WHEELER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Facility Information
- Original Design Capacity
- 1,000 (at 286% capacity)
- Bed Capacity
- 2,874 beds
- Current Population
- 2,860
- Active Lifers
- 339 (11.9% of population) · Sep 2026 GDC report
Read: Brown v. Plata - A Legal Roadmap for Georgia's Prison Crisis →
- Address
- 195 North Broad Street, Alamo, GA 30411
- Phone
- (912) 568-1731
- Fax
- (912) 568-1710
- Mailing Address
- P.O. Box 466, Alamo, GA 30411
- County
- Wheeler County
- Opened
- 1998
- Operator
- CoreCivic
Leadership & Accountability (as of 2024 records)
Officials currently holding positional authority at this facility, with deaths attributed to GPS-tracked records during their leadership tenure. Inclusion reflects role-based accountability, not legal findings of personal culpability. Death counts shown as facility / career.
| Role | Name | Since | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warden (Wheeler Correctional Facility) (facility lead) | Gillis, Shawn | 2024-01-01 | 15 / 15 |
About
Last updated September 13, 2026.(DS)
Wheeler Correctional Facility sits in Alamo, in Wheeler County — one of the two largest prisons in Georgia. Opened in 1998 and privately operated by CoreCivic under contract with the Georgia Department of Corrections, the medium-security men's facility was originally built to house 1,000 people. It doubled in size around 2010 and now carries a rated capacity of 2,874, against an original design capacity of 1,000. GPS records place the current population at 2,860 — 99.5% of rated capacity. Warden Shawn Gillis has led the facility since January 2024.
The physical plant consists of eight main housing units in mixed configurations: three cellblocks with three pods each housing 80 to 88 men; three dormitory-style units with six pods housing approximately 48 men each; three dormitory-style units with seven pods housing 64 to 84 men; and two segregation units totaling 178 beds. The facility also includes single cells, intensive therapeutic housing, and a CERT Team. GPS's facility record lists no special designations and no programming profile beyond the housing configuration — a notable absence for a facility of this size, where the public record offers no detail on education, vocational, religious, or treatment programming.
Contraband Cellphones and the Failure of Perimeter Security
The most heavily documented pattern at Wheeler in public records is the flow of contraband cellphones into the facility and the criminal enterprises they enable. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Jose Calderon was sentenced to 262 months in September 2024 for brokering methamphetamine distribution from inside Wheeler using a contraband cellphone — a man already serving sentences for trafficking meth who used the device to arrange the movement of kilos of meth to dealers across the state.
A second case, reported by The Georgia Virtue in June 2026, involved inmate Dequatte Tucker, who directed a drug trafficking conspiracy from inside Georgia state prisons using contraband cellphones. Tucker was sentenced to 188 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Co-defendants Roger Jenkins and Corey Hill received sentences of 84 months and 18 months respectively. The investigation, which involved multiple law enforcement agencies, resulted in the seizure of 21 firearms and over $17,000, and led to convictions for 33 additional defendants.
A third case involved Marcus Allen Daniels, who allegedly ran a $13,000 bitcoin scam from prison using an illegal cellphone, targeting a Lindale woman by impersonating a sheriff's employee, as reported by KLTV. After a shakedown at Wheeler on April 14, 2026, investigators recovered a cellphone from Daniels's cell. An arrest warrant was issued on May 6 with a $1 million bond, to be served automatically upon his release or parole from his current 20-year sentence.
Three separate prosecutions originating from Wheeler in under two years suggest the perimeter is porous in ways the policy framework has not closed. The systemwide context sharpens the point: officer vacancies in Georgia's prisons have run between 49.3% and 60% for multiple years, against a national standard of no more than 10%, and the hiring pipeline cannot close the gap — an acceptance rate under 15%, with 82.7% of new hires leaving in their first year. Georgia ranks last of 50 states for correctional-officer pay. Interdiction is a staffing-intensive function, and at Wheeler the prosecutions kept coming.
Violence, Mortality, and the Limits of Official Accounting
GPS has recorded 45 deaths in custody at Wheeler Correctional Facility since 2020. Four are classified as homicides, two as suicides, 14 as natural or medical, seven as other, and 18 as unknown or pending — a category that itself signals the opacity of death investigations inside the facility. The most recent recorded deaths include Jacob V. Reyes, 62, on July 25, 2026; Damon Luke Crowe, 40, on April 26, 2026; Demetrice Labron Joshen, 28, on November 21, 2025; and Dustin James Parham, 35, on November 2, 2025, classified as a homicide.
