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Georgia Prisoners’ Speak

A Fifty-State Reference for the Blue-Ribbon Study Committee

How this survey was built

Georgia Prisoners’ Speak has compiled a fifty-state reference table on post-conviction procedure: the rules that decide when, where, and whether a person already convicted can have a court examine whether that conviction was lawfully obtained. That is a narrower thing than a second trial, and the distinction runs through everything below: these proceedings ask whether the State convicted someone in violation of their constitutional rights, not whether a jury reached the right result. It was built for the Georgia House Blue-Ribbon Study Committee on Criminal Post-Conviction Litigation, and it is published here in full so that anyone can check it.

This page explains what the table covers, how it was verified, and, just as importantly, what could not be verified. The findings drawn from it are on the companion page, Challenging a Conviction in Georgia: How the Rules Compare to the Other Forty-Nine States.

What the table covers

The table answers fifteen questions for each of the fifty states, asked in three passes.

Seven questions on post-conviction procedure (July 2026):

	Question
Where an ineffective-assistance claim must be raised	On direct appeal, in post-conviction, or either, and what happens if you pick wrong
The time limit for challenging a conviction	How long you have to bring the challenge your state provides (in Georgia, a petition for habeas corpus), what starts the clock, and what excuses a late filing
Counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding	Whether a lawyer is appointed, and whether that depends on the sentence
Screening of self-represented petitions	How a state identifies a meritorious petition from someone with no lawyer
Where the petition is filed	The court of conviction, the county of confinement, or elsewhere
The bar on second petitions	What blocks a successive petition, and what excuses it
Judicial reassignment	Whether the original trial judge hears the challenge to their own case

Two questions on the trial record and on weighing the evidence (August 2026):

	Question
Jury selection in the record	Whether the questioning of prospective jurors in a non-capital felony trial is taken down as a matter of course, or only on request
Weighing the evidence again	Whether any court may reconsider the weight of the evidence after a verdict, who may do it, and whether a refusal is reviewable

Six questions on counsel for a person under sentence of death (September 2026), asked because a witness told the Committee on 21 August 2026 that Georgia is the only state with no mechanism for appointing counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings:

	Question
The entitlement	Whether an indigent prisoner under sentence of death is entitled to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction petition
The mechanism	Who provides the lawyer: a capital defender office, a resource centre, court appointment, or nothing
Standards	Whether qualification standards exist for that lawyer
The deadline	Whether the filing period waits on the appointment of counsel
Practice	How the mechanism operates in fact
The verdict	Mandatory, discretionary, none, no death penalty, or unclear

Fifty states, fifteen questions, 750 cells. The time limit is also examined on its own, in a separate pass, for the reason given next.

The time limit, separately

The time limit is a question often answered inaccurately in fifty-state comparisons, because the states do not all use the same instrument. A person in Georgia challenges a conviction by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, and the four-year limit in O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) is a limit on that writ. Most states no longer proceed that way: they enacted a purpose-built post-conviction statute or rule that displaced habeas for this purpose, and the one-year figure usually quoted for those states is the limit in that act. Alabama’s year is Rule 32.2(c); Pennsylvania’s is the Post Conviction Relief Act. Neither is a habeas deadline. Set side by side in a single column and ranked, those numbers compare a writ with a statute and report the difference as though it were a difference in generosity.

A separate pass therefore establishes, for each state and from primary sources: whether habeas corpus still lies to challenge a conviction and on what deadline; what separate post-conviction remedy exists and on what deadline; which of the two is the operative route today; and whether a late filing under the operative route can ever be excused. Georgia is compared on the deadline only against states where the instrument is the same.

The standard

Every cell must terminate in a primary source a reader can pull. A statute section, a court rule, or a controlling case, plus a short verbatim quote from that source showing it says what we claim.

No cell rests on a secondary summary, a practice guide, or a law-review footnote. Where a primary source could not be reached, the cell is marked unverified and says what was looked for, rather than being filled in with something plausible.

An unverified cell is an acceptable outcome. A confidently wrong cell is not.

How each cell was checked

Every citation was re-fetched and searched for its quoted language, so that a citation which resolves but does not contain what it is cited for cannot survive. A cell is counted as verified only where that independent retrieval found the quote at the cited source. The counts on this page are the result of that check, not of each cell’s own certification. Where a source refuses automated retrieval (some state court sites serve a challenge page), the cell is verified instead against a copy of the document retrieved by hand and retained; the cell says so.

Every cited opinion in the first pass was read in full, 201 of them, start to finish, to establish facts a quotation cannot show on its own: whether the quoted passage is the court’s holding or merely dictum, whether it sits in the majority opinion rather than a concurrence or dissent, and how the court actually voted.

Where a decision was not unanimous, the table says so. Twenty-eight cells rest on divided courts. Georgia’s rule that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in habeas is one of them: Gibson v. Turpin (1999) was decided 4 to 3, with the Chief Justice, the Presiding Justice and one other Justice dissenting on precisely that point, and the dissent recording that Georgia was then the only jurisdiction in the country without such a right. A rule carried by one vote is stated here as a rule carried by one vote.

Later decisions citing each case were read, 2,519 opinions across 160 cases, to ask a question a keyword search cannot answer: has a later court undermined this? Where one has, the cell says so. Rhode Island’s screening rule rests on Shatney v. State (2000), which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held “shall be deemed abrogated and inapplicable” in Motyka v. State (2017) for initial post-conviction applications by applicants sentenced to life without parole; the table records that limit alongside the rule.

Enacted legislation was screened against every cell. A court can be overtaken by a legislature as readily as by a later court, and no amount of reading the decisions will show it: a statute that displaces a case is usually written into a different part of the code and need not mention the case at all. So the enactments of each state were collected from its own legislative record, 684 of them, and each was tested not against the general subject of the question, but against the specific statute section or case that the individual cell rests on. Two cells were set aside for closer reading. In both, the legislation left the stated rule standing: Nevada’s 2025 amendment to NRS 34.738 changed where a petition challenging the computation of time served is filed, not where a challenge to a conviction is filed, and Utah’s 2026 capital-case act changed which court appoints counsel for a death-sentenced petitioner, not whether counsel is appointed at all.

Every first-pass question was answered twice, independently. A second researcher answered each question from scratch without seeing the first answer, and the two were compared. Where both reached the same rule from overlapping authority, that agreement stands behind the cell. Where they diverged, the disagreement was referred out and settled directly against the primary sources. Missouri is an example of why this matters: post-conviction there is governed by Supreme Court Rules 29.15 and 24.035, not by RSMo § 547.360, because Schleeper v. State (Mo. banc 1998) holds that the statute codified the rule almost verbatim and, the enacting bill not having expressly referred to the rule, “did not create a second and independent avenue for post-conviction relief.”

The second pass was contested. The two questions on the trial record and weight review went through an adversarial review by a second, independent system, a targeted re-run of every cell the review left unresolved, and a primary-source corpus for all fifty states (834 retained documents, each quotation locatable by search in the saved file). Where the review proposed a change that would have moved a state toward Georgia’s group, or away from it, the change was accepted only on the primary text.

Counsel was coded under a written rule. The count of states that appoint counsel at a first post-conviction proceeding (mandatory, conditional, discretionary, none) is not a tally of the short labels on the table. Each of the fifty verified cells was coded on 1 September 2026 under a stated rule that names what makes an entitlement mandatory rather than conditional, with each state’s operative words quoted; the coding and its sensitivity bands are held with the survey.

What the table shows

734 of 750 cells (97.9%) are verified against a primary source: the cited statute, rule or opinion was retrieved independently and the quoted language found in it.

Post-conviction procedure (seven questions, July 2026)	339 of 350 cells verified
Trial record and weight review (two questions, August 2026)	100 of 100 cells verified
Counsel under sentence of death (six questions, September 2026)	295 of 300 cells verified

16 cells are unverified, and they are listed rather than hidden. In each, no primary source squarely answering the question could be reached, or the quoted language could not be found at the cited source on re-fetch. Often that is because none exists: several states simply have no rule on whether the original trial judge hears the post-conviction petition, and that silence is itself an answer the Committee should have.

Alaska: capital pc counsel standards
Kentucky: capital pc counsel standards
Michigan: capital pc deadline interaction
New Mexico: capital pc counsel standards
Wyoming: capital pc counsel standards
Hawaii: judicial reassignment
Hawaii: successive bar
Louisiana: judicial reassignment
Louisiana: successive bar
New Hampshire: judicial reassignment
New Hampshire: successive bar
New Mexico: judicial reassignment
New Mexico: pro se screening
Oregon: judicial reassignment
West Virginia: judicial reassignment
West Virginia: successive bar

What we could not verify

The table states rules, not outcomes. How a rule is written and how it works in practice are different questions. This table answers the first. A state whose statute promises appointed counsel and a state whose courts actually appoint one will look identical here.

The screen of enacted legislation is a screen, not a guarantee. It reads what the states publish of their own sessions, so a very recent enactment that has not yet reached the public record, or one that changes a rule without naming the authority it changes, could pass it. Where that risk is highest, a rule resting on a single case rather than on a statute, the table says which case, so the check can be repeated.

Deadlines are compared only against deadlines of the same kind. Georgia’s four years runs against the writ of habeas corpus itself; most states’ periods run against a statute enacted to replace the writ. Those numbers are not interchangeable, and where they are set beside each other on this page the instrument is named alongside the number.

The capital-counsel pass excludes federal counsel by design. A prisoner under sentence of death is entitled to appointed counsel in federal habeas under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 in every state. That is a federal mechanism, and it is not counted for any state, so a state with nothing of its own is recorded as having nothing.

Corrections

If you find an error, we want to know. Every cell carries its source, so a disagreement can be resolved by reading the same document we read. Write to accountability@gps.press and we will correct the table and note the correction here.

Compiled by The GDC Accountability Project, Inc. (Georgia Prisoners’ Speak). Procedure pass verified 31 July 2026; trial-record and weight pass 16 August 2026; capital-counsel pass 7 September 2026.

What the fifty states do

The rows below reduce each question to the shortest accurate description of every state’s rule, so the country can be read at a glance; the full answer and its source are in the tables that follow. The comparisons after it are drawn from the substance of each rule rather than from these short descriptions, and each states how many states it rests on.

Question	How the states divide	Georgia
Post-conviction procedure
Where an ineffective-assistance claim must be raised	19 Post-conviction only 12 Either forum 10 Post-conviction preferred 5 Earliest opportunity 4 Direct appeal required	Earliest opportunity
Counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding	21 Conditional 17 Discretionary 8 Mandatory 4 None	None
How self-represented petitions are screened	42 Judicial screening 4 Mandatory counsel 3 Defender intake 1 No merit screen	No merit screen
Where the petition is filed	38 Court of conviction 6 Either 2 County of confinement 1 Split: conviction or confinement 1 Designated court 1 Not established 1 Court of Appeals	County of confinement
The bar on second or successive petitions	39 Barred, narrow exceptions 6 Barred, cause and prejudice 4 Discretionary 1 No express bar	Barred, narrow exceptions
Whether the original trial judge hears the challenge	17 Same judge permitted 14 Same judge default 6 Unaddressed 5 Reassignment mandatory 3 Reassignment discretionary 2 Not established 1 Not applicable 1 Same judge mandatory 1 Split by case type	Reassignment mandatory
The trial record, and weighing the evidence again
Whether jury selection is part of the trial record	31 Mandatory record 12 Request only 5 Judge directed 1 Not established 1 Contested	Request only
Whether any court weighs the evidence again	22 Trial judge only 21 No lens-free forum 4 Nominal, lensed 3 Appellate weight review	Trial judge only
Counsel for a person under sentence of death
Is a person under sentence of death entitled to appointed post-conviction counsel?	23 Mandatory 16 No death penalty 4 No death penalty; provision remains 3 Discretionary 1 Mandatory, prospective only 1 None 1 Conditionally mandatory 1 Authorities conflict	None
Who provides the lawyer, and how	13 Public defender 10 Court appointment 10 Statewide capital defender 9 Court appointment from list 4 No death penalty 3 None 1 Resource center	Resource center
Qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel	16 Standards by rule 16 No standards 6 Standards by statute 5 No death penalty 4 Not established 1 Standards by rule and statute 1 Standards by court order 1 Standards by guideline	No standards
Whether the capital deadline waits for counsel	28 Runs regardless 11 No fixed deadline 8 Runs from appointment 1 Runs from brief 1 Tolled until counsel 1 Runs from finality	No fixed deadline
How the mechanism operates in fact	18 Office operating 14 Applied example 14 No death penalty 3 Not established 1 Office unfunded or vacant	Office operating
The verdict: does the state have a mechanism at all?	24 Mandatory 21 No death penalty 3 Discretionary 1 None 1 Authorities conflict	None

Where Georgia stands apart

Screening. 39 of 50 states screen self-represented petitions through a judge, 6 through a defender office, and 4 by appointing counsel outright. Georgia is the only state where no merit screen operates before the merits are reached, and no counsel trigger operates either way. A Georgia judge decides every petition; none is ever flagged as strong enough to warrant counsel first.
Counsel. Appointed counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding is mandatory in 8 states, and conditional on a threshold such as a hearing or a substantial issue in 21 more. Georgia is one of 4 states that provide none.
Counsel under sentence of death. 24 states require counsel to be appointed for a capital post-conviction petition and 3 let a court appoint; 21 have no death penalty. Georgia is the only state with no mechanism. It appropriates $900,000 a year to a private resource centre that has no power to be appointed to anything: state money, no state mechanism.
Venue. 36 of 49 states route the petition back to the court that entered the conviction. Georgia is one of 2 that send it instead to the county where the person is held.
Innocence. Of the 37 states whose rule on this point could be established, 22 let actual innocence or newly discovered evidence excuse a late filing. Georgia is among the 15 that do not.

Where Georgia is unexceptional

A table that made Georgia an outlier on every question would deserve suspicion. On where an ineffective-assistance claim may be raised, Georgia sits with the largest group of states rather than apart from it. On whether an appellate court may weigh the evidence again, Georgia is with the great majority. The filing deadline is not summarised here at all, because it is the one question a single column cannot answer honestly: the states do not all use the same instrument, and how long a period runs matters less than whether a court may excuse a late filing. Both points are set out below.

On the question the venue proposal leaves open. If a first habeas petition is heard in the court that entered the conviction, the judge whose trial is under challenge may be the judge who decides it. Of the 39 states whose rule could be established, 34 allow the judge whose trial is being challenged to decide the challenge; 5 do not. Few states have legislated on the point: in 12 states nothing addresses it at all, which is itself why the trial judge keeps the case.

The time limit on challenging the lawfulness of a conviction

What this proceeding is, and is not. A writ of habeas corpus tests whether a conviction was lawfully obtained — whether, in the words of O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(a), there was “a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of this state.” It is not a retrial and not a second appeal. Georgia’s courts have said so repeatedly: the insufficiency of the evidence is not a ground for habeas relief (Allen v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 642 (1975)), and the remedy for newly discovered evidence is an extraordinary motion for new trial, not habeas (Bush v. Chappell, 225 Ga. 659 (1969)). The question below is therefore not how long a person has to argue they are innocent. It is how long they have to argue that the State convicted them unconstitutionally — and after that period runs, the claim is not heard on its merits at all.

This is asked more often than it is answered accurately, because the fifty states do not use the same instrument. A person in Georgia challenges a conviction by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, and the four-year limit comes from the habeas statute. Most states no longer do it that way: they enacted a purpose-built post-conviction statute or rule that absorbed the writ, and the one-year figure so often quoted for those states is the limit in that act, not a limit on habeas corpus. Ranking those numbers against each other in a single column compares a writ with a statute. The table below therefore reports the instrument first.

What the writ still does

Of the 50 states surveyed, 12 keep habeas corpus as a live route to challenge a conviction, 20 keep it only for narrow claims such as a facially void judgment or want of jurisdiction, and 18 have folded it into a post-conviction act that is now the exclusive remedy. Georgia is in the first group: the writ itself, not a statute enacted to replace it, is how a conviction is attacked here.

What a person may actually bring

What decides whether a conviction is ever re-examined is not how long the door stands open but what may be carried through it, and whether anyone helps carry it. On each of those, Georgia sits at or near the closed end of the country.

Can this be brought?	Georgia	Elsewhere
A claim that the conviction is void on its face, free of any time limit	No. Closed by Harper (2009); O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4 now reaches void sentences only	Yes in 21 states, which keep an untimed writ for precisely this defect
A late claim heard because the trial was constitutionally unfair — the very thing the writ exists to test	No.	No — in none of the 33 states whose rule could be established. Not one State forgives lateness on this ground
A late claim forgiven on a showing of actual innocence — a different claim, and a demanding one	No. There is no innocence gateway once the period has run	Yes in 12 of the 38 states whose rule could be established, typically on a showing that no reasonable juror would have convicted
The clock starting later for newly discovered facts	Yes. § 9-14-42(c)(4) runs from when the facts “could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”	Yes in 19 of 43 established
The clock starting later for a newly recognised retroactive right	Yes. § 9-14-42(c)(3)	Yes in 16 of 39 established
A late claim saved by equitable tolling	No. Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354 (2020), declined to adopt it	Available in 8 of the 28 states whose rule could be established
Relief where the sentencing court never gave the warning the statute requires	No remedy. § 9-14-42(d) directs the warning; Stubbs holds nothing follows from its absence	—
A petition brought with a lawyer, for someone who cannot afford one	No. Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855 (1999), decided 4–3	Mandatory in 8, conditional on a threshold in 21, discretionary in 17
A self-represented petition that is screened for merit rather than left to sink	No merit screen before the merits are reached — and no counsel trigger either way	39 screen through a judge, 6 through a defender office, 4 by appointing counsel

Two rows in that table answer yes for Georgia, and they matter. § 9-14-42(c) does not simply run four years from conviction: it runs from the latest of four dates, including the discovery of the supporting facts and the recognition of a new retroactive right. Georgia is not bare on this point and should not be described as though it were.

But look at the first row. A writ of habeas corpus exists to test whether the State obtained a conviction unconstitutionally. No State in the country lets an untimely claim be heard on that ground. Where forgiveness exists at all it is keyed to factual innocence — a showing that the petitioner did not do it, usually that no reasonable juror would have convicted. That is a different claim from the one the writ is for. A person whose trial was unfair, and who therefore cannot say what a fair trial would have found, fits through none of these doors. The escape hatch does not match the claim.

Georgia then withholds the one hatch that does exist. 12 states will hear an untimely claim from someone who can show actual innocence; Georgia will not. It provides no lawyer to bring the petition and no screening to find the meritorious ones, and it has closed the untimed route for a conviction void on its face.

The claim Georgia closed: a conviction void on its face

In most of the country a person holding a conviction that is void on its face — entered by a court without jurisdiction, or void for some other reason apparent on the record — may say so at any time. Georgia had that remedy and closed it. The provision other states rely on exists in Georgia’s code and has since 1863. O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4 states that “[t]he judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.” In Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162 (2008), the Supreme Court of Georgia read that section to reach a void conviction. Sixteen months later, in Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216 (2009), it overruled that holding, leaving the section to reach void sentences only: the law was “restored to its pre-Chester state, whereby a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case.”

The same three votes decided both. Chester was unanimous in judgment but divided four to three on the point: “All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, THOMPSON, and HINES, JJ., who concur specially” — three Justices declining the reasoning that reached void convictions. Harper then came down four to three the other way: “All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., Benham and Melton, JJ., who dissent.” The three who had refused Chester‘s reasoning were now the majority overruling it, the Justice who wrote Chester was in dissent, and the Chief Justice dissented.

What this sequence asks of the General Assembly — the right every Justice acknowledged, the three remedies that closed, and the repair — is argued in full at The Sleeping Giants, Argued.

Harper did not leave those claims without a home. It named three remedies. Two of them close. A motion in arrest of judgment under § 17-9-61 “must be made during the term at which the judgment was obtained,” so it expires within months of sentencing — Georgia’s courts have held such motions untimely when filed five years afterwards, and twenty-one. An extraordinary motion for new trial under § 5-5-41 reaches newly discovered evidence, but the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878 (2019), that claims of constitutional deprivation “could be pursued only through habeas corpus.” What is left is the writ, and the four years runs against it. A person holding a conviction that is void on its face has, in most states, an untimed route to say so. In Georgia that route runs through habeas corpus, and closes.

State by state

The first column is the instrument a conviction challenge travels on today. “No limit” means the state sets no filing period for that route.

