Where Georgia’s private-prison money goes
Georgia pays two publicly traded corporations more than $1 billion to run prisons for profit. Both carry long records of understaffing, violence, and death — and a business model that pays off when more people are locked up, longer.
Nearly four out of every five private-prison dollars — about $861 million — go to a single company, CoreCivic, now the subject of a U.S. Department of Justice civil-rights investigation. The rest goes to The GEO Group. There is no third option and no public operator competing on price: Georgia has handed two Wall-Street companies a billion-dollar franchise to incarcerate its residents. Source: Open Georgia vendor payments FY2018–2025 (CoreCivic + CCA ≈ $870M of $1.11B total).
The money over time
GDC payments to private-prison operators per fiscal year (Open Georgia) — a steady, recession-proof ~$140M/year to keep the beds full.
Follow each dollar
CoreCivic — the franchise
$861Mto CoreCivic, FY18–25 (NYSE: CXW)CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America) is the largest US private-prison operator. The DOJ opened a 2024 civil-rights investigation into its Trousdale Turner facility citing stabbings, assaults, murders, deaths, and sexual misconduct; Tennessee fined the company more than $29.5 million for understaffing, and it has faced roughly 700 lawsuits since 2020. Georgia keeps paying.
Sources: DOJ press release on the Trousdale investigation; Tennessee Lookout / Fortune on the fines; SEC filings; Open Georgia.
The GEO Group
$239Mto GEO Group, FY18–25 (NYSE: GEO)The GEO Group runs private prisons and ICE detention. Its record includes deaths in ICE custody, $1-a-day forced-labor litigation in multiple states, and persistent understaffing and inadequate-care allegations. It was a real-estate investment trust until 2021, when it converted to a taxable corporation — a tax maneuver, not a change in how it runs a prison.
Sources: AFSC Investigate; multi-state forced-labor litigation dockets; SEC filings; Open Georgia.
The incentive built into the contract
The throughline is structural. A private operator’s revenue depends on keeping beds full — every empty bed is lost margin. That is a financial interest in more people incarcerated, for longer: the exact opposite of what a parole board, a sentencing reform, or an oversight system is supposed to want. Georgia has put that incentive on its own payroll.
Sources: GPS analysis; standard private-corrections contract structure (per-diem / occupancy).
The same system, across our data
Every number below comes from GPS’s own databases — click through to the underlying data.
The numbers we can’t see — and why
- Per-facility staffing and incident data the operators report to the state — not public per facility.
- Whether contract penalties are actually assessed when conditions fail, or quietly waived.
- Any occupancy guarantee or minimum-payment floor in the Georgia contracts.
We publish the verified figures and label the gaps. How we verify →