The named homicide on this page is LaParrish Dawayne London, 30, who died on March 21, 2023, from a stab wound to the chest, as reported by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. GPS's aggregate signals for the past 12 months show six sources documenting alleged inmate-on-inmate assaults across four months (March through August 2026), with severity ratings ranging from critical to low. Three sources recorded family fear for the incarcerated person's life across three months, and three sources recorded unnamed staff misconduct allegations across three months. These are aggregate patterns, not individual incidents, but they corroborate the violence documented in the public record.
Inmate accounts collected by GPS describe a pattern of stabbing incidents at Wheeler requiring emergency medical evacuation, including air transport, in recent years. Multiple witnesses report that at least one stabbing fatality occurred before emergency medical transport arrived. These accounts are consistent with the London homicide and with the four homicides GPS has recorded since 2020, but they also suggest additional incidents that have not surfaced in official mortality records.
Commissary Extortion and the Collapse of Institutional Control
The most sustained pattern in family reports to GPS concerns extortion through the commissary system. Multiple families, reporting independently and months apart, describe a scheme in which incarcerated people buy out the entire commissary store to force others to purchase items at inflated prices — one family member alleges a $10 bar of soap sold for $40, with debts escalating daily when only partial payment is made. Families report that their incarcerated relatives refuse to speak out for fear of retaliation, and that attempts to report the scheme through GDC channels have gone unresolved.
One family member reports having paid more than $2,000 since June through Cash App after their son called from Wheeler saying he would be harmed if money was not sent. The account, published through GPS's own investigative coverage, describes sustained demands for money in exchange for safety and protection inside the facility. GPS has not yet fact-checked this account, and it should be read as a family allegation rather than corroborated fact.
The broader pattern is one of complaint channels that close without resolution. GPS staff have identified a recurring dynamic at Wheeler: family complaints answered verbally, attributed to the incarcerated person's conduct — often drug use — and then dropped by both parties without a written finding or follow-up. One family member reports that a complaint was closed after a state official attributed the underlying concern to drugs, and that the family discontinued the complaint believing it had been resolved. GPS's internal notes describe a source with a history of being asked repeatedly for material and disengaging, suggesting the documentation trail is thin on both sides.
The facility's status as a private prison adds a layer of accountability opacity. Wheeler is operated by CoreCivic under contract with GDC, and family reports describe confusion about which entity is responsible for addressing complaints — with one family member reporting that the only written record of site-visit findings or a referral is the family member's own emails. GPS has received recurring reports of extortion and retaliatory discipline at Wheeler, and the aggregate signal data shows staff misconduct allegations across three months in 2026, though these remain unnamed and uncorroborated.
Food Safety Scores and the Limits of Inspection
The Georgia Department of Public Health has conducted seven routine food-safety inspections at Wheeler since May 2023, and every one has produced a Grade A score: 100 in May 2023, 93 in September 2023, 96 in March 2024, 90 in December 2024, 97 in May 2025, 94 in November 2025, and 100 in June 2026. The violations cited are the routine findings of institutional kitchens — handwashing facilities, food-contact surface sanitation, wiping cloth storage, plumbing and backflow devices, contamination prevention during food preparation.
These scores present a puzzle when set against GPS's systemic findings on GDC food service. GPS has documented a pattern of food-service sanitation failure across GDC kitchens that DPH inspection scores systematically fail to capture: tray-sanitizing dishwashers broken for sustained periods, roach and rodent infestation in kitchen and serving areas, and meals served on visibly contaminated trays. The pattern is hidden from DPH scores, GPS's analysis concludes, because inspections are scheduled walkthroughs that do not assess equipment under load, and because GPS has documented professional overlap between inspectors and facility staff in small-county settings. Wheeler County is precisely the kind of small-county setting where that regulatory-capture dynamic operates.
The systemic finding does not allege specific failures at Wheeler's kitchen. But it frames the Grade A scores as evidence of a process that may not capture what happens when the inspectors leave. GDC spends approximately $1.69 per person per day on food — under 60 cents per meal — against the FDA Thrifty Food Plan estimate of roughly $10 per day for an adult man's nutritionally adequate diet. The Marshall Project independently corroborated the pattern in May 2026, reporting rats in kitchens, insects in food, moldy trays, and visible malnutrition across Georgia facilities.