State	Habeas corpus	Separate post-conviction remedy	Detail
Alabama	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (subsumption); Ala. Code § 15-21-1 to -34 (habeas chapter, which contains no limitations period)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief (Ala. R. Crim. P. 32) · Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) (LIMITATIONS PERIOD)	Detail Habeas: A proceeding under this rule displaces all post-trial remedies except posttrial motions under Rule 24 and appeal. Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule. Post-conviction remedy: the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed … within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment On excusing a late filing: the court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) and (f), unless the petition is filed … within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment THE STATUTE HAS NO DEADLINE, BUT THAT IS A TRAP. Alabama's habeas chapter (Ala. Code Title 15, ch. 21) is still on the books and, having read every section heading from § 15-21-1 through § 15-21-34, I confirm it contains no limitations period of any kind. But habeas cannot be used to attack a conviction: Rule 32.4 converts any such filing into a Rule 32 proceeding, which then takes Rule 32.2(c)'s one-year bar. Salter v. State, 606 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992): 'A petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the requirements of Rule 32.' Still applied: Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) ('Bagley's petition must be treated as a Rule 32 petition attacking his 1995 convictions and sentences'). Independently, § 15-21-23 forbids habeas inquiry 'into the regularity or justice of any order, judgment, decree or process of any court legally constituted,' and § 15-21-24 limits discharge to six jurisdictional/void-process grounds — so even pre-Rule 32, statutory habeas reached only void judgments. Habeas does survive in Alabama for NON-conviction custody questions (bail, extradition, prison discipline/good-time, expired sentence), which is why the writ still appears in Alabama reports; those are not conviction challenges. SECOND CRITICAL POINT: Rule 32's one-year bar is not universal. By its own terms 32.2(c) reaches only grounds under Rule 32.1(a) [constitutional], (e) [newly discovered facts], and (f) [out-of-time appeal]. Grounds (b) (court without jurisdiction), (c) (sentence exceeds/not authorized by law), and (d) (held past sentence expiration) carry NO deadline and may be raised at any time — that untimed jurisdictional route is functionally where Alabama's common-law habeas went. Sub-deadlines: 32.1(f) out-of-time-appeal petitions from denial of a prior Rule 32 petition get six months from discovery; 32.1(e) newly-discovered-facts petitions get the later of the one year or six months after discovery. The one year runs from issuance of the certificate of judgment on direct appeal (Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P.), or from lapse of the time to appeal if no appeal was taken; it cannot begin before April 1, 1987. The period was two years until amended to one year effective Aug. 1, 2002 (Salter's text still says two). CAPITAL CASES: I found no separate capital deadline — Rule 32 by its terms applies to 'any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense,' and the reviewed capital Rule 32 litigation (e.g. Ex parte Land) proceeds under the same rule; I did not separately verify Ala. Code § 15-18-200 DNA-testing procedure, so treat any capital-specific carve-out as unverified. 365 days is the calendar-year period expressed in days; the rule says 'one (1) year,' not a day count. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Alaska	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Alaska R. Civ. P. 86(m) (habeas rule, amended through SCO 1829 eff. 10/15/2014); AS 12.75.020; AS 12.75.110; Fisher v. State, 315 P.3d 686 (Alaska App. 2013); Hertz v. State, 8 P.3d 1144 (Alaska App. 2000)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Application for post-conviction relief, AS 12.72.010-.040 / Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1 · AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A); construed in Geisinger v. State, 334 P.3d 1241 (Alaska App. 2014)	Detail Habeas: This rule does not apply to any post-conviction proceeding that could be brought under Criminal Rule 35.1. The court shall treat such a complaint as an application for post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35.1. Post-conviction remedy: (A) if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure On excusing a late filing: AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) … 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final HABEAS IS NOT AN OPEN-ENDED ROUTE TO A CONVICTION IN ALASKA. Alaska never repealed habeas: AS ch. 12.75 and Civil Rule 86 are both in force, and I read the entire chapter (AS 12.75.010-.230, akleg print view) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. But it is closed as a conviction-attack vehicle by three independent locks. (1) Civil Rule 86(m), captioned 'Superseded By Post-Conviction Relief Procedure Under Criminal Rule 35.1,' makes conversion mandatory; Fisher, 315 P.3d 686, calls it a 'clear and mandatory directive' and reversed a court that dismissed rather than converted a habeas petition. (2) AS 12.75.020 bars the writ to 'A person properly imprisoned or restrained by virtue of the legal judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and AS 12.75.110 forbids inquiry 'into the legality or justice of any order, judgment, or process specified in AS 12.75.020.' (3) AS 12.72.010(6) sweeps into PCR any claim 'subject to collateral attack upon any ground or alleged error previously available under the common law, statutory law, or other writ.' Net effect: a habeas petition attacking a conviction is re-labeled a PCR application and inherits AS 12.72.020's deadline — so filing in habeas buys no extra time. Hertz, 8 P.3d at 1147-48, conceded in dicta 'that a person held under a void judgment can seek redress in habeas corpus' and said a procedural bar 'might be unconstitutional' as to such a claim, but held Hertz's claims were cognizable under Rule 35.1 and rejected his Alaska Const. art. I, sec. 13 suspension-clause argument; McLaughlin, 214 P.3d 386, then held a defendant cannot escape the AS 12.72.020 limitation by styling the attack as one on a void judgment. So the void-judgment escape hatch is reserved, not established — I found no Alaska decision actually granting habeas relief from a conviction outside Rule 35.1. Habeas does remain a live, deadline-free remedy for restraint NOT resting on a criminal judgment (pretrial custody, extradition, child custody under Rule 86(l)). PC DEADLINE MECHANICS: 365 days is the figure for anyone who took a direct appeal — Geisinger, 334 P.3d 1241, holds 'a defendant who appeals his conviction or sentence, or both, has one year from the date the decision on appeal is final.' A defendant who took NO appeal gets 18 months (about 548 days) from entry of judgment. EXCEPTIONS: no time limit at all if the applicant claims the sentence was illegal (AS 12.72.020(a)(3), narrowly construed to sentences unauthorized by the judgment); AS 12.72.020(b) allows late claims on due diligence plus physical/mental incapacity or state obstruction, or newly discovered evidence proving innocence by clear and convincing evidence; AS 12.72.025 gives one year from finality of a prior PCR decision for a claim that PCR counsel was ineffective; AS 12.72.020(a)(6) otherwise bars any second application; post-conviction DNA testing has its own exclusive vehicle, AS ch. 12.73. No capital variation — Alaska has no death penalty. Caveat: courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/crpro.pdf (Criminal Rule 35.1 itself) timed out repeatedly and I could not read it directly; Rule 35.1's content here rests on the akleg statutory text and on verbatim quotation in Hertz, McLaughlin and Fisher. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Arizona	No limit habeas survives narrowly · A.R.S. § 13-4121 (Prosecution of writ); habeas article A.R.S. §§ 13-4121 to 13-4147 contains no filing deadline. Narrowed by A.R.S. §§ 13-4131(B), 13-4132(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3; Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964).	90 days no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Relief, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule 32 (defendants sentenced after trial or contested probation violation, and all capital cases) / Rule 33 (defendants who pled guilty or no contest) · Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020); parallel provision Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A)	Detail Habeas: A person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may petition for and prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. Post-conviction remedy: A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. On excusing a late filing: A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. THE HEADLINE FINDING: Arizona's habeas corpus statute carries NO filing deadline of any kind. I read every section of the habeas article, A.R.S. Title 13, ch. 39, art. 26 (§§ 13-4121 through 13-4147, index at https://www.azleg.gov/arsDetail/?title=13), and no provision imposes a time bar on petitioning. The only timing language runs against the court, not the petitioner: § 13-4124(A) ('shall grant it without delay'), and § 13-4142(A) ('Any writ or process authorized by this article may be issued and served on any day or at any time', https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04142.htm). § 13-4123(B) restricts SUCCESSIVE writs (no discharge on a second writ 'unless upon some ground not existing at the time of issuing the prior writ, or unless upon some point of law not raised at the hearing upon the return of the prior writ') but that is a repetitiveness bar, not a clock. The writ is constitutionally protected: Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 14 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended by the authorities of the state' (https://www.azleg.gov/const/2/14.htm). \|\| WHY 'NARROW' AND NOT 'AVAILABLE': the deadline-free writ is not a usable route to attack a conviction. Three primary sources close it. (1) A.R.S. § 13-4131(B) bars discharge of a person detained 'by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, or of any process issued upon such judgment or decree' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04131.htm). (2) § 13-4132 permits discharge of a prisoner held on state-court process only in enumerated cases 'subject to the restrictions of section 13-4131' — case 1 being 'When the jurisdiction of the court or officer has been exceeded' (https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/04132.htm). So what survives is the jurisdictional/facially-void sliver. (3) The Arizona Supreme Court states the same rule: 'In Arizona, the writ of habeas corpus may be used only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction.' Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964), read at https://static.case.law/ariz/95/cases/0292-01.json (that JSON encodes the apostrophe in 'court's' as \u2019). \|\| WHY NOT 'SUBSUMED': Rule 32 does NOT absorb habeas by its own terms. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3(a): 'A post-conviction proceeding is part of the original criminal action and is not a separate action. It displaces and incorporates all trial court post-trial remedies except those obtainable by Rule 24 motions and habeas corpus.' (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N282598E0F08511E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). That express carve-out is why 'subsumed' would be wrong. BUT the very next subsection is what makes habeas non-operative for conviction challenges — Rule 32.3(b): 'If a court receives any type of application or request for relief–however titled–that challenges the validity of the defendant's conviction or sentence following a trial, it must treat the application as a petition for post-conviction relief.' A pleading captioned 'petition for writ of habeas corpus' that attacks the conviction is therefore re-characterized as a Rule 32 petition and inherits Rule 32's 90-day clock and preclusion rules. Habeas retains independent force for restraint claims that do NOT attack the judgment's validity — e.g. sentence-computation and release-date disputes; see State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 82 P.3d 369 (App. 2004), No. 1 CA-HC 02-0013, a habeas appeal over community-supervision calculation (https://static.case.law/ariz/207/cases/0008-01.json). \|\| ON THE 90 DAYS: the deadline is a two-step notice-then-petition system. The 90 days is for the NOTICE, not the petition, and it runs from oral pronouncement of sentence OR 30 days after the direct-appeal mandate, whichever is later — so a defendant who appeals effectively gets mandate + 30 days. Critically, the 90 days applies only to Rule 32.1(a) claims (conviction or sentence obtained in violation of the U.S. or Arizona constitutions — this is where ineffective-assistance claims live). Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) — no subject-matter jurisdiction, sentence not authorized by law, custody beyond expiration of sentence, newly discovered material facts, no-fault failure to file a timely notice of appeal, significant change in the law, and actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence (Rule 32.1, https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N1ABBE970F08511E99BA696ECB1FD62B1?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)) — have NO fixed deadline: Rule 32.4(b)(3)(B), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) within a reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.' Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D) also requires the court to excuse an untimely 32.1(a) notice 'if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to timely file a notice was not the defendant's fault.' \|\| PLEADING DEFENDANTS (the large majority of Arizona convictions) use Rule 33, not Rule 32, and get a shorter effective window because they have no direct appeal: Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A), 'A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 33.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence' — no mandate alternative (https://govt.westlaw.com/azrules/Document/N71DBAF40F0AA11E9AE7883349DB2718C?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default)). Rule 33.4(b)(3)(C) additionally allows a successive Rule 33 notice for ineffective assistance of Rule 33 counsel filed within 30 days of the first proceeding's final order or mandate. \|\| CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: a death-sentenced defendant proceeds under Rule 32 even if he pled guilty (Rule 32.3(c)), and the 90-day clock does not apply to him — under Rule 32.4(b)(3)(C) 'the Supreme Court clerk must expeditiously file a notice requesting post-conviction relief with the trial court upon the issuance of the mandate' on direct appeal, i.e. the notice is filed for him automatically. \|\| PRECLUSION (separate from the deadline, and often the real bar): Rule 32.2(a), amended effective April 14, 2025, precludes Rule 32.1(a) relief on any ground still raiseable on direct appeal or in a Rule 24 motion, finally adjudicated on the merits previously, or waived — and a court 'may determine by a preponderance of the evidence that an issue is precluded, even if the State does not raise preclusion.' \|\| Rules cited are the restyled Rules 32 and 33 added Aug. 29, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020, which split the former single Rule 32 into trial-conviction (32) and plea (33) tracks; the Westlaw azrules pages state currency through amendments received May 1, 2026. Sources fetched and read directly: azleg.gov (statutes/constitution), govt.westlaw.com/azrules (official free unannotated Arizona court rules), static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project), courtlistener.com search API. CourtListener's /opinion/ HTML pages returned HTTP 202 and its /api/rest/v4/opinions/ endpoint returned 401 from this host, so case text was read from static.case.law instead. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Arkansas	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999) (Ark. Sup. Ct.), construing Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123 and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11; reaffirmed in Fields v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 39	90 days Petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (Rule 37) · Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(i) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Arkansas Judiciary official text, current to 06/12/2025)	Detail Habeas: neither the Arkansas Constitution nor the state statutes place a time limit on pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, to do so would contravene the proscription against suspending the right to habeas corpus. Post-conviction remedy: a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment. On excusing a late filing: a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment Arkansas is a NO-DEADLINE-HABEAS state. The common-law/statutory writ (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101 to -123) was never abolished or absorbed into Rule 37, and Renshaw holds a filing deadline on it would be an unconstitutional suspension under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 11. Read the whole subchapter (§§ 16-112-101 through -123 section list plus §§ 16-112-103, -115): no limitations period appears anywhere. But the writ is NARROW, not general: Crockett v. Payne, 2026 Ark. 62 (Apr. 16, 2026) — 'A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment and commitment order is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause,' and 'The circuit court's inquiry into the validity of the judgment is limited to the face of the commitment order.' Ineffective assistance, defective information, trial error and due-process claims are expressly NOT cognizable in habeas (Crockett, citing True v. Payne, 2021 Ark. 154; Mitchell v. State, 2018 Ark. 331). Crockett himself filed habeas in 2025 on a 1983 guilty plea and was rejected on scope, never on timeliness — the no-deadline rule in operation. Rule 37 side: 37.2(c)(ii) gives 60 days from the appellate mandate where a direct appeal was taken (90 days only for guilty pleas / unappealed convictions); (c)(iii) 60 days from dismissal of an appeal. Rule 37.2(b) is a partial exclusivity clause — 'All grounds for postconviction relief from a sentence imposed by a circuit court, including claims that a sentence is illegal or was illegally imposed, must be raised in a petition under this rule' — which narrows, but on the Supreme Court's own 2026 practice does not eliminate, the habeas route for facially void judgments and jurisdictional defects. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 37.5(e) — a death-sentenced person files 'within ninety (90) days after the entry of the order' appointing (or declining to appoint) postconviction counsel under 37.5(b)(2), not from the judgment or mandate. Separate trap for the comparison: Arkansas has a SECOND thing labeled habeas — Act 1780, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208, 'Writ of Habeas Corpus — New Scientific Evidence' (DNA/actual innocence). Despite the habeas label it carries its own timing rule, § 16-112-202(10): a rebuttable presumption of timeliness within 36 months of conviction and a rebuttable presumption AGAINST timeliness after 36 months, rebuttable on newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, new technology, incompetence, or good cause. That 36-month figure is not the general habeas deadline and must not be reported as one. Sources fetched and read: Rules of Criminal Procedure PDF from the Arkansas Judiciary court-rules database; Renshaw, Fields and Crockett opinion PDFs from opinions.arcourts.gov (official Arkansas Supreme Court publisher); statutory text from law.onecle.com Arkansas Code Title 16 (2016 replacement volume, the same 'Repl. 2016' the court cites in Fields). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
California	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, slip op. pp. 1, 13 (Cal. Supreme Ct., No. S228137); statutory basis Cal. Penal Code § 1473(a)	No limit Motion to vacate a conviction or sentence, Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7 (available only to a person no longer in criminal custody); companion motion to vacate under § 1473.6. California has NO general post-conviction act analogous to Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61. · Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(b)(1), (c)	Detail Habeas: Generally, under California law, there are no fixed, determinate deadlines. Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard. Post-conviction remedy: Except as provided in paragraph (2), a motion pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody. On excusing a late filing: There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard. CALIFORNIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly, not implied. Penal Code § 1473(a) preserves the writ ('A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), and habeas is the ordinary, primary route for collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence; it was never abolished or folded into a post-conviction act. The Supreme Court in Robinson v. Lewis confirmed at p. 13: 'There are no specific time limits for either filing the first petition or filing subsequent petitions in a higher court. Instead, California courts employ a reasonableness standard.' Timeliness is instead governed by an indeterminate doctrine, not a clock: a claim must be presented 'without substantial delay,' measured (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, read at static.case.law/cal-4th/18/cases/0770-01.json) 'from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.' Substantial delay is excused for good cause, or under three exceptions in noncapital cases (fundamentally unfair trial from constitutional error; actual innocence; conviction or sentence under an invalid statute). So there is no date on which a noncapital petition becomes time-barred — only a fact-specific diligence inquiry. Robinson also created one bright line in the petitioner's favor: a 'safe harbor' gap period between courts that will never count as substantial delay. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND DO HAVE A HARD DEADLINE. Penal Code § 1509 (added by Proposition 66, Nov. 8, 2016) makes habeas 'the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death,' and § 1509(c) provides: 'Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code' — i.e. 365 days from the order appointing counsel, not from finality. An untimely initial capital petition, or any successive one, is dismissed unless the court finds actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence (§ 1509(d)). Robinson expressly limits itself to noncapital procedure (fn. 1, citing Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808). The § 1473.7 motion is NOT a PCRA analogue and is not an alternative for a person in prison: by its terms it is open only to 'A person who is no longer in criminal custody,' and it carries no fixed period — § 1473.7(b)(1) deems it timely 'at any time' out of custody, subject only to a 'reasonable diligence' rule after immigration notice (§ 1473.7(b)(2)) and an 'without undue delay' rule for innocence and racial-bias claims (§ 1473.7(c)). The one genuine one-year figure outside the capital context is Penal Code § 1473.6(d), also limited to persons 'no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained': 'A motion pursuant to this section must be filed within one year of the later of' discovery of the government misconduct or the section's effective date. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: California's one-year figures (§ 1509 capital habeas, § 1473.6) are easy to mistake for a general habeas deadline. They are not. For a noncapital petitioner in custody challenging a conviction today, habeas under § 1473 is the operative vehicle and no filing deadline applies. Note also that the federal one-year AEDPA clock (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)) runs regardless — that federal limit, not state law, is the practical time pressure on California prisoners, and it is the reason the Ninth Circuit certified the question answered in Robinson. § 1473 was amended by Stats. 2025, ch. 784 (SB 734), effective January 1, 2026; the amendments expand grounds (including Racial Justice Act claims under § 745) and add no deadline. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Colorado	No limit habeas survives narrowly · C.R.S. § 13-45-103(2) (Habeas Corpus Act, §§ 13-45-101 to -119); construed in Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1994) and Gottorff v. Lengerich, 2026 CO 37 (June 1, 2026)	3 years no excuse for a late filing Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction review (statutory counterpart, C.R.S. § 18-1-410) · C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1); Colo. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I); applied People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8	Detail Habeas: If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction Post-conviction remedy: no person who has been convicted as an adult … shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period … All class 1 felonies: No limit … All other felonies: Three years On excusing a late filing: no person who has been convicted as an adult … shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period … All other felonies: Three years HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. I read the entire Habeas Corpus Act, C.R.S. §§ 13-45-101 through 13-45-119 (2024 official CRS, Office of Legislative Legal Services printout): it contains no limitation period of any kind. The writ is not abolished and not formally subsumed — it remains a separate statutory civil action with its own parties (custodian only, not 'the People'), its own venue (any district court, petitioner's choice), and its own appellate route directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, § 13-4-102(1)(e) excluding habeas from court of appeals jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court decided a habeas appeal on the merits on June 1, 2026 (Gottorff, 2026 CO 37), citing § 13-45-101(1) as current law. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo. 1994): 'This is not to say, however, that Crim.P. 35(c) motions and habeas corpus petitions are interchangeable. Rather, each remedy has its own distinctive procedures.' WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': two independent narrowings. (1) Statutory — § 13-45-103(3): 'No court on the return of a habeas corpus shall inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment or decree of a court legally constituted, in any other manner.' Coupled with § 13-45-103(2), a prisoner held under process of a legally constituted court may be discharged only on jurisdictional/facially-void grounds. (2) Judicial exhaustion rule — Duran, 868 P.2d at 377: habeas 'is only an appropriate remedy to redress an unlawful restraint on one's liberty when no other form of relief is available.' CRITICAL INTERACTION — habeas cannot be used to evade the post-conviction deadline. A habeas petition raising claims cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) is converted by the court into a Rule 35(c) motion and transferred to the sentencing court (Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 1993); Duran, 868 P.2d at 378), whereupon § 16-5-402 applies. Johnson expressly warned, footnote: 'in the future, district courts must be cognizant of the applicability of section 16-5-402 to pro se habeas petitions.' Duran, footnote: 'Crim.P. 35(c) motions are collateral attacks on criminal convictions and are therefore subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 16-5-402. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).' So the no-deadline finding is real but confined to the residual core for which habeas properly lies — void judgment / entitlement to immediate release (Johnson: 'habeas corpus is appropriate to review whether a conviction is void'). Those claims are untimed under both routes anyway, because § 16-5-402(2)(a)-(b) exempts want of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction from the time bar. POST-CONVICTION TIERS (§ 16-5-402(1), verbatim table): class 1 felonies — No limit; all other felonies — Three years (1095 days, the figure reported above); misdemeanors — Eighteen months (~547 days); petty offenses — Six months (~182 days). CAPITAL/CLASS 1 DIFFERENCE: there is no deadline at all for class 1 felonies, so a person serving life for first-degree murder faces no post-conviction time bar (Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020; class 1 remains the top tier). The three years runs from when the conviction becomes final, i.e. issuance of the mandate on direct appeal (People v. Becker, No. 25CA0627 (Colo. App. July 2, 2026), ¶ 8, citing People v. Prendergast, 2024 COA 127, ¶ 28; People v. Parks, No. 25CA0519 (Colo. App. Feb. 26, 2026), ¶ 16). Statutory exceptions, § 16-5-402(2): lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; lack of personal jurisdiction; incompetence or mental-health commitment; and 'justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.' Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I), as adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Rule Change 2008(18): 'Any motion filed outside of the time limits set forth in § 16-5-402, 6 C.R.S., shall allege facts which, if true, would establish one of the exceptions listed in § 16-5-402 (2), 6 C.R.S.' Currency of the rule text was confirmed against the Judicial Branch's own Form 4 (Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c), Appendix to Chapter 29), which reprints the same four-tier table. COMPARATIVE CAUTION for the Chief Justice's answer: Colorado has no one-year post-conviction clock. Its three-year felony period is materially longer than the one-year PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 deadlines in states that abolished habeas for conviction challenges, and unlike those states Colorado never repealed its habeas remedy — it narrowed it judicially and by § 13-45-103. Sources fetched and read: CRS 2024 Titles 13 and 16 (leg.colorado.gov); Rule Change 2008(18) and Form 4 (coloradojudicial.gov); Gottorff, 2026 CO 37 (coloradojudicial.gov); Duran v. Price and Johnson v. Gunter full text (static.case.law); Becker and Parks (storage.courtlistener.com). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Connecticut	5 years ★ lateness raises a presumption the petitioner may rebut habeas still lies · Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(c) (habeas jurisdiction: § 52-466; deadline added by P.A. 12-115, eff. Oct. 1, 2012); quoted verbatim in Hobby v. Commissioner of Correction, AC48638 (Conn. App. Apr. 21, 2026)	3 years Petition for a new trial (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-270), limitation at § 52-582(a) · Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-582(a), quoted as currently in force in Carter v. State, AC40914 (Conn. App. Nov. 5, 2019); still operative per Jones v. State, AC47824 (Conn. App. Feb. 17, 2026)	Detail Habeas: there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment Post-conviction remedy: No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment . . . except that a petition . . . based on DNA . . . or other newly discovered evidence . . . may be brought at any time On excusing a late filing: there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after . . . Five years after . . . the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment Connecticut did NOT abolish or subsume habeas. Chapter 915 (§§ 52-466 to 52-470) is intact and habeas remains the general collateral vehicle for attacking a conviction, including ineffective-assistance claims; Conn. App. decisions in 2025-2026 adjudicate such petitions routinely. There is no PCRA-style exclusive post-conviction act. CRITICAL QUALIFIER ON THE 5-YEAR FIGURE: § 52-470(c)-(e) is NOT a statute of limitations and is not jurisdictional. It creates a REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION of delay without good cause. It bites only if the respondent requests relief: under (e) the court, 'upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause,' and dismisses only 'If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay.' Good cause expressly 'includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence.' A late petition is thus dismissible, not barred. Precise trigger: presumption arises after the LATER of (1) five years after the conviction became final on conclusion/expiration of appellate review, (2) October 1, 2017, or (3) two years after a new retroactive constitutional/statutory right was recognized. The Oct. 1, 2017 floor (which protected pre-2012 convictions) has now passed, so the 5-year period governs today. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS are shorter: § 52-470(d) presumes delay two years (730 days) after final judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, or Oct. 1, 2014, whichever is later; withdrawal of a prior petition is not a 'judgment.' Under both (c) and (d), time is NOT tolled during the pendency of another petition challenging the same conviction. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE AT ALL for three categories: § 52-470(f) provides that subsections (b) through (e) 'shall not apply to (1) a claim asserting actual innocence, (2) a petition filed to challenge the conditions of confinement, or (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed.' An actual-innocence habeas claim therefore faces no filing deadline whatsoever. (The practical scope of the capital carve-out was not verified here.) Before P.A. 12-115 (effective Oct. 1, 2012, applicable to petitions filed on or after that date) Connecticut habeas had no deadline of any kind. Appeal from a habeas judgment requires certification petitioned within ten days, § 52-470(g). ON THE POST-CONVICTION COLUMN: the petition for a new trial is not a general post-conviction act — it is ground-specific (newly discovered evidence, mispleading, want of notice, or 'other reasonable cause' construed as fraud, accident or mistake). Its three-year clock runs from rendition of judgment, but criminal petitions resting on DNA or other newly discovered evidence unavailable at trial may be filed AT ANY TIME, so the 1095-day figure binds only ordinary grounds. Also uncapped: Practice Book § 43-22 lets 'The judicial authority . . . at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition' — no deadline, but confined to sentence illegality, verified at https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf. SOURCING CAVEAT: law.onecle.com carries the 2016 revision. It is accurate for § 52-470 (verbatim-matched against the 2026 Hobby opinion's quotation of subsection (c), so no amendment since), but STALE for § 52-582, which has since been subdivided and broadened beyond DNA to 'other newly discovered evidence' — the current text was therefore taken from the Appellate Court's quotation in Carter, not from onecle. cga.ct.gov was unreachable from this host throughout. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Delaware	No limit habeas survives narrowly · 10 Del. C. §§ 6901–6918 (Chapter 69, Habeas Corpus); construed by Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954) and Holloman v. State, No. 372, 2022 (Del. Feb. 6, 2023)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 — Postconviction remedy · Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (Rules of Criminal Procedure, Superior Court of Delaware, 2026 Edition; Rule 61 last amended Dec. 15, 2023, eff. Jan. 1, 2024)	Detail Habeas: Every person imprisoned or restrained of liberty … shall have remedy by the writ of habeas corpus, and may obtain relief, except: (1) Persons committed or detained on a charge of treason or felony, the species whereof is plainly and fully set forth in the commitment Post-conviction remedy: A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized … more than one year after the right is first recognized On excusing a late filing: A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final NO DEADLINE ON HABEAS — EXPLICIT FINDING. I read all of 10 Del. C. ch. 69 (§§ 6901-6918). It contains no filing deadline of any kind for a habeas petitioner; the only time figures in the chapter run against the custodian (§ 6907: produce the body 'within 3 days'; § 6914: deliver a copy of the warrant within 6 hours). Delaware habeas is not abolished and not fully subsumed — the Superior Court still entertains and decides petitions from convicted prisoners on the merits — but it is NARROW. Del. Supreme Court, Holloman v. State (Feb. 6, 2023): 'Under Delaware law, the writ of habeas corpus provides relief on a very limited basis. Habeas corpus only "provides an opportunity for one illegally confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the commitment." Where the commitment is regular on its face and the court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter, habeas corpus does not afford a remedy' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=343610). The controlling rule is Curran v. Woolley, 104 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. 1954), quoted verbatim in Chambers v. Emig, C.A. No. N25M-04-068 (Del. Super. Apr. 14, 2025): 'After a judgment of conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction and a subsequent commitment pursuant thereto, a prisoner may not obtain his discharge by a writ of habeas corpus no matter how illegal or erroneous the judgment of conviction might have been, if the judgment of the court is legal on its face' (https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=378190). Chambers also illustrates the absence of a habeas deadline in practice: a petition filed in 2025 attacking a Jan. 2007 sentence — roughly 18 years out — was reached and denied for facial regularity, with no timeliness bar invoked. TWO INDEPENDENT NARROWING SOURCES: (a) the statutory carve-out, 10 Del. C. § 6902(1), quoted above, which by its terms excludes felony commitments regular on their face; and (b) Rule 61(a)(2) 'Exclusiveness of remedy. The remedy afforded by this rule may not be sought by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or in any manner other than as provided herein.' So the merits of a conviction go to Rule 61 and its 1-year clock; habeas reaches only jurisdiction and facial validity of the commitment, without a clock. Practical effect: the timeless remedy is also the one that almost never yields relief. RULE 61 DETAIL. Deadline is stated in years, not days; 365 is my conversion of 'one year' and Delaware fixes no day-count. Finality trigger, Rule 61(m)(1): 30 days after sentencing if no direct appeal; otherwise the Supreme Court's mandate on direct review, or the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate if certiorari is sought. Rule 61(b)(4): a motion 'may not be filed until the judgment of conviction is final,' so the window opens at finality. EXCEPTIONS: Rule 61(i)(5) — the time bar, the successive bar, procedural default and former adjudication 'shall not apply either to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d)' — i.e. new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence, or a new retroactive rule of constitutional law. Those two gateways are also the only escape from Rule 61(d)(2), under which second or subsequent motions 'shall be summarily dismissed,' and the innocence gateway is available only to movants convicted after trial, not by plea. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Rule 61(l) displaces the one-year clock for a defendant seeking to set aside a death sentence — one postconviction proceeding as of right, with the motion due 'within 60 days of the date of the scheduling order' entered after direct review concludes, submitted for decision within 270 days, extendable by up to 60 days for compelling cause; failure to comply can bar or dismiss the motion with prejudice. Delaware has had no valid death penalty statute since Rauf v. State (2016) and Powell (2016), so § 61(l) is largely dormant, but I did not verify that point from a primary source and flag it as outside this finding. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Florida	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(o); Fla. Stat. ch. 79	2 years no excuse for a late filing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 — Motion to Vacate; Set Aside; or Correct Sentence · Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, July 13, 2026, p. 340)	Detail Habeas: The remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850. Post-conviction remedy: A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final On excusing a late filing: No other motion may be filed or considered under this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final The writ itself carries NO deadline and cannot be abolished — Fla. Const. art. I, s. 13: 'The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost'; Fla. Stat. s. 79.01 directs the court to 'grant the writ forthwith,' and ch. 79 (read in full) contains no limitations period. Fla. Stat. s. 79.071 still expressly contemplates habeas attacking 'the validity of any statute, criminal law proceeding or conviction.' BUT that no-deadline writ is NOT an escape hatch from the 2-year clock, which is the trap in this comparison. Rule 3.850(o) provides: 'An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule must not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court that sentenced the applicant or that the court has denied the applicant relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the applicant's detention.' Baker (Fla. 2004) closed the loophole explicitly, announcing the Florida Supreme Court would 'dismiss as unauthorized, habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants that seek the kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850' (also barring claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, and successive claims). Baker quotes State v. Bolyea that rule 3.850 'is a procedural vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus' — i.e. classic subsumption, not a parallel track. Classified 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow' because the residue is defined by inadequacy of the 3.850 remedy, not by claim type: jurisdictional claims are themselves cognizable under 3.850(a)(2)-(3), so Florida is not a state where habeas survives as the jurisdictional-claim vehicle. Baker cited the provision as 3.850(h); it is renumbered (o) in the current rule with materially identical text, which I confirmed against the July 13, 2026 rules. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 730 DAYS, all in 3.850(b): a motion to vacate a sentence exceeding the legal maximum may be filed at any time (see also Rule 3.800(a)); plus 2-year-from-discovery windows for newly discovered facts, newly announced retroactive constitutional rights, and neglect by retained counsel who failed to file. CAPITAL CASES DIFFER IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: death-sentenced defendants proceed under Rule 3.851, not 3.850, and get only 1 year — 3.851(d)(1): 'Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final' (365 days); but habeas remains a live, authorized remedy for them in the Florida Supreme Court, subject to a filing trigger rather than a period — 3.851(d)(3): 'All petitions for extraordinary relief in which the Supreme Court of Florida has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writs of habeas corpus, must be filed simultaneously with the initial brief filed on behalf of the death-sentenced defendant in the appeal of the circuit court's order on the initial motion for postconviction relief filed under this rule.' Separately, ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel — historically raised by habeas petition in the appellate court, per the Rule 9.140 committee note ('The former was previously applied for by a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court') — is now governed by Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5), which sets 2 years from finality on direct review, extendable only on a sworn showing that counsel affirmatively misled the petitioner about the appeal's result, and 'In no case may a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than 4 years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review.' Belated appeals go under 9.141(c). Bottom line for the legislator's comparison: Florida should be scored as a 2-year state, and it belongs in the column of states where a facially unlimited habeas remedy has been rendered unavailable for conviction challenges by an exclusive post-conviction rule — not in the column of states where habeas genuinely lies without a deadline. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Georgia	4 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c), quoted verbatim in Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 357-358 (840 S.E.2d 407) (2020)	No limit Extraordinary motion for new trial, O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41 (Georgia has NO PCRA-style post-conviction act; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq., is itself the post-conviction remedy) · O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41(a)-(b), quoted in Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878, 880-881 (834 S.E.2d 65) (2019)	Detail Habeas: Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor … or within four years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed Post-conviction remedy: Except for the requirement in OCGA § 5-5-41 (a) that the moving party show a "good reason" for not seeking a new trial within 30 days of the judgment, the requirements for extraordinary motions for new trial are not specified by statute On excusing a late filing: An untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling' INSTRUMENT CHECK — Georgia is the inverse of the PCRA pattern. It never abolished or subsumed habeas; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 (O.C.G.A. § 9-14-40 et seq.) IS Georgia's post-conviction act, and the limitation period was added directly onto the writ by Ga. L. 2004, p. 917, § 1. So the four-year figure is a true HABEAS deadline and is directly comparable to other states' habeas deadlines, not to a PCRA one. CAPITAL CASES HAVE NO DEADLINE: § 9-14-42(c) expressly excepts a petition 'challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death,' so death-sentenced petitioners face no filing period at all. DEADLINE TIERS: felony 4 years; misdemeanor 1 year; misdemeanor TRAFFIC 180 days under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33, and that one is jurisdictional ('Failure to file the challenge within the time prescribed in this Code section shall divest the court of jurisdiction'). DAYS FIGURE IS MY ARITHMETIC — the statute says 'four years,' not a day count; 1461 = four calendar years including one leap day. ACCRUAL: § 9-14-42(c)(1)-(4) gives four alternative start dates (finality, removal of state-created impediment, newly recognized retroactive right, discovery of facts by due diligence), so it functions like a discovery rule, not a flat run from finality. NO TOLLING: Stubbs v. Hall holds an untimely petition 'is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling' and declined to adopt equitable tolling; there is also no remedy for a sentencing court's failure to give the § 9-14-42(d) advisement. But Phagan v. State, 287 Ga. 856 (2010), holds § 9-14-42(c) is not a statute of repose, so civil renewal after dismissal is available. SEPARATE LACHES BAR: § 9-14-48(e) permits dismissal on a particularized showing of prejudice from delay, but applies only to convictions had before July 1, 2004, and not to death cases. THE EMNT IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: Mitchum holds an extraordinary motion for new trial 'was not the proper vehicle' and that constitutional claims 'could be pursued only through habeas corpus'; § 5-5-41 carries no fixed filing deadline (only a 'good reason' showing for delay past 30 days) and only one such motion is allowed, but it reaches newly discovered evidence and other non-constitutional grounds, not constitutional deprivation. Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), then abolished the trial-court motion for out-of-time appeal, pushing still more claims into habeas as 'the exclusive post-appeal procedure.' PRACTICAL UPSHOT FOR THE COMPARISON: a non-capital Georgia felony petitioner gets four years — longer than the one-year PCRA-type deadlines in Pennsylvania, Alabama and Delaware, and longer than the federal one-year AEDPA period — but unlike states that keep an untimed habeas beside a short post-conviction motion, Georgia has no untimed fallback for constitutional claims. ⚠ CURRENCY CAVEAT (added 2026-07-30): the Cook v. State point above is NO LONGER a complete statement of Georgia law. HB 176, signed 2025-05-14, enacted O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39.1 specifically to undo Cook — it restores a statutory out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal within 100 days of the missed deadline (state consent, excusable neglect, ineffective assistance, or other good cause), and § 5-6-39.1(a)(3) gives an indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel to seek it. Confirmed verbatim in Owenby v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2026-05-22) and applied in Barrionuevo v. State (2026-05-27). The separate § 5-6-39.1(b) window for defendants whose motions were DISMISSED under Cook ran only until June 30, 2026 and has now closed. NOTE FOR THE COUNSEL COLUMN: Georgia now guarantees counsel for this STATUTORY route while Gibson v. Turpin (4-3) still denies it for the WRIT — same state, opposite answers depending on the instrument. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Hawaii	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a) (eff. 01/01/2026)	No limit no filing period HRPP Rule 40 post-conviction proceeding (Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Form A) · Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40(a)(1)	Detail Habeas: The post-conviction proceeding established by this rule shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis Post-conviction remedy: At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction On excusing a late filing: At any time but not prior to final judgment HAWAII HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. HRPP Rule 40 is the operative vehicle and it expressly absorbs habeas corpus for conviction/sentence challenges ('shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis'), while imposing no limitations period at all — the text reads 'At any time but not prior to final judgment.' I read Rule 40(a)-(i) in full; there is no time bar anywhere in it. The independent habeas statute, HRS ch. 660, also survives and likewise contains no limitations period: I read §660-3 ('The supreme court, the justices thereof, and the circuit courts may issue writs of habeas corpus in cases in which persons are unlawfully restrained of their liberty…') and §660-5 (complaint contents) verbatim at law.onecle.com/hawaii/title-36/660-3.html and /660-5.html, and reviewed the full §§660-1 through 660-33 section list — no section imposes a deadline. Ch. 660 habeas remains live for restraint NOT based on a judgment of conviction (Martinez v. Kawamura, Haw. 2023, notes such petitions 'are governed by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 660'); for conviction challenges it is folded into Rule 40 (Turner v. Hawai'i Paroling Authority: relief sought 'under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40, which incorporates inter alia remedies afforded' by habeas) — case snippets via CourtListener API search, full opinion texts not retrieved (CourtListener opinion endpoint returned 401/202), so the two cases are corroborative only; the classification rests on the rule text itself. WHAT ACTUALLY BARS A HAWAII PETITIONER IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME: Rule 40(a)(3) denies relief 'where the issues sought to be raised have been previously ruled upon or were waived,' with a rebuttable presumption that failure to appeal or raise an issue was knowing — except claims of illegal sentence, which cannot be waived. Two routing rules to note: Rule 35(a) provides 'A motion made by a defendant to correct an illegal sentence more than 90 days after the sentence is imposed shall be made pursuant to Rule 40' — the 90 days is a routing line between rules, NOT an outer deadline, since Rule 40 itself is open-ended; and Rule 40(c)(2) requires a nonconforming petition alleging illegality of judgment or custody to be 'accepted for filing and … treated as a petition under this rule,' so a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction is converted rather than dismissed. No capital-case variation exists: Hawaii has no death penalty. Rule 32(d) also channels post-sentence plea withdrawal into Rule 40 ('only by petition pursuant to Rule 40'), subject to a manifest-injustice standard. Caution for the comparison the legislator is drawing: Hawaii belongs in the 'no deadline' column, and the contrast with one-year states (PCRA, Ala. R. 32.2(c), Del. R. 61(i)(1)) is a contrast in KIND, not degree. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Idaho	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Idaho Code § 19-4203(4) (Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation Procedures Act, I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42); accord I.C. § 19-4901(b); Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) application, Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 to 19-4911 · Idaho Code § 19-4902(a)	Detail Habeas: Habeas corpus shall not be used as a substitute for, or in addition to, a direct appeal of a criminal conviction or proceedings under Idaho criminal rule 35 or the uniform post-conviction procedures act, chapter 49, title 19, Idaho Code Post-conviction remedy: An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. On excusing a late filing: An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. IMPORTANT — do NOT read Idaho as a no-deadline habeas state. Idaho's habeas act (I.C. tit. 19 ch. 42) genuinely contains NO filing deadline: I read the entire chapter PDF (legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH42.pdf) and the only limitations language anywhere in it is the cross-reference in § 19-4203(4) to the UPCPA's period; the sole 30-day figure is the respondent's response deadline in § 19-4209. But that open-ended habeas does not reach convictions. Idaho habeas survives as a real, live remedy for a closed list of NON-conviction claims only — § 19-4203(2) permits an in-state prisoner to raise (a) conditions of confinement, (b) parole revocation, (c) miscalculation of sentence, (d) loss of good time credits, (e) a detainer; § 19-4203(3) limits out-of-state prisoners to conditions of confinement alone and expressly bars 'any issue concerning the legality of his out-of-state conviction or sentence.' For the validity of a conviction or sentence, the UPCPA is exclusive: § 19-4901(b) — 'Except as otherwise provided in this act, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' Confirmed by controlling case law read in full: Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 949 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1997) (static.case.law/idaho/130/cases/0861-01.json) — 'The UPCPA comprehends and replaces all other common law, statutory or other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus, that were previously available to collaterally challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. … A writ of habeas corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement.' Eubank also rejected the argument that the one-year UPCPA bar unconstitutionally suspends habeas under Idaho Const. art. I, § 5, holding 'there has been no constitutional violation of Eubank's right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Idaho Constitution, art. I, § 5.' So the practical answer to the legislator's question for a non-capital Idaho prisoner is ONE YEAR, running from expiration of the time for appeal / determination of the appeal, whichever is later — not from finality of conviction, and not tolled by a discovery rule on the face of the statute. CAPITAL CASES ARE FAR SHORTER — 42 days. I.C. § 19-2719(3) requires the defendant to file 'any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known' within 42 days of the judgment imposing death, and § 19-2719(4) sweeps habeas into that same window: 'Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time limitations of subsection (3) of this section.' Section 19-2719(5) makes untimely claims waived and strips the courts of power to hear them. ONE EXCEPTION TO THE ONE-YEAR RULE: § 19-4902(b) permits a fingerprint/forensic DNA testing petition 'at any time' where the technology was unavailable at trial (available even to defendants who pleaded guilty, § 19-4902(d)); § 19-2719(4) makes that DNA route applicable in capital cases too. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (illegal sentence) is a further separate route preserved by § 19-4203(4); I did not read ICR 35 itself, so its timing is unverified here and no figure above rests on it. § 19-4224 provides that ch. 42 'sets forth the exclusive procedures and remedies in habeas corpus actions.' Idaho case law also permits a court to treat a mislabeled habeas petition attacking a conviction as a UPCPA application, which subjects it to the § 19-4902 one-year bar rather than reviving an untimed remedy. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Illinois	No limit habeas survives narrowly · Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008), construing the Habeas Corpus Act, 735 ILCS 5/10-101 to 10-137 (esp. 10-124)	6 months no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. · 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)	Detail Habeas: an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction … or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release Post-conviction remedy: No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. On excusing a late filing: No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Illinois never abolished or subsumed state habeas: Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-101 through 10-137) is intact and was amended as recently as P.A. 103-51, eff. 1-1-24 (10-103). I read all 37 sections at the ILGA text (https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ILCS/details?ActName=Code+of+Civil+Procedure.&ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&ChapAct=735+ILCS+5%2F&SeqStart=75500000&SeqEnd=79300000). No section imposes any limitations period on filing; the only time figures in the entire article are unrelated procedural ones — a 6-hour deadline for a custodian to furnish a copy of the commitment (10-105) and a 15-day removal rule (10-130). 10-102 is unconditioned as to time: 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty … may apply for habeas corpus.' BUT THE PRICE OF THAT OPEN WINDOW IS SCOPE. 735 ILCS 5/10-124 permits discharge 'only' on seven enumerated causes, the operative ones being that 'the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction' or that 'by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged.' 10-124(7) adds: 'No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.' 10-123(2) separately bars discharge of anyone held 'By virtue of a final judgment of any circuit court … unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired.' Beacham drives the point home on the very next line after the quoted passage: 'A complaint for order of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of these defects, even though the alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights.' So a person raising ineffective assistance, Brady, or any ordinary trial-error claim cannot use habeas at all, no matter how timely. Beacham cites the 1996 West version of 10-124; I confirmed the current ILGA text of 10-124 is word-for-word identical (still sourced to P.A. 82-280). OPERATIVE VEHICLE IS THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT, and its clock is the answer to the legislator's question. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) sets three alternative outer limits: 6 months after conclusion of U.S. Supreme Court proceedings; if no cert petition is filed, 6 months from the date for filing one; and if the defendant took no direct appeal at all, 'no later than 3 years from the date of conviction' (1,095 days). I coded pc_deadline_days as 180 for the governing 6-month period; the statute says 'months,' not days, so 180 is a conversion, and the 3-year figure is the correct one for the no-direct-appeal subset. Every one of the three is excused where 'the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence' — a real and frequently litigated escape hatch, so the Illinois deadline is materially softer than a flat one-year bar. Two further carve-outs: (c) provides 'This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence,' and 122-1(f) allows only one petition without leave of court, successive petitions requiring cause and prejudice. CAPITAL: none — Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011, and in the current text 122-1(a)(2) (capital actual-innocence), (a)(3), and (e) all read '(blank).' Note a live drafting artifact: subsection (a-5) still says 'A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the person's conviction,' but (a)(2) is now blank, leaving that cross-reference dangling; the actual-innocence exception survives through the standalone sentence in (c). THIRD ROUTE, for completeness: 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (petition for relief from judgment), whose subsection (c) requires that 'the petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment' (730 days), tolled for legal disability, and which is the usual vehicle for void-judgment attacks that habeas will not reach. COMPARISON CAUTION: an Illinois answer of '6 months' and a Pennsylvania answer of '1 year' are commensurable — both are purpose-built post-conviction acts. Neither is a habeas figure. Illinois habeas itself is untimed and would be miscounted as either '0' or 'unlimited' by any table that does not separate the two instruments. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Indiana	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(b) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026); see also §1(c); Ind. Code § 34-25.5 (habeas chapter, no limitations period)	No limit no filing period Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1 · Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule PC 1, §1(a) (eff. Feb. 2, 2026)	Detail Habeas: Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them. Post-conviction remedy: Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. On excusing a late filing: Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: … may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. NO DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT — Indiana is a no-time-limit state on both tracks. (1) HABEAS: the writ is expressly NOT suspended, but is mechanically converted when used to attack a conviction. PC Rule 1 §1(c): 'This Rule does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but if a person applies for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the person is incarcerated and challenges the validity of his conviction or sentence, that court shall transfer the cause to the court in which the conviction took place, and the latter court shall treat it as a petition for relief under this Rule.' Hence 'subsumed,' not 'abolished': habeas survives intact for a claim of entitlement to immediate release that does NOT attack the conviction's validity. Controlling case law, Manley v. Butts, 71 N.E.3d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (published), quoting Partlow v. Superintendent, 756 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) and Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 374 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1978): 'One is entitled to habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from unlawful custody' and '[a] petitioner may not file a writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/03/10/james_e._manley_v._keith_butts.pdf) Statutory narrowing to the same effect: Ind. Code § 34-25.5-5-1(a)(2) — the habeas court 'shall not inquire into the legality of any judgment or process by which the party is in custody … Upon any process issued on a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction' (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-5-1.html). (2) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I fetched and read all 24 sections of the habeas chapter, Ind. Code §§ 34-25.5-1-1 through 34-25.5-7-1; the chapter contains no limitations period, no filing deadline, and no laches provision. The sole occurrence of 'within' is geographic (§ 34-25.5-3-3, judges 'issue writs of habeas corpus within their respective counties'). Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 grants the writ to 'Every person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever,' with no temporal condition (https://law.onecle.com/indiana/34/34-25.5-1-1.html). Currency caveat: the onecle text is a 2006 snapshot of a chapter added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.21 with no amendment notations; text confirmed unchanged by the Indiana Court of Appeals quoting § 34-25.5-1-1 verbatim in 2017 (Manley) and 2020 (Willet v. State, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/07/31/shawn_g._willet_v._state_of_indiana.pdf). (3) NO PCR DEADLINE: 'at any time' in PC Rule 1 §1(a) is the current operative text — the most recent amendment (Order Amending Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies, Cause No. 26S-MS-8, filed Jan. 20, 2026, eff. Feb. 2, 2026, https://secure.in.gov/courts/files/order-rules-2026-0120-pcr.pdf) altered only §§ 2 and 9, on indigent-counsel referral, and touched nothing time-related. (4) THE REAL TIME CONSTRAINT IS LACHES, NOT A DEADLINE. Indiana bars stale petitions only through an equitable affirmative defense the State must plead and prove. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677 (Ind. 2017): 'For laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and, second, that the State has been prejudiced by the delay.' (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2017/05/05/trondo_l._humphrey_v._state_of_indiana.pdf) This is a fact-specific, State-borne burden, not a period that runs against the petitioner — the correct comparison point against a PCRA-style one-year bar. (5) OTHER LIMITS THAT ARE NOT DEADLINES: successive petitions require advance authorization from the Indiana Supreme Court or Court of Appeals on a showing of 'a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief' (PC Rule 1 §12); claims not raised in the original petition are waived (PC Rule 1 §8). Neither is a clock. (6) CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: death-sentenced cases carry a scheduling regime absent from non-capital cases. Ind. Crim. Rule 6.1(H) (formerly Crim. R. 24; renumbered eff. Jan. 1, 2024): 'Within thirty days following completion of rehearing,' counsel must enter an appearance, advise the trial court of intent to petition for post-conviction relief, and request extension of the stay; the Supreme Court then 'will direct the trial court to submit a case management schedule consistent with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) for approval' (https://rules.incourts.gov/pdf/PDF%20-%20Criminal/criminal.pdf). That 30 days is a deadline for counsel's appearance and notice of intent, not for the petition itself; the petition's due date is set by court order. I did not read Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) directly — the content of that scheduling statute is unverified here. (7) SCOPE NOTE: PC Rule 2 (belated notice of appeal) is a distinct vehicle for restoring a direct appeal and was not examined; PC Rule 1 §1(d) folds Ind. Code § 35-38-7-5 DNA-testing petitions into Rule 1. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Iowa	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Iowa Code § 822.1 (2026); construed in State v. Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d 122, 127-28 (Iowa 2015); Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1974)	3 years no excuse for a late filing Application for postconviction relief, Iowa Code ch. 822 (Iowa's enactment of the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, formerly ch. 663A) · Iowa Code § 822.3 (2026)	Detail Habeas: The provisions of sections 663.1 through 663.44, inclusive, shall not apply to persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense. Post-conviction remedy: All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. On excusing a late filing: All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. Iowa's habeas chapter (ch. 663) is still on the books and contains NO limitation period — I read all 44 sections and none imposes one — but that fact confers nothing on a convicted person, because § 822.1 switches the entire chapter off for them. Do not score Iowa as an untimed-habeas state. The Iowa Supreme Court: 'pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.1, the legislature foreclosed habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense' (Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 127, citing 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1276, § 1). Exclusivity is also stated affirmatively in § 822.2(2): the ch. 822 remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies formerly available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' § 822.2(1)(g) sweeps in any ground 'formerly available under any common law, statutory or other writ.' So the operative period is the three years in § 822.3, not a habeas period. Exceptions and edges: (1) § 822.3 carries a broad statutory escape — 'this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period' — with DNA results under § 81.10 expressly a qualifying ground of fact; the same sentence bars using ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel to toll or relate back (2019 amendment). (2) A different, much shorter 90-day deadline runs from a final disciplinary decision for good-time-forfeiture claims under § 822.2(1)(f), filed in the county of confinement — not a conviction challenge, but easy to conflate. (3) Ch. 663 habeas remains live for people OUTSIDE § 822.1's phrase 'convicted of, or sentenced for.' Hernandez-Galarza holds a deferred judgment is not a conviction, so such a person falls between the two chapters and ch. 663 'might be available' — though the court denied relief there for failure to meet § 663.1's mandatory pleading requirements and absence of any State restraint. Habeas also still lies in Iowa for non-conviction matters (extradition, pretrial detention, child custody). (4) I did not find, and do not assert, any Iowa holding on whether a residual constitutional writ survives § 822.1 for purely jurisdictional claims; Iowa Const. art. I, § 13 protects the writ but qualifies it — 'refused when application is made as required by law' — and Hernandez-Galarza treated the 1970 Act as a valid legislative limitation without reaching a suspension-clause challenge. Treat that narrow question as unverified. (5) No capital variation: Iowa has no death penalty. Ch. 663 text read at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/663.pdf; case text at https://static.case.law/nw2d/864/html/0122-01.html. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Kansas	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · K.S.A. 60-1507(e) ('Exclusiveness of remedy'); K.S.A. 60-1501(a)-(c); Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202, 708 P.2d 977 (1985)	1 year no filing period K.S.A. 60-1507 motion attacking sentence (Kansas analogue of 28 U.S.C. § 2255) · K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)-(2)	Detail Habeas: An application for a writ of habeas corpus … shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced said applicant … unless … the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective … Post-conviction remedy: Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (A) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction On excusing a late filing: the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit INSTRUMENT TRAP. The one-year figure is NOT a habeas deadline. K.S.A. 60-1507 is physically located inside Chapter 60, Article 15 — the habeas corpus article (60-1501 through 60-1507, verified from the article index at kslegislature.gov) — and Kansas bar literature calls it habeas ('Habeas Corpus in Kansas: The Great Writ Affords Postconviction Relief at K.S.A. 60-1507,' 67 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 16 (1998), listed in the revisor's annotations). But 60-1507 is captioned 'Prisoner in custody under sentence; motion attacking sentence' and is a motion filed in the sentencing court, modeled on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, complete with a § 2255(e)-style savings clause. The writ itself is 60-1501 to 60-1506. HABEAS DEADLINE: the habeas statute's grant, K.S.A. 60-1501(a), contains NO time limit — 'any person in this state who is detained, confined or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever … may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus.' The only deadlines in the habeas statute are in (b) and (c), each 30 days, and each is confined to a specific population and prefaced by an express carve-out: '(b) Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-1507 … an inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections shall file a petition for writ pursuant to subsection (a) within 30 days from the date the action was final, but such time is extended during the pendency of the inmate's timely attempts to exhaust such inmate's administrative remedies'; (c) is the parallel rule for patients of the secretary for aging and disability services. That 30-day clock runs from 'the date the action was final' — the challenged administrative action — which is why 60-1501's case annotations are almost entirely prison discipline, segregation, good-time, and parole (Murphy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589 (1996), read: administrative segregation). It is not a conviction-challenge clock, and by its own terms it does not apply where 60-1507 governs. So where habeas does still reach a conviction in Kansas, there is NO filing deadline. WHERE IT STILL REACHES A CONVICTION: two routes. (1) The savings clause quoted above — habeas lies if the 60-1507 remedy 'is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of said applicant's detention.' (2) Where 60-1507 does not apply at all. The Kansas Supreme Court entertained a 60-1501 writ attacking a municipal-court conviction on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel grounds in Gilchrist v. City of Osawatomie, 238 Kan. 202 (1985), holding: 'K.S.A. 60-1507 was not available to petitioner since it may be used only by a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction. A municipal court is not a court of general jurisdiction.' No time bar was applied, and the court rejected the argument that failure to take a direct appeal barred the writ: 'It is generally held if the constitutional rights of the accused are at issue, habeas corpus is available as a remedy under certain circumstances even though no direct appeal was taken' (fetched from static.case.law/kan/238/cases/0202-01.json). Note this residual habeas is limited by FORUM and ADEQUACY, not by claim type — it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims, which is why the status here is 'subsumed' rather than 'narrow.' OPERATIVE FOR AN ORDINARY FELONY CONVICTION: 60-1507, one year. 60-1501(a) opens 'Subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507,' and 60-1507(e) is captioned 'Exclusiveness of remedy.' A person in Kansas Department of Corrections custody under a district-court sentence must use 60-1507. TRIGGERS AND EXTENSION: the year runs from the later of (A) the final direct-appeal order or termination of appellate jurisdiction, (B) denial of certiorari or the Supreme Court's final order after granting it, or (C) the decision on a prior 60-1507 motion. It 'may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice,' and since the 2016 amendment (L. 2016, ch. 58, § 2) that inquiry is statutorily narrowed: 'the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence,' with actual innocence requiring a showing that 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.' Untimely motions must be dismissed sua sponte under (f)(3). CUSTODY REQUIREMENT: 60-1507 reaches only 'a prisoner in custody under sentence,' so it is unavailable to someone who has fully discharged the sentence; whether habeas or another vehicle fills that gap is unverified here. CAPITAL: the statutory text draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the one-year rule applies uniformly. NO-DEADLINE NEIGHBOR: K.S.A. 22-3504(a) (verified at ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch22/022_035_0004.html) provides 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time while the defendant is serving such sentence,' with no deadline, and the revisor's annotations record that the one-year limit 'does not procedurally bar the bringing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence' (State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380 (2007)). But 22-3504 reaches only sentences — defined in (c)(1) as imposed without jurisdiction, not conforming to the applicable statutory provision, or ambiguous as to time and manner — never the conviction itself, and expressly not sentences rendered erroneous by a later change in the law. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a modern published Kansas decision construing the scope of the 60-1507(e) savings clause; CourtListener's Kansas full-text coverage is thin and returned no on-point hits. I also could not fetch Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183 (kscourts.gov returned 403) or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights habeas suspension clause, so neither is relied on above. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Kentucky	No limit habeas survives narrowly · KRS 419.020 (habeas statute), construed in Brumley v. Seabold, 885 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. App. 1994); scope set by Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994)	3 years no excuse for a late filing RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence · Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10), quoted verbatim in Bush v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 621 (Ky. App. 2007)	Detail Habeas: KRS 419.020 fails to address any time constraints with regard to a petitioner's right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, the phrase "on any day at any time" would seem to indicate that there are no time constraints Post-conviction remedy: Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant On excusing a late filing: Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant HABEAS IS NOT ABOLISHED AND CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE. Ky. Const. sec. 16 preserves the writ; KRS ch. 419 implements it. I read every section of KRS 419.020-.130 (apps.legislature.ky.gov, chapter id=39274, updated 07/30/2026): none imposes any period for FILING a petition. The only period in the chapter is KRS 419.130(1) — thirty (30) days to APPEAL a habeas judgment — which is not a filing limit. KRS 419.020 makes the writ issuable 'on any day at any time.' BUT habeas is narrow as a route to attack a conviction. Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994) (Ky. Supreme Court, controlling): 'we recognize as the general rule that the RCr 11.42 procedure is adequate for a collateral attack by a prisoner in custody under a judgment which he believes to be defective for one reason or another. But we recognize as an exception that the prompt relief available by writ of habeas corpus remains for a prisoner who can establish in a summary procedure that the judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio.' Marcum calls that exception 'narrowly circumscribed' and says petitions beyond its scope 'will be disposed of summarily.' Earlier: Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964) — 'There being no showing that the remedy by motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 is inadequate to test the legality of appellant's detention, his petition was properly dismissed' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/377/cases/0154-01.json). Second narrowing: the petitioner must seek IMMEDIATE RELEASE. Graham v. O'Dea, 876 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. App. 1994): 'The statute applies only to individuals who can demonstrate that they are entitled to release from custody' (https://static.case.law/sw2d/876/cases/0621-01.json); accord Fryrear v. Parker, 920 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1996) (Ky. Supreme Court) (https://static.case.law/sw2d/920/cases/0519-01.json). So habeas is 'narrow,' not 'subsumed': RCr 11.42 has not been made the exclusive remedy — Marcum expressly holds a court rule 'cannot supplant the right to a writ of habeas corpus, a fundamental right guaranteed by Sec. 16 of our Kentucky Constitution.' IMPORTANT CAVEAT ON 'NO DEADLINE': there is no statutory limitations period, but LACHES can bar a stale habeas petition. Brumley v. Seabold (the same case quoted above) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition filed nine years after the challenged proceeding, holding 'the prisoner cannot be allowed to sit on a claim of right while the evidence available to the Commonwealth to support the action taken disintegrates.' That is an equitable, fact-specific bar, not a fixed period. RCr 11.42 DETAIL: three years runs from finality of the judgment (final appellate judgment, or trial-court judgment if no direct appeal — Palmer v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Ky. App. 1999), quoted in Bush). Two statutory exceptions, quoted in Bush: (a) facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; (b) a fundamental constitutional right not established within the period and held retroactive. RCr 11.42(1) requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence' or on probation, parole or conditional discharge. CURRENCY: RCr 11.42(10) is unamended — the Kentucky Supreme Court's 2024 (2024-17) and 2025 (2025-02) omnibus rules orders on kycourts.gov contain no reference to Rule 11.42; the Kentucky Dept. of Public Advocacy packet revised Dec. 2019 quotes the same clause ('within three years after the judgment becomes final,' RCr 11.42(10), https://dpa.ky.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/RCr-11-42-December-2019.doc.pdf); and the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to RCr 11.42 as a live remedy on 06/25/2026 in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2023-SC-0513. NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE FOUND: RCr 11.42(10) draws no distinction for capital cases, and I found none in the cases read. THIRD VEHICLE, PARTLY UNVERIFIED: Kentucky also has CR 60.02, reserved for 'extraordinary situations when relief is not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42' (Commonwealth v. Taylor, 06/25/2026, quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997), https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2026/06/25/commonwealth_of_kentucky_v._victor_d._taylor.pdf). I did not read CR 60.02's own text, so its time limits are UNVERIFIED here and no figure is asserted. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE COMPARISON: a Kentuckian challenging a conviction today is governed by the three-year RCr 11.42 deadline, not by any habeas deadline; Kentucky's habeas remedy has no filing deadline but reaches only judgments void ab initio where the petitioner would be entitled to immediate release. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Louisiana	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 351 (Title IX, Habeas Corpus), amended by Acts 1980, No. 429, §2; construed in State ex rel. Glover v. State, 660 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1995)	2 years no excuse for a late filing Application for Post Conviction Relief, La. Code Crim. Proc. Title XXXI-A, arts. 924-930.8 · La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8(A) (Acts 1990, No. 1023; Acts 1999, No. 1262; Acts 2004, No. 401; Acts 2013, No. 251; Acts 2021, No. 104; Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 10; Acts 2025, No. 393)	Detail Habeas: The provisions of this Title are not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief under Title XXXI-A. Post-conviction remedy: No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922 On excusing a late filing: All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney. INSTRUMENT WARNING: Louisiana's habeas corpus statute itself carries NO filing deadline — Title IX (arts. 351-370) contains no time-limitation article at all (verified against the Code of Criminal Procedure table of contents: 351 definition, 352 venue, 353 form/contents, 354-370 procedure; art. 354's 'time' is the custodian's answer time, not a petitioner deadline). But habeas is NOT a route to a conviction today: art. 351's third paragraph closes Title IX to anyone 'entitled to file' post-conviction relief. The La. Supreme Court in Glover: art. 351 'states unambiguously that habeas corpus relief is not available to persons entitled to file an application for post conviction relief,' and Official Revision Comment (c) to art. 351 'Habeas corpus relief is not the proper procedural device for petitioners who may file applications for post conviction relief. Essentially, habeas corpus deals with pre-conviction complaints concerning custody.' Glover also held the PCR time bar does not suspend the writ under La. Const. art. I, sec. 21, reasoning that sec. 21 protects 'the traditional common law writ' and art. 930.8 'lies outside' it. The legislature made the absorption explicit in 2025: art. 924(4) now defines post conviction relief as 'a form of post conviction habeas corpus.' So the operative number is 2 years / 730 days from finality under art. 914 or 922 — not the 1 year common in PCRA-style states, and not an open-ended habeas. Hardening: art. 930.8(F) 'All of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.' Exceptions in art. 930.8(A): (1) facts unknown to petitioner/prior counsel with subjective 'diligence' — new facts must be submitted within two years of discovery, and a guilty/nolo pleader seeking art. 926.2 relief loses this exception after five years; (2) previously unknown facts under a clear-and-convincing 'manifest injustice' test; (3) a newly announced retroactive constitutional interpretation, filed within one year of that ruling's finality; (4) a transitional grandfather — an otherwise-barred application is heard if filed on or before August 1, 2027 and within two years of finality; (5)-(6) art. 926.1 DNA and art. 926.2 factual innocence. CAUTION on factual innocence: art. 926.2's standalone escape from arts. 930.4/930.8 required filing on or before December 31, 2022 after a trial to verdict — that window has closed, so such claims now run through the ordinary 2-year bar, and a petitioner who pled guilty on or after August 1, 2025 'shall not be entitled to assert a claim of factual innocence.' CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: art. 930.8(B) — post-conviction appellate review in death cases goes directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and once an execution warrant issues any application containing a new claim must be filed no later than 45 days before the execution date, with a ruling 21 days out and a 7-day writ window. CUSTODY GATE: art. 926(F) limits eligibility to those currently serving a sentence or on probation/parole and requires dismissal of an application filed after the sentence is completed; art. 924.1 bars PCR while direct appeal is available or pending. Practical effect: a person off supervision has neither remedy — PCR is closed by art. 926(F)(2) and habeas by its own custody requirement (art. 351). Text current through the 2025 First Extraordinary Session per legis.la.gov; art. 930.8 as shown reflects Acts 2025, No. 393. Unverified: I did not locate a post-2025 Louisiana appellate decision on CourtListener applying art. 351 to a mislabeled habeas petition (CourtListener's Louisiana intermediate-appellate coverage is sparse); the subsumption finding rests on the statute plus Glover, which remains the controlling Louisiana Supreme Court authority. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Maine	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (Purpose), Title 15 ch. 305-A; and 14 M.R.S. § 5502 ("Post-conviction habeas corpus") REPEALED by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2	1 year no excuse for a late filing Post-conviction review, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (§§ 2121-2132) · 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) (Time for filing; PL 2011, c. 601, § 11)	Detail Habeas: It replaces the remedies available pursuant to post-conviction habeas corpus, to the extent that review of a criminal conviction or proceedings were reviewable, the remedies available pursuant to common law habeas corpus, including habeas corpus as recognized in Title 14 Post-conviction remedy: A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A. On excusing a late filing: A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review Maine is a clean 'subsumed' state, and the habeas_no_deadline=false coding needs explanation. Title 14 ch. 609 (habeas corpus) still exists and § 5501 ('Right to writ') contains no time limit of any kind — but it is NOT an open deadline-free route to challenge a conviction. Two independent primary sources close it: (1) 14 M.R.S. § 5502, captioned 'Post-conviction habeas corpus,' reads in full '(REPEALED)' — repealed by PL 1979, c. 701, § 2, the same act that enacted ch. 305-A; and (2) § 2122 names Title 14 §§ 5501 and 5509 to 5546 specifically as remedies ch. 305-A replaces, and calls ch. 305-A the 'comprehensive and, except for direct appeals from a criminal judgment, exclusive method of review.' So the residual writ has no deadline but no reach into conviction challenges; do not tabulate Maine as unlimited-habeas. § 2122 states the chapter is construed to provide relief to persons required to use it 'as required by the Constitution of Maine, Article I, Section 10' (the writ-suspension clause) — i.e. the statute was drafted to occupy the constitutional guarantee rather than leave a parallel habeas route. The one year runs from the LATEST of three triggers (§ 2128-B(1)(A)-(C)): final disposition of direct appeal or expiry of appeal time; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right; or discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence — so it is a discovery-style limit, not a flat year from judgment. Time while a properly filed U.S. Supreme Court cert petition on the same judgment is pending is excluded. § 2128-B(1) contains no equitable-tolling clause on its face; I did not verify judicial tolling doctrine from a controlling case. Separate one-year clocks apply to post-sentencing proceedings (§ 2128-B(2)) and to indirect impediments (§ 2128-B(3)); § 2128-B(3) also sets a 60-DAY limit for noncitizens seeking relief under § 2124(3)(E), running from when the noncitizen became or should have become aware that deportation proceedings were initiated as a consequence of the plea — the shortest deadline in the chapter. Jurisdictional gate: § 2124 requires a 'present restraint or other specified impediment' (incarceration, probation/parole, unconditional discharge, unpaid fine or restitution, unperformed community service, future-served sentence, NCR commitment). A petitioner with no qualifying restraint is outside ch. 305-A, and habeas has been replaced — a standing gap, not an alternative writ; I did not find a controlling case resolving what remedy such a person has. DNA testing is a separate chapter, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-B (§§ 2136-2138), and I found no limitation period in § 2138 — that route appears untimed. No capital variant exists; ch. 305-A draws no capital/non-capital distinction. Confirming Law Court case law could not be read: CourtListener opinion pages returned HTTP 202/401 challenges and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked, so every figure above rests on the statutes themselves, which are dispositive and controlling here. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Maryland	No limit habeas survives narrowly · Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(a) (whole subtitle, §§ 3-701 to 3-707, read; contains no limitations period); confirmed as a surviving remedy by Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011)	10 years no excuse for a late filing Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (UPPA), Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101 to 7-301 · Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b)	Detail Habeas: A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus Post-conviction remedy: Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. On excusing a late filing: Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none, at any point in Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-701 to 3-707, all of which I read. Two clocks in that subtitle are decoys and must not be reported as filing deadlines: § 3-706(a) gives a judge 5 days to file a memorandum after discharging someone on unconstitutionality grounds, and § 3-707(b)(1) gives 10 days to apply for leave to appeal in BAIL habeas cases. Neither limits when a petition may be filed. Habeas is NOT subsumed and NOT abolished. Crim. Proc. § 7-107(b)(1) expressly contemplates 'a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus' — and takes away only the appeal, providing such a person 'may not appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland or the Appellate Court of Maryland.' That is a preclusion of appellate review, not a limitations period; a comparison that reads § 7-107 as a habeas deadline is wrong. Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327 (2019) (slip op. 29), quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 175 (2011): 'The UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies.' Accord Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447 (1960) (UPPA 'did not abrogate the remedies formerly available under the writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis… it clearly took away the right of appeal'); Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658 (1990) ('for constitutional reasons the General Assembly did not restrict the authority of judges to issue writs of habeas corpus'). WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available': Maryland's narrowing is not the survey's canonical jurisdictional/facially-void shape, so flagging the mismatch. Habeas survives with full force and no deadline where the UPPA provides no remedy (e.g. parole, diminution credits, conditions and duration of confinement — Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502 (2001); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 (1994)). But as a route to attack a CONVICTION it is doubly constrained: (1) zero appellate review under § 7-107(b)(1), so relief depends on a single circuit judge with no error correction, and (2) the UPPA was enacted, per Gluckstern at 658, 'in place of the common law habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and sentences,' and courts route such claims there — see Simms v. Shearin, 221 Md. App. 460 (2015) (dismissing appeal; petitioner 'did not file his petition for writ of habeas corpus for a purpose other than to challenge the legality of his conviction'); Green v. Hutchinson, 158 Md. App. 168 (2004). Also, § 3-703(a) makes issuance discretionary where the petitioner has already had a hearing on a prior petition under the same commitment. UPPA DETAILS: the 10 years runs from IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE, not from finality of direct appeal — a materially earlier trigger than the federal AEDPA clock, worth flagging for any legislator comparison. Subject to an 'extraordinary cause' escape (§ 7-103(b)); only one petition per trial or sentence (§ 7-103(a)); a concluded proceeding may be reopened 'if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice' (§ 7-104) with no time limit on reopening. § 7-102(a) otherwise permits filing 'at any time' subject to §§ 7-103 and 7-104. UPPA covers persons 'confined under sentence of imprisonment' or 'on parole or probation' (§ 7-101, as quoted in Sabisch slip op. 30). CAPITAL: no capital-specific deadline exists; Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013, so the distinction is now moot. NOT VERIFIED: Md. Rule 15-303 (habeas procedure) — the Maryland Judiciary publishes the Rules only through Westlaw, which is paywalled and unfetchable, so I could not read the rule text. Maryland cases cite Rule 15-303(e)(3) as a ground for summary denial (successive/no-relief-warranted petitions), and nothing in the cases citing it suggests it imposes a filing deadline, but I did not confirm the rule's text firsthand. Adjacent statutory remedies exist outside the UPPA — Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (post-conviction DNA testing) and § 8-301 (writ of actual innocence), both referenced in Simms — but I did not read them and make no claim about their deadlines. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Massachusetts	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · G. L. c. 248, § 25 (as appearing in St. 1979, c. 344, § 12); see also G. L. c. 248, § 1; Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992); Soura, petitioner, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002)	No limit no filing period Motion for postconviction relief / new trial, Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)–(b) · Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), amended Sept. 6, 2001, eff. Oct. 1, 2001	Detail Habeas: The court shall have no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, at its discretion for—…a person who is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction. Post-conviction remedy: Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to correct the sentence then being served On excusing a late filing: Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion MASSACHUSETTS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER INSTRUMENT. Rule 30(a) and 30(b) both say relief may be sought 'at any time'; c. 248 contains no limitations section (all 40 section headings inspected). (1) Habeas is subsumed, not merely narrowed, as to conviction challenges. G. L. c. 248, § 1 grants the writ 'unless— … Second, He has been convicted or is in execution upon legal process, civil or criminal,' and § 25 removes the discretionary power for anyone 'imprisoned or restrained of his liberty pursuant to a criminal conviction.' Rule 30's Reporter's Notes to subdivision (a): 'When originally adopted in 1979, this subdivision consolidated the previously distinct procedures of habeas corpus and writ of error.' (2) Habeas survives — with no deadline — only for claims OUTSIDE the conviction: Stewart, petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992): 'Rule 30 encompasses all motions for postconviction relief that challenge the sentence, conviction, or confinement imposed… a petition for habeas corpus relief does not lie… He must proceed under rule 30'; habeas lies where 'the term of a lawfully imposed sentence has expired' and the petitioner would get immediate release (Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30–31 (1989), good-time forfeiture). Soura, 436 Mass. 1003 (2002): claims centering 'on the indictment, trial, conviction, and sentencing stages' — 'Our habeas corpus statute does not apply in these circumstances. See G. L. c. 248, § 25.' So habeas is not a route to challenge a conviction at all — not even for jurisdictional/void claims. (3) Constitutional caveat: Mass. Const. Pt. II, c. 6, art. 7 guarantees habeas 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner'; Averett (quoting Hennessy, 386 Mass. 848, 852 n.3 (1982)) warned that § 25's total elimination 'may run afoul of' that article, but McCastle, petitioner, 401 Mass. 105, 107 (1987) held 'there is no constitutional impediment to restricting [the petitioner] to rule 30 relief' for a conviction attack. (4) The real Massachusetts limit is waiver, not a clock: Rule 30(c)(2) waives claims not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior Rule 30 motion. (5) No death penalty. Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, a 'capital case' means a murder-in-the-first-degree conviction or a third habitual-offender conviction; after rescript, 'no appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice… on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question' — a gatekeeper, still not a deadline. (6) Reporter's Notes add two boundaries: Rule 30(a) is unavailable to contest a sentence already completed, and an illegally-IMPOSED (as opposed to illegal) sentence must be corrected within Rule 29(a)'s 60 days. (7) mass.gov returns HTTP 403 to non-browser clients; Rule 30 text was read from the Internet Archive capture of the official mass.gov rule page, which shows effective date 10/01/2001 and no amendment since, and the operative wording matches the version quoted by the SJC. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Michigan	No limit habeas survives narrowly · MCL 600.4307 (Revised Judicature Act of 1961, ch. 43, Habeas Corpus) — right to bring; no period prescribed. Narrowed by MCL 600.4310(3) and Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 485-486 (2007) (published).	No limit no filing period Motion for relief from judgment, MCR subchapter 6.500 (Postappeal Relief), MCR 6.501-6.509 · MCR 6.502(G)(1), Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026) — the only limitation on the motion is numerical, not temporal	Detail Habeas: An action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on the behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this state under any pretense whatsoever, except as specified in section 4310. Post-conviction remedy: Except as provided in subrule (G)(2), regardless of whether a defendant has previously filed a motion for relief from judgment, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. On excusing a late filing: no subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal MICHIGAN HAS NO FILING DEADLINE ON EITHER TRACK. This is the headline: unlike PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 states, Michigan's post-conviction vehicle carries no one-year (or any) clock, and habeas carries none either. (1) NO HABEAS DEADLINE: I read the entire RJA habeas chapter index (MCL 600.4301-600.4370) and the full text of MCR 3.303(A)-(M). Neither prescribes any period for filing. MCL 600.4307 grants the action to any person restrained 'under any pretense whatsoever,' qualified only by subject-matter exclusions in MCL 600.4310, never by time. The writ is constitutionally protected: Const 1963, art 1, Sec 12 — 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.' (2) WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE': MCL 600.4310 provides that habeas 'may not be brought by or on behalf of … (3) Persons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.' Published Court of Appeals precedent preserves one lane through that bar. Moses v Dep't of Corrections, 274 Mich App 481, 486 (2007), verbatim: 'while plaintiff may not use a habeas proceeding as a substitute for an appeal or to review the merits of his criminal conviction, plaintiff may assert a radical defect in the jurisdiction of the court in which his conviction was obtained.' Moses also states, quoting People v Price, 23 Mich App 663, 669-671 (1970), that relief 'is open to a convicted person in one narrow instance, … where the convicting court was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime in question,' and that the defect must be 'radical, rendering the conviction absolutely void.' Habeas is thus NOT subsumed or abolished — Moses (2007) postdates the 1989 adoption of subchapter 6.500 and granted the writ to reach the merits of a jurisdictional claim — but it reaches only jurisdictional/void-judgment claims. Moses also notes habeas may be denied in the court's discretion where full relief is available in a more appropriate proceeding. (3) NO POST-CONVICTION DEADLINE: I read MCR 6.501 through 6.509 in full in the official Michigan Court Rules of 1985 (updated May 1, 2026). No subrule imposes a filing period. The gatekeeping is entirely non-temporal: MCR 6.502(G)(1) allows 'one and only one motion' (exceptions in (G)(2) for retroactive change in law, newly discovered evidence including new scientific evidence per (G)(3), or a vacated predicate conviction; plus an innocence waiver), and MCR 6.508(D)(3) bars grounds 'other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal … unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause … and (b) actual prejudice.' A person sentenced decades ago may file a first 6.500 motion today; the obstacle is the one-motion rule and the cause-and-prejudice showing, not a clock. (4) EXCLUSIVITY / OPERATIVE: MCR 6.501 — 'Unless otherwise specified by these rules, a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the circuit court not subject to appellate review under subchapters 7.200 or 7.300 may be reviewed only in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.' For an ordinary conviction challenge the 6.500 motion is therefore the operative vehicle; habeas is operative only for a radical jurisdictional defect, where it runs in parallel and is not subject to the one-motion rule. (5) NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: Michigan has no death penalty. Const 1963, art 4, Sec 46 — 'No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death.' (6) COMPARISON CAUTION: Michigan is a state where habeas survives with no deadline sitting beside a post-conviction motion that ALSO has no deadline — so the common '1 year' figure quoted for PCRA-type states has no Michigan counterpart on either instrument. Sources fetched and read: legislature.mi.gov (MCL 600.4301 chapter index, 600.4307, 600.4310, Const art 1 Sec 12, Const art 4 Sec 46); courts.michigan.gov official Michigan Court Rules PDF (MCR 3.303, MCR 6.501-6.509); static.case.law/mich-app/274/cases/0481-01.json (Moses full text). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Minnesota	No limit habeas survives narrowly · Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2025); construed in Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979)	2 years no excuse for a late filing Petition for postconviction relief, Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (Minnesota postconviction remedy act) · Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2025)	Detail Habeas: A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction … may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint. Post-conviction remedy: No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. On excusing a late filing: No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Minnesota habeas was never abolished and remains a live statutory civil remedy (ch. 589, §§ 589.01-589.30). I read the entire chapter: it contains no limitations period of any kind. Its only time provisions govern the return of the writ (24 hours plus travel time) and the appeal schedule (§ 589.30) — none limit when a petition may be filed. Habeas is nonetheless NARROW as a route to attack a conviction, for two independent reasons. First, § 589.01 by its own terms excludes 'persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal,' and § 589.04(c) requires the petition to affirmatively 'state that the restrained person is not committed or detained under process, judgment, decree, or execution, as specified in section 589.01.' Second, § 590.01, subd. 2 is an express exclusivity clause: the postconviction remedy 'takes the place of any other common law, statutory or other remedies which may have been available for challenging the validity of a conviction, sentence, or other disposition and must be used exclusively in place of them unless it is inadequate or ineffective.' Kelsey (Minn. 1979) states the surviving residue: 'habeas corpus would not be available to a prison inmate who was confined pursuant to a final judgment unless the inmate challenged the jurisdiction of the court rendering the final judgment or the legality of his sentence.' Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) confirms the subsumption is complete and current, describing the habeas route in the past tense: 'Before the Legislature passed the postconviction statute in 1967, we allowed prisoners to bring writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis to challenge their convictions,' and calling subd. 2 an 'exclusivity provision' showing 'the postconviction statute merely codified or replaced preexisting remedies.' Loyd v. Fabian (Minn. App. 2004) states the modern scope: 'limited to constitutional issues, jurisdictional challenges, claims that confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and claims that confinement violates applicable statutes.' In practice habeas today carries execution-of-sentence and custody matters (good time, parole/supervised release, conditions of confinement) rather than conviction validity — the cases I read (Guth 2006, Rud 2007) are all of that type. So the deadline-free habeas route is real but does not reach ordinary trial-error, ineffective-assistance, plea-validity or Brady claims. CAUTION FOR THE COMPARISON: Minnesota's ch. 590 is a purpose-built postconviction act, not habeas, so its 2-year period is a postconviction deadline — the same instrument-mismatch trap as Pennsylvania's PCRA. Note also that the legislature expressly modeled the 2-year period on the federal 1-year habeas limit under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), per legislative history recounted in Carlton — further reason not to read it as a state habeas deadline. THE 2-YEAR BAR IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL: Carlton holds 'the time limitation in subdivision 4(c) does not operate as a jurisdictional bar, and that it therefore is subject to waiver' — the State waives it by failing to plead untimeliness — and that it is 'a statute of limitations subject to equitable principles.' Carlton separately upheld subd. 4(a) as constitutional as applied, 'a reasonable limitation' even assuming a state due process right to one review. PC EXCEPTIONS: § 590.01, subd. 4(b) lists five (disability/mental disease, newly discovered evidence including scientific evidence, new retroactive interpretation of law, pre-May-1-1980 offenses under subd. 3, and a catch-all for petitions that are 'not frivolous and … in the interests of justice'), but subd. 4(c) imposes a secondary 2-year clock: any petition invoking an exception 'must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.' Separately, subd. 1 codifies a Knaffla-type bar: a petition after a completed direct appeal 'may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal.' THIRD, DEADLINE-FREE VEHICLE FOR ILLEGAL SENTENCES: Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 provides 'The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law,' and Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016) held that 'applying the 2-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, to a Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motion violates the separation of powers.' The Revisor prints this as a standing note to subd. 4. So a Minnesota prisoner attacking an unauthorized sentence has an untimed route, but it is a rule-based sentence-correction motion, not habeas. CAPITAL: ch. 590 draws no capital/non-capital distinction — no separate capital track or deadline appears anywhere in the statute. Sources read in full text: revisor.mn.gov for §§ 589.01, ch. 589 complete, 590.01, and Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03; static.case.law for Kelsey (283 N.W.2d 892), Loyd (682 N.W.2d 688), Guth (716 N.W.2d 23), Rud (743 N.W.2d 295), Carlton (816 N.W.2d 590), and Reynolds (888 N.W.2d 125). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Mississippi	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Laws 1984, ch. 378, § 2), quoted and applied in Taylor v. State, No. 2023-CA-00738-COA (Miss. Ct. App.)	3 years no excuse for a late filing Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to 99-39-29 · Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)	Detail Habeas: abolishes the common law writs relating to post-conviction collateral relief, including by way of illustration but not limitation, error coram nobis, error coram vobis, and post-conviction habeas corpus, as well as statutory post-conviction habeas corpus Post-conviction remedy: A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi On excusing a late filing: A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi Mississippi is the opposite of the no-deadline-habeas states. State habeas does NOT lie to challenge a conviction or sentence: § 99-39-3(1) makes the UPCCRA the 'exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences' and expressly abolishes BOTH common-law and statutory post-conviction habeas. Habeas survives only outside collateral attack — the general writ, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-1 ('shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention'), carries no filing deadline anywhere in ch. 11-43, but the 1984 Act (which itself amended § 11-43-9) removed conviction challenges from it; Walker v. State, 555 So. 2d 738 (Miss. 1990) leaves habeas for pre-conviction/bail matters and calls the UPCCRA 'post-conviction habeas corpus renamed.' Courts recharacterize habeas petitions as PCR motions and apply the 3-year bar: Carter v. State, No. 2024-CP-01328-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2025) (petition 'labeled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' treated as PCR, time-barred), https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO187475.pdf. Clock runs from the direct-appeal ruling, or if no appeal from expiration of the appeal time, or for guilty pleas from entry of the judgment of conviction. CAPITAL CASES ARE SHORTER, NOT LONGER: § 99-39-5(2) — 'Likewise excepted are filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases which shall be made within one (1) year after conviction' (365 days). Statutory exceptions to the 3-year bar: intervening Mississippi/U.S. Supreme Court decision; newly discovered, practically conclusive evidence; untested or retestable biological/DNA evidence; expired sentence or unlawfully revoked probation/parole. The bar hardened recently — Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶8) (Miss. 2023) overruled the judicially crafted 'fundamental-rights exception,' so illegal-sentence and fundamental-constitutional-right claims no longer escape the 3 years; only the express statutory exceptions remain. One unverified point: 2026 H.B. 1751 (Corrections Omnibus Act) brought §§ 99-39-5 and 99-39-27 forward 'for purposes of possible amendments'; billstatus.ls.state.ms.us was unreachable (TLS chain error) so I could not confirm from a primary source whether it was enacted or whether it altered the period. The introduced version was a bring-forward with no change to the three-year language, and the most recent primary source read — the Oct. 28, 2025 Carter opinion citing § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020) — applies three years. Statutory text cross-validated against courts.ms.gov opinions quoting §§ 99-39-3(1) and 99-39-5(2) verbatim. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Missouri	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91.01(b) (habeas rule; no limitations period anywhere in Rule 91's 21 subsections or in RSMo ch. 532); narrowed by State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) and State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010)	6 months Motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment or sentence — Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (conviction after trial) and Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (conviction after guilty plea) · Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b) (identical text in R. 24.035(b))	Detail Habeas: Any person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint. Post-conviction remedy: If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. On excusing a late filing: If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE — stated explicitly. No filing time limit appears in Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91 (read all 21 subsection headings, 91.01, 91.02, 91.04 in full) or in RSMo ch. 532 (read the full chapter index and 532.010, 532.040). R. 91.04(a) lists the required contents of a petition and includes no timeliness allegation. Concrete proof it is not merely theoretical: in State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. banc 2010) (unanimous), the Missouri Supreme Court discharged a petitioner in 2010 on a March 2003 guilty plea — roughly seven years after the 180-day Rule 24.035 window closed. Missouri's high court still entertains original Rule 91 petitions today (e.g. State ex rel. Dorsey v. Vandergriff, decided 2024-03-20; In re Branson v. Shewmaker, 2025-04-29). WHY 'narrow', NOT 'available': Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) (unanimous) holds 'habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction proceedings. Habeas corpus may be used to challenge a final judgment after an individual's failure to pursue appellate and post-conviction remedies only to raise jurisdictional issues or in circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results.' Zinna restates the modern gateway test, quoting Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2002): default is excused only on '(1) a claim of actual innocence or (2) a jurisdictional defect or (3)(a) that the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense … and (b) prejudice …'. This is broader than pure jurisdictional/facially-void review but is clearly not a general route. WHY NOT 'subsumed': R. 29.15(a) and 24.035(a) say the motion is 'the exclusive procedure by which such person may seek relief IN THE SENTENCING COURT' (emphasis added) — a court-specific exclusivity. R. 91.02(a) directs the habeas petition to the circuit or associate circuit judge 'for the county in which the person is held in custody,' a different court, which is why the post-conviction rules did not extinguish the writ. Zinna nonetheless describes R. 24.035/29.15 as intended to be a 'single, unitary, post-conviction remedy, to be used in place of other remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus' — so the two coexist in tension, with habeas as the residual. SECOND PC DEADLINE: the same rules impose 90 days after the appellate mandate issues if a direct appeal was taken ('If an appeal of the judgment or sentence sought to be vacated, set aside or corrected is taken, the motion shall be filed within 90 days after the date the mandate of the appellate court issues affirming such judgment or sentence.'). The 180-day figure reported here is the no-appeal track. Missed deadlines are fatal: 'Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver.' VERSION CAVEAT: the current rule runs 180 days from 'the date the sentence is entered.' Older versions ran 180 days from delivery to the Department of Corrections (Zinna recites that formulation), and R. 29.15(m)/24.035(m) preserve the pre-2018 version for sentences pronounced before Jan. 1, 2018. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but R. 91.02(b) lets a person 'held in custody pursuant to a conviction for a capital crime and a sentence of death' whose conviction the Supreme Court has affirmed file the Rule 91 petition 'in this Court in the first instance,' and deems any such petition filed elsewhere to have been filed there. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003) — a 4-3 decision — first recognized a freestanding actual-innocence habeas claim, framed as whether 'a Missouri prisoner sentenced to death can obtain habeas relief on a claim of actual innocence alone'; Zinna and Brown state actual innocence as a gateway without a capital limitation. SUCCESSIVE-WRIT RULE, NOT A DEADLINE: RSMo 532.040 bars an inferior court from entertaining an application already refused by a superior court. ONE MORE NO-DEADLINE ROUTE (not defendant-initiated): RSMo 547.031.1 (2021, am. 2024) lets a prosecuting or circuit attorney 'file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time' on information of possible innocence — the vehicle in the Lamar Johnson, Christopher Dunn and Marcellus Williams proceedings. Sources read in full: revisor.mo.gov (ch. 532 index, 532.010, 532.040, 547.031); courts.mo.gov Supreme Court Rules (91.01, 91.02, 91.04, 29.15, 24.035); static.case.law (Simmons 866 S.W.2d 443, Jaynes 63 S.W.3d 210, Zinna 301 S.W.3d 510, Amrine 102 S.W.3d 541). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Montana	No limit habeas survives narrowly · Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, ¶ 22, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337 (construing Mont. Code Ann. § 46-22-101(2) against Mont. Const. art. II, § 19)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Petition for postconviction relief, Montana Postconviction Hearing Act, Mont. Code Ann. tit. 46, ch. 21 · Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1) (2025)	Detail Habeas: as applied to a facially invalid sentence–a sentence which, as a matter of law, the court had no authority to impose–the procedural bar created by § 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ Post-conviction remedy: a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final On excusing a late filing: a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly because it is the finding most easily lost. Title 46, ch. 22 contains no limitations period anywhere: I read the section lists for all three parts (Part 1 Availability, Part 2 Issuance, Part 3 Return/Hearing/Appeal) and no section imposes one. Section 46-22-204 runs the other way: 'The writ of habeas corpus or any associated process may be issued and served on any day or at any time.' Lott itself is the proof — the court granted the writ in 2006 on a sentence imposed in 1992, fourteen years earlier, expressly acknowledging both the appeal and postconviction windows had long closed. But the remedy is NARROW, not open. Section 46-22-101(2) provides: 'The writ of habeas corpus is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal. The relief under this chapter is not available to attack the legality of an order revoking a suspended or deferred sentence.' Lott held that bar unconstitutional ONLY as applied to a facially invalid sentence, and was careful to distinguish sentence from conviction (¶ 23: 'Since Lott has challenged his sentence and not the underlying conviction, he is not entitled to be released but only to be resentenced'). So a person attacking the CONVICTION itself has no habeas route at all once appeal is exhausted — hence operative = post_conviction. A person attacking a facially invalid SENTENCE has a live, deadline-free habeas route. Lott is current law, not a historical artifact: the Montana Supreme Court applied it and granted the writ in Bokma v. Olsen, 2025 MT 37, ¶¶ 11-12, 15, which also holds that denial of earned credit for time served or elapsed time 'creates a facially invalid sentence which we may review in a habeas corpus proceeding.' Habeas also remains unrestricted by § 46-22-101(2) for restraint not resting on a court-of-record conviction — pretrial detention, bail (§ 46-22-103), and petitioners who have not yet exhausted appeal. POST-CONVICTION EXCEPTIONS: § 46-21-102(2) allows a newly-discovered-evidence-of-innocence claim within 1 year of the date the petitioner discovers or reasonably should have discovered the evidence, whichever is later — a discovery-rule extension, not a suspension. Section 46-21-101(1) additionally requires that the petitioner have 'no adequate remedy of appeal.' TRANSITIONAL: the 1-year period is not universal — Lott n.2 records that it 'went into effect on April 24, 1997, and applies to all persons convicted on or after April 24, 1996,' with a 5-year deadline for earlier convictions (citing State v. Wright, 2001 MT 247, ¶ 9, and Hawkins v. Mahoney, 1999 MT 82, ¶ 9). Nearly all live cases now fall under the 1-year rule. CAPITAL: § 46-21-102 as read draws no capital/non-capital distinction — the 1-year period is uniform on its face. I did not separately verify whether other chapter 21 provisions alter capital timing, so treat any capital-specific variation as unverified. Also unverified: judicially created equitable exceptions to the § 46-21-102 bar (Montana case law recognizes a narrow fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice escape) — I did not read those cases, so that point rests on no primary source here. COMPARISON WARNING for the legislator's question: quoting '1 year' as Montana's habeas deadline would be wrong twice over. The 1-year figure belongs to a separate statutory remedy in a different chapter, and Montana's habeas remedy — unlike Pennsylvania's PCRA or Delaware's Rule 61 model, where habeas was fully subsumed — was never abolished and carries no time limit, because Mont. Const. art. II, § 19 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended') sets a constitutional floor the legislature cannot statutorily close. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Nebraska	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824 (habeas corpus article — contains no limitations period); Tyrrell v. Frakes, 309 Neb. 85, 958 N.W.2d 673 (2021)	1 year Nebraska Postconviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 · Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) (added by Laws 2011, LB137, § 1; amended Laws 2023, LB50, § 18)	Detail Habeas: In the case of a prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of conviction, habeas corpus is available as a remedy only upon a showing that the judgment, sentence, and commitment are void. Post-conviction remedy: A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: (a) The date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal On excusing a late filing: A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — stated explicitly. Nebraska's habeas article (Ch. 29, art. 28) runs §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824; I read the Legislature's full Chapter 29 section index and every heading in that range, and no section imposes a limitations period on filing the writ. The article's only 'limitation' heading, § 29-2813, is a two-year bar on DAMAGES actions for false imprisonment ('shall be sued or molested for any offense against the provisions of said sections, unless within two years after the time when such offense shall have been committed'), not on the petition (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-2813). Section 29-2801 directs that on a proper application it is the judge's 'duty forthwith to allow a writ of habeas corpus' — no timing precondition. NARROWING: § 29-2801 by its own terms excludes 'persons convicted of some crime or offense for which they stand committed.' Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 384 (2016) (official PDF, https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2016/12/23/sanders_v._frakes.pdf): 'unless the conviction is void, those who "stand committed" pursuant to a final conviction are excluded from the scope of the relief afforded by the writ of habeas corpus in Nebraska.' Sanders also holds habeas will NOT reach a claim that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional. So the no-deadline writ buys a petitioner only jurisdictional/facially-void claims. NOT SUBSUMED — this is the key structural finding. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3003 ('Postconviction remedy; cumulative'): 'The remedy provided by sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 is cumulative and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state. Any proceeding filed under [the Act] which states facts which if true would constitute grounds for relief under another remedy shall be dismissed without prejudice.' (https://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=29-3003). State v. Boeggeman, 316 Neb. 581, 596-97 (2024) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00011033PUB): 'Although many states have adopted a unitary postconviction remedy that has replaced all existing procedures and encompasses all claims … Nebraska has not. "The remedy provided by [the Nebraska Postconviction Act] is cumulative …." … For example, Nebraska statutes still provide for motions for a new trial and writs of habeas corpus.' Boeggeman is the cleanest illustration of the contrast: sentenced 2/6/2017, postconviction motion filed 12/21/2020 and held time-barred with no equitable tolling — yet the court said 'At a minimum, an application for a writ of habeas corpus is available to Boeggeman should he continue to be confined beyond the completion date of his Nebraska sentences.' OPERATIVE: for an ordinary constitutional challenge (ineffective assistance, Brady, involuntary plea), the Postconviction Act is the route and the clock is 365 days — Boeggeman calls the Act 'the primary procedure for bringing collateral attacks on final judgments in criminal cases based upon constitutional principles.' Habeas is independently operative, with no deadline, for the narrower void-judgment/jurisdictional set; § 29-3003 affirmatively channels claims out of postconviction when another remedy fits. Hence 'both.' PC LIMIT DETAILS: it is a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional (State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (2015)); it governs successive motions (State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70 (2017)); retroactive application is not ex post facto (Amaya); per the Legislature's official annotation to § 29-3001, for convictions already final when the limit took effect the year ran from 8/27/2011 and expired 8/27/2012 (State v. Smith, 286 Neb. 77 (2013)) — annotation read, case text not read. CAPITAL: no longer window. State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84 (2025) (https://www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/public/viewAdvanced?docId=N00012173PUB), syllabus pt. 5: the 1-year limit 'governs all postconviction motions, including successive motions and those challenging a death sentence,' and 'even in capital cases, § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling.' Separately, § 29-2801's own text excludes from the writ 'persons committed for treason or felony, the punishment whereof is capital, plainly and specially expressed in the warrant of commitment.' OTHER CUMULATIVE REMEDIES named by Boeggeman and left in force: motion for new trial (§§ 29-2101 to 29-2103), writ of error coram nobis, and plea withdrawal — their deadlines were not established here and are unverified. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Nevada	1 year ★ late filing excusable for good cause habeas still lies · Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (time limit), read with § 34.720 (scope) and § 34.724(2)(b) (exclusivity); bars held mandatory in State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225 (2005)	— None · Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.724(2)(b) — cited to establish that NO separate post-conviction act exists; the former Post-Conviction Relief Act (NRS 177.315–177.385) was repealed in 1991 and Chapter 177 now contains only appeal provisions (NRS 177.015–177.305)	Detail Habeas: Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or … within 1 year after … remittitur. Post-conviction remedy: Comprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them. On excusing a late filing: Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year CRITICAL FOR THE COMPARISON — Nevada's 1-year figure IS a habeas deadline, not a PCRA-style substitute-act deadline. Nevada took the opposite path from Pennsylvania/Alabama/Delaware: instead of abolishing habeas and replacing it with a separate act, it kept habeas as the sole vehicle and put the deadline on habeas itself. NRS 34.720 confirms the post-conviction subchapter 'appl[ies] only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus in which the petitioner: 1. Requests relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence; or 2. Challenges the computation of time.' So a conviction challenge is a habeas petition and is subject to NRS 34.726's 1-year bar; there is no deadline-free general-habeas route sitting beside it. NRS 34.390(1) makes this explicit by carving the post-conviction subchapter out of the ordinary duty to grant the writ ('shall grant the writ without delay, except as otherwise provided in NRS 34.720 to 34.830'). RUNNING OF THE YEAR: from entry of the judgment of conviction, or, if a direct appeal was taken, from issuance of the appellate court's remittitur. STATUTORY EXCEPTION: 'good cause shown for delay,' which NRS 34.726(1)(a)-(b) defines as delay not the petitioner's fault AND undue prejudice from dismissal; Riker adds that good cause requires 'an impediment external to the defense.' The bars are not discretionary — Riker, 121 Nev. 225: 'Application of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory,' and 'the statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State.' ADDITIONAL BARS BEYOND THE YEAR: NRS 34.800(2) creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice (laches) once 5 years pass from the judgment or the direct-appeal decision, but the State must specifically plead it; NRS 34.810 separately mandates dismissal of successive petitions and of guilty-plea petitions not alleging an involuntary/unknowing plea or ineffective assistance. CAPITAL CASES: no longer deadline, and Riker rejects any capital softening — 'the f[act] that a habeas petitioner faces a death sentence does not somehow lessen the effect of procedural bars.' NRS 34.820 supplies only a separate counsel-appointment and procedural track for death-sentenced petitioners. NARROW SURVIVING NON-HABEAS ROUTES, each carved out of exclusivity as 'incident to the proceedings in the trial court' under NRS 34.724(2)(a): (1) NRS 176.555 — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' — genuinely no deadline, but it reaches only a facially illegal sentence, not a conviction challenge; (2) NRS 176.165 motion to withdraw a plea, which NRS 34.724(3) (added 2019) permits post-sentence only if it is a first such motion, filed within 1 year of conviction, by a person NOT incarcerated on that charge, and not barred by laches (rebuttable presumption at 5 years) — so it is unavailable to the incarcerated petitioner this comparison concerns. VENUE: NRS 34.738 requires filing in the district court of the county where the conviction occurred. Every figure above was read in the NRS text at the fetched leg.state.nv.us URLs; the Riker quotes were read in the full opinion text at https://static.case.law/nev/121/cases/0225-01.json. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
