glover v. State (1996), requires that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel be raised “at the earliest practicable moment” — which means in a motion for new trial, filed within approximately 30 days of sentencing.

Here’s the trap: during that 30-day window, the same attorney whose performance was deficient is almost always still representing the defendant. There is no automatic right to new counsel for filing an IAC motion. The system demands that trial counsel argue their own incompetence.

If trial counsel fails to raise the IAC claim in the motion for new trial, the claim is barred on direct appeal. The defendant must then pursue it in habeas corpus — which has a four-year deadline with no actual innocence exception, and no right to appointed counsel. A prisoner must navigate the two-prong Strickland test pro se.

Six Restrictions, One State

No other state combines all six of these barriers:

The Federal System and Most States Got This Right

In Massaro v. United States (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that IAC claims may be brought in collateral proceedings — whether or not the petitioner raised them on direct appeal. Justice Kennedy identified four reasons IAC claims belong in post-conviction proceedings: the trial record is usually insufficient, collateral proceedings allow evidentiary development, the trial judge typically handles the collateral proceeding, and IAC claims are categorically different because they require inquiry outside the trial record.

The majority of states follow the federal model:

States including Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, and Michigan permit IAC on both direct appeal and collateral review with no waiver penalty. Georgia stands alone in combining the timing trap with every other restriction.

The Public Defender Crisis Makes It Worse

The timing trap is devastating on its own. Combined with Georgia’s public defender crisis, it becomes an assembly line for injustice.

Georgia public defenders carry caseloads 7 to 13 times national standards. The RAND Corporation’s 2023 National Public Defense Workload Study found that felonies require an average of 35 hours for reasonably effective assistance. A Georgia public defender with 687 felony cases would need 24,045 hours — the equivalent of 12 full-time attorneys — to provide constitutionally adequate representation.

In Gwinnett County in 2022, fewer than 4% of private attorneys handling indigent cases hired investigators. Less than 1% hired expert witnesses. Zero cases involved social workers. Average billing per case was under $1,500 for serious felonies. This is the representation the state provides — and then demands that these same lawyers identify and litigate their own failures within 30 days.

The Peterson Mandate

In Sanders v. State (March 3, 2026), Chief Justice Peterson — joined by seven of nine justices — identified the IAC timing problem by name and asked the legislature to fix it. Peterson declared Georgia’s post-conviction system “a mess” created by “a series of well-meaning but short-sighted decisions this Court made over the course of several decades.”

Critically, Peterson noted that because the “earliest practicable moment” doctrine is case law, not codified statute, the General Assembly has the power to override it by statute. No constitutional amendment is required.

The Reform

Bill 3 of the Georgia Post-Conviction Justice Act would codify the Strickland standard while eliminating the timing trap:

This aligns Georgia with the federal model and the majority of states. It codifies what Chief Justice Peterson asked for. It creates no new constitutional right — it provides the procedural mechanism to vindicate a right that already exists under the Sixth Amendment.

Sources

Sanders v. State, No. S26A0222 (Ga. 2026) — Peterson concurrence

Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183 (1996) — “earliest practicable moment”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) — IAC in collateral proceedings

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) — cause to excuse procedural default

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) — Justia

RAND National Public Defense Workload Study (2023) — RAND

SCHR Georgia Public Defender Council Database — SCHR

GPS Research Collection #69: The IAC Trap

Related Policy Briefs

Part of:  Vision 2027: Post-Conviction Justice Reform
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