Staffing Collapse and the Private Prison Context
Wheeler operates inside a system where officer vacancies have run between 49.3% and 60% systemwide for multiple years, against a national standard of no more than 10%. The October 2024 DOJ findings letter concluded that "the leadership of the Georgia Department of Corrections has lost control of its facilities" and faulted GDC for placing "too much blame on gangs and insufficient emphasis on understaffing." Approximately 31% of the system's roughly 49,000 incarcerated population are validated members of 315 different security threat groups — more than double the national average — and DOJ and the Guidehouse 2024 consultant assessment independently concluded that gangs effectively run multiple facilities, controlling access to phones, showers, food, and bed assignments.
The contraband cellphone prosecutions at Wheeler — three separate cases in under two years — are consistent with a facility where gang control of phones and the flow of contraband has outpaced the staffing needed to interdict it. A former GDC sergeant, Tyler Ryals, forced out in 2024 after whistleblowing, told GPS he had personally been the only security person on the entire Telfair compound of roughly 1,250 maximum-security inmates. GPS treats staffing collapse and gang assumption of facility control as the integrated structural finding that explains the per-facility violence, classification, mortality, and infrastructure-failure narratives.
Wheeler's status as a CoreCivic-operated private prison adds a further dimension. The facility is one of the two largest prisons in the state, and its population of 2,860 sits at 99.5% of rated capacity — a figure that leaves essentially no slack for classification, programming, or the kind of individualized management that might interrupt the extortion and violence patterns families describe. The facility's original design capacity of 1,000, doubled by the 2010 expansion, means the physical plant was retrofitted to hold far more people than it was built for, with the housing configurations — pods of 80 to 88 men in cellblocks, dormitories of 48 to 84 — reflecting that compression.
Sources
This analysis draws on reporting from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Georgia Virtue, KLTV, and GDC public statements; Georgia Department of Public Health food-safety inspection records; GPS's mortality database and aggregate signal records; and inmate and family accounts collected by GPS staff, including a GPS-authored account published through GPS's platform. Systemic findings draw on GPS's own investigative reporting, the October 2024 DOJ findings letter, the Guidehouse 2024 consultant assessment, and The Marshall Project's May 2026 investigation of Georgia prison food.
Mortality Statistics
48 deaths documented at this facility from 2020 to present.
Deaths by Year
- 2026: 3
- 2025: 7
- 2024: 7
- 2023: 6
- 2022: 2
- 2021: 4
- 2020: 18
Food Safety Inspections
Georgia Department of Public Health
What the score doesn't measure. DPH grades kitchen compliance on inspection day — food storage, temperatures, pest control. It does not grade whether today's trays are clean. GPS reporting has found broken dishwashers at most Georgia state prisons we've documented; trays go out wet, stacked, and visibly moldy — including at facilities with recent scores near 100.
Who inspects. Most Georgia state prisons sit in rural counties — often with fewer than 20,000 people, several with fewer than 10,000. The environmental health inspector lives in that community and often knows the kitchen staff personally. Rural inspection regimes don't have the structural independence you'd expect in a city-sized health department. Read the scores accordingly.
Read the investigation: “Dunked, Stacked and Served: Why Georgia Prison Trays Are Making People Sick”
Recent inspections
| Date | Score | Purpose | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 1, 2026 | 100 | Routine | |
| Nov 17, 2025 | 94 | Routine | |
| May 19, 2025 | 97 | Routine | |
| Dec 2, 2024 | 90 | Routine | |
| Mar 18, 2024 | 96 | Routine | |
| Sep 25, 2023 | 93 | Routine | |
| May 3, 2023 | 100 | Routine |
June 1, 2026 — Score 100
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
No violations recorded for this inspection.