New Hampshire	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Mallard v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, No. 2021-0357, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Jan. 4, 2023) (quoting State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974)); see RSA ch. 534	3 years Petition for a new trial, RSA ch. 526 (RSA 526:1) · RSA 526:4 (Time)	Detail Habeas: In contrast, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time." State v. Daigle, 114 N.H. 679, 681 (1974) (quotation and ellipsis omitted). Post-conviction remedy: A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit. On excusing a late filing: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 'provides a remedy for constitutional errors at the trial without limit of time.' NEW HAMPSHIRE HAS NO POST-CONVICTION ACT AND HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE OF ANY KIND. NH never enacted a PCRA/Rule-32-style exclusive remedy, so nothing was subsumed. Three independent routes coexist and Mallard (2023) expressly rejected the Warden's argument that the new-trial motion and habeas are 'functionally equivalent': 'he was permitted to move for a new trial under RSA chapter 526, and he was entitled to collaterally attack trial errors by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if harmful constitutional error could be established.' Within 3 years both vehicles are open; after 3 years habeas alone remains, with no outer limit. \|\| HABEAS SCOPE. RSA ch. 534 (read in full) contains no limitations period at all — RSA 534:2 is a subject-matter carve-out, not a clock, and RSA 534:31's 2-year bar applies only to suits for the chapter's penalties, not to the petition. Habeas is constitutionally entrenched: N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 91, quoted in Mallard, guarantees it 'in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner.' A caution for readers of the bare statute: RSA 534:2 says persons 'imprisoned upon legal process, civil or criminal, in which the cause of the imprisonment is distinctly expressed' are 'not entitled of right to such writ,' and the historic standard was purely jurisdictional (Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 505). Case law removed that as a practical bar — jurisdiction is 'lost' on constitutional error. Bonser v. Courtney, 124 N.H. 796, 807-08 (1984) (read at static.case.law/nh/124/cases/0796-01.json): 'a plaintiff by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may collaterally attack that proceeding, after the time for direct appeal has expired, if harmful constitutional error can be established.' Mallard confirms ineffective-assistance claims need not be raised on direct appeal and are properly brought in habeas, and granted relief on a 2013 conviction attacked in 2020. Classified 'available,' not 'narrow.' \|\| NON-TIME LIMITS (these are what actually bar late petitioners, not a clock). Habeas is not a substitute for direct appeal, so a claim that could have been raised on appeal may be procedurally defaulted — Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988) (read at static.case.law/nh/131/cases/0138-01.json); Sleeper v. Warden, 155 N.H. 160, 162-63 (2007) (cited in Mallard, not separately read). Res judicata does not apply to habeas (Gobin v. Hancock, 96 N.H. 450), so successive petitions raising different issues survive. LACHES: the superior court in Mallard acknowledged 'no statute of limitations for habeas petitions' in NH but dismissed a 9-year-old petition as 'untimely under something akin to laches'; the Supreme Court REVERSED, assuming without deciding that laches could apply and holding the State bears the burden of showing delay that was both unreasonable and prejudicial. Delay alone is therefore not a bar, and laches remains formally undecided. \|\| RSA 526:4 REACHES CRIMINAL CASES. Two primary confirmations: Mallard applied RSA ch. 526 to a criminal new-trial motion, and RSA 651-D:2, I permits a DNA petition 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4, at any time after conviction' — a carve-out only needed because 526:4 otherwise binds post-conviction petitioners. \|\| OTHER. Post-conviction DNA testing, RSA 651-D:2 (gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/651-D/651-D-mrg.htm), has no deadline. CAPITAL: no separate capital post-conviction track was located in the NH statutes; not independently verified, treat as unverified. Note courts.nh.gov 403s datacenter requests; the Mallard slip opinion was retrieved from CourtListener's storage mirror of the court's own PDF. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
New Jersey	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · N.J.S.A. 2A:67-14(b) (Habeas Corpus Act, L.1951 (1st SS), c.344); accompanied by N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d); applied in Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958)	5 years no excuse for a late filing Petition for post-conviction relief under N.J. Ct. R. 3:22 (court rule, not a statute — New Jersey has no post-conviction statute) · N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1) (official text, njcourts.gov, amendments through June 1, 2026)	Detail Habeas: The persons hereinafter specified shall not be entitled to prosecute writ of habeas corpus: … b. Any person committed or restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction Post-conviction remedy: Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) of this rule, no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged On excusing a late filing: no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry INSTRUMENT WARNING. New Jersey is the mirror image of the trap in the question. Its habeas act has NO filing deadline — the Habeas Corpus Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:67-1 to -36, contains no limitations period on the writ (the only 'Limitation' section, 2A:67-11, is a 2-year limit on damages actions for offenses against the chapter, not on filing). But that costs the state nothing, because the writ is statutorily unavailable to the very people who would use it: 2A:67-14(b) bars habeas to anyone 'restrained of his liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.' A no-deadline habeas that a convicted person may not file is not a route. Do not score New Jersey as 'habeas, unlimited.' THREE INDEPENDENT LOCKS, all read verbatim. (1) Statute: 2A:67-14(b), above. (2) Rule, exclusivity — R. 3:22-3, official njcourts.gov text, unchanged since Sept. 1, 2009: 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey, a petition pursuant to this rule is the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime.' (3) Rule, absorption — R. 3:22-2(d) makes cognizable on PCR 'Any ground heretofore available as a basis for collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common-law or statutory remedy.' Case application: Janiec v. McCorkle, 52 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1958) quotes 2A:67-14(b) and holds 'habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy in this State where a person confined as an habitual criminal seeks to attack an underlying conviction on the ground that the court in which such conviction took place had no jurisdiction to try or convict him.' State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992): 'Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.' State v. Staruch, 326 N.J. Super. 245, 249 (App. Div. 1999) quotes R. 3:22-3 and R. 3:22-2(d) verbatim. WHY NOT 'NARROW'. New Jersey does not leave the usual jurisdictional/void-judgment residue outside the rule. Jurisdictional attacks are themselves a PCR ground — R. 3:22-2(b), 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon defendant's conviction' — and so carry the same 5-year bar. Habeas does still lie in New Jersey for NON-conviction restraint: 2A:67-13(a)-(e) reaches persons held for a criminal matter, on civil process, under any pretense, pretrial for bail purposes, or confined in a psychiatric facility. Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J. Super. 512 (App. Div. 2000) is a live modern application of 2A:67-14 — in a civil matter, where the court noted the petitioner's reliance on R. 3:22 was misplaced because that rule governs criminal post-conviction relief. So the writ is alive; it just does not reach convictions. RESIDUAL CARVE-OUT, FLAGGED NOT ASSERTED. R. 3:22-3 opens 'Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of New Jersey.' The natural referent is the state suspension clause (N.J. Const. art. I, para. 14). I could NOT retrieve the constitutional text from any primary source reachable from this host (njleg.state.nj.us returns a bot wall), so I do not assert its wording, and I found no modern New Jersey decision using that clause to permit a free-standing habeas attack on a conviction. Treat it as a theoretical reservation, not a working route. PCR DEADLINE DETAIL. 5 years is a calendar-year period, not a day count; 1825 = 5 x 365 and is an approximation supplied only to fill the integer field. Two features make it less generous than 5 years sounds: (a) it runs from ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION under R. 3:21-5, not from finality of direct appeal, so the clock runs throughout the direct appeal; and (b) R. 3:22-3 forbids filing PCR while a direct appeal or trial-court motion is pending. R. 3:22-12(a)(3) softens this by treating a petition dismissed without prejudice for that reason as a first petition if refiled within 90 days of the direct-appeal judgment (or within the 5 years). Escapes from the bar are only R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) — excusable neglect for the delay PLUS a reasonable probability that enforcing the bar would work a fundamental injustice — and (a)(1)(B), 'it alleges a claim for relief as set forth in paragraph (a)(2)(A) or paragraph (a)(2)(B) of this rule and is filed within the one-year period set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this rule' (i.e., a new retroactive constitutional right, or a factual predicate not earlier discoverable through reasonable diligence). R. 3:22-12(b): 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein.' Second or subsequent petitions: 1 year from the latest of the three triggers in R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(A)-(C), plus the gatekeeping of R. 3:22-4(b). CORRECTION TO WIDELY-CIRCULATED STALE TEXT. Two post-2010 changes defeat most secondary summaries and every free full-text reproduction of R. 3:22 I could find (courtcaddy.com's copy stops at the Feb. 1, 2010 version). Per the rule's own official Note: 'paragraph (a)(1) amended, paragraph (b) deleted, and paragraph (c) redesignated paragraph (b) July 28, 2017 to be effective September 1, 2017.' So (i) subparagraphs (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) were added in 2017, codifying State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 399-400 (App. Div. 2013); and (ii) the old capital-causes provision — 30 days from denial of certiorari in death-penalty cases — was DELETED effective Sept. 1, 2017. There is now NO capital/non-capital difference in the New Jersey deadline; New Jersey repealed capital punishment in 2007. Separately, R. 3:22-2(e) (IAC for failure to file a requested direct appeal) was added effective Sept. 1, 2018. TWO GENUINELY UNLIMITED ROUTES that a comparison should not miss, both read in full from the official rule text. R. 3:21-10(b): 'A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time … (5) correcting a sentence not authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice' — illegal-sentence correction has no deadline, and R. 3:22-2(c) expressly routes such claims there when not paired with another PCR ground. R. 3:20-2: 'A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made at any time.' So a New Jersey petitioner outside the 5 years is not necessarily remediless; the relief just is not called habeas and is not PCR. SOURCING. Court rules were read from njcourts.gov's own content API (jsonapi/taxonomy_term/rules_of_court), which returns the canonical rule body that the public rules pages render only in JavaScript; the page banner states 'Includes amendments effective on or before June 1, 2026.' Human-readable equivalents: /attorneys/rules-of-court/322-3-exclusiveness-of-remedy-not-substitute-appeal-or-motion, /322-2-grounds, /322-12-limitations, /321-10-reduction-or-change-of-sentence, /320-2-time-making-motion. The 5-year period was additionally confirmed against the Supreme Court's own adopting order (njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2010/01/n100119c.pdf) and against Appellate Division opinions from 2024 (a0324-22) and 2026 (a0124-24), both of which block-quote the rule. Statutes were read on law.onecle.com, whose Title 2A text is a snapshot last modified October 11, 2016 and does reflect the 2013 amendment to 2A:67-13 (P.L.2013, c.103); 2A:67-14 shows no amendment since L.1951 (1st SS), c.344. I could not reach an official New Jersey statute database from this host (njleg.state.nj.us serves a bot wall; the LIS gateway is a session-based frameset), so a hypothetical amendment to 2A:67-14 after October 2016 would not be reflected here — though P.L.2023, c.250 amended a neighboring section (2A:67-8) without disturbing the chapter, indicating Chapter 67 remains live law. Case text from the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law); case identification via CourtListener's HTML search (its API and opinion pages return 403/202 to this host). Justia, FindLaw, casetext, courtrules.net and casemine were unreachable or barred and are not relied on anywhere above. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
New Mexico	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 (N.M. Sup. Ct.); accord Rule 5-802 NMRA (habeas corpus), which contains no filing deadline for conviction/sentence challenges	No limit NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6 'Post-conviction remedy' (a § 2255-style motion to vacate, preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA); separately, Rule 5-803 NMRA 'post-sentence relief' for petitioners who have completed their sentences · NMSA 1978 § 31-11-6(A)	Detail Habeas: Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners and since this is not a successive habeas petition, these cases are inapposite. Post-conviction remedy: A motion for such relief may be made at any time. On excusing a late filing: Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners NEW MEXICO IS A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE, AND HABEAS IS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE — the opposite of the PCRA pattern. New Mexico never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act; instead its § 2255-style post-conviction statute was preempted BY habeas. The NMSA annotations to § 31-11-6 state: 'Preemption by Rule 5-802 NMRA. — This section has been preempted by Rule 5-802 NMRA, which governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Peppers, 1990-NMCA-057' and 'Habeas corpus. — An inmate may not resort to this section when the relief sought can be obtained directly by writ of habeas corpus… Cummings v. State, 2007-NMSC-048' (same URL as pc_url). Note that even the preempted statute carried no deadline (§ 31-11-6(A), quoted above). SCOPE OF HABEAS: Rule 5-802(A) NMRA — 'This rule governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody or under restraint for a determination that such custody or restraint is, or will be, in violation of the constitution or laws of the State of New Mexico or of the United States; that the district court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or that the sentence was illegal or in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.' Not narrowed to jurisdictional/void claims — it reaches ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, illegal search, etc. Source read: https://twelfthdistrict.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2024/01/Rule-5-802-Habeas-Corpus.pdf. NO-DEADLINE CONFIRMED TWICE: the official committee commentary published with Rule 5-802 (2009 amendments) states 'Although there is no time limit for filing a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the date of filing can have an impact on the deadline for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,' and later 'Because there are no filing deadlines for filing state habeas petitions by unrepresented inmates in New Mexico…' (same Rule 5-802 PDF). NO LACHES EITHER: Sutphin ¶ 15 — 'We expressly join those jurisdictions that have declined to apply laches to habeas proceedings' (habeas_url). TWO NUMBERS IN RULE 5-802 THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE DEADLINES AND MUST NOT BE MISCODED AS SUCH: (1) Rule 5-802(C)(1)(b) gives a NMCD inmate one (1) year to petition challenging a prison DISCIPLINARY decision — a conditions-of-confinement claim, filed in a separate case in the county of confinement (Rule 5-802(E)(2)); it has nothing to do with attacking a conviction, and is waived if NMCD fails to give written notice of the limit. (2) Rule 5-802(L)(3) — in DEATH PENALTY cases, 'unless an extension of time is granted for good cause shown, within one-hundred eighty (180) days after appointment, the defendant shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' That 180-day capital provision is the only fixed habeas filing deadline in the rule; New Mexico's repeal of capital punishment and the current absence of death-sentenced prisoners was NOT verified from a primary source in this run, so treat the practical reach of (L)(3) as unverified. THE OUT-OF-CUSTODY TRACK: habeas requires custody or restraint, so someone who has finished the sentence uses Rule 5-803 NMRA instead (successor to coram nobis; superseded Rule 1-060(B) for post-sentence criminal matters). Rule 5-803(C) has a timeliness standard but no fixed period. Quoted verbatim in State v. Otero, 2020-NMCA-030 ¶ 8: a motion must be brought 'within a reasonable time after the completion of the petitioner's sentence[.]' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/February-25-2020-State-of-New-Mexico-v.-Miguel-Otero-No.-A-1-CA-37742.pdf), and in Pruit v. State, No. A-1-CA-38370 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2022) ¶ 7: filed 'within a reasonable time' unless the district court 'finds good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time' (https://coa.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/01/August-18-2022-Randal-K.-Pruit-v.-State-of-New-Mexico-No.-A-1-CA-38370.pdf). Pruit and McGarrh v. State (A-1-CA-39044, Apr. 26, 2022) reject the argument that a fundamental-error claim escapes the reasonable-time requirement. So: for a person still in custody, filing today, there is NO deadline whatsoever; for a person off paper, the bar is a discretionary reasonableness standard, not a clock. OTHER NUMBERS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, ALSO NOT HABEAS DEADLINES: Rule 5-801 NMRA gives 90 days to move to REDUCE a sentence (discretionary leniency, not a validity challenge); its committee commentary says 'Motions challenging the legal validity of a conviction or a sentence should be brought under Rule 5-802 or Rule 5-803 NMRA.' The 120/90/45-day figures in Rule 5-802(H) are court- and counsel-side processing deadlines running from the file-stamp date after a petition arrives, not filing deadlines for the petitioner. Statutory habeas also survives independently at NMSA 1978 §§ 44-1-1 to 44-1-38 (Ch. 44, art. 1); § 44-1-1 — 'Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty, except in the cases in the following section specified, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus… to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful' — with no limitations period, and the compilation's own annotation to § 44-1-1 reads 'New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitioners. State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045' (https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmsa/en/4388/1/document.do). Practical caveat for the comparison: the real limits on a stale New Mexico petition are the successive-petition discretion in Rule 5-802(I) and fundamental-error review for claims that could have been raised on direct appeal (Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021; Sutphin ¶ 10) — merits doctrines, not a filing clock. Sources fetched and read: static.case.law (Caselaw Access Project) for Sutphin; nmonesource.com (New Mexico Compilation Commission, official publisher) for NMSA chs. 31 and 44; nmcourts.gov domains for Rule 5-802 and the Court of Appeals opinions. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
New York	No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7002(a) (art. 70, Habeas Corpus); construed in People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257 (1966)	No limit no filing period CPL article 440 motion — CPL 440.10 (motion to vacate judgment); CPL 440.20 (motion to set aside sentence) · N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(1)	Detail Habeas: A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state … may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance. Post-conviction remedy: At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that: On excusing a late filing: At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE, AND NEITHER DOES THE POST-CONVICTION MOTION. New York is a two-track no-deadline state; nothing here resembles a one-year PCRA-style bar. (1) Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed. CPLR art. 70 remains in force and contains exactly twelve sections, 7001-7012 (Application of article; Petition; When the writ shall be issued; Content of writ; Service; Obedience; Warrant; Return; Hearing; Determination; Appeal; Redetention) — verified against the current 2026 section list. None is a limitations provision, and no temporal condition appears in 7002(a). Keitt expressly held the CPLR did not narrow the writ: the Legislature 'did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available under the now repealed Civil Practice Act.' (2) Habeas is 'narrow' rather than 'available' for CONVICTION challenges because of judge-made limits, not a clock. Keitt: habeas tests 'a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right,' but 'Departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated … by reason of practicality and necessity,' and 'the writ may not be utilized as a substitute for appeal or to again review the errors already passed on in an earlier appeal.' The decisive practical limit is the immediate-release rule: People ex rel. Douglas v. Vincent, 50 N.Y.2d 901 (1980) — no habeas relief 'because the only remedy he seeks would provide him a new trial or new appeal, and not a direction that he be immediately released from custody'; reaffirmed verbatim in People ex rel. Kaplan v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 N.Y.2d 648 (1983). Since almost every conviction challenge seeks retrial rather than release, habeas is not the working vehicle even though it is open indefinitely. (3) CPL 440.10 carries procedural bars, not a time bar. Subd. 2 (mandatory denial: claim already decided on appeal; record-based claim reviewable on a pending appeal; unjustifiable failure to appeal) and subd. 3 (discretionary denial) channel record-based claims to direct appeal. The only timing rules inside the statute are diligence standards, not fixed periods: (1)(g) newly discovered evidence 'must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence,' and (1)(i) trafficking-victim vacatur 'shall be made with due diligence.' CPL 440.20(1) likewise runs 'At any time after the entry of a judgment,' and adds death-sentence-specific grounds — with no deadline attached. (4) Not established here from primary sources: New York's judge-made writ of error coram nobis, the vehicle for ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel (a gap CPL art. 440 does not reach, as the Douglas dissent discusses at length). It is generally understood to carry no time limit, but I did not read the controlling case, so treat that as unverified. (5) Sourcing: quoted text was cross-checked against the current statute as published by the NY Senate (CPL 440.10 updated Feb. 11, 2022; CPLR 7002 updated Aug. 13, 2021) via newyork.public.law, since nysenate.gov returns 403 to this client; the quoted sentences are identical in both. The current CPL 440.10 includes post-2019 amendments (2021 trafficking/misdemeanor paragraphs, ineffective-assistance carve-outs in subd. 2) that the onecle snapshot lacks, but the operative opening phrase 'At any time after the entry of a judgment' is unchanged. Case texts are Harvard CAP scans via static.case.law; CourtListener was rate-limited (HTTP 429) throughout, so no post-1983 confirming decision was read. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
North Carolina	No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17-4(2) (habeas denied where detention rests on a final judgment of a competent tribunal); scope confirmed by In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962), quoted in In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976)	7.0 years no excuse for a late filing Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR), N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 15A, art. 89 (§§ 15A-1411 to 15A-1422) · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a1) (noncapital, seven years), added by S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a); § 15A-1415(a) (capital, 120 days)	Detail Habeas: Application to prosecute the writ shall be denied in the following cases: … (2) Where persons are committed or detained by virtue of the final order, judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction Post-conviction remedy: In a noncapital case, a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) On excusing a late filing: a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. All 46 sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 17 were read (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByChapter/Chapter_17.html); no section imposes any time limit on applying for the writ. § 17-3 lets 'Every person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty within this State, for any criminal or supposed criminal matter… prosecute a writ of habeas corpus,' with no temporal condition. The only time-flavored provision is § 17-4(3), which bars habeas 'in vacation time' for one who 'willfully neglected, for the space of two whole sessions after his imprisonment' to apply — that removes the vacation-time writ only, not the writ itself. NOT SUBSUMED. This is the key structural point for the comparison: § 15A-1411(c) states verbatim that 'The relief formerly available by motion in arrest of judgment, motion to set aside the verdict, motion for new trial, post-conviction proceedings, coram nobis and all other post-trial motions is available by motion for appropriate relief. The availability of relief by motion for appropriate relief is not a bar to relief by writ of habeas corpus.' So unlike PA's PCRA, AL Rule 32, or DE Rule 61, the NC MAR is expressly NOT the exclusive remedy; the writ survives beside it. WHY 'NARROW,' NOT 'AVAILABLE.' § 17-4(2) denies the writ to anyone held under a final judgment of a competent tribunal, which is nearly every convicted person. In re Imprisonment of Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471, 474 (1976), quoting In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 540 (1962): 'The only questions open to inquiry are whether on the record the court which imposed the sentence had jurisdiction of the matter or had exceeded its powers.' Stevens adds that the writ 'is not appropriately… a substitute for appeal,' and that § 17-33(2) extends jurisdiction to cases where 'though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission or event, which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be discharged' (read at https://static.case.law/nc-app/28/html/0471-01.html; § 17-33 at https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_17/GS_17-33.html). Dantzic v. State, 279 N.C. 212, 218 (1971) recites the same § 17-4(2) bar. Net: habeas lies with no deadline, but only for a void/jurisdictionally defective judgment or a post-judgment entitlement to release — not for trial error, IAC, or Brady. RECENT AND MATERIAL CHANGE — READ THIS BEFORE COMPARING NC TO OTHER STATES. Until 1 Dec 2025 the NC noncapital MAR had NO deadline at all: the repealed text of § 15A-1415(a) read 'At any time after verdict, a noncapital defendant by motion may seek appropriate relief upon any of the grounds enumerated in this section.' S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a) struck that and added the seven-year § 15A-1415(a1). Its effective-date clause, s. 15(c), reads verbatim: 'This section becomes effective December 1, 2025, and applies to verdicts entered on or after that date' (https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/HTML/2025-2026/SL2025-70.html). BOTH REGIMES ARE THEREFORE LIVE TODAY (30 Jul 2026): a noncapital verdict entered before 1 Dec 2025 — i.e. essentially the entire current prison population — still has NO MAR deadline; only verdicts from 1 Dec 2025 forward carry the seven-year clock. A one-number answer for NC will be wrong for most petitioners. The 2557 figure is 7 x 365.25 rounded; the statute speaks in years, not days, and runs from the latest of the five events in § 15A-1415(a)(1)-(5), not from conviction. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: § 15A-1415(a) gives capital defendants 120 days from the latest of those events (or from appointment of postconviction counsel, (a)(6)); S.L. 2025-93, s. 6(a) also now requires the hearing within 24 months absent written findings of extraordinary circumstances. EXCEPTIONS TO THE MAR CLOCK: § 15A-1415(c) permits filing 'at any time after verdict' for newly discovered evidence bearing on guilt/innocence or death-penalty eligibility (itself subject to a 'reasonable time of its discovery' rule), a retroactive significant change in law, a fully served sentence, and — noncapital only — good cause plus actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice under § 15A-1419(c). § 15A-1415(c1) allows filing at any time with the district attorney's consent, and § 15A-1415(d) allows extensions for good cause. § 15A-1415(b) separately limits which grounds may be raised more than 10 days after entry of judgment. S.L. 2025-70 also repealed grounds (b)(7) and (b)(9) effective 1 Dec 2025. OPERATIVE: the MAR. A person challenging a conviction today files an MAR; habeas will be denied under § 17-4(2) unless the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. But the untimed habeas remedy is a genuine residual backstop, and it matters more after the 2025 amendment: for a post-1 Dec 2025 verdict, a jurisdictional claim under § 15A-1415(b)(2) becomes time-barred by MAR at seven years, while the same defect remains reachable by habeas with no deadline. UNVERIFIED: I did not locate a post-amendment NC appellate decision construing § 15A-1415(a1) or its interaction with habeas — none should be expected yet given the 1 Dec 2025 effective date. State v. Daw (N.C. 2024) surfaced as a recent habeas-adjacent NC Supreme Court decision but CourtListener returned HTTP 202/401 on the opinion body and it is outside case.law's coverage, so it is not relied on here. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
North Dakota	No limit habeas survives narrowly · N.D. Cent. Code § 32-22-02 (Habeas Corpus — Who not entitled to relief); ch. 32-22 entire	2 years no excuse for a late filing Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D. Cent. Code ch. 29-32.1 · N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-01(2)	Detail Habeas: [N]ot entitled to relief from imprisonment or restraint under a writ of habeas corpus … whenever it appears: … Except as provided in section 32-22-17, that the person is detained in custody by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction Post-conviction remedy: Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. On excusing a late filing: an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read all 43 sections of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-22 and there is no limitations period of any kind — no year/month/day filing bar anywhere in the chapter. North Dakota's short clock lives entirely in the post-conviction act, not in habeas. But habeas is NARROW as a conviction challenge, not a free alternative route: § 32-22-02(2) denies relief to anyone held 'by virtue of the final order or judgment of any competent court of criminal jurisdiction' except on § 32-22-17 grounds, which are jurisdictional/void-process only ('When the jurisdiction of such court or officer has been exceeded'; 'When the process is defective in some matter of substance required by law rendering such process void'; 'When the process is not authorized by any order or judgment of any court nor by any provisions of law') and are themselves 'subject to the restrictions of section 32-22-02.' EXCLUSIVITY: § 29-32.1-01(4) — 'a proceeding under this chapter replaces all other common law, statutory, or other remedies available before July 1, 1985, for collaterally challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence. It is to be used exclusively in place of them.' HABEAS NOT ABOLISHED: § 29-32.1-02 — 'A court in which original jurisdiction in habeas corpus is vested may entertain a habeas corpus proceeding under chapter 32-22 or this chapter. This chapter, to the extent appropriate, governs the proceeding.' Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1985) (read in full at https://static.case.law/nw2d/373/cases/0894-01.json) holds the UPPA cannot abolish habeas: cases finding the Act exclusive 'do not hold that the Uniform Act creates a new remedy and that habeas corpus is abolished. Such a construction of the statute would be blatantly violative of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution,' and 'The right of the people to seek an original writ of habeas corpus in this Court remains … a cumulative remedy available to those incarcerated in this State.' Jensen construed the predecessor 1969 act (ch. 29-32) but rests on ND Const. art. I, § 14 and art. VI, § 2; still cited, e.g. Jensen v. Little, 459 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1990). UNVERIFIED POINT: because § 29-32.1-02 makes the UPPA govern a habeas proceeding 'to the extent appropriate,' the two-year bar may reach a habeas petition used as a conviction challenge. I found no North Dakota decision applying the two-year bar to a habeas petition, and no modern (post-2013) ND case entertaining habeas as a conviction challenge — so whether the deadline travels into habeas is open. Do not report ND as an unlimited-time habeas state without this caveat. THE 2-YEAR CLOCK IS RECENT: Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶ 12 (read at https://static.case.law/nw2d/882/cases/0724-01.json) — 'Section 29-32,1-01, N.D.C.C., was amended in 2013 to include the two-year statute of limitations and to make the state post-conviction relief process similar to federal habeas corpus.' Before 2013 the UPPA had no filing deadline either. FINALITY (§ 29-32.1-01(2)): runs from expiration of time to appeal to the ND Supreme Court; if appealed, from expiration of time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court; if certiorari sought, from that Court's final order. EXCEPTIONS (§ 29-32.1-01(3)): newly discovered evidence including DNA that would establish the petitioner did not engage in the conduct; a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely filing; or a new retroactively applicable interpretation of federal or state constitutional/statutory law by the U.S. Supreme Court or a ND appellate court — each carrying its own two-year clock from discovery, cessation of the disability, or the retroactive law's effective date. Venue is the court of conviction (§ 29-32.1-03(1)). NO CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: North Dakota has no death penalty; the maximum is 'Class AA felony, for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed' (§ 12.1-32-01(1), https://ndlegis.gov/cencode/t12-1c32.pdf), so no separate capital track exists. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Ohio	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-1093, ¶ 8-9 (Ohio Sup. Ct.); R.C. 2725.05; R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01-2725.28, no limitations period); Ohio Const. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c)	1 year Petition for postconviction relief, R.C. 2953.21 · Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a) (current version eff. Apr. 12, 2021, H.B. 136)	Detail Habeas: there is a limited exception to the adequate-remedy requirement: 'when a court's judgment is void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.' Post-conviction remedy: a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal On excusing a late filing: a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key finding. Ohio never abolished or subsumed habeas: Ohio Const. art. I, § 8 forbids suspending the writ and art. IV, § 3(B)(1)(c) vests courts of appeals with ORIGINAL jurisdiction in habeas corpus, so the statutory exclusivity clause below cannot displace it. I read every section heading of R.C. Chapter 2725 (2725.01 through 2725.28) on the official Ohio Laws chapter page (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/chapter-2725) and read R.C. 2725.04 in full, which exhaustively prescribes what a habeas petition must specify — nothing in the chapter imposes any filing period. The only time limits anywhere in the chapter are collateral: six hours to hand over a copy of the commitment warrant on demand (2725.22) and a two-year limit on CIVIL actions to recover forfeitures from officials who disobey the writ (2725.27). Neither is a habeas filing deadline. Leyman itself confirms the practice: 1999 conviction, habeas petition filed 2014, decided on the merits in 2016 with no timeliness bar raised or applied. BUT THE WRIT IS NARROW. R.C. 2725.05 (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2725.05): 'If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court… and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed.' Leyman ¶ 8 adds that the writ is 'generally available only when the petitioner's maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully' (quoting Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213), that the petitioner must be entitled to immediate release, and that 'habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law' — with the void-for-lack-of-jurisdiction exception quoted above. So habeas reaches jurisdictional/facially-void judgments and expired-sentence detention, not ordinary constitutional trial error. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE. R.C. 2953.21(K): 'Subject to the appeal of a sentence for a felony that is authorized by section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, the remedy set forth in this section is the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case…' This is why the 365-day postconviction petition, not habeas, is the operative route for an ordinary claim (ineffective assistance, Brady, etc.) — but it does not and constitutionally cannot extinguish the narrow habeas remedy the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Leyman in 2016. CLOCK MECHANICS. The 365 days runs from the date the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal — not from conviction or from finality — and if no appeal is taken, from expiration of the time to appeal. The figure was 180 days until H.B. 663 (eff. Mar. 23, 2015) raised it to 365; a comparison drawn from older sources will show 180. EXCEPTIONS. R.C. 2953.23(A) (https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-2953.23) permits an untimely or successive petition only if the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts, or a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right applies, AND shows by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty; or on qualifying DNA results establishing actual innocence. CAPITAL DIFFERENCES. Same 365 days, but measured from transcript filing in the Ohio Supreme Court rather than the court of appeals; capital petitioners get appointed Rule 20-certified counsel, postconviction discovery, no page limits, and 180 days to amend as of right. The separate serious-mental-illness petition under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv) had its own 365-day window running from the amendment's effective date (Apr. 12, 2021), which has since closed. UNVERIFIED: I did not read the Ohio Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court or the Rules of Appellate Procedure, so I cannot rule out a court-rule timing provision for original actions by primary source; the no-deadline finding rests on the absence of any period in Chapter 2725 plus the Ohio Supreme Court reaching the merits of a 15-year-late petition in Leyman. CourtListener returned HTTP 429 throughout, so no case-law corroboration beyond the Leyman slip opinion was obtainable. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Oklahoma	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080 (as amended by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2022)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Application for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1089 · Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080.1(A) (added by Laws 2022, c. 144, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2022)	Detail Habeas: Excluding a timely appeal, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods of challenging a conviction or sentence including, but not limited to, writs of habeas corpus. Post-conviction remedy: A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: On excusing a late filing: this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction OKLAHOMA FLIPPED IN 2022. Before Nov. 1, 2022 the non-capital Post-Conviction Procedure Act had NO filing deadline, and § 1080 said only that the Act 'encompasses and replaces all common law and statutory methods' of attack. Laws 2022, c. 144 did two things: (1) amended § 1080 to name 'writs of habeas corpus' expressly among the replaced remedies, and (2) added § 1080.1, a one-year limitation. So a person filing a state habeas petition to challenge an Oklahoma conviction today is filing a PCPA application, and it is time-barred after one year. NO UNTIMED HABEAS ROUTE SURVIVES for conviction challenges. Trigger is the latest of five dates (§ 1080.1(A)(1)-(5)): finality of direct review in the OCCA or expiration of time to seek it; gubernatorial revocation of parole/conditional release; removal of a state-created impediment; recognition of a new retroactive U.S. Supreme Court right; or the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence. § 1080.1(B) closes the jurisdictional escape hatch verbatim: 'this limitation period shall apply irrespective of the nature of the claims raised in the application and shall include jurisdictional claims that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.' § 1080.1(C) applies it to applications filed on or after Nov. 1, 2022. Companion amendment, 22 O.S. § 1086, now requires that 'All grounds for relief available to an applicant under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, including claims challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court, must be raised in his or her original, supplemental or amended application.' THE HABEAS CHAPTER ITSELF (12 O.S. §§ 1331-1355, R.L. 1910) contains no filing deadline of any kind — I read all 25 sections in the current official Title 12 (https://www.oklegislature.gov/OK_Statutes/CompleteTitles/os12.pdf) and there is no limitation period. But it never reached a final conviction anyway: 12 O.S. § 1342 provides 'No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process, whereby the party is in custody… Second. Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.' Habeas therefore survives in Oklahoma only for custody NOT resting on a final conviction — e.g. 22 O.S. § 1079 (review of denial of bail on appeal 'by habeas corpus proceedings before the appellate court'), pretrial detention, extradition, and custody disputes under 12 O.S. § 1354. CAPITAL CASES ARE DIFFERENT AND SHORTER: 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(1) requires the capital application be 'filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety (90) days from the date the appellee's brief on direct appeal is filed or, if a reply brief is filed, ninety (90) days from the filing of that reply brief' — 90 days, filed in the OCCA rather than the district court, and § 1089(C) limits capital claims to those that could not have been raised on direct appeal. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION LEFT OPEN — UNVERIFIED: Okla. Const. art. II, § 10 reads 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this State' (verified verbatim from https://www.oklegislature.gov/OKStatutes/CompleteTitles/AllOKConstitutionArticles.rtf). Whether § 1080.1 suspends the writ as to jurisdictional claims is a live question I could not resolve from a primary source. CORROBORATION, NOT AUTHORITY: CourtListener's search API confirms the OCCA is applying § 1080.1 — Hammon v. State, 2023 OK CR 19, 540 P.3d 486 (matched snippet: 'remained the case until November 1, 2022, when Section 1080.1 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes became effective') and Acosta v. State, 2026 OK CR 9 (Feb. 24, 2026) (matched snippet: 'Section 1080.1(A)(1) states: A. A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application'). I could NOT retrieve either full opinion — oscn.net returns HTTP 201 to automated requests and CourtListener's opinion pages return HTTP 202 — so I have not read those opinions and do not rest any figure on them. Every number above comes from statutory text I read in full. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Oregon	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · ORS 34.330 (Who may not prosecute writ), read with ORS 138.540(1) and Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 364-66 (1992)	2 years no excuse for a late filing Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition, ORS 138.510-138.680 · ORS 138.510(3)	Detail Habeas: A person may not prosecute a writ of habeas corpus if: … (3) Except as provided in ORS 138.530, the person is eligible to obtain post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680. Post-conviction remedy: A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition: On excusing a late filing: A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — but it is not a route to a conviction challenge in Oregon, so the no-deadline fact does not create an unlimited attack on a judgment. I read all of ORS ch. 34 (2025 text, includes 2025 c.476): the habeas sections, ORS 34.310-34.730, contain no limitation period of any kind. The only 60-day limit in chapter 34 is ORS 34.030, which governs the WRIT OF REVIEW (ORS 34.010-34.100), a different writ; the 21-day limit is mandamus (ORS 34.130); the 7-day limit in ORS 34.370 is the court's deadline to rule on a show-cause order, not a petitioner's filing deadline. Habeas is expressly NOT abolished: ORS 138.540(1) ends, 'With the exception of habeas corpus, all common law post-conviction remedies, including the motion to correct the record, coram nobis, the motion for relief in the nature of coram nobis and the motion to vacate the judgment, are abolished in criminal cases.' WHY 'SUBSUMED' RATHER THAN 'NARROW': three primary sources close the conviction-challenge route. (1) ORS 138.540(1): a PCR petition 'shall be the exclusive means, after judgment rendered upon a conviction for a crime, for challenging the lawfulness of such judgment or the proceedings upon which it is based.' (2) ORS 34.330(2)-(3) bars the writ to a person restrained 'by virtue of the judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction' and to any person 'eligible to obtain post-conviction relief.' (3) Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353 (1992) (read in full via static.case.law/or/314/cases/0353-01.json): 'If the procedures provided by that act are a reasonable substitute for the writ of habeas corpus, they are constitutional… Persons desiring that same opportunity, but asserting substantive grounds established in the PCHA, must utilize the procedures set out in that act.' Bartz upheld the PCR limitation period against Or Const Art I, sec 23 ('The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion, or invasion the public safety require it'). NO JURISDICTIONAL CARVE-OUT SURVIVES OUTSIDE PCR: ORS 138.530(1)(b) makes 'Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the judgment rendered upon petitioner's conviction' a PCR ground, so even facially-void/jurisdictional attacks are PCR claims. Mueller v. Benning, 314 Or 615, 620 n 2 (1992) (read in full): 'In the statutory scheme, if post-conviction relief is available, habeas corpus generally is not. ORS 34.330(3); ORS 138.540(1).' Twitty v. Maass, 95 Or App 715 (1989) (read in full) affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction because PCR was available, and held a petitioner must first litigate that PCR is unavailable before claiming habeas. TWO NARROW RESIDUAL CHANNELS, both deadline-free but not general routes: ORS 138.530(3) provides the PCR act 'shall not be construed to limit the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in habeas corpus as provided in the Constitution of this state' — Or Const Art VII (Amended), sec 2: 'the supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in… habeas corpus proceedings' (discretionary, rarely exercised); and ORS 138.530(2) preserves relief 'available prior to May 26, 1959, under the writ of habeas corpus,' but as a rule of construction applied INSIDE a PCR proceeding, not as a separate action. WHERE HABEAS IS STILL FULLY LIVE (no deadline): ORS 138.540(2) — a person restrained under a conviction who 'asserts the illegality of the restraint upon grounds other than the unlawfulness of such judgment' must proceed 'by habeas corpus or other remedies,' expressly including 'unlawful revocation of parole or conditional pardon or completed service of the sentence imposed'; and conditions of confinement under ORS 34.362, which requires facts showing deprivation of a constitutional right 'that requires immediate judicial attention and for which no other timely remedy is practicably available' (Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or 21 (1978); Barrett v. Belleque, 344 Or 91 (2008), both read). PCR DEADLINE MECHANICS: 730 days runs from, per ORS 138.510(3)(a)-(c), entry of judgment in the register if no appeal; the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts; or, if certiorari is sought, the later of denial of certiorari or entry of final state judgment after remand. ESCAPE CLAUSE: the two years does not bar grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition' (ORS 138.510(3)) — a genuine safety valve, not a formality. Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or App 295 (1998) (read in full) upheld the separate retroactive one-year period in ORS 138.510(4) (pre-Aug 5, 1989 convictions; expired Nov 4, 1994) even though it carries NO escape clause, rejecting the argument that a short PCR bar suspends habeas. CAPITAL DIFFERENCE: no different deadline, but ORS 138.510(2) permits a next-friend petition on behalf of a person convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death on a preponderance showing of mental incapacity or lack of court access plus a significant relationship. EXPIRED SPECIAL WINDOW: Or Laws 2023, ch 368, sec 1 (printed as a note to ORS 138.510) reopened filing 'at any time before December 30, 2024' for nonunanimous-jury-verdict claims notwithstanding ORS 138.510(3) and (4); that window has closed. Text verified against the Oregon Legislature's official ORS pages current through the 2025 session (ORS ch. 138 carries 2025 c.268 amendments; ORS ch. 34 carries 2025 c.476). View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Pennsylvania	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (Ch. 65, §§ 6501–6505, read in full, contains no limitations period); Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546 · 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); accord Pa.R.Crim.P. 901(A)	Detail Habeas: Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law. Post-conviction remedy: Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: On excusing a late filing: Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: PENNSYLVANIA'S HABEAS STATUTE CARRIES NO FILING DEADLINE — 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 65 (§§ 6501 Writ not to be suspended, 6502 Power to issue writ, 6503 Right to apply for writ, 6504 Return on writ, 6505 Interference with writ prohibited) was read in full and contains no limitations period of any kind. That fact is, however, almost entirely inoperative for a conviction challenge, and a comparison that stops there would mislead. TWO STATUTES CLOSE THE DOOR. (1) § 6503(b), quoted above, withdraws habeas wherever 'a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.' (2) 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (fetched: https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.042.000..HTM): 'The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.' CASE LAW READ (Caselaw Access Project full text): Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016) (https://static.case.law/a3d/136/cases/0493-01.json) — 'this Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review,' quoting Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013): 'The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.' Descardes holds the bar applies even where the petitioner is INELIGIBLE for PCRA relief (sentence completed) and even where the legal basis for the claim did not exist until after the one-year window closed — cognizability, not eligibility, is the test, so there is no fallback writ. THE RESIDUAL HABEAS IS REAL BUT NARROW AND IS NOT A CONVICTION CHALLENGE. Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034 (Pa. 2007) (https://static.case.law/a2d/938/cases/1034-01.json): 'Despite our prior indications that all claims that can be channeled into the PCRA should be so channeled, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended in this Commonwealth… we have never held that the remedy of habeas corpus does not exist for the rare instance where the PCRA offers no remedy.' West allowed habeas for a substantive-due-process challenge to a nine-year delay in EXECUTING a valid sentence; Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007), discussed at length in West, allowed it for an international-law challenge to carrying out a death sentence. Both attack the continuing validity of custody, not the conviction. Claims that DO attack a conviction — including want of jurisdiction, § 9543(a)(2)(viii), and illegal sentence, § 9543(a)(2)(vii) — are expressly enumerated PCRA grounds and must go through the PCRA. So Pennsylvania is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state for this comparison; it is the opposite of one. THE ONE-YEAR PCRA BAR IS JURISDICTIONAL, not a statute of limitations: Descardes holds that where the petition is untimely or the petitioner ineligible, 'both the PCRA court and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.' § 9545(a) adds that 'No court shall have authority to entertain a request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a petition under this subchapter.' EXCEPTIONS to the year, § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii): governmental interference; facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence; a newly recognized constitutional right held by the U.S. or Pennsylvania Supreme Court to apply retroactively. A petition invoking an exception must itself be filed 'within one year of the date the claim could have been presented,' § 9545(b)(2) — this was 60 days until Act 146 of Oct. 24, 2018; the statutory note states the amendment 'shall apply only to claims arising one year before the effective date of section 3 or thereafter.' 'Judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review… or at the expiration of time for seeking the review,' § 9545(b)(3). CAPITAL CASES GET NO LONGER PERIOD: § 9542 provides 'Except as specifically provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to capital and noncapital cases'; the capital-specific provisions in § 9545(c) concern stays of execution, not the filing deadline. STANDING: § 9543(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.000..HTM) requires the petitioner to be 'currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole,' awaiting execution, serving a sentence that must expire first, or — subparagraph (iv), added after Descardes — to have 'completed a sentence… and is seeking relief based upon DNA evidence obtained under section 9543.1(d).' ONE GENUINELY UNTIMED ROUTE EXISTS: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(1) (https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/42/00.095.043.001..HTM) — a convicted person 'may apply by making a written motion to the sentencing court at any time for the performance of forensic DNA testing'; § 9543.1(a)(4) repeats that 'DNA testing may be sought at any time.' That is a testing motion inside the PCRA scheme, not habeas. BOTTOM LINE FOR THE LEGISLATOR: a Pennsylvanian challenging a conviction today has one year from finality under the PCRA, enforced as a jurisdictional bar, with three narrow exceptions each carrying their own one-year clock; state habeas corpus, though never repealed and never subject to any deadline, is unavailable to him because his claim is cognizable under the PCRA. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Rhode Island	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9-1 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 1), as construed in DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 600 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v. Grieco, 430 A.2d 412, 413 n.1 (R.I. 1981))	No limit dismissal for delay is discretionary Post Conviction Remedy, R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 10-9.1 · R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 (P.L. 1974, ch. 220, § 3)	Detail Habeas: Every person imprisoned in any correctional institution or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus Post-conviction remedy: A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the appropriate court. An application may be filed at any time. On excusing a late filing: laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense' Rhode Island is the inverse of the PCRA-type states: the purpose-built post-conviction act is the one with NO deadline, and habeas is the remedy that was taken away. Both moves came from one session law, P.L. 1974, ch. 220 — § 1 rewrote the habeas statute to carve out convicted prisoners, § 3 created ch. 10-9.1. HABEAS: § 10-9-1 by its own terms excludes 'persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding.' DiLibero holds a habeas petition was therefore 'an inappropriate avenue for relief from imprisonment' for a petitioner 'imprisoned as a result of a final judgment of conviction.' § 10-9.1-1(b) reinforces this: the post-conviction remedy 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.' CAUTION ON habeas_no_deadline=true: ch. 10-9 (read in full via its section index, §§ 10-9-1 to 10-9-32) contains no limitations provision of any kind, so the field is literally true — but it is true because no deadline was ever needed, not because a convicted person has an open-ended habeas route. Habeas in RI survives intact and untimed for people NOT held under a final criminal judgment (pretrial detention, extradition, other restraint); it is simply not a conviction-challenge vehicle. Do not tabulate RI as 'habeas available, no deadline.' Also, § 10-9-22 makes denial of a habeas petition non-appealable (confirmed in DiLibero). POST-CONVICTION: 'at any time' is real statutory text but is judicially narrowed. Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005): 'we construe the statutory term as meaning at any reasonable time,' holding laches 'may, in appropriate circumstances, be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense.' The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance both unreasonable delay and prejudice — so the practical bar is fact-specific and party-raised, not a fixed clock. There is thus no number to report for RI; a legislator comparing RI to Pennsylvania's one-year PCRA should be told RI has no limitations period at all on either instrument. DNA-testing petitions under § 10-9.1-12 likewise carry no deadline. Ch. 10-9.1 contains no capital-case variation. NOT VERIFIED: I read § 10-9.1-8's title ('Waiver of or failure to assert claims') from the chapter index but not its text, so I make no claim about how RI bars successive applications; and I did not test whether any residual state-constitutional habeas survives the § 10-9-1 carve-out, though DiLibero and Grieco give no hint of one. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
South Carolina	No limit habeas survives narrowly · Moore v. Stirling, Op. No. 28088 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2022) (orig. juris. habeas; quoting Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008)); S.C. Const. art. I, § 18 & art. V, § 5; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200	1 year no excuse for a late filing Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act — application for post-conviction relief (PCR), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 · S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A)	Detail Habeas: Notwithstanding the exhaustion of appellate review, including all direct appeals and PCR, habeas corpus relief remains available to prisoners in South Carolina. Post-conviction remedy: An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal… On excusing a late filing: An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal… HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the key comparison point. No limitations period appears anywhere in the habeas chapter (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200, read in full; every time limit there governs how fast officials must act AFTER the writ issues, not when a prisoner may file), and none in Rule 245, SCACR (original jurisdiction, last amended Apr. 30, 2024) or Rule 240, SCACR (extraordinary-writ petitions). The one-year period is textually confined to PCR: § 17-27-45(A) limits 'An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter,' i.e. Chapter 27 only. Demonstrated in practice: Moore was convicted and sentenced to death in 2001, exhausted PCR, filed federal habeas in 2015, and filed this state habeas petition in 2020 (App. Case No. 2020-001519); the Court ordered briefing, heard argument, and denied on the merits — no timeliness bar raised or applied. Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 495 S.E.2d 426 (1998), reached 1976 convictions attacked by habeas in 1995 on the same footing. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': South Carolina splits the writ in two. (1) The STATUTORY writ is superseded. Gibson: 'The availability of habeas corpus has been severely limited by the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act… Thus, this Act supersedes and encompasses the habeas corpus procedure provided by statute.' Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 495 S.E.2d 429 (1998) (decided the same day) holds 'a matter which is cognizable under the Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the circuit or other lower courts.' (2) The CONSTITUTIONAL writ expressly survives § 17-27-20(B)'s exclusivity clause. Gibson: 'habeas corpus continues to be available as a constitutional remedy provided a petitioner qualifies for this extraordinary relief and clears the procedural hurdles.' Simpson n.4: 'Under art. 5, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution, this Court retains the ability to entertain writs of habeas corpus in our original jurisdiction.' Simpson expressly denied that this curtailment suspends the writ under art. I, § 18: 'our action today does not suspend the writ, but merely curtails its use to those situations where the Act would not be applicable.' GATES ON THE SURVIVING WRIT (all from Moore, quoting Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990)): the petitioner must plead exhaustion of all other remedies, and must prove '(1) the existence of a constitutional violation; and (2) the denial of fundamental fairness which, in the setting, is shocking to the universal sense of justice.' 'Habeas relief is seldom used and acts as an ultimate ensurer of fundamental constitutional rights,' and 'a defendant bears a much higher burden of proof in a habeas proceeding.' Hamm v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 744 S.E.2d 503 (2013), and In re Chapman, 419 S.C. 172, 796 S.E.2d 843 (2017), restate the rule as current: 'habeas relief is only available when other remedies, such as PCR, are inadequate or unavailable.' So the no-deadline writ is not an escape hatch from the one-year PCR bar — Hamm holds that blowing the § 17-27-45 deadline is itself a failure to exhaust that BARS habeas ('Because Hamm failed to exhaust all other remedies, he is barred from habeas corpus relief'). A legislator comparing states should note that South Carolina's practical deadline for challenging a conviction is one year, and the timeless writ behind it is reserved for the gravest constitutional violations. OTHER PCR TIMING: § 17-27-45(B) gives one year from recognition of a new retroactive constitutional right; § 17-27-45(C) gives one year from actual discovery of new material facts, or when they could have been found by reasonable diligence. § 17-27-90 separately bars successive applications absent 'sufficient reason' for the omission. CAPITAL: no different deadline — the same one-year § 17-27-45(A) applies; § 17-27-160 (S.C. Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) adds only expedited procedures (30-day return, status conference within 30 days, merits hearing within 180 days) plus two appointed counsel and full civil discovery (§ 17-27-150(B)). ARCHAIC PROVISION, NOT A DEADLINE: § 17-17-20, descended from the 1679 English act, forfeits habeas 'to be granted in vacation time' for one who 'wilfully neglected by the space of two whole terms after his imprisonment to pray a habeas corpus.' It restricts only vacation-time writs under Chapter 17, does not bar a term-time or original-jurisdiction petition, and no modern SC decision found here applies it; it should not be reported as a filing deadline. NOT VERIFIED: whether any unpublished or post-2022 SC decision has narrowed this further — a CourtListener sweep of published SC opinions filed after Jan. 1, 2018 returned nothing altering the rule, and Moore (2022) is the most recent controlling statement located. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
South Dakota	2 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · SDCL 21-27-3.3 (Two-year statute of limitation), enacted SL 2012, ch 118, § 3; read with SDCL 21-27-1 and Asmussen v. Young, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶¶ 4, 6	— None · SDCL ch. 23A-34 (Post-Conviction Proceedings) — repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15; South Dakota has had no separate post-conviction act since	Detail Habeas: A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. This limitation period shall run from the latest of: (1) The date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review… Post-conviction remedy: CHAPTER 23A-34 POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS [REPEALED] [Repealed by SL 1983, ch 169, § 15] On excusing a late filing: A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. South Dakota is the inverse of the PCRA-style states: it kept habeas corpus as the collateral remedy and put the one-year-style deadline ON the habeas writ itself. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act (SDCL ch. 23A-34) was repealed in 1983 by the same act that recodified habeas (SL 1983, ch 169), so ch. 21-27 habeas is the sole general vehicle. Do NOT report SD as 'no habeas deadline' — since 2012 there is a two-year limit, and the statute is patterned on AEDPA with nearly verbatim trigger language, but it gives two years where the federal act gives one (Asmussen, 2019 S.D. 51, ¶ 8). Deadline is stated as 'two-year' in the text; 730 is my day conversion, not a statutory figure. Four alternative accrual dates: finality of direct review; removal of unconstitutional state-created impediment; newly recognized retroactive constitutional right (requires recognition by BOTH the U.S. and S.D. Supreme Courts); discovery of the factual predicate by due diligence. 'Factual predicate' is objective — knowing the facts starts the clock even if the prisoner does not understand their legal significance (Asmussen ¶¶ 9-10). Transitional rule: for judgments final before July 1, 2012, the two years ran from July 1, 2012, i.e. expired July 1, 2014 (Hughbanks v. Dooley, 2016 S.D. 76, ¶ 22, as applied in Asmussen ¶ 6 — I read this holding as recited in Asmussen, not in Hughbanks itself). Predecessor SDCL 21-27-3.2 (repealed 2012) was not a limitations period at all but a rebuttable five-year presumption of prejudice to the State (Davis v. Weber, 2013 S.D. 88, ¶ 10) — do not carry that five-year figure into a current comparison. Scope, not timing, is the other narrowing: habeas reaches only (1) the court's jurisdiction, (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law, and (3) in certain cases deprivation of basic constitutional rights (Davis ¶ 9) — broad enough for ineffective-assistance claims, which SDCL 21-27-4 expressly contemplates, so I classify it 'available' rather than 'narrow.' Other limits: custody is required (SDCL 21-27-1); no application may be maintained while a direct appeal is pending or during the time to perfect one (SDCL 21-27-3.1); successive applications require circuit-court leave and are confined to newly discovered evidence of actual innocence or a new retroactive constitutional rule (SDCL 21-27-5.1); the writ is unavailable for penal disciplinary sanctions (SDCL 21-27-1.1); appellate review requires a certificate of probable cause (SDCL 21-27-18.1). The felony DNA-testing chapter (SDCL ch. 23-5B) is an adjunct motion, not a post-conviction act, and SDCL 23-5B-17 states 'Nothing in this chapter provides a basis for relief in any state or federal habeas corpus proceeding.' No capital carve-out found: ch. 21-27's section list contains no death-penalty provision and 21-27-3.3 applies to 'all applications for relief under this chapter.' Currency check: the SDLRC source line for 21-27-3.3 shows only 'SL 2012, ch 118, § 3' with no later amendment, and a CourtListener search returned Lee v. Weber, 2023 S.D. 54 applying it, though I did not read that opinion. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Tennessee	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (Tenn. Supreme Court, construing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130)	1 year Post-Conviction Procedure Act petition, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to -122 · Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a)	Detail Habeas: Although there is no habeas corpus statute of limitations, the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow. Post-conviction remedy: a person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken On excusing a late filing: The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity HABEAS IS NOT SUBSUMED AND HAS NO FILING DEADLINE. Tennessee keeps two parallel routes: Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 19 — 'In Tennessee, two distinct procedural avenues are available to collaterally attack a final judgment in a criminal case — habeas corpus and post-conviction petitions.' The writ is constitutionally entrenched (Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15) and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to -130; I read every section heading in ch. 21 in the official code XML (release 76, 2021-05-21) and there is no limitations provision anywhere in the chapter. What limits habeas is the CLAIM, not the clock: relief lies 'only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired' (Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164, quoted in the Tenn. Crim. App.'s Keel v. Adams, No. W2025-00356-CCA-R3-HC, filed 07/02/2026, at 4). Voidable claims — ineffective assistance, involuntary plea, denial of counsel not shown on the judgment's face — are NOT cognizable in habeas and must go to post-conviction. Practical confirmation that no deadline operates: Alvin Dean Shaver v. Sean Phillips, No. E2024-01385-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2025), at 2 — 'Twenty-eight years later, in July 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus' from a 1996 guilty plea; the court reached the merits and never raised timeliness (https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2025/01/31/alvin_dean_shaver_v._sean_phillips_warden.pdf). STATUTORY NARROWING: § 29-21-101(b), added by Acts 2009, ch. 420 and applicable to petitions filed on or after June 11, 2009, strips habeas from guilty-plea/negotiated-sentence petitioners raising concurrent-vs-consecutive sentencing or release-eligibility-percentage claims. § 29-21-102 excludes persons held under federal process. POST-CONVICTION SIDE: the one-year period is jurisdictional and expressly non-tollable — § 40-30-102(a): 'The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity'; the code's annotation to that section cites Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) for due-process tolling where the statute would deny 'a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in a meaningful time and manner' (I read the annotation, not the Seals opinion itself). § 40-30-102(b) allows three late-filing exceptions — new retroactive constitutional right (1 year from the ruling), new scientific evidence of actual innocence (no period stated), and invalidated prior conviction used to enhance (1 year from that ruling) — and § 40-30-102(c) permits only one petition per judgment, with reopening under § 40-30-117. A THIRD, UNLIMITED ROUTE: the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, § 40-30-303, lets a person convicted of enumerated offenses 'at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis' — also no deadline. CAPITAL: I found no capital-specific variation in either the habeas chapter or § 40-30-102; the one-year period applies to capital cases on its face — treat any capital carve-out as unverified. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 (motion to correct an illegal sentence) is a further possible route I did not read and do not assert. CURRENCY: statutory text taken from the official Tennessee Code XML transform, release 76 (2021-05-21); § 29-21-101 last amended 2009, § 40-30-102 last amended 1996, and Tenn. Crim. App. opinions filed through July 2026 apply both in identical terms. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Texas	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (article contains no filing deadline), as rewritten by Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 319, sec. 5 (S.B. 440); Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (majority footnote)	— None · Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, Sec. 5 (exclusivity clause), read in S.B. 440 enrolled text, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) — Texas enacted no PCRA-style post-conviction act; habeas is itself the post-conviction remedy	Detail Habeas: The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims. Post-conviction remedy: After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner. On excusing a late filing: The doctrine of laches concerns prejudice, not mere passage of time. In this opinion, we do not impose any time limits on habeas claims. TEXAS IS A HABEAS-ONLY STATE, AND NON-CAPITAL STATE HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE AT ALL. Texas never replaced habeas with a purpose-built post-conviction act, so there is no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue and no one-year period to report; pc_vehicle is null and the pc_* deadline fields are inapplicable rather than 'no deadline' findings. Art. 11.07 IS the state habeas statute and is simultaneously the exclusive post-conviction vehicle for a final felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death (Sec. 1: 'This article establishes the procedures for an application for writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death'). I read all seven sections of Art. 11.07 as rewritten in 1995 and none imposes any time limit. Art. 11.07 Sec. 4 is a subsequent-application / abuse-of-the-writ bar (new factual or legal basis, or actual innocence), NOT a limitations period — do not code it as a deadline. The only temporal bar is the EQUITABLE doctrine of laches, which is fact-specific and has no fixed period: Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoted above); Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (read in full at https://static.case.law/sw3d/398/cases/0206-01.json), which broadened prejudice to a totality-of-the-circumstances test and expressly REJECTED a proposed presumption of prejudice after five years; Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (court may raise laches sua sponte). Perez's own survey footnote confirms Texas is on the no-limitations side: 'Over half of all states now employ statutes of limitation for state post-conviction relief, thus making the equitable doctrine of laches largely inapplicable in those states.' The Carrio dissent states the legislative inference directly: 'While the Legislature specifically provided time requisites for filing petitions in death penalty cases under article 11.071, it chose not to impose timeliness requirements for filing petitions in other felony cases under article 11.07.' CAPITAL CASES DIFFER SHARPLY: Art. 11.071 Sec. 4(a) does carry a deadline. As amended by S.B. 1728, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (read at https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/75R/billtext/html/SB01728F.htm): an application 'must be filed in the convicting court not later than the 180th day after the date the court of criminal appeals appoints counsel under Section 2 or not later than the 45th day after the date the appellee's original brief is filed on direct appeal with the court of criminal appeals' (current law runs the 180 days from appointment by the convicting court and adds 'whichever date is later'). Sec. 4(b) presumes later filings untimely absent good cause shown by 'particularized justifying circumstances,' and Sec. 4(f) forecloses good cause entirely after the 91st day past the filing date. So the correct comparative statement is: Texas habeas = no deadline for non-capital felonies, 180/45 days for capital. Other Chapter 11 vehicles are also habeas: Art. 11.072 (community supervision / probated sentences, where the conviction is not final), Arts. 11.08-11.09 (pretrial). Chapter 64 post-conviction DNA testing is a separate limited-purpose proceeding, not a conviction-challenge substitute, and habeas does not lie for errors in it (Ex parte Baker, 185 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Texas Const. art. I, sec. 12 makes the writ 'a writ of right' that 'shall never be suspended.' SOURCING CAVEAT: statutes.capitol.texas.gov was rebuilt as a JavaScript single-page app and returns only a navigation shell to non-browser clients for every Docs/GetStatute/PDF path, so the article text could not be read from the official codification. I therefore read the statutory language in the enrolled bill text on capitol.texas.gov (S.B. 440 for the 1995 Art. 11.07 rewrite and the enactment of Art. 11.071; S.B. 1728 for the 1997 amendment to Art. 11.071 Sec. 4). Confirmed that no deadline has since been added to Art. 11.07 by (a) the CCA's continuing 1999-2021 laches jurisprudence, which would be unnecessary if a limitations period existed, and (b) the Court of Criminal Appeals staff paper 'Article 11.07 Writs of Habeas Corpus' hosted on the official judiciary site (https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1457413/1107-paper-53123-update.pdf), whose 'Delay, Laches, & Waiver' section identifies laches as the sole temporal defense and cites Ex parte Hill, 632 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); I did not read Hill itself, so it is cited here only as reported by that source. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Utah	Not available habeas absorbed into a post-conviction act · Utah Code § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (Post-Conviction Remedies Act), Replacement of prior remedies (eff. 5/9/2017)	1 year no excuse for a late filing Petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C · Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1) (eff. 5/4/2022)	Detail Habeas: This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal… This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs. Post-conviction remedy: A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. On excusing a late filing: A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. Utah is NOT a no-deadline-habeas state. Habeas corpus survives in Utah, but only for restraints that do not challenge a conviction: § 78B-9-102(2)(a) exempts from the PCRA only 'habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.' Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1) (extraordinary relief for 'wrongful restraints on personal liberty') applies only 'Except for instances governed by Rule 65C,' and Rule 65C(a) governs 'all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=65B and =65C). So for a conviction challenge the writ route is closed and the PCRA's one-year bar is the only deadline. RESIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT AUTHORITY, but it carries no separate/longer deadline. Utah Const. art. I, § 5: 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/ArticleI/UC_AI_S5_1800010118000101.html); art. VIII, §§ 3, 5 give the courts power to issue all extraordinary writs. In Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, ¶ 174, the Utah Supreme Court held: 'we exercise our writ power independent of the PCRA. But that independent exercise is largely hidden from view because Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C—which incorporates the PCRA—governs the exercise of that power. And we exercise that power in total harmony with the PCRA.' And at ¶ 194: 'under the current version of rule 65C, we can only hear a time-barred case, like Patterson's, when failure to do so would violate a petitioner's constitutional rights' (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Patterson%20v.%20State20210826.pdf). Patterson expressly rejected the free-standing common-law 'egregious injustice' exception floated in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, and Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 ('We eliminated any such exception when we adopted rule 65C,' ¶ 192), and upheld the one-year bar against Open Courts and Suspension Clause challenges. WATCH FOR A STALE CITE: Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) said 'no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition' — that is no longer Utah law. Patterson ¶¶ 200-04 rejected it, and Nunez v. State, 2026 UT 25 (filed 2026-07-30) declined again to 'reinstate the now defunct interests of justice exception to the PCRA's time bar' (¶ 28), reaffirming 'we have incorporated the PCRA through rule 65C—including the PCRA's one-year statute of limitation' (¶ 26) (https://legacy.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Nunez%20v.%20State20260730.pdf). Patterson ¶ 212 left open that some future petitioner might show the bar unconstitutional as applied; no one has yet. ACCRUAL AND TOLLING soften the one year: § 78B-9-107(2) runs it from the LATER of six dates, including '(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based,' and § 78B-9-107(3)(a) tolls for periods the petitioner was prevented from filing 'due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, due to physical or mental incapacity,' or, for human-trafficking claims, force/fraud/coercion. CAPITAL CASES get no longer deadline — the same one year applies, and Utah Code § 78B-9-202(5) provides that appointment of capital post-conviction counsel 'does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 78B-9-107' (https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S202_2026050620260506.html). CARVE-OUTS: § 78B-9-107(6) provides the one-year bar 'does not apply to a petition filed under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence'; § 78B-9-102(2) also exempts Rule 22(e) motions to correct an illegal sentence and Board of Pardons and Parole actions (the latter reachable under Rule 65B(d)(2)(D)). le.utah.gov section URLs render via JavaScript; the versioned C78B-9-S###_<id>.html URLs cited above are the pages that carry the actual statutory text. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Vermont	No limit habeas survives narrowly · 13 V.S.A. § 7136 (Priority of procedure); habeas remedy itself at 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985	No limit no filing period Post-conviction relief / petition for review, 13 V.S.A. §§ 7131-7137 · 13 V.S.A. § 7131 (Prisoner in custody under sentence)	Detail Habeas: An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner entitled to move for relief under sections 7131-7135 … shall not be entertained … unless … the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention. Post-conviction remedy: A prisoner who is in custody under sentence of a court and claims the right to be released … may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. On excusing a late filing: A prisoner … may at any time move … to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. NEITHER REMEDY HAS ANY FILING DEADLINE. This is the headline: Vermont has no analogue to the one-year bars of Pennsylvania's PCRA, Alabama's Rule 32, or Delaware's Rule 61. (1) PCR: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 affirmatively says 'at any time.' I read all of §§ 7131-7137 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/13/221); the only limit is § 7134, which is discretionary, not temporal: 'The court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' (2) HABEAS: I read all 35 sections of 12 V.S.A. ch. 143, §§ 3951-3985 (http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/fullchapter/12/143). The chapter contains no limitation period; a grep of the full chapter text for 'year,' 'month,' 'day,' 'limitation,' and 'barred' returns zero hits. The writ is granted on the terms of § 3952 — a person 'otherwise restrained of his or her liberty … may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus' — with no time condition attached. WHY 'narrow' RATHER THAN 'available' OR 'subsumed': Vermont did NOT abolish or repeal habeas — ch. 143 stands in full force as a separate writ, separately docketed in the civil division of the superior court, and still actively litigated (recent Vermont Supreme Court habeas dockets include Perron v. Menard, Davey v. Baker, Aguiar v. Williams, In re Fredrick). But § 7136 makes PCR a condition precedent for anyone within § 7131's reach. The Vermont Supreme Court applies this by conversion rather than dismissal: Coyle v. Hofmann, 2009 VT 46, ¶ 5, 186 Vt. 525 (https://static.case.law/vt/186/cases/0525-01.json) — 'We treat petitions for habeas corpus challenging sentences as petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR) under 13 V.S.A. § 7136.' Coyle ¶ 6, quoting Berard v. Moeykens, 132 Vt. 597, adds that such a petition 'could be dismissed out of hand under 13 V.S.A. § 7136, which requires initial resort to a petition for post-conviction review … as a condition precedent to habeas corpus.' So habeas survives as a route to a conviction/sentence challenge only where the PCR motion is 'inadequate or ineffective' — narrowing, not exclusivity. This is the federal 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) savings-clause model, which is no accident: Coyle ¶ 5 records that § 7131 'was patterned after the federal PCR statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.' Note that the narrowing is NOT the jurisdictional-claims-only kind seen in some states — In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 356, quoted in Coyle ¶ 5, holds the scope of habeas relief EXPANDED under these statutes to 'a wide range [of relief], … including remedies short of full release.' PRACTICAL EFFECT FOR THE LEGISLATOR'S QUESTION: because § 7131 itself has no deadline, the § 7136 channeling rule costs a Vermont petitioner nothing in time — it routes them to a vehicle that is equally open-ended. A Vermont prisoner challenging a conviction today files under § 7131, at any time. GATING CONDITION THAT DOES BITE: § 7131 requires the movant be 'in custody under sentence,' and habeas requires present restraint, so neither remedy reaches a person who has fully discharged the sentence. That custody requirement, not any clock, is Vermont's real limit. CAPITAL: none of the provisions read draws any capital/non-capital distinction, and no capital-specific deadline appears anywhere in 13 V.S.A. ch. 221 or 12 V.S.A. ch. 143. RELATED, ALSO NO DEADLINE: 13 V.S.A. § 5561 (postconviction DNA testing, Title 13 ch. 182 'Innocence Protection') — 'A person convicted of a qualifying crime may at any time file a petition requesting forensic DNA testing.' SOURCE CAVEAT, stated for candor: the legislature's own site labels Vermont Statutes Online 'an unofficial copy of the Vermont Statutes Annotated that is provided as a convenience.' It is nonetheless the State of Vermont's own publication of its code, current through the 2025 session, and § 7131 and § 7136 there carry their original 1966 enactment credits with no subsequent amendment adding a time bar. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Virginia	2 years ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (Code 1950, § 8-596; as amended through 2021 Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345)	No limit Writ of actual innocence — Va. Code ch. 19.2 (§ 19.2-327.2, biological evidence, Supreme Court of Virginia) and ch. 19.3 (§ 19.2-327.10, nonbiological evidence, Court of Appeals). Innocence-only; NOT a general post-conviction act. Virginia has no PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 analogue. · Va. Code § 19.2-327.10 (nonbiological); § 19.2-327.2 (biological); contents provision § 19.2-327.11 — no filing period appears anywhere in either chapter	Detail Habeas: A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from … final disposition of the direct appeal in state court …, whichever is later. Post-conviction remedy: Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, upon a petition of a person who was convicted of a felony … the Court of Appeals shall have the authority to issue writs of actual innocence under this chapter. On excusing a late filing: The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face. Virginia is the INVERSE of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 pattern: it never replaced habeas with a post-conviction act, so state habeas corpus ad subjiciendum remains the general vehicle for challenging a conviction or sentence — and the legislature put the deadline INSIDE the habeas statute. Do not code Virginia as 'no habeas deadline'; it has one. THE DEADLINE IS COMPOUND, and 730 days is a floor, not a ceiling: § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets two years from final trial-court judgment OR one year from final disposition of the direct appeal (or expiry of the time to appeal), 'whichever is later.' For anyone who appeals, the one-year-post-appeal prong usually controls and runs longer than 730 days from judgment. A single-integer cell will misstate Virginia unless footnoted. Note also that § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets a separate one-year period for non-conviction habeas ('other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction or sentence … within one year after the cause of action accrues') — that is the detention-only figure, not the conviction figure, and the two are easy to swap. Structure confirmed by § 8.01-658(B), which is written entirely around petitions that 'challenge[] a criminal conviction or sentence.' The writ is constitutionally protected from suspension by Va. Const. art. I, § 9. OTHER LIMITS: § 8.01-654(B)(2) imposes a strict successive-petition bar — a petition must contain all facts then known, and 'No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition' — with a carve-out for a first petition whose sole claim is deprivation of the right to appeal. The statute contains no tolling or good-cause provision on its face. CAPITAL: there is no longer a special capital habeas track — §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654.2 (the death-penalty habeas filing and counsel provisions) were 'Repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2021,' alongside abolition of the death penalty; the same 2021 acts amended § 8.01-654 itself. Older sources citing a 60-day capital habeas deadline are dead law. SIDE REMEDIES: the actual-innocence writs carry no filing deadline but reach only freestanding innocence (§ 19.2-327.11 bars human biological evidence as the sole basis under the nonbiological writ, and requires evidence that would leave no rational trier of fact finding guilt); they cannot carry ordinary ineffective-assistance or Brady claims, which must go in habeas within § 8.01-654(A)(2). § 8.01-677 (motion in lieu of coram vobis) is confined to 'any clerical error or error in fact' and is not a general post-conviction route. VERIFICATION LIMIT: every figure above is from the statutory text on the official Virginia legislature site, each page stamped current as of 7/30/2026. I did NOT confirm from a read case how Virginia courts treat the (A)(2) period (jurisdictional vs. affirmative defense, availability of equitable tolling) — CourtListener returned HTTP 429 on repeated attempts and Justia/Google Scholar are blocked. Treat that one sub-point as unverified; it does not affect the deadline figures. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Washington	1 year ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas still lies · RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (one-year bar; definition expressly names habeas); RCW 7.36.130(1) (habeas chapter cross-references the same limit); RCW 7.36.010, .040 (writ still granted by superior court); RAP 16.3(b) (superior-court habeas expressly NOT superseded)	1 year Personal restraint petition (RAP 16.3-16.15), with trial-court motions for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8 transferred to the Court of Appeals to be treated as PRPs · RAP 16.4(d); RCW 10.73.090(1)-(2) (which names 'a personal restraint petition' first in the definition of collateral attack); CrR 7.8(b), (c)(2)	Detail Habeas: No petition or motion for collateral attack … may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final … 'Collateral attack' … includes … a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition … Post-conviction remedy: The appellate court will only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances and if such relief may be granted under RCW 10.73.090, or .100. On excusing a late filing: No petition or motion for collateral attack … may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final … 'Collateral attack' … includes … a habeas corpus petition WASHINGTON IS NOT A NO-DEADLINE HABEAS STATE — this is the inverse of the pattern the comparison usually turns on. RCW 10.73.090(2) names 'a habeas corpus petition' by name inside the definition of 'collateral attack,' so the one-year clock reaches habeas directly rather than only reaching a substitute remedy. Habeas was NOT abolished or subsumed: ch. 7.36 RCW remains in force (RCW 7.36.010: 'Every person restrained of his or her liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus'), RCW 7.36.040 still empowers superior courts to grant it, and RAP 16.3(b) states the PRP rules 'do not supersede and do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings initiated in the superior court.' RAP 16.3(b) DOES supersede habeas procedure in the APPELLATE courts, so the split is: superior-court habeas survives intact; appellate habeas is replaced by the PRP. Both carry the identical one-year period, so the answer to the legislator's question is one year regardless of which instrument is named. The 1989 act (1989 c 395) created RCW 10.73.090 and amended RCW 7.36.130 in the same breath — a deliberate choice to keep habeas alive but time-bar it. RCW 7.36.130(1) now bars inquiry into 'any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction except where it is alleged in the petition that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution … have been violated and the petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.' The Supreme Court reads it the same way: Ruiz-Sanabria, 184 Wn.2d 632, 635 (2015) (per curiam), cites 'RCW 7.36.130(1) (no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody unless a petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100).' TWO ROUTES ESCAPE THE DEADLINE ENTIRELY. (1) Facial-invalidity/jurisdiction: the bar applies by its terms only 'if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction' (RCW 10.73.090(1)); a facially invalid judgment, or one from a court without competent jurisdiction, is subject to NO time limit at all. (2) The seven RCW 10.73.100 exemptions: newly discovered evidence (with reasonable diligence), statute unconstitutional facially or as applied, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence after a not-guilty plea, sentence in excess of the court's jurisdiction, modification of community-custody conditions under RCW 9.94A.703/.709, and significant retroactive change in law. Critically, the petition must be 'based solely on' those grounds — a mixed petition loses the exemption. Clock start: RCW 10.73.090(3) — the LAST of trial-court filing of the judgment, issuance of the appellate mandate on a timely direct appeal, or U.S. Supreme Court denial of timely cert (a motion to reconsider cert denial does not extend finality). Channeling in practice: CrR 7.8(c)(2) requires the superior court to transfer a defendant's postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals as a PRP 'unless the court determines that the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that they are entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.' So the PRP is the dominant working vehicle even when the filing starts elsewhere; superior-court habeas is a preserved but rarely-used alternative. A separate successive-petition restriction (RCW 10.73.140, referenced in CrR 7.8(b) and RAP 16.4(d)'s 'no more than one petition for similar relief … without good cause shown') operates independently of the time bar; I did not read RCW 10.73.140's full text directly, so treat its precise scope as unverified. No capital difference exists: RCW 10.95.030(1) now prescribes life without release or parole for aggravated first degree murder, so RAP 16.3(c)'s reservation of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction over death-sentence PRPs is vestigial. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
West Virginia	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) (Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, Ch. 53 Art. 4A); confirmed by W. Va. Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Rules 1-10 (no limitations period)	No limit None · W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) — establishes there is NO separate post-conviction vehicle; the Art. 4A habeas writ is the exclusive remedy	Detail Habeas: A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed Post-conviction remedy: such writ comprehends and takes the place of all other common law and statutory remedies … which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence and shall be used exclusively in lieu thereof On excusing a late filing: A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence WEST VIRGINIA HABEAS HAS NO FILING DEADLINE — none in the statute, none in the court rules. This is the inverse of the PCRA pattern: WV did not replace habeas with a purpose-built act. Its post-conviction act IS habeas corpus — Ch. 53, Art. 4A is literally titled 'POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS' — so there is no separate one-year-style vehicle to confuse it with. Art. 4A contains only §§ 53-4A-1 through -11 (verified against the official code's article index); no limitations section exists. The Supreme Court of Appeals' Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, read in full, impose no deadline either: Rule 3 ('Filing Petition') governs only venue and filing fee. THE REAL LIMIT IS PRECLUSION, NOT TIME. § 53-4A-1(b)-(c) bars any contention 'previously and finally adjudicated' or 'waived,' and creates a 'rebuttable presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to advance' any ground not raised before trial, at trial, or on direct appeal. Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762 (1981) (read via static.case.law) construes the Act to give each prisoner 'one omnibus post-conviction habeas corpus hearing.' So a legislator should understand WV as unlimited in time but essentially one-shot in substance. 2021 CARVE-OUT: HB 2888 added § 53-4A-1(b)(1) and the closing sentence of (c), providing that a contention is neither finally adjudicated nor waived where new or undermined 'forensic scientific evidence' exists and there is a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome. RELATIONSHIP TO GENERAL HABEAS: the ordinary writ under § 53-4-1 (Art. 4, no deadline, granted on 'probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority') still exists, but § 53-4A-1(f) displaces it for conviction/sentence challenges while preserving it for habeas sought 'for any purpose other than to challenge the legality of a criminal conviction or sentence.' DEADLINED MOTIONS THAT ARE NOT CONVICTION-CHALLENGE VEHICLES — do not substitute these in a cross-state table: W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(b) sentence reduction, 120 days; Rule 35(a) correction of an illegal sentence, 'at any time'; W. Va. Code § 15-2B-14 post-conviction DNA testing motion, no stated deadline but limited to testing. CAPITAL: the Act draws no capital/non-capital distinction. CURRENCY: § 53-4A-1's bill history on the official code site shows its last amendment was 2021 (HB 2888); I searched the full bill lists for the 2025 and 2026 Regular Sessions (2,808 bills in 2026) and found zero bills mentioning habeas or 53-4A, so no deadline has been enacted since. Not established from a primary source: whether WV courts apply laches to bar a stale Art. 4A petition — I found no controlling case either way, so treat that as unverified rather than assuming delay is costless. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Wisconsin	No limit ★ no filing period habeas still lies · State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, ¶21 (Wis. Sup. Ct.), construing Wis. Stat. ch. 782 and § (Rule) 809.51	No limit Motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (collateral attack on sentence/conviction) · Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2)	Detail Habeas: Smalley's imposition of a "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement for habeas claims is unsupported either by the statutory text or Wisconsin cases. Post-conviction remedy: A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time. On excusing a late filing: HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 … it contains no limitations period whatsoever … Rule 809.51 … likewise contains no filing deadline … THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove HEADLINE: Wisconsin imposes NO filing deadline on EITHER route. This is the opposite of the PCRA/Rule 32/Rule 61 one-year model. (1) HABEAS HAS NO DEADLINE. I read the full certified text of Wis. Stat. ch. 782 (782.01-782.46, published 7-1-26): it contains no limitations period whatsoever — the chapter's single occurrence of 'day' is the return date in § 782.07, not a filing period. Rule 809.51, the vehicle for a habeas petition filed in the court of appeals, likewise contains no filing deadline (its only time limit, 14 days, runs against the State's response). Lopez-Quintero, 2019 WI 58, ¶10, expressly OVERRULED State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, which had read a 'prompt and speedy' timeliness pleading requirement into Rule 809.51: 'We hold that the court of appeals may not deny a habeas petition ex parte on the ground the petitioner failed to demonstrate he sought relief in a prompt and speedy manner. We overrule Smalley.' The petitioner there had delayed nearly ten years. (2) THE ONLY TIME LIMIT IS LACHES — an affirmative defense the State must plead and prove, including prejudice, not a clock the petitioner must beat: 'Any equitable concerns regarding substantial delays… are properly raised not sua sponte by the court of appeals but instead by the State asserting the defense of laches and establishing prejudice resulting from the delay' (¶10). (3) HABEAS IS NARROWED IN SCOPE, NOT IN TIME. § 782.01(1): 'Every person restrained of personal liberty may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from such restraint subject to ss. 782.02 and 974.06.' § 782.02 then bars the writ to anyone 'committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or order of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction,' and § 974.06(8) bars a habeas petition by a person who could move under § 974.06 'unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his or her detention.' Per the official annotation to § 782.01 citing State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, habeas requires restraint, restraint contrary to constitutional protections or by a body lacking jurisdiction, AND no other adequate remedy at law. I classified this 'available' rather than 'narrow' because it is not confined to jurisdictional or facially-void claims — see (4). (4) HABEAS IS THE MANDATORY, EXCLUSIVE VEHICLE FOR ONE MAJOR CLASS OF CONVICTION CHALLENGE. State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶35 (read in full): 'A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under § 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus.' That is the Knight petition, State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520 (1992) (read in full): 'to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus.' Knight rested precisely on § 974.06(8)'s 'inadequate or ineffective' escape hatch. By contrast, ineffective assistance of POSTCONVICTION counsel goes to the circuit court, 'either as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus' (Starks ¶35, citing State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry). So a Wisconsin prisoner's route depends on which counsel failed — and neither route has a deadline. (5) § 974.06 IS NOT A ONE-YEAR ACT. It is the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act analogue and 'may be made at any time,' § 974.06(2). It opens only once the direct route closes: § 974.06(1) applies 'After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired.' Its real constraint is issue preclusion, not time: § 974.06(4) bars grounds not raised in an original motion 'unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised,' enforced by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168 (1994) (read in full). A legislator comparing states must not mistake that bar for a deadline — a 30-year-old conviction can still be attacked under § 974.06 if 'sufficient reason' excuses the omission. (6) THE 60-DAY FIGURE BELONGS TO THE DIRECT APPEAL, NOT COLLATERAL REVIEW. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b) requires a notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing, and § 809.30(2)(h) requires the postconviction motion or notice of appeal 'within 60 days after the later of the service of the transcript or circuit court case record.' § 974.02(1) channels all non-§ 974.06 postconviction motions into that timetable. If a survey cell reports '60 days' for Wisconsin, it has captured the direct-appeal clock and missed both collateral remedies. (7) OTHER REMEDIES: § 974.07(2) DNA-testing motion — 'At any time after being convicted' (no deadline). Sentence modification under § 973.19 carries a 90-day limit as described in Starks ¶50 (I did not read § 973.19 itself; treat that one figure as unverified). (8) CAPITAL: no capital-specific variation appears anywhere in ch. 782, § 974.06, or Rule 809.30. (9) OPERATIVE = BOTH: § 974.06 for most conviction/sentence attacks; habeas, exclusively, for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and wherever the § 974.06 motion is inadequate or ineffective. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source
Wyoming	No limit ★ no excuse for a late filing habeas survives narrowly · Nixon v. State, 2002 WY 118, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2002) (construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134); accord Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, ¶ 11; Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 14; statutory narrowing at Wyo. Stat. § 1-27-125	5 years Post-conviction relief, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (Title 7, ch. 14, "Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights") · Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d), quoted verbatim in Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, n.5 (Wyo. 2019)	Detail Habeas: Review in a state habeas corpus action is not time limited, but is seriously limited in scope so that defendants may only raise a claim going to the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court. Post-conviction remedy: No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. On excusing a late filing: No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. HABEAS LIES WITH NO DEADLINE — this is the headline finding. Wyoming never abolished or absorbed habeas: the post-conviction act expressly preserves it (§ 7-14-108: 'W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 shall not repeal any existing laws'), and Nixon ¶11 treats §§ 1-27-101 to 134 and §§ 7-14-101 to 108 as two parallel avenues. I read the entire habeas chapter (§§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134, wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/title01.pdf) — it contains no filing deadline of any kind. The price of that open window is scope: § 1-27-125 provides 'Habeas corpus is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner,' and Parkhurst (2019) describes §§ 1-27-101 through 134 as '(limiting state habeas corpus relief to jurisdictional claims).' So habeas reaches only subject-matter/personal jurisdiction defects — hence 'narrow,' not 'available.' OPERATIVE SPLIT: a garden-variety conviction challenge (IAC, Brady, trial error) must go under ch. 7-14 and dies at 5 years; a jurisdictional/void-judgment claim can go by habeas at any time. Deadline math: statute says '5 years,' converted at 365 d/yr = 1825; it runs from entry of the judgment of conviction, not from finality of appeal. Additional ch. 7-14 traps beyond the clock: § 7-14-103(a) makes claims that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal 'procedurally barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim' (exceptions in § 7-14-103(b) for newly available facts, ineffective appellate counsel, and same counsel at trial and on appeal); § 7-14-104(c) denies appointed counsel to indigent petitioners; review is by certiorari, not appeal of right (§ 7-14-107). TWO OTHER UNTIMED ROUTES, both verified: W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) — 'The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time' (wyocourts.gov/app/uploads/2026/06/WRCrP-with-bond-schedule.pdf) — and the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, §§ 7-12-401 through 7-12-407, which carries no filing deadline (only internal response deadlines of 120/30/150 days) but is confined to newly-discovered-evidence claims of actual innocence (Parkhurst ¶14). CAPITAL: I found no separate capital post-conviction track or differing deadline in ch. 7-14; I did not independently verify whether one exists elsewhere, so treat capital differences as unverified. Nixon's 'not time limited' holding rests on Hovey v. Sheffner, 93 P. 305 (Wyo. 1908), which I did not read directly; Nixon itself is confirmed still-current by Saunders (2015) and by Parkhurst (2019), both read in full. View the habeas source View the post-conviction source

★ marks the states where habeas corpus, rather than a statute enacted to replace it, is the operative route today.

The trial record, and weighing the evidence again

Two questions were added in August 2026, after the Committee’s second meeting turned to ineffective assistance of counsel. Both concern what a post-conviction court has to work with. The first asks whether the questioning of prospective jurors in a non-capital felony trial is taken down as a matter of course, because a claim about jury selection cannot be reviewed if no record of it exists. The second asks whether any court, after a verdict, may consider whether the evidence actually supported it, rather than whether some evidence could have.

Is jury selection part of the record?

Rule	States	Which
Recorded as a matter of course	31	Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
Recorded if the judge directs	5	Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Montana
Recorded only on request, or the required record excludes it	12	California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, Washington
Not established	1	South Dakota
Contested within the state	1	Texas

31 states record jury selection as a matter of course. Georgia is one of 12 that record it only on request. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-5(a) directs the judge to have the testimony taken down and, when the judge so directs, the other proceedings except argument; the Supreme Court of Georgia reads “proceedings” to mean matters occurring during the evidence, so jury selection is transcribed only on a specific request (State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341 (1980), reaffirmed in Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411 (2020): if a defendant wants a more complete record of voir dire, he must make a specific request to that effect; Harper v. State, 312 Ga. 684 (2021)). Capital cases are different: where death is sought, jury selection must be recorded (Owens v. State, 233 Ga. 869 (1975)).

9 states separate taking the record down from transcribing it: Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia. The reporter records jury selection in every case; a transcript is prepared only if a party asks for one on appeal. West Virginia states the model in State v. Bolling, 162 W. Va. 103 (1978), adopting the federal practice that reporters record (but not transcribe unless requested for appellate purposes) the voir dire examination of jurors. Recording costs little once a courtroom is wired; transcription is the expense, and under this design it stays on request.

Does any court weigh the evidence again?

On appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence is judged in the light most favourable to the verdict: the question is whether a rational juror could have convicted, not whether the evidence in fact supported the conviction. The survey asked three narrower questions. May an appellate court reverse on the weight of the evidence? Is there any forum at all that looks at the evidence without that lens? And where the only such forum is the trial judge, is the judge’s refusal to order a new trial reviewable?

Appellate weight review	States	Which
An appellate court may reverse on the weight of the evidence	3	New York, Ohio, Wisconsin
A nominal power, applied through the lens that favours the verdict	4	Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey
No appellate weight review	43	the other states, Georgia among them

A forum without the lens	States
Yes, an appellate court	3
Yes, but only the trial judge (Georgia)	24
No forum at any level	23

Where only the trial judge may weigh (24 states): is a refusal reviewable?	States	Which
Reviewable, deferentially, for abuse of discretion	20
Not reviewable on its merits; reviewable only for failure to exercise the discretion at all (Georgia)	2	Georgia, Tennessee
Not reviewable in either direction	2	Louisiana, Missouri

Georgia has the forum. On a motion for new trial on the general grounds (O.C.G.A. §§ 5-5-20, 5-5-21) the trial judge must consider the conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, sitting as the thirteenth juror (Weston v. State, 320 Ga. 472 (2024)). What Georgia does not have is review of the answer. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviews whether the trial court exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror, but the decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is vested solely in the trial court and is not subject to our review (Weston; Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22 (2023)). An order that recites only the sufficiency standard is sent back; an order that weighed the evidence and refused is final.

Georgia shares that structure with Tennessee, and Louisiana and Missouri go further, leaving the refusal unreviewable in either direction. Of those four, Louisiana’s rule is constitutional (La. Const. art. V, § 10(B)); the other three, Georgia among them, could change it by statute or court rule. Only 3 states give an appellate court a real power to reverse on weight, so nothing in this table supports a claim that most states do what Georgia does not. What it supports is narrower: of the states whose only unlensed look at the evidence is the trial judge’s and whose refusal is unreviewable on its merits, Georgia is the one whose jury-selection record is not required to exist.

Counsel for a person under sentence of death

On 21 August 2026 a witness told the Committee that Georgia is the only state with no mechanism for appointing counsel to a person under sentence of death who seeks post-conviction review. The general survey above had measured counsel at a first post-conviction proceeding for everyone and found four states with no entitlement (Arkansas, Georgia, Virginia, Wyoming); it had not measured capital cases separately. So the question was put to all fifty states, six cells each, with the same rule as every other cell: a primary source and a verbatim quote, re-fetched and checked. Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599, which every state’s death-sentenced prisoners receive, was excluded by design, so no state is credited with a federal mechanism.

The result

Verdict	States	Which
Counsel must be appointed	24	Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah
A court may appoint counsel	3	Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota
No state mechanism	1	Georgia
Authorities conflict	1	Wyoming
No death penalty	21	Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin

The claim holds. Georgia is the only state of fifty with no mechanism. 24 states require counsel to be appointed; 3 let a court appoint; 21 have no death penalty; one state’s authorities conflict. Georgia stands alone in the last column that remains.

Georgia, on the authorities

Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855 (1999), decided the question and assigned it: A law requiring appointed counsel for capital habeas petitioners is not constitutionally compelled, and therefore, the decision to create such a law rightfully belongs to the General Assembly. (at 862). Twenty-seven years later the General Assembly has not created one. The state capital defender is confined by O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d) to the trial court and direct appeal and is forbidden to assist with federal habeas; the capital habeas statute, § 9-14-47.1, and Uniform Superior Court Rule 44 are silent on counsel; no provision compensates appointed habeas counsel. The cell’s search covered §§ 9-14-40 to 9-14-53, § 17-10-36 and chapter 17-12 of the Code, and Rule 44 in full.

Georgia does fund the work, and that has to be said in the same breath. The FY2027 General Appropriations Act (HB 974, Judicial Branch § 6.7, “Resource Center”) appropriates $900,000 in state general funds, with the same line in the FY2026 Act (HB 68, § 20.1000); a 2005 Department of Audits report (06-05) ties that line to the Georgia Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center, Inc. and found it 99% state-funded. That is a grant to a private charity, not an entitlement, an appointing authority, a qualification standard or a compensation scheme, and a prisoner the Center cannot take has no remedy. The accurate statement is that Georgia provides state money and no state mechanism.

Gibson was decided four to three. The dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote in 1999 that Georgia was the only jurisdiction that failed to provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction cases. This measurement, taken in 2026, finds the same thing.

The one soft edge

Wyoming is unresolved, not a second Georgia. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii) entitles a needy person to public-defender representation in post-conviction proceedings “in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed”, while § 7-14-104(c), captioned “No right to appointed counsel”, says the opposite. No Wyoming decision reconciles them, and no one is under sentence of death there. The finding is therefore stated as it is measured: Georgia is the only state with no mechanism, not the only state where a condemned person cannot get a lawyer.

State by state

The verdict for each state, the status of its death penalty, and the authority the verdict rests on. The six detailed tables for this pass are in the section below on counsel for a person under sentence of death.