November 17, 2025 — Score 94
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2D |
adequate handwashing facilities supplied & accessible 511-6-1.07(3)(a) - handwashing cleanser, availability (pf) Corrected | 4 | No handwash soap at the handwash sink in the main kitchen area. CA: Each handwash sink shall be provided with a supply of hand cleaning liquid. COS: PIC (person-in-charge) got hand soap for the sink. |
| 2D |
adequate handwashing facilities supplied & accessible 511-6-1.06(2)(o) - using a handwashing sink- operation & maintenance (pf) Corrected | 4 | Observed tray stored in the handwash sink at the serving line in the back. CA: A handwash sink shall be maintained so that it is accessible at all time for use. COS: PIC removed tray. |
| 16B |
plumbing installed; proper backflow devices 511-6-1.06(2)(r) - system maintained in good repair (p, c) | 2 | No plumbing connection from the back dump sink to the floor drain. CA: Plumbing system shall be maintained in good repair. |
May 19, 2025 — Score 97
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12A |
contamination prevented during food preparation, storage, display 511-6-1.04(4)(i) - storage or display of food in contact with water or ice (c) | 3 | Packaged food in the outside walk-in freezer was stored in direct contact with ice and the food in the package is subject to the entry of water due to the nature of its packaging. CA: PIC will get ice removed from boxes. |
December 2, 2024 — Score 90
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(6)(n) - manual and mechanical warewashing equipment, chemical sanitization-temperature, ph, concentration, hardness (p,pf) Corrected Repeat | 4 | Observed the 3-compartment sink sanitizer (quaternary ammonium) registering at less than the minimum 200 ppm. COS - The sink was redone to the correct concentration at time of inspection. |
| 12C |
wiping cloths: properly used and stored 511-6-1.04(4)(m) - wiping cloths, use limitation (c) | 3 | Wiping cloth quaternary ammonium compound sanitizing solution not at proper minimum strength. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(2)(a) - floor, walls, & ceilings, cleanability (c) | 1 | Floors near the dishmachine is heavily damaged. Floor near the kettles is also heavily damaged and holding water. Floors must be smooth and easily cleanable. CA: Should be corrected by next inspection. |
March 18, 2024 — Score 96
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(6)(n) - manual and mechanical warewashing equipment, chemical sanitization-temperature, ph, concentration, hardness (p,pf) Corrected | 4 | Hot water sanitizing dish machine final rinse not reaching proper final temperature at the manifold. CA: Maintenance called to repair and dishes moved to the other dish machine. |
September 25, 2023 — Score 93
Routine · Inspector: Victoria Thornton
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(7)(a)1 - equipment, food-contact surfaces,& utensils (pf) Corrected | 4 | Observed old labels stuck to food containers; must be taken off during cleaning. COS - Old labels removed. |
| 12B |
personal cleanliness 511-6-1.03(5)(g) - jewelry (c) | 3 | Observed several food service workers (inmates) wearing jewelry other than a plain wedding band on their arms/hands while handling food. |
May 3, 2023 — Score 100
Routine · Inspector: Mark Harden
No violations recorded for this inspection.
Recent reports (5)
Source-attributed observations and allegations from news coverage and reports submitted to GPS. Each entry credits its source.
- ALLEGATION According to Kltv.com Published: May 7, 2026Daniels allegedly ran a $13,000 bitcoin scam from prison using an illegal cellphone, targeting a Lindale woman by impersonating a sheriff's employee.
"According to the Smith County Sheriff's Office, the victim was told by a caller impersonating a sheriff's employee that she needed to send $13,000 via a bitcoin machine to avoid arrest for a missed subpoena. Investigators identified Daniels as an inmate in the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) and, after a shakedown at Wheeler Correctional Facility on April 14, 2026, recovered a cellphone from his cell."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to The Georgia Virtue Published: Jun 25, 2026Inmate Dequatte Tucker directed a drug trafficking conspiracy from inside Georgia state prisons using contraband cell phones.
"much of the operation directed from inside Georgia state prisons using contraband cell phones."
Read source → - ALLEGATION Submitted via GPS public submission form Recorded by GPS: Apr 21, 2026INCIDENT — WHEELER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY: An inmate was stabbed in the chest in dorm 8m4 at Wheeler Correctional Facility. A life flight helicopter…Read source →
- ALLEGATION Submitted via GPS public submission form Incident: Mar 7, 2026TIP — WHEELER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY: [AI-detected via Telegram relay] Report of serious violence at Wheeler facility. Source indicates 'blood on blood' suggesting a…Read source →
- OBSERVATION According to Migrated From Case Recorded by GPS: May 8, 2026Report of serious violence at Wheeler facility. Source indicates 'blood on blood' suggesting a stabbing or violent altercation, with life flight h…
"[AI-detected via Telegram relay] [AI-detected via Telegram relay] Source message IDs: ['2026-03-07 01:05:19', '2026-03-07 01:08:52', '2026-03-07 01:09:09']"
Timeline (13)
Source Articles (8)
Former leadership
Officials who previously held leadership roles at this facility.
| Role | Name | Tenure | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT (facility lead) | Brown, Vashti J | 2024-01-01 → 2024-12-31 | 7 / 12 |