State	Verdict	Death penalty	Authority	Detail
Alabama	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b), (j); Ex parte State of Alabama (In re State v. Donnie Lee Abernathy), No. CR-2023-0825 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024)	Detail Death penalty: active Alabama has a statutory mechanism: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b) requires the trial court to appoint separate post-conviction counsel for an indigent capital defendant within 30 days of the death sentence. The mandate is unqualified in form ('shall appoint') but limited in reach by § 13A-5-53.1(j) — it applies only to defendants sentenced to death after August 1, 2017. A prisoner sentenced to death on or before that date has no mandatory entitlement; for that cohort appointment is conditional under Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) and Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a), and under Rule 32.7(c) can occur only after a petition is filed and survives summary dismissal — so the petition itself must be prepared without appointed counsel. A reader comparing Alabama to Georgia should record 'mandatory, prospective only,' not simply 'mandatory.' the trial court, within 30 days of the entry of the order pronouncing the defendant's death sentence, shall appoint the defendant a separate counsel for the purposes of post-conviction relief under this section. View the source document Note: THE CRITICAL QUALIFIER: § 13A-5-53.1(j) reads, verbatim on the same fetched page, 'This section shall apply to any defendant who is sentenced to death after August 1, 2017.' The Court of Criminal Appeals applies it exactly that way (Abernathy: 'Because Abernathy was sentenced to death after August 1, 2017, his petition for postconviction relief is governed by the Fair Justice Act'; Belcher n.3: 'Because Belcher was sentenced to death after August 2017, his postconviction efforts were governed by the FJA'). Alabama's death row is predominantly pre-2017, so the mandatory appointment provision does not reach most people currently under sentence of death in Alabama. For that cohort the only authorities are Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) — which conditions appointment on the court declining summary dismissal AND finding counsel 'necessary,' i.e. after a petition already exists — and Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a), which says a judge 'may appoint counsel.' A hostile reader will seize on this; the survey cell should carry the date limit, not just the word 'mandatory.' SOURCE OF THE RULE: statutory, not judicial. The Fair Justice Act, Act 2017-417, created the mandate; the Alabama Supreme Court has adopted no capital post-conviction counsel rule. The FJA's trade is explicit — it grants counsel while compressing state post-conviction to run 'concurrently and simultaneously with the direct appeal' (§ 13A-5-53.1(b)), with the petition due 365 days after the first direct-appeal brief and only one 90-day extension available. NO OFFICE, CAPPED FEES: Alabama has no capital post-conviction defender office and no state resource center. The Office of Indigent Defense Services is a fiscal/administrative unit of the Department of Finance (Ala. Code § 15-12-1(8); its published materials are contract, billing and certification forms). Capital post-conviction counsel's total fee is capped at $7,500 by § 13A-5-53.1(b), waivable by the OIDS Director; the general post-conviction cap is $1,500 at $70/hour (§ 15-12-23(d)). Funding is state — Fair Trial Tax Fund plus a General Fund top-up (§ 12-19-252). STANDARDS CAVEAT: the capital-counsel qualification standards are in an executive-branch rule (Ala. Admin. Code r. 355-9-1-.08), not a statute or court rule, and their criteria (jury trials to verdict, capital case litigated to verdict/hung jury/plea) are written for trial counsel. We found no authority expressly applying them to, or exempting them from, a § 13A-5-53.1(b) post-conviction appointment; the cell records what the rule says, not an inference about its scope. PRACTICE FRICTION: Abernathy is worth reading in full — the circuit court believed it had satisfied the FJA by naming 'standby counsel' at the December 2021 sentencing hearing; direct-appeal counsel later showed that lawyer had been employed by the District Attorney's Office for several months; the court appointed replacement counsel in October 2023 and granted a 270-day extension, which the Court of Criminal Appeals then vacated as unauthorized. WHAT we COULD NOT VERIFY: we did not locate an Alabama appellate decision squarely holding that Rule 32.7(c) appointment is discretionary in a capital case; that characterization in the cells rests on the conditional text of Rule 32.7(c) and the permissive 'may appoint' in § 15-12-23(a), both fetched and quoted, not on a case. the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved. Crim. App. opinions were reachable only as storage.courtlistener.com PDFs; Justia, FindLaw and casetext were unavailable (403/410).
Alaska	No death penalty	Abolished 1957	AS 12.55.015; AS 12.55.125(a); AS 18.85.100(c); Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977); Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1964)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1957 Alaska abolished capital punishment in 1957, two years before statehood, and has not restored it. The Alaska Supreme Court has twice said so: Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1964) ('in 1957 the legislature abolished the death penalty as punishment in Alaska for any crime'), and Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977) n.5. Current law confirms it: the authorized sentences a court may impose (AS 12.55.015) include no death sentence, first-degree murder is punished by a term of years up to 99 (AS 12.55.125(a)), and the word 'capital' appears nowhere in the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently no capital post-conviction counsel provision exists on the books, and none is needed. The only residual capital reference in Alaska law is the bail clause of Alaska Const. art. We, § 11 ('to be released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great'), which Carman treated as inoperative for exactly this reason. Any Alaska prisoner, however sentenced, is entitled to appointed counsel for a timely first post-conviction application under AS 18.85.100(c) and Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1). statutory authorization for the death penalty was repealed by the territorial legislature in 1957. Ch. 132, SLA 1957. View the source document Note: (1) The repeal was enacted by the TERRITORIAL legislature (Ch. 132, SLA 1957), two years before statehood, so Alaska has never had capital punishment as a state. Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1964).html): 'in 1957 the legislature abolished the death penalty as punishment in Alaska for any crime.' (2) Reinstatement bills have been introduced and died; e.g. HB 481, 19th Legislature, 'CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR CHILD MURDER' (Reps. Masek, Kohring, Ogan), which was still in House Judiciary at its last status date of 02/29/1996 (https://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/19?Root=HB%20481). We could not run a full bill-subject search of the 34th Legislature (2025-26) because akleg.gov's bill-subject index is JavaScript-driven and returned an empty document; no evidence of reinstatement was found and the current sentencing statutes and criminal rules contain no capital provision. (3) The Alaska post-conviction counsel right is statutory plus constitutional, not capital-specific: AS 18.85.100 was amended by SLA 1995, ch. 79 'to afford indigent applicants the right to appointed counsel' (Talmadge v. State, Op. No. 2819 (Alaska App. Oct. 24, 2025), n.27), and Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003) locates a first-PCR right to competent counsel in the Alaska due process clause. Importantly, that entitlement stops at the first, TIMELY application — AS 18.85.100(c)(1) withholds appointed counsel for untimely or successive applications and for petitions for review/certiorari, a limit that would bite hard in a capital case if Alaska had one. (4) SOURCE CAVEAT a hostile reader should know: the Alaska Legislature's own statute pages (akleg.gov BASIS) are JavaScript-driven and its folio text server returned 'could not connect to pipe,' Justia and FindLaw return 403, and casetext returns 410 — so statutory text was read on law.onecle.com, a mirror whose Alaska pages are stamped 'Last modified: November 15, 2016.' Currency was cross-checked against controlling decisions: Hall v. State, Op. No. 2821 (Alaska App. Nov. 28, 2025) for AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A), and Wassillie v. State, 331 P.3d 1285 (Alaska App. 2014) for AS 18.85.100(c). The mirrored text of AS 12.55.125(a) shows a 20-year minimum for first-degree murder and may lag later amendments to the minimum term; the load-bearing point — that the maximum is a term of years, not death — is independently confirmed by Green and Carman and by AS 12.55.015's list of authorized sentences. (5) Court rules were read from the Alaska Court System's own PDFs (https://courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/crpro.pdf and…/adm.pdf); note these are two-column PDFs, so quoted rule language must be pulled line-by-line. (6) Bottom line for the Georgia committee: Alaska is not a counter-example to the Georgia Resource Center's claim in either direction. It supplies no capital post-conviction mechanism because it has no capital sentences — but unlike Georgia it does guarantee, by statute and court rule, appointed counsel to every indigent prisoner filing a timely first post-conviction application.
Arizona	Counsel must be appointed	Active	A.R.S. § 13-4234(D); A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), (C); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b); State v. Montoya, No. CR-22-0106-AP (Ariz. Aug. 15, 2024)	Detail Death penalty: active Arizona provides appointed counsel to indigent prisoners under sentence of death in first (and successive) state post-conviction proceedings as a matter of statutory entitlement, reinforced by court rule. The Supreme Court clerk files the PCR notice automatically on the direct-appeal mandate and the Supreme Court (or an authorized county presiding judge) must appoint qualified counsel from a Supreme Court-maintained roster. There is no capital post-conviction defender office; counsel are compensated from county funds with partial, appropriation-capped state reimbursement. All indigent state prisoners under a capital sentence are entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent them in state postconviction proceedings. View the source document Note: (1) TWO SOURCES OF LAW, SAME ANSWER. The entitlement rests on statute (A.R.S. §§ 13-4041(B), 13-4234(D)) AND on a Supreme Court rule adopted by order (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b)). Current Rule 32 was adopted wholesale by Arizona Supreme Court Order R-19-0012 (filed Aug. 29, 2019), which abrogated the prior Rule 32 effective Jan. 1, 2020; all rule text quoted here is from that order. We checked the Arizona Supreme Court's published list of amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure (newest entry R-23-0042, eff. Jan. 2024) and the August 2026 list of pending rule-change petitions: nothing since 2019 amends Rule 32.5, Rule 32.7, or Rule 6.8, and nothing pending would. The Supreme Court applied Rule 32.5(b) as current law in State v. Montoya (Aug. 2024). (2) NO DEFENDER OFFICE — AND ONE WAS ABOLISHED. Arizona created a State Capital Postconviction Public Defender Office in Laws 2006, ch. 369; § 6 of the same act terminated the office on July 1, 2011 and repealed Title 41, ch. 41 on Jan. 1, 2012. Arizona Revised Statutes Title 41 as currently published contains no capital post-conviction defender office. The 2006 version of § 13-4041(C) directed courts to 'appoint counsel from the state capital postconviction public defender office'; the current text directs appointment 'from the list.' So Arizona's mechanism today is roster-based court appointment, which is a weaker institutional structure than Florida's CCRCs or Texas's OCFW — but the ENTITLEMENT is mandatory regardless. (3) STATUTE/RULE DEADLINE MISMATCH, flagged in the deadline cell: § 13-4234(D) says 60 days from notice and § 13-4234(G) calls the limits jurisdictional; Rule 32.7(a)(2)(A) says 12 months. The legislature has not conformed the statute. We found no decision squarely resolving it. (4) COMPENSATION CONDITION. Under § 13-4041(F), appointed counsel is paid only if a petition is timely filed or a timely 'no meritorious claim' notice is filed after record review — a structural feature the Georgia committee may want to note. (5) FEDERAL CONTEXT, OUT OF SCOPE BUT ADJACENT: the U.S. Attorney General certified Arizona's capital counsel mechanism as satisfying 28 U.S.C. ch. 154 on April 14, 2020 (85 Fed. Reg., 'Certification of Arizona Capital Counsel Mechanism'), finding a qualifying mechanism continuously since May 19, 1998. That is a federal-habeas opt-in determination, not the state mechanism itself, and we did not verify whether the certification has since been modified or litigated; it is reported here only because it independently describes the same state provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel is NOT counted anywhere above. (6) DEATH PENALTY ACTIVE. Arizona resumed executions on March 19, 2025 (Aaron Gunches, by lethal injection, after an Arizona Supreme Court warrant of execution issued Feb. 11, 2025) — its first since November 2022. This fact is from news and ADCRR press reporting located by search, not from a primary source we fetched; the operative point for this table is that the Arizona Supreme Court was still affirming death sentences on direct appeal in 2024 (Montoya), so the capital PCR counsel machinery is in active use. (7) The Georgia Resource Center's claim, as applied to Arizona, is CORRECT: Arizona is not a Georgia-like state. It has a mandatory statutory entitlement, statutory competency standards, a Supreme Court-maintained qualified-counsel list, and a compensation-and-reimbursement scheme.
Arkansas	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202; Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5; Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480, 215 S.W.3d 589 (2005)	Detail Death penalty: active Arkansas has a mandatory state mechanism for appointed counsel in capital post-conviction, resting on two mutually reinforcing sources adopted in 1997 to 'opt in' under AEDPA: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-91-201 to -206 (Act 925 of 1997) and Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5. The circuit court must hold a hearing (21 days from mandate under Rule 37.5(b)(1)(A); two weeks after affirmance under § 16-91-202(a)(1)(A)(i)) and must appoint qualified counsel for an indigent death-sentenced petitioner who accepts the appointment; the court may decline only on a written finding of non-indigency or knowing rejection. Counsel must satisfy exclusive statutory/rule qualification criteria, the appointment carries through the post-conviction appeal, and the Arkansas Public Defender Commission pays compensation and expenses from state funds. Arkansas is therefore squarely a counterexample to the claim that Georgia is the only state without a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism. Our Rule 37.5 provides an elaborate process for appointing qualified legal counsel for indigent capital defendants who desire representation for post-conviction relief. View the source document Note: SOURCE-VINTAGE CAVEAT (read before relying on the statutory quotes): the Arkansas Code text quoted here is from law.onecle.com, which labels its Arkansas Code snapshot 'Last modified: November 15, 2016'. Justia, FindLaw and Casetext were unreachable from we (403/403/410) and the official Arkansas Code is behind LexisNexis, so the quoted subsections could not be re-verified against an official current publisher. Partial corroboration: Act 662 of the 2025 Regular Session (SB 375), which we fetched in full from arkleg.state.ar.us, amends § 16-91-202 at § 61 — and it amends ONLY subsection (e)(2)(A) (adding capital rape and treason to the alternative-qualification route), reprinting the rest of the section untouched. That confirms § 16-91-202 was still on the books and being amended in 2025, and that subsections (a), (c), (d) and (f) — the ones quoted above — were not altered by that act. We could not exhaustively rule out amendments in the 2017-2023 sessions; arkleg's 'Code Sections Amended' search is JavaScript-driven and returned no data to a plain fetch. TWO INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF THE RIGHT. The entitlement does not depend on the statute alone. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5 ('Special rule for persons under sentence of death') was adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas by per curiam in 1997, separately from Act 925. Its text is verified for subsection (b)(1)(A) from the court's own republication in In re Rule 37.5(b)(1)(A) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, 347 Ark. 1013 (2001) ('The circuit court shall conduct a hearing to consider the appointment of an attorney to represent the person in post-conviction proceedings under this rule.'), and for subsection (e) from the court's verbatim quotation in Simpson v. State, 347 Ark. 564 (2002). We could NOT obtain a full current text of Rule 37.5 from an official publisher — arcourts.gov returned 404 on every rules path tried and Arkansas court rules are hosted commercially. The content of Rule 37.5(b)(2) and (c) is therefore established here through controlling Arkansas Supreme Court decisions construing them (Jackson, Hill), not through the rule text itself. Rule 37.5 was still in force as of the 2019 edition, cited as such in Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168. RULE ADOPTED BY COURT ORDER, NOT ONLY BY STATUTE — relevant to Georgia, since it shows a supreme court can create the mechanism without waiting for the legislature. The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted Rule 37.5 in 1997 'in order to "opt in" to the benefits of AEDPA by setting criteria for appointed counsel for indigent capital defendants sentenced to death' (Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480 (2005)). NO DEDICATED CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION OFFICE. Unlike Florida (CCRC) or Texas (OCFW), Arkansas has no standing capital post-conviction defender office. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission's Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-205) is created for the TRIAL stage 'when the death penalty is sought,' and § 16-91-202(d)(3) affirmatively strips the Commission of 'any supervisory authority over counsel appointed to represent a petitioner in capital post-conviction proceedings.' The Commission's role is list-keeper and payer. Circuit courts have nonetheless appointed that office to Rule 37.5 work (Jackson, 343 Ark. 613). A study committee weighing an Arkansas-style model should note this is a court-appointment-plus-state-payment model, not an institutional-defender model. FEDERAL COUNSEL IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE — and Arkansas said so expressly. Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480 (2005), decided precisely the question of whether federally appointed capital habeas counsel can carry the representation into state post-conviction, and held it cannot: appointment for state proceedings 'is a matter for state courts,' and counsel appearing on unexhausted state claims 'must comply with the criteria for appointment set out in Rule 37.5.' This is a useful data point for the Georgia committee on why federal 18 U.S.C. § 3599 counsel should not be counted as a state mechanism. DEATH PENALTY STATUS. Arkansas retains and is expanding capital punishment: Act 662 of 2025 created the new capital offense of 'capital rape,' with uncodified legislative findings expressly asserting that 'The United States Supreme Court gravely erred in Kennedy v. Louisiana.' Widely reported context we did NOT verify against a primary source, and which should be checked before citing: roughly two dozen people are under sentence of death in Arkansas; the state has carried out no execution since four lethal injections in April 2017; and Act 302 of 2025 added nitrogen hypoxia as an execution method and was challenged in a suit filed in August 2025. DEADLINE FRAGILITY IS A REAL, LITIGATED RISK, not a theoretical one. Because Rule 37.5(e)'s 90 days runs from the appointment order, a breakdown in appointment can consume the filing period. That is exactly what happened in Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001): appointed Commission counsel moved to withdraw on conflict grounds (trial counsel was joining the Commission, and the director had previously represented Jackson), the circuit court did not rule for nearly three months, replacement counsel was appointed after the 90 days had run, and the petition was dismissed as untimely. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed on fundamental-fairness grounds. Any state copying this design should note the appointment-triggered clock needs a safety valve. METHOD. Justia, FindLaw and Casetext were unreachable (403/403/410); courtlistener.com HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law (Jackson, Simpson, Hill, In re Rule 37.5(b)(1)(A)) and from opinions.arcourts.gov (Johnson), with the the published-opinion record v4 search API used only for discovery. Every quote above was grep-confirmed present in the fetched text of the cited URL.
California	Counsel must be appointed	Moratorium	Cal. Gov. Code § 68662; In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932	Detail Death penalty: moratorium California entitles an indigent person under sentence of death to appointed counsel for the first state habeas petition. Gov. Code § 68662 commands the sentencing superior court to offer to appoint counsel and to enter an order; on findings of indigency and acceptance (or inability to decide) the order must be an appointment. The California Supreme Court's majority opinion in In re Morgan calls this a 'statutory right.' The entitlement is mandatory on paper and, as of the HCRC's 2025 annual report, unfulfilled for 346 of the state's 562 death-sentenced people. in California an indigent prisoner who is under a court judgment of death has a statutory right to the assistance of appointed counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief. View the source document Note: The death penalty statute remains fully in force and juries continue to impose it (5 new death sentences in 2025); executions are suspended by Gov. Newsom's Executive Order N-09-19 of March 13, 2019, and California has not executed anyone since 2006. HCRC reports 562 people under sentence of death at the end of 2025. CDCR's published condemned list shows a higher number (605 as of Dec. 2024) because it does not reclassify people whose death sentences have been reversed until resentencing. STRUCTURAL POINT FOR THE COMMITTEE: the appointing authority changed. Before Proposition 66 (approved Nov. 8, 2016), Gov. Code § 68662 required the CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT to offer to appoint capital habeas counsel; Prop. 66 shifted that duty to the sentencing superior court. The Supreme Court's own 'Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death' (Policy 3.1, June 2025 revision) states that Prop. 66 was 'effective October 25, 2017' and that 'the responsibility for appointment of habeas corpus counsel falls primarily to the sentencing court,' the Supreme Court retaining only replacement appointments in pre-Prop. 66 cases (https://supreme.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/supremecourt/default/2025-06/SUPREME%20COURT%20POLICIES%20REGARDING%20CASES%20ARISING%20FROM%20JUDGMENTS%20OF%20DEATH%20June%202025%20clean_1.pdf). QUALIFICATION STANDARDS ARE RULE-BASED, NOT STATUTORY: Gov. Code § 68665 directs the Judicial Council and Supreme Court to adopt them; rules 4.561, 4.562 and 8.652 were adopted effective April 25, 2019 — i.e. the operative superior-court appointment machinery did not exist for the first 18 months after Prop. 66 took effect. Section 68665(b) expressly instructs that standards avoid 'unduly restricting the available pool' and that 'Experience requirements shall not be limited to defense experience,' and that they be adequate to qualify California for 28 U.S.C. ch. 154 opt-in. SECOND-TIER PROVISION: Penal Code § 1509.1(b) entitles a death-sentenced person to a new attorney in the Court of Appeal to raise claims that prior state habeas counsel was ineffective; HCRC reports 43 people awaiting that appointment, no funding stream for it, and that the appellate courts have generally stayed § 1509.1 proceedings as a result. FEDERAL COUNSEL IS SEPARATE AND EXCLUDED HERE: Gov. Code § 68661.1 restricts HCRC's federal habeas representation and bars spending state funds to attack a California capital judgment in federal court; 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was not counted. AUTHORITY we COULD NOT PULL: Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 (upholding Prop. 66) — courtlistener.com opinion pages could not be retrieved; nothing in this table rests on it. Every cell above terminates in a source we fetched and read: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov for Gov. Code §§ 68660-68665 and Pen. Code § 1509; courts.ca.gov for Cal. Rules of Court 4.561, 4.562 and 8.652; static.case.law (the digitised case record) for In re Morgan, whose 'statutory right' passage sits in the majority opinion; and hcrc.ca.gov for the 2025 annual report.
Colorado	No death penalty	Abolished 2020	Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-901 (SB 20-100); residual mechanism at § 16-12-205 and Colo. R. Crim. P. 32.2; People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42, ¶ 3 (unitary review process no longer applied after commutation)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2020 — SB 20-100, § 16-11-901, effective March 23, 2020 for offenses charged on or after July 1, 2020; no one under sentence of death (Gov. Polis commuted all three death sentences to LWOP on March 23, 2020) Colorado abolished the death penalty by SB 20-100, codified at § 16-11-901 and effective March 23, 2020, for offenses charged on or after July 1, 2020; the same day Governor Polis commuted the sentences of all three men on Colorado's death row to life without parole, leaving no one under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: the capital post-conviction counsel mechanism remains fully on the books and is MANDATORY in form — § 16-12-205(1) ('the trial court shall enter an order appointing new postconviction counsel' for an indigent death-sentenced defendant who elects postconviction review) and Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)(we) ('Appoint new counsel… absent waiver'), with statutory qualification standards, a 154-day clock running from the appointment hearing, and compensation paid by the state public defender or alternate defense counsel. So Colorado is emphatically NOT a state that lacks a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism; it is a state whose mandatory mechanism no longer has any occupant. For offenses charged on or after July 1, 2020, the death penalty is not a sentencing option for a defendant convicted of a class 1 felony in the state of Colorado. … This section does not apply to a person currently serving a death sentence. View the source document Note: 1) TWO SEPARATE SCHEMES. Part 2 of article 12 of title 16 (unitary review) applies only to death sentences imposed on or after the date the supreme court adopted implementing rules; Crim. P. 32.2 states it 'shall apply to class one felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1998.' For a death sentence imposed before that, § 16-12-202(4) provides that 'appellate review and postconviction review shall be as otherwise provided by law' — i.e. ordinary Crim. P. 35(c), not the mandatory § 16-12-205 appointment. Nathan Dunlap's 1996 death sentence fell outside the unitary scheme. 2) NOT REPEALED. SB 20-100 did not repeal Part 2; §§ 16-12-201 to -210 appear intact in the official OLLS printouts for both CRS 2024 and CRS 2025 (verified at https://olls.info/crs/crs2025-title-16.pdf), and § 16-12-205's source note shows no amendment since 2009. Crim. P. 32.2 likewise remains in the criminal rules; its source note shows last amendment adopted December 14, 2011 / June 21, 2012 (the 'Rule of Seven' conversion that changed 5 days to 7 and 150 days to 154). 3) THE MECHANISM IS DORMANT, NOT DEFUNDED. There is no capital post-conviction defender office to be vacant or unfunded — appointment is by the trial court from private counsel meeting § 16-12-205(2) qualifications, paid from state appropriations through OSPD or OADC. 4) STATUTORY LIMIT WORTH FLAGGING TO THE COMMITTEE. § 16-12-205(5) provides that 'The ineffectiveness of counsel during postconviction review shall not be a basis for relief,' and § 16-12-206(1)(c) confines the first postconviction motion to an enumerated list of issues; § 16-12-209 forecloses further review after the rule deadline absent narrow exceptions. 5) SOURCING. Rule 32.2's text is quoted from the Colorado General Assembly Office of Legislative Legal Services' official court-rules volume (crs2023-court-rules.pdf); the Colorado Supreme Court's own adopting order for the 2004 version is at https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Rule_Change_2004-06.pdf but predates the 2012 time-computation amendments. The People v. Owens applied example is quoted from the the digitised case record scan of 330 P.3d 1027; that scan has OCR artifacts elsewhere in the opinion, though not in the quoted sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel was excluded throughout and plays no part in these findings.
Connecticut	No death penalty	Abolished 2012	Public Acts 2012, No. 12-5; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-46a, 51-296(a), 52-470(f)(3); State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015); State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2012 (P.A. 12-5, prospective repeal effective April 25, 2012); all remaining death sentences held unconstitutional under the state constitution in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015), reaffirmed in State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016); no one under sentence of death Connecticut abolished the death penalty prospectively by P.A. 12-5 (effective April 25, 2012), and in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015), the Supreme Court held that executing anyone who committed a capital felony before that date would violate the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment; State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016), reaffirmed it. No one is under sentence of death. Residual capital provisions remain on the books: §§ 53a-46a and 53a-46b (expressly limited to capital felonies committed before April 25, 2012) and § 52-470(f)(3)'s exemption of death-sentence challenges from the habeas timeliness bar. Had a death sentence survived, the counsel mechanism would be MANDATORY: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a) requires the court to designate a public defender for an indigent petitioner in 'any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter,' which includes a first state habeas by a person under sentence of death — but through the general habeas-counsel statute, with no capital-specific office, entitlement or qualification standard. this state's death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. View the source document Note: SOURCE-ACCESS CAVEAT: cga.ct.gov (the official General Assembly statute site) is unreachable from we — every request, https and http, www and bare, returned connection failure (HTTP 000), while jud.ct.gov, portal.ct.gov and courtlistener.com all resolved normally. The statutory text quoted for §§ 51-291, 51-296 and 52-470 therefore cites a web.archive.org capture of the official cga.ct.gov chapter pages (chap_887.htm and chap_915.htm), which reproduces the CGA's own text and annotations verbatim. law.justia.com and codes.findlaw.com return 403; casetext.com could not be retrieved; law.onecle.com has no Connecticut title 51 tree; the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved. Where a live official URL exists it was preferred: the § 51-296(a) holding is cited to the Connecticut Supreme Court's own slip opinion in Kaddah on jud.ct.gov, the abolition holding to the Santiago slip opinion on jud.ct.gov, and the practice cell to the Chief Public Defender's annual report on portal.ct.gov. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS A CAREFUL READER MUST KNOW: (1) Connecticut has no capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision and never did — capital petitioners were covered by the same § 51-296(a) that covers every habeas petitioner. The claim that Georgia is the only state with 'no mechanism' is not tested here by a capital statute, because Connecticut's mechanism is general. (2) That general mechanism is nonetheless MANDATORY in form ('shall… designate') and is statutory, not constitutional: Connecticut courts repeatedly note there is no constitutional right to habeas counsel and that the right comes from § 51-296 alone (see the annotation to 24 Conn. App. 723, and Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 (1992)). It is conditioned on the petitioner requesting counsel and on an indigency investigation. (3) The § 52-470(f)(3) capital carve-out from the habeas filing deadline is one of only three carve-outs (the others being actual innocence and conditions-of-confinement claims) and survives on the books even though no death sentence does. (4) BEWARE a citation trap: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296a is NOT a death-penalty counsel statute despite the adjacent numbering — it governs eligibility for counsel in family relations and juvenile matters. Some secondary sources conflate it with capital appointment. (5) The Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit's staffing was cut immediately after P.A. 12-5 and the unit's capital work has since wound down; the Habeas Corpus Unit continues to exist for ordinary habeas work. (6) Practice Book § 23-26 ('Appointment of Counsel') implements § 51-296 as a court rule but adds nothing capital-specific; it was read in the official Practice Book PDF at jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB.pdf and is not quoted here only because that PDF's two-column extraction interleaves adjacent columns, which would corrupt a verbatim multi-line quote.
Delaware	No death penalty	Abolished 2024	11 Del. C. § 4209(a), (b)-(h) [Repealed] (84 Del. Laws ch. 433 (2024)); residual: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(iii), (l); Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2024 Delaware has abolished the death penalty and has no one under sentence of death, so no capital post-conviction counsel mechanism can currently operate. The capital sentencing procedures in 11 Del. C. § 4209 were held unconstitutional in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016), made Rauf retroactive and vacated the death sentence of a prisoner then in collateral review; and HB 70 of the 152nd General Assembly, signed 9/26/24 (84 Del. Laws ch. 433), repealed § 4209(b)-(h), leaving only the life-without-parole penalty quoted here. A RESIDUAL PROVISION REMAINS ON THE BOOKS AND IS MANDATORY: Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2)(iii) still commands that 'The judge shall appoint counsel' for a first timely postconviction motion seeking to set aside 'a sentence of death,' and Rule 61(l) still guarantees a capital defendant 'a right to one postconviction proceeding' with a counsel-first scheduling sequence. So had Delaware retained capital punishment, its answer to this survey would be 'mandatory' — the Georgia Resource Center's claim would not have failed here. Any person who is convicted of first-degree murder for an offense that was committed after the person had reached the person’s eighteenth birthday shall be punished by imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of probation or parole View the source document Note: SEQUENCE OF ABOLITION: judicial invalidation first, statutory repeal second. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) held Delaware's capital sentencing procedure unconstitutional after Hurst v. Florida and held the infirmities unseverable; Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016) held Rauf retroactive on state-law grounds under Danforth v. Minnesota, vacating a final death sentence, which emptied the state's death row. Eight years later HB 70 (152nd G.A., signed 9/26/24, 84 Del. Laws ch. 433) struck the capital procedures from the Code; the bill's official synopsis reads 'This Act eliminates the death penalty in Delaware' (https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/129979). ORPHANED CROSS-REFERENCES: the Delaware courts never cleaned up the rules. Supreme Court Rule 35 ('Review and stay of death penalty') still implements '11 Del C. § 4209(f) and (g)' — subsections that no longer exist — and Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2)(iii), 61(l), and 61(m)(2) ('automatic statutory review of a death penalty') all remain in the 2026 Edition of the criminal rules, whose Rule 61 history line ends 'Mar. 23, 2017, effective Apr. 6, 2017; Dec. 15, 2023, effective Jan. 1, 2024.' The Delaware Courts rules page states that for the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Superior Court of Delaware, 2026 Edition, 'Currently, there are no amendments.' SOURCE OF THE RIGHT: the capital counsel entitlement is a COURT RULE promulgated by the Superior Court (with Supreme Court approval), not a statute — relevant to Georgia, where a rule-based fix would not require legislation. Rule 61 is also the exclusive remedy: R. 61(a)(2) provides the remedy 'may not be sought by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,' so there is no parallel state-habeas track with a separate counsel rule. NUMBERING TRAP for anyone checking this cell: the mandatory capital clause was added June 4, 2014 as Rule 61(e)(1)(iii) and moved to Rule 61(e)(2)(iii) by the Mar. 23, 2017 amendment (a new (e)(1) governs the timing of the counsel request). Cases and secondary sources citing 'Rule 61(e)(1)' before 2014 are quoting a purely discretionary rule ('The court will appoint counsel for an indigent movant only in the exercise of discretion and for good cause shown'), which is a materially different provision. NOT COUNTED: 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel, which is out of scope. CITATION NOTE: the published-opinion record opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law full-text pages, which were fetched and contain the quoted language.
Florida	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1); Fla. Stat. §§ 27.702(1), 27.710(5); Silvia v. State, No. SC2026-1162 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2026)	Detail Death penalty: active Counsel must be appointed. Florida is close to the opposite pole from the claim being tested: appointment is automatic and court-initiated rather than something the prisoner must request. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1) requires the Supreme Court of Florida, simultaneously with the mandate affirming a death sentence on direct appeal, to enter an order appointing CCRC or directing the trial court to appoint registry counsel; Fla. Stat. § 27.702(1) independently commands that CCRC 'shall represent each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state' in collateral proceedings, and § 27.710(5) requires immediate registry appointment whenever a death-sentenced person becomes unrepresented. Rule 3.851(b)(6) bars self-representation in capital postconviction, and Rule 3.851(b)(5) requires counsel to continue 'until a judge allows withdrawal or until the sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out.' The entitlement is to representation only, not to effective representation: §§ 27.7002(1)-(2) and 27.711(10) foreclose challenges to the adequacy of that representation. the Supreme Court of Florida must at the same time issue an order appointing the appropriate office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel or directing the trial court to immediately appoint counsel from the Registry of Attorneys maintained by the Justice Administrative Commission View the source document Note: Death penalty active and executions ongoing: Silvia v. State, No. SC2026-1162 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2026), records that Governor DeSantis signed a warrant on July 17, 2026 setting execution for August 18, 2026. SOURCES OF THE RULE: the entitlement rests on BOTH a statute (Fla. Stat. ch. 27, pt. IV, §§ 27.7001-27.715, enacted 1985 and repeatedly amended, most recently by the Timely Justice Act, ch. 2013-216) AND a Supreme Court rule adopted by court order (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, current through July 13, 2026); either standing alone would make appointment mandatory. Rule text quoted is from the Florida Bar's official compilation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure updated July 13, 2026; the most recent amendments (In re Amendments to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220, 3.851, and 3.853, No. SC2024-1471 (Fla. Apr. 10, 2025)) touched 3.851(f)(2) and (i)(11), not the appointment provision in 3.851(b). Statutory text checked against both the 2024 and 2026 Florida Statutes on flsenate.gov; §§ 27.701, 27.702, 27.704, 27.715 are unchanged between them. IMPORTANT LIMIT a hostile reader will press: Florida guarantees the PRESENCE of counsel, not its quality. Fla. Stat. § 27.7002(1) provides that chapter 27 'does not create any right… to challenge in any form or manner the adequacy of the collateral representation provided,' and the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held there is no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of capital postconviction counsel (Silvia, slip op. at 10-11, discussing Barwick, 361 So. 3d 785, 790-91, and Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 28 (Fla. 2016)). FUNDING CAVEAT: the CCRC offices are state-appropriated and staffed, but private registry counsel operate under hard statutory fee caps (§ 27.711(4)-(6)) that JAC may enforce by permanent removal from the registry (§ 27.7002(5)-(6)); Justice Pariente's concurrence in McClain v. Atwater, 110 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 2013), flagged those caps as a structural problem, and we did NOT independently verify current CCRC appropriation levels or vacancy rates. Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is excluded from this analysis; the § 3006A reference in Fla. Stat. § 27.702(3)(a) concerns reimbursement to the state trust fund for CCRC's federal work and is not the state mechanism.
Georgia	No state mechanism	Active	O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47.1; Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 862 (1999)	Detail Death penalty: active No state mechanism for appointed counsel in capital post-conviction. The Supreme Court of Georgia squarely held there is no constitutional right and expressly assigned the creation of any such right to the legislature; the General Assembly has not created one in the 27 years since. The state's capital defender is statutorily confined to trial and direct appeal (O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d)), the capital-habeas statute (§ 9-14-47.1) and rule (USCR 44) are silent on counsel, and there is no compensation authority for appointed habeas counsel. The one thing that must be said against a flat 'nothing': Georgia appropriates $900,000/yr in state general funds to a private 501(c)(3), the Georgia Resource Center, to represent death-sentenced people in habeas. That is state money, and a hostile reader will say so — but it is a grant to a charity, not an entitlement, an appointment, a qualification standard, or a compensation scheme, and a prisoner the Center cannot take has no remedy. A law requiring appointed counsel for capital habeas petitioners is not constitutionally compelled, and therefore, the decision to create such a law rightfully belongs to the General Assembly. View the source document Note: The Resource Center director's claim to the Blue-Ribbon Study Committee is accurate as to the legal question — Georgia provides no right to, and no procedure for, appointment of counsel in capital state habeas — but it is incomplete in one respect a hostile reader will exploit: Georgia does fund capital post-conviction representation. The FY 2027 General Appropriations Act (HB 974, signed 2026), Judicial Branch § 6.7, appropriates $900,000 in state general funds to the 'Resource Center'; the identical line and purpose language appears in the FY 2026 Act (HB 68, § 20.1000). The Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts Report 06-05 (Oct. 2005) ties that line item to the Georgia Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center, Inc. and found it 99% state-funded. So the correct framing is: state money, no state mechanism. SEARCH SCOPE — we read O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-40 through 9-14-53, § 9-14-47.1, § 17-10-36 (Unified Appeal Procedure enabling statute, which governs trial and direct appeal only), O.C.G.A. ch. 17-12 (Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, incl. §§ 17-12-1, 17-12-8 [repealed 2015], 17-12-12), and all of Uniform Superior Court Rule 44 (44.1–44.13). None provides for, permits, or compensates appointed counsel in state habeas. NOT INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED, flagged as such: (a) the O.C.G.A. annotation to § 9-14-53 reports Willis v. Price, 256 Ga. 767 (1987), holding that the county reimbursement for habeas 'court costs' in § 9-14-53 (cap now $30,000/county/yr) 'does not embrace attorney fees' — we read the annotation, not the opinion; (b) press reporting of a March 2026 Georgia Supreme Court concurrence by Chief Justice Peterson calling the post-conviction system broken, and of the 2026 Blue-Ribbon Study Committee's work — we did not pull those documents. OTHER SOURCE PATHS: courtlistener.com opinion HTML pages could not be retrieved. 855, which carries the full opinion text; justia and casetext were 403/410. Gibson v. Turpin was a 4-3 decision; the dissent (Benham, C.J., Sears and Hunstein, JJ.) asserted at the time that 'Georgia is the only jurisdiction that fails to provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction cases,' which is the 1999 ancestor of the claim this survey is testing. As of Sept. 2026 the Georgia Resource Center's site states it is searching for its next Executive Director, consistent with the 'interim director' who testified on 2026-08-21.
Hawaii	No death penalty	Abolished 1957	Act 282, 1957 Session Laws of Hawaii (abolition); Haw. Rev. Stat. s 706-656 (life without parole is the maximum for first degree murder); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) (general post-conviction counsel); Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527 (1982)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1957 Hawaii abolished capital punishment in 1957 by Act 282, 1957 Session Laws of Hawaii, while still a Territory and two years before statehood. The Hawaii Supreme Court states the fact directly in Huihui v. Shimoda, quoted here. The maximum penalty for first degree murder is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (HRS s 706-656); no Hawaii statute authorizes a death sentence and no one is or can be under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: none capital-specific. Nothing in the Hawaii Revised Statutes or the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure addresses capital post-conviction counsel. What is on the books is a general, mandatory post-conviction counsel provision, HRPP Rule 40(i), which would supply appointed counsel through the Office of the State Public Defender to any indigent Rule 40 petitioner stating a non-frivolous claim, including, hypothetically, one under sentence of death. Hawaii is thus not a state that 'provides nothing'; it is a state where the capital question does not arise, and whose general post-conviction counsel right is stronger than Georgia's. This statute was amended only once since its enactment in 1892, when capital punishment was abolished in this state in 1957. View the source document Note: (1) ABOLITION PREDATES STATEHOOD. Hawaii repealed capital punishment by Act 282, 1957 SLH, while a U.S. Territory; it entered the Union in 1959 with no death penalty and has never reinstated one. Because the 1957 statute is a session law from the territorial period, it is cited here through the Hawaii Supreme Court's own recital of it in Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527 (1982), rather than from the session-law volume, which is not available online. (2) THE COUNSEL RIGHT IS A COURT RULE, NOT A STATUTE. HRPP Rule 40(i) was promulgated and amended by order of the Hawaii Supreme Court (last amended May 30, 2006, effective July 1, 2006), not enacted by the legislature. A Georgia reader should note that Hawaii's post-conviction counsel guarantee therefore rests on the judiciary's own rulemaking power. It is nonetheless mandatory in operation: Rapozo v. State (Haw. 2021) treats a colorable claim as triggering an entitlement and ordered counsel appointed on remand. (3) THE RIGHT IS SCREENED, NOT UNCONDITIONAL. Rule 40(i) excuses referral where the claim is 'patently frivolous and without trace of support,' the same screen Rule 40(f) applies to hearings. So the sequence is: colorable claim -> counsel plus hearing; patently frivolous claim -> neither. (4) SOURCE-HOST CAVEAT ON THE STATUTES. The official HRS host, capitol.hawaii.gov, returns HTTP 403, as do Justia and FindLaw. The HRS text for ss 802-1, 802-5, 802-8 and 706-656 is therefore cited to law.onecle.com, whose Hawaii compilation is dated October 27, 2016 and whose credit lines show amendments through L 2015, c 231. The structural facts relied on here (OPD created within the department of budget and finance; mandatory appointment 'at all stages'; state payment via the comptroller) are long-standing and are corroborated by Hawaii Supreme Court decisions through 2021. One detail that may have moved since 2016 is the appointed-counsel rate in HRS s 802-5(b), shown as $90/hour with a $6,000 felony cap; that figure should be re-checked against the current HRS before being quoted to the committee. The court-rule sources (HRPP, from courts.state.hi.us) and the case sources are current. (5) VESTIGIAL TEXT. Hawaii Const. art. We, s 10 still opens 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury…'. That is inherited Fifth Amendment phrasing in the grand-jury clause and authorizes nothing; it is the only 'capital' reference in the state constitution's criminal-procedure provisions. The Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure contain no occurrence at all of 'capital,' 'death penalty,' or 'sentence of death.' (6) RELEVANCE TO THE GEORGIA CLAIM. Hawaii neither confirms nor refutes the Georgia Resource Center's assertion on its own terms, because Hawaii has no capital post-conviction litigation to staff. If the committee counts Hawaii among the '49 other states,' it is counting a state whose general post-conviction counsel provision is mandatory and whose post-conviction filing window is unlimited (Akau v. State (Haw. 2019): no statute of limitations, and laches unavailable) – a materially more generous regime than Georgia's on both axes, but not a capital-specific mechanism of the kind the committee is being asked to create.
Idaho	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a); Idaho Code § 19-5905(1)(g); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013)	Detail Death penalty: active Idaho requires appointment of counsel for a death-sentenced prisoner's first state post-conviction proceeding. Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) — a rule adopted by Idaho Supreme Court order, not by statute — commands the sentencing judge to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender immediately after imposing death, and the SAPD must assign at least two qualified attorneys, none of whom may be prior counsel. Idaho Code § 19-5905(1)(g) makes 'Post-conviction relief proceedings in district court in capital cases' a statutory duty of the SAPD upon court appointment, funded from the SAPD's state budget. Idaho is therefore not a state that leaves capital post-conviction petitioners to proceed pro se: the entitlement is mandatory, the provider is a named statewide state-funded office, and qualification standards are set by we.C.R. 44.3. the district judge who sentenced the defendant must appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, who must assign at least two attorneys to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any post-conviction remedy referred to in Idaho Code § 19-2719(4) View the source document Note: 1) SOURCE OF THE RIGHT: the mandatory-appointment command is a COURT RULE, not a statute. We.C.R. 44.2 was adopted January 26, 2022 (eff. Feb. 1, 2022) and amended November 1, 2024; an earlier version of Rule 44.2 (quoted in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610 (2013)) required appointment of 'at least one attorney.' The current rule requires appointment of the SAPD and assignment of at least two attorneys. The statutory side (we.C. § 19-5905(1)(g)) obliges the SAPD to serve once appointed but does not itself command the court to appoint. 2) Do NOT confuse this with Idaho's general post-conviction counsel statute: we.C. § 19-4904 (UPCPA) is discretionary and county-funded — 'a court-appointed attorney MAY be made available' — and we.C. § 19-6009(3) excludes from the State Public Defender's caseload those cases where the SAPD has jurisdiction under § 19-5905. Capital post-conviction runs on the § 19-2719 / Rule 44.2 track instead. 3) COMPENSATION: we.C.R. 44.2(b)(1) sets a $100/hour floor for lead capital post-conviction counsel not employed by a publicly funded office; 44.2(b)(2) requires the trial court to authorize investigative, expert and other preparation expenses. Conflict counsel is paid from the SAPD's budget (we.C. § 19-5906). 4) QUALIFICATION NUMBERS UNVERIFIED AS CURRENT: we.C.R. 44.3(c) incorporates 'applicable indigent defense standards' by reference. The former Public Defense Commission's IDAPA 61.01.02.060 set numeric thresholds (lead appellate/post-conviction capital counsel: 10 years of criminal defense litigation plus lead counsel in at least one capital or federal capital habeas case), but the copy we could read (Cornell LII) is a TEMPORARY rule effective April 10, 2024 that cites the repealed §§ 19-850/19-855/19-860 numbering; the PDC was folded into the Office of the State Public Defender effective October 1, 2024 and adminrules.idaho.gov returned 404 for a current IDAPA 61.01.02, so we could not confirm those numbers remain in force. The standards cell therefore rests only on we.C.R. 44.3 and 44.2(a). 5) TWO RECENT DECISIONS we COULD NOT PULL: Row v. State, Docket No. 50540 (Idaho Sept. 4, 2025) and Abdullah v. State, Docket No. 52130 (Idaho Mar. 2, 2026), both on § 19-2719's 42-day bar. isc.idaho.gov/opinions/*.pdf returns HTTP 404 and courtlistener.com opinion pages could not be retrieved; Justia and FindLaw return 403. Secondary summaries indicate Row clarified that Hall did not create a right to EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE of capital post-conviction counsel, but we did not read Row and no cell above depends on it. Note the distinction: nothing suggests Row disturbed Rule 44.2's mandatory-APPOINTMENT command, which is on the face of the current rule. 6) STRAIN IN PRACTICE: SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District (Idaho Dec. 18, 2023) arose from the SAPD's conflict in Azad Abdullah's capital post-conviction case and the difficulty of finding conflict-free capital counsel in Idaho; we read only a vLex preview of that opinion, so it appears in notes and in the practice cell's narrative but is not a cited source for any cell. 7) DEATH PENALTY: active. Idaho Code § 19-2716 (as amended 2025 and 2026) makes firing squad the primary method, with lethal injection as the fallback.
Illinois	No death penalty	Abolished 2011	725 ILCS 5/119-1	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2011 Illinois abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2011 (P.A. 96-1543, adding 725 ILCS 5/119-1), and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books. Former 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (mandatory appointment for a death-sentenced petitioner) and the capital paragraph of 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (appointment of the State Appellate Defender for capital post-conviction representation) were struck by P.A. 103-51, eff. Jan. 1, 2024; the OSAD capital funding provisions in 725 ILCS 105/10 were blanked by P.A. 97-1003 in 2012; the Capital Crimes Litigation Act was repealed effective Jan. 1, 2012; and Supreme Court Rules 43, 416 and 714 were repealed and reserved Feb. 6, 2013. For the Georgia committee's purpose Illinois cannot be counted either for or against the 'other 49 states' claim as a present-tense matter — but as a historical datapoint it cuts toward the claim: while Illinois had a death penalty it gave capital post-conviction petitioners counsel as of right, on more generous terms than its non-capital rule, through a state-funded defender unit. Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished. (a) Beginning on July 1, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 96-1543), notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed. View the source document Note: READING THE QUOTED PUBLIC ACTS: Illinois enrolled bills print deleted material struck through and new material underscored; text extraction loses that formatting. In the P.A. 103-0051 quotes above, '(Blank).' is the inserted text and everything following it in that paragraph is the DELETED language. The currently codified sections confirm the result: 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) reads '(1) (Blank).' (https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-2.1.htm) and 725 ILCS 5/122-4 contains no capital paragraph (https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/072500050K122-4.htm). TWO-WAVE CLEANUP, WITH A 13-YEAR LAG: the death penalty ended July 1, 2011, the Capital Crimes Litigation Act (725 ILCS 124) was repealed Jan. 1, 2012 by the same act with the Capital Litigation Trust Fund balance moved to the Death Penalty Abolition Fund, OSAD's capital funding provisions were blanked by P.A. 97-1003 (eff. Aug. 17, 2012), and the Supreme Court repealed the capital rules Feb. 6, 2013 (M.R. 3140) — but the General Assembly did not strip capital text from the Post-Conviction Hearing Act until P.A. 103-51, eff. Jan. 1, 2024 (bill synopsis: removes 'other than historic references' to 'capital offense', 'death penalty', 'sentenced to death', and 'sentence of death'). Between 2011 and 2024 a mandatory capital post-conviction counsel command sat in the statute books with no one it could apply to. ALSO BLANKED: 725 ILCS 5/122-2.2(a) (intellectual disability / Atkins claims in capital post-conviction). STANDARDS CAVEAT: Rule 714's experience requirements were expressly for trial counsel; we found no capital post-conviction counsel qualification standard in the current Supreme Court Rules (searched the full compiled rules for 'capital', 'sentence of death', 'death penalty') or in the M.R. 3140 repealing order. NOT VERIFIED: whether any individual remains under an Illinois sentence of death. Governor Quinn's March 2011 commutation of the remaining death sentences is widely reported, but we could not reach a primary source from we (the Illinois Secretary of State archives page returned no response), so we record only that 725 ILCS 5/119-1 bars imposition of a death sentence and that no capital-specific counsel provision survives. SOURCES CHECKED AND CLEAN: 725 ILCS Chapter list (only capital-specific act is 725 ILCS 124, marked '(Repealed by P.A. 96-1543)'); 725 ILCS 105/10 (State Appellate Defender Act) — (c)(5) and (d) both blank; Ill. S. Ct. R. 651 — no capital provision after the Feb. 6, 2013 amendment.
Indiana	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(H)	Detail Death penalty: active Indiana provides counsel for capital state post-conviction by mandatory court rule, delivered through a state-funded statewide office. Criminal Rule 6.1(H) requires the State Public Defender (or privately retained counsel) to enter an appearance in the trial court within thirty days after direct-appeal rehearing is completed and to announce an intent to petition for post-conviction relief; the Public Defender of Indiana describes that capital representation as 'automatic if the petitioner is indigent.' Ind. Code § 33-40-1-2(a) supplies the parallel statutory duty ('shall represent'), and Ind. Code § 33-40-1-6 supplies a standing state appropriation. Indiana is therefore squarely in the column of states with a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism — a data point against the claim that Georgia is the only state without one. The qualification a hostile reader is entitled to: the entitlement is to the office's appearance, and P-C.R. 1(9)(c) lets appointed counsel withdraw on a certified no-merit finding without a capital exception, so this is not an unconditional right to litigate to judgment with counsel. Within thirty days following completion of rehearing, private counsel retained by the inmate or the State Public Defender (by deputy or by special assistant in the event of a conflict of interest) must enter an appearance in the trial court View the source document Note: (1) NUMBERING TRAP — the operative rule is now Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1, not Rule 24. Indiana revised and renumbered its Criminal Rules effective January 1, 2024 (republished as the restyled set effective January 1, 2025); former Crim. R. 24 (Capital Cases) became Rule 6.1, and former 24(H) is now 6.1(H) with 'shall' restyled to 'must.' The State Public Defender's own FAQ, quoted above, still cites the superseded 'Ind. Criminal Rule 24(H)' — the citation is stale but the substance matches current Rule 6.1(H) verbatim in operation. Anyone checking this table should expect to see both numbers in the literature. (2) SOURCE OF THE RIGHT — this is a supreme-court rule plus a statute, NOT a constitutional holding. Nothing we located holds that the Indiana or U.S. Constitution requires counsel in capital post-conviction. (3) THE MERIT QUALIFIER — Ind. P-C.R. 1(9)(a) says the Public Defender 'may represent' a petitioner 'if the Public Defender determines the proceedings are meritorious and in the interests of justice,' and § 9(c) requires counsel to withdraw on a no-merit certification; P-C.R. 1(4)(e) then lets the court re-order representation only if it makes a preliminary merit finding. Neither section carves out capital cases in its text. Rule 6.1(H)'s mandatory appearance and the office's 'automatic' capital policy are what make the capital answer mandatory rather than discretionary; a hostile reader could press on that seam. (4) PENDING RULE CHANGE — an October 2025 Indiana Supreme Court rules proposal would rewrite Rule 6.1 to add, for the first time, capital post-conviction counsel standards: the State Public Defender 'must appoint at least two qualified post-conviction attorneys,' with experience, mental-health/forensic-expert and mitigation requirements, twelve hours of capital training within two years, and a two-pending-capital-PCR-case cap per attorney. It had NOT been adopted as of the currently published rules (Effective January 1, 2025), so today Indiana has capital trial and appellate counsel standards but no post-conviction counsel standards. (5) P-C.R. 1 was itself amended effective February 2, 2026 (order of January 20, 2026), adding, inter alia, § 1(e) routing Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(k) new-evidence petitions by death-sentenced persons into the successive-petition track of § 12; § 12(c) refers authorized successive petitions to the State Public Defender, who 'may represent the petitioner as provided in Section 9(a).' (6) DEATH PENALTY STATUS — active with people under sentence of death. Indiana resumed executions in December 2024 after roughly a fifteen-year pause; the Corcoran opinion cited above (Dec. 10, 2024) is primary-source evidence of active capital litigation, and press reporting (Indiana Capital Chronicle, IPM) records executions of Joseph Corcoran (Dec. 2024), Benjamin Ritchie (May 2025) and Roy Lee Ward (Oct. 2025). The execution figures come from news reporting, not from a primary source we pulled. (7) CITATION HOUSEKEEPING — Ind. Code §§ 33-40-1-1 to -6 were read in a Justia static compilation of the 2015 Indiana Code (statecodesfiles.justia.com); every section there carries 'As added by P.L.98-2004, SEC.19' and we found no later amending public law, but iga.in.gov serves the current code only through a JavaScript application that returns no text, so the currency of that chapter is inferred from the absence of amendment history rather than confirmed against the live official code. The § 33-40-1-6 appropriation language quoted in the mechanism answer comes from that 2015 compilation. (8) Federal 18 U.S.C. § 3599 counsel was excluded throughout; the Public Defender of Indiana states flatly that it 'do[es] not provide representation in federal court.'
Iowa	No death penalty	Abolished 1965	1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1965 Iowa abolished capital punishment in 1965. 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8), captioned "DEATH PENALTY ABOLISHED" and approved February 24, 1965, struck the death penalty from Iowa Code §§ 690.2, 690.5 and 706.3 (1962), substituted life imprisonment, and repealed ch. 792 (execution procedure); conforming amendments followed in ch. 436 (H.F. 595), approved May 14, 1965. No capital sentence can be imposed today and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books: "capital," "death penalty" and "sentence of death" appear nowhere in Iowa Code ch. 822 (postconviction), ch. 815 (indigent defense) or ch. 13B (state public defender), in the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in the State Public Defender's rules (Iowa Admin. Code ch. 493). Indigent ch. 822 applicants — including people serving life without parole for first-degree murder, Iowa's harshest sentence — do receive appointed counsel and state-paid representation costs under Iowa Code §§ 815.10(1)(a), 815.11(1) and 822.5, but that is a general, non-capital mechanism. AN ACT to abolish the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes View the source document Note: SCORING CAUTION FOR THE GEORGIA COMPARISON: Iowa cannot be counted either for or against the Resource Center's "other 49 states" claim on capital post-conviction counsel. It belongs in the no-death-penalty bucket — it provides nothing capital-specific, but the question is inapplicable, not answered in the negative. Do not score Iowa's general § 815.10/§ 822.5 postconviction-counsel mechanism as a capital mechanism. METHOD ON THE NEGATIVES: every 'no provision exists' statement above rests on a full-text search of a fetched primary document, not on inference. Searched and returning zero hits for "capital" / "death penalty" / "sentence of death": Iowa Code ch. 822 (2026), ch. 815 (2026), ch. 13B (2026), Iowa Ct. R. ch. 2 (Rules of Criminal Procedure, May 2025 compilation), and Iowa Admin. Code ch. 493 (State Public Defender, agency compilation dated 6/10/2026). ABOLITION IS BY STATUTE, NOT COURT DECISION. The operative act is 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8), approved February 24, 1965 — a hostile reader can pull it at the cited legis.iowa.gov URL. We found no Iowa appellate decision stating the abolition year and did not rely on any secondary account of it. REINSTATEMENT ATTEMPTS: bills to restore capital punishment have been introduced repeatedly and have not passed — H.F. 271 (89th G.A., 2021) and S.F. 357 (90th G.A., 2023) are both fetched and cited above. Both are evidence for the negative finding rather than against it: each would have had to direct the Iowa Supreme Court to create competency standards for capital counsel and direct the State Public Defender to assemble qualified lead and co-counsel teams, which is only necessary because none exists. Notably, neither bill's counsel provisions as summarized in the LSA documents reach STATE post-conviction counsel; S.F. 357's post-conviction counsel clause addressed FEDERAL postconviction proceedings — out of scope here and, in any event, never enacted. GENERAL (NON-CAPITAL) PC CONTEXT, for separation only, not re-researched: Iowa Code § 822.5 makes costs and expenses of legal representation available to indigent ch. 822 applicants except those confined in a state institution seeking relief under § 822.2(1)(e) or (f), and not where the applicant is self-represented. § 822.3A (2019, amended 2022) bars pro se filings by represented PCR applicants. UNRESOLVED: we did not locate a primary source fixing the date of Iowa's last execution and therefore make no claim about it.
Kansas	Counsel must be appointed	Active	K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2); Kleypas v. State, 522 P.3d 304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022)	Detail Death penalty: active Kansas provides appointed counsel as of right to an indigent person under sentence of death in state post-conviction proceedings. K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2) says the court 'shall appoint one or more counsel' on an indigency finding, with no merits screening of the kind that governs non-capital 60-1507 movants under 22-4506(b). The Kansas Court of Appeals has construed the provision as conferring 'an absolute right to counsel in district court' and reversed a dismissal entered without the statute's procedures. Counsel is drawn from BIDS's statewide Capital Habeas Office or from a Board-prequalified capital panel, funded by state appropriation, under qualification standards fixed by K.A.R. 105-3-2 that a judge may not waive for capital post-conviction appointments. The one honest qualification: the entitlement attaches upon the filing of the petition rather than before it, so the 60-1507(f) one-year clock runs before the statutory right is triggered. Under K.S.A. 22-4506(d), an indigent person convicted of capital murder has a statutory right to counsel in district court upon a filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion attacking sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507. View the source document Note: DEATH PENALTY STATUS: Active but dormant in execution terms. The Kansas Department of Corrections states 'The State of Kansas has not conducted an execution since 1965'; the current statute was enacted by the 1994 Legislature effective July 1, 1994 (https://www.doc.ks.gov/newsroom/capital). KDOC's page lists nine people under sentence of death as of its November 2016 table (Flack, Kahler, Thurber, Kleypas, Cheever, Gleason, Robinson, J. Carr, R. Carr) and notes Kansas has no separate death row; that table is stale and we did not verify the current population from a primary source. PENDING REPEAL LEGISLATION: SB 245 and HB 2272 (2025-26 biennium), both titled 'Providing that no person shall be sentenced to death for crimes committed after July 1, 2025, and creating the crime of aggravated murder,' remain in the Judiciary committees and have not been enacted (kslegislature.gov measure pages for sb245 and hb2272). Both are PROSPECTIVE ONLY, so even if enacted they would not disturb existing death sentences or the K.S.A. 22-4506(d) capital post-conviction counsel mechanism. AUTHORITY LEVELS: The counsel right is statutory (K.S.A. 22-4506(d), added by L. 1997, ch. 181, § 6 and amended L. 2006, ch. 148, § 4), not a court rule and not constitutional — the Kansas courts hold there is no constitutional right to counsel in a 60-1507 proceeding (McCarty v. State, 32 Kan. App. 2d 402 (2004)). The qualification standards are an agency regulation (K.A.R. 105-3-2, last amended Nov. 9, 2012), not a supreme court order; we quoted it from Cornell LII and independently confirmed the identical text in BIDS's own published compilation, 'Regulations Governing KSBIDS' (static1.squarespace.com asset linked from ksbids.gov). CASE POSTURE: Kleypas is a PUBLISHED Kansas Court of Appeals decision, not a Kansas Supreme Court decision; a the published-opinion record search of kan/kanctapp returned no later Kleypas opinion, but we could not affirmatively verify from a primary source whether a petition for review was filed or denied, so it should be cited as Court of Appeals authority. We cite the P.3d reporter only (522 P.3d 304) because that is the citation the published-opinion record carries; a parallel Kan. App. 2d cite appeared in secondary search results but we did not verify it. FUNDING FIGURES: the $3.1M/all-SGF capital defense unit figure is FY 2021 from a Kansas Legislative Research Department memo dated January 27, 2021, not current-year. GEORGIA COMPARISON: Kansas is squarely a counter-example to the claim that Georgia is the only state without a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism — it has a mandatory statutory entitlement, a dedicated state-funded capital habeas defender office, and non-waivable qualification standards.
Kentucky	Counsel must be appointed	Active, executions halted	RCr 11.42(5); KRS 31.110(2)(c); Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Ky. 2001)	Detail Death penalty: active — capital punishment remains on the books and prisoners remain under sentence of death, but no execution since 2008 (Marco Allen Chapman) and all executions have been enjoined by the Franklin Circuit Court since 2010 Kentucky HAS a state mechanism, and where Kentucky law speaks to appointment it speaks in mandatory terms — but the mandate is conditional and arrives late. RCr 11.42(5) says the court 'shall… appoint counsel'; no Kentucky statute or rule gives a judge discretion to refuse once the conditions are met, so 'discretionary' would be inaccurate. Equally, 'mandatory' should not be read as counsel-of-right on filing: the duty attaches only when the Commonwealth's answer raises a material fact issue requiring a hearing and the movant makes a specific written request, and Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Ky. 2001) overruled the contrary reading of KRS 31.110(2)(c) in Commonwealth v. Ivey. The practical mechanism is institutional rather than rule-driven: a state-appropriated statewide defender agency (DPA, Post-Conviction Branch) that a court appoints on the prisoner's own pro se motion, backed by a statutory entitlement to post-conviction representation in KRS 31.110(2)(c) subject to a DPA-plus-court merit screen. There is no capital-specific entitlement, no capital post-conviction defender office, and no capital counsel qualification standard. For the Georgia committee's purposes: Kentucky is not a state with 'nothing,' but neither is it a Florida-CCRC-style automatic-appointment state. RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant and that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the DPA may provide legal services even without judicial appointment View the source document Note: 1) THE CENTRAL FINDING: Kentucky has no capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision of any kind. Capital and non-capital prisoners travel the identical RCr 11.42 / KRS 31.110(2)(c) route. Any comparison table should flag that Kentucky's 'mandatory' appointment is a general post-conviction rule that happens to cover death-sentenced prisoners, not a capital mechanism. 2) THE APPOINTMENT DUTY IS RULE-BASED, NOT STATUTORY. Fraser v. Commonwealth (Ky. 2001) reallocated the two authorities: RCr 11.42(5) (a Supreme Court rule) fixes when a judge must appoint; KRS 31.110(2)(c) (a statute) fixes when DPA may serve without appointment. Fraser overruled Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980), which had required appointment 'upon request' at any stage. Before 2001, Kentucky would have been coded closer to counsel-as-of-right. Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132 (Ky. 2006) reaffirmed Fraser after the 2002 rewrite of KRS 31.110 and recognized a 'statutory right to counsel' entailing minimally competent representation; the Moore dissent characterized that right as 'conditional and incomplete.' 3) MERIT SCREEN. KRS 31.110(2)(c) lets DPA and the court jointly terminate representation if the proceeding is 'not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense.' KRS 422.285(3) applies the same screen to capital DNA-testing petitions and provides for DPA withdrawal. This is a live off-ramp in capital cases, not a formality. 4) FUNDING IS SPLIT. DPA lawyers are state-appropriated (FY22: $68.3M general funds of a $74.5M total). Direct litigation expenses for 'needy persons confined in a state correctional institution' — the category that captures every death-row post-conviction case — are charged to counties under KRS 31.185(3), (6) and paid from a special account funded by a mandatory 12.5-cents-per-capita county appropriation, with the state Treasury as backstop if that account runs dry. A Georgia reader comparing per-case cost should not treat Kentucky as purely state-funded. 5) EXECUTION MORATORIUM. Kentucky's death-row prisoners brought a Franklin Circuit Court declaratory-judgment action challenging the lethal-injection protocol; that court entered a temporary injunction, and the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to disturb it in Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Shepherd, 336 S.W.3d 98 (Ky. 2011) ('we decline to issue the requested writ or otherwise disturb a temporary injunction issued in the declaratory judgment action by the Franklin Circuit Court'). Press reporting in 2026 indicates the injunction remains in force after the Attorney General moved to dissolve it; we did not fetch a 2026 court order and do not certify that reporting. 6) ORGANIZATIONAL DRIFT. The named 'Capital Post-Conviction Unit' that appeared in DPA's counsel listings in the 1990s does not appear on DPA's current public branch listing, which shows Appeals, Post-Conviction, Juvenile Post-Disposition, and the Kentucky Innocence Project. We found no source stating the unit was abolished versus merged into the Post-Conviction Branch; treat the current locus of capital collateral work as the Post-Conviction Branch. 7) SOURCE ACCESS. courtlistener.com opinion HTML pages could not be retrieved.case.law JSON documents, which fetched cleanly; dpa.ky.gov rate-limits (HTTP 429) intermittently and may need a retry.
Louisiana	Counsel must be appointed	Active	La. R.S. 15:178; State v. Chester, 27 So. 3d 837 (La. 2010)	Detail Death penalty: active Louisiana has an express, mandatory statutory mechanism for appointed counsel in capital state post-conviction proceedings: the sentencing court must, within 30 days of a death sentence, order the statewide office of the state public defender to enroll a separate attorney for state post-conviction, and that office must cause staff or supervised contract counsel to be enrolled (La. R.S. 15:169(A)). The Louisiana Supreme Court has treated the entitlement as a 'statutory right' (State v. Chester) and enforces it through its standing capital decretal (State v. Clark). This is the opposite of the Georgia pattern; nothing in the record supports treating Louisiana as lacking a mechanism. the court, within thirty days of the imposition of the sentence of death, shall order the office of the state public defender to have enrolled at least one attorney for direct appeal and at least one separate attorney for state post conviction proceedings View the source document Note: RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGE (must be flagged): Acts 2025, No. 393 (HB 675), effective Aug. 1, 2025, rewrote Louisiana post-conviction procedure. Enrolled text: https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1426018. Section 2 strengthened R.S. 15:178 — the old text ('the court, after the imposition of the sentence of death, shall appoint the office… to represent the defendant on direct appeal and in any state post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate') became a 30-day duty to order enrollment of at least one appellate attorney AND at least one separate post-conviction attorney, with 'if appropriate' struck. Section 2 also added R.S. 15:169(C) (supplemental funding for capital post-conviction from the Overcollections Fund on JLCB approval). Section 1 repealed the exception that had exempted death-sentenced petitioners from the two-year limitation of art. 930.8(A) (House Legislative Services digest, HB 675 engrossed: https://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1408188), added a transitional window through Aug. 1, 2027, made the limitations jurisdictional and non-excusable, required all capital post-conviction appellate review to go directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and enacted art. 930.11 court/DA timing rules and an abandonment rule for petitioners who fail to seek a ruling. The practical effect for capital petitioners is a first-ever hard filing deadline, which raises the stakes of timely enrollment under R.S. 15:178. AGENCY RESTRUCTURING: Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 22 (SB 8, eff. Mar. 20, 2024; https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1377436) created the office of the state public defender, transferred the Louisiana Public Defender Board's authority to it, repealed R.S. 15:151 and 153-160, and left a Louisiana Public Defender Oversight Board in the office of the governor; the state public defender is a gubernatorial appointee (R.S. 15:152(A)). The capital standards relied on above are rules of the former board still codified in LAC Title 22, Part XV (Chapter 9 promulgated LR 36:998 (May 2010) under R.S. 15:148; §§ XV-309 and XV-503 are older 2002 rules of the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board whose authority notes cite statutes since repealed). A hostile reader could argue the 2002-era rules are stale; the 2010 Chapter 9 guidelines, which speak in terms of 'the state public defender,' are the safer citation, and R.S. 15:178 and 15:169 do the load-bearing work regardless. SECOND, INDEPENDENT HOOK: La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.7 ('Right to counsel'), which applies to all petitioners including capital ones, provides that the court 'may appoint counsel' for an indigent petitioner stating a colorable claim (A)-(B) and 'shall appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner when it orders an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a claim' (C) — https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=112948. That is a mandatory floor at the hearing stage on top of R.S. 15:178. SCOPE DISCIPLINE: 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was not counted; R.S. 15:169(B) in fact bars state-appropriated funds for capital representation in federal court while allowing state post-conviction counsel to accept federal appointments paid by the federal court. Chester makes clear the state right is statutory, not constitutional (citing Murray v. Giarratano), and is waivable by a competent prisoner. SOURCE ACCESS: law.justia.com and caselaw.findlaw.com return 403; casetext.com returns 410; courtlistener.com opinion HTML pages return 202 (its v4 search API works and was used to locate cases); www.lasc.org HTML rule pages return a bot-challenge body, though lasc.org opinion PDFs fetch normally. Case text for State v. Chester was read from Harvard's the digitised case record static file.json), which contains the sentence quoted in the right-cell answer: 'an indigent [inmate] on death row has a statutory right to appointed counsel to pursue post-conviction relief "if appropriate," La. R.S. 15:178, he may knowingly and intelligently waive that purely statutory right.' we did not verify the size of Louisiana's death row or the 2025 resumption of executions against a primary source; press reporting puts the death-sentenced population near 55.
Maine	No death penalty	Abolished 1887	P.L. 1887, ch. 133, § 1 (abolition); 17-A M.R.S. § 1603; Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1887 Maine abolished capital punishment in 1887 and no capital-counsel provision of any kind remains on the books. The Law Court stated the abolition and its consequence directly in Gosselin, citing the abolishing session law. Confirming that nothing residual survives: 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (post-conviction review, §§ 2121-2132) has no capital section; 4 M.R.S. ch. 37 (the public-defense commission) has no capital unit or capital standard; and PDS rule 94-649 ch. 3 lists sixteen specialized counsel panels, none capital, with zero occurrences of 'capital' or 'death.' The only residue of the word 'capital' in Maine law is constitutional and non-capital in effect: the pretrial bail clause of Me. Const. art. We, § 10 and the grand-jury clause of art. We, § 7. Capital crimes or offenses have been unknown in this jurisdiction since capital punishment was abandoned in 1887, P. L. 1887, Chap. 133, Sec. 1 View the source document Note: SCOPE OF THE NEGATIVE, STATED HONESTLY: the Maine Revisor's full-text statute search (legislature.maine.gov/statutes/search.asp) is POST-only and could not be exercised from we, so the finding that no capital-counsel provision survives rests on reading the complete section lists and texts of the two chapters where such a provision would live (15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A, §§ 2121-2132; 4 M.R.S. ch. 37, §§ 1801-1807) plus the full text of the operative PDS eligibility rule — not on an exhaustive code-wide keyword sweep. A hostile reader who ran that sweep would be checking a claim we did not make. WHAT THE ABOLITION SOURCE IS: Gosselin (1945) is a Law Court opinion citing P.L. 1887, ch. 133, § 1 as the abolishing act; we did not pull the 1887 session law itself, and we make no claim about Maine's earlier 19th-century abolition-and-reinstatement sequence, which we did not verify. RECODIFICATION TRAP: the murder-sentencing provision moved. Former 17-A M.R.S. § 1251 was REPEALED by PL 2019, c. 113, Pt. A, § 1 and replaced by § 1603; a citation to § 1251 now resolves to a page reading '(REPEALED)'. STANDARDS RULE IS AN AGENCY RULE, NOT A STATUTE OR COURT ORDER: 94-649 ch. 3 is promulgated by the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services under 4 M.R.S. § 1804(2)(B); an older MCILS-era version of ch. 3 is still reachable on a stale maine.gov path, and the URL cited here is the currently adopted 2025 version linked from maine.gov/pds/about/rules. AGENCY RENAMED AND STILL IN FLUX: MCILS became the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services (PL 2023, c. 558; c. 638), and 4 M.R.S. § 1807 (court appointment of private attorney) is flagged on the Revisor's site as repealed effective 2/01/26 by its own subsection 6 — a Georgia reader comparing structures should not treat Maine's delivery system as settled. FOR THE COMMITTEE'S ACTUAL QUESTION: Maine is not a counterexample to Georgia in either direction. It provides no capital post-conviction counsel mechanism, but only because it has had nothing to appoint counsel for since 1887. Counting Maine as one of the '49 other states' with a mechanism would be wrong; counting it alongside Georgia as a state that denies capital petitioners counsel would be equally wrong.
Maryland	No death penalty	Abolished 2013	2013 Md. Laws ch. 156 (S.B. 276), §§ 1-5; Grandison v. State, 234 Md. App. 564, 174 A.3d 388 (2017) (commutation of the last death sentences)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2013 Maryland repealed the death penalty by Chapter 156 of the Acts of 2013 (S.B. 276), approved May 2, 2013 and effective October 1, 2013. The same Act repealed the capital post-conviction subtitle — Crim. Proc. §§ 7-201 through 7-204 and the subtitle heading "Proceedings After Death Sentences" — and deleted the death-sentence references from §§ 7-101, 7-103(b) and 7-107(b). First-degree murder is now punishable only by life without parole or life (Crim. Law § 2-201(b)). Residual provisions: the Governor may still "change a sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole" (Corr. Servs. § 7-601(a)(1)), and any post-conviction petitioner — capital or not — has a mandatory statutory right to counsel on a first petition under Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a), delivered by the Office of the Public Defender under § 16-204(b)(1)(iii). There is no capital-specific counsel mechanism left on the books. SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That Section(s) 7–201 through 7–204 and the subtitle “Subtitle 2. Proceedings After Death Sentences”; 8–108 and 11–404 of Article – Criminal Procedure of the Annotated Code of Maryland be repealed. View the source document Note: Repeal was prospective: Ch. 156 took effect October 1, 2013 and did not itself vacate sentences already imposed — the General Assembly deliberately preserved the Governor's power to 'change a sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole' (Corr. Servs. § 7-601(a)(1), as amended by the same Act; current text fetched and confirmed). Governor O'Malley used it: Grandison v. State, 234 Md. App. 564 (2017) (fetched at https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2017/2039s14.pdf) states 'Then, in 2015, Governor Martin O'Malley, exercising his pardon power, commuted Grandison's death sentences to sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Executive Order 01.01.2015.05 (Jan. 20, 2015).' That opinion documents the commutation for Grandison specifically; we did not locate a single primary source in this pass reciting the commutation of all remaining condemned prisoners, so the 'no one under sentence of death' proposition rests on the repeal plus that commutation rather than on one instrument covering everyone. TEXTUAL POINT A HOSTILE READER WILL RAISE: § 7-101 now says Title 7 'applies to a person convicted in any court in the State who is: (1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation' — the phrase 'death or' was struck in 2013 — so on the face of the current statute the UPPA counsel right attaches to persons under sentence of imprisonment, and Maryland would have to re-amend it if capital punishment were ever restored. SCOPE LIMITS: the OPD mandate in § 16-204(b)(1)(iii) is expressly limited to 'a postconviction proceeding for which the defendant has a right to an attorney under Title 7' — it does not reach state habeas corpus or motions to correct an illegal sentence. Md. Rule 4-214(b), quoted in Grandison (2012), provides that 'The representation of appointed counsel does not extend to the filing of subsequent discretionary proceedings including… petition for post conviction relief,' so trial/appellate appointment does not carry over; OPD assigns post-conviction counsel separately. NOT VERIFIED: the text of the repealed §§ 7-201 through 7-204 could not be retrieved — Justia and FindLaw are 403, casetext could not be retrieved.onecle 404, the mgaleg legacy statute viewer and the archived returned NotFound/404, and the published-opinion record full-text search returned zero Maryland opinions quoting those sections. What the capital subtitle said about counsel is therefore unknown to this pass; all that is established from the chapter law itself is its title ('Proceedings After Death Sentences') and that former § 7-103(b)(2) sent capital filing deadlines to it. BACKGROUND (official legislative document, not primary law): the Department of Legislative Services fiscal and policy note for S.B. 276 (https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/fnotes/bil_0006/sb0276.pdf) records that OPD's 'Capital Defense Division was disbanded as a separate budget program in fiscal 2010 and renamed the Aggravated Homicide Division,' which provided trial-level capital representation and would be eliminated on repeal; it also reports five death row inmates as of 2010. Relevant to the Georgia claim under test: Maryland is not a counter-example either way — it is a state where the capital post-conviction machinery was repealed along with the punishment, leaving a mandatory general post-conviction counsel right that Georgia does not have.
Massachusetts	No death penalty	Abolished 1984	Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, §§ 68-71 (residual, inoperative); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 2; Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1984 Massachusetts's death penalty was invalidated by the Supreme Judicial Court: District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980) struck the 1979 statute under art. 26 (cruel punishment), and Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) struck the successor statute, St. 1982, c. 554, under art. 12. No capital-sentencing statute has been enacted since; G.L. c. 265, § 2 fixes life without parole for first-degree murder. Residual provisions remain on the books — G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 (trial, sentencing and automatic SJC death-sentence review) and G.L. c. 277, § 47 (permissive trial-stage counsel in 'capital' cases) — but NONE of them provides post-conviction counsel. For the Georgia committee's purposes, Massachusetts cannot be counted among states that supply a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism; it supplies none, and needs none. The death penalty provisions enacted in St. 1982, c. 554, violate art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. They impermissibly burden both the right against self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial guaranteed by that article. View the source document Note: ABOLITION WAS JUDICIAL, NOT LEGISLATIVE. Watson (1980) struck the 1979 statute under art. 26; Colon-Cruz (Oct. 18, 1984) struck St. 1982, c. 554 under art. 12 because death was available only after trial, coercing guilty pleas and jury-trial waivers. The Legislature never repealed the statutes, so G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 are STILL PRINTED as current law on malegislature.gov (see https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleII/Chapter279/Section68 and…/Section71). A hostile reader may cite them; they are inoperative and, critically, none of them mentions post-conviction counsel. FALSE FRIEND — READ THIS BEFORE CITING ANY MASSACHUSETTS 'CAPITAL' AUTHORITY: in current Massachusetts law 'capital case' does not mean death penalty. G.L. c. 278, § 33E defines it as '(i) a case in which the defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the first degree and was convicted of murder in the first degree; or (ii) the third conviction of a habitual offender.' Massachusetts authorities about counsel, appeal, or the § 33E gatekeeper in 'capital cases' therefore concern first-degree murder, NOT a death sentence, and must not be counted as capital post-conviction counsel provisions. Likewise G.L. c. 277, § 47 ('Arraignment in capital cases… assignment of counsel') is a trial-stage, permissive provision. FEDERAL: the federal death penalty still reaches Massachusetts defendants in the U.S. District Court (e.g., the Tsarnaev prosecution), and 18 U.S.C. § 3599 counsel attaches there — that is federal, out of scope, and is not a Massachusetts mechanism. SOURCING LIMITS: the official site is not publicly retrievable, so the current official text of Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 and SJC Rule 3:10 could not be fetched directly; Rule 30(b) and Rule 30(c)(5) are quoted here as the SJC itself set them out in Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591 (2012) and Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000). The Rule 30(c)(5) text quoted in Mains is the version reported at 378 Mass. 900 (1979) ('in his discretion'); the currently published rule reads 'in the exercise of discretion' — a wording change only, appointment remains discretionary either way, but we could not fetch the official current text to verify that wording. the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law, which fetches cleanly and contains the quoted text verbatim.
Michigan	No death penalty	Abolished 1846	Mich Const 1963, art 4, § 46; People v Parks, Docket No. 162086 (Mich, July 28, 2022) (slip op at 24 n 10)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1846 (statute); constitutional prohibition, Const 1963, art 4, § 46, effective January 1, 1964 — no one under sentence of death and reinstatement would require a constitutional amendment Michigan has no death penalty: capital punishment was abolished by statute in 1846 and is prohibited outright by Const 1963, art 4, § 46, effective January 1, 1964, which forecloses the legislature from enacting one. No residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books — the Michigan Court Rules (updated July 31, 2026) contain no capital or death-penalty provision at all, and the sole post-conviction counsel rule, MCR 6.505(A), is discretionary and non-capital-specific. Michigan therefore cannot be counted either for or against the proposition that 49 states provide capital post-conviction counsel; it is a state where the question cannot arise. No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death. View the source document Note: SOURCING CAVEAT a hostile reader should know: legislature.mi.gov (and house.mi.gov) refuse connections from this research host — every HTTPS request returned a connection failure, and the HTTP listener 404s — so the official state text of Const 1963, art 4, § 46 and of the Michigan Compiled Laws could not be pulled directly. The constitutional text cited above is law.onecle.com's reproduction of MCL Chapter 1 (Constitution of Michigan of 1963), which carries the official history line 'Const. 1963, Art. IV, § 46, Eff. Jan. 1, 1964.' It is independently corroborated by the Michigan Supreme Court (People v Parks (2022), fn 10: first state to abolish; last execution 1830) and by the Sixth Circuit en banc in United States v Gabrion (2013) (Michigan is 'a State that lacks the death penalty'). Anyone with access to legislature.mi.gov should re-pull https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Article-IV-46 to confirm. SCOPE POINTS: (1) Abolition here is CONSTITUTIONAL, not merely statutory — unlike states that repealed a death-penalty statute, Michigan's legislature cannot re-enact one without a constitutional amendment, so there is no dormant capital-counsel apparatus waiting to be revived. (2) we searched the full official Michigan Court Rules PDF (updated July 31, 2026, 2.88M characters of extracted text): zero occurrences of 'capital case,' 'capital offense,' 'death penalty,' or 'penalty of death'; the only 'capital' hits are 'capital stock' and 'capital letters.' (3) A defendant CAN be sentenced to death in Michigan under FEDERAL law for a federal crime committed there — Marvin Gabrion was, in the Western District of Michigan — but federal capital habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is not a state mechanism and is excluded per the pass instructions. (4) MCL text (e.g., the Appellate Defender Act, MCL 780.711–780.719, and the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, MCL 780.981–780.1003) could not be fetched; only their titles in the compiled-law index were confirmed. Nothing in that index suggests a capital provision, but the statutory text was not read and no cell above rests on it.
Minnesota	No death penalty	Abolished 1911	Minn. Stat. § 609.185	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1911 Minnesota has had no death penalty since 1911. The gravest homicide, first-degree murder, carries life imprisonment (Minn. Stat. § 609.185), and § 609.10, subd. 1 lists no death sentence among the felony sentences available. No one is or can be under sentence of death, so the capital post-conviction counsel question does not arise. Residual provision on the books: none is capital-specific — Minn. Stat. § 590.05 and § 611.25, subd. 1 give an indigent postconviction petitioner a mandatory claim on the chief appellate public defender only if the petitioner has not already had a direct appeal, and a discretionary one otherwise. For the Georgia committee's purpose, Minnesota is not a state that supplies capital post-conviction counsel; it is a state with nothing to supply it for. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life View the source document Note: (1) Abolition is documented by primary session law: Laws of Minnesota 1911, ch. 387 (H.F. No. 2), approved April 22, 1911, amended R.L. 1905 § 4876 to make first-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment. The 2025 Minnesota Statutes confirm the present state of the law: a full-text fetch of ch. 609 (the entire criminal code) returned zero hits for 'capital punishment', 'punishable by death', 'death penalty', 'sentence of death' or 'capital offense'. (2) Full-text fetches of ch. 590 (postconviction relief), ch. 589 (habeas corpus) and ch. 611 (public defender) returned zero hits for 'capital', 'death sentence', 'sentence of death' or 'death penalty' — there is no dormant capital-counsel provision anywhere in those chapters. (3) One vestigial capital reference survives in the Minnesota Constitution, art. We, § 7: 'All persons before conviction shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.' It is a bail clause with no operative effect and creates no counsel right (https://www.revisor.mn.gov/constitution/). (4) Terminology caution for a hostile reader: what older sources call the 'state public defender's' appellate/postconviction function is now statutorily the 'chief appellate public defender' (Minn. Stat. § 611.24, as amended); § 590.05 still says 'state public defender'. (5) The § 590.05 / § 611.25 duty is split — mandatory ('shall represent') only for a petitioner who has not already had a direct appeal, discretionary ('may represent') for all other § 590.01 petitioners. In a hypothetical capital system, where direct appeal is automatic, that structure would leave a first post-conviction petitioner in the discretionary tier. (6) Minnesota's public defender funding is a capped state appropriation to the Board of Public Defense (§ 611.27, subds. 1, 7); there is no separate capital or post-conviction funding stream. (7) Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was not counted and is irrelevant here.
Mississippi	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1)(ii); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9); Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017)	Detail Death penalty: active Mississippi provides appointed counsel as of right for indigent prisoners under sentence of death in their FIRST state post-conviction proceeding, through a dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. The duty is stated in mandatory terms: the Supreme Court 'shall' order the indigence/counsel determination immediately after the direct appeal, and appointment 'shall be made by the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel' (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9)). The petitioner may decline and proceed pro se only after an informed, voluntary, on-the-record election, in which case appointed counsel remains as advisor. The entitlement is limited to initial petitions; there is no Rule 22(c) right to appointed counsel for successive capital PCR petitions, though CPCC represents many successive petitioners in fact. Where a petitioner is sentenced to death the Supreme Court shall, immediately after the announcement of the decision on direct appeal, order that the convicting court determine whether the petitioner is indigent and, if so, whether the petitioner desires appointment of counsel View the source document Note: SOURCE ARCHITECTURE: the operative appointment machinery is a COURT RULE — Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)-(e), adopted by Mississippi Supreme Court order effective June 24, 1999 and amended effective July 27, 2000 — working in tandem with statute. The statutory side is the Capital Post-Conviction Counsel Act, H.B. 1228, 2000 Miss. Laws ch. 569, codified at Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-101 to 99-39-119, plus Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9) (appointment) and § 99-15-18 (compensation of non-CPCC appointed counsel). Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017), states the history directly: 'The current version of Rule 22(c) was adopted by this Court in 2000 in tandem with the Legislature's enactment of House Bill 1228.' A reader looking only at the Mississippi Code will miss the entitlement language, which lives in Rule 22(c)(1)(i). CITATION LIMITS: Justia and FindLaw return HTTP 403 and billstatus.ls.state.ms.us (the Mississippi Legislature's bill text server) is unreachable from here, so the full verbatim text of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9) could not be pulled from a code publisher. Its operative language is quoted in the Mississippi Attorney General's Oct. 6, 2025 filing (fetched and read), and Brown and Rule 22 independently corroborate the mechanism; every quote recorded above comes from a document actually fetched and read at the cited URL. SCOPE: the right runs to the initial capital PCR petition only — Brown holds Rule 22(c) inapplicable to successive petitions, which must clear the UPCCRA time and successive-writ bars, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2)(b), 99-39-27(9); in practice CPCC nonetheless serves as counsel in the majority of successive petitions. FEDERAL HABEAS IS EXCLUDED from this finding: CPCC's representation ends when federal habeas proceedings begin unless a federal court appoints a CPCC attorney (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-107). OFFICE STATUS: CPCC is not unfunded or vacant — it is an operating independent state agency (www.pcc.ms.gov) with five attorneys, two mitigation specialists, one investigator and an office administrator, nine authorized positions, and an FY2026 appropriation of $1,996,447 general funds plus $206,000; its FY2026-2030 strategic plan concedes historical staff instability but reports 'Staff is now stabilized.' DEATH PENALTY: active. MDOC's current death row page reports 35 people under sentence of death and records the last execution as Charles Ray Crawford on October 15, 2025 (https://www.mdoc.ms.gov/general-public/death-row/current-death-row-demographics). BEARING ON THE GEORGIA CLAIM: Mississippi is not a counterexample to the Resource Center's assertion — it is squarely on the other side of it, with a funded, statutorily created capital post-conviction defender office and a rule-based entitlement to qualified counsel.
Missouri	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.1 (L. 1997 S.B. 56); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(a); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.036(a); Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004)	Detail Death penalty: active MANDATORY, and among the stronger provisions in the country: not one appointed lawyer but two, on a 30-day deadline, with statutory qualification standards, a bar on trial/direct-appeal counsel serving, a state-funded compensation-and-expenses obligation on the State Public Defender, and a rule that the prisoner may not even waive the appointment absent a competency finding. The duty appears BOTH in a statute enacted by the General Assembly in 1997 (Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370, from S.B. 56) and in Supreme Court of Missouri Rules 29.16 and 24.036, so it does not depend on either source alone. The claim that Georgia is the only state without a mechanism is not contradicted or supported by Missouri in isolation, but Missouri plainly HAS a mechanism. If the movant is indigent, the court shall cause to be appointed two counsel to represent the movant. View the source document Note: SCOPE: only state capital post-conviction was measured; 18 U.S.C. sec. 3599 federal habeas counsel is excluded and plays no part in any cell. STATUTE PLUS RULE: Missouri's capital post-conviction counsel right rests on two independent footings — Mo. Rev. Stat. secs. 547.360/547.370, enacted by L. 1997 S.B. 56 and effective Aug. 28, 1997 (never since amended), and Missouri Supreme Court Rules 29.15/29.16 and 24.035/24.036. Where Missouri Supreme Court procedural rules and a statute conflict, the rules govern (Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 5), but here they are substantively parallel. ONE DIVERGENCE WORTH FLAGGING: sec. 547.370.1 requires the court to make an on-the-record indigency finding and to appoint two counsel 'If the movant is indigent'; Rule 29.16(a) states the two-counsel duty without an express indigency condition. RULE HISTORY: Rule 29.16 was adopted Nov. 19, 1996, effective July 1, 1997, and amended by court order Apr. 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021; the amendment lengthened the capital amended-motion window from 60 to 180 days (extendable 90 more for good cause). Rule 29.16(f) makes the current version applicable to motions filed on or after Jan. 1, 2021; Rule 29.15(m) preserves the earlier text for older sentences. GUILTY-PLEA TRACK: Rule 24.036 mirrors Rule 29.16 verbatim for a death sentence entered after a guilty plea — verified separately at courts.mo.gov. WAIVER: a death-sentenced movant cannot reject appointed counsel unless the court finds on the record he is competent to decide and understands the consequences (R. 29.16(a); sec. 547.370.1). LIMIT ON THE RIGHT: Missouri treats ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as categorically unreviewable (Hutchison, 150 S.W.3d 292, citing State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 871 (Mo. banc 1992)), so the mandatory appointment carries no enforceable performance guarantee; and Rule 29.15(l)/sec. 547.360.12 bar successive motions, so the entitlement attaches to the FIRST motion only. FUNDING: state, by annual appropriation to the State Public Defender system (sec. 600.040.2), with cities/counties furnishing only office space and utilities for district offices (sec. 600.040.1) — i.e. state-funded for present purposes, not county-funded. WHAT we COULD NOT VERIFY: (a) publicdefender.mo.gov returned a connection failure (HTTP 000) from we on every attempt, so MSPD's internal Capital Division / Appellate-PCR Division structure and staffing rest on secondary description only and are flagged as such inside the mechanism cell rather than asserted; (b) courts.mo.gov page.jsp and file.jsp return 403 (only the ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly document paths respond), so the 2021 Driskill capital PCR opinion could not be pulled and the applied example is the 2004 Hutchison decision instead; (c) courtlistener.com HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law; (d) Missouri's current death-row population (reported as nine as of July 2026) comes from press reporting, not a primary source, and is not relied on by any cell — the death_penalty_status field records only that the death penalty is active, which the operative 2020/2021 rule amendment and continued capital PCR litigation independently confirm; (e) counsel for successive motions or for a Rule 91 state habeas petition by a death-sentenced prisoner was not researched, being outside the 'first post-conviction' question.
Montana	Counsel must be appointed	Active, executions halted	Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3); In re Amending This Court's Standards for Competency of Counsel for Indigent Persons in Death Penalty Cases, No. 97-326 (Mont. July 16, 2002) (Standards Part III, postconviction phase)	Detail Death penalty: active — capital punishment remains on the books (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103 still prescribes execution by lethal injection, verified in the 2025 MCA), but Montana has carried out no execution since 2006, two men (Ronald Allen Smith and William Gollehon) remain under sentence of death, and executions have been enjoined since an October 2015 Montana First Judicial District Court ruling that pentobarbital is not the 'ultra-fast-acting barbiturate' § 46-19-103(3) requires (that 2015 order was not itself fetched as a primary source and is reported here on secondary reporting only) Montana law entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction petition, by statute, on the court's own initiative, at state expense. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) obliges the sentencing court to notify the prisoner within 30 days of finality and to order the Office of the State Public Defender to assign qualified counsel within 75 days; the entitlement survives a change in financial circumstances ('the court shall order the assignment of counsel'); counsel must meet capital-specific competency standards adopted by the Montana Supreme Court (AF 97-326, Part III); and OPD pays. Montana is therefore NOT in Georgia's position. The honest qualifications for a hostile reader: the right is mandatory but unenforceable through post-conviction itself (§ 46-21-201(3)(f)), the qualification standards rest on a court order rather than a statute, and the provision has no reported application because Montana's death row is two men, both sentenced before it was enacted. If a petitioner entitled to counsel under this subsection (3) is determined not to be indigent but becomes indigent at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, the court shall order the assignment of counsel as provided in subsection (3)(b)(i). View the source document Note: 1) SOURCE HIERARCHY: the entitlement is STATUTORY (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3), added by Sec. 6, Ch. 378, L. 1997, per the section's own History note, and amended by Sec. 19, Ch. 358, L. 2017 when the Office of the State Public Defender was restructured under § 2-15-1029). The QUALIFICATION STANDARDS are NOT statutory — they were adopted by Montana Supreme Court order in administrative file AF 97-326 (June 29, 1999) and amended July 16, 2002. A committee drafting a Georgia analogue should note the two-instrument structure: statute creates the right and the funding, a supreme-court order supplies the competency floor and a clerk-maintained registry, and the statute cross-references the order (§ 46-21-201(3)(a)). 2) THE ENFORCEMENT GAP is the single most important qualifier and the Attorney General's office will find it: § 46-21-201(3)(f) says 'Violation of this subsection (3) is not a basis for a claim or relief under this chapter,' and Part IV of AF 97-326 repeats it. A prisoner who is never notified, never assigned counsel, or assigned unqualified counsel has a mandatory right with no post-conviction remedy for its breach. 3) DEADLINE MISMATCH: the one-year clock of § 46-21-102(1) starts at finality and is not tolled by appointment, while the court has up to 75 days after finality merely to order the assignment — a structural squeeze absent from states that run the capital clock from appointment. 4) NO DEDICATED CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION OFFICE: unlike Florida's CCRC or Texas's OCFW, Montana routes capital post-conviction to its general statewide public defender agency. There is no capital PCR unit and no state resource center. 5) UNTESTED IN PRACTICE: we could not locate any reported decision applying § 46-21-201(3), and we have recorded that as a negative finding rather than inferring that the provision works. capital_pc_practice's quote is the Supreme Court's registry provision, which is standing machinery, not a case applying the statute; applied_example is deliberately null. 6) NOT COUNTED: 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel plays no part in this assessment, and § 46-21-201(2) (non-capital post-conviction, conditioned on a required hearing or the interests of justice, and narrowed by § 46-8-104(2)'s 'extraordinary circumstances' limit) was excluded as out of scope. 7) BEARING ON THE GEORGIA CLAIM: on these sources Montana is a state with a mandatory capital post-conviction appointment mechanism, so it does not contradict the Georgia Resource Center's characterization — though the enforcement carve-out in (3)(f) means Montana's right is weaker than a flat 'shall appoint' would suggest.
Nebraska	A court may appoint counsel	Active	Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004; State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993)	Detail Death penalty: active Nebraska provides a mechanism, but it is discretionary and not capital-specific. A prisoner under sentence of death seeking first state post-conviction relief is governed by the general Nebraska Postconviction Act; § 29-3004 says the district court 'may appoint' up to two attorneys, and the Nebraska Supreme Court reviews a refusal only for abuse of discretion. Nebraska case law supplies a floor — a movant who presents a justiciable issue of law or fact is entitled to appointment, and the court has reversed a denial and ordered counsel appointed for a death-sentenced prisoner (Mata III) — but a death sentence itself triggers nothing. State v. Victor squarely applied the discretionary rule to a death row inmate and affirmed the denial of counsel. So Nebraska is neither Georgia (nothing at all) nor Florida/Arizona (a mandatory capital PC office): it is court-appointment-on-discretion, with a statewide defender office (the NCPA capital litigation division) available to take the appointment when a court makes one. This power is within the discretion of the district court, and failure to appoint counsel in postconviction proceedings is not error in the absence of an abuse of discretion. View the source document Note: Death penalty status: Nebraska's Legislature abolished capital punishment by L.B. 268 (2015) over the Governor's veto, but the act was suspended by referendum petition and rejected by the electorate at the November 2016 general election, restoring the death penalty; the Nebraska Legislature's own statute pages carry the notation 'Referendum 2016, No. 426 — Note: The changes made to section [29-3920/29-3928/29-3930] by Laws 2015, LB 268… have been omitted because of the vote on the referendum at the November 2016 general election.' Death remains the authorized penalty for a Class we felony under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1), Nebraska executed Carey Dean Moore in 2018, and State v. Trail (2025) confirms prisoners remain under sentence of death. Note that the capital litigation division and the chief counsel's capital-experience requirement survived only because the referendum nullified L.B. 268's amendments to §§ 29-3928 and 29-3930 — the 2015 repeal would have stripped that language out. What a careful reader must know: (1) Nothing in Nebraska law distinguishes a capital post-conviction petitioner from any other post-conviction petitioner on the counsel question. There is no capital PCR unit within the judiciary, no state-funded resource center, no qualified-counsel roster, and no capital-specific appointment trigger. (2) The one place Nebraska is materially better than a pure 'no mechanism' state is the NCPA — a real, staffed statewide office with a statutory capital litigation division that accepts post-conviction and state habeas appointments. But it is appointment-dependent and funded solely from a $3-per-case court filing fee (§§ 29-3921, 33-156), generating under $900,000 for the entire agency in FY 2024-2025. (3) The deadline finding is the sharpest one for a study committee: because § 29-3001(4) runs from finality regardless of appointment, and because State v. Trail holds equitable tolling unavailable 'even in capital cases,' a Nebraska death-sentenced prisoner can lose the entire one-year window while pro se and waiting on a discretionary appointment. (4) The 'justiciable issue' entitlement is judge-made (State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608 (1988)), not statutory, and is enforced only through abuse-of-discretion review after the fact. (5) 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel is excluded from all of the above and formed no part of any finding here.
Nevada	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.820(1); Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997)	Detail Death penalty: active Nevada mandates appointment of counsel for an indigent prisoner under sentence of death on a first state post-conviction habeas petition. NRS 34.820(1) uses 'shall' and pairs appointment with a mandatory stay of execution. Delivery is by district-court appointment from each judicial district's SCR 250 list rather than through a dedicated capital post-conviction defender office, and compensation is charged to the state Department of Indigent Defense Services rather than to counties. The one qualification a careful reader should carry forward is sequencing, not entitlement: the duty attaches once a first petition is filed, and the NRS 34.726 one-year deadline runs from remittitur whether or not counsel has yet been appointed. the court shall: (a) Appoint counsel to represent the petitioner; and (b) Stay execution of the judgment pending disposition of the petition and the appeal. View the source document Note: DEATH PENALTY ON THE BOOKS: NRS 200.030(4)(a) still authorizes punishment 'By death' for first-degree murder where aggravators outweigh mitigators (verified at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-200.html). Nevada has not abolished capital punishment; abolition bills have not been enacted. As background only — NOT verified against a primary source in this pass — no execution has been carried out in Nevada since 2006, so the capital post-conviction machinery operates against a de facto pause in executions. SOURCE OF THE STANDARDS: the qualification standards live in Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250, adopted and amended by court order (the version fetched is 'Amended; effective July 8, 2019'), not in statute; SCR 250(1) expressly extends the rule to 'proceedings for post-conviction relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence of death,' and SCR 250(2) 'prevail[s] over any inconsistent statute or court rule' per the preceding rule. NO DEDICATED OFFICE: unlike Florida (CCRC), Arizona or Texas (OCFW), Nevada has no statewide capital post-conviction defender or resource center; every appointment is case-by-case, and SCR 250(2)(f) caps first-petition representation at a single attorney. STATUTORY-MANDATE CONSEQUENCE: because appointment is mandatory rather than discretionary, Nevada recognizes a state-law right to EFFECTIVE post-conviction counsel in capital cases (Crump; McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 165 n.5 (1996)) — a right Crump says 'does not arise if the counsel was appointed pursuant to the court's discretion.' This is a material difference from states whose capital PC counsel is discretionary. STATUTORY CURRENCY: NRS 34.820 was last amended in 2023; NRS 34.750 was amended in 2023 and 2025 (the 2025 change routes costs through the Department of Indigent Defense Services). OCR ARTIFACT: the digitized McNelton text at static.case.law renders the statutory subsection as '34.820(l)(a)' with a lowercase letter l where the printed opinion has the numeral 1; the quote is reproduced verbatim from the fetched source. UNVERIFIED OBSERVATION, flagged so no one relies on it: the the published-opinion record docket metadata for Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 (2018) lists the Federal Public Defender for the District of Nevada and assistant federal defenders as counsel for the appellant in a STATE capital post-conviction appeal, suggesting federal defender resources supplement Nevada's state mechanism in practice. We could not follow through to a fetchable primary document for that (courtlistener.com opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law), so it is recorded as an observation only and is NOT counted as part of the state mechanism.
New Hampshire	A court may appoint counsel	Abolished 2019	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:2, I	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2019 (prospective only) — one person remains under sentence of death New Hampshire is not a 'no mechanism' state, but neither does it guarantee counsel. Appointment in a capital post-conviction proceeding rests on the general indigent-defense statute, RSA 604-A:2, we, which conditions the duty to appoint on a judicial finding that 'the interests of justice or judicial economy require' it; the NH Judicial Council's own capital post-conviction guidelines describe this as the court exercising 'its discretion to appoint counsel.' If a court does appoint, the Judicial Council must supply counsel meeting its September 2015 capital post-conviction eligibility and performance standards, paid from the state indigent-defense appropriation. There is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no automatic or mandatory appointment, and no deadline keyed to counsel. Death penalty repealed prospectively in 2019; RSA 630:5 remains in force and one person remains under sentence of death, so the machinery is live rather than vestigial. In a post-conviction proceeding in which a defendant seeks to attack the validity of an underlying conviction, the court shall appoint counsel or approve a request for services other than counsel when the interests of justice or judicial economy require. View the source document Note: REPEAL IS PROSPECTIVE ONLY. Laws 2019, ch. 42 (HB 455-FN), enacted without the Governor's signature and effective May 30, 2019, amended RSA 630:1, III to substitute life without parole for death, but § 42:2 provides: 'Section 1 of this act shall apply to persons convicted of capital murder on or after the effective date of this act.' (https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2019/HB0455.html). RSA 630:5 — the entire capital sentencing, automatic-review, proportionality-review and execution-method apparatus — was never repealed and remains in the code (https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/630/630-mrg.htm). Michael Addison, sentenced to death in December 2008 and affirmed in State v. Addison (Capital Murder — Proportionality Review), 167 N.H. 562 (2015), remains under sentence of death; his repeal-based collateral challenge was argued in the New Hampshire Supreme Court on March 26, 2026 and, as of September 7, 2026, no decision was found on the published-opinion record. TWO BILLS TO RESTORE THE DEATH PENALTY (HB 1737-FN and HB 1749) were introduced in the 2026 session; HB 1737-FN was killed as Inexpedient to Legislate on February 19, 2026 (https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/billinfo.aspx?id=1562&inflect=1). THE OPERATIVE CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION AUTHORITY IS AN AGENCY GUIDELINE, NOT LAW. The 'Eligibility Guidelines and Performance Standards: Capital Post-Conviction Representation' were adopted by the New Hampshire Judicial Council in September 2015 — not by statute and not by supreme-court order. They are internally consistent with, and expressly presuppose, discretionary judicial appointment; they create no entitlement to counsel and, on their face, bind only counsel once appointed. They remain published on the Council's forms-and-publications page as of the January 5, 2026 archived capture, more than six years after repeal. SOURCE-ACCESS CAVEAT: courts.nh.gov and judicialcouncil.nh.gov both return HTTP 403, so the Judicial Council standards and the Addison brief are cited to Internet Archive captures of the official PDFs (the archived URLs above return the documents' full text). NEGATIVE FINDINGS, WITH WHAT WAS SEARCHED: RSA ch. 604-A (indigent defense), ch. 604-B (public defender program), ch. 630 (homicide), ch. 526 (new trials) and ch. 534 (habeas corpus) were read in full and contain no capital post-conviction counsel provision; N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 32 (counsel in criminal cases) and R. 47 (counsel fees, indigent criminal cases) and the N.H. Rules of Criminal Procedure were read and contain no capital counsel qualification standard — Rule 47 treats capital murder only as a $150/hour, $19,000-cap fee tier. the published-opinion record full-text searches of the New Hampshire corpus for RSA 604-A:2 combined with 'post-conviction,' and for capital post-conviction counsel, returned no decision construing the clause. Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was excluded throughout and is not counted here.
New Jersey	No death penalty	Abolished 2007	L.2007, c.204 (approved Dec. 17, 2007), amending N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619 (2009)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2007 New Jersey abolished the death penalty by L.2007, c.204, approved and effective December 17, 2007, and no one has been under sentence of death since the Governor's contemporaneous commutation of the eight remaining death sentences (State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619, 624 (2009)). NO residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books: the sole capital-specific PCR rule, R. 3:22-12(b) ('Capital Causes; Petition'), was deleted effective September 1, 2017, and neither R. 3:22-6 nor N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-1 et seq. has ever contained a capital-specific counsel clause. The generally applicable rule — mandatory, not capital-specific — is R. 3:22-6(a): on a first PCR petition from an indigent defendant convicted of an indictable offense, the court 'shall as of course' assign the Office of the Public Defender. Under R. 3:22-3, PCR is 'the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime,' so there is no separate state habeas track with its own counsel rule. AN ACT to eliminate the death penalty and allow for life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, revising various parts of the statutory law, repealing P.L.1983, c.245, and supplementing Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. View the source document Note: (1) SCOPE CAVEAT FOR THE COMMITTEE: New Jersey cannot be counted either for or against the Georgia Resource Center's claim without qualification. It has no capital post-conviction counsel mechanism because it has no capital sentences — not because it declined to create one. Its general PCR counsel rule is mandatory on a first petition. (2) The abolition did NOT self-execute as to existing death sentences. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b (L.2007, c.204, s.2) gave each death-sentenced inmate 60 days to move for resentencing and waive further sentencing appeals, and provided that otherwise 'the inmate shall remain under the sentence of death previously imposed by the sentencing court.' The eight men on death row left it by executive commutation, not by the statute. (3) The residual capital PCR provision was removed by COURT ORDER, not by the Legislature: R. 3:22-12(b) ('Capital Causes; Petition' — 30 days from denial of certiorari on direct appeal) was deleted by Supreme Court order of July 28, 2017, effective September 1, 2017, per the official Note to R. 3:22-12. Secondary reproductions of the New Jersey rules still circulating online (e.g. courtcaddy.com) show the deleted capital paragraph as if current; it is not. (4) SOURCING DISCLOSURE on the rule text: njcourts.gov retired its per-rule PDFs and now serves the Rules of Court only through a JavaScript-only viewer that returns no rule text to a fetch. The cited URL is the Judiciary's own r3-22.pdf as archived; the November 2018, June 2022 and July 2023 captures are byte-identical, and the 2023, 2024 and 2025 Omnibus Rule Amendment Orders (n230804b.pdf, n240719c.pdf, n250808a.pdf, all live on njcourts.gov) contain no amendment to R. 3:22, so the text is current. The January 14, 2010 amendment order (njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2010/01/n100119c.pdf) independently corroborates the R. 3:22-6A and R. 3:22-12 text. (5) Under R. 3:22-3 post-conviction relief is the exclusive collateral remedy, so New Jersey has no separate state habeas proceeding requiring its own counsel analysis. (6) Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. s. 3599 is out of scope and is not counted anywhere above. (7) The OPD's capital infrastructure is genuinely gone, not merely dormant: its current public description of divisions lists no capital unit, and its August 2024 pool-attorney guidelines contain no capital or death-penalty practice category.
New Mexico	No death penalty	Abolished 2009	N.M. Laws 2009, ch. 11 (H.B. 285), §§ 1, 5-6; residual provision: Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA; Fry v. Lopez and Allen v. LeMaster, 2019-NMSC-013, 447 P.3d 1086	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2009 (prospectively, for crimes on or after July 1, 2009); no one under sentence of death since June 28, 2019, when the Supreme Court vacated the last two death sentences in Fry v. Lopez New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009 — H.B. 285, Laws 2009, ch. 11, 'ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY; PROVIDING FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE OR PAROLE' — but only prospectively: section 6 applies the act 'to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009,' which left Robert Fry and Timothy Allen under sentence of death until the Supreme Court vacated both sentences on June 28, 2019 (Fry v. Lopez, 2019-NMSC-013). No one is now under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: the capital post-conviction counsel mechanism remains on the books and is MANDATORY. Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA still requires that, upon the mandate affirming a death sentence, 'the district court shall promptly appoint counsel to represent the defendant,' with the 180-day habeas deadline running from that appointment and the execution stayed meanwhile. So had New Mexico a death row, its answer would be 'mandatory' — appointment automatic on affirmance, no indigency screen in the capital paragraph, and the clock keyed to counsel rather than to finality. RELATING TO CAPITAL FELONY SENTENCING; ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY; PROVIDING FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE OR PAROLE. View the source document Note: 1) The capital counsel provision is a COURT RULE adopted by Supreme Court order, not a statute — Rule 5-802 NMRA, amendment history ending with Supreme Court Order No. 17-8300-025, effective for cases pending or filed on or after December 31, 2017. We checked the New Mexico Supreme Court's published approved-amendments lists for 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 and Rule 5-802 appears in none of them, so the text quoted here is current. The copy we cite is hosted on a New Mexico judiciary domain (Twelfth Judicial District Court). 2) The 2009 repeal was partial in an important way: it repealed §§ 31-14-1 to 31-14-16, 31-18-14.1, 31-20A-1, 31-20A-2.1 to 31-20A-4 and 31-20A-6 NMSA 1978, but the Capital Felony Sentencing Act framework continued to govern pre-July-2009 crimes, which is why Fry and Allen remained death-sentenced for another decade. 3) Fry rests on the STATUTORY comparative-proportionality command of former § 31-20A-4(C)(4), not on a constitutional holding; the Court expressly declined to reach the constitutional questions. 4) A 2025 reinstatement bill, SB 187 (death penalty for murder of a peace officer), died — the nmlegis action record shows 'Action Postponed Indefinitely.' The LFC fiscal impact report on that bill records LOPD's position that capital defense requires 'a team with at least two attorneys with specialized training, one investigator, and someone trained in screening for mental and psychological issues,' and lists LOPD's projected costs as recurring General Fund. If New Mexico ever restores capital sentencing, Rule 5-802(L) would operate again without further legislative action. 5) SCOPE CAUTION on the standards cell: Rule 12-302(G) NMRA is an appellate rule for 'capital appellate counsel.' Rule 5-802(L)(7) routes capital habeas appeals to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, so 12-302(G) would reach counsel on such an appeal by its terms, but we found no decision so holding, and there is no qualification standard whatever for the counsel the district court must appoint under 5-802(L)(1). 6) UNVERIFIED LEAD, not relied on: Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, 267 P.3d 806, is Timothy Allen's capital habeas case in the Supreme Court and would be the best applied example of the district-court mechanism in operation. We could not obtain its text — the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law's 267 P.3d nor its N.M. vol. 150 metadata. Nothing in this table depends on it. 7) we also could not fetch NMSA 1978, § 31-16-3 (Indigent Defense Act) in primary form — Justia 403s, onecle has no New Mexico path, and nmonesource's per-chapter PDF IDs are not ordered by chapter number (4364 = ch. 10, 4383 = ch. 14, 4384 = ch. 24, 4385 = ch. 32), so we did not locate chapter 31. That section is cited only inside the quoted text of Rule 5-802(H)(2)(c), which governs NON-capital appointments and is out of scope here; no capital cell rests on it. 8) Federal counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is not counted anywhere above. 9) For the Georgia comparison the measurement is: New Mexico's capital post-conviction provision is mandatory, automatic on affirmance, institutionally routed to the state public defender, and deadline-protective (clock runs from appointment, execution stayed) — but it is presently a dead letter because the state has neither a death penalty nor anyone under sentence of death.
New York	Counsel must be appointed	No one under sentence	N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b), (2), (9)	Detail Death penalty: no one under sentence — the death penalty statute was never repealed (Penal Law § 60.06 still directs that a first-degree-murder defendant may be sentenced 'to death'; Penal Law § 125.27 and CPL 400.27 remain in force), but it has been unenforceable since People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004) struck CPL 400.27(10)'s deadlock instruction and held only the Legislature could cure it; the Legislature has not, and the last death sentence was vacated in People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007). Functionally abolished by judicial decision (2004), formally still on the books. New York law mandates appointed, state-paid counsel for an indigent person under sentence of death on a first state post-conviction motion. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b) provides that such a defendant 'shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel'; § 35-b(2) provides that the trial court 'shall assign' lead counsel for the initial CPL 440.10/440.20 motion and the Court of Appeals 'shall assign' counsel for the appeal; § 35-b(9) makes the cost a state charge; and 22 NYCRR § 515.2 sets qualification standards specific to capital post-conviction counsel. The mandate is real on the books but DORMANT: New York's death-sentencing statute has been unenforceable since People v. LaValle (2004), the last death sentence was vacated in People v. Taylor (2007), no one is under sentence of death, and the Capital Defender Office that administers the roster closed in 2008. New York therefore is not a working comparator for a live capital post-conviction system, but neither is it a state whose law provides nothing — the entitlement, the appointing courts, the state funding and the qualification standards all remain enacted law. the defendant shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel and investigative, expert and such other reasonably necessary services in accordance with the provisions of this section. View the source document Note: 1) DO NOT read New York as evidence that a live capital post-conviction counsel system operates in the state. The § 35-b entitlement is mandatory in text and still enacted, but there has been no death-sentenced prisoner in New York since 2007 and the Capital Defender Office branches closed in 2005 and 2008. The verdict is 'mandatory' because that is what the enacted statute says, not because the mechanism is operating; 'no_death_penalty' was rejected because New York never repealed its death penalty statute — a hostile reader can pull Penal Law § 60.06 and find the word 'death' still there. 2) The § 35-b entitlement covers only the FIRST post-judgment motion; a successive CPL 440.10/440.20 motion carries no right to appointed counsel and, under CPL 460.40(3) and 22 NYCRR § 510.4(c), no stay of execution absent good cause. 3) The qualification standards are a Court of Appeals RULE (22 NYCRR Part 515) adopted on the CDO's proposal under Judiciary Law § 35-b(4)(b)(iv), not a statute. 4) SOURCING CAVEAT on the standards cell: nycourts.gov and nysenate.gov both return HTTP 403 (Cloudflare), justia returns 403, and casetext returns 410, so 22 NYCRR § 515.2 is cited to an Internet Archive capture of the Court of Appeals' own published rule text (captured 2008-07-24). Part 515 still appears in current NYCRR indexes, but we could not fetch a live official copy to confirm it has not since been amended or repealed; treat the rule's continued currency as unverified. 5) The § 35-b and CPL texts are cited to public.law, which mirrors nysenate.gov and records the source as accessed 2026-09-05, two days before this pass. 6) A bill to strip death-penalty references from New York law (S5291, 2025-26 session) has reportedly been introduced; we could not verify its text or status because nysenate.gov blocks we, so nothing in this record depends on it. 7) Judiciary Law § 35-b(12) expressly excludes federal habeas: the section does not authorize counsel or services 'with respect to the filing, litigation, or appeal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in any federal court' — so nothing recorded here is 18 U.S.C. § 3599 counsel. 8) The LaValle and Taylor opinions were read in full at.json and.json (the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.
North Carolina	Counsel must be appointed	Active, executions halted	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(c), (c1); State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276 (1998)	Detail Death penalty: active — capital punishment remains in force; 122 people on death row per the N.C. Department of Adult Correction roster, but no execution since Samuel Flippen on Aug. 18, 2006 (de facto moratorium) MANDATORY. North Carolina is a clean counterexample to the claim that Georgia's absence of a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism is unique. An indigent prisoner under sentence of death who applies to the Office of Indigent Defense Services within 10 days of the triggering direct-appeal event (§ 7A-451(c)) is presumed indigent if previously adjudicated indigent, and IDS 'shall appoint two counsel' (§ 7A-451(c1)) — a duty, not a discretion, exercisable without a hearing (§ 7A-451(c2)) and implemented by IDS Rule 2C.2(a) ('The IDS Director shall appoint two lawyers'). The N.C. Supreme Court has read the statute the same way, describing it as one that 'requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants.' Counsel are private lawyers from a statewide qualification roster, appointed and paid by a state-appropriated agency; the 120-day MAR deadline runs from the latest of six events, one of which is the appointment of that counsel (§ 15A-1415(a)(6)). The single honest qualification: the entitlement is triggered by the prisoner's own timely application rather than appointed sua sponte, and it covers the first MAR — successor MARs require the IDS Director's pre-approval for compensation. requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants View the source document Note: 1) SOURCE OF THE STANDARDS: North Carolina's qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel are NOT in a statute or a supreme-court order. They are IDS Commission rules (Rules for Providing Legal Representation in Capital Cases, Part 2 and its Appendix), adopted under the delegation in § 7A-498.5(c)(7) and § 7A-451(d). The Commission can change them by its own vote. The current Part 2 rules file is the August 2026 posting on ncids.org; Part 2C itself carries the notation 'Amended Effective September 25, 2015' and the Appendix 'Amended Effective May 29, 2015' — i.e., the post-conviction subpart has been stable for a decade. 2) THE APPLICATION WINDOW IS THE ONE SOFT SPOT. § 7A-451(c) appointment is triggered by the prisoner's application 'no later than 10 days' from the latest of the three specified direct-appeal events. Nothing in Chapter 7A directs IDS to appoint absent an application, and we found no authority excusing an untimely one. A drafter copying North Carolina should decide whether to keep that gate. 3) NO STANDALONE OFFICE. Unlike Florida (CCRC) or Arizona, North Carolina delivers capital post-conviction representation through private appointed counsel on an IDS-maintained roster. The Office of the Capital Defender is trial-level only; the Appellate Defender recruits private counsel for state and federal death-penalty postconviction work (§ 7A-498.8(b)(5)) and may take a case as counsel of record at his discretion. The office exists and is funded — this is not an unfunded-office situation. 4) SUCCESSOR MARs ARE OUTSIDE THE ENTITLEMENT. IDS Policy 04.01.07, effective August 9, 2024 (originally adopted 2010, rescinded July 2019, reinstated 2024), requires the IDS Director's pre-approval before appointed counsel may be compensated for investigating or litigating a successor MAR for a death-sentenced client. 5) RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGE, COUNSEL UNAFFECTED: S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(a) repealed § 15A-1415(b)(7) and (b)(9) as MAR grounds effective December 1, 2025, and S.L. 2025-93 added the 24-month hearing requirement in § 15A-1415(a). Neither touched § 7A-451(c)/(c1) or the appointment-of-counsel trigger in § 15A-1415(a)(6). 6) SCOPE DISCIPLINE: the non-capital MAR counsel route (§ 7A-451(a)(3), counsel only 'if appointment of counsel is authorized by Chapter 15A') is a different and much weaker provision and was not relied on for any cell above; nothing here counts 18 U.S.C. § 3599 federal habeas counsel. 7) CITATION NOTE: the State v. Bates text cited is the the digitised case record's static JSON of 348 N.C. 29; the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages return HTTP 202 and casetext returned 410, so the CAP file is the fetchable copy. The quoted phrase appears there verbatim; section symbols in that file are unicode-escaped, which is why the quote stops before the statutory citation.
North Dakota	No death penalty	Abolished 1973	N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1973 North Dakota abolished capital punishment for all state crimes in the 1973 criminal code, effective July 1, 1975. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01 is an exhaustive classification — 'Offenses are divided into seven classes, which are denominated and subject to maximum penalties' — whose most severe class, class AA felony, carries a maximum of life imprisonment without parole; murder is a class AA felony (§ 12.1-16-01). No capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books. The residual provision that would apply to any such petitioner is N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1), which makes appointment of counsel MANDATORY for any indigent post-conviction applicant who requests it, delivered through the state-funded Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents. North Dakota therefore neither supports nor refutes the Georgia Resource Center's '49 states' claim on its own terms: it has no capital post-conviction mechanism because it has no capital sentences, while its general post-conviction counsel guarantee is mandatory. Class AA felony, for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed. View the source document Note: Abolition timing: the 1973 legislative assembly abolished the death penalty for all state crimes as part of the new criminal code, effective July 1, 1975 (North Dakota Supreme Court official history, https://www.ndcourts.gov/about-us/history/four-capital-murder-trials-since-the-last-execution-in-1905: 'The 1973 legislature, as part of North Dakota's new criminal code, abolished the death penalty for all state crimes, effective July 1, 1975.'). A partial abolition — all but treason and murder by a life-term inmate — was enacted in 1915. VESTIGIAL CAPITAL LANGUAGE: N.D. Const. art. We, § 11 still says 'All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great' (https://ndlegis.gov/constit/a01.pdf), but no capital offense exists to trigger it; N.D.R.Crim.P. 24 contains no capital-case jury or peremptory-challenge provision, and N.D.C.C. tit. 37 (military code) contains no death penalty. Chapter 12-56 of the Century Code is now 'OUT-OF-STATE PAROLEE SUPERVISION [Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 102, § 6]', not an execution chapter. SEARCHES RUN AND RETURNING NOTHING: a the published-opinion record query restricted to the North Dakota Supreme Court for 'no death penalty' returned zero opinions, and a query for 'capital punishment' AND 'North Dakota' returned only pre-1975 cases plus State v. Garcia (1997) and State v. Borner (2013); no modern North Dakota decision addresses appointment of capital post-conviction counsel, which is consistent with the absence of any capital sentence. INTERNAL TENSION IN THE POST-CONVICTION ACT a hostile reader may raise: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(2) still says 'An application may be filed at any time,' while the two-year limit in § 29-32.1-01(2) was added later (2013); both appear in the current chapter text. LIMIT ON THE RESIDUAL RIGHT: § 29-32.1-09(2) provides that a court may dismiss grounds alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and that 'An applicant may not claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel' — so the mandatory appointment right is statutory, not constitutional, and carries no enforceable competence guarantee. Federal capital work arising in North Dakota (the Rodriguez prosecution in the District of North Dakota) is supplied under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and is expressly NOT counted here as a state mechanism. Standards cited in capital_pc_counsel_standards are Commission-adopted policy documents, not statutes or court rules; the statutory hook for them is N.D.C.C. § 54-61-02(1)(a)(3).
Ohio	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(1); State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 25-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2025)	Detail Death penalty: active Ohio has a mandatory statutory mechanism. R.C. 2953.21(J)(1) requires the common pleas court to appoint counsel for an indigent person under sentence of death who intends to file a post-conviction petition, and R.C. 2953.21(J)(2) limits the appointment to capital-certified counsel. The mandate is bounded: Ohio appellate courts read it as reaching only a timely-filed FIRST petition, so successive or untimely capital petitions carry no right to appointed counsel, and R.C. 2953.21(J)(2) forecloses any ineffective-assistance challenge to the appointed lawyer's performance. There is no dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office; appointment is by the trial court, with county payment and capped state reimbursement. the court shall appoint counsel to represent the person upon a finding that the person is indigent and that the person either accepts the appointment of counsel or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel View the source document Note: (1) Death penalty is statutorily authorized and people remain under sentence of death, but Ohio has carried out no execution since July 2018 and Gov. Mike DeWine has issued serial reprieves; on April 17, 2026 he reset three 2026 execution dates (O'Neal, Henderson, Bonnell) to 2029, citing pharmaceutical suppliers' unwillingness to provide drugs (https://governor.ohio.gov/media/news-and-media/governor-dewine-issues-reprieves-4-17-2026). The counsel mechanism nonetheless remains fully operative — capital post-conviction litigation continues. (2) STALE CROSS-REFERENCE a hostile reader will test: R.C. 2953.21(J)(2), 120.06(F) and 120.33(C) all still cite 'Rule 20 of the Rules of Superintendence,' but Sup.R. 20-20.05 were repealed effective Feb. 1, 2015 and relocated into the Rules for Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases (Appt.Coun.R.), administered by the Supreme Court's Commission on Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases (https://www.courtnewsohio.gov/happening/2015/capCaseCounsel_020215.asp; rules at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/docs/Boards/capitalCases/capitalCases.pdf; the current restyled Rules of Superintendence contain no Rule 20). Courts apply the requirement as demanding 'capital-certified' counsel. (3) The mandate is judicially narrowed to a timely first petition (State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 26, collecting State v. Conway, 2013-Ohio-3741; State v. Waddy, 2016-Ohio-4911; State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-4995; State v. Burke, 2005-Ohio-7020) — the statute's text is not expressly so limited, so this is a construction the Georgia committee should attribute to case law, not to the words of the statute. (4) R.C. 2953.21(J)(2) expressly bars relief for the 'ineffectiveness or incompetence' of the appointed post-conviction lawyer — Ohio guarantees appointment, not effectiveness. (5) H.B. 136 (eff. April 12, 2021) added the serious-mental-illness post-conviction petition, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv), which is within the same appointment provision. (6) Ohio's mechanism is the type Congress contemplated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 154/2261; R.C. 2953.21(J)(3) references § 154 expressly.
Oklahoma	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B); Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11, ¶ 24, 531 P.3d 649	Detail Death penalty: active Oklahoma provides appointed counsel for capital state post-conviction as a matter of statutory right. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) directs that OIDS 'shall represent all indigent defendants in capital cases seeking post-conviction relief' on district-court appointment after an indigency hearing; OCCA Rule 1.14(D)(2) requires the appointment application to be made for post-conviction as well as direct appeal in every indigent capital case; and the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice treated the entitlement as binding — holding in Davison that the statutory right entails reasonably effective counsel, and in Stouffer that a death-sentenced petitioner may not discharge appointed capital post-conviction counsel to proceed pro se. We recognize the right to be represented by capital post-conviction counsel, though not guaranteed in the Constitution, is granted by Oklahoma statute; and that right, if it means anything, means the right to reasonably effective counsel. View the source document Note: (1) PENDING AMENDMENT: § 1089 was amended by Laws 2026, HB 3996, c. 328, § 1, effective November 1, 2026 — after the date of this research (Sept. 7, 2026). The amended § 1089(B) keeps the OIDS representation mandate verbatim and ADDS a sentence: 'The System shall contract with, and provide for reasonable payment of, experts as necessary to provide effective representation.' The 2026 text is at https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=70874; the currently operative (2022) text quoted in the cells above is at CiteID=552733. Cite the version by date. (2) The appointing authority is the DISTRICT COURT, not the Court of Criminal Appeals, even though the capital PC application is filed in the first instance in the Court of Criminal Appeals — a structural quirk worth flagging to a study committee. (3) The statutory hook is phrased as a duty on the defender agency 'upon appointment,' not as an express 'the court shall appoint' command; the appointment duty comes from OCCA Rule 1.14(D)(2), a court rule adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, not from statute. That combination — statute + court rule + case law — is what makes the verdict 'mandatory' rather than 'discretionary.' (4) Qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel are administrative, not statutory: § 1355.4(C)(9) delegates them to OIDS, and the OIDS Board's adoption of the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines is documented only on the agency's Capital TRIAL Counsel Application. We found no OAC Title 200 rule and no OCCA rule setting experience criteria; a hostile reader who claims Oklahoma has codified capital PC counsel qualifications should be asked for the citation. (5) Conflict-out cases go to private counsel with statutory fee caps of $20,000 (lead) / $5,000 (co-counsel) under § 1355.13, exceedable only on an exceptional-case finding by the Executive Director approved by the Board. (6) The deadline does not wait on counsel: 90 days from the State's direct-appeal brief under § 1089(D)(1) and Rule 9.7(A)(2), with no appointment-based tolling; the OCCA manages the problem by order (stay/reset), as in Stouffer. (7) OIDS was operating under an Interim Executive Director (Jamie D. Pybas) as of the FY 2026 Budget Performance Review submitted 1/24/2025; the agency is funded, but that leadership status is on the record. (8) As to the Georgia Resource Center's claim: Oklahoma is squarely NOT a state without a mechanism — it has a mandatory statewide state-funded one.
Oregon	Counsel must be appointed	No one under sentence	ORS 138.590(3), (4); Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 333 P3d 288 (2014)	Detail Death penalty: no one under sentence of death (death penalty still authorized by ORS 163.105(1)(a) for aggravated murder; executions under executive moratorium since 2011; all 17 death sentences commuted effective December 14, 2022) Oregon law entitles an indigent petitioner under sentence of death to appointed counsel in state post-conviction proceedings: on a finding of financial eligibility the circuit court 'shall appoint suitable counsel' (ORS 138.590(4)), the statute expressly presumes that a death-sentenced petitioner 'qualifies for the appointment of counsel under this section' and requires a competency finding or an on-the-record waiver colloquy before he proceeds without it (ORS 138.590(2)-(3)), and counsel is paid by the Oregon Public Defense Commission (ORS 138.590(6)). The entitlement is delivered by case-by-case court appointment of OPDC-certified counsel, not by a capital post-conviction defender office, and it attaches only once a petition has been filed. If a petitioner who has been sentenced to death qualifies for the appointment of counsel under this section but rejects the appointment, the court shall determine, after a hearing if necessary, whether the petitioner rejected the offer of counsel View the source document Note: 1) Oregon has no capital-only post-conviction counsel statute. The mechanism is the general Post-Conviction Hearing Act provision, ORS 138.590, which carries four capital-specific subsections ¹ and a new section was added to the 138.510-to-138.680 series (ch 131 § 5, a discredited-forensic-science ground). ORS 138.590 was not amended in 2026, and the two-year deadline language survives with a new forensic-science exception that sunsets January 2, 2031. 6) Death-penalty context: SB 1013 (2019) sharply narrowed aggravated murder; Governor Kate Brown commuted all 17 death sentences by order effective December 14, 2022 — 'Today we am commuting Oregon's death row so that we will no longer have anyone serving a sentence of death and facing execution in this state' (https://apps.oregon.gov/oregon-newsroom/OR/GOV/Posts/Post/governor-kate-brown-commutes-oregon-s-death-row-15087). The death penalty remains on the books, so the ORS 138.590 capital provisions and the PCR Attorney 3 standard remain operative law with no current subjects. 7) Bearing on the Georgia claim: Oregon does provide a state mechanism for appointed capital post-conviction counsel, and it is mandatory for the financially eligible — but it is court appointment of certified private counsel, triggered by a petition the prisoner must first file, not a funded capital post-conviction defender office.
Pennsylvania	Counsel must be appointed	Active, executions halted	Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1) (234 Pa. Code Rule 904); Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021)	Detail Death penalty: active — 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 remains in force and prisoners remain under sentence of death, but executions are under an executive moratorium: Gov. Wolf began granting reprieves in February 2015, a practice the Supreme Court upheld as within the Article IV, § 9(a) reprieve power in Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199 (Pa. 2015), and Gov. Shapiro announced in February 2023 that he will sign a reprieve for every execution warrant (the Shapiro announcement is press-reported; I did not locate a fetchable official pa.gov release for it). Pennsylvania has carried out three executions since 1962, all of volunteers. Pennsylvania mandates appointment of new counsel for a death-sentenced prisoner's first state post-conviction proceeding. The duty is imposed by Supreme Court rule (Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1), redesignated (h)(1) effective Nov. 1, 2026), not by the PCRA statute, and is triggered automatically on remand of the record at the conclusion of direct review, subject only to three on-the-record waiver/retained-counsel exceptions. Counsel must satisfy the statewide capital qualification standards of Pa.R.Crim.P. 801, and the appointment continues through PCRA appeal. Provision is by trial-court appointment funded at county level; there is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office. the trial judge shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction collateral review, unless: View the source document Note: (1) The entitlement is RULE-BASED, not statutory. The PCRA itself (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546) says nothing about appointing counsel; the mandate lives in the Supreme Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure, which under Pa. Const. Art. V, § 10 supersede inconsistent statutes. A legislature copying Pennsylvania would be copying a court rule. (2) SUBDIVISION LETTERING: by order of April 21, 2026 (56 Pa.B. 2555, published May 9, 2026) the Court restyled Rule 904 — old (A)-(H) become (a)-(h), and the in-forma-pauperis subdivision becomes a Rule 124 fee-waiver cross-reference — effective November 1, 2026. As of today (Sept. 7, 2026) the operative citation is Rule 904(H)(1); the pacodeandbulletin.gov page already displays the incoming (h) text. The capital appointment language is verbatim identical in both versions and dates to a 2000 amendment; the Bulletin shows it carried over with no substantive change. (3) A STATUTORY capital post-conviction counsel provision exists on the books but has never operated: the Capital Unitary Review Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9570-9579 (1995), § 9572(a) of which required the court to 'appoint new counsel for the purposes of collateral review' within 30 days of a death verdict, and § 9572(c) of which directed the Supreme Court to adopt appointment standards. The Supreme Court suspended CURA in its entirety on August 11, 1997 as inconsistent with its rules and reaffirmed that suspension in In re Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1999) ('this Court remains determined that the initial decision to suspend CURA was correct'), text at.json. Do not cite § 9572 as live Pennsylvania law. (4) Rule 801's opening clause is framed around cases 'in which the attorney for the Commonwealth has filed a Notice of Aggravating Circumstances pursuant to Rule 802' — a trial-stage trigger; its application to post-conviction counsel rests on the Comment ('all stages… including… post-conviction') and on the Rule 904 Comment, both quoted above, rather than on the rule's first sentence. That is the one textual seam an adversarial reader could probe. (5) FUNDING: capital PCRA appointments are paid by the county of conviction. Until the 2023-24 budget Pennsylvania supplied no state indigent-defense funding at all; since then PCCD's Indigent Defense Advisory Committee has distributed $7.5 million a year ($22.5 million over three years) in non-competitive formula grants to county defender offices, intended to 'supplement, not replace' county money (Governor's office, https://www.pa.gov/governor/newsroom/2026-press-releases/new-report–governor-shapiro-s-invests-in-indigent-defense). None of it is capital-post-conviction-specific, and no state capital defender office exists. (6) Federal counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is excluded from this survey, but readers should know that federally funded Capital Habeas Units in fact appear in Pennsylvania state PCRA proceedings; the Commonwealth's effort to disqualify them failed in In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia, 790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133853p.pdf. (7) Sources that could not be pulled from we and therefore support nothing above: the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages (HTTP 202) and its opinions API (401); legis.state.pa.us and palegis.us (connection failure), so 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 was read on law.onecle.com — whose text is current for § 9545(b)(1) and (b)(3) as quoted but stale at § 9545(b)(2) (still shows the pre-2018 60-day window); for that reason the deadline cell is anchored to the official Pa. Code text of Rule 900(B)(1) instead. Justia and FindLaw return 403.
Rhode Island	No death penalty	Abolished 1984	R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2; Pona v. State, No. 2022-150-M.P. (R.I. Feb. 3, 2025)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1984 Rhode Island abolished capital punishment: R.we. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 makes life imprisonment the penalty for first-degree murder, with no death option, the death sentence having been removed by P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 1 (shown in the History of Section on the cited page) after the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional in 1979. Title 13 (Criminals — Correctional Institutions) contains no chapter for execution of a death sentence, and the only reference to death as a punishment in the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure is Rule 46(a)(2), which concerns extradition to a demanding state. RESIDUAL PROVISION: R.we. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 gives every indigent post-conviction applicant a mandatory statutory right to the public defender (court-assigned counsel on conflict), with no capital carve-out and no severity threshold — so if Rhode Island had a person under sentence of death, that person would have counsel as of right. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for life. View the source document Note: Rhode Island is a no-death-penalty state, so it cannot serve as a direct counterexample to the Georgia Resource Center's claim on capital post-conviction counsel — but it is also not a state that provides 'nothing,' because its general post-conviction counsel statute is mandatory and would reach a capital applicant on its own terms. Four points a careful reader needs: (1) The abolition is statutory, not constitutional. The death sentence was removed from R.we. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 by P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 1 (visible in the History of Section on the cited page), following the 1979 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision holding the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional. We was unable to fetch the 1979 opinion (State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (R.we. 1979)) from any source we can reach — the published-opinion record opinion pages return HTTP 202, casetext returns 410, and Justia/FindLaw return 403 — so the 1979 holding is reported here as background only and is NOT the basis of any cell; the verdict rests on the current text of § 11-23-2, which we fetched and read. (2) Rhode Island's counsel right in post-conviction is statutory, not constitutional: Bryant v. Wall, 896 A.2d 704, 708 (R.we. 2006), quoted in Pona, states 'the right to counsel in such proceedings arises by virtue of statute.' A legislature that repealed § 10-9.1-5 would leave nothing behind. (3) Rhode Island's post-conviction remedy is exclusive — § 10-9.1-1(b) provides it 'comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence' — so there is no separate state habeas track with a different counsel rule. (4) Nothing in this row counts 18 U.S.C. § 3599; no federal habeas mechanism was relied on. Capital-post-conviction qualification standards (experience, prior capital work, training) do not exist in Rhode Island in any form we could locate after reading the PCR chapter, the Public Defender chapter, and the Superior Court criminal rules.
South Carolina	Counsel must be appointed	Active	S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B); Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016)	Detail Death penalty: active South Carolina provides appointed counsel as of right in capital state post-conviction proceedings. § 17-27-160(B) commands that two counsel 'shall be immediately appointed' for an indigent death-sentenced applicant who desires representation, imposes statutory qualification standards on at least one of them, and directs compensation from state Death Penalty Trial Fund appropriations. The duty is mandatory in form ('shall'), but is conditioned on indigency and on the applicant not waiving counsel, and it is triggered by the filing of the PCR application — no state provision supplies counsel to draft and file the initial application, and the § 17-27-45(A) one-year clock runs independently of appointment. The Supreme Court has described the provision as creating a 'state-created right to qualified counsel.' Delivery is by case-by-case court appointment (Rule 608(f)(1)(A), SCACR), not by a statewide capital post-conviction defender office. If the applicant is indigent and desires representation by counsel, two counsel shall be immediately appointed to represent the petitioner in this action. View the source document Note: STATUTORY VINTAGE: § 17-27-160 was enacted by 1996 Act No. 448, § 6 (the 'South Carolina Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996') and, per the History note on the General Assembly's official Code page, has not been amended since. A search of the 2025-2026 session surfaced no bill amending it. TRIGGER AND GAP: the appointment duty arises 'Upon receipt of the application' — the statute gives an unrepresented death-sentenced prisoner no lawyer for the act of preparing and filing the initial application, while § 17-27-45(A)'s one-year limit runs from the remittitur regardless. In Robertson the gap was bridged ad hoc: the Supreme Court stayed the execution and appointed a PCR judge, who appointed counsel months before the application was filed. Georgia's committee should note this as the practical seam in South Carolina's scheme. NO INSTITUTIONAL PROVIDER: South Carolina has no capital post-conviction defender office and no state resource center. SCCID's Capital Trial Division is trial-level only (three attorneys per its FY2017-18 year-end report to the House Legislative Oversight Committee, https://www.scstatehouse.gov/CommitteeInfo/HouseLegislativeOversightCommittee/AgencyWebpages/IndigentDefense/Year-end%20Report%20for%20the%20Capital%20Trial%20Division%20(FY%202017-2018).pdf). Much capital PCR representation in fact comes from appointed private counsel and from the nonprofit Justice 360 (counsel of record in both Robertson and Winkler v. State, 418 S.C. 643 (2016)); Justice 360 is not a state mechanism and is not counted here. PAY: appointed capital PCR counsel are paid at the § 16-3-26(B)(2) trial rates — $50/hour out of court, $75/hour in court, $25,000 aggregate cap — exceedable only if the court certifies in a written order with specific findings under § 16-3-26(D). § 16-3-26(we)'s restriction to South Carolina-resident attorneys is expressly inapplicable to PCR counsel, and § 17-27-160(B) closes by stating that nothing in the section precludes an out-of-state attorney from appearing pro hac vice. STALE CROSS-REFERENCE: § 17-27-160(B) funds capital PCR appellate counsel through 'the Office of Appellate Defense pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 17'; that office was abolished and its functions, employees and funds transferred to the Division of Appellate Defense within the Office of Indigent Defense by § 17-3-360(A) (2005 Act No. 103; 2007 Act No. 108). RULE VS. STATUTE: the qualification floor is statutory, but implementation runs through Supreme Court rules — Rule 421, SCACR (death-penalty certification of lead and second counsel) and Rule 608, SCACR (appointment from county lists; Rule 608(b)(7) expressly defines a 'Death Penalty Case' to include a capital PCR action). SCRCP 71.1(d) supplies the general, weaker PCR appointment rule ('the court shall promptly appoint counsel' after the State's return if a hearing is required); capital applicants get the stronger § 17-27-160(B) entitlement instead. ENFORCEMENT HISTORY: from an August 13, 2003 memorandum by Chief Justice Toal to all circuit judges until Robertson in December 2016, South Carolina circuit courts appointed capital PCR counsel under a materially looser reading of the qualification standard than the statute requires. DEATH PENALTY STATUS: active. Executions resumed in September 2024 after a roughly 13-year hiatus, following 2021 legislation adding the firing squad and electric chair and a 2023 supplier-shield law; five men were executed in 2025, including Mikal Mahdi by firing squad in April 2025 and Stephen Stanko by lethal injection in June 2025. FEDERAL COUNSEL EXCLUDED: Robertson's federally appointed 18 U.S.C. § 3599 habeas lawyers are visible throughout that record, but federal appointment is not counted as a state mechanism here.
South Dakota	A court may appoint counsel	Active	SDCL 21-27-4; Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38; State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, 793 N.W.2d 63	Detail Death penalty: active South Dakota has a state mechanism, but it is a general habeas-counsel statute, not a capital-counsel guarantee. SDCL 21-27-4 directs the circuit judge to appoint counsel for an indigent habeas applicant ONLY on a finding that appointment 'is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding,' and only where the application is made in good faith (i.e., non-frivolous, State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, ¶ 13). The South Dakota Supreme Court treats that decision as discretionary and reviews it for abuse of discretion; in Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38, it affirmed dismissal of a habeas application on which counsel was never appointed. A person under sentence of death receives no different treatment: there is no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital qualification standard, no capital tolling rule, and no capital carve-out anywhere in SDCL ch. 21-27 or ch. 23A-27A. So on the Georgia comparison the honest answer is neither 'mandatory' nor 'none' — South Dakota is 'discretionary,' with county funding at first instance. the court or judge shall, if the judge finds that such appointment is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding, appoint counsel for the indigent person View the source document Note: 1) Death penalty retained and operative: SDCL ch. 23A-27A is in force, and the Eighth Circuit stated on May 4, 2026 that 'Briley Piper has been on death row in South Dakota for 20 years' (Piper v. A.G. of S.D., No. 25-2617, slip op. at 3, https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/05/252617P.pdf). Piper is South Dakota's only prisoner under sentence of death; the last execution was Charles Rhines in 2019 (that last point is from press reporting, not a primary source, and is not relied on for any cell). 2) LEGISLATIVE CHANGE A COMMITTEE MUST KNOW: SL 2012, ch. 118 rewrote South Dakota's collateral regime in three ways at once — § 4 inserted into SDCL 21-27-4 the condition that the judge must find appointment 'necessary,' converting what had previously read as a directive to appoint into a discretionary one; § 4 also added 'The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel, whether retained or appointed, during any collateral post-conviction proceeding is not grounds for relief under this chapter'; and § 3 added the two-year limitation now at SDCL 21-27-3.3. A pre-2012 South Dakota decision (Jackson v. Weber, 2001 S.D. 136, Konenkamp, J., concurring specially) described habeas applicants as 'statutorily entitled to mandatory appointment of counsel' — we saw that language only in a the published-opinion record search snippet, not in the full opinion, so it is offered as context, not as a verified cell. 3) The Office of Indigent Legal Services (SDCL ch. 23A-51, created by SL 2024, ch. 95, effective Mar. 18, 2024) exists and is state-funded through the UJS budget, but SDCL 23A-51-8 confines it to APPEALS — 'direct appeals in criminal cases, habeas corpus appeals, and abuse or neglect of a child appeal cases' — so first-instance capital habeas counsel remains a county charge under SDCL 21-27-4. The commission may expand the office's scope by its own action; as of the sources fetched it had not. 4) The Commission on Indigent Legal Services has rulemaking power over minimum training standards and caseloads (SDCL 23A-51-6(4)(a)); we did not locate any promulgated administrative rule text (rules.sd.gov returned an empty document for the chapter we probed), so whether any such rules now exist is UNVERIFIED. Nothing suggests any would be capital-specific. 5) Sources that failed here and were not used: Justia (403), FindLaw (403), casetext (410), the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages (HTTP 202), the published-opinion record detail API (401 without a key). All South Dakota statutory text was read from sdlegislature.gov's own /api/Statutes/<section>.html renderings, and all case text from ujs.sd.gov PDFs.
Tennessee	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(3) (with § 1(d)(1)(D), § 1(e)(4)(A), § 3(h)); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201 to -210; Holton v. State, 201 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006)	Detail Death penalty: active Tennessee has a mandatory appointment mechanism for capital state post-conviction, backed by a dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. Two Tennessee Supreme Court rules supply the command: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(3) ('Upon finding a party indigent, the court shall enter an order appointing counsel'), which by § 1(d)(1)(D) covers proceedings initiated by a petition for post-conviction relief, and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a), which requires the judge to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner once the petition states a colorable claim. Rule 13, § 1(e)(4)(A) makes the state Office of the Post-Conviction Defender the appointee of first resort, and Rule 13, § 3(h) imposes capital-specific competency standards. The one qualification: the duty attaches only after the prisoner has filed a petition that survives colorable-claim screening, so it is a mandatory-on-filing entitlement rather than an automatic appointment upon affirmance of a death sentence. Tennessee is emphatically not a 'no mechanism' state. Upon finding a party indigent, the court shall enter an order appointing counsel. View the source document Note: SOURCE-ACCESS DISCLOSURE: tncourts.gov, the official publisher of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, serves a JavaScript browser-validation interstitial and could not be read directly. Rules 13 and 28 were therefore read from pinned Internet Archive captures of the official tncourts.gov pages (Rule 13 captured 2025-06-15; Rule 28 captured 2025-06-20). The Rule 13 capture reflects amendments through Public Chapter 1007 (2024), effective January 1, 2025, so it is current as of that date; a reader with access should confirm against tncourts.gov directly. Justia, FindLaw, casetext (statutes) and Google Scholar all refused we, and the published-opinion record opinion HTML pages could not be retrieved.case.law) rather than a code publisher. RULE, NOT STATUTE: Tennessee's capital post-conviction qualification standards exist only by Supreme Court order (Rule 13, adopted April 3, 1997, effective July 1, 1997), not by legislation. They were adopted specifically to cure a federal district court's 1996 holding that Tennessee 'imposes insufficient standards to ensure that only qualified competent counsel will be appointed to represent habeas petitioners in capital cases' (927 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)) — a sequence a Georgia study committee may find directly instructive. UNVERIFIED CELL COMPONENT: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107(b)(1), the statutory twin of Rule 28 § 6(B)(3)(a), is cited in the answers but we could not fetch its text from any primary source; no cell rests on it. CURRENCY OF § 40-30-206(a): the quoted text is the Tennessee Supreme Court's 2006 quotation of the 2003 codification. Part 2 was reorganized in 2011 as the Post-Conviction Defender Oversight Commission Act of 2011 (§§ 40-30-201 to -210). The U.S. Attorney General's July 2026 certification still cites § 40-30-206(a) and (c) for the defender's duties, indicating the provision survives, but we could not read the current codified text. DEATH PENALTY: active. Executions resumed in 2025 after a pause for lethal-injection protocol review, and press reporting indicates the Tennessee Supreme Court has set multiple 2026 execution dates and roughly 41 people remain under sentence of death. Those population and scheduling figures come from news reporting, not a primary source we fetched, and should be confirmed against Tennessee Department of Correction data before use in a table.
Texas	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2(b); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)	Detail Death penalty: active Texas mandates appointed counsel for an indigent death-sentenced prisoner's initial state habeas application. Art. 11.071 § 2(b) requires the convicting court, immediately after the death judgment, to determine indigence and desire for counsel and, if the defendant wants counsel, to appoint the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs; § 2(c) requires that appointment within 30 days, with private counsel from a statewide qualified list if OCFW cannot accept. The entitlement is to 'competent' counsel measured at appointment; Ex parte Graves holds there is no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel, so the right is to appointment and funding, not to a remedy for counsel's later performance. If the defendant desires appointment of counsel for the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus, the court shall appoint the office of capital and forensic writs to represent the defendant as provided by Subsection (c). View the source document Note: SOURCING CAVEAT: statutes.capitol.texas.gov now serves a JavaScript shell (every /Docs/… URL returns the same 1,651-character app frame with no statutory text), so the codified quotes are cited to texas.public.law. That text was cross-checked word-for-word against the official enrolled bill on the Legislature's own server — Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1215 (S.B. 1743), at https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/billtext/html/SB01743F.HTM — which contains the current art. 11.071 § 2(b), (c) language verbatim. NOTE: texas.public.law inserts bracket-style section titles into the running text (e.g. 'Section 78.054 (Powers and Duties)'); every quote above was cut to avoid those insertions and is verbatim as rendered. STATUTORY HISTORY: art. 11.071 was added by the 1995 Habeas Corpus Reform Act (Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319); the defender office was created by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 781 (S.B. 1091) as the Office of Capital Writs and renamed the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs by S.B. 1743 (2015). We found no amendment to art. 11.071 § 2 after 2015 (public.law text accessed 26 May 2025; the Office of Court Administration's 89th-Legislature (2025) judicial update PDF, https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1461455/89th-legislative-update.pdf, contains no reference to art. 11.071). LIMIT OF THE RIGHT: Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), holds the statutory right is to counsel who is competent at the time of appointment and that ineffective assistance by habeas counsel is neither a cognizable claim nor cause to escape the § 5 subsequent-writ bar — a Georgia committee should not read 'mandatory appointment' as 'enforceable quality guarantee.' FUNDING SPLIT: OCFW is state-funded (Gov't Code § 78.052(b): General Appropriations Act plus the fair defense account), but appointed private counsel is paid by the county with state reimbursement capped at $25,000 per application (art. 11.071 § 2A(a)). CAPACITY: OCFW director Benjamin Wolff's written testimony to the House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence (https://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/86R/handouts/C2202020102200003/15e8534d-d11d-4223-a037-8c7d92471da9.PDF) states the fallback list held only 14 attorneys and that § 78.056's 'proficiency and commitment' standard is undefined with no work-product review; that figure is as of the 2020 interim hearing and we did not find a current count. OUT OF SCOPE, NOTED FOR ACCURACY: art. 11.071 § 2(e) requires state-appointed habeas counsel, after the CCA denies relief, to move for appointment of federal counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 — that is a duty imposed on state counsel, not a federal mechanism being counted as a state one. Non-capital habeas counsel under art. 11.07 is governed separately and is not included here.
Utah	Counsel must be appointed	Active	Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(1)(a) (effective May 6, 2026; Laws of Utah 2026, ch. 345 (H.B. 495)); Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, 344 P.3d 581 (applying the § 78B-9-202 funding provisions)	Detail Death penalty: active Utah entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction petition, and does so automatically: the sentencing court 'shall' appoint qualified counsel within 30 days after remittitur following affirmance on direct appeal, without any request from the prisoner. Counsel must satisfy Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e) and be drawn from a qualified list the Utah Supreme Court is required to maintain; fees and litigation expenses are paid from STATE funds by the Division of Finance at up to $250/hour ($120,000 fees, $40,000 expenses presumptive caps, exceedable for good cause). The prisoner may waive appointment only after an on-the-record finding of understanding. Limits: the entitlement is statutory only — § 78B-9-202(4) disclaims any right to effective assistance and bars relief on ineffectiveness claims; appointment does not toll the one-year limitation period (§ 78B-9-202(5)); and public-expense appointment is unavailable for second or successive petitions except for newly-discovered-evidence or new-rule claims. Utah is therefore a clear counterexample to the claim that Georgia's absence of a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism is unique. the sentencing court shall: (i) advise the individual, in open court and on the record, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the individual's conviction and sentence; and (ii) appoint counsel to represent the individual on a petition for postconviction relief View the source document Note: RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGE — the governing text is four months old. H.B. 495, 'Capital Felony Case Amendments,' 2026 General Session (enrolled; codified as Laws of Utah 2026, ch. 345), rewrote § 78B-9-202 effective 5/6/2026. Its Highlighted Provisions state that the bill 'requires the Utah Supreme Court to maintain a list of qualified defense counsel for purposes of appointing defense counsel for an individual sentenced to death on a petition for postconviction relief' and 'increases the amount of attorney fees and litigation expenses that a court may authorize for a petition for postconviction relief in a death penalty case' (https://le.utah.gov/~2026/bills/hbillenr/HB0495.pdf). Two substantive shifts: (1) appointment moved from request-triggered ('If a petitioner requests the court to appoint counsel' — version eff. 5/4/2022, superseded 5/6/2026, https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title78B/Chapter9/C78B-9-S202_2022050420220504.html) to automatic within 30 days of remittitur; (2) presumptive funding caps rose from $60,000/$20,000 (the figures the Utah Supreme Court applied in Menzies, 2014 UT 40 ¶ 37) to $250/hour up to $120,000 in fees plus $40,000 in expenses. CAUTION FOR A HOSTILE READER: the bill's own summary line says 'the Utah Supreme Court, after a direct appeal, appoint defense counsel' — the ENACTED text places the appointment duty on the SENTENCING court and gives the Supreme Court only the roster duty. Cite the codified text, not the summary. ROSTER NOT YET LOCATED: no published Utah Supreme Court order or posted list implementing § 78B-9-202(1)(e) was found on utcourts.gov as of 2026-09-07; the duty is new and the roster's existence could not be verified. STALE CROSS-REFERENCE: Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e) (eff. 11/1/2024, printed 2026-09-07) still cites 'Utah Code section 78B-9-202(2)(a)' — the subsection renumbered to (1)(a)(ii) by the 2026 amendment; the rule has not yet been conformed. STATUTORY, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL: § 78B-9-202(4) — 'Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel' and 'Relief may not be granted on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective' — was added by the legislature in 2008 to override Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, which had recognized a statutory right to effective post-conviction counsel; the Utah Supreme Court noted this sequence in Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40 ¶ 24 n.19 & n.20. DEATH PENALTY: active. Utah executed Taberon Dave Honie by lethal injection on August 8, 2024, and the 2026 legislature amended (not repealed) the execution statutes in Utah Code tit. 77, ch. 19 via the same H.B. 495; several people remain under sentence of death (Ralph Menzies died of natural causes on death row in November 2025). The 2024 execution and death-row composition come from press reporting, not a primary source, and are not load-bearing for any cell.
Vermont	No death penalty	Abolished	13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107 (repealed by 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024); 13 V.S.A. § 3401 (as amended by § 7 of the same act); 13 V.S.A. § 2303; State v. Pray, 133 Vt. 537, 346 A.2d 227 (1975)	Detail Death penalty: abolished — narrowed to a few categories by 1965, No. 30 (13 V.S.A. § 2303) and described by the Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Pray, 133 Vt. 537 (1975) as abolished 'except in certain cases'; unconstitutional and unenforceable since 1972 per the Legislature's own Act 161 summary; last capital provisions repealed effective June 6, 2024 (2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7-8); no one under sentence of death Vermont has no death penalty and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision. The last substantive capital penalty (treason) and the entire execution subchapter were removed by 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7-8, effective June 6, 2024; the Vermont Statutes Online now carries the notation '§§ 7101-7107. Repealed. 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024' under a chapter 221 subchapter still headed 'EXECUTION OF DEATH SENTENCE.' Murder is capped at life without parole (13 V.S.A. § 2303(a)) and kidnapping at life (13 V.S.A. § 2405(b)). Nothing capital-specific about counsel remains on the books. Had a death sentence survived, the generally applicable rule would be closer to MANDATORY than discretionary: 13 V.S.A. § 5232 says counsel 'shall be assigned' to needy persons in habeas and other confinement-release proceedings and § 5233(a)(3) covers 'any other postconviction proceeding' with more than minimal effect on detention, though the petition-for-review statute itself, 13 V.S.A. § 7137, is permissive ('may appoint counsel'). This state therefore neither confirms nor refutes the Georgia Resource Center's 49-state claim on its own terms: Vermont provides no capital mechanism because it has no capital sentences, not because it withholds counsel. §§ 7101-7107. Repealed. 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024. View the source document Note: SOURCE-ACCESS CAVEAT (important for anyone re-checking these citations): legislature.vermont.gov serves an incomplete TLS chain — every https request failed (curl HTTP 000; WebFetch reported 'unable to verify the first certificate'), while plain http:// to the same paths returns the identical official pages. Every Vermont statute and act URL cited here is therefore http://, not https://. Justia and FindLaw return 403; casetext.com could not be retrieved; law.onecle.com has no Vermont tree (404); vermont.public.law was unreachable (HTTP 000); the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved; State v. Pray was read in full from static.case.law/vt/133/cases/0537-01.json. SUBSTANTIVE POINTS A CAREFUL READER MUST KNOW: (1) Vermont's capital repeal is very recent. Until June 6, 2024 the execution machinery (13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107) and a death penalty for treason (13 V.S.A. § 3401) were still printed in the statutes, though unenforceable after Furman. Any survey table compiled before mid-2024 that shows Vermont with capital statutes on the books is not wrong about the text — it is out of date. (2) The chapter 221 subchapter heading 'Subchapter 003 : EXECUTION OF DEATH SENTENCE' still appears in the Vermont Statutes Online with every section under it repealed; that heading is not a live capital provision. (3) Vermont's collateral-review scheme contains an internal tension worth stating plainly rather than smoothing over: 13 V.S.A. § 7137 says the court 'may appoint counsel,' while 13 V.S.A. § 5232 says counsel 'shall be assigned' in 'habeas corpus and other proceedings wherein the person is confined in a penal or mental institution in this state and seeks release therefrom,' and § 5233(a)(3) covers 'any other postconviction proceeding.' Which governs a § 7131 petition is a non-capital question already covered by the earlier survey pass and is not resolved here; it is flagged only because it is the provision that would have reached a death-sentenced petitioner. Note also that § 5233(a)(3), as amended in 2016, conditions the service on the assigned attorney's own judgment that the claims are non-frivolous and the factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary support. (4) Do not count United States v. Fell (D. Vt.) as a Vermont capital mechanism. It is a federal capital prosecution tried in Vermont with counsel under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005 and 3599; Vermont state law supplied nothing. (5) Vermont's Constitution, ch. II, § 40, still uses the phrase 'capital offenses' in its bail provision — a dead textual reference, as State v. Pray explained in 1975. (6) The commonly repeated fact that Vermont's last execution was in 1954 comes from secondary sources (news and encyclopedia entries) and was NOT verified against a primary source in this pass; it is not relied on for any cell. (7) Vermont court rules and Supreme Court administrative orders are distributed through LexisNexis rather than as free text on vtcourts.gov, so the capital-standards cell rests on an exhaustive read of the statutes plus targeted searching, not on a rule-by-rule read of the rulebook.
Virginia	No death penalty	Abolished 2021	2021 Acts of Assembly, Sp. Sess. I, ch. 344 (H.B. 2263), cll. 2, 3, 4; see also Va. Code § 18.2-10(a)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2021 Virginia abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2021. The abolition act barred any future death sentence, converted every unexecuted death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, and repealed the entire capital post-conviction apparatus — Article 4.1 of Chapter 10 of Title 19.2 (§§ 19.2-163.7 and 19.2-163.8, the mandatory capital habeas counsel appointment and the qualified-attorney list) and §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654.2 (the capital habeas deadline and procedures). NO residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains in the Code or in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Virginia therefore supplies no data point either way for the proposition that 49 states have a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism: it had a mandatory one until 2021, and now has neither the mechanism nor anyone who could invoke it. That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on or after the effective date of this act for any violation of law. View the source document Note: 1) Effective date and vehicle: 2021 Special Session we, chs. 344 (HB 2263) and 345 (SB 1165), approved March 24, 2021, effective July 1, 2021. Enactment clause 2 repealed §§ 8.01-654.1, 8.01-654.2, 17.1-313, 18.2-17, Article 4.1 (§§ 19.2-163.7, 19.2-163.8) of Chapter 10 of Title 19.2, Article 4.1 (§§ 19.2-264.2 through 19.2-264.5) of Chapter 15 of Title 19.2, § 53.1-230, and Chapter 13 (§§ 53.1-232 through 53.1-236) of Title 53.1. Enactment clause 3 provides that 'any person under a sentence of death imposed for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2021, but who has not been executed by July 1, 2021, shall have his sentence changed to life imprisonment' — this was self-executing by statute, not an executive commutation, though the Fourth Circuit loosely called it one. Va. Code § 18.2-10(a) now authorizes only 'imprisonment for life' for a Class 1 felony. 2) Rules of court: the current Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia contain no capital-specific habeas or counsel provision. Rule 5:7A — the rule pre-2021 capital habeas orders applied to death-sentence petitions in the Supreme Court (see Juniper v. Warden, Record No. 062556, applying Rule 5:7A(g) page limits) — now reads 'Reserved. This Rule was stricken by Order dated November 1, 2021.' That is a change made by court order, not by statute. Rule 5:7(a)(1) carries the general § 8.01-654(A)(2) deadlines with no capital exception. 3) Scope discipline: former § 19.2-163.7 also mandated two trial-level attorneys, one from an IDC capital defense unit; only its final sentence (state habeas counsel) is the in-scope entitlement, and it is the sentence quoted. Counsel in NON-capital Virginia post-conviction is outside this pass and was not re-researched. Counsel appointed for Virginia prisoners in FEDERAL habeas under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is not a state mechanism and is excluded. 4) Sources: the repealed statutory texts are quoted from pinned Internet Archive snapshots of the official law.lis.virginia.gov pages (Oct. 29, 2020; Jan. 27, 2021; June 22, 2021); the current pages at those same URLs now read 'Repealed.' 5) the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.gov and the Fourth Circuit opinion from govinfo.gov.
Washington	No death penalty	Abolished 2018	RCW 10.95.030, as amended by 2023 c 102 s 23 (death-penalty provisions repealed by 2023 c 102 s 21); residual capital-counsel provision at RCW 10.73.150(3); State v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018) (slip op.)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 2018 (State v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018), held it unconstitutional under Const. art. I, § 14 and converted all death sentences to life); death-penalty statutes repealed by the legislature in 2023 (2023 c 102 §§ 21, 23); no one under sentence of death Washington has no death penalty. State v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018), held the death penalty unconstitutional under article we, section 14 of the state constitution and converted every existing death sentence to life imprisonment ('All death sentences are hereby converted to life imprisonment.'). The legislature followed in 2023, repealing RCW 10.95.040 through 10.95.200 and amending RCW 10.95.030 so that aggravated first degree murder carries only life without release or parole (2023 c 102 §§ 21, 23). RESIDUAL PROVISION: RCW 10.73.150(3) survives untouched and still promises, in mandatory terms, that 'Counsel shall be provided at state expense' to an indigent person 'under a sentence of death' who requests counsel for a first collateral attack — so had Washington kept the death penalty, its answer would be 'mandatory.' The implementing court rule, RAP 16.25 (Supreme Court appoints qualified counsel on a capital PRP), was rescinded effective September 1, 2026 by Order No. 25700-A-1699, leaving the statute without machinery. Under article I, section 14, we hold that Washington's death penalty is unconstitutional, as administered, because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. View the source document Note: TIMING MATTERS FOR THIS SURVEY. As recently as August 31, 2026, Washington had BOTH a mandatory capital post-conviction counsel statute (RCW 10.73.150(3), 'Counsel shall be provided at state expense') and a Supreme Court rule implementing it (RAP 16.25, 'the Supreme Court shall appoint counsel… for a first personal restraint petition,' with a qualified-attorney list and a three-year appellate/collateral experience floor). On June 4, 2026 the Supreme Court entered Order No. 25700-A-1699, 'IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RELATED TO THE DEATH PENALTY,' rescinding RAP 16.19 through 16.27 (including 16.25, counsel; 16.26, capital PRP discovery; 16.27, investigative and expert services for a person under sentence of death) and amending RAP 16.1, 16.3, 16.5, 4.2, 12.5 and 18.17 to strip capital references, effective September 1, 2026 — six days before this survey. Current RAP 16.3(c) no longer gives the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction over capital PRPs. Order verified at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rule_related_orders/orders/25700-A-1699.pdf; the rescission is also stated on the face of the live rule PDFs ('[RESCINDED]… Rescinded effective September 1, 2026'). THE STATUTE REMAINS. RCW 10.73.150(3) was not repealed by the 2023 death-penalty cleanup act and still appears in the current code. Anyone quoting Washington as a 'mandatory' state should quote the statute; anyone quoting it as a live mechanism is wrong — there is nobody under sentence of death and no rule left to appoint under. DO NOT CONFUSE WITH THE NON-CAPITAL TRACK (out of scope but adjacent and easy to misread): RCW 2.70.020(2) authorizes the Office of Public Defense, 'Subject to availability of funds appropriated for this specific purpose,' to provide counsel for a first timely PRP by an incarcerated person, and expressly states 'Nothing in this subsection creates an entitlement to counsel at state expense to file a personal restraint petition.' That discretionary, appropriation-limited program (2023 c 261, effective January 1, 2024) is the non-capital mechanism; the capital mechanism was the separate mandatory one in RCW 10.73.150(3). NO DEDICATED OFFICE: Washington never created a capital post-conviction defender agency; counsel were private appointees of the Supreme Court, paid from the state appropriation administered by the Office of Public Defense (RCW 2.70.020(1)(b)). The superior-court capital rules (SPRC 1-7) have not been rescinded, but SPRC 1(a) provides they 'do not apply in any case in which imposition of the death penalty is no longer possible,' and SPRC 2's qualification standards reach only trial and direct appeal, never post-conviction.
West Virginia	No death penalty	Abolished 1965	W. Va. Code § 61-11-2; Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W. Va. 137, 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975); State ex rel. Campbell v. Wood, 151 W. Va. 807, 155 S.E.2d 893 (1967)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1965 West Virginia abolished capital punishment in 1965 by Chapter 40, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1965, now W. Va. Code § 61-11-2, which remains in force as published on the official state code site. The abolition is retroactive by its own terms, so no one is or can be under sentence of death. NO residual capital-specific counsel provision remains on the books: neither W. Va. Code ch. 53, art. 4A nor the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings nor the Public Defender Services act (ch. 29, art. 21) contains any capital or death-penalty provision. What West Virginia does have, and what would govern if the death penalty were ever restored, is the generic § 53-4A-4(a) directive that the court 'shall appoint counsel for the petitioner' in post-conviction habeas — but that right is screened, not automatic: it is conditioned on the court finding indigency, good faith, and that the petition 'has merit or is not frivolous.' For the purpose of the Georgia claim, West Virginia can be counted neither as a state that provides capital post-conviction counsel nor as one that denies it; the question does not arise there. Capital punishment is hereby abolished for all offenses against the laws of the State of West Virginia, and no person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any offense in violation of said laws shall be executed View the source document Note: ENACTING ACT: The Supreme Court of Appeals identified the abolition's source precisely in State ex rel. Campbell v. Wood, 151 W. Va. 807 (1967): 'The legislature, by Chapter 40, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1965, now Code, 61-11-2, as amended, provided: "Capital punishment is hereby abolished…"'.json). Some press accounts date the abolition to 1959 (the year of the last execution); the controlling statutory date is 1965. ACTIVE REINSTATEMENT EFFORT — a careful reader must know this: the 2026 Regular Session saw at least two bills to restore capital punishment, and BOTH DIED IN COMMITTEE. S.B. 1037 (Bartlett), 'Allowing death penalty for first degree murder during commission of sexual assault,' would have expressly repealed § 61-11-2 and added new §§ 61-2-2a through 61-2-2h and 62-7-4 through 62-7-6A; a committee substitute was reported out of Senate Judiciary and referred to Senate Finance on 02/27/26, where it died (https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_history.cfm?input=1037&year=2026&sessiontype=RS&btype=bill). H.B. 4661, the 'First Responder Defense & Justice Act,' last action was 'To House Judiciary 01/21/26' (https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_history.cfm?input=4661&year=2026&sessiontype=RS&btype=bill). Neither became law, and § 61-11-2 as published on code.wvlegislature.gov and fetched on 2026-09-07 still reads 'Capital punishment abolished.' If a future session repeals § 61-11-2, West Virginia would have a death penalty with NO capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision, no capital PC defender office, and no qualification standards — the generic § 53-4A-4 screen would be the only mechanism. NATURE OF THE RESIDUAL RIGHT: § 53-4A-4(a) is worded 'shall appoint,' but the mandate is gated on a merits screen the court applies before appointment, and § 53-4A-4(a) makes an order denying counsel as frivolous 'final.' Rule 6 of the habeas rules is worded 'may appoint,' resolving to 'shall' only once the court finds appointment warranted — so the statute and the rule are in tension on the face of the text, though the point is academic absent a death penalty. STANDARDS PROOF IS NEGATIVE: the assertion that no capital counsel standards exist rests on the complete fetched text of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings containing zero occurrences of 'death' or 'capital,' and on ch. 29, art. 21 (Public Defender Services, including the § 29-21-13a panel-attorney compensation provisions) containing none either. RULE SOURCE: the habeas rules were adopted by order of the Supreme Court of Appeals, not by statute. FEDERAL COUNSEL: 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is not implicated and was not counted; West Virginia generates no federal capital habeas cases. VERIFICATION GAP: the published-opinion record HTML opinion pages could not be retrieved.case.law), which fetched cleanly at HTTP 200; those URLs contain the quoted text verbatim.
Wisconsin	No death penalty	Abolished 1853	Wis. Stat. s. 939.50(3)(a); see also s. 940.01(1)(a); Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856)	Detail Death penalty: abolished 1853 Wisconsin abolished capital punishment in 1853 and has no death penalty today, so the capital post-conviction counsel question does not arise and no residual capital-counsel provision remains on the books. Current law confirms the absence from the top down: Wis. Stat. s. 940.01(1)(a) makes first-degree intentional homicide — the gravest offense — a Class A felony, and Wis. Stat. s. 939.50(3) enumerates the penalty for every felony class, with Class A capped at life imprisonment and death appearing nowhere in the schedule. Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856), records the 1853 abolition. What Wisconsin does provide to any post-conviction movant, capital or not, is discretionary: court referral under s. 974.06(3)(b) 'if it appears that counsel is necessary,' and SPD representation under s. 977.05(4)(j) only if the agency 'determines the case should be pursued.' For a Class A felony, life imprisonment. View the source document Note: Wisconsin is a no-death-penalty state and therefore neither supports nor rebuts the Georgia Resource Center's claim about capital post-conviction counsel; it should be scored separately from the 27 death-penalty states. Abolition was by session law (Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856), identifies it as ch. 108, Laws of 1853; some secondary accounts cite ch. 103 — we quote the court's own text rather than resolve the discrepancy, and did not obtain the 1853 session law itself). The question has been revisited politically but never enacted: 2005 Senate Joint Resolution 5 (enrolled May 2006) put an advisory-only question to the November 2006 voters — 'Should the death penalty be enacted in the State of Wisconsin for cases involving a person who is convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, if the conviction is supported by DNA evidence?' (https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/enrolledbills/2005/REG/SJR5.html). The legislature's own phrasing ('be enacted') presupposes no death penalty exists, and none appears in the current penalty schedule of s. 939.50(3), which is published current through 2025 Wis. Act 247. We did not verify the referendum's vote tally. Scope check on residual provisions: we read Wis. Stat. ss. 974.06, 977.02, 977.05, 20.550, Rule 809.30, and Wis. Admin. Code ss. PD 1.01–1.04 in full and found no capital-case classification, no capital counsel entitlement, and no capital certification tier — the SPD's highest tiers are Class A felony (trial) and level two appellate (Class A–F). We did not run an exhaustive full-code search for every residual use of 'punishable by death' (such phrasing survives in extradition-type contexts referring to other states' offenses); that is a lexical remnant, not a Wisconsin capital-counsel mechanism. Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. s. 3599 is out of scope and is not counted. Note finally that the s. 974.06 track carries no filing deadline whatever ('may be made at any time'), which is a materially different design from the deadline-plus-appointment regimes in capital states.
Wyoming	Authorities conflict	Active, no one under sentence	Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii); contra Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c); Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005)	Detail Death penalty: active (no one under sentence of death) A mechanism exists and has been used, but Wyoming's two governing statutes contradict each other on the face of the code and no Wyoming decision has reconciled them. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii) entitles a needy person to public defender representation in proceedings under the post-conviction act 'in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed'; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c), under the caption 'No right to appointed counsel,' says an indigent petitioner under that act 'is not entitled to representation by the state public defender or by appointed counsel,' with no capital carve-out. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-108 ('W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 shall not repeal any existing laws') cuts in favour of the capital entitlement surviving, and so does practice: the Office of the State Public Defender represented the death-sentenced petitioner in Engberg (1991), Harlow (2005) and Eaton (2009). This verdict is emphatically NOT 'none' — Wyoming is not a state that leaves a death-sentenced prisoner to file pro se. It is a state where the entitlement rests on a single clause of the Public Defender Act that a later and facially more specific post-conviction provision appears to contradict, and where no court has ever been asked to choose between them. in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed or in such other cases as the state public defender deems appropriate, in a writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court, and in proceedings under W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 View the source document Note: CURRENCY OF SOURCES: statutory text is from the Wyoming Legislative Service Office's official compiled Title 7 and Title 6 PDFs (wyoleg.gov/statutes/compress/), which carry amendments through Laws 2024; both were fetched 2026-09-07. The wyoleg.gov interactive statute viewer is JavaScript-only and returns an empty body to a fetch, so the LSO PDF is the citable primary text. \|\| DEATH PENALTY STATUS: Wyoming retains capital punishment — Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b) ('shall be punished by death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment') and § 6-2-102 (capital sentencing) are unrepealed, and § 6-2-103(a) still provides automatic Supreme Court review of a death sentence. But no one is currently under sentence of death: Dale Wayne Eaton's death sentence was vacated on federal habeas in 2014 (see Eaton v. Pacheco, 931 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 2019), Nos. 15-8013 & 16-8086); the Death Penalty Information Center's Wyoming page (fetched 2026-09-07) records a death-row population of 0, one execution since 1976 (Mark Hopkinson, 1992), and that Wyoming prosecutors waived the death penalty in Eaton's case on 27 September 2021. DPIC is secondary and is not relied on for any cell — it supports only this status line. Repeal bills have been introduced repeatedly and failed; the statute is on the books. The capital post-conviction counsel provision therefore remains law but is presently dormant. \|\| TRAP FOR SECONDARY SOURCES: before 1990 Wyoming DID guarantee post-conviction counsel and the Supreme Court enforced it — Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987); Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1987); Fondren v. State, 749 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1988); Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1988). Web summaries still describe '§ 7-14-104' as 'providing for appointment of an attorney to represent a poor person seeking post-conviction relief.' That is the REPEALED text. The 1988 amendment made appointment discretionary and Laws 1990, ch. 95, § 2 repealed subsections (a) and (b) outright, leaving today's subsection (c). Do not cite the 1987-88 cases as current Wyoming law. \|\| NO JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION: a the published-opinion record full-text opinion search for '7-6-104(c)(ii)' returns two hits, neither from Wyoming — the only substantive one is Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 513 S.E.2d 186 (1999) (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting), which cited the Wyoming subsection in a 50-state survey. A search restricted to Wyoming opinions citing '7-14-104' and filed after 1 Jan 1991 returns exactly one case, Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, 115 P.3d 1110, and only in a footnote: 'Wyoming law does not go this far. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-104(c), 7-6-104(c)(vi)…; Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17… (The Constitution does not require counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.).' Keats and Patrick are NON-capital. So every post-1990 Wyoming statement that there is no post-conviction counsel right comes from a non-capital case, and the capital clause has never been construed. \|\| 1989/1990 SESSION LAWS NOT OBTAINED: we could not confirm when the death-penalty clause entered § 7-6-104(c)(ii). wyoleg.gov exposes no session-law archive (wyoleg.gov/sessionlaws/ returns an empty body). What IS verified from the current code is that § 7-6-104(c)(iii) — which in 1987 read 'To be represented in any post-conviction proceeding or appeal therefrom under W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 unless the court… determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense' (quoted in Aden, 761 P.2d at 89) — was repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 121, § 2, and that the surviving post-conviction reference in (c)(ii) sits inside a death-penalty clause. \|\| FEDERAL COUNSEL EXCLUDED: 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is not counted. One related item a hostile reader will find and should not be allowed to miscount: in Eaton the FEDERAL district court, in granting a conditional writ, ordered Wyoming to 'promptly appoint[] experienced death[-]penalty counsel… to represent [Eaton] in any further [state-court] proceedings' (quoted at Eaton v. Pacheco, 931 F.3d 1009, slip op. at 9). That is a federal habeas remedy directed at resentencing, not a Wyoming statutory mechanism, and it is not counted here. \|\| Wyoming has no state habeas alternative in play for this question: post-conviction runs exclusively through Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 to -108, review of a denial is by certiorari to the Supreme Court (§ 7-14-107), and W.R.Cr.P. 44's right to assigned counsel stops at direct appeal.

295 of 300 cells in this pass are verified by re-fetching the cited source. The 5 that are not: Alaska (counsel standards); Kentucky (counsel standards); Michigan (deadline interaction); New Mexico (counsel standards); Wyoming (counsel standards). None of them is a verdict cell.

The fifteen-question tables

All 750 cells are below, grouped by question so the states can be compared on the same rule. Each answer carries the source it rests on: open Source to see the statute or case, the quoted language, and a link to the document itself. Cells that could not be verified are marked as such. The short label under each state’s name is a scan aid; every count on this page is drawn from the substance of the rule, never from the labels.

Key: Verified the cited source was retrieved and confirmed to contain the quoted language. Unverified no primary source squarely answering the question could be reached; the cell says what was looked for.

Post-conviction procedure

Seven questions about how a person already convicted can have a court examine whether the conviction was lawfully obtained.

Where an ineffective-assistance claim must be raised

Whether a claim that your trial lawyer failed you belongs on direct appeal or in a later post-conviction proceeding, and what happens if you choose wrong.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Earliest opportunity verified	Either stage is possible but tightly constrained: an ineffective-assistance claim is reviewable on direct appeal only if it was first presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial filed within Rule 24.1(b)'s 30-day jurisdictional window; when that is not reasonably possible, the proper vehicle is a Rule 32 petition (Ex parte Ingram, overruling Ex parte Jackson). Rule 32.2(d) adds a forfeiture rule: 'Any claim that counsel was ineffective must be raised as soon as practicable, either at trial, on direct appeal, or in the first Rule 32 petition, whichever is applicable' (verbatim text verified in V.R. v. State, 852 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002),.json).	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(d); Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1(b) Case: Ex parte Ingram, 675 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1996) an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be presented in a new trial motion filed before the 30-day jurisdictional time limit set by Rule 24.1(b), Ala. R.Crim.P., expires, in order for that claim to be properly preserved for review upon direct appeal View the source document
Alaska Post-conviction only verified	IAC claims must be litigated first in the trial court — by new-trial motion or post-conviction application — and, absent plain error, Alaska's appellate courts will not entertain an IAC claim raised for the first time on direct appeal. AS 12.72.010(9) expressly makes ineffective assistance of counsel 'at trial or on direct appeal' a post-conviction ground, so the consequence of choosing the wrong stage is non-review on appeal, not forfeiture of the collateral claim.	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.72.010(9) Case: Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292 (Alaska App. 1984) In the absence of plain error, we will henceforth require that the question of ineffective assistance of counsel be argued first to the trial judge either in a motion for a new trial or an application for post-conviction relief. View the source document
Arizona Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a Rule 32/33 post-conviction proceeding, not on direct appeal; since 2002, appellate courts will not address an IAC claim raised on direct appeal regardless of merit, though improvidently raising it there carries no preclusive effect. However, an IAC claim that was raised or could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 proceeding is deemed waived and precluded in later proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) Case: State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (Ariz. 2002) we reiterate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by appellate courts regardless of merit. View the source document
Arkansas Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be brought in a postconviction petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 in the circuit court; the Arkansas Supreme Court will not reach IAC on direct appeal unless the claim was first presented to and ruled on by the trial court (e.g., in a Rule 33.3(b) new-trial motion) with the facts fully developed. Raising it prematurely on direct appeal is not a forfeiture — the court simply declines to reach it and the defendant may proceed under Rule 37 — but a ground 'finally adjudicated… in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction' cannot be relitigated under Rule 37.2(b) (McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 941 S.W.2d 397 (1997)).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1; Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3(b) Case: Ratchford v. State, 357 Ark. 27, 159 S.W.3d 304 (2004) It is well settled that this court will not consider ineffective assistance as a point on direct appeal unless that issue has been considered by the trial court. View the source document
California Post-conviction preferred verified	Either stage, with habeas corpus the preferred and usually required forum: an IAC claim fails on direct appeal unless the record itself shows counsel could have had no satisfactory explanation, and there is no forfeiture for bypassing the appeal — the Dixon/Waltreus bars on claims that could have been raised on appeal expressly do not apply to IAC claims brought first on habeas.	Source Case: People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 Because claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal View the source document
Colorado Post-conviction preferred verified	Colorado routes ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review: a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in the trial court is the preferred and presumptive vehicle, and appellate courts have long discouraged litigating IAC on direct appeal. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal — the supreme court struck down a statute (former § 16-5-402(3)) that barred collateral attacks after an unsuccessful appeal, People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1994). The penalty runs the other way: an IAC claim raised and resolved on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) (People v. Versteeg, 165 P.3d 760 (Colo. App. 2007)).	Source Statute / rule: Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c); C.R.S. § 18-1-410 Case: Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) In light of the considerations potentially involved in determining ineffective assistance, defendants have regularly been discouraged from attempting to litigate their counsels' effectiveness on direct appeal. View the source document
Connecticut Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be pursued on collateral review (habeas corpus or petition for a new trial), not direct appeal; since Leecan the Supreme Court declines to review IAC on direct appeal even where the record arguably supports it. There is no waiver penalty for omitting IAC from direct appeal — Leecan expressly lowered the deliberate-bypass barrier so all IAC claims, record-based or not, are heard in one evidentiary habeas proceeding.	Source Case: State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 (1986) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly pursued on a petition for new trial or on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal View the source document
Delaware Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims must be raised collaterally in a Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 motion, not on direct appeal; the Delaware Supreme Court will not consider an IAC claim on direct appeal unless the trial court decided it on the merits (Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994)). There is no forfeiture penalty for withholding IAC from direct appeal — because the claim cannot be raised there, it is neither 'repetitive' nor procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i) when first raised on collateral review. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Urquhart v. State was not unanimous — VAUGHN, Justice, dissenting..	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61; Rule 61(i)(2)-(3) Case: Urquhart v. State, 203 A.3d 719, 726-27 (Del. 2019); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994) a Sixth Amendment claim arguing ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal and thus his motion is not repetitive or procedurally defaulted View the source document
Florida Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised by motion under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 in the sentencing court, not on direct appeal; when raised on direct appeal the appellate court rejects them without prejudice to a later 3.850 motion, so there is no forfeiture. The narrow exception cuts the other way: where the ineffectiveness was apparent on the face of the record so the claim was properly raisable on direct appeal, and it was raised there and ruled on, re-raising it in postconviction is procedurally barred (Loren, 601 So. 2d at 273). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: McKinney v. State was not unanimous — McDONALD, J., concurs in the conviction, but dissents to the sentence. OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion..	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c) ("This rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence.") Case: McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1991); see also Loren v. State, 601 So. 2d 271, 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not reviewable on direct appeal but are more properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief. View the source document
Georgia Earliest opportunity verified	A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised at the earliest practicable moment — by motion for new trial or on direct appeal — whenever new counsel appears at that stage; if new post-trial or appellate counsel fails to raise it then, the claim is waived and procedurally defaulted on state habeas absent cause and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice. Where the same lawyer represented the defendant at trial and on appeal, habeas is the first available forum and no default attaches; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) conditions the habeas default expressly on whether 'the petitioner had new counsel subsequent to trial.'	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) Case: White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 (1991); see also Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183 (1996) New counsel must raise the ineffectiveness of previous counsel at the first possible stage of post-conviction review. View the source document
Hawaii Either forum verified	Either forum. The Hawaii Supreme Court entertains ineffective-assistance claims for the first time on direct appeal, and where the appellate record is insufficient it affirms without prejudice to a later HRPP Rule 40 petition; Rule 40(f) expressly contemplates IAC as a Rule 40 ground. There is a forfeiture consequence, however: under Rule 40(a)(3) an issue that could have been raised on appeal is waived absent proof of extraordinary circumstances, with a rebuttable presumption that the failure was knowing.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(3), 40(f) Case: State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 864 P.2d 583 (1993) shall continue to entertain ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on appeal. … the appellate court may affirm defendant's conviction without prejudice to a subsequent Rule 40 petition on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim View the source document
Idaho Either forum verified	Either — an ineffective-assistance claim may be raised on direct appeal or reserved for a petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, but not both; if raised and decided on direct appeal it becomes res judicata and cannot be relitigated in post-conviction. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) forfeits any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, yet IAC claims resting on matters outside the trial record fall outside that bar, and IAC of appellate counsel is never forfeited because it could not have been raised on direct appeal.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) Case: State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1995); Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992); Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 521-22 (2015) A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial may raise the issue on direct appeal or reserve it for post-conviction proceedings, but he may not do both. View the source document
Illinois Direct appeal required verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must generally be raised on direct appeal in Illinois; a claim that could have been resolved on the trial record but was not raised is forfeited/procedurally defaulted on collateral review. The exception is narrow and record-based: procedural default does not bar an IAC claim that depends on facts outside the record, which is properly reserved for a post-conviction petition. Veach rejected the appellate court's 'categorical approach' and requires case-by-case assessment of record sufficiency.	Source Case: People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶¶ 46-48 (citing People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 14) Thus, in Illinois, a defendant must generally raise a constitutional claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review or risk forfeiting the claim. View the source document
Indiana Either forum verified	Either forum, at the defendant's election: a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel need not be raised on direct appeal and is fully available in post-conviction, but if it IS raised on direct appeal (by the Davis/Hatton procedure or otherwise) the entire issue is foreclosed from collateral review. There is no forfeiture penalty for waiting, but the supporting contentions may not be split between the two proceedings — the defendant must pick one forum for the whole claim.	Source Case: Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind. 1998) we hold that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may be presented for the first time in a petition for postconviction relief. However, if ineffective assistance of trial counsel is raised on direct appeal, it will be foreclosed in postconviction proceedings. View the source document
Iowa Post-conviction only verified	Post-conviction only. Since July 1, 2019, Iowa Code § 814.7 requires every ineffective-assistance claim in a criminal case to be brought as a chapter 822 postconviction application and forbids appellate courts from deciding it on direct appeal; State v. Treptow holds the supreme court is "without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal." There is no forfeiture for not raising it on direct appeal — the statute says the claim "need not be raised on direct appeal… in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief purposes."	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 814.7 (rewritten by 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 31, eff. 7/1/2019) Case: State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 103-06, 110 (Iowa 2021); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 152 (Iowa 2021) An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. . . . [T]he claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings. View the source document
Kansas Post-conviction only verified	Trial-counsel ineffectiveness must first be presented to the district court; Kansas appellate courts will not decide an IAC claim for the first time on direct appeal. The two routes are a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or a discretionary motion to remand the pending direct appeal for an evidentiary hearing (a "Van Cleave hearing"), so failing to raise IAC on direct appeal forfeits nothing; conversely, a claim actually decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under 60-1507, which "ordinarily may not be used as a substitute for direct appeal… or as a substitute for a second appeal" (Rule 183(c)(3)), and all IAC grounds must be asserted together in the first 60-1507 motion or later ones are an abuse of remedy.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 60-1507(a); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(c)(3) Case: State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 119-21, 716 P.2d 580 (1986) An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be considered for the first time on appeal. View the source document
Kentucky Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective-assistance claims are ordinarily raised collaterally by motion under RCr 11.42 in the sentencing court, not on direct appeal, because there is usually no record or trial-court ruling to review; direct-appeal review is permitted only where a record exists and the trial court actually ruled (e.g., on a new-trial motion). There is no forfeiture for withholding the claim from direct appeal — unpreserved IAC claims remain available collaterally, and an unsuccessful palpable-error claim on direct appeal does not preclude a later RCr 11.42 IAC claim resting on the same underlying error (Martin). The converse does bite: an issue actually raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated under RCr 11.42 by recasting it as ineffective assistance (Sanborn).	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42; RCr 10.26 Case: Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998); Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998) As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment, because there is usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can be properly considered. View the source document
Louisiana Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective-assistance claims are routed by jurisprudence to post-conviction relief (PCR) in the district court of conviction, because that forum permits a full evidentiary hearing; the Louisiana Supreme Court has said the appropriate avenue is PCR "not by direct appeal." A direct-appeal court may nonetheless reach the claim when the existing record suffices (State v. Ratcliff: "in the interest of judicial economy we will address the issue now"). Consequences attach at the wrong stage in both directions: La. C. Cr. P. art. 924.1 bars a PCR application while direct appeal is available or pending, and art. 930.4(A) provides that a claim "fully litigated in an appeal… shall not be considered" in PCR, while art. 930.4(C) directs denial of a claim raised in the trial court but "inexcusably" not pursued on appeal. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Truitt was not unanimous — MARCUS, J., concurs with the affirmance of the conviction but dissents from the reversal of the sentence. LEMMON, J., dissents in part from reversal of the sentence, believing that a fifteen-year sentence for participation in a gang rape (now punishable under La.R.S. 14:42 as aggravated rape with a.	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 924.1; La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4(A), (C) Case: State v. Truitt, 500 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1987); State v. Ratcliff, 416 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) The appropriate avenue for asserting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is through postconviction relief, not by direct appeal. View the source document
Maine Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a post-conviction review petition under 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A; the Law Court categorically will not consider IAC on direct appeal and reaches such claims only after issuing a certificate of probable cause from a PCR judgment. Raising IAC on direct appeal forfeits nothing but produces no review; the operative waiver risk is 15 M.R.S. § 2128(3), which requires all grounds — IAC included — to be raised in a single PCR action.	Source Statute / rule: 15 M.R.S. §§ 2122, 2128(1), (3) Case: State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, ¶¶ 4-5, 698 A.2d 521 (reaffirmed in State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20, and State v. Troy, 2014 ME 65, ¶ 3, 91 A.3d 1064) Today we make clear that we will not consider a claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; henceforth, we will consider such a contention only after we issue a certificate of probable cause following a hearing on a post-conviction petition. View the source document
Maryland Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be raised in a Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPPA) proceeding, not on direct appeal; the Supreme Court of Maryland (then Court of Appeals) recognizes a narrow exception where the critical facts are undisputed and the trial record permits fair evaluation. Consequences run both ways: a claim an appellate court decides on the merits on direct appeal is 'finally litigated' and cannot be relitigated collaterally (Crim. Proc. § 7-106(a)(1)(i)), while a claim the petitioner could have raised earlier is waived if the failure was intelligent and knowing, with a rebuttable presumption of knowing waiver (§ 7-106(b)(1)(i)3, (b)(2)) excused only by 'special circumstances' (§ 7-106(b)(1)(ii)).	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-106(a)(1)(i), (b)(1)-(2) Case: Robinson v. State, 404 Md. 208 (2008) We have held repeatedly that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a post-conviction proceeding, subject to a few exceptions. View the source document
Massachusetts Post-conviction preferred verified	Massachusetts routes ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review: the Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) motion for a new trial in the trial court is the 'preferred method,' and direct appeal is available only under the narrow Adamides exception where the factual basis 'appears indisputably on the trial record.' There is no forfeiture penalty for holding an IAC claim for collateral review — Zinser found no waiver where the claim could not have been resolved on the trial record, and expressly left open whether a record-based claim is waived by omission on direct appeal (adding that even a waived claim gets substantial-risk-of-miscarriage-of-justice review). The waiver risk runs the other way: Rule 30(c)(2) waives grounds not raised in the first Rule 30 motion.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), (c)(2) Case: Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807 (2006) We begin with the well-established principle that the preferred method for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for a new trial. View the source document
Michigan Either forum verified	Either forum, but with a cause-and-prejudice forfeiture. IAC is normally raised on direct appeal, where a defendant whose claim depends on facts outside the record must obtain a trial-court evidentiary (Ginther) hearing, sought by motion to remand under MCR 7.211(C)(1); it may also be raised in a MCR 6.500 motion for relief from judgment. But MCR 6.508(D)(3) bars relief on any non-jurisdictional ground that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the defendant shows both good cause for the omission and actual prejudice, and MCR 6.508(D)(2) separately bars grounds already decided against the defendant absent a retroactive change in law.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.508(D)(3); see also MCR 6.508(D)(2), MCR 7.211(C)(1) Case: People v. Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates View the source document
Minnesota Earliest opportunity verified	Split by record-dependence: a trial-counsel IAC claim that can be resolved on the trial record must be raised on direct appeal and is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla if first raised in postconviction, while a claim that requires evidence outside the record (e.g. attorney-client communications) may be brought in a postconviction petition. The forfeiture is codified for post-appeal petitions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 ('may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal'). Appellate-counsel IAC is not Knaffla-barred in a first postconviction petition because, as Onyelobi states, such claims 'could not have been brought at any earlier time.'	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 Case: Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2019); Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition. View the source document
Mississippi Either forum verified	Either forum, but with a conditional forfeiture: under M.R.A.P. 22(b) an IAC claim that rests on facts fully apparent from the trial record may be raised on direct appeal, and where appellate counsel did not represent the defendant at trial, failure to raise such a record-apparent claim on direct appeal waives it for post-conviction review. Claims resting on facts outside the record are not waived and belong in a UPCCRA motion; independently, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) procedurally bars any claim 'capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal' absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. App. P. 22(b); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-21(1), 99-39-3(2) Where the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issues in post-conviction proceedings. View the source document
Missouri Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective assistance of trial AND appellate counsel must be raised by motion in the sentencing court under Rule 29.15 (conviction after trial) or Rule 24.035 (guilty plea), each of which is by its terms 'the exclusive procedure' for those claims; IAC is not cognizable on direct appeal. Raising IAC on direct appeal carries no forfeiture — the claim is simply not reviewed — but the bar runs the other way as well: Rule 29.15 'is not a substitute for direct appeal,' so trial error that could have been raised on appeal is not cognizable in post-conviction absent rare circumstances requiring fundamental fairness (McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Mo. banc 2013)). Rule 29.15(d)/24.035(d) separately waive any claim known to the movant that is omitted from the motion.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(a), (d); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(a), (d) Case: State v. Nettles, 481 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) Missouri courts have held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, even if compelling, is not cognizable on direct appeal. View the source document
Montana Earliest opportunity verified	Routing is claim-specific: a record-based IAC claim must be raised on direct appeal, and a claim that cannot be documented from the trial record must be raised in a Title 46, ch. 21 postconviction petition. The consequence is statutory forfeiture — § 46-21-105(2), MCA bars postconviction review of grounds that 'were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal' — but raising record-based IAC on direct appeal does not foreclose non-record IAC in postconviction, and a non-record claim wrongly brought on direct appeal is dismissed without prejudice rather than forfeited (State v. White, ¶¶ 12, 31).	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-105(2), MCA Case: State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 12, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340 (adopting the rule of Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8); restated in State v. Hooper, 2016 MT 237, ¶ 5 they must be raised in the direct appeal and, conversely, where the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be documented from the record in the underlying case, those claims must be raised by petition for post-conviction relief View the source document
Nebraska Direct appeal required verified	Routing depends on counsel identity and record sufficiency. Because § 29-3003 makes the Postconviction Act's remedy "cumulative and … not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy" — a phrase the Nebraska Supreme Court reads to include direct appeal — an IAC claim known to the defendant or apparent from the record must be raised on direct appeal when appellate counsel differs from trial counsel, or it is procedurally barred in a § 29-3001 motion. Where the same counsel served at trial and on appeal, or where the direct-appeal record is insufficient to resolve the claim, the claim is preserved for postconviction and is not forfeited by having been raised (or not resolved) on appeal.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3003, 29-3001(1) Case: State v. Molina, 271 Neb. 488, 713 N.W.2d 412 (2006) (quoted); State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014) (modern statement of the rule) a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues already litigated on direct appeal or which were known to the defendant and counsel at the time of the trial View the source document
Nevada Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims belong in a post-conviction habeas petition; the Nevada Supreme Court will not entertain them on direct appeal unless an evidentiary hearing on the claim has already been held (or, per Pellegrini, would be unnecessary). There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal: Nevada applies a bright-line rule that IAC claims brought in a timely first post-conviction petition escape the NRS 34.810(1)(b) waiver bar even if they could have been raised on appeal. Conversely, an IAC claim actually decided on appeal cannot be relitigated in habeas under the law-of-the-case doctrine.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.810(1)(b) Case: Feazell v. State, 111 Nev. 1446, 1449 (1995); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883-84 (2001) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought in a timely first post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus are not subject to dismissal on grounds of waiver, regardless of whether the claims could have been appropriately raised on direct appeal View the source document
New Hampshire Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims are litigated in the superior court on a petition/motion for a new trial (RSA 526:1, :2) or a habeas petition, not resolved on direct appeal; when a defendant raises IAC against a public defender while appealing, the appeal is stayed and the claim remanded to superior court (State v. Veale, 154 N.H. 730, 741 (2007): 'a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will maintain its proper place as a method of collateral review'). There is no forfeiture for failing to raise IAC on direct appeal. But the underlying non-IAC claim itself is procedurally waived for collateral review if the defendant knew of it and could have raised it on direct appeal (Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-43 (1988)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Avery v. Cunningham is cited for background only. In State v. Kinne, 161 N.H. 41 (2010), the court recorded that Pepin “determined that our subsequent decisions had undercut the holding in Avery” and concluded that “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon alleged trial errors are not procedurally barred by the failure to raise those errors on direct appeal.” Pepin, not Avery, is the operative authority for the no-forfeiture rule stated here.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 526:1; RSA 526:2 Case: State v. Pepin, 159 N.H. 310, 312-13 (2009); State v. Veale, 154 N.H. 730, 741 (2007); Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-44 (1988) the broad language of Avery has been significantly undermined so that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon alleged trial errors are not procedurally barred by the failure to raise those errors on direct appeal View the source document
New Jersey Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims are ordinarily raised on collateral review by petition for post-conviction relief, not on direct appeal; New Jersey courts have a declared general policy against entertaining IAC claims on direct appeal because they rest on facts outside the trial record. Failing to raise IAC on direct appeal is therefore not a forfeiture: R. 3:22-4(a)(1) exempts grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' in a prior proceeding and R. 3:22-4(a)(2) separately excepts enforcement of the bar 'to preclude claims, including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,' that would cause fundamental injustice. Conversely, an IAC ground actually adjudicated on the merits on direct appeal is conclusively barred on PCR by R. 3:22-5.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-4(a); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-5 Case: State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992) Our courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record. View the source document
New Mexico Post-conviction preferred verified	Either forum is open, but habeas corpus under Rule 5-802 NMRA is the declared preferred vehicle because the trial record usually cannot support an IAC determination. Rejection of an IAC claim on direct appeal does not automatically bar it in habeas: preclusion is an equitable, discretionary doctrine, and it does not apply where the facts supporting the claim could not or customarily would not be developed at trial. A claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but was not remains cognizable in habeas, but is reviewed only for fundamental error.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802 NMRA (rule text itself not retrievable — see notes) Case: Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344, 851 P.2d 466 (1993); State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 (fundamental-error limit, ¶ 10) Two New Mexico cases endorse SCRA 1986, 5-802 habeas corpus proceedings as the preferred avenue for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. View the source document
New York Either forum verified	Either. A trial-counsel ineffective-assistance claim may be raised on direct appeal where the record permits, or by a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate, and since L 2021, ch 501 (A2653, signed 10/25/2021, effective immediately) the mandatory bars in CPL 440.10(2)(b) and (2)(c) expressly do NOT apply to ineffective assistance — so failing to raise a record-based IAC claim on direct appeal no longer forfeits it on collateral review. Residual limits remain: CPL 440.10(2)(a) still mandates denial of a ground actually determined on the merits on direct appeal, and ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel is not a 440 claim at all — it must be raised by common-law coram nobis in the appellate court that heard the appeal (People v. Bachert).	Source Statute / rule: CPL 440.10(2)(b), (2)(c), as amended by L 2021, ch 501 §§ 1-2; cf. CPL 440.10(2)(a), 440.10(3)(a) Case: People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852, 853-854 (1978); People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593 (1987) adequate review thereof upon such an appeal unless the issue raised upon such motion is ineffective assistance of counsel View the source document
North Carolina Either forum verified	Either forum, but routing is record-dependent: an IAC claim must be brought on direct appeal when the cold record alone permits decision, while a claim requiring investigation or an evidentiary hearing is premature on appeal and is dismissed without prejudice to reassertion in a motion for appropriate relief (MAR). Failure to raise a claim that could adequately have been raised on direct appeal is a mandatory ground for denying a later MAR under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), but § 15A-1419(c)(1) expressly lists ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel as 'good cause' excusing that default on a showing of actual prejudice.	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), (b), (c)(1) Case: State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001) IAC claims brought on direct review will be decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required View the source document
North Dakota Either forum verified	Either forum, with no forfeiture for choosing direct appeal. The North Dakota Supreme Court says an ineffective-assistance claim "should not be brought on direct appeal" but will review the record for plain defectiveness if it is; where the record is inadequate the claim may still be pursued in post-conviction. The consequence attaches only afterward: a claim actually "fully and finally determined" on direct appeal is res judicata under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), and a claim inexcusably omitted from an earlier proceeding is a misuse of process under § 29-32.1-12(2)(a) (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 13-16, 928 N.W.2d 441).	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), (2)(a) Case: State v. Strutz, 2000 ND 22, ¶¶ 26-27, 606 N.W.2d 886 (reaffirmed in State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 3, 928 N.W.2d 441) When the record on direct appeal is inadequate to determine whether the defendant received ineffective assistance, the defendant may pursue the ineffectiveness claim at a post-conviction proceeding where an adequate record can be made. View the source document
Ohio Earliest opportunity verified	Ohio routes ineffective-assistance claims by whether the claim can be decided on the trial record. An IAC claim that could fairly be determined without evidence outside the record must be raised on direct appeal by new appellate counsel; raising it later in an R.C. 2953.21 petition is barred by res judicata (State v. Perry; State v. Cole). An IAC claim resting on evidence dehors the record is properly brought in the postconviction petition and escapes the res judicata bar; Cole also recognizes a qualification where the same lawyer represented the defendant at trial and on appeal.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(1)(a) Case: State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (applying State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175) Generally, the introduction in an R.C. 2953.21 petition of evidence dehors the record of ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient, if not to mandate a hearing, at least to avoid dismissal on the basis of res judicata. View the source document
Oklahoma Direct appeal required verified	Ineffective assistance of TRIAL counsel must be raised on direct appeal — OCCA Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b) supplies a direct-appeal application-for-evidentiary-hearing vehicle for claims resting on facts outside the record — and a trial-IAC claim not raised there is waived on post-conviction under 22 O.S. § 1086 (Logan waived his trial-IAC ground on exactly this basis). Ineffective assistance of APPELLATE counsel is the exception: it may be raised for the first time on post-conviction. A claim already raised and rejected on direct appeal is barred by res judicata.	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1086; Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b), Rules of the Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. Case: Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, 293 P.3d 969, ¶¶ 3-5 Issues that were previously raised and ruled upon by this Court are procedurally barred from further review under the doctrine of res judicata; and issues that were not raised previously on direct appeal, but which could have been raised, are waived for further review. View the source document
Oregon Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance ('inadequate assistance') claims are raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding under Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ORS 138.510–138.680; the Court of Appeals holds the issue can be resolved on direct appeal only 'in rare instances' because it ordinarily requires evidence outside the trial record. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC on direct appeal: ORS 138.550(2) bars only grounds that 'could reasonably have been asserted' on direct review, and Turner v. Cupp holds a record-dependent IAC claim could not reasonably have been asserted there. Conversely, a ground actually asserted and decided on direct appeal may not be relitigated in post-conviction under ORS 138.550(2).	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.550(2) Case: State v. Robinson, 25 Or App 675, 550 P2d 758 (1976); Turner v. Cupp, 1 Or App 596, 465 P2d 249 (1970) Defendant, having been convicted of murder upon trial by jury, contends on appeal that his trial counsel was incompetent. This issue, except in rare instances, is one which can be properly resolved only in a post-conviction proceeding in which evidence can be taken. View the source document
Pennsylvania Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must generally be deferred to collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act; IAC is an enumerated PCRA ground under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Raising IAC on direct appeal is not a forfeiture — under Grant such claims are dismissed WITHOUT prejudice to reassertion in a first PCRA petition — but a defendant who declines to raise IAC on direct appeal suffers no waiver penalty either, which is the point of the deferral rule. Commonwealth v. Holmes (2013) preserves narrow trial-court discretion to reach IAC pre-PCRA (claim apparent from the record and meritorious, or good cause plus an express waiver of PCRA review), and Commonwealth v. Delgros (2018) adds a third exception where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining PCRA review at all. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Commonwealth v. Grant was not unanimous — Justice EAKIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion. Justice CASTILLE files a concurring and dissenting opinion.. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: the Grant deferral rule has recognised exceptions beyond Holmes. In Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009), the court addressed a Superior Court holding that “creates an exception to the Grant rule.” Grant remains the governing rule; it is not absolute.	Source Statute / rule: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) Case: Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013) We now hold that, as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review. View the source document
Rhode Island Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must ordinarily be raised in an application for post-conviction relief under R.we. Gen. Laws ch. 10-9.1, not on direct appeal, because on direct appeal the Supreme Court reviews only specific rulings of the trial justice. There is one narrow exception: an IAC claim that rests on a specific ruling of the trial justice (e.g., denial of counsel's motion to withdraw) may be entertained on direct review. Omitting IAC from a direct appeal carries no forfeiture; the statutory bar (§ 10-9.1-8) operates against grounds finally adjudicated or omitted from a prior post-conviction application, absent an interest-of-justice finding.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1(b) (post-conviction remedy "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review") Case: State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 371 A.2d 596 (1977); State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rondeau, 480 A.2d 398 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1994) The defendant therefore must raise this claim by means of a petition for post-conviction relief. View the source document
South Carolina Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims are routed to collateral review under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, not direct appeal; the Supreme Court of South Carolina holds PCR is 'the proper avenue' and declines to reach IAC raised for the first time on appeal because it was never presented to or ruled on by the trial court. Raising it on appeal is not a forfeiture — the appellate court simply refuses to reach it and the applicant proceeds by PCR — but the mirror-image bar is real: under § 17-27-90 a ground 'finally adjudicated' cannot support a later application, and non-IAC issues that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal cannot be asserted in PCR absent an IAC framing (Drayton v. Evatt, as restated in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000)). Rule 71.1(b), SCRCP separately forbids filing a PCR application while a direct appeal is pending or during the time an appeal may be perfected.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(B); Rule 71.1(b), SCRCP Case: State v. Felder, 290 S.C. 521, 351 S.E.2d 852 (1986) we hold that post-conviction relief rather than a direct appeal is the proper avenue of relief in this case View the source document
South Dakota Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims belong in a state habeas corpus proceeding under SDCL ch. 21-27, not on direct appeal; the South Dakota Supreme Court will not reach an IAC claim on direct appeal absent exceptional circumstances (counsel so ineffective and representation 'so casual' as to be a 'manifest usurpation' of constitutional rights). Declining to reach it is without prejudice — Dillon says the Court 'decline[s] to address' the claims 'at this time,' so raising IAC on direct appeal carries no forfeiture; the claim is simply deferred to habeas.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-3.1 (habeas 'cannot be maintained while an appeal from the applicant's conviction and sentence is pending or during the time within which such appeal may be perfected') Case: State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 28, 632 N.W.2d 37 Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. View the source document
Tennessee Either forum verified	Either forum: Tennessee has no rule compelling an ineffective-assistance claim onto direct appeal, and the Post-Conviction Procedure Act expressly contemplates competency-of-counsel claims being heard post-conviction (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105(b)). But raising it on direct appeal carries a real forfeiture: IAC is a single ground for relief, so once adjudicated it is 'previously determined' under § 40-30-106(h) and cannot be relitigated post-conviction on new factual allegations; Tennessee courts call the practice 'fraught with peril.'	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(g), (h) Case: Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) It is true that ineffective assistance is a single ground for relief and a petitioner may not relitigate the issue by presenting new and different factual allegations in a subsequent proceeding. View the source document
Texas Either forum verified	Either forum is available: an IAC claim may be raised on direct appeal, but because the trial record is usually undeveloped the Article 11.07 writ is the ordinary vehicle, and a rejection on direct appeal for an inadequate record does not bar habeas relitigation with new evidence (Ex parte Torres). The res judicata consequence runs the other way: a specific allegation of deficient performance that was rejected on the merits on an adequate direct-appeal record is not cognizable on habeas unless the applicant offers additional evidence (Ex parte Nailor).	Source Case: Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) specific allegations of deficient attorney performance that were rejected on direct appeal are not cognizable on habeas corpus as a part of a larger ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the defendant does not offer additional evidence to support that specific claim of deficient performance View the source document
Utah Either forum verified	Either forum, but with a real forfeiture consequence. IAC is an enumerated PCRA ground (§ 78B-9-104(1)(d)), and Utah litigates IAC on direct appeal too, with Utah R. App. P. 23B permitting remand for findings on facts outside the record. But § 78B-9-106(1) makes a petitioner ineligible for PCRA relief on a ground that (a) may still be raised on direct appeal, (b) was raised or addressed on appeal, or (c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal — so a record-based IAC claim omitted from direct appeal is defaulted. The sole statutory escape is § 78B-9-106(3)(a): the default is excused if the failure to raise the ground was itself due to ineffective assistance of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(a)-(c), (3)(a); § 78B-9-104(1)(d); Utah R. App. P. 23B a petitioner may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised in the trial court, at trial, or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. View the source document
Vermont Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be brought by post-conviction relief petition under 13 V.S.A. § 7131, not on direct appeal; the Supreme Court declines to reach IAC on direct appeal because the trial record is inadequate. There is no forfeiture penalty — declining review on direct appeal leaves the claim fully available in PCR, and failure to raise IAC on direct appeal does not bar it later. Reaffirmed in State v. Tobin, 2018 VT 108, ¶ 10 ('we generally do not consider an argument based on ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal').	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 Case: State v. Gabaree, 149 Vt. 229, 232-33, 542 A.2d 272, 274 (1988); accord State v. Tobin, 2018 VT 108, ¶ 10, 199 A.3d 1069; State v. Judkins, 161 Vt. 593, 594 (1993) (mem.) We have held that the proper avenue of raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for post-conviction relief, and not through a direct appeal of a conviction. View the source document
Virginia Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective-assistance claims must be raised in a state habeas corpus petition and cannot be raised on direct appeal; a Virginia appellate court will not reach them on direct review. Because the claim is unavailable on direct appeal, there is no forfeiture for omitting it there — but the converse default rule applies to other claims: under Slayton v. Parrigan a non-jurisdictional claim that could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal is barred in habeas. Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(6) presupposes habeas as the forum by deeming attorney-client privilege waived when 'inadequacy of counsel' is alleged as a habeas ground.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(6) Case: Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 S.E.2d 299 (2001); see also Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) Claims raising ineffective assistance of counsel must be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding and are not cognizable on direct appeal. View the source document
Washington Either forum verified	Either. Ineffective-assistance claims are regularly decided on direct appeal, but review there is confined to the trial record, so a personal restraint petition (PRP) is the required vehicle for any IAC claim depending on facts outside the record — and it may be filed concurrently with the direct appeal. There is no forfeiture for omitting IAC from the direct appeal (a petitioner 'may raise new issues' in a PRP), but an issue actually raised and rejected on direct appeal cannot be renewed in a PRP unless the interests of justice require relitigation (In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 303 (1994)).	Source Case: State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335 & n.5, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) There is nothing intrinsic in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that requires it to be considered only in a collateral proceeding such as a personal restraint petition. We regularly consider such claims on direct appeal. View the source document
West Virginia Post-conviction preferred verified	Ineffective assistance may technically be assigned as error on direct appeal, but West Virginia strongly channels it to post-conviction habeas under W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1 et seq., because the appellate record will not contain trial counsel's explanation. There is no forfeiture for skipping direct appeal: Losh v. McKenzie treats incompetency of counsel as a 'classic collateral issue' that 'must be litigated in a collateral proceeding,' and State v. Miller expressly held that rejecting an IAC claim on a deficient direct-appeal record 'does not foreclose further development of the ineffectiveness of counsel issue on a post-conviction collateral attack.'	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c) Case: State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760, 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992); State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995); Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981) it is the extremely rare case when this Court will find ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. View the source document
Wisconsin Post-conviction only verified	Ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised first by a postconviction motion in the circuit court (the court of conviction) under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) / § 974.02; it cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal, because the appellate record must contain trial counsel's testimony from a 'Machner' hearing. Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) excuses a prior motion only where the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised. A claim that could have been raised in that motion or on direct appeal is barred from a later § 974.06 collateral motion absent a 'sufficient reason' (§ 974.06(4); State v. Escalona-Naranjo), so raising it at the wrong stage carries a real forfeiture penalty.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h); Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) Case: State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979); State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675 (Ct. App. 1996) We hold that it is a prerequisite to a claim of ineffective representation on appeal to preserve the testimony of trial counsel. View the source document
Wyoming Direct appeal required verified	Ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised on direct appeal (the record is developed by a W.R.A.P. 21 motion for remand); a trial-IAC claim not raised there is procedurally barred in post-conviction and the court loses jurisdiction over it under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i). The only escapes are § 7-14-103(b): facts not known or reasonably available at the time of direct appeal, constitutionally ineffective appellate counsel, or (added in 2018, codifying Keats) that the petitioner was represented by the same attorney in the trial and appellate courts. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal and is therefore not subject to the waiver rule.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i), (b)(i)-(iii) Case: Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 2005) a petitioner cannot raise the issue of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief because that issue could have been raised in the direct appeal and is therefore foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata View the source document

The time limit for challenging the lawfulness of a conviction

How long a person has to bring the challenge their state provides (in Georgia, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus), what starts the clock, and whether a late filing can be excused. The states do not all use the same instrument, so the periods are not directly comparable; they are set against each other, with the instrument named, in the section on the time limit.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama 1 year verified	One year for claims under Rule 32.1(a) and (f): for a conviction that was appealed, one year from the Court of Criminal Appeals' issuance of the certificate of judgment; for a conviction not appealed, one year from the lapse of the time to appeal (Rule 32.2(c)). A newly-discovered-material-facts petition under Rule 32.1(e) must be filed within the one-year period or within six months after discovery of the facts, whichever is later. Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888 (Ala. 2007) holds the limitations provision 'is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar' and that equitable tolling is available 'in extraordinary circumstances that are beyond the petitioner's control and that are unavoidable even with the exercise of diligence' (verified at.json).	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) Case: Kuenzel v. State, 204 So. 3d 910 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015); Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888 (Ala. 2007) within one (1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, Ala. R.App. P. View the source document
Alaska 18 months verified	For conviction-related claims, the later of 18 months after entry of the judgment or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the appellate decision is final; illegal-sentence claims have no time limit. AS 12.72.020(b) allows late claims on due diligence where disability or state interference prevented timely filing, or on newly discovered, non-cumulative, non-impeachment evidence establishing innocence by clear and convincing evidence; no general equitable-tolling doctrine appears in the statute.	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.72.020(a)(3), (b) if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure View the source document
Arizona 90 days verified	For trial convictions, the notice for a constitutional claim under Rule 32.1(a) is due within 90 days after oral pronouncement of sentence or 30 days after issuance of the direct-appeal mandate, whichever is later; pleading defendants under Rule 33.4(b)(3)(A) have 90 days after oral pronouncement of sentence. Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) — including newly discovered material facts (e) and actual innocence (h) — may be filed 'within a reasonable time after discovering the basis of the claim.' The court must excuse an untimely Rule 32.1(a) notice if the defendant adequately explains the delay was not the defendant's fault (Rule 32.4(b)(3)(D)).	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3); accord A.R.S. § 13-4234(C) A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. View the source document
Arkansas 90/60 days verified	Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), a petition must be filed within ninety (90) days of entry of judgment where the conviction rested on a guilty plea or no appeal was taken (ninety days from pronouncement if judgment was not entered of record within ten days), and within sixty (60) days of the appellate mandate — or of dismissal of the appeal — where an appeal was taken. These limits are jurisdictional; there is no equitable tolling and no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception inside Rule 37 (counsel's failure to notify the petitioner that the mandate issued did not excuse untimeliness, O'Brien v. State, 339 Ark. 138, 3 S.W.3d 332 (1999)). Actual-innocence relief lies outside Rule 37: coram nobis, whose availability is not governed by Rule 37's time limits but requires due diligence (Larimore v. State, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000)), and Act 1780 of 2001, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208, for new scientific evidence.	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) Case: Shoemate v. State, 339 Ark. 403, 5 S.W.3d 446 (1999) The time limitations imposed in Rule 37 are jurisdictional in nature, and the circuit court may not grant relief on a untimely petition for postconviction relief. View the source document
California Reasonable time verified	Non-capital: no fixed statutory deadline; a judge-made reasonableness standard requires filing 'without substantial delay' measured from when the petitioner or counsel knew or should have known the claim's basis, with delay excusable for good cause and untimely claims still heard under narrow exceptions including actual innocence (fundamental miscarriage of justice). Capital: Penal Code § 1509(c) requires the initial petition within one year of the Government Code § 68662 counsel-appointment order, and § 1509(d) excuses untimeliness only on a preponderance showing of actual innocence or death-ineligibility. The statutory new-evidence ground likewise requires presentation 'without substantial delay' (Pen. Code § 1473(b)(1)(C)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 was not unanimous — Mosk, J., concurring in the result; Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting; Brown, J., concurring and dissenting. Mosk, J., and Brown, J., would deny the petition solely on the merits..	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Penal Code § 1509(c)-(d) (capital); § 1473(b)(1)(C) Case: In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. View the source document
Colorado 3 years verified	C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1) sets the collateral-attack deadlines: no limit for class 1 felonies, three years for all other felonies, eighteen months for misdemeanors, six months for petty offenses. The period runs from 'the date of said conviction,' which the supreme court holds means after the direct appeal is exhausted — People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Colo. 1994) ('the time limits of section 16-5-402… do not begin to run until after a defendant's appeal has been exhausted'). There is no express actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception; the statutory safety valves in § 16-5-402(2) are lack of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, an adjudication of incompetence or mental-health commitment, and 'justifiable excuse or excusable neglect' (§ 16-5-402(2)(d)), which functions as the tolling mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: C.R.S. § 16-5-402(1), (2) Case: People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994) All class 1 felonies: No limit; All other felonies: Three years; Misdemeanors: Eighteen months; Petty offenses: Six months View the source document
Connecticut No deadline verified	No fixed statute of limitations; instead, P.A. 12-115 (2012) created a rebuttable presumption that a first petition is unreasonably delayed if filed after the latest of five years from finality of the conviction, October 1, 2017, or two years after a newly recognized retroactive right. On the respondent's request the court orders the petitioner to show good cause and dismisses absent it; good cause includes newly discovered material evidence not discoverable with due diligence. Subsections (b)-(e) do not apply to actual-innocence claims, conditions-of-confinement petitions, or capital convictions carrying a death sentence.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(c), (e), (f) has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review View the source document
Delaware 1 year verified	Rule 61(i)(1) bars a postconviction motion filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction becomes final, or — for a claim asserting a newly recognized retroactively applicable right — more than one year after that right is first recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. Where a direct appeal was taken, finality runs from issuance of the Delaware Supreme Court's mandate under Supreme Court Rule 19 (Staats v. State, 961 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 2008)). For motions filed on or after June 4, 2014, the Rule's escape hatch is the Rule 61(d)(2) pleading gateway (actual innocence in fact, or a new retroactive constitutional rule); we could not fetch a text-extractable copy of current Rule 61(i)(5) to confirm its exact wording, and we found no Delaware authority recognizing equitable tolling.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) Case: Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1120 (Del. 2010); Staats v. State, 961 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 2008) A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final View the source document
Florida 2 years verified	Two years, running from the date the judgment and sentence become final. Three enumerated exceptions: (b)(1) facts unknown and not ascertainable by due diligence, with the claim filed within 2 years of discovery; (b)(2) a newly established constitutional right held to apply retroactively, within 2 years of the mandate; and (b)(3) retained counsel's neglect in failing to file a timely motion (the Steele v. Kehoe remedy), itself capped at 2 years. A motion to vacate a sentence exceeding the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. Capital cases run on a separate 1-year clock under Rule 3.851(d)(1).	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (capital: 1 year) Case: In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure—2018 Regular-Cycle Report, 265 So. 3d 494, 532-33 (Fla. 2018) (appendix reproducing rule 3.850(b)); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999) A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final View the source document
Georgia 4 years verified	Four years for a felony and one year for a misdemeanor (180 days for misdemeanor traffic convictions under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33), running from any of four statutory dates in § 9-14-42(c): the judgment becoming final on conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek it; removal of a state-created impediment; initial recognition by the U.S. or Georgia Supreme Court of a newly recognized right made retroactive on collateral review; or the date the facts supporting the claim could have been discovered through due diligence. There is no limitation period for petitions challenging a death sentence, and the statute contains no free-standing actual-innocence exception.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c); O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33(a), (d) Any action brought pursuant to this article shall be filed within one year in the case of a misdemeanor, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 40-13-33, or within four years in the case of a felony View the source document
Hawaii No deadline verified	There is no limitations period. HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) permits a petition "at any time" after final judgment, so no deadline runs from anything and no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed. The only temporal limit is a floor, not a ceiling: a petition may not be filed before final judgment (defined as expiration of the Rule 4(b) HRAP appeal period, or termination of the appellate process), and may be filed during a pending direct appeal only by leave of the appellate court. Newly discovered evidence is an independently enumerated ground under Rule 40(a)(1)(iv), not a deadline exception.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(1) At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction View the source document
Idaho 1 year verified	One year, running from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of an appeal, or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later (the period runs from issuance of the remittitur where a direct appeal was taken). A petition for fingerprint or forensic DNA testing under § 19-4902(b) may be filed at any time. For claims not knowable within the year, Idaho recognizes a 'reasonable time' extension, and equitable tolling is available but narrowly.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4902(a); § 19-4902(b) Case: Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05 (2007); Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 422 (2017); Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251-53 (2009) An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. View the source document
Illinois 6 months verified	Six months after the conclusion of proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court; if no certiorari petition is filed, six months from the date such a petition was due; if the defendant took no direct appeal, three years from the date of conviction. Late filing is excused only if the petitioner pleads facts showing the delay was not due to his or her 'culpable negligence' — the Act's sole tolling mechanism, which the supreme court has construed as 'something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to recklessness.' The limitation expressly does not apply to a petition advancing a claim of actual innocence.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) Case: People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002) No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. View the source document
Indiana No deadline verified	No deadline: Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 1(a) permits a petition to be instituted "at any time," and there is no statute of limitations, so no tolling or actual-innocence exception is needed. Newly discovered material facts are themselves an enumerated ground for relief (§ 1(a)(4)). Delay is policed instead by the State's affirmative defense of laches, which the State must plead and prove (unreasonable delay plus prejudice to the State).	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 1(a); § 1(a)(4) Case: Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief. View the source document
Iowa 3 years verified	Three years from the date the conviction or decision is final, or, if there was an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo issued; a challenge to a prison-discipline decision under § 822.2(1)(f) must instead be filed within ninety days of the final disciplinary decision. The only statutory escape is "a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period," and the section adds that a ground of fact includes DNA-profiling results ordered under § 81.10. A freestanding actual-innocence claim is not independently exempt; it must come through that ground-of-fact clause (Schmidt; Quinn), and since July 1, 2019 ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel neither tolls the period nor relates back.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.3 Case: Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 798-99, 802 (Iowa 2018); Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Iowa 2022); Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact . . . . View the source document
Kansas 1 year verified	One year, running from the later of (A) the final order of the last Kansas appellate court to exercise jurisdiction on direct appeal or termination of that jurisdiction, (B) denial of certiorari or the U.S. Supreme Court's final order, or (C) — added in 2022 — the disposition of a prior 60-1507 motion. The period "may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice," and since the 2016 amendment that inquiry is confined by statute to why the movant filed late or whether the movant makes a colorable claim of actual innocence (more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of new evidence); there is no separate equitable-tolling route in the text.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)-(3) For purposes of finding manifest injustice under this section, the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence View the source document
Kentucky 3 years verified	Three years, running from when the judgment becomes final — which Kentucky construes as the final judgment on direct appeal, or the trial court's judgment if no appeal was taken (Palmer). The rule's only two exceptions are RCr 11.42(10)(a), facts unknown to the movant and not ascertainable by due diligence, and (10)(b), a fundamental constitutional right newly recognized and held retroactive; there is no separate actual-innocence gateway in the rule. Equitable tolling is unsettled: the five-factor test adopted in Robertson was overruled in Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Ky. 2011) ("we overrule Robertson"), and Roach v. Commonwealth (2012) expressly declined to decide whether equitable tolling can ever apply to an untimely RCr 11.42 motion. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Robertson v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion..	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(10), (10)(a), (10)(b) Case: Robertson v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Ky. 2005) (setting out the rule verbatim); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.3d 763, 764 (Ky. App. 1999) (accrual); Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. 2011); Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131 (Ky. 2012) Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the movant proves either: (a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant View the source document
Louisiana 2 years verified	Two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final under La. C. Cr. P. art. 914 or 922. Statutory exceptions cover previously unknown facts (with a subjective due-diligence inquiry, and new facts must be submitted within two years of discovery), a retroactively applicable new constitutional interpretation (filed within one year of that ruling's finality), DNA testing under art. 926.1, factual innocence under art. 926.2, and a transitional window for applications filed on or before August 1, 2027. There is no equitable tolling: art. 930.8(F) makes all of the article's limitations "jurisdictional" and provides they "shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney."	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(A), (F) Case: State ex rel. Glover v. State, 660 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1995) (upholding the art. 930.8 time bar against federal and state constitutional challenge, when the period was three years) No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final View the source document
Maine 1 year verified	One year, running from the latest of (A) final disposition of the direct appeal or expiration of the time to seek it, (B) initial recognition by the Law Court or U.S. Supreme Court of a newly recognized constitutional right made retroactive on collateral review, or (C) the date the claim's factual predicate could have been discovered through due diligence; time during a pending U.S. Supreme Court certiorari petition on the same judgment is excluded. There is no actual-innocence exception — subparagraph (C) is the only newly-discovered-evidence route — and the Law Court has never adopted equitable tolling in the post-conviction context, expressly leaving the question open in Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 15-16.	Source Statute / rule: 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) Case: Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 15-16 A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A. The limitation period runs from the latest of the following: View the source document
Maryland 10 years verified	A UPPA petition may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed, unless extraordinary cause is shown; the period runs from imposition of sentence, not from finality of appeal. Title 7 contains no separate actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception to the 10-year limit — 'extraordinary cause' is the only statutory escape. Newly discovered evidence is instead channelled to a petition for writ of actual innocence under Crim. Proc. § 8-301, which may be filed 'at any time,' or to a new-trial motion under Md. Rule 4-331.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. View the source document
Massachusetts No deadline verified	There is no deadline. Rule 30(a) permits a motion to vacate an unlawful restraint or correct a sentence 'at any time, as of right,' and Rule 30(b) permits a new-trial motion 'at any time.' Because no limitations period exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed; the operative limits are instead claim-specific — Rule 30(c)(2) waiver (Rodwell holds the facially unlimited Rule 30(a) is still subject to it) and, for newly discovered evidence, the requirement that the evidence was not discoverable through reasonable pretrial diligence.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (b) Case: Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016 (2000) The trial judge upon motion in writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done. View the source document
Michigan No deadline verified	There is no filing deadline. Subchapter 6.500, fetched in full at the cited URL, contains no limitations period: MCR 6.502 sets out the motion's nature, form, and successive-motion limits but prescribes no time within which it must be filed, and MCR 6.431(A)(4) affirmatively channels a defendant whose appeal rights have lapsed into subchapter 6.500. The direct-appeal window closes earlier — a criminal defendant's application for leave to appeal must be filed within 6 months of entry of judgment or the later dates in MCR 7.205(A)(2)(b). Because no limitations period exists, Michigan has no tolling doctrine or newly-discovered-evidence exception to a deadline; innocence and new evidence instead operate on the successive-motion bar (MCR 6.502(G)(2)) and as a waiver of the good-cause requirement (MCR 6.508(D)(3)).	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.431(A)(4); MCR 6.502 (no limitations provision); MCR 7.205(A)(2)(a) If the defendant is no longer entitled to appeal by right or by leave, the defendant may seek relief pursuant to the procedure set forth in subchapter 6.500. View the source document
Minnesota 2 years verified	Two years, running from the later of entry of judgment of conviction or sentence (if no direct appeal was filed) or an appellate court's disposition of the direct appeal. Five exceptions in subd. 4(b) include newly discovered evidence (including scientific evidence) and a catch-all where the petition 'is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice'; but any petition invoking an exception must itself be filed within two years of the date the claim arises (subd. 4(c)). Carlton v. State held the period is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver by the State.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)-(c) Case: Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2012) No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal. View the source document
Mississippi 3 years verified	Three years, running from the date the Mississippi Supreme Court rules on the direct appeal; if no appeal was taken, three years after the time for taking an appeal expired; and for a guilty plea, three years after entry of the judgment of conviction (capital filings are separately stated as one year after conviction). Statutory exceptions: an intervening decision of the Mississippi or United States Supreme Court that would have adversely affected the outcome; evidence not reasonably discoverable at trial that would be 'practically conclusive'; untested or retestable biological/DNA evidence; and claims that the sentence has expired or that probation, parole or conditional release was unlawfully revoked. The Act contains no equitable-tolling provision.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) A motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi View the source document
Missouri 90/180 days verified	If a direct appeal was taken, the motion is due within 90 days after the appellate mandate issues affirming the judgment or sentence; if no appeal was taken, within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. Failure to file in time is a 'complete waiver' of the right to proceed and of every claim that could have been raised, which the motion court must enforce even if the State never raises it (Dorris). There is no actual-innocence, newly-discovered-evidence, or general equitable-tolling exception: the only recognized excuses for a late INITIAL motion are active interference by a third party where the inmate did all he reasonably could to file on time, and misfiling by the court — abandonment by counsel does not excuse it (Price).	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b), (m); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(b), (m) Case: Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 301-02 (Mo. banc 2014); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered. View the source document
Montana 1 year verified	One year from the date the conviction becomes final, which is when the time for appeal to the Montana Supreme Court expires; if an appeal was taken, when the time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari expires; or if certiorari was sought, the date of that Court's final order. § 46-21-102(2) creates an actual-innocence/newly-discovered-evidence exception running one year from discovery or reasonable discovery, whichever is later. Equitable tolling is available: Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226 held the one-year bar is not a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction and remanded for the district court to decide whether refusing to toll would work 'a clear miscarriage of justice, one so obvious' that the bar would compromise the integrity of the judicial process.	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-102(1)-(2), MCA Case: Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226, ¶¶ 23-25, 344 Mont. 300, 187 P.3d 654 (reversing Petition of Gray, Peña, and Wells to the extent they treated the bar as jurisdictional) a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final View the source document
Nebraska 1 year verified	One year, running from the later of five events in § 29-3001(4): (a) the date the conviction became final by conclusion of direct appeal or expiration of the time to appeal; (b) the date the factual predicate of the constitutional claim could have been discovered through due diligence; (c) removal of a state-created impediment; (d) initial recognition of a constitutional claim made retroactive on collateral review; or (e) denial of certiorari or affirmance, if the prisoner filed notice of the certiorari petition in the district court within thirty days. There is no separate actual-innocence exception, and the Nebraska Supreme Court holds the one-year period is not subject to equitable tolling — expressly including capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) Case: State v. Boeggeman, 316 Neb. 581, 5 N.W.3d 735 (2024); State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84, 21 N.W.3d 61 (2025) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of a verified motion for postconviction relief. The one-year limitation period shall run from the later of: View the source document
Nevada 1 year verified	One year, running from entry of the judgment of conviction or, if a direct appeal was taken, from the appellate court's remittitur, unless the petitioner shows good cause — statutorily defined as delay not the petitioner's fault plus undue prejudice from dismissal. The one-year limit applies to successive as well as first petitions and the statutory bars are mandatory, not discretionary; Nevada has no separate equitable-tolling doctrine, and NRS 34.800 adds laches with a rebuttable presumption of prejudice after five years. A bar may still be excused on a showing that refusing to reach the merits would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which ordinarily requires a colorable showing of actual innocence; separately, a freestanding factual-innocence petition under NRS 34.900–34.990 based on newly discovered evidence has no filing deadline.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.800; NRS 34.960(1) Case: State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225 (2005); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887 (2001); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction View the source document
New Hampshire 3 years verified	A petition for a new trial — New Hampshire's principal post-conviction vehicle — must be filed within three years after rendition of the judgment complained of; in a criminal case judgment is 'rendered' when the trial court imposes sentence, and the pendency of a direct appeal does not toll the period (State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801, 803-05 (2007)). The only exception located is post-conviction DNA testing: RSA 651-D:2, we permits a petition 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4, at any time after conviction,' and RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) authorizes vacatur or a new trial on favorable results 'notwithstanding RSA 526:4.' Newly discovered non-DNA evidence does not extend the three-year bar (State v. Breest, 169 N.H. 640, 651 (2017)). No equitable-tolling doctrine and no general actual-innocence exception was located; RSA 534 (habeas) contains no limitations period in any of its 32 sections.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 526:4; RSA 651-D:2, I and VI(b) Case: State v. Looney, 154 N.H. 801 (2007); State v. Breest, 169 N.H. 640 (2017) A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit. View the source document
New Jersey 5 years verified	A first PCR petition must be filed no more than five years after the date of entry, pursuant to R. 3:21-5, of the judgment of conviction being challenged; the escape stated in R. 3:22-12(a)(1) is excusable neglect for the delay plus a reasonable probability that enforcing the time bar would produce a fundamental injustice. A second or subsequent petition gets one year from the latest of a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right, discovery of a factual predicate not discoverable earlier through reasonable diligence, or denial of the prior PCR where prior PCR counsel's ineffectiveness is alleged (R. 3:22-12(a)(2)). There is no general equitable tolling: R. 3:22-12(c) provides that 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein'; newly discovered evidence may instead support a new-trial motion, which R. 3:20-2 permits 'at any time.'	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1), (a)(2), (c); N.J. Ct. R. 3:20-2 Case: State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 2013) Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) sets a five-year time limitation for the filing of a PCR petition, unless the petition itself shows excusable neglect for the late filing and fundamental injustice if defendant's claims are not considered on their merits. View the source document
New Mexico No deadline verified	There is no deadline. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that New Mexico imposes no statute of limitations on habeas petitioners, and it expressly declined to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to habeas proceedings, reasoning that the mere passage of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one deprived of fundamental rights. Because no period runs, no tolling or newly-discovered-evidence exception is needed; free-standing actual-innocence claims based on new evidence are separately cognizable in habeas. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Sutphin was not unanimous — PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Serna concurred with the majority that fundamental error may be corrected in habeas and that laches do not apply, but dissented on the determination that Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, and wou.	Source Case: State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶¶ 12, 15, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72 Since New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas petitioners and since this is not a successive habeas petition, these cases are inapposite. View the source document
New York No deadline verified	None. A CPL 440.10 motion to vacate may be made 'at any time after the entry of a judgment' — New York imposes no limitations period on post-conviction motions, so no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed to reach the merits. The only timing constraints are internal to particular grounds: a newly-discovered-evidence motion under CPL 440.10(1)(g) 'must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new evidence,' and CPL 440.30 imposes five-year windows — each with express tolling for diligent pursuit plus extraordinary circumstance, newly-learned facts, or the interests of justice — on post-guilty-plea DNA-testing motions and on requests that the People produce property.	Source Statute / rule: CPL 440.10(1); CPL 440.10(1)(g); CPL 440.30(1)(b)(ii); CPL 440.30(1-a)(a)(2)(ii) At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment View the source document
North Carolina No deadline verified	Capital: 120 days from the latest of five direct-review completion events or from appointment of postconviction counsel (§ 15A-1415(a)). Noncapital: seven years from the latest of those direct-review events (§ 15A-1415(a1)) — but this deadline was created by S.L. 2025-70, s. 15, which 'becomes effective December 1, 2025, and applies to verdicts entered on or after that date,' so for noncapital verdicts entered before then the prior rule (MAR 'at any time after verdict') still governs. Regardless of the time limits, § 15A-1415(c) permits filing at any time based on newly discovered evidence bearing on guilt/innocence or death eligibility (filed within a reasonable time of discovery), a retroactive significant change in law, a fully served sentence, or a noncapital showing of good cause plus prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice; § 15A-1415(c1) allows any untimely filing with district attorney consent, and § 15A-1415(d) permits a good-cause extension (presumptively up to 30 days).	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(a), (a1), (c), (c1), (d); S.L. 2025-70, s. 15(c) In a noncapital case, a defendant may file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief based on any of the grounds enumerated in this section within seven years from the latest of any of the events listed in subdivisions (1) through (5) View the source document
North Dakota 2 years verified	Two years, running from the date the conviction becomes final. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a) supplies three exceptions: newly discovered evidence (including DNA) that would establish the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct; a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely assertion; and a new, retroactively applicable interpretation of federal or state law. Each exception carries its own two-year clock — from discovery, from cessation of the disability, or from the effective date of the retroactive law, which Hieb fixes as the date the opinion is distributed or published (§ 29-32.1-01(3)(b); Hieb ¶¶ 10-11). We found no North Dakota authority recognizing equitable tolling outside these enumerated exceptions.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2), (3) Case: Hieb v. State, 2016 ND 146, ¶¶ 7, 10-12, 882 N.W.2d 724 The petition alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence, including DNA evidence, which if proved and reviewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted View the source document
Ohio 1 year verified	A petition must be filed no later than 365 days after the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals on direct appeal (or in the Supreme Court if the direct appeal involves a death sentence); if no appeal is taken, 365 days after the time for filing the appeal expires. R.C. 2953.23(A) supplies the only exceptions: (1) the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts, or a new retroactive federal or state right was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, AND clear-and-convincing proof that but for constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found guilt; or (2) DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71–.81 establishing actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The statute provides no equitable-tolling provision — an untimely petition may not be entertained unless one of those exceptions applies.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2)(a); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A) a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal View the source document
Oklahoma 1 year verified	One year, added by Laws 2022, HB 3383 (eff. Nov. 1, 2022) as 22 O.S. § 1080.1; before that Oklahoma had no limitations period. It runs from the latest of five triggers, the default being the date the conviction (or suspended-sentence revocation) became final on conclusion of direct review by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals — the OCCA held in Acosta that the 90 days for U.S. Supreme Court certiorari is NOT added. Other triggers include removal of a state-created impediment, a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right, and the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence; there is no free-standing actual-innocence exception and no statutory equitable tolling.	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1080.1(A); § 1080.1(B) (applies to jurisdictional claims) Case: Acosta v. State, 2026 OK CR 9, ¶¶ 4-6; Hammon v. State, 2023 OK CR 19 A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: View the source document
Oregon 2 years verified	Two years. ORS 138.510(3) runs the period from (a) entry of the judgment in the register if no appeal is taken, (b) the date the appeal becomes final in the Oregon appellate courts, or (c) if certiorari is sought, the later of denial of certiorari or entry of final state judgment after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. The only statutory exception is the 'escape clause' for grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' earlier — construed in Bartz and Verduzco; the chapter contains no separate actual-innocence exception and no tolling provision.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.510(3) Case: Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992); Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 172 (2015) A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition View the source document
Pennsylvania 1 year verified	One year from the date the judgment becomes final, which § 9545(b)(3) defines as the conclusion of direct review (including discretionary review in the U.S. and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts) or the expiration of time for seeking that review. Three statutory exceptions exist: governmental interference, previously unknown facts not ascertainable by due diligence, and a newly recognized constitutional right held to apply retroactively; a petition invoking an exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. There is no freestanding actual-innocence exception — newly discovered evidence travels through the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) unknown-facts exception. The deadline is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling.	Source Statute / rule: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)-(3) Case: Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2002) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final View the source document
Rhode Island No deadline verified	There is no limitations period: § 10-9.1-3 provides that an application may be filed at any time, and newly discovered material facts requiring vacation in the interest of justice are themselves a statutory ground under § 10-9.1-1(a)(4), so no separate actual-innocence exception is needed. The Supreme Court has, however, construed "at any time" to mean at any reasonable time and held that the state may plead laches as an affirmative defense, bearing the burden of proving unreasonable delay plus prejudice by a preponderance. Because no deadline exists, equitable tolling has no role.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 (see also § 10-9.1-1(a)(4); §§ 10-9.1-10 to -12, DNA/innocence protection) Case: Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391 (R.I. 2005) An application may be filed at any time. View the source document
South Carolina 1 year verified	One year, running from entry of the judgment of conviction or from the sending of the remittitur / filing of the final decision on direct appeal, whichever is later. § 17-27-45(B) gives a separate one-year window from the date a newly recognized, retroactively applied constitutional right is determined to exist, and § 17-27-45(C) is the newly-discovered-evidence exception: one year from actual discovery of the material facts or from when they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence — applied by the Supreme Court in Coats v. State, 352 S.C. 500, 575 S.E.2d 557 (2003). There is no freestanding actual-innocence exception. Equitable tolling: the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question in Gary v. State, 347 S.C. 627, 557 S.E.2d 662 (2001) n.2, and the Court of Appeals in Pelzer analyzed the doctrine, called it 'rarely applied in South Carolina' and 'reserved for extraordinary circumstances,' and refused to apply it to a PCR application filed in the wrong place a few days late.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A), (B), (C) Case: Coats v. State, 352 S.C. 500, 575 S.E.2d 557 (2003); Pelzer v. State, 378 S.C. 516, 662 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 2008) An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal View the source document
South Dakota 2 years verified	Two years, running from the latest of four dates: (1) finality of the judgment on conclusion of direct review or expiration of time to seek it; (2) removal of a state-created impediment; (3) initial recognition of a newly recognized, retroactive constitutional right by the U.S. or South Dakota Supreme Court; or (4) the date the factual predicate could have been discovered through due diligence. Trigger (4) is a discovery rule for newly discovered evidence; the section contains no free-standing actual-innocence exception and no express equitable-tolling clause.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-3.3 (added by SL 2012, ch 118, § 3) A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. This limitation period shall run from the latest of: View the source document
Tennessee 1 year verified	One year from the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or, if no appeal is taken, one year from the date the judgment became final (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a)). The statute says the period 'shall not be tolled for any reason,' and the three exceptions in § 40-30-102(b) are narrow: a new retroactive constitutional right, NEW SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE of actual innocence (not newly discovered evidence generally), and invalidation of a prior conviction used to enhance the sentence. Notwithstanding that text, the Tennessee Supreme Court holds due process requires tolling where an attorney's misconduct or abandonment impedes a diligent petitioner.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), (b) Case: Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615 (Tenn. 2013) must petition for post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken View the source document
Texas No deadline verified	There is no statute of limitations for a non-capital Article 11.07 application; the Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly declined to impose one and instead bars stale applications through the equitable doctrine of laches, which requires the State to show unreasonable delay plus prejudice. Perez leaves intact escape hatches for justifiable excuse, absence of material prejudice, and 'new evidence that shows he is actually innocent of the offense' (398 S.W.3d at 218). Capital applications under Art. 11.071 § 4(a) have a hard deadline: the later of 180 days after appointment of habeas counsel or 45 days after the State's direct-appeal brief. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Ex parte Perez was not unanimous — MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. JOHNSON, J., concurred..	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (no limitations period); art. 11.071 § 4(a) (capital deadline) Case: Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) we have no desire to impose upon defendants the requirement that claims for relief be asserted within a specified period of time View the source document
Utah 1 year verified	One year from accrual. Accrual is the later of six events listed in § 78B-9-107(2), including (b) entry of the appellate decision, (d) denial of certiorari, and (e) the date the petitioner knew or should have known, with reasonable diligence, of the evidentiary facts underlying the petition — which is how newly discovered evidence is accommodated. The period is tolled while the petitioner is prevented from filing by unconstitutional state action, by physical or mental incapacity, or (for § 78B-9-104(1)(h) claims) by force, fraud, or coercion, and during the pendency of a DNA-testing or factual-innocence petition. Part 3 (DNA testing) and Part 4 (factual innocence) petitions are exempt from this limitations period entirely.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code § 78B-9-107(1), (2)(e), (3)(a), (4), (6) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued. View the source document
Vermont No deadline verified	There is no deadline. Section 7131 permits a prisoner in custody under sentence to move 'at any time,' and the section has not been amended since 1974. Because no limitations period exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable tolling is needed; the Vermont Supreme Court has also held the doctrine of laches inapplicable to PCR proceedings (In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361 (1981), reaffirmed in In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 9-10).	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 Case: In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 9-10, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210 (citing In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 361, 438 A.2d 1106, 1110 (1981)) or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed View the source document
Virginia 2 years verified	A habeas petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence must be filed within two years of final judgment in the trial court, or within one year of final disposition of the direct appeal in state court (or expiration of the time to appeal), whichever is later. There is no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception (Brown v. Booker). Equitable tolling and 'conditional filing' were rejected in Lahey, but the general statutory tolling provision of Code § 8.01-229(D) does apply where the Commonwealth's suppression of exculpatory evidence obstructed the filing (Hicks).	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (tolling via Va. Code § 8.01-229(D)) Case: Brown v. Booker, 826 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 2019) (no innocence exception); Hicks v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 289 Va. 288, 768 S.E.2d 415 (2015) (§ 8.01-229(D) tolling applies); Lahey v. Johnson, 283 Va. 225, 720 S.E.2d 534 (2012) (no equitable tolling) shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from either final disposition of the direct appeal in state court or the time for filing such appeal has expired, whichever is later View the source document
Washington 1 year verified	One year from the date the judgment becomes final — the latest of filing of the judgment and sentence with the trial court clerk, issuance of the appellate mandate on a timely direct appeal, or denial of a timely certiorari petition (RCW 10.73.090(3)) — and the limit applies only if the judgment is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. RCW 10.73.100 wholly exempts a petition 'based solely on' newly discovered evidence (with reasonable diligence), unconstitutionality of the statute of conviction, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence after a not-guilty plea, a sentence exceeding the court's jurisdiction, a community-custody modification, or a material change in the law given retroactive effect. Equitable tolling exists but is narrow — it requires bad faith, deception, or false assurances plus diligence (In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435, 448-49 (2013)) — and a 'mixed' petition containing even one time-barred claim must be dismissed in its entirety (In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 703 (2003)).	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.090(1), (3); RCW 10.73.100 Case: In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435 (2013); In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695 (2003) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face View the source document
West Virginia No deadline verified	There is no limitations period. W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) permits a post-conviction habeas petition to be filed 'at any time' once the conviction and sentence have been entered and the direct-appeal right has expired or been exhausted. Because no deadline exists, no actual-innocence exception or equitable-tolling doctrine is needed; nothing in §§ 53-4A-1 through -9 or the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings imposes a time bar or a laches bar.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed and the time for the taking of an appeal with respect thereto has expired or the right of appeal with respect thereto has been exhausted. View the source document
Wisconsin No deadline verified	There is no limitations period for a collateral postconviction motion: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2) provides that such a motion 'may be made at any time.' Because no deadline exists, Wisconsin needs no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception. The direct-appeal-track motion under Rule 809.30 does have deadlines (notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing, § 809.30(2)(b); motion within 60 days of transcript/record service, § 809.30(2)(h)), but the court of appeals may enlarge them for good cause under Rule 809.82(2)(a), and the bar on enlargement in Rule 809.82(2)(b) expressly excepts § 809.30 appeals. A state habeas petition, being equitable, is subject to laches (State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry).	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2); Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b), (h); Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) Case: State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900 A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time. View the source document
Wyoming 5 years verified	Five years, running from entry of the judgment of conviction. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d). The Act contains no actual-innocence or newly-discovered-evidence exception to that period: § 7-14-103(b)(i) (facts not known or reasonably available at the time of direct appeal) is expressly 'Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(i)' and so lifts only the direct-appeal procedural bar, not the time bar. The separate Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-401 through 407 (2018), is a distinct remedy limited to factual innocence supported by newly discovered evidence, and Parkhurst held it cannot be read to revive time-barred constitutional claims. No Wyoming authority recognizing equitable tolling of § 7-14-103(d) was located.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) Case: Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, 443 P.3d 834, 840 n.5 (Wyo. 2019) No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. View the source document

Counsel in a first post-conviction proceeding

Whether a lawyer is appointed for someone who cannot afford one, and whether that depends on the sentence. The count published above this table (mandatory, conditional, discretionary, none) is the 1 September 2026 coding of these cells under a written rule, not a tally of the short labels.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Discretionary verified	No automatic right to appointed counsel in a first Rule 32 proceeding. Appointment under Rule 32.7(c) is conditional: it operates only if the court does not summarily dismiss the petition, and requires indigence, the petitioner's desire for counsel, and a judicial finding that counsel is 'necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner.' The Ex parte Allen majority characterizes this as 'a court may appoint counsel in certain situations' — i.e., contingent on the court's own merits screen, not a right (for the 2017 capital-case statute, see notes). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Ex parte Allen was not unanimous — MOORE, C.J., and LYONS and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur. WOODALL, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the result..	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) Case: Ex parte Allen, 825 So. 2d 271 (Ala. 2002) if it appears that the petitioner is indigent or otherwise unable to obtain the assistance of counsel and desires the assistance of counsel, and it further appears that counsel is necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner, the court shall appoint counsel View the source document
Alaska Mandatory verified	Yes — mandatory for indigent applicants bringing a timely first application, in all cases (Alaska has no death penalty, so no capital-only track). Grinols v. State holds this right to counsel in a first post-conviction application is of constitutional stature under the Alaska due process clause and includes effective assistance. The statute expressly denies appointed counsel for untimely or successive applications.	Source Statute / rule: AS 18.85.100(c) Case: Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003) An indigent person is entitled to representation under (a) and (b) of this section for purposes of bringing a timely application for post-conviction relief under AS 12.72 View the source document
Arizona Mandatory verified	Yes, mandatory on request in a first proceeding: within 15 days after a timely first notice, the presiding judge must appoint counsel for a defendant who requests it, is entitled to counsel under Rule 6.1(b), and is indigent (Rule 32.5(a); identically Rule 33.5(a) for pleading defendants). Appointment on all other (successive/untimely) notices is discretionary. In capital cases appointment for state post-conviction proceedings is mandatory by statute after affirmance on direct appeal.	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(a), 33.5(a); A.R.S. § 13-4041(B) (capital) No later than 15 days after the defendant has filed a timely first notice under Rule 32.4, the presiding judge must appoint counsel for the defendant View the source document
Arkansas None verified	There is no right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital Rule 37 proceeding; the Arkansas Supreme Court holds the right to counsel ends after direct appeal and the State is not obligated to provide counsel, and it has rejected Martinez/Trevino-based demands for appointment (Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259; Ratchford, 357 Ark. at 35). Appointment is mandatory only in capital cases: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(b)(2) requires the circuit court, after a post-mandate hearing, to appoint a qualified attorney if the person under sentence of death is indigent and desires appointed counsel (Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613, 37 S.W.3d 595 (2001)).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(b)(2), (c) Case: O'Brien v. State, 339 Ark. 138, 3 S.W.3d 332 (1999); Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613, 37 S.W.3d 595 (2001) the right to counsel ends in Arkansas after the direct appeal of the original criminal trial is completed, and the State is not obligated to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings View the source document
California Conditional verified	No right to appointed counsel at the filing/screening stage of a non-capital first petition; appointment becomes mandatory for an indigent petitioner once the court issues an order to show cause (rule 4.551(d)(3)). Capital cases: the sentencing court must offer and appoint post-conviction counsel for indigent death-sentenced prisoners (Gov. Code § 68662; Pen. Code § 1509(b)). Racial Justice Act claims have a special earlier trigger: counsel must be appointed for an indigent petitioner whose petition pleads a plausible § 745(a) violation (Pen. Code § 1473(e)(5)).	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(d)(3); Cal. Gov. Code § 68662; Cal. Penal Code § 1473(e)(5) On issuing an order to show cause, the court must appoint counsel for any unrepresented petitioner who desires but cannot afford counsel. View the source document
Colorado Conditional verified	No constitutional right, but a limited statutory right in a first Rule 35(c) proceeding: if the motion survives summary denial and the public defender finds arguable merit, counsel is provided, and that counsel must be effective under Strickland. Appointment is not automatic — courts need not appoint counsel for claims that are 'wholly unfounded' (Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 379 (Colo. 1994), quoted in Silva). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Silva v. People was not unanimous — Justice COATS dissents. Justice EID does not participate..	Source Statute / rule: C.R.S. §§ 21-1-103, 21-1-104(1)(b); Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) Case: Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Colo. 2007) We hold that while there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, there exists a limited statutory right to post-conviction counsel in Colorado if a defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion has arguable merit. View the source document
Connecticut Conditional verified	Yes — a mandatory statutory right, not limited to capital cases: the court shall designate a public defender for any indigent petitioner in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter. Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 (1992), holds this statutory right embraces effective habeas counsel, enforceable by a subsequent habeas petition; per Gilchrist, appointment attaches once the writ issues, not during pre-issuance screening.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a) Case: Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834 (1992) in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter, in any extradition proceeding, or in any delinquency matter, the court before which the matter is pending shall, if it determines after investigation by the public defender or his office that a defendant is indigent View the source document
Delaware Conditional verified	Appointment is mandatory for a defined class: the Superior Court shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion, on request, where the motion attacks a judgment of conviction entered after a trial, affirmed on direct appeal, for a class A, B, or C felony under 11 Del. C. § 4205(b). Effective April 6, 2017 that provision was renumbered Rule 61(e)(2) and a new Rule 61(e)(1) requires the request for counsel to be filed contemporaneously with the motion or counsel may be deemed waived. Outside that class (guilty pleas, lesser felonies, untimely or successive motions) we could not verify the current standard from a fetchable primary source.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2) (formerly 61(e)(1)); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b) Case: Baldwin v. State, 166 A.3d 938, 939-40 & n.4 (Del. 2017) shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel if the motion seeks to set aside … a judgment of conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review View the source document
Florida Discretionary verified	Discretionary in non-capital cases, mandatory in capital cases. Rule 3.850(h)(7) says the court "may appoint counsel," listing factors (adversary nature and complexity of the proceeding, complexity of the claims, the defendant's intelligence and education, need for an evidentiary hearing, need for substantial legal research); Graham requires the court to determine the need and resolve doubts in favor of appointment. For a death-sentenced prisoner, counsel is appointed automatically: on issuance of the mandate affirming the death sentence the Supreme Court of Florida appoints the appropriate Capital Collateral Regional Counsel office or directs registry appointment.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(7) (redesignated from 3.850(f)(7) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1); Fla. Stat. §§ 27.7001, 27.710, 27.711 Case: Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1365-66 (Fla. 1979) (quoting Hooks v. State, 253 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 1971)) although there is no absolute right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings, the Court before which the proceedings are pending must determine the need for counsel and resolve any doubts in favor of the appointment of counsel for the defendant View the source document
Georgia None verified	None. There is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in a Georgia habeas proceeding, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has held this is true in capital cases as well, expressly leaving creation of any such right to the General Assembly. The habeas article's only funding provision, § 9-14-53, reimburses counties for court costs and does not provide attorney fees; death-sentenced petitioners in Gibson were served, if at all, by volunteer counsel recruited through the Georgia Appellate and Educational Resource Center. Gibson was decided 4-3: Chief Justice Benham, Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears dissented on precisely this point, Fletcher writing that “the state and federal constitutions require appointment of counsel,” and the dissent noting that Georgia was then the only jurisdiction failing to provide a right to counsel in capital post-conviction cases. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Gibson v. Turpin was not unanimous — All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J, who dissent..	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-53 (court costs only; no counsel provision) Case: Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855 (1999) It is well settled that there is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in Georgia habeas corpus proceedings. View the source document
Hawaii Conditional verified	Mandatory, subject to a frivolousness screen. If a Rule 40 petition alleges that the petitioner cannot pay the costs of the proceeding or afford counsel, the court "shall" refer the petition to the Public Defender for representation as in other penal cases; the only escape is that no referral need be made if the claim is patently frivolous and without trace of support. Not limited to capital cases and not limited to a first petition — Rule 40(i) is written in terms of any petition under the rule. Note the rule's operative verb is "refer… for representation," not "appoint."	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) the court shall refer the petition to the public defender for representation as in other penal cases; provided that no such referral need be made if the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and without trace of support View the source document
Idaho Discretionary verified	Discretionary in non-capital cases: § 19-4904 says a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an indigent applicant, and the Idaho Supreme Court has held this creates no statutory right to post-conviction counsel. Mandatory in capital cases: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 requires the sentencing judge, immediately after imposing death, to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, who must assign at least two attorneys for post-conviction.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4904; Idaho Code § 19-6010(2); Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 Case: Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291 (2000); Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616 (2013) we have held that I.C. § 19-4904 does not create a statutory right to post-conviction counsel View the source document
Illinois Conditional verified	Mandatory, but conditional and second-stage only: if the petitioner requests counsel, alleges indigency, and the petition is NOT summarily dismissed under section 122-2.1, the court 'shall appoint counsel' on being satisfied he has no means to procure counsel. No counsel is furnished for the first-stage screening. The right is statutory, not constitutional, and entitles the petitioner only to the 'reasonable level of assistance' implemented by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c).	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-4 Case: People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007) If appointment of counsel is so requested, and the petition is not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. View the source document
Indiana Discretionary verified	No right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital post-conviction proceeding; representation by the State Public Defender is discretionary with that office and conditioned on its own merit determination, and the trial court cannot be required to appoint anyone else. Indiana holds there is no Sixth Amendment or state constitutional right to post-conviction counsel. Capital cases differ: Criminal Rule 6.1(H) requires retained counsel or the State Public Defender to enter an appearance in the trial court within thirty days after completion of rehearing on direct appeal and give notice of intent to petition for post-conviction relief.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 9(a); Ind. Criminal Rule 6.1(H) (capital) Case: Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind. 1989) Petitioner retains the right to employ counsel or to proceed pro se, but the court is not required to appoint counsel for a petitioner other than the Public Defender. View the source document
Iowa Discretionary verified	Statutory, not constitutional, and discretionary rather than automatic. Iowa Code § 822.5 makes the costs and expenses of legal representation available to an applicant unable to pay, but the supreme court reads that unqualified "shall" as placing appointment in the district court's sound discretion, with the statutory right attaching when the applicant presents a cognizable claim (Goode), most recently reaffirmed in Smith v. State (Iowa 2026). No capital-case distinction exists — Iowa has no death penalty.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.5 Case: Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 2006); Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Iowa 2018); Smith v. State, 32 N.W.3d 6, 10 (Iowa 2026) an indigent's right to counsel in a postconviction relief proceeding is statutorily based; no state or federal constitutional grounds for counsel exist in such proceedings. . . . The determination whether to appoint counsel rests in the district court's sound discretion. View the source document
Kansas Conditional verified	Conditionally mandatory, not discretionary: if a first 60-1507 motion presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel for an indigent movant (Rule 183(i); K.S.A. 22-4506(b)), and must also appoint counsel for an indigent movant's appeal (22-4506(c); Rule 183(m)-(n)). There is no appointment where the motion presents no substantial question. For an indigent movant convicted of capital murder and under sentence of death, appointment is mandatory on an indigency finding without any merit screening, and appointed counsel may not be trial or direct-appeal counsel unless both counsel and the movant expressly request it (22-4506(d)(2)-(3)).	Source Statute / rule: Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(i); K.S.A. 22-4506(b), (c), (d)(2)-(3) If a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, the court must appoint counsel to represent an indigent movant. View the source document
Kentucky Conditional verified	No general right to appointed counsel in a first RCr 11.42 proceeding. Appointment is mandatory only when an evidentiary hearing is required and the indigent movant specifically requests counsel in writing; if no hearing is required, counsel need not be appointed, though the judge retains discretion to appoint at any stage. Fraser held that RCr 11.42(5) — not KRS 31.110(2)(c) — fixes when a judge must appoint, and to that extent overruled Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980), which had read the statute to require appointment on request. Whether a different rule governs capital post-conviction was not verified here. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Fraser v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part we. KELLER, J., dissents as to Part we by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part II. KELLER, J., concurs as to Part II by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J..	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(5); KRS 31.110(2)(c) Case: Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453, 455-56 (Ky. 2001), overruling in part Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980) If an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must be appointed to represent the movant if he/she is indigent and specifically requests such appointment in writing. View the source document
Louisiana Conditional verified	No categorical right; appointment is discretionary at the outset and mandatory only at a defined trigger. Under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.7(A) the court "may" appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges a claim that would entitle him to relief, and "may" appoint under (B) for evidence bearing on procedural objections; under (C) the court "shall" appoint counsel once it orders an evidentiary hearing on the merits (or authorizes depositions or requests for admissions for use on the merits). Capital cases are different: within thirty days of a death sentence the court must order the state public defender to enroll at least one separate attorney for state post-conviction proceedings (La. R.S. 15:178; see also R.S. 15:169).	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.7(A), (C); La. R.S. 15:178 The court shall appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner when it orders an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a claim View the source document
Maine Conditional verified	Mandatory for an indigent petitioner whose petition is not summarily dismissed: on an application for assigned counsel under Rule 69 (affidavit of indigency per 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B)), the court 'shall assign counsel for the indigent petitioner,' and assigned counsel must continue through appeal unless relieved by the court or the Law Court (Rule 69(c)). Counsel is not assigned where the petition is summarily dismissed at the Rule 70(b) screen. No capital-case variation appears in ch. 305-A or Rules 65-75A.	Source Statute / rule: M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(c)(2); M.R.U. Crim. P. 69(a)-(c); 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B) Case: Armstrong v. State, 2025 ME 12, ¶¶ 6, 9 (motion to assign counsel denied because the petition was summarily dismissed) the court shall provide the nonindigent petitioner the opportunity to retain counsel or shall assign counsel for the indigent petitioner. View the source document
Maryland Mandatory verified	Mandatory. A petitioner is statutorily entitled to assistance of counsel (and a hearing) on a first UPPA petition, and Crim. Proc. § 16-204(b)(1)(iii) obliges the Office of the Public Defender to provide representation to indigent petitioners in 'a postconviction proceeding for which the defendant has a right to an attorney under Title 7.' The entitlement is not capital-only; Title 7 contains no capital carve-out. It becomes discretionary on a motion to reopen a concluded proceeding under § 7-104, where the court decides whether counsel or a hearing is granted (§ 7-108(b)(1)).	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a); § 16-204(b)(1)(iii) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is entitled to assistance of counsel and a hearing on a petition filed under this title. View the source document
Massachusetts Discretionary verified	None as of right — appointment is discretionary with the judge, even on a first Rule 30 motion. Rule 30(c)(5) commits assignment of counsel to the judge's discretion, and G.L. c. 278A, § 5 does the same for forensic-testing motions. Conceicao holds that neither the federal Constitution nor the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights gives an indigent defendant an absolute right to counsel on a new-trial motion, and that 'the decision whether to appoint counsel on a motion for a new trial properly remains within the discretion of the trial judge.' No statute or rule was found creating a mandatory post-conviction right in first-degree-murder ('capital') cases.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5); G.L. c. 278A, § 5 Case: Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261-264 (1983) The judge in the exercise of discretion may assign or appoint counsel in accordance with the provisions of these rules to represent a defendant in the preparation and presentation of motions filed under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule. View the source document
Michigan Conditional verified	Discretionary, with one mandatory trigger. For an indigent defendant who has requested counsel, the court 'may' appoint at any time during a 6.500 proceeding, but appointment becomes mandatory once the court directs that oral argument or an evidentiary hearing be held (MCR 6.505(A)); appointed counsel must then be given 56 days to amend or supplement the motion (MCR 6.505(B)), and the appointment carries through to the application for leave to appeal (MCR 6.509(B)). Appointment is separately mandatory by statute when post-conviction DNA testing shows the defendant is not the source of the biological material (MCL 770.16(8)). There is no capital-case regime: Michigan's constitution forbids the death penalty (Const 1963, art 4, § 46).	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.505(A); see also MCR 6.505(B), MCR 6.509(B), MCL 770.16(8) the court may appoint counsel for the defendant at any time during the proceedings under this subchapter. Counsel must be appointed if the court directs that oral argument or an evidentiary hearing be held. View the source document
Minnesota Conditional verified	Mandatory for an indigent petitioner who has not already had a direct appeal: § 611.14(2) makes such a person 'entitled to be represented by a public defender,' and § 590.05 says the state public defender 'shall represent' that person. Deegan v. State independently grounds this in Article we, § 6 of the Minnesota Constitution as a right to counsel for one review. For a petitioner who already took a direct appeal, § 590.05 is permissive only — the state public defender 'may represent' such persons — so representation in a later first postconviction petition is discretionary.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 611.14(2); Minn. Stat. § 590.05 Case: Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2006) a person convicted of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor, who is pursuing a postconviction proceeding and who has not already had a direct appeal of the conviction View the source document
Mississippi Discretionary verified	No right to appointed counsel in a first non-capital post-conviction proceeding: appointment is discretionary and arises only if an evidentiary hearing is required, for a petitioner who qualifies for appointment under § 99-15-15. In capital cases appointment is mandatory — upon affirmance of a death sentence the Supreme Court orders the trial court to determine indigence and whether the inmate will accept counsel, and the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel makes the appointment (§ 99-39-23(9)); M.R.A.P. 22(c)(1)(i) requires qualified counsel unless the petitioner makes an informed, voluntary on-the-record election to proceed pro se.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(1), (9); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1) If an evidentiary hearing is required, the judge may appoint counsel for a petitioner who qualifies for the appointment of counsel under Section 99-15-15. View the source document
Missouri Mandatory verified	Mandatory, not discretionary, and not limited to capital cases: on the filing of a pro se motion by an indigent movant in a first Rule 29.15 or 24.035 proceeding the court must appoint counsel within 30 days. The right is created by rule, not by the constitution — Price holds a movant has no constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel — and where the movant seeks to set aside a death sentence, appointed successor counsel must meet the qualifications of Rule 29.16 (Rule 24.036 for plea cases). No equivalent appointment right attaches to a Rule 91 habeas petition.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(e), (f); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e), (f) Case: Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 303 (Mo. banc 2014) Within 30 days after an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall cause counsel to be appointed for the movant. View the source document
Montana Conditional verified	No categorical right in a first noncapital postconviction proceeding. Counsel becomes mandatory only once the court determines a hearing is required or that the interests of justice require it (§ 46-21-201(2)), and § 46-8-104(1)-(2) frames the appointment as discretionary ('may order') and limits 'interests of justice' appointments to 'extraordinary circumstances,' defined to include lack of access to legal materials or a condition preventing the petitioner from reading or writing English. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: within 30 days of finality the sentencing court must notify the prisoner, and within 75 days must order the Office of State Public Defender to assign counsel meeting competency standards, who may not be prior counsel absent express agreement (§ 46-21-201(3)).	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-201(2)-(3), MCA; § 46-8-104, MCA If the death sentence has not been imposed and a hearing is required or if the interests of justice require, the court shall order the office of state public defender View the source document
Nebraska Discretionary verified	There is no right to appointed counsel in a first postconviction motion. Section 29-3004 provides that the district court "may appoint not to exceed two attorneys," and Nebraska treats that power as discretionary, reversible only for abuse of discretion. Appointment becomes obligatory only when the record shows a justiciable issue of law or fact. Capital cases are not treated differently: State v. Victor (a death-penalty postconviction appeal) held neither the Eighth Amendment nor due process requires appointed counsel for death-row inmates seeking state postconviction relief, and affirmed the denial of counsel because the claims were procedurally barred or meritless.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 Case: State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993); State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608, 423 N.W.2d 477 (1988) Under Nebraska case law, where the record shows that a justiciable issue of law or fact is presented to the court in a postconviction action, an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel. View the source document
Nevada Discretionary verified	Discretionary in non-capital cases, mandatory in capital ones. On a verified allegation of indigency, and if the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court 'may' appoint counsel, considering the severity of the consequences and whether the issues are difficult, the petitioner cannot comprehend the proceedings, or counsel is needed for discovery. Appointment is mandatory only where the petitioner is under sentence of death and the petition is the first challenging the judgment (NRS 34.820(1)(a)); the Nevada Supreme Court has held there is otherwise no federal constitutional, state constitutional, or statutory right to counsel — or to effective counsel — in post-conviction proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.750(1); NRS 34.820(1)(a) Case: McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 (1996); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. View the source document
New Hampshire Discretionary verified	Discretionary, not categorical. RSA 604-A:2, we directs the court, in a post-conviction proceeding attacking the validity of an underlying conviction, to appoint counsel (or approve non-counsel services) 'when the interests of justice or judicial economy require.' Appointment is mandatory only in the RSA 651-D:2 DNA track, once an indigent petitioner satisfies paragraph we (RSA 651-D:2, we-a). When appointment is made, RSA 604-A:2, II sets the order: public defender program first, then contract attorney, then any qualified attorney. There is no separate capital track in operation: RSA 630:1, III now requires life without parole for capital murder.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 604-A:2, I and II; RSA 651-D:2, I-a In a post-conviction proceeding in which a defendant seeks to attack the validity of an underlying conviction, the court shall appoint counsel or approve a request for services other than counsel when the interests of justice or judicial economy require. View the source document
New Jersey Mandatory verified	Mandatory, by rule, for an indigent defendant's first petition — and without any separate application for counsel. R. 3:22-6(a) directs that on a first petition the court 'shall as of course' assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender for indictable convictions, or assign counsel under R. 3:4-2 for non-indictable convictions, unless the defendant affirmatively elects to proceed pro se. On a second or subsequent petition attacking the same conviction, assignment is discretionary and available 'only upon application therefor and showing of good cause' (R. 3:22-6(b)). Not limited to capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a), (b) the court shall as of course, unless defendant affirmatively states an intention to proceed pro se, by order assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender if the defendant's conviction was for an indictable offense View the source document
New Mexico Conditional verified	New Mexico has a statutory (not merely discretionary) entitlement: a 'needy person' — including one detained under a conviction of a serious crime — is entitled to appointed counsel in any postconviction proceeding that counsel or the person considers appropriate, unless the court finds it is not a proceeding a reasonable person with adequate means would bring at their own expense. The entitlement is therefore statutory but subject to that judicial merits screen, and it is not limited to capital cases. We found no reachable opinion construing this subsection specifically in a first habeas proceeding.	Source Statute / rule: NMSA 1978, § 31-16-3(A), (B)(3) (Indigent Defense Act) represented in any other postconviction proceeding that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring View the source document
New York Discretionary verified	No free-standing statutory right to appointed counsel merely to file a first CPL 440.10 motion. Two hooks exist in County Law article 18-B: (1) § 722(4) addresses a judge 'assigning counsel to a defendant when a hearing has been ordered' on an Article 440 motion or coram nobis, directing that such counsel be furnished under the county's 18-B plan; and (2) the final paragraph of § 722 provides that an assignment of appellate counsel in a criminal appeal 'includes authorization for representation by appellate counsel' with respect to preparing and litigating an Article 440 motion or coram nobis. The statute draws no capital/non-capital distinction. We did not reach a controlling New York decision resolving whether assignment becomes mandatory once a hearing is ordered, so that characterization rests on the statutory text alone.	Source Statute / rule: County Law § 722(4); County Law § 722 (final unnumbered paragraph) or in assigning counsel to a defendant when a hearing has been ordered in a proceeding upon a motion, pursuant to article four hundred forty of the criminal procedure law, to vacate a judgment View the source document
North Carolina Conditional verified	Noncapital: conditionally mandatory rather than automatic — there is no right to counsel merely on filing, but once the screening judge finds the motion presents sufficient information to warrant a hearing or that the interests of justice require it, appointment for an indigent unrepresented movant is mandatory ('shall appoint'), and § 7A-451(a)(3) confirms entitlement for a defendant convicted of a felony, fined $500 or more, or sentenced to imprisonment where Chapter 15A authorizes appointment. Capital: an indigent under a sentence of death who applies to the Office of Indigent Defense Services within 10 days of the specified direct-review triggers is presumed indigent if previously so adjudicated, and IDS 'shall appoint two counsel,' who may not be prior trial or appellate counsel unless the defendant expressly requests it and waives future IAC allegations.	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(3); § 15A-1421; § 7A-451(a)(3), (c), (c1), (e) If the motion presents sufficient information to warrant a hearing or the interests of justice so require, the judge shall appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who is not represented by counsel. View the source document
North Dakota Discretionary verified	Discretionary, not mandatory — and statutory rather than constitutional. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1) reads that if an applicant requests counsel and the court is satisfied the applicant is indigent, "counsel shall be provided at public expense" (quoted verbatim in State v. McClary, 2016 ND 31, ¢ 8, 876 N.W.2d 29), but North Dakota construes the actual appointment as discretionary: counsel should be appointed where a substantial issue of law or fact may exist, and denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Bell v. State, 2001 ND 188, ¶¶ 1, 20, 636 N.W.2d 438). Wholly failing to rule on a request is itself error (McClary, ¶ 11). Chapter 29-32.1 draws no capital/non-capital distinction. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Woehlhoff v. State was not unanimous — LEVINE, J., concurs in the result..	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1) Case: Woehlhoff v. State, 531 N.W.2d 566, 569 (N.D. 1995) (quoting State v. McMorrow, 332 N.W.2d 232, 237 (N.D. 1983)); Bell v. State, 2001 ND 188, 636 N.W.2d 438 The appointment of counsel is discretionary, but applications should be read in a light most favorable to the applicant. If a substantial issue of law or fact may exist, counsel should be appointed. View the source document
Ohio Conditional verified	There is no constitutional right to counsel in a first Ohio postconviction proceeding. In non-capital cases the entitlement is statutory and conditional: under R.C. 120.16(A)(1) and (D) an indigent petitioner is entitled to representation by the public defender only if the public defender concludes the issues have arguable merit, and Crowder requires the trial court to notify the public defender once it determines an evidentiary hearing is warranted. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: R.C. 2953.21(J)(1) directs the court to appoint counsel (Sup.R. 20-certified, and not trial counsel absent express request) for an indigent person who intends to file a petition. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Crowder (1991) was not unanimous — Moyer, C.J., and Resnick, J., dissent. Moyer, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion..	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(J)(1)–(2); Ohio Rev. Code 120.16(A)(1), (D) Case: State v. Crowder (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 151, 573 N.E.2d 652 We agree with the court of appeals that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a postconviction proceeding. View the source document
Oklahoma Discretionary verified	Non-capital: discretionary, not mandatory. Counsel is made available only after the application is filed and only on a finding by the court that assistance is necessary to a fair determination of meritorious claims; appointed counsel is paid from the court fund (22 O.S. § 1082). Capital: mandatory — the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System 'shall represent' all indigent capital defendants seeking post-conviction relief on appointment by the district court following an indigency hearing (22 O.S. § 1089(B)).	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1082; 22 O.S. § 1089(B) (capital) Counsel necessary in representation shall be made available to the applicant after filing the application on a finding by the court that such assistance is necessary to provide a fair determination of meritorious claims. View the source document
Oregon Mandatory verified	Mandatory, not discretionary, and not limited to capital cases: if the circuit court is satisfied the petitioner cannot pay expenses or employ suitable counsel it 'shall order' financial eligibility (ORS 138.590(2)), and in that order 'the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel,' who represents the petitioner throughout the circuit court proceeding (ORS 138.590(4)). Counsel is likewise appointed for a post-conviction appeal on request by an indigent petitioner (ORS 138.500(1)(b)). By contrast, counsel in a true habeas corpus proceeding under ORS chapter 34 is discretionary (ORS 34.355 speaks only to compensation 'if counsel is appointed').	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.590(2), (4) In the order to proceed as a financially eligible person, the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel to represent petitioner. Counsel so appointed shall represent petitioner throughout the proceedings in the circuit court. View the source document
Pennsylvania Mandatory verified	Mandatory. On a first PCRA petition the judge must appoint counsel for a defendant who shows inability to afford or otherwise procure counsel — this is a rule-based entitlement, not limited to capital cases. Appointment continues throughout the collateral proceedings including appeal. On a second or subsequent petition, appointment is required only where an evidentiary hearing is required under Rule 908, though the judge may appoint whenever the interests of justice require. In capital cases Rule 904(H) goes further: the trial judge must appoint new counsel at the conclusion of direct review absent a valid waiver.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), (D), (E), (F)(2), (H) when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant's first petition for post-conviction collateral relief. View the source document
Rhode Island Mandatory verified	Appointed counsel is mandatory by statute on a first application: an indigent applicant is entitled to be represented by the Public Defender, and if the Public Defender is conflicted or otherwise unable to serve, the court shall assign counsel. The right is statutory legislative grace rather than constitutional, and it cannot be satisfied with anything less than a meaningful attorney-client relationship; counsel may exit only through the Shatney no-merit procedure, after which the applicant proceeds pro se. It is not limited to capital cases (Rhode Island has no death penalty), but an applicant serving life without parole is guaranteed an evidentiary hearing on a first application, and there is no right to appointed counsel to appeal the denial of a successive application the Public Defender has found to lack a reasonable likelihood of success.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 Case: Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012); Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000); Louro v. State, 740 A.2d 343 (R.I. 1999); Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012) An applicant who is indigent shall be entitled to be represented by the public defender. View the source document
South Carolina Conditional verified	Mandatory by court rule, but conditional: once the State has filed its return, if the application presents questions of law or fact requiring a hearing, the court 'shall promptly appoint counsel' for an indigent applicant (Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP), and § 17-27-60 makes the costs of representation available to indigents. The condition matters — an application summarily dismissed on the pleadings under § 17-27-70(b) is disposed of without appointed counsel, which is what happened in Odom. Rule 71.1(g) further entitles an indigent applicant to counsel to appeal a PCR denial. In capital cases appointment is unconditional and doubled: § 17-27-160(B) requires two qualified counsel to be 'immediately appointed.' The right is rule- and statute-based, not constitutional — Aice v. State expressly notes there is no constitutional right to counsel in PCR under Pennsylvania v. Finley.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 71.1(d), (g), SCRCP; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-60, 17-27-160(B) Case: Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753 (1999) If, after the State has filed its return, the application presents questions of law or fact which will require a hearing, the court shall promptly appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is indigent. View the source document
South Dakota Discretionary verified	Discretionary, not mandatory, even in a first habeas. Counsel is appointed for an indigent applicant only if the judge additionally finds appointment 'necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding'; fees are charged to the committing county. The same section provides that ineffectiveness of counsel in a collateral post-conviction proceeding is not itself a ground for relief. No separate capital-case post-conviction counsel mandate was found in SDCL ch. 23A-27A.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-4 the court or judge shall, if the judge finds that such appointment is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding, appoint counsel for the indigent person View the source document
Tennessee Conditional verified	Mandatory by statute in a first post-conviction proceeding, but conditioned: the petition must survive preliminary consideration (i.e., not be dismissed under § 40-30-106), the petitioner must be unrepresented and request counsel, and the court must find him indigent under § 40-14-201 — then the court 'shall appoint counsel.' The court may also appoint counsel earlier, in its discretion, to secure the filing of a complete petition (§ 40-30-106(e)). This applies to all cases, not just capital; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 § 1(d)(1)(D) lists post-conviction among covered proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107(b)(1) If a petitioner not represented by counsel requests counsel and the court is satisfied that the petitioner is indigent as defined in § 40-14-201, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. View the source document
Texas Discretionary verified	Mandatory only in capital cases: art. 11.071 § 2(a) provides an applicant 'shall be represented by competent counsel' unless the applicant validly elects to proceed pro se, and § 2(c) requires the convicting court to appoint the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs or listed counsel within 30 days. In non-capital first habeas proceedings appointment is discretionary under art. 1.051(d)(3) on an interests-of-justice finding. Art. 11.074(b) adds one mandatory non-capital trigger: the court 'shall appoint an attorney' when the State itself represents that an eligible indigent defendant is not guilty, is guilty only of a lesser offense, or was convicted under a law held unconstitutional.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.051(d)(3); art. 11.071 § 2(a), (c); art. 11.074(b) a habeas corpus proceeding if the court concludes that the interests of justice require representation View the source document
Utah Discretionary verified	No right to appointed counsel in a non-capital first petition — appointment is purely discretionary, and available only after the petition survives summary screening. The court 'may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner,' appoint counsel pro bono or from the Indigent Appellate Defense Division, weighing incarceration, likely need for an evidentiary hearing or investigation, and complexity. Trial and direct-appeal counsel are ineligible for the appointment. In capital cases appointment is mandatory: within 30 days after the Supreme Court remits following affirmance, the sentencing court 'shall' appoint qualified post-conviction counsel, subject to knowing waiver.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code § 78B-9-109(1)-(2) (non-capital, discretionary); § 78B-9-202(1)(a)(ii), (1)(d)-(e) (capital, mandatory); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(j) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis or from the Indigent Appellate Defense Division View the source document
Vermont Conditional verified	There is no constitutional right, but Vermont provides a statutory right to state-funded counsel in a PCR proceeding under 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3), and courts do appoint the Defender General's Prisoners' Rights Office at the outset. Since the 2004 amendment (further amended eff. May 25, 2016) that right is conditioned on the assigned attorney's own judgment that the claims are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument and have evidentiary support; on that showing counsel may withdraw without an Anders brief. In re Bruyette expressly reserved whether that merits condition may cut off counsel in an initial trial-court PCR. Not limited to capital cases — Vermont has no death penalty. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Bruyette was not unanimous — Dooley, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. He concurs in granting counsel's motion to withdraw but dissents from the holding that the Defender General may refuse to appoint new counsel to replace him..	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3); see also 13 V.S.A. §§ 5232(2), 7137 Case: In re Bruyette, 2014 VT 30, ¶¶ 9-10 & n.1, 196 Vt. 261, 96 A.3d 1151; In re Bailey, 2009 VT 122, ¶¶ 11-12; In re Gould, 2004 VT 46, ¶¶ 13-22 Vermont law does, however, provide a statutory right to state-funded counsel in a PCR proceeding. View the source document
Virginia None verified	None as of right. The Supreme Court of Virginia holds there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a state habeas proceeding — neither in the circuit court nor on habeas appeal — and therefore no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel; habeas does not lie to correct a prior habeas counsel's errors. Any appointment is discretionary (the circuit court in Howard did appoint counsel), and no statute confers a right to counsel in a first non-capital habeas. Virginia's only habeas-specific mandatory-counsel provision, former § 19.2-163.7 in Article 4.1 ('Counsel in Capital Cases'), was repealed effective July 1, 2021 with the abolition of capital punishment.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 (repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, eff. July 1, 2021; formerly Title 19.2, ch. 10, art. 4.1, 'Counsel in Capital Cases'); cf. § 19.2-163.3 (public defender duties reach only persons 'charged with a crime or offense' and direct appeals) Case: Howard v. Warden of the Buckingham Correctional Center, 232 Va. 16, 348 S.E.2d 211 (1986) Because Howard did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his prior habeas proceeding, he could not have been denied the effective assistance of counsel by Maupin's alleged shortcomings in handling that proceeding either in the trial court or on appeal. View the source document
Washington Conditional verified	No unconditional right; appointment in a first collateral attack is conditional and statutory, not constitutional. For a non-capital indigent petitioner, counsel is provided at state expense only after the Chief Judge determines under RAP 16.11 that the issues raised are not frivolous (RCW 10.73.150(4)); a person under sentence of death was entitled to appointed counsel on request to file and prosecute a collateral attack (RCW 10.73.150(3)). The same statute bars public counsel for a second or subsequent collateral attack in non-capital cases, and the 1995 enacting legislature expressly found there is 'no constitutional right to appointment of counsel at public expense to collaterally attack a judgment and sentence.'	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.150(3), (4) Is not under a sentence of death and requests counsel to prosecute a collateral attack after the chief judge has determined that the issues raised by the petition are not frivolous, in accordance with the procedure contained in rules of appellate procedure 16.11. View the source document
West Virginia Conditional verified	Appointment in a first post-conviction habeas is mandatory once threshold findings are made, but those findings are discretionary gatekeepers. W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) provides that if the court is satisfied the petitioner is indigent and that the petition was filed in good faith and 'has merit or is not frivolous,' the court 'shall appoint counsel'; if it finds the petition frivolous or without merit, the request 'shall be denied' by a final order. Habeas Rule 4(b) likewise makes appointment mandatory where the petitioner may have grounds but the petition is insufficient. This is statutory, not capital-specific — West Virginia has no capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) that the petition was filed in good faith, and has merit or is not frivolous, the court shall order that the petitioner proceed in forma pauperis, and the court shall appoint counsel for the petitioner. View the source document
Wisconsin Discretionary verified	Two-tiered. For the first-tier postconviction motion on the direct-appeal track (Rule 809.30 — the proceeding in which IAC must be raised), appointment is mandatory for an indigent who requests it: Rule 809.30(2)(e) says the State Public Defender 'shall appoint counsel.' For a truly collateral first petition under § 974.06, there is no entitlement — § 974.06(3)(b) makes court referral conditional ('If it appears that counsel is necessary'), and § 977.05(4)(j) lets the SPD take a postconviction or habeas case only 'if the state public defender determines the case should be pursued.' A separate mandatory referral exists for unrepresented indigent movants seeking postconviction DNA testing (§ 974.07(11)).	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(e); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3)(b); Wis. Stat. § 977.05(4)(j); Wis. Stat. § 974.07(11) the state public defender shall appoint counsel for the person and request a transcript View the source document
Wyoming None verified	None as of right. Wyoming provides no entitlement to appointed counsel in initial state post-conviction proceedings under the post-conviction relief act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through -108. In Keats — an appeal from the denial of an initial petition for post-conviction relief — the Wyoming Supreme Court quoted ABA Standard 5-6.2's call for counsel at 'postconviction review' and appended footnote 2 stating that Wyoming law 'does not go this far,' citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c) and the public defender statute § 7-6-104(c)(vi), and noting there is no federal constitutional right (Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17). What is verifiable from a fetchable primary source is the absence of an entitlement, not a categorical statutory ban: the State Public Defender's office in fact appeared for the petitioner in capital post-conviction litigation in Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 (appeal from denial of post-conviction relief in a capital murder case).	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(vi) Case: Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 15 & n.2, 115 P.3d 1110, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005); Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2005) Wyoming law does not go this far. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-104(c), 7-6-104(c)(vi) (Lexis-Nexis 2005); Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 838, ¶ 17 (Wyo.2005) (The Constitution does not require counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.). View the source document

How self-represented petitions are screened

How a state tells a meritorious petition from a meritless one when the petitioner has no lawyer.

49 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Judicial screening verified	No dedicated mechanism — no defender-office intake, counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral; the circuit judge screens petitions on the pleadings. Rule 32.6(b) requires each claim to be pleaded with specific facts, and Rule 32.7(d) authorizes summary dismissal without a response or hearing under the quoted standard; appointment of counsel under Rule 32.7(c) is considered only if the petition survives summary dismissal.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(d); Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(b) Case: Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule View the source document
Alaska Mandatory counsel verified	Screening operates through mandatory appointed counsel plus independent judicial review: every indigent first-time applicant receives counsel, who within 60 days must pursue the pro se application, file an amended one, or file a detailed 'no-merit' certificate under Criminal Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B); under Rule 35.1(f)(2) the court may not dismiss until it independently examines the merits, gives notice of intended dismissal, and considers the applicant's response.	Source Statute / rule: Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(2), (f)(2); AS 18.85.100(c) Case: Griffin v. State, 18 P.3d 71 (Alaska App. 2001) Even when an attorney files the certificate described in Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B), the trial court is prohibited from allowing the attorney to withdraw until the court has independently examined the potential merits of the case and has likewise concluded that the petitioner has no colorable claim View the source document
Arizona Mandatory counsel verified	Layered screening rather than pure pro se review: counsel is appointed on request for timely first petitions (Rule 32.5(a)); if appointed counsel finds no colorable claim, counsel must file a notice cataloguing the record reviewed and potential issues (including potential IAC claims), then remains as advisory counsel while the defendant may file a petition pro se (Rule 32.6(c)-(e)). The court then reviews the petition, response, and reply and must summarily dismiss if no claim presents a material issue of fact or law (Rule 32.11(a)).	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a); see also Rules 32.5, 32.6(c)-(e); accord A.R.S. § 13-4236(C) If, after identifying all precluded and untimely claims, the court determines that no remaining claim presents a material issue of fact or law that would entitle the defendant to relief under this rule, the court must summarily dismiss the petition. View the source document
Arkansas Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and on the papers: the circuit court reviews the petition against the files and record and, if they conclusively show no entitlement to relief, denies without a hearing but must make written findings specifying the parts of the record relied on (Rule 37.3(a)); otherwise it must serve notice on the prosecutor and grant a prompt reported hearing (Rule 37.3(c)). Failure to make the required written findings is reversible error unless the record conclusively shows the petition is meritless. A second layer of merit screening occurs on appeal, where the Supreme Court dismisses pro se postconviction appeals that are clearly without merit (Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626; Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475 (2007)).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(a), (c) Case: Wooten v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999); Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259 If the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect View the source document
California Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening under Rule of Court 4.551: the court must rule on every habeas petition within 60 days of filing (rule 4.551(a)(5)(A)), may request an informal response from the state, and must issue an order to show cause if the petition states a prima facie case taking its factual allegations as true; any denial must state reasons. Counsel is then appointed for indigent petitioners on issuance of the order to show cause.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(5), (c)(1) court must issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. View the source document
Colorado Judicial screening verified	Two-tier screening. First, judicial: the trial court reviews the pro se motion and may deny it without a hearing only where the motion, files, and record clearly establish the allegations are without merit (Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV)). Second, defender-office intake: if not summarily denied, the motion is served on the state public defender, which enters only if it finds arguable merit under C.R.S. § 21-1-104 (Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V); Silva v. People). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Silva v. People was not unanimous — Justice COATS dissents. Justice EID does not participate..	Source Statute / rule: Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV)–(V); C.R.S. § 21-1-104(1)(b), (2) Case: Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 (Colo. 2007) Therefore, the court and the state public defender's office must find that a defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion has arguable merit before the statutory right to post-conviction counsel is triggered. View the source document
Connecticut Judicial screening verified	A judge screens every petition before the writ issues: under Practice Book § 23-24 the court conducts preliminary review and declines to issue the writ only if it lacks jurisdiction, the petition is wholly frivolous on its face, or the relief sought is unavailable (Gilchrist confirms this pre-issuance screening precedes any appointment of counsel). Petitions that survive proceed with appointed counsel for indigent petitioners under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a), and face a further statutory 'good cause for trial' screen after the close of pleadings under § 52-470(b).	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Practice Book § 23-24; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-470(b), 51-296(a) Case: Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 548 (2020) conduct a preliminary review of the petition, prior to commencement of the habeas action through issuance of the writ, to determine whether the petition is patently defective because the court lacks jurisdiction, the petition is wholly frivolous on its face View the source document
Delaware Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial: the Superior Court judge reviews the pro se motion and may summarily dismiss it when it plainly appears from the motion and the record of prior proceedings that the movant is not entitled to relief; a qualifying indigent first-time movant who is not summarily dismissed gets appointed counsel on request. Motions are commonly referred to a Superior Court Commissioner, who may hold evidentiary hearings and submit proposed findings on 'applications for postconviction relief,' subject to de novo determination by a judge (10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)b, d). We found no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in Delaware primary law.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5), 61(e); 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)b Case: Baldwin v. State, 166 A.3d 938, 939-42 (Del. 2017) it plainly appears from the motion for post-conviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the [defendant] is not entitled to relief View the source document
Florida Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, and nothing else. On filing, the clerk forwards the motion to the court, which must sort it: untimely and facially insufficient motions are summarily denied with prejudice; a timely but insufficient motion draws a nonfinal order giving the defendant 60 days to amend; a motion stating some sufficient and some insufficient claims draws 60 days to cure the latter; claims conclusively refuted by the record are summarily denied with the record attached; otherwise the state must answer and an evidentiary hearing follows. Spera makes the amendment opportunity mandatory on a first motion. There is no defender-office intake, counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral mechanism for non-capital postconviction.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(1)-(6) (redesignated from 3.850(f)(1)-(6) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. Stat. § 27.51(1) (public defender duties, which do not extend to collateral proceedings) Case: Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 2007) we hold that in dismissing a first postconviction motion based on a pleading deficiency, a court abuses its discretion in failing to allow the defendant at least one opportunity to correct the deficiency unless it cannot be corrected View the source document
Georgia No merit screen verified	Georgia has no merit-screening mechanism for self-represented habeas petitions. The general pre-filing frivolity screen for unrepresented indigent civil filers, O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d), does not apply to habeas petitions, and the merits may be reached only after the petition is filed (Hicks v. Scott). No counsel is appointed on issuance, and the statute instead requires the respondent to answer or move to dismiss within 20 days and the court to set a hearing (§ 9-14-47). The only merit gate is appellate: the Supreme Court of Georgia must issue a certificate of probable cause before an unsuccessful petitioner may appeal (§ 9-14-52(a)–(b)). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Hicks v. Scott was not unanimous — All the Justices concur, except Carley and Hines, JJ, who dissent. Carley, J., dissenting, joined by Hines, J., on the ground that this Court lacked jurisdiction because the application for certificate of probable cause was untimely filed..	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(a)–(b) Case: Hicks v. Scott, 273 Ga. 358 (2001) This Court has previously held, however, that this Code section does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus relief. View the source document
Hawaii Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, mandatory and on the papers: every post-conviction document received by any court must be transmitted to a judge, who determines how it is docketed (HRPP Rule 42.3(a); accord R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 33). A nonconforming pro se petition must still be accepted for filing and treated as a Rule 40 petition (Rule 40(c)(2)), no petition may be dismissed for want of particularity until the petitioner has had an opportunity to clarify it (Rule 40(e)), and a hearing is required unless the claim is "patently frivolous and… without trace of support" (Rule 40(f), 40(g)(2)). Surviving that screen also triggers mandatory referral of an indigent petitioner to the Public Defender (Rule 40(i)). The rules establish no defender-office intake screen and no conviction-integrity referral.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 42.3(a); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(c)(2), 40(e), 40(f), 40(g)(2), 40(i); R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 33 All post-conviction documents received by any court shall be transmitted to a judge for processing View the source document
Idaho Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening only. Under § 19-4906(b) the court may give notice of its intent to dismiss with its reasons and must allow the applicant 20 days to reply. The court must rule on any request for appointed counsel before reaching the merits, and must appoint counsel if the pro se petition alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim, with every inference running in the unrepresented petitioner's favor. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Charboneau v. State was not unanimous — Justice KIDWELL dissenting, in which Chief Justice SCHROEDER concurs. Justice Kidwell dissents on the grounds that the petition was frivolous and the district court's error in not ruling on counsel was harmless..	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4906(b); § 19-4904 Case: Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-94 (2004); Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654 (2007) If he alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. View the source document
Illinois Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening. Within 90 days of docketing, the circuit court must examine every petition on its own and may summarily dismiss it in a written order if it is 'frivolous or is patently without merit' — construed to mean the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. A petition that survives (or that the court fails to rule on within 90 days) is docketed for second-stage proceedings, where indigent counsel is appointed. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral step built into the Act.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a), (a)(2), (b) Case: People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 16 (2009) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. View the source document
Indiana Defender intake verified	Defender-office intake plus judicial screening. If the petitioner is indigent, confined in an Indiana penal facility or committed to the DOC, and has requested representation, the clerk must send the petition to the State Public Defender's office (§ 2); that office screens the case and represents the petitioner only if it determines the proceeding is meritorious and in the interests of justice (§ 9(a)). Counsel who later concludes there is no merit must withdraw with a certificate of consultation and investigation (§ 9(c)); the court may separately refer an indigent incarcerated petitioner to the State Public Defender on its own preliminary finding of merit (§ 4(e)), and may deny the petition without further proceedings if the pleadings conclusively show no entitlement to relief (§ 4(f)).	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 §§ 2, 4(e)–(f), 9(a), 9(c) the Public Defender may represent any petitioner confined in a penal facility in Indiana or committed to the Indiana Department of Correction in all proceedings under this Rule, including appeal, if the Public Defender determines the proceedings are meritorious and in the interests of justice View the source document
Iowa Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, coupled with discretionary appointment of counsel — there is no defender-office intake gate or conviction-integrity referral required by chapter 822. Under Iowa Code § 822.6(2) the court may screen the application on the pleadings and record and, if it intends to dismiss, must give the applicant its reasons and an opportunity to reply. On the counsel side, Furgison directs judges to read the "often inartfully drawn application in a light most favorable to the applicant" and appoint counsel at once if a substantial issue of law or fact may exist.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.6(2); Iowa Code § 822.5 Case: Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559-60 (Iowa 2002); Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980); Furgison v. State, 217 N.W.2d 613, 615-16 (Iowa 1974) it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for dismissal. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. View the source document
Kansas Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and on the papers: on a 60-1507 motion filed with a poverty affidavit the court "shall make a preliminary examination of the petition or motion and the supporting papers" (K.S.A. 22-4506(a)), and must grant a prompt hearing unless the motion, files, and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief (K.S.A. 60-1507(b); Rule 183(f)). If the papers present substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact the court must appoint counsel from the Board of Indigents' Defense Services panel and order a transcript (22-4506(b)); Bellamy describes the three permissible dispositions — summary denial, a preliminary hearing held after appointment of counsel, or a full evidentiary hearing. We found no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in K.S.A. 60-1507, 22-4506, or Rule 183.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-4506(a)-(b); K.S.A. 60-1507(b); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(f), (h) Case: Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 353-54, 172 P.3d 10 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 170-71, 14 P.3d 424 (2000)) the court shall make a preliminary examination of the petition or motion and the supporting papers View the source document
Kentucky Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and is done by the judge of the sentencing court on the papers. Under RCr 11.42(2) the judge examines whether the motion is signed, verified, and pleads specific grounds and supporting facts that would warrant relief; if not, it may be summarily dismissed. Only if the Commonwealth's answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved on the face of the record must the court hold a hearing and (on written request) appoint counsel. Separately, Fraser holds that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the Department of Public Advocacy may furnish post-conviction legal services without any judicial appointment, which is Kentucky's defender-office intake path. No conviction-integrity-unit referral mechanism was located. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Fraser v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part we. KELLER, J., dissents as to Part we by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J., joins. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part II. KELLER, J., concurs as to Part II by separate opinion, in which STUMBO, J..	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(2), (5); KRS 31.110(2)(c) (as construed in Fraser) Case: Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001) shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall warrant a summary dismissal of the motion. View the source document
Louisiana Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, and it is mandatory. La. C. Cr. P. art. 927(A)(1) requires the court to conduct a preliminary review of every PCR petition — for custody, timeliness under art. 930.8, adequacy of factual and legal grounds, record contradiction, and whether each claim is procedurally barred or facially frivolous — and to dismiss if the petition and exhibits show no entitlement to relief; only if it survives does the court order an answer. Art. 930.11(A)(1) gives the court thirty days from filing to complete that review. Petitioners must use the uniform application approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court (art. 926(D)). There is no statewide defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral for non-capital PCR.	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 927(A); see also arts. 926(D), 930.11(A)(1) The court shall conduct a preliminary review of all petitions for post-conviction relief for compliance with the limitations for relief established in this Title. View the source document
Maine Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening. The court must promptly examine every petition and must summarily dismiss it, in whole or part and with stated reasons, if the face of the petition and its exhibits affirmatively disclose no restraint/impediment (§ 2124), waiver (§ 2128) with no § 2128-A exception, untimeliness (§ 2128-B), or no cognizable ground (§ 2125). A petition surviving that screen triggers assignment of counsel for an indigent petitioner, who then has 42 days to file an amended petition. No defender-office intake, innocence-commission, or conviction-integrity referral appears in ch. 305-A or M.R.U. Crim. P. 65-75A.	Source Statute / rule: M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(a)-(c); 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1) The court shall enter an order for the summary dismissal of the petition in whole or in part, stating the reasons for the dismissal, if from the face of the petition and any exhibits attached to it, the petition affirmatively discloses View the source document
Maryland Defender intake verified	Maryland uses defender-office intake rather than judicial merits screening: on receipt of any post-conviction petition the clerk must notify the county administrative judge and the State's Attorney, and if the petition alleges indigency must forward a copy to the Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender. There is no threshold merit gate on a first petition — Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a) entitles the petitioner to counsel and a hearing, and Md. Rule 4-406(a) requires a prompt hearing unless the parties stipulate to relief. Discretionary screening applies only to a request to reopen under § 7-104.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a); Md. Rule 4-403 If the petition alleges that the petitioner is indigent, the clerk shall promptly notify the Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender by forwarding a copy of the petition. View the source document
Massachusetts Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and done on the papers: under Rule 30(c)(3) the judge decides on the motion and supporting affidavits without a hearing unless a 'substantial issue' is raised, and Rule 30(c)(5) leaves appointment of counsel to the judge's discretion (Conceicao: where a colorable or meritorious issue is presented, 'it is much the better practice to assign counsel'). Post-conviction forensic-testing motions get a parallel judicial gate under G.L. c. 278A, § 3(e), which requires the court to review all motions expeditiously and dismiss facially insufficient ones without a hearing. No defender-office intake, automatic counsel-on-issuance, or conviction-integrity referral is built into the rules.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(3), (c)(5); G.L. c. 278A, § 3(e) Case: Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 262 (1983) on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or affidavits View the source document
Michigan Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening by the assigned judge. The court must promptly examine the motion together with all files, records, transcripts and correspondence, and summarily deny it — with a concise statement of reasons — if it plainly appears the defendant is not entitled to relief; otherwise it must order a prosecutor response and further proceedings (MCR 6.504(B)(1)-(4)). Two provisions specifically protect self-represented filers: the court must give notice and 90 days to withdraw or amend before recharacterizing a mis-styled first motion as a motion for relief from judgment, and failure to do so means the filing cannot count against the one-motion limit (MCR 6.502(D)); and counsel must be appointed for an indigent defendant once the court directs oral argument or an evidentiary hearing (MCR 6.505(A)). There is no defender-office intake screen in the rules.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.504(B)(2); see also MCR 6.502(D), MCR 6.505(A) If it plainly appears from the face of the materials described in subrule (B)(1) that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the court shall deny the motion without directing further proceedings. View the source document
Minnesota Judicial screening verified	Two statutory mechanisms operate together: defender-office intake — where the petitioner is unrepresented, the court administrator must forward a copy of the petition to the State Public Defender and tell the petitioner of the referral (§ 590.02, subd. 1(4)) — and judicial screening, under which the court must promptly set an early hearing unless 'the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief' (§ 590.04, subd. 1). Section 590.03 directs the court to 'liberally construe the petition' and waive defects in form. There is no separate merits-triage panel or statutory conviction-integrity referral in ch. 590.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(4); § 590.04, subd. 1; § 590.03 In the event the petitioner is without counsel, the court administrator shall forthwith transmit a copy of the petition to the state public defender and shall advise the petitioner of such referral. View the source document
Mississippi Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening only, at two levels. In the trial court the judge examines the motion and all related files promptly and may dismiss it summarily if it plainly appears the movant is not entitled to relief (§ 99-39-11(1)-(2)); a clerk returns a non-complying motion if a judge so directs (§ 99-39-9(4)). Where the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court screens the application for leave and must deny it unless the claims are not procedurally barred and 'present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right' (§ 99-39-27(5)); there is no defender-office intake for non-capital post-conviction cases, the Indigent Appeals Division being limited to felony appeals (§ 99-40-1(2)).	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-11(1)-(2), 99-39-9(4), 99-39-27(5); cf. § 99-40-1(2) If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal View the source document
Missouri Mandatory counsel verified	There is no merit screen gating access: counsel must be appointed for EVERY indigent pro se movant within 30 days of filing, and appointed counsel must then determine whether the pro se motion pleads sufficient facts and all known claims, filing either an amended motion or a statement in lieu explaining what was done. Merit screening is judicial and comes afterward, on the papers — the court denies without a hearing if the motion, files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. Separately, and outside the movant's control, § 547.031 RSMo permits the prosecuting or circuit attorney to move to vacate at any time on information that the convicted person may be innocent.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(e), (h); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e), (h); § 547.031 RSMo If the court shall determine the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, a hearing shall not be held. View the source document
Montana Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening only. Under § 46-21-201(1)(a) the district court reviews the petition against the files and records; if they conclusively show no entitlement to relief the petition is dismissed without a response being ordered, otherwise the court orders the county attorney and Attorney General to respond and may then dismiss as a matter of law for failure to state a claim. The pleading burden falls on the petitioner: § 46-21-104 requires attached affidavits, records, or other evidence plus a supporting memorandum with citations, and a pro se petition can be dismissed for non-compliance (Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶ 3). We found no statutory defender-office intake, automatic counsel-on-docketing, or conviction-integrity referral anywhere in Title 46, ch. 21 (parts 1 and 2 comprise only §§ 46-21-101 to -105, -110, -111, and -201 to -203).	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-201(1)(a), MCA; § 46-21-104, MCA Unless the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall cause notice of the petition to be sent to the county attorney View the source document
Nebraska Judicial screening verified	Screening is done by the sentencing judge on the papers, not by any defender office, screening panel, or conviction-integrity unit. Under § 29-3001(2) the court must serve the county attorney and grant a prompt hearing unless the motion and the files and records of the case show the prisoner is entitled to no relief; motions alleging only conclusions may be denied without a hearing. Counsel is discretionary, but appointment is required once the record shows a justiciable issue of law or fact (State v. Wiley; State v. Victor). No postconviction unit exists in the Commission on Public Advocacy — § 29-3930 lists capital litigation, appellate, violent crime and drug defense, DNA testing, and major case resource center divisions — and a pro se movant is held to the same standard as one represented by counsel (State v. Parmar).	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(2); see § 29-3930 (Commission on Public Advocacy divisions) Case: State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608, 423 N.W.2d 477 (1988) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served on the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon View the source document
Nevada Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening. A self-represented petitioner must use the mandatory statutory form (NRS 34.735); the clerk presents the petition promptly to a judge, who examines it expeditiously and either orders the prosecuting agency to respond within 45 days or, for a successive petition plainly barred under NRS 34.810(3), enters summary dismissal; after the response the judge decides whether an evidentiary hearing is required, granting the writ and setting a hearing if it is and dismissing without a hearing if it is not. Chapter 34 provides no defender-office intake, conviction-integrity referral, or other non-judicial merit screen; counsel may be appointed by the court once the petition survives summary dismissal (NRS 34.750(1)).	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.735; NRS 34.740; NRS 34.745; NRS 34.770; NRS 34.750(1) If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, the judge or justice shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing. View the source document
New Hampshire Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial, done by the superior court on the papers; New Hampshire has no defender-office intake mandate and no statutory conviction-integrity referral that we could locate. Two statutory screens exist: for habeas, RSA 534:5 directs that the writ 'shall not be granted' if the attached copy of the committing process shows the petitioner is lawfully held; and for DNA petitions, RSA 651-D:2, we-a requires appointment of counsel once the court finds an indigent petitioner has met the pleading requirements of paragraph we — counsel on issuance. Outside the DNA track, appointment of counsel is discretionary and is itself the merit signal (RSA 604-A:2, we).	Source Statute / rule: RSA 651-D:2, I-a; RSA 534:5; RSA 604-A:2, I If the superior court determines that an indigent petitioner has met the requirements of paragraph I, it shall appoint counsel to represent such petitioner in any further proceedings under this section. View the source document
New Jersey Defender intake verified	Screening is done first by court staff and the Criminal Presiding Judge, then by the defender office. Under R. 3:22-6(a) the criminal division manager's office determines indigency and screens the petition for cognizability under R. 3:22-2 and for compliance with the specificity/verification requirements of R. 3:22-8, and forwards it to the Criminal Presiding Judge, whose assignment order must state the reasons if the petition is not cognizable or is deficient; counsel is then assigned as of course on a first petition and, under R. 3:22-6A(3), must file an amended or new petition within 120 days curing those deficiencies. The Office of the Public Defender's Conviction Integrity Unit separately reviews each referral, orders transcripts, and assigns an experienced attorney who may amend the petition.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6A(3) The criminal division manager's office shall determine whether the defendant is indigent and screen the petition to determine whether the petition is cognizable under R. 3:22-2 and, if so, whether the requirements of R. 3:22-8 have been met. View the source document
New Mexico Judicial screening unverified	Not verified. The screening mechanism lives in Rule 5-802 NMRA, whose text we could not extract. A search-engine-indexed excerpt of the official rule PDF on nmcourts.gov reads that the petition goes 'to a judge presiding in the criminal division' and that 'the clerk of the court shall immediately forward a file-stamped copy of the petition and any attachments to the district attorney and to the public defender department post-conviction unit' — i.e. judicial assignment plus mandatory defender-office intake review — but we could not fetch that text from the document itself and found no statute or reachable opinion reproducing the provision.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802 NMRA View the source document
New York Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening on the papers, by the motion court. Under CPL 440.30 the court must summarily deny if a mandatory bar appears from conceded allegations or unquestionable documentary proof; it may deny without a hearing if the papers allege no legal ground, lack sworn factual substantiation, are conclusively refuted by documentary proof, or rest on an unsupported bare allegation with no reasonable possibility of being true; it must grant without a hearing where the sworn allegations are conceded or conclusively documented; and if none of those apply it must conduct a hearing. The statute creates no defender-office intake, screening panel, or conviction-integrity referral; the only statutory routes to counsel we located are the County Law § 722 hooks described under counsel_initial_habeas.	Source Statute / rule: CPL 440.30(2), (3), (4), (5) Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court may deny it without conducting a hearing if: (a) The moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis for the motion View the source document
North Carolina Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening on the record, with counsel appointed if the motion survives it: the clerk docketalls the MAR and brings it to the senior resident superior court judge (or chief district court judge), who assigns it, and the assigned judge must conduct an initial review, deny the motion if all claims are frivolous, and appoint counsel for an indigent unrepresented movant if the motion warrants a hearing or the interests of justice require. Two supplements exist outside the MAR track: the Office of Indigent Defense Services is statutorily responsible for inmate legal-access services (§ 7A-498.3(a)(2a), contracted in practice to NC Prisoner Legal Services), and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission accepts factual-innocence claims directly from claimants convicted of homicide, robbery, registrable offenses, and Class A–E felonies, with other claims referable by a court, agency, or counsel.	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(2)-(3); § 7A-498.3(a)(2a); § 15A-1467(a) The judge assigned to the motion shall conduct an initial review of the motion. If the judge determines that all of the claims alleged in the motion are frivolous, the judge shall deny the motion. View the source document
North Dakota Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, paired with a clerk-notification duty. Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(6) the clerk of court must tell a petitioner who files without counsel how to obtain appointed counsel if indigent; the district court then bears the ultimate duty to decide whether counsel should be appointed, which requires it to determine whether "a substantial issue of law or fact may exist" on the application read most favorably to the applicant. Applications lacking such an issue may be summarily disposed of (§§ 29-32.1-09, 29-32.1-09.1). We located no defender-office intake unit, conviction-integrity referral, or other separate merit-screening body in North Dakota. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Woehlhoff v. State was not unanimous — VANDE WALLE, C.J., and SANDSTROM and NEUMANN, JJ., concur. LEVINE, J., concurs in the result..	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(6); §§ 29-32.1-09, 29-32.1-09.1 Case: Woehlhoff v. State, 531 N.W.2d 566, 569 (N.D. 1995) the initial duty on the clerk of court to notify a convict, who petitions for post-conviction relief without assistance of counsel, about the procedure to obtain counsel if indigent, the trial court is delegated the ultimate duty to determine if counsel should be appointed View the source document
Ohio Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial, done by the sentencing court on the papers: before granting a hearing the court must determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief, considering the petition, supporting affidavits, documentary evidence and all files and records, and must file findings of fact and conclusions of law if it dismisses. There is no statutory defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral; the county and state public defenders may decline any postconviction matter unless first satisfied there is arguable merit (R.C. 120.16(D); R.C. 120.06(B)).	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(D) Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief. View the source document
Oklahoma Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening only. The district court reviews the application, the State's answer or motion, and the record, and may dismiss without a hearing or grant summary disposition; it must take account of substance regardless of defects of form, and may not dispose on the pleadings if a material issue of fact exists (22 O.S. §§ 1083(B)-(C), 1084). Merit-screening for counsel is the court's own finding under § 1082. There is no defender-office intake, no automatic counsel on issuance, and no conviction-integrity referral for non-capital petitioners; capital petitioners are handled by the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System under § 1089(B).	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1083(B)-(C); § 1084; § 1082 Case: Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 21 (construing § 1083(b)-(c)) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion of respondent, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may order the application dismissed View the source document
Oregon Judicial screening verified	Two statutory mechanisms operate together. The court may enter judgment on its own motion denying a 'meritless petition' — one that, liberally construed, fails to state a claim (ORS 138.525(1)–(2)); such a dismissal is not appealable (138.525(3)) but is without prejudice if entered without a hearing and the petitioner was unrepresented (138.525(4)). Separately, every financially eligible petitioner receives appointed counsel, who must move to amend a defective petition within 15 days or file an affidavit stating that no ground for relief can be pleaded (ORS 138.590(4)–(5)) — so screening is done by appointed counsel plus the judge, not by a defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.525; ORS 138.590(4), (5) The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the defendant, enter a judgment denying a meritless petition brought under ORS 138.510 to 138.680. View the source document
Pennsylvania Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening, paired with near-automatic appointment of counsel. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) the judge promptly reviews the petition, any Commonwealth answer, and the record; if satisfied there is no genuine issue of material fact the judge must issue a notice of intent to dismiss stating the reasons, and the petitioner has 20 days to respond before dismissal. In practice the screening rarely falls on an unaided pro se petitioner, because Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) requires counsel be appointed for an indigent defendant's first petition. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral mechanism in the rules.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) the judge shall promptly review the petition, any answer by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other matters of record relating to the defendant's claim(s). View the source document
Rhode Island Mandatory counsel verified	Rhode Island has no separate screening office; screening runs through mandatory counsel. Every indigent applicant is entitled to the Public Defender (or court-assigned counsel), and if appointed counsel concludes the application lacks merit, counsel must move to withdraw with a "no-merit" memorandum detailing the review and listing each issue the applicant wished to raise, after which the hearing justice must hold a hearing with the applicant present and independently determine whether any ground has arguable merit before allowing withdrawal. The court may separately dismiss on the pleadings under § 10-9.1-6(b), but only after notice of its intent and an opportunity for the applicant to reply; for applicants serving life without parole, an evidentiary hearing is required on a first application. ⚠ SCOPE LIMIT: in Motyka v. State, 175 A.3d 1188 (R.we. 2017), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that “from this point forward, Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.we. 2000), shall be deemed abrogated and inapplicable in any case involving both an initial application for postconviction relief and an applicant who has been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,” and directed that counsel be appointed on remand. The Shatney no-merit-withdrawal procedure described above therefore does not govern that class of case; Shatney otherwise remains good law.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5; § 10-9.1-6(b) Case: Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000); Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012); Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012) The court then must conduct a hearing with the applicant present. View the source document
South Carolina Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening on the pleadings, followed by mandatory appointment of counsel if the case survives. The State must answer within thirty days; if the court is then satisfied on the application, answer and record that the applicant is not entitled to relief, it issues a conditional order stating its intention to dismiss and its reasons, and the applicant must be given an opportunity to reply before dismissal — and summary disposition is improper if a material issue of fact exists (§ 17-27-70(b)-(c)). If the application instead presents questions of law or fact requiring a hearing, Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP requires the court to appoint counsel for an indigent applicant, and that counsel must ensure all available grounds are pleaded and amend if necessary. There is no defender-office intake screen or conviction-integrity referral. Odom v. State additionally requires PCR judges to advise pro se applicants of their right to appeal and to appellate counsel when an application is summarily dismissed.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b); Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP Case: Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753 (1999) it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. View the source document
South Dakota Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and is done on the face of the application: the court or judge to whom the application is made must issue the writ unless the application and its attachments show the applicant can get no relief. There is no defender-office intake, conviction-integrity referral, or automatic appointment of counsel on issuance; counsel is separately discretionary under SDCL 21-27-4.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-5 shall forthwith award the writ, unless it shall appear from the application itself or from any document annexed thereto, that the applicant can neither be discharged nor admitted to bail, nor in any other manner relieved. View the source document
Tennessee Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening. Within 30 days of filing, the assigned judge reviews the petition against the record and decides whether it states a 'colorable claim' — defined as a claim that, taken as true and viewed most favorably to the petitioner, would entitle him to relief (Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H)). If it does, the court must enter a preliminary order appointing counsel for an indigent petitioner; if not, it dismisses with written findings. A pro se petition may not be dismissed for defective form until the petitioner has had a reasonable opportunity to amend with the assistance of counsel (R. 28 § 6(B)(4)(b)). There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral in non-capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 6(B)(2)-(4); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106 the judge to whom the case is assigned shall review the petition and all documents related to the judgment and determine whether the petition states a colorable claim View the source document
Texas Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening in the convicting court, followed by mandatory review in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The writ issues by operation of law on filing (art. 11.07 § 3(b)), the State must answer within 30 days, and the convicting court then has 20 days to decide whether controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of confinement exist; inaction counts as a finding of none, and the record goes to the CCA, which reviews every application (§ 5). No counsel is appointed on issuance and there is no defender-office intake for non-capital writs.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 3(c); see also art. 11.072 § 7(a) (community supervision: order denying application as frivolous) it shall be the duty of the convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement View the source document
Utah Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening on the pleadings, before any response is required. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h) the assigned judge must review every petition and forthwith dismiss any claim already adjudicated or 'frivolous on its face' — defined as facts that do not support relief as a matter of law, no arguable basis in fact, or an expired sentence. A petition that is not frivolous but merely defective is returned with 21 days' leave to amend. Only if some portion survives is the petition served on the State and counsel possibly appointed. An initial capital petition may not be screened for summary dismissal at all.	Source Statute / rule: Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)(1)-(4), (i), (j) The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order View the source document
Vermont Judicial screening verified	Two screens operate. Judicially, 13 V.S.A. § 7133 requires the superior court to serve the State and grant a prompt hearing unless the motion, files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. Institutionally, the court appoints the Defender General's Prisoners' Rights Office, and continued state-funded representation depends on a multi-attorney merits review by that office under 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3); if the case survives, counsel proceeds, and a court that later perceives merit may refer it back for reevaluation. Vermont has no statutory conviction-integrity referral mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7133; 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3) Case: In re Bailey, 2009 VT 122, ¶¶ 5, 11-14, 187 Vt. 176, 992 A.2d 276; In re Bruyette, 2014 VT 30, ¶¶ 3, 13-16, 196 Vt. 261, 96 A.3d 1151 Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served View the source document
Virginia Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening only. The petition must be on a form approved and provided by the Attorney General (§ 8.01-655), the court may resolve it on the record without a hearing (§ 8.01-654(B)(4)), and no response from the respondent is required unless the court orders one (§ 8.01-658(A)). No counsel attaches on issuance in habeas, and the statutory duties of public defenders (§ 19.2-163.3) extend only to trial and direct appeal, not collateral proceedings. The one contrast is the separate writ of actual innocence based on nonbiological evidence, where a petition that survives summary dismissal carries an entitlement to counsel (§ 19.2-327.11(E)).	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code §§ 8.01-655, 8.01-654(B)(4), 8.01-658(A); cf. §§ 19.2-163.3, 19.2-327.11(D)–(E) no response to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall be required except upon an order of the court View the source document
Washington Judicial screening verified	Judicial screening in the intermediate appellate court. Because every PRP is filed in the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge screens it at initial consideration under RAP 16.11(b): frivolous petitions are dismissed, non-frivolous petitions decidable on the record go to a panel of judges, and petitions that cannot be decided on the record are transferred to a superior court for a reference hearing or merits determination. RCW 10.73.140 directs that review on receipt and dismissal on the court's own motion without requiring a State response; the Chief Judge's non-frivolousness finding is also the statutory trigger for appointing counsel (RCW 10.73.150(4)), so counsel screening follows the judicial screen rather than preceding it at intake.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.140; RAP 16.11(b); RCW 10.73.150(4) Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition, the court of appeals shall, whenever possible, review the petition and determine if the petition is based on frivolous grounds. If frivolous, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion View the source document
West Virginia Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial, performed by the circuit judge to whom the petition is assigned. Under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings, if initial review shows the petitioner 'may have grounds for relief' but the pro se petition is inadequate, the court must appoint counsel to file an amended petition; under Rule 4(c) the court enters a summary dismissal order with specific findings if the grounds were previously and finally adjudicated or waived. There is no defender-office intake or conviction-integrity referral in the rules or statute.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-3(a) the court determines that the petitioner may have grounds for relief but the petition, as filed, is not sufficient for the court to conduct a fair adjudication of the matters raised in the petition, the court shall appoint an attorney View the source document
Wisconsin Judicial screening verified	Screening is judicial and done on the face of the motion. Under Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3) the circuit court must serve the district attorney, grant a prompt hearing, and make findings unless the motion and record 'conclusively show' no entitlement to relief; under State v. Bentley and State v. Allen, a motion alleging sufficient material facts (the five w's and one h) that would entitle the movant to relief compels an evidentiary hearing, while conclusory motions may be denied without one. There is a counsel hook rather than a defender-intake or conviction-integrity screen: § 974.06(3)(b) directs the court, if counsel appears necessary and the movant appears indigent, to refer the person to the State Public Defender for an indigency determination and appointment.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3), (3)(b) Case: State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 Unless the motion and the files and records of the action conclusively show that the person is entitled to no relief, the court shall: View the source document
Wyoming Judicial screening verified	None beyond judicial screening on the papers. There is no counsel-on-issuance, defender-office intake, or conviction-integrity referral mechanism: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104 is titled 'No right to appointed counsel' and forbids public-defender or appointed representation for indigent petitioners. The clerk docket the petition and brings it promptly to the court (§ 7-14-101(b)); the Attorney General answers or moves to dismiss within thirty days (§ 7-14-105(a)); and the court takes evidence or brings the petitioner in only if it determines that to be necessary (§ 7-14-106(a)). Merit is thus identified by the district judge alone, from the petition, its required supporting affidavits, and the State's response.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-106(a); see also §§ 7-14-104(c), 7-14-105(a) Case: Smizer v. State, 835 P.2d 334, 338 (Wyo. 1992) ('The statute does not require that a hearing be held in every case') The court may, if it determines it to be necessary, receive proof by affidavits, deposition, oral testimony or other evidence and may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. View the source document

Where the petition is filed

The court that convicted you, the county where you are held, or somewhere else.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Court of conviction verified	The court of conviction. Rule 32.5 requires Rule 32 petitions to be filed in and decided by the convicting court, and a petition filed in another court is transferred there rather than dismissed.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.5 Case: Hanna v. State, 841 So. 2d 310 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) Petitions filed under this rule shall be filed in and decided by the court in which the petitioner was convicted. If a petition is filed in another court, it shall be transferred to the court where the conviction occurred. View the source document
Alaska Court of conviction verified	The court of conviction: the application is filed with the clerk at the court location where the underlying criminal case is filed, not the place of confinement. The AS 12.72/Criminal Rule 35.1 application has superseded traditional habeas corpus as Alaska's collateral-attack vehicle (Alaska Civil Rule 86(m), as described in Grinols).	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.72.030(a) An application for post-conviction relief shall be filed with the clerk at the court location where the underlying criminal case is filed View the source document
Arizona Court of conviction verified	In the court where the defendant was sentenced (the court of conviction), not the county of confinement (Rule 32.4(b)(1); Rule 33.4(b)(1)). By statute, if a defendant instead files a habeas corpus petition attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence, the receiving court must transfer it to the court where the defendant was convicted or sentenced, to be treated as a post-conviction relief petition (A.R.S. § 13-4233).	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(1); A.R.S. §§ 13-4233, 13-4234(A) A defendant must file a notice requesting post-conviction relief under Rule 32 in the court where the defendant was sentenced. View the source document
Arkansas Split: conviction or confinement verified	Venue splits by remedy. A statutory writ of habeas corpus must be sought in the circuit court of the county where the prisoner is confined — a court lacks personal jurisdiction to issue and make returnable before itself a writ for a prisoner held in another county (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-105). An actual-innocence petition under Act 1780 is the exception and must be filed in the court in which the conviction was entered, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a) (Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626; Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004), quoting § 16-112-202(a)(2): 'The motion shall be filed before the court in which the conviction was entered.'). Rule 37 postconviction petitions are filed in the trial court that imposed the sentence.	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-105; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a); Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) Case: Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475, 255 S.W.3d 832 (2007) Any petition for writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of a prisoner is properly addressed to the circuit court in the county in which the prisoner is held in custody, unless the petition is filed pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001. View the source document
California Either verified	The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas jurisdiction, so a petition may be filed at any level; under the transfer doctrine applied in In re Roberts, a petition attacking the validity of a judgment should be transferred to the court that rendered the judgment, while conditions-of-confinement claims go to the county of confinement. Capital: § 1509(a) makes the court that imposed the death sentence the exclusive forum absent good cause.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Cal. Penal Code § 1509(a) (capital) Case: In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575 The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. View the source document
Colorado Court of conviction verified	A Rule 35(c) motion — Colorado's primary postconviction vehicle — must be filed in the court that imposed the sentence, i.e., the court of conviction. A statutory habeas petition (C.R.S. §§ 13-45-101 to -119) is filed against the custodian in the district court where the prisoner is held, but claims attacking the conviction may not proceed there: the court must convert the petition to a Crim. P. 35(c) motion and transfer it to the sentencing court (Johnson v. Gunter).	Source Statute / rule: Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3); C.R.S. § 13-45-101 Case: Johnson v. Gunter, 852 P.2d 1263, 1265 n.6 (Colo. 1993) Venue for any CrimP. 35(c) motion attacking Johnson's 1985 conviction is proper only in the court which imposed the sentence. View the source document
Connecticut Designated court verified	Neither the court of conviction nor the district of confinement for convicted prisoners: all habeas applications by or on behalf of inmates confined under a criminal conviction must be filed in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Tolland. Other habeas applicants (non-conviction custody) file in the judicial district of claimed confinement under § 52-466(a)(1).	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-466(a)(2) made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland View the source document
Delaware Court of conviction verified	The statutory writ of habeas corpus is awarded and issued by the Superior Court (Family Court only in child-support and certain Family Court matters), 10 Del. C. § 6901. Collateral attacks on convictions proceed instead by motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, filed in the Superior Court criminal case in which the sentence was imposed — the court of conviction, not the county of confinement; every Rule 61 appeal we read (Urquhart, Baldwin, Cannon, Harden) came up from the sentencing court's docket in the underlying criminal case.	Source Statute / rule: 10 Del. C. § 6901; Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) The writ of habeas corpus shall be awarded and issued by the Superior Court except in cases involving child support enforcement in which case the writ shall be awarded and issued by the Family Court. View the source document
Florida Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. Rule 3.850 is the exclusive vehicle for collateral attack on a Florida judgment and is filed in the sentencing court; Rule 3.850(o) bars entertaining a habeas application from a prisoner authorized to proceed by motion unless he first sought relief in the sentencing court, and Baker holds habeas simply unavailable as a substitute. Traditional statutory habeas under chapter 79 is filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the county where the prisoner is detained (§ 79.09), but that route cannot be used to obtain relief cognizable under 3.850.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(o) (redesignated from 3.850(m) eff. Jan. 1, 2026); Fla. Stat. § 79.09 Case: Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla. 2004) The remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850. View the source document
Georgia County of confinement verified	The superior court of the county in which the petitioner is being detained, and those superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction — not the court of conviction. If the petitioner is not in custody, or is detained by the United States, another state, or a foreign state, the petition must be filed in the superior court of the county where the challenged conviction and sentence were imposed. For traffic-misdemeanor challenges naming the commissioner of driver services, venue is the Superior Court of Fulton County (§ 40-13-33(c)).	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-43; O.C.G.A. § 40-13-33(c) A petition brought under this article must be filed in the superior court of the county in which the petitioner is being detained. The superior courts of such counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions arising under this article. View the source document
Hawaii Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. A post-conviction proceeding is instituted by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place, and it is docketed there as a special proceeding. This governs custody-based claims as well as judgment-based claims, because Rule 40(a) makes the Rule 40 proceeding encompass "all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis" for judgments of conviction and custody based on such judgments. Rule 40(c)(1) confirms it applies in both circuit and district courts.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(b); see also 40(a), 40(c)(1) A proceeding for post-conviction relief shall be instituted by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place View the source document
Idaho Court of conviction verified	A post-conviction petition attacking the conviction or sentence is filed in the court of conviction — with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place. Idaho's separate habeas corpus statute is a different track: a prisoner files in the district court of the county where the alleged confinement violation occurs, and that remedy reaches only conditions of confinement, parole revocation, sentence miscalculation, loss of good time, and detainers.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4902(a); Idaho Code § 19-4205(1)-(2); § 19-4224 A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place. View the source document
Illinois Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition is filed with the clerk of the circuit court in which the conviction took place, with a copy served on the State's Attorney. Illinois's separate statutory habeas corpus remedy (735 ILCS 5/10-103) is different and much narrower: it may be brought in the circuit court of the county of confinement OR the county of sentencing, or in the supreme court.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit. View the source document
Indiana Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. The verified petition must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place, with one exception: a claim that parole was unlawfully revoked is filed in the county where the petitioner is incarcerated. Rule 1 § 1(c) preserves habeas corpus but requires that a habeas application filed in the county of incarceration which challenges the validity of the conviction or sentence be transferred to the court of conviction and treated as a post-conviction petition.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 2; § 1(c) A person who claims relief under this Rule or who otherwise challenges the validity of a conviction or sentence must file a verified petition with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place View the source document
Iowa Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. Iowa Code § 822.3 requires the application to be filed with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction or sentence took place, and § 822.7 requires it to be heard in that same court. The one exception is a challenge to a prison-disciplinary decision under § 822.2(1)(f), which is filed with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the applicant is confined.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code §§ 822.3, 822.7 Case: Davis v. State, No. 25-0157 (Iowa May 8, 2026); Sahinovic v. State, 940 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 2020) A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction or sentence took place. View the source document
Kansas Court of conviction verified	A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion attacking the sentence is filed in the court of conviction — the court that imposed the sentence — and that remedy is exclusive unless inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention (60-1507(e); Rule 183(b)). A K.S.A. 60-1501 habeas petition, used for restraints other than the validity of the sentence, is filed instead in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or the district court of the county where the restraint is taking place, subject to a 30-day deadline extended during exhaustion of administrative remedies.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 60-1507(a), (e); K.S.A. 60-1501(a)-(b) may, pursuant to the time limitations imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence View the source document
Kentucky Court of conviction verified	The post-conviction motion is filed in the court of conviction: RCr 11.42(1) lets a prisoner proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence. Kentucky's separate statutory habeas remedy under KRS Chapter 419 lies instead in the circuit court of the county of confinement, but Commonwealth v. Marcum confines it to the narrow case of a judgment void ab initio, treating RCr 11.42 in the sentencing court as the general and adequate route (Marcum himself, held at the reformatory in Oldham County, petitioned the Oldham Circuit Court). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Robertson v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion..	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(1); KRS 419.020-.110 Case: Robertson v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Ky. 2005); Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 210-12 (Ky. 1994) though RCr 11.42(1) provides that a prisoner may “proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence” View the source document
Louisiana Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. La. C. Cr. P. art. 925 fixes venue in the parish of conviction, and art. 926(A) requires the application to be "by written petition addressed to the district court for the parish in which the petitioner was convicted." Post-conviction relief is the vehicle for a person in custody after sentence; art. 924(4) describes it as "a form of post conviction habeas corpus." Service must be made on both the district attorney for the parish of conviction and the attorney general (art. 926(E)).	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 925; see also art. 926(A), (E) Applications for post conviction relief shall be filed in the parish in which the petitioner was convicted. View the source document
Maine Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Jurisdiction is in the Superior Court (exercisable also by a single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, an Active Retired Justice, or a judge authorized to sit in the Superior Court on post-conviction cases), and venue lies in the county where the criminal judgment was entered, transferable at the assigned justice's or judge's discretion. The action is docketed in the Unified Criminal Docket.	Source Statute / rule: 15 M.R.S. § 2123(1), (1-A), (2); see also 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(A); M.R.U. Crim. P. 65, 68 Venue must be in the county in which the criminal judgment was entered. View the source document
Maryland Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A UPPA proceeding is commenced in the circuit court of the county where the conviction took place (Md. Rule 4-401(a); Crim. Proc. § 7-102(a)). Common-law/statutory habeas corpus under Courts & Jud. Proc. Title 3, Subtitle 7 is different in form but converges on the same venue: any circuit court judge or appellate judge may grant the writ (§ 3-701), but a judge receiving the petition must refer it to a court in the judicial circuit in which the person confined was convicted (§ 3-702(b)(1)).	Source Statute / rule: Md. Rule 4-401(a); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-102(a); Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-701, 3-702(b)(1) A proceeding under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act is commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court of the county where the conviction took place. View the source document
Massachusetts Court of conviction verified	The court of conviction, before the trial judge. Rule 30(a) directs the motion to 'the trial judge,' Rule 30(c)(7) lets the trial judge hear it 'wherever the judge is then sitting,' and G.L. c. 278A, § 3(a) requires forensic-testing motions to be filed 'in the court in which the conviction was entered.' Common-law habeas under G.L. c. 248 is not an alternative for convicted prisoners: § 1 excludes anyone who 'has been convicted or is in execution upon legal process,' and McCastle holds Rule 30 is the exclusive vehicle (though under c. 248, § 2 the writ, where available, may issue irrespective of the county of confinement).	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (c)(7); G.L. c. 278A, § 3(a); G.L. c. 248, §§ 1, 2 Case: McCastle, Petitioner, 401 Mass. 105, 106-107 (1987) If he is limited to his rule 30 remedy, as we hold he is, his remedy lies not with a single justice of this court but with the trial judge. View the source document
Michigan Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A motion for relief from judgment is filed with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, and the clerk dockets it under the original conviction's file number (MCR 6.503(A)). Michigan's separate statutory habeas corpus action is venued in the county of confinement (MCR 3.303(A)(2)), but it is closed to this population: MCL 600.4310(3) provides that habeas to inquire into the cause of detention 'may not be brought by or on behalf of… (3) Persons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.'	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.503(A)(1); MCL 600.4310(3); MCR 3.303(A)(2) A defendant seeking relief under this subchapter must file a motion, and a copy of the motion with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced. View the source document
Minnesota Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A ch. 590 postconviction petition is filed in the district court of the county in which the conviction was had (§ 590.01, subd. 1), must be 'addressed to the district court of the judicial district in the county where the conviction took place' (§ 590.02, subd. 3), and is heard in open court in that judicial district — or, at the assigned judge's discretion, in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, or Tenth Judicial Districts (§ 590.04, subd. 2). Common-law habeas under ch. 589 goes to the district court of the county where the petitioner is detained, but is unavailable to persons detained 'by virtue of the final judgment' of a criminal court, and § 590.01, subd. 2 makes the postconviction remedy exclusive.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1; § 590.02, subd. 3; § 590.04, subd. 2; cf. §§ 589.01, 589.02 may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court in the county in which the conviction was had View the source document
Mississippi Court of conviction verified	The court of conviction: the motion is filed as an original civil action in the trial court, and the UPCCRA abolished post-conviction habeas corpus (statutory and common law) as a separate route, so there is no county-of-confinement filing for attacking a conviction or sentence (§ 99-39-3(1)). Critical gate: if the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal or the appeal was dismissed, the motion may not be filed in the trial court until a quorum of the Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court grants leave to file, under the procedure in § 99-39-27.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-7, 99-39-3(1), 99-39-27 The motion under this article shall be filed as an original civil action in the trial court, except in cases in which the petitioner's conviction and sentence have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and there affirmed or the appeal dismissed. View the source document
Missouri Either verified	Missouri splits by vehicle. A Rule 29.15/24.035 post-conviction motion goes to the COURT OF CONVICTION — relief is sought 'in the sentencing court' and the motion is filed with the clerk of the trial court. A Rule 91 habeas petition instead goes in the first instance to a circuit or associate circuit judge for the COUNTY OF CONFINEMENT, absent good cause for filing higher, except that a petitioner held under a death sentence this Court has affirmed may file directly in the Supreme Court of Missouri.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(a), (c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(a), (c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91.02(a), (b) Movant shall file the motion and two copies thereof with the clerk of the trial court. View the source document
Montana Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction: a postconviction petition under Title 46, ch. 21 is filed with the court that imposed the sentence, not the county of confinement. If the sentence came from a justice's, municipal, or city court, the petitioner must first exhaust all appeal remedies and then file in the district court of the county where that lower court sits (§ 46-21-101(2)). Common-law habeas under Title 46, ch. 22 may be granted by any Supreme Court justice or any district judge over a person restrained within that judge's jurisdiction (§ 46-22-202(1)), but § 46-22-101(2) makes habeas unavailable to attack the validity of a conviction or sentence once the remedy of appeal is exhausted, so the sentencing court is the operative forum for collateral attack.	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-101(1)-(2), MCA; §§ 46-22-101(2), 46-22-202(1), MCA may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence or revocation order View the source document
Nebraska Either verified	A Postconviction Act motion is filed in the court of conviction — the court that imposed the sentence (§ 29-3001(1)); a DNA Testing Act motion likewise goes to "the court that entered the judgment" (§ 29-4120(1)). Common-law habeas corpus is the opposite: an application to release a prisoner held under sentence must be brought in the county where the prisoner is confined, although that is a venue rule the custodian can waive by failing to object (Anderson v. Houston, following Gillard v. Clark).	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(1); § 29-4120(1); §§ 29-2801 to 29-2824 (habeas) Case: Anderson v. Houston, 274 Neb. 916, 744 N.W.2d 410 (2008) may file a verified motion, in the court which imposed such sentence, stating the grounds relied upon and asking the court to vacate or set aside the sentence View the source document
Nevada Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A petition challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. Only other petitions — e.g., challenges to the computation of time served — go to the county of incarceration, the county of residence if the petitioner has been released, or the First Judicial District Court in Carson City for petitioners incarcerated or residing outside Nevada; a misfiled petition is deemed filed on receipt and must be transferred by the clerk.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.738 Case: Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737 (2006) A petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. View the source document
New Hampshire Either verified	Venue depends on the vehicle. A habeas application goes to the superior court in the county of confinement (RSA 534:3, as amended by 1994, 56:1). A petition for a new trial goes to the superior court in the county where the judgment was rendered — the court of conviction (RSA 526:2). A post-conviction DNA petition goes to the superior court in the county of conviction (RSA 651-D:2, we). Because most New Hampshire post-conviction litigation, including ineffective-assistance litigation, proceeds by new-trial petition, it is normally heard in the court of conviction.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 534:3; RSA 526:2; RSA 651-D:2, I Application for the writ shall be made to the superior court in the county in which the person is imprisoned, by a person so imprisoned or restrained, or by some person in his behalf. View the source document
New Jersey Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. R. 3:22-1 requires the petition to be filed with the criminal division manager's office of the county in which the conviction took place, captioned in the action in which the conviction was entered. Because R. 3:22-3 makes a PCR petition 'the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime' and R. 3:22-2(d) folds in any ground formerly available by habeas corpus, there is no separate place-of-confinement filing route for a conviction challenge.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-1; N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-3 Any person convicted of a crime may, pursuant to this rule, file with the criminal division manager's office of the county in which the conviction took place a petition for post-conviction relief captioned in the action in which the conviction was entered. View the source document
New Mexico Not established verified	Not verified for post-conviction petitions. The general habeas statute makes application to a court or judge 'within the district where the prisoner is detained' (quoted below), but Rule 5-802(E) NMRA supplies the place of filing for post-conviction habeas, and the Judiciary's own official petition form (Form 9-701) instructs petitioners that there are two claim types that 'must file two separate petitions and submit each petition in the location required by Rule 5-802 (E)' — indicating the rule splits venue between the convicting court and the place of confinement. We could not extract Rule 5-802(E) to confirm which claim goes where, so the operative post-conviction venue rule is unverified.	Source Statute / rule: NMSA 1978, § 44-1-3; Rule 5-802(E) NMRA (unretrieved) to the supreme or district court or to any judge thereof, being within the district where the prisoner is detained View the source document
New York Either verified	Two separate tracks with different venues. The principal post-conviction vehicle, a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate, is made to 'the court in which [the judgment] was entered' — the court of conviction. A CPLR article 70 state habeas petition instead goes to the supreme court in the judicial district, the appellate division in the department, or a county judge in the county, where the person is DETAINED; CPLR 7002(b)(5) adds a special rule sending trial detainees in cities of one million or more to the supreme court in the county where the charge is pending.	Source Statute / rule: CPL 440.10(1); CPLR 7002(b) a petition for the writ shall be made to: 1. the supreme court in the judicial district in which the person is detained; or 2. the appellate division in the department in which the person is detained View the source document
North Carolina Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. North Carolina has no separate post-conviction petition: the MAR is 'a motion in the original cause and not a new proceeding' (§ 15A-1411(b)), commenced by filing with the clerk of superior court of the district where the defendant was indicted, and heard by a judge empowered to act in criminal matters in the district where the judgment was entered (§ 15A-1413(a)). Effective December 1, 2025, new § 15A-2007 fixes venue in the county of conviction for any filing, claim, or proceeding relating to the conviction, sentencing, treatment, housing, or execution of a death-sentenced defendant, excepting matters filed directly with the Supreme Court of North Carolina; the separately preserved Chapter 17 writ of habeas corpus (§ 15A-1411(c)) instead goes by written application to any appellate-division justice or judge, or any superior court judge (§ 17-6).	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(b1)(1); § 15A-1413(a); § 15A-1411(b)-(c); § 15A-2007; § 17-6 The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of superior court of the district wherein the defendant was indicted a motion, with service on the district attorney in noncapital cases View the source document
North Dakota Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement: the application is filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction and sentence took place, and the State is named respondent (N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(1)). It must be a district court — the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is not available in North Dakota municipal courts, and a municipal court judgment on such an application is void (Holbach ¶ 20). A separate action must be commenced rather than a motion filed in the criminal file (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441).	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(1) Case: Holbach v. City of Minot, 2012 ND 117, ¶¶ 15, 20, 817 N.W.2d 340 [a] proceeding is commenced by filing an application with the clerk of the court in which the conviction and sentence took place. View the source document
Ohio Court of conviction verified	A postconviction petition under R.C. 2953.21 — which R.C. 2953.21(K) makes the exclusive collateral challenge to a conviction or sentence — is filed in the court that imposed sentence, i.e. the court of conviction. Ohio's separate statutory habeas corpus writ (R.C. Chapter 2725) is instead tied to the place of confinement: for an inmate of a state correctional institution, only courts or judges of the county where the institution is located have jurisdiction, and a writ issued by another county's court is void (R.C. 2725.03). That writ is also unavailable where the sentencing court had jurisdiction (R.C. 2725.05).	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(1)(a); Ohio Rev. Code 2725.03; Ohio Rev. Code 2725.05 A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence View the source document
Oklahoma Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement: the proceeding is instituted in the court that imposed the judgment and sentence (22 O.S. § 1080), by filing a verified application with the clerk of that court (§ 1081). Two carve-outs: an application arising from revocation of parole or conditional release is filed in the district court of the county where the revocation occurred (§ 1081), and a capital post-conviction application is filed directly in the Court of Criminal Appeals (§ 1089(D)(1); OCCA Rule 9.7(A)(2)). The Act 'encompasses and replaces' state habeas corpus for challenges to a conviction or sentence.	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1080; 22 O.S. § 1081; 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(1) (capital) may institute a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in the court in which the judgment and sentence on conviction was imposed to secure the appropriate relief View the source document
Oregon County of confinement verified	County of confinement, not the court of conviction: the petition is filed with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner is imprisoned; if the petitioner is not imprisoned, in the county where the conviction and sentence were rendered (ORS 138.560(1)). A person on parole or post-prison supervision is deemed imprisoned at the institution from which released (138.560(2)). The court of confinement may transfer the case to the county of conviction if the hearing can be more expeditiously conducted there, and that order is not reviewable (138.560(4)). Statutory habeas corpus proper lies in the circuit court of the judicial district where the party is imprisoned or restrained (ORS 34.320); a post-conviction DNA-testing petition, by contrast, is filed in the court of conviction (ORS 138.690(1)).	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.560(1), (2), (4); cf. ORS 34.320; ORS 138.690(1) A proceeding for post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner is imprisoned View the source document
Pennsylvania Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Original jurisdiction lies in the court of common pleas (42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a)), and Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) directs the clerk to docket the petition at the same term and number as the underlying conviction and sentence and to place it in the existing criminal case file. Separate state habeas corpus is not an alternative route: § 9542 makes the PCRA the sole means of collateral relief and expressly subsumes habeas corpus and coram nobis.	Source Statute / rule: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) make a docket entry, at the same term and number as the underlying conviction and sentence, reflecting the date of receipt, and promptly shall place the petition in the criminal case file. View the source document
Rhode Island Court of conviction verified	The petition is filed in the court of conviction, not the county of confinement; if the conviction was entered in District Court, a denial there is appealable to the Superior Court within twenty days. Common-law state habeas corpus is not an alternative route for convicted prisoners: § 10-9-1 extends the writ only to persons restrained "other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding," and § 10-9.1-1(b) makes the chapter 10-9.1 remedy exclusive of other collateral remedies.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-2(a), (b); § 10-9-1; § 10-9.1-1(b) An action to secure post conviction relief under this chapter shall be brought in the court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. View the source document
South Carolina Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. The proceeding is commenced by filing the verified application with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place (§ 17-27-40), and § 17-27-80 provides that it 'shall be heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place.' Even a common-law habeas petition by a convicted, confined prisoner is redirected there: § 17-17-100 requires the judge issuing the writ to transfer the matter for hearing 'to any judge of any court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the person was convicted.' In capital cases § 17-27-160(A) fixes venue in the county of indictment.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-40, 17-27-80, 17-27-160(A); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-17-100 A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place. View the source document
South Dakota Court of conviction verified	The court of conviction, not the county of confinement: the application must be heard before a judge of the circuit court in which the conviction took place. (SDCL 21-27-1 permits an application to be made to 'the Supreme or circuit court, or any justice or judge thereof,' but SDCL 21-27-14.1 fixes the hearing court for a convicted applicant.)	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-14.1 The application shall be heard before any judge of the court in which the conviction took place. View the source document
Tennessee Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred; if the misdemeanor conviction was not in a court of record, it is filed in a court of record with criminal jurisdiction in the county where the conviction was obtained (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a); accord Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 4(E)). Tennessee's separate and much narrower state habeas corpus remedy has different venue — the court or judge 'most convenient in point of distance to the applicant,' i.e., ordinarily the county of confinement (Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105).	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred, a written petition naming the state as the respondent. View the source document
Texas Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. A post-conviction felony application is filed with the clerk of the convicting court, which is where fact development occurs, but the writ is returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin, which alone grants or denies relief (art. 11.07 §§ 3(a), 5). Capital applications are likewise filed in the convicting court (art. 11.071 § 4(a)); community-supervision applications go to the court that imposed supervision (art. 11.072 § 2(a)); post-conviction misdemeanor applications go to the judge of the convicting court (art. 11.09(b)).	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 3(a)-(b); art. 11.071 § 4(a); art. 11.072 § 2(a); art. 11.09(b) must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction being challenged was obtained, and the clerk shall assign the application to that court View the source document
Utah Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c) requires commencement in the district court of the county where the judgment of conviction was entered, and § 78B-9-104(1) directs the action to 'the district court of original jurisdiction.' If filed in the wrong county the court may change venue on its own motion; a party may also move for a convenience-based transfer. The PCRA is the sole remedy and replaces prior extraordinary and common-law writs, so there is no separate confinement-county habeas route for challenges to a conviction or sentence.	Source Statute / rule: Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c); Utah Code § 78B-9-104(1); § 78B-9-102(1)(a) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. View the source document
Vermont Court of conviction verified	A PCR petition is filed in the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed — the court of conviction, not the county of confinement. That clause fixes venue only and is not jurisdictional (In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 113 (1993), applied in In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 7), so a misfiled petition is transferable rather than void. Common-law habeas under 12 V.S.A. § 3953 lies in the county of imprisonment, but 13 V.S.A. § 7136 bars entertaining it unless PCR has been sought and shown inadequate or ineffective.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7131; 13 V.S.A. § 7136; 12 V.S.A. § 3953 Case: In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶ 7, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210; In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 113, 623 A.2d 466, 467 (1993); Shequin v. Smith, 129 Vt. 578, 285 A.2d 708 (1971) may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence View the source document
Virginia Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction, not county of confinement. For detention originating under criminal process, only the circuit court that entered the original judgment may issue the writ; if a district court entered the judgment, the circuit court for the city or county where that district court sits. This is expressly made 'subject to the provisions of § 17.1-310,' which preserves the Supreme Court of Virginia's own original jurisdiction to award writs of habeas corpus. Hearings, once granted, may be held at any circuit court within the same circuit, as designated by the judge.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1); Va. Code § 17.1-310 only the circuit court that entered the original judgment or order resulting in the detention complained of in the petition shall have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus View the source document
Washington Court of Appeals verified	Not the court of conviction. A personal restraint petition is filed in the Court of Appeals (RAP 16.5(a)); a petition by a person under sentence of death was filed in the Supreme Court (RAP 16.5(b)), and a petition filed in the Supreme Court is ordinarily transferred to the Court of Appeals. A CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment is filed in the superior court that entered the judgment, but that court must transfer it to the Court of Appeals for treatment as a PRP unless the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either the defendant makes a substantial showing of entitlement to relief or resolution requires a factual hearing (CrR 7.8(c)(2)); if the appellate court transfers a PRP down, venue is the superior court for the county in which the challenged decision was made (RAP 16.12).	Source Statute / rule: RAP 16.5(a)-(b); CrR 7.8(c)(2); RAP 16.12; RCW 7.36.040 A personal restraint petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals View the source document
West Virginia Either verified	Rule 3(a) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings gives the petitioner a choice of two circuit courts — the county of incarceration or the county of conviction and sentence — and the circuit court may transfer between those venues. By statute the petition may also be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals (which has original habeas jurisdiction), and W. Va. Code § 53-4A-3(b) lets the granting court make the writ returnable to itself, to the circuit court of the county of incarceration, or to the circuit court of conviction.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(a); § 53-4A-3(b) in the circuit court of the county wherein the petitioner is incarcerated; or (2) in the circuit court of the county wherein the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. If appropriate, the circuit court may transfer a petition to either venue. View the source document
Wisconsin Court of conviction verified	Venue depends on the vehicle. A § 974.06 postconviction motion — the presumptive route — is filed in the court of conviction: the movant 'may move the court which imposed the sentence.' A true habeas petition under ch. 782 goes to the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the circuit court within the county where the prisoner is detained (§ 782.03), but § 974.06(8) bars entertaining it unless the § 974.06 motion was first pursued or that remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective.' A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the exception: it must be brought by habeas petition in the appellate court that heard the appeal (State v. Knight), while ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel goes back to the circuit court (Rothering).	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1), (8); Wis. Stat. § 782.03 Case: State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992); State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675 (Ct. App. 1996) may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. View the source document
Wyoming Court of conviction verified	Court of conviction. A petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act is commenced by filing with the clerk of the district court where the conviction occurred, with a copy served on the Wyoming Attorney General; the clerk docket it and brings it promptly to the court. Wyoming's separate common-law/statutory habeas corpus remedy, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-27-101 through 134, is a different vehicle limited to jurisdictional claims and was not surveyed for venue here.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b) Case: Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 14, 443 P.3d 834, 837-38 (Wyo. 2019) (describing §§ 1-27-101 through 134 as 'limiting state habeas corpus relief to jurisdictional claims') The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court where the conviction occurred a petition verified by affidavit. View the source document

The bar on second or successive petitions

What blocks a second attempt, and what excuses it.

46 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A petition is successive if the petitioner has previously filed any petition challenging a judgment arising out of the same trial or guilty-plea proceeding. Relief may not be granted on a successive petition raising the same or similar grounds. A successive petition on different grounds must be denied unless either (1) the petitioner is entitled to relief because the court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or impose the sentence, or (2) the petitioner shows both good cause why the new grounds were not known and could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, AND that failure to entertain the petition would result in a miscarriage of justice.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) The court shall not grant relief on a successive petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the same petitioner. A successive petition on different grounds shall be denied unless View the source document
Alaska Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A claim is barred if it was decided on the merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding (AS 12.72.020(a)(5)), and any second application is flatly barred once a previous one has been filed ². Excuses: an application alleging ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel filed within one year of the prior decision's finality (AS 12.72.025; constitutionally compelled by Grinols), and certain parole/DOC administrative claims (AS 12.72.020(c)). The newly-discovered-evidence/innocence exception in (b) by its terms lifts only the time bars ('Notwithstanding (a)(3) and (4)'), not the successive-application bar.	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.72.020(a)(5)-(6), (c); AS 12.72.025 Case: Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003) a previous application for post-conviction relief has been filed under this chapter or under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure View the source document
Arizona Barred, cause and prejudice verified	A defendant is precluded from relief on a Rule 32.1(a) constitutional claim on any ground still raiseable on direct appeal, finally adjudicated on the merits, or waived at trial, on appeal, or in a previous post-conviction proceeding (Rule 32.2(a), amended eff. April 14, 2025, excepting rights waivable only knowingly, voluntarily, and personally). Claims under Rule 32.1(b)-(h) are exempt from waiver-preclusion, but a successive or untimely notice must explain why the claim was not raised earlier, and the court may summarily dismiss if the reasons are insufficient (Rule 32.2(b)).	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2; accord A.R.S. § 13-4232 waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous post-conviction proceeding, except when the claim raises a violation of a constitutional right that can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the defendant. View the source document
Arkansas Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Rule 37.2(b) requires that all grounds be raised in the original petition, and provides that any ground not so raised, or 'finally adjudicated or intelligently and understandingly waived' in the proceedings that produced the conviction or in any other proceeding taken to secure relief, 'may not be the basis for a subsequent petition.' The only recognized escape is that the first petition was specifically denied without prejudice; amendment of a pending petition requires leave of court (Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996)).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b), (e) Case: McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 941 S.W.2d 397 (1997) a petitioner is limited to one petition for postconviction relief unless the first petition was specifically denied without prejudice to allow the filing of a second petition View the source document
California Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Judge-made abuse-of-the-writ doctrine: absent a change in law or facts, successive or piecemeal petitions are not entertained unless the petitioner justifies the failure to raise the claims earlier, with an exception for a fundamental miscarriage of justice (including actual innocence). Penal Code § 1475 channels renewed applications on new legal points to a higher court. Capital: § 1509(d) requires dismissal of any successive petition unless the court finds by a preponderance that the petitioner is actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Penal Code § 1475; § 1509(d) (capital) Case: In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750 Before a successive petition will be entertained on its merits the petitioner must explain and justify the failure to present claims in a timely manner in his prior petition or petitions. View the source document
Colorado Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Since the July 1, 2004 amendment, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) requires courts to deny any claim raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding, and 35(c)(3)(VII) requires denial of any claim that 'could have been presented in an appeal previously brought' or a prior postconviction proceeding (People v. Versteeg, 165 P.3d 760, 764 (Colo. App. 2007)). Enumerated exceptions include claims based on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive (quoted in Wenzinger); the § 16-5-402 time bar applies independently to successive motions.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)–(VII); C.R.S. § 16-5-402 Case: People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415 (Colo. App. 2006) shall deny any claim that was raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding on behalf of the same defendant View the source document
Connecticut Discretionary verified	No absolute bar. A successive petition is dismissible under Practice Book § 23-29(3) if it 'presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or to proffer new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior petition' (rule text verified as quoted in Gilchrist, n.2), and under § 52-470(d) it carries a rebuttable presumption of unreasonable delay if filed more than two years after the judgment on the prior petition became final (or after October 1, 2014, or two years after a new retroactive right, whichever is latest), with dismissal absent good cause under § 52-470(e). Withdrawal of a prior petition does not count as a judgment triggering the two-year period, and the actual-innocence/conditions/capital-death exemptions of § 52-470(f) apply.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(d), (e); Conn. Practice Book § 23-29(3) In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause View the source document
Delaware Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A second or subsequent postconviction motion is summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial AND pleads with particularity either (i) new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges, or (ii) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court that renders the conviction or death sentence invalid. This regime applies to motions filed on or after June 4, 2014; before that amendment the bar was the far softer 'interest of justice' standard (Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 (Del. 2016)).	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2), 61(i)(2) Case: Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164, 1167 (Del. 2015) Under Rule 61, the Superior Court will summarily dismiss a second postconviction motion unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the movant either: View the source document
Florida Discretionary verified	A second or successive motion is styled an "extraordinary pleading." The court may dismiss it if it fails to allege new or different grounds and the prior determination was on the merits, or, where new grounds are alleged, if the failure to raise them in the prior motion was an abuse of the procedure or there was no good cause for the failure by the defendant or defendant's counsel. The bar is permissive, so good cause excuses it and the determination is reviewed as a matter of trial-court discretion; oversight by prior postconviction counsel is not automatically good cause, and Florida recognizes no remedy for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(j)(2) (redesignated from 3.850(h)(2) eff. Jan. 1, 2026) Case: Ruth v. State, 207 So. 3d 970, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) the judge finds that the failure of the defendant or the attorney to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure or there was no good cause for the failure View the source document
Georgia Barred, narrow exceptions verified	All grounds must be raised in the original or amended petition; grounds not so raised are waived. The waiver is excused only where the federal or Georgia Constitution otherwise requires, or where the judge to whom the successive petition is assigned finds grounds asserted in it that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. A petition must itself identify any prior proceedings and, for prior habeas petitions, state which claims were previously raised (§ 9-14-44).	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-51; O.C.G.A. § 9-14-44 Any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of the United States or of this state otherwise requires or unless any judge to whom the petition is assigned, on considering a subsequent petition, finds grounds for relief View the source document
Hawaii Barred, narrow exceptions unverified	Rule 40 relief is unavailable where the issues were previously ruled upon or were waived, and waiver expressly reaches issues that could have been raised "in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this rule" — so a second or successive petition raising an omitted claim is barred. A rebuttable presumption treats the earlier omission as knowing and understanding. Two escapes: proof of extraordinary circumstances justifying the failure to raise the issue, and an express carve-out for claims of illegal sentence, which Rule 40(a)(3) exempts from waiver altogether. Rule 40(g)(2) lets the court dismiss on these grounds at any time.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(3), 40(g)(2) an issue is waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised … in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this rule, and the petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances View the source document
Idaho Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Section 19-4908 requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application; a ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly and intelligently waived cannot support a later application unless the court finds 'sufficient reason' why it was not asserted or was inadequately raised, and the successive petition must also be filed within a reasonable time after the claim became known. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is NOT a sufficient reason — Murphy v. State overruled Palmer v. Dermitt on that point in 2014.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-4908 Case: Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014), overruling Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007) may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application. View the source document
Illinois Barred, cause and prejudice verified	Only one petition may be filed without leave of court; leave requires a statutory cause-and-prejudice showing — an objective factor that impeded raising the claim initially, plus a claim that so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Separately, section 122-3 waives any claim not raised in the original or an amended petition. A judicially created fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception excuses cause and prejudice entirely where the petitioner states a colorable claim of actual innocence.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f); 725 ILCS 5/122-3 Case: People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 23-24 (following People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 330 (2009)) Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. View the source document
Indiana Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Two layers. Rule 1 § 8 requires all available grounds to be raised in the original petition and bars any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived, unless the court finds a ground that "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition." Independently, § 12 requires advance appellate authorization: the petitioner files a successive-petition form and proposed petition with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Tax Court, and leave issues only on a showing of a reasonable possibility of entitlement to relief; authorization is not a merits ruling and does not preclude summary disposition.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 §§ 8, 12(a)–(c) The court will authorize the filing of the petition if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief. View the source document
Iowa Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Iowa Code § 822.8 requires all grounds for relief to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application; a ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the earlier proceeding cannot be the basis for a subsequent application unless the court finds "sufficient reason" why it was not asserted or was inadequately raised. Since July 1, 2019, § 822.3 forecloses the principal route around that bar: an allegation that prior postconviction counsel was ineffective neither tolls the limitation period nor relates a late successive application back to the first, abrogating Allison v. State.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.8; Iowa Code § 822.3 (no tolling or relation back) Case: State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010); Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Iowa 2022) All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in the applicant's original, supplemental or amended application. . . . unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised . . . . View the source document
Kansas Barred, narrow exceptions verified	The sentencing court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief (K.S.A. 60-1507(c)), and Rule 183(d) forbids consideration where the ground was determined adversely to the movant on a prior motion, that determination was on the merits, and justice would not be served by reaching the merits again. The bar reaches claims that were raised or could have been raised earlier, so all ineffective-assistance grounds must be brought together in the first motion. It is excused by "exceptional circumstances" — unusual events or intervening changes in law that prevented the movant from raising the claim earlier — and an untimely successive motion additionally requires manifest injustice or a colorable actual-innocence claim under 60-1507(f)(2).	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 60-1507(c), (f)(2); Kan. S. Ct. R. 183(d) Case: Manco v. State, 51 Kan. App. 2d 733, 736-39, 354 P.3d 551 (2015); State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 868, 872, Syl. ¶ 2, 248 P.3d 1282 (2011) In other words, K.S.A. 60-1507(c) generally bars successive motions raising claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior motion. View the source document
Kentucky Barred, narrow exceptions verified	RCr 11.42(3) requires the motion to state all grounds known to the movant and makes final disposition conclusive as to all issues that could reasonably have been presented, so a second RCr 11.42 motion is barred as to any ground the movant knew or should have known. Gross adds that waiver of the opportunity to file has the same preclusive effect, and that CR 60.02 reaches only grounds unavailable on direct appeal and unavailable under RCr 11.42 — requiring a showing of special, extraordinary circumstances and filing within a reasonable time. The practical excuse is therefore a ground genuinely unavailable earlier, pursued through CR 60.02 rather than a repeat RCr 11.42 motion.	Source Statute / rule: Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42(3); Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 Case: Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Ky. 1983) the motion shall state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge. Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding. View the source document
Louisiana Barred, narrow exceptions unverified	La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4 supplies the bars, and the court "shall" apply them: a successive application is dismissed if it fails to raise a new or different claim (E), or if it raises a new or different claim "that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application" (F). Related bars reach claims fully litigated on appeal (A), claims known but inexcusably not raised in the proceedings leading to conviction (B), claims raised below but inexcusably not pursued on appeal (C), and claims resting on a rule held nonretroactive (D). The excuse is thus that the omission was not inexcusable; art. 930.4(H) makes these limitations jurisdictional and non-waivable, and any successive or supplemental application must also be served on the attorney general (G). Independent gateways exist under arts. 926.1 (DNA) and 926.2 (factual innocence).	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.4(E), (F), (H) A successive application shall be dismissed if it raises a new or different claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application. View the source document
Maine Barred, narrow exceptions verified	All grounds for relief must be raised in a single post-conviction review action; grounds not so raised are waived unless the Maine or U.S. Constitution requires otherwise, or the court determines the ground could not reasonably have been raised in the earlier action. Section 2128(4) applies the same 'could not reasonably have been raised' test to a person who previously challenged the judgment under the former habeas statutes (14 M.R.S. §§ 5502-5508). A successive petition remains subject to the § 2128-B one-year deadline, and Rule 70(b)(2) directs summary dismissal where the face of the petition discloses waiver and no § 2128-A exception.	Source Statute / rule: 15 M.R.S. § 2128(3), (4); 15 M.R.S. § 2128-A; M.R.U. Crim. P. 70(b)(2) any grounds not so raised are waived unless the Constitution of Maine or the Constitution of the United States otherwise requires or unless the court determines that the ground could not reasonably have been raised in an earlier action View the source document
Maryland Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Hard one-petition rule: for each trial or sentence a person may file only one UPPA petition (Crim. Proc. § 7-103(a)), and claims already finally litigated or intelligently and knowingly not raised in a prior petition are barred (§ 7-106(a), (b)(1)(i)6). The only general escape is judicial reopening: the court may reopen a concluded post-conviction proceeding if it determines the action is in the interests of justice (§ 7-104), with counsel and a hearing then discretionary (§ 7-108(b)(1)). Reopening is mandatory, not discretionary, where DNA testing under § 8-201 produced results favorable to the petitioner (Md. Rule 4-401(b)).	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 7-103(a); § 7-104; § 7-106(b)(1)(i)6; Md. Rule 4-401(b) For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for relief under this title. View the source document
Massachusetts Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Rule 30(c)(2) waiver is the bar: all grounds must be raised in the original or amended motion, and grounds not so raised are waived. Two textual escapes exist — the judge 'in the exercise of discretion' may permit them in a subsequent motion, or the grounds 'could not reasonably have been raised' earlier; a waived claim is still ordinarily reviewed for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. In first-degree-murder cases, G.L. c. 278, § 33E adds a gatekeeper: after rescript, no appeal from denial of a post-conviction motion lies unless a single justice of the SJC allows it as presenting 'a new and substantial question.'	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(2); G.L. c. 278, § 33E Case: Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2000) If a defendant fails to raise a claim that is generally known and available at the time of trial or direct appeal or in the first motion for postconviction relief, the claim is waived. View the source document
Michigan Barred, narrow exceptions verified	One motion only per conviction. MCR 6.502(G)(1) permits, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment regarding a conviction, regardless of prior filings. MCR 6.502(G)(2) allows a second or subsequent motion on three grounds: (a) a retroactive change in law occurring after the first motion was filed; (b) a claim of new evidence not discovered before the first motion — expressly including 'new scientific evidence,' defined by MCR 6.502(G)(3) to cover shifts in a field of scientific knowledge (including scientific consensus), in a testifying expert's own knowledge and opinions, or in the scientific method underlying the trial evidence; and (c) a final court order vacating a conviction described in or underlying the judgment. The clerk refers successive motions to the assigned judge to decide whether an exception applies, and the court may waive the bar entirely if it concludes there is a significant possibility the defendant is innocent.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.502(G) regardless of whether a defendant has previously filed a motion for relief from judgment, after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. View the source document
Minnesota Barred, narrow exceptions verified	The Knaffla rule bars claims raised, or known and not raised, in a direct appeal or in an earlier postconviction petition; separately, § 590.04, subd. 3 permits the court to 'summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner' and to summarily deny a petition whose issues an appellate court already decided in the same case. Powers recognizes only two escapes: a novel legal issue, or where the interests of justice require review. The subd. 4 two-year limit applies independently to every petition.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3; § 590.01, subd. 1 Case: Powers v. State, 731 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. 2007); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) matters raised or known but not raised in an earlier petition for postconviction relief will generally not be considered in subsequent petitions for postconviction relief View the source document
Mississippi Barred, narrow exceptions verified	An order granting relief, dismissing the motion, or otherwise denying relief is a final judgment that bars a second or successive motion (§ 99-39-23(6)); in the appellate posture, denial or dismissal of an application for leave to proceed likewise bars a successive application (§ 99-39-27(9)), and res judicata applies to all issues decided at trial and on direct appeal (§ 99-39-21(3)). The statutory excuses are: an intervening Mississippi or U.S. Supreme Court decision that would have adversely affected the outcome; newly discovered, practically conclusive evidence not reasonably discoverable at trial; an expired sentence or unlawfully revoked probation, parole or conditional release; supervening mental illness before execution under § 99-19-57(2); and new or different DNA-testing grounds or more advanced DNA technology. M.R.A.P. 22(a) warns that successive applications not clearly demonstrating an exception may draw sanctions.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-23(6), 99-39-27(9), 99-39-21(3); Miss. R. App. P. 22(a) any order dismissing the petitioner's motion or otherwise denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article. View the source document
Missouri Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A flat statutory-style bar with no exception written into the rule: the circuit court may not entertain successive Rule 29.15 or 24.035 motions. The only escape is a Rule 91 habeas petition, and Missouri confines that to raising jurisdictional issues or 'circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice results' — the manifest-injustice gateway being satisfied by cause-and-prejudice or a showing of actual innocence. A petitioner under a sentence of death may additionally bring a freestanding actual-innocence habeas claim on clear and convincing evidence (Amrine).	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(l); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(l) Case: State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1993); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. banc 2003) The circuit court shall not entertain successive motions. View the source document
Montana Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A second or subsequent petition must be dismissed unless it raises grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended original petition; the original petition may be amended only once. Ineffectiveness of counsel in the original or amended original postconviction proceeding is expressly excluded as a ground for a successive petition (§ 46-21-105(2)), and § 46-21-105(3) defines 'grounds for relief' to include all legal and factual issues that were or could have been raised in support of the claim.	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-105(1)(b), (2)-(3), MCA The court shall dismiss a second or subsequent petition by a person who has filed an original petition unless the second or subsequent petition raises grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition View the source document
Nebraska Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Section 29-3001(3) provides that the court "need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner," and the courts enforce that as a hard bar: a successive motion is entertained only if it affirmatively shows on its face that the basis for relief was not available when the prior motion was filed. Having proceeded pro se in the first motion is no excuse (State v. Parmar; State v. Marshall), and the one-year limitation of § 29-3001(4) applies to successive motions as well (State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70).	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(3) Case: State v. Marshall, 272 Neb. 924, 725 N.W.2d 834 (2007); State v. Ortiz, 266 Neb. 959, 670 N.W.2d 788 (2003) An appellate court will not entertain a successive motion for postconviction relief unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time the movant filed the prior motion. View the source document
Nevada Barred, cause and prejudice verified	A second or successive petition must be dismissed if it alleges no new or different grounds and the prior determination was on the merits, or, if new grounds are alleged, if the failure to assert them earlier was an abuse of the writ; the petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving specific facts showing good cause and actual prejudice, and a judge must summarily dismiss a successive petition plainly barred on the face of the record (NRS 34.745(3)). Successive petitions are additionally subject to the one-year limit of NRS 34.726 and to laches under NRS 34.800. Ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel supplies good cause only where appointment of that counsel was statutorily mandated — i.e., a capital first petition under NRS 34.820(1)(a) — and must not itself be procedurally defaulted; otherwise a bar is excusable only by a fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice showing, typically colorable actual innocence.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.810(3)-(4); NRS 34.745(3) Case: McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 (1996); Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2018) A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits View the source document
New Hampshire No express bar unverified	No successive-petition bar was located in New Hampshire primary law. We read all 32 sections of RSA 534 (habeas) and all 6 sections of RSA 526 (new trials): neither contains any second-or-successive provision, and neither states an excuse standard. A the published-opinion record full-text search of the New Hampshire Supreme Court corpus for 'abuse of the writ' returned 0 opinions; a search for 'second petition for habeas corpus' OR 'successive petitions' returned 3 opinions, none announcing a successive-petition bar. The nearest limits found are the three-year bar of RSA 526:4 and the judge-made procedural-default rule of Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138, 142-43 (1988) (a claim the petitioner knew of and could have raised on direct appeal is 'procedurally waived for collateral review'), against the background rule that habeas is not a substitute for appeal (Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503, 505 (1957)). In Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44, 45-46 (2005) a second habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice as premature, not as successive. Whether a claim already decided in a prior collateral petition may be relitigated, and what excuses a repeat filing, is not resolved by any source we reached.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 534 (no successive provision); RSA 526 (no successive provision) Case: Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988); Springer v. Hungerford, 100 N.H. 503 (1957); Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44 (2005)
New Jersey Barred, narrow exceptions verified	R. 3:22-4(b) requires dismissal of a second or subsequent petition unless it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2) AND alleges on its face one of three things: reliance on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the U.S. or New Jersey Supreme Court and unavailable during prior proceedings; a factual predicate that could not have been discovered earlier through reasonable diligence which, if proven and viewed against the whole record, would raise a reasonable probability of relief; or a prima facie case of ineffective assistance by counsel who represented the defendant on the first or subsequent PCR application. Independently, R. 3:22-5 makes 'a prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief' conclusive.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-4(b); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(2); N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-5 A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief shall be dismissed unless: (1) it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and (2) it alleges on its face either: View the source document
New Mexico Discretionary verified	No statutory successive-petition bar was located; preclusion is equitable and discretionary. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel may, at the discretion of the later habeas court, prevent relitigation of issues argued and decided on a prior petition where their resolution was necessary to the earlier decision. The Court adopted the Sanders/Kuhlmann framework for petitioner-side preclusion, so a repeat claim must be reached where the 'ends of justice' require it — notably where the constitutional claim is supplemented by a colorable showing of innocence — and it noted that principles of finality have rarely been applied with the same force in habeas as in ordinary litigation.	Source Case: Manlove v. Sullivan, 108 N.M. 471, 775 P.2d 237 (1989); described as the successive-petition rule in Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344 (1993) At least against the state, we believe collateral estoppel principles may, at the discretion of a subsequent habeas corpus court, prevent relitigation of issues argued and decided on a previous habeas corpus petition View the source document
New York Discretionary verified	Discretionary rather than absolute. CPL 440.10(3)(b) permits denial where the ground was already determined on the merits on a prior motion or proceeding in a state or federal court (unless there has since been a retroactively effective change in the controlling law), and 440.10(3)(c) permits denial where the defendant was in a position to raise the ground on a previous 440 motion but did not. The same subdivision expressly authorizes the court to grant relief anyway 'in the interest of justice and for good cause shown' if the motion is otherwise meritorious. Separately, CPL 440.10(2)(a) is a MANDATORY bar for a ground previously determined on the merits on direct appeal, subject to the same retroactive-change-in-law exception. Successive CPLR article 70 habeas petitions are governed by CPLR 7003(b), under which a court need not issue the writ if legality of detention was determined on a prior habeas proceeding, the petition presents no new ground, and the ends of justice would not be served.	Source Statute / rule: CPL 440.10(3)(b), (3)(c) and closing paragraph of 440.10(3); CPL 440.10(2)(a); CPLR 7003(b) Although the court may deny the motion under any of the circumstances specified in this subdivision, in the interest of justice and for good cause shown it may in its discretion grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious View the source document
North Carolina Barred, cause and prejudice verified	A successive MAR must be denied if the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground in a previous MAR but did not (§ 15A-1419(a)(1) — inapplicable where the prior motion was the 10-day motion or was made during the direct appeal), if the ground was already determined on the merits on appeal or in a prior state or federal proceeding absent a retroactively effective change in controlling law ³, or if the motion is untimely under § 15A-1415(a) or (a1) ⁴. Denial is mandatory ('shall deny') unless the defendant demonstrates good cause plus actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Good cause is confined to state action (including ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel), a new retroactively applicable right, or a factual predicate not discoverable with reasonable diligence — and ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel is expressly excluded as good cause.	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(1)-(2), (a)(4), (b), (c), (d), (e) Upon a previous motion made pursuant to this Article, the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so. View the source document
North Dakota Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Two bars, both in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12: res judicata under (1) for claims "fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding," and misuse of process under (2) for a claim the applicant "inexcusably failed to raise" in the proceeding leading to conviction or in a prior post-conviction proceeding, or for multiple applications containing frivolous claims. Clark ¶ 23 identifies three triggering situations, including inexcusable failure to pursue an issue on direct appeal that was litigated at trial. The escape is showing the earlier omission was excusable; and critically both are affirmative defenses the State must plead under § 29-32.1-12(3), so they are waived if not pleaded (State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 13, 15, 928 N.W.2d 441).	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1), (2), (3) Case: Clark v. State, 1999 ND 78, ¶¶ 7, 23, 593 N.W.2d 329 Presents a claim for relief which the applicant inexcusably failed to raise either in a proceeding leading to judgment of conviction and sentence or in a previous postconviction proceeding View the source document
Ohio Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A court may not entertain a second or successive petition (or an untimely first petition) unless R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) or (A)(2) applies. (A)(1) requires BOTH that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts relied on, or that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a new retroactive right, AND clear-and-convincing proof that but for constitutional error at trial no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty (or, for a death sentence, eligible for it). (A)(2) is the DNA-actual-innocence route. Separately, R.C. 2953.21(A)(4) waives any ground for relief not stated in the original or amended petition, except as R.C. 2953.23 provides.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(4) a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies View the source document
Oklahoma Barred, narrow exceptions verified	22 O.S. § 1086 bars any ground finally adjudicated, or not raised in the original/supplemental/amended application, or knowingly and voluntarily waived; the sole statutory excuse is a court finding that the ground 'for sufficient reason' was not asserted or was inadequately raised before. The 2022 amendment expressly extended this to claims challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Independently, § 1080.1(A) applies the one-year limitation to subsequent applications as well as original ones. Capital successive applications face the stricter § 1089(D)(8) gate: legal or factual basis previously unavailable, plus clear and convincing evidence no reasonable factfinder would have convicted or imposed death.	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1086; 22 O.S. § 1080.1(A); 22 O.S. § 1089(D)(8) (capital) Case: Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 3 Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived … may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised View the source document
Oregon Barred, narrow exceptions verified	ORS 138.550(3) requires all grounds to be asserted in the original or amended petition and deems unasserted grounds waived, excused only if the court on a subsequent petition finds grounds that 'could not reasonably have been raised' in the original or amended petition — the same escape-clause wording as the two-year deadline, with the burden on the petitioner (Verduzco). A prior petition withdrawn by leave of court before judgment has no effect on the right to file again (138.550(3)); and ORS 138.510(4) absolutely bars a further petition in the same case where a post-conviction petition was dismissed before November 4, 1993.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.550(3); ORS 138.510(4) Case: Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 172 (2015) must be asserted in the original or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition View the source document
Pennsylvania Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Pennsylvania has no separate successive-petition standard — the same one-year jurisdictional deadline in § 9545(b)(1) applies expressly to 'a second or subsequent petition,' and the only escapes are the same three statutory exceptions (governmental interference, unknown facts, new retroactive constitutional right), each of which must itself be filed within one year of when the claim could have been presented. Independently, § 9543(a)(3) requires that the allegation of error be neither previously litigated nor waived: an issue is previously litigated if the highest court of right ruled on its merits or it was raised and decided in a prior collateral attack (§ 9544(a)), and waived if the petitioner could have raised it earlier and did not (§ 9544(b)).	Source Statute / rule: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)-(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) Case: Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000) For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. View the source document
Rhode Island Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Section 10-9.1-8 requires all then-available grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application, and bars any ground finally adjudicated, not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the conviction proceeding or any other proceeding taken to secure relief. The Supreme Court treats this as codified res judicata: a merits judgment precludes not only issues actually decided but all issues that might have been raised. The sole escape is a judicial finding that in the interest of justice the applicant should be permitted to assert the ground, an exception the Court describes as very limited and narrow.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-8 Case: Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110 (R.I. 2007); Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008) parties cannot bring forth new claims in subsequent applications that could have been, but were not, raised in the first postconviction-relief application View the source document
South Carolina Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Section 17-27-90 requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental or amended application; grounds finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived cannot support a subsequent application unless the court finds a 'sufficient reason' why the ground was not asserted or was inadequately raised. South Carolina construes 'sufficient reason' narrowly: in Aice v. State the Supreme Court held ineffectiveness of prior PCR counsel is not per se a sufficient reason, and that 'as long as it was possible to raise the argument in his first PCR application, an applicant may not raise it in a successive application.' The one-year limitations period of § 17-27-45(A) applies independently. Recognized escapes are narrow and procedural: Case v. State (first application dismissed with no counsel and no hearing), Carter v. State (PCR counsel was the same as trial counsel), Tilley v. State (ground genuinely could not have been raised earlier), and an Austin v. State belated appeal where the applicant was denied appellate review of the first PCR denial — to which, per Odom, the one-year bar does not apply.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90 Case: Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991) may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application. View the source document
South Dakota Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A claim already presented in a prior habeas application — or otherwise presented to the courts of this state — must be dismissed, and no second or subsequent application may be filed at all without leave from the circuit court. Leave must be denied unless the applicant identifies (1) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty, or (2) a new, previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral review by both the U.S. and South Dakota Supreme Courts. The grant or denial of leave is not appealable.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-5.1 (added by SL 2012, ch 118, § 5) A claim presented in a second or subsequent habeas corpus application under this chapter that was presented in a prior application under this chapter or otherwise to the courts of this state by the same applicant shall be dismissed. View the source document
Tennessee Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A strict one-petition rule: only one petition may attack a single judgment, and if a prior petition was resolved on the merits any second or subsequent petition 'shall be summarily dismissed' (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 5(B)). The only escape is a motion to reopen the first petition under § 40-30-117(a), permitted on three grounds — a new retroactive constitutional right (moved within one year of the ruling), new scientific evidence of actual innocence, or invalidation of a prior conviction used to enhance the sentence — and only if the facts, if true, would establish entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c); § 40-30-117(a) This part contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief. In no event may more than one (1) petition for post-conviction relief be filed attacking a single judgment. View the source document
Texas Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Article 11.07 § 4(a) bars merits consideration of a subsequent non-capital application unless it pleads sufficient specific facts establishing either (1) that the factual or legal basis of the claim was unavailable when the previous application was filed, or (2) that by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a federal constitutional violation, no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsections (b) and (c) define unavailability narrowly; art. 11.073(c) and art. 11.0731(c) supply a changed-science and faulty-DNA-testing route to satisfy the unavailability prong.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 4(a)-(c); art. 11.071 § 5(a) (capital); art. 11.072 § 9(a) (community supervision) a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that View the source document
Utah Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Section 78B-9-106(1)(d) bars any ground raised or addressed in a previous post-conviction request, or that could have been but was not raised there; the one-year limit independently bars under (1)(e). Critically, the ineffective-assistance escape in § 78B-9-106(3)(a) is written to excuse only subsection (1)(c) defaults — it does not reach the successive bar in (1)(d) — and § 78B-9-109(3) provides that ineffectiveness of appointed post-conviction counsel 'cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent postconviction petition.' The only statutory excuse to (1)(d) is § 78B-9-106(3)(b), for grounds not raised because of force, fraud, or coercion as defined in § 76-5-308. Either the State or the court sua sponte may raise the bar at any time.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(d)-(e), (2), (3)(b); § 78B-9-109(3); § 78B-9-202(2) (capital counsel funding) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief View the source document
Vermont Barred, cause and prejudice verified	13 V.S.A. § 7134 provides that a court 'is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' Vermont applies two distinct doctrines: § 7134 bars relitigation of claims actually raised and decided on the merits in an earlier PCR, and claims raised for the first time in a later petition are barred as abuse of the writ. To excuse the latter, the State must first plead abuse with clarity and particularity; the burden then shifts to the petitioner to show cause (an objective factor external to the defense) and actual prejudice, per the McCleskey standard adopted in In re Laws.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7134 Case: In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, ¶¶ 21-25, 182 A.3d 1149; In re Laws, 2007 VT 54, ¶¶ 11, 20-22, 182 Vt. 66, 928 A.2d 1210; Chandler v. State, 2016 VT 62, ¶ 8 Then the burden shifts to the petitioner to show cause for failing to raise the claim previously and actual prejudice from the default. View the source document
Virginia Barred, narrow exceptions verified	A petition must contain all allegations whose facts are known to the petitioner at filing and must enumerate all previous applications and their disposition; no writ may be granted on any allegation the facts of which the petitioner knew when filing any previous petition. The excuse built into the statute is therefore factual newness — facts genuinely unknown at the time of the earlier petition. One carve-out: the bar does not apply to a first petition whose sole allegation is denial of the right to pursue an appeal, provided it certifies no prior petitions were filed. The § 8.01-654(A)(2) limitations period continues to apply, and there is no innocence exception to it.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) No writ shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition. View the source document
Washington Barred, narrow exceptions verified	In the Court of Appeals, RCW 10.73.140 bars a successive PRP that raises grounds already raised, or where the petitioner fails to certify no prior petition on similar grounds and show good cause for not raising the new grounds earlier; the court dismisses on its own motion without a State response. RAP 16.4(d) — 'No more than one petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown' — governs in the Supreme Court, because RCW 10.73.140 by its terms reaches only the Court of Appeals (In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 566 (1997)). 'Similar relief' turns on the grounds asserted rather than the remedy sought, good cause is established by a significant intervening change in the law, and a prior petition dismissed on procedural grounds was never 'heard and determined,' so it does not trigger the bar; the one-year limit of RCW 10.73.090 applies independently.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.140; RAP 16.4(d) Case: In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 934 P.2d 1174 (1997); In re Pers. Restraint of Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 502-03 (1984) the court of appeals will not consider the petition unless the person certifies that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar grounds, and shows good cause why the petitioner did not raise the new grounds in the previous petition View the source document
West Virginia Barred, narrow exceptions unverified	A petitioner is ordinarily entitled to one omnibus post-conviction habeas proceeding; claims 'previously and finally adjudicated or waived' are barred, and failure to raise an available ground creates a rebuttable presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver (W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c)). Losh v. McKenzie recognizes three narrow exceptions permitting a successive petition: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus hearing, newly discovered evidence, or a retroactively applicable favorable change in the law. Waiver applies only if the prior proceeding was a true omnibus hearing meeting the four Losh/Gibson criteria, including counsel or a knowing waiver of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(b), (c); § 53-4A-3(a); § 53-4A-7(a) Case: Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981); Gibson v. Dale, 173 W. Va. 681, 319 S.E.2d 806 (1984) These exceptions include: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus habeas corpus hearing; newly discovered evidence; or, a change in the law, favorable to the applicant, which may be applied retroactively. View the source document
Wisconsin Barred, cause and prejudice verified	Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) requires all grounds to be raised in the original, supplemental, or amended motion; any ground finally adjudicated, not raised, or knowingly and intelligently waived cannot support a subsequent motion unless the court finds a 'sufficient reason' for the omission. State v. Escalona-Naranjo extends that bar to grounds that could have been raised in an earlier § 974.02 motion or on direct appeal. Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can supply the sufficient reason, but under State v. Romero-Georgana the movant must plead that the omitted claim was 'clearly stronger' than the claims counsel did raise. No sufficient reason is required at all if the defendant filed neither a § 974.02 motion nor a direct appeal. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Escalona-Naranjo was not unanimous — SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). We am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan joins this dissent..	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) Case: State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994); State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 We simply apply the plain language of subsection (4) which requires a sufficient reason to raise a constitutional issue in a sec. 974.06 motion that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a sec. 974.02 motion. View the source document
Wyoming Barred, narrow exceptions verified	Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(ii) strips jurisdiction over any claim 'not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this act,' and (a)(iii) does the same for any claim 'decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which has become final.' The three statutory excuses in § 7-14-103(b) are expressly 'Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(i)' only, so by their terms they do not lift the (a)(ii) or (a)(iii) bars; the five-year limit of § 7-14-103(d) applies independently to any later petition.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(ii)-(iii), (b) Case: Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 55, 105 P.3d 1049, 1071 (Wyo. 2005) (claims 'raised and decided in the direct appeal' are 'procedurally barred from reconsideration in this proceeding') Was not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this act View the source document

Whether the original trial judge hears the challenge

If a first habeas petition is heard in the court of conviction, as has been proposed for Georgia, may the judge whose trial is being challenged decide that challenge? Few states have any rule on the point, and the proposal does not address it.

44 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Reassignment discretionary verified	Expressly addressed by rule, and the original judge is the default: Rule 32.6(d) assigns the Rule 32 proceeding to the sentencing judge 'where possible,' with assignment or transfer to another judge permitted for good cause — reassignment is discretionary, not mandatory. In Ex parte Adkins the Alabama Supreme Court invoked Rule 32.6(d) to require transfer (denying mandamus conditioned on transfer) where the petition's allegations put the trial judge's own impartiality reasonably in question.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(d) Case: Ex parte Adkins, 687 So. 2d 155, 156 (Ala. 1996) The proceeding shall be assigned to the sentencing judge where possible, but for good cause the proceeding may be assigned or transferred to another judge View the source document
Alaska Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is permitted — and in practice assigned — to hear post-conviction applications: Plyler's application was assigned to the judge who presided over his jury trial, and the Court of Appeals held an applicant has no right to peremptorily disqualify that judge, treating the trial judge's familiarity with the case as a reason to keep it. Reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden; AS 12.72.010-.040 contain no judge-assignment provision, and for-cause disqualification was not at issue in Plyler.	Source Case: Plyler v. State, 10 P.3d 1173 (Alaska App. 2000) Because the judge who conducted a defendant's trial would be familiar with the circumstances of the trial, we are persuaded that it would be unwise to allow a defendant to disqualify the judge by means of a peremptory challenge View the source document
Arizona Same judge default verified	Arizona affirmatively requires the original judge where possible: the presiding judge must, if possible, assign the post-conviction proceeding to the sentencing judge (Rule 32.10(a); identically Rule 33.10 track for pleading defendants). The parallel statute adds that if the sentencing judge's testimony appears relevant, that judge shall transfer the case to another judge (A.R.S. § 13-4234(we)); change-of-judge Rules 10.1 and 10.2 apply when the case is assigned to a new judge.	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.10(a); accord A.R.S. § 13-4234(I) The presiding judge must, if possible, assign a proceeding for post-conviction relief to the sentencing judge. View the source document
Arkansas Same judge permitted verified	Rule 37 proceedings are heard in the court of conviction, and the original trial judge is permitted — not forbidden and not required to step aside — to hear the petition. Reassignment is not mandatory; disqualification is discretionary and reversible only for abuse of discretion, and recusal is not required merely because the judge must pass on the propriety of his or her own trial rulings (Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996), following Travis). No provision of Rule 37 requiring or authorizing reassignment to a different judge was located.	Source Case: Travis v. State, 283 Ark. 478, 678 S.W.2d 341 (1984); Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996) The same judge who presides over a defendant’s trial may also preside over a post-conviction proceeding; disqualification is discretionary and will not justify reversal absent an abuse of discretion. View the source document
California Same judge permitted verified	Capital cases: assignment to the original trial judge is statutorily required unless that judge is unavailable or other good cause exists (§ 1509(a), adopted by Proposition 66 in 2016). Non-capital cases: no statute or rule of court either requires or forbids the original trial judge; assignment is unaddressed, but Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962 (read in full) holds a habeas petitioner may peremptorily challenge the judge assigned to rule on the petition under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6, subject to that statute's procedural limits.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Penal Code § 1509(a) Case: Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962 A petition filed in or transferred to the court which imposed the sentence shall be assigned to the original trial judge unless that judge is unavailable or there is other good cause to assign the case to a different judge. View the source document
Colorado Same judge permitted verified	Neither Rule 35(c) nor statute addresses which judge hears the motion; the original trial judge is permitted and routinely presides — in Colorado's most prominent capital postconviction case the same judge who presided at trial conducted the 52-day 35(c) hearing (Dunlap). Reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden: it occurs only under the generally applicable disqualification standards of C.R.S. § 16-6-201 and Crim. P. 21(b), which require a showing of actual bias ('bent of mind') even in postconviction proceedings (People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 276-77 (Colo. 1996)). We searched Rule 35 case law and the published-opinion record for any mandatory-reassignment rule and found none.	Source Statute / rule: C.R.S. § 16-6-201; Colo. R. Crim. P. 21(b) Case: Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo. 2007); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1996) hearing consumed 52 days of court time and was conducted by the same judge who had presided over the guilt and penalty phases of the trial View the source document
Connecticut Not applicable verified	The premise does not apply in Connecticut: post-conviction habeas is not heard in the court of conviction, because § 52-466(a)(2) routes every petition by a convicted, confined prisoner to the judicial district of Tolland, so the original trial judge does not hear it as a structural matter. We found no statute or rule that requires, permits, or forbids assignment of the original trial judge to a habeas case; searched the full text of chapter 915 (§§ 52-466 to 52-470), the Practice Book habeas rules as reproduced in Gilchrist, and the published-opinion record for Connecticut Supreme Court opinions pairing habeas with 'original trial judge' and recusal (one immaterial hit, Barlow v. Comm'r of Corr.). Note § 52-466(d) separately lets any judge make the writ returnable before another judge with that judge's consent.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-466(a)(2) made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland View the source document
Delaware Same judge default verified	Post-conviction is heard in the court of conviction, and the judge who took the plea or presided at trial and sentencing may hear the Rule 61 motion — reassignment is not required. In Harden the same judge who imposed sentence ruled on the Rule 61 petition after a Commissioner's report, and the Delaware Supreme Court, reversing on the merits, ordered a different judge only for the new sentencing, stating it was doing so 'not because the original trial judge did anything wrong.' we could not verify the text of Rule 61(d)(1), which the Superior Court's 2014 amendment order appears to word as a directive that a first motion be presented promptly to that same judge, because the Judiciary publishes its rules only as non-extractable PDFs. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Harden v. State was not unanimous — VALIHURA, Justice, dissenting, with VAUGHN, Justice, joining.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(1) (text unverified) Case: Harden v. State, 180 A.3d 1037, 1046, 1051 (Del. 2018) The same judge who presided over Harden's sentencing hearing heard Harden's objections to the Commissioner's recommendation and issued a thorough decision explaining why she agreed that his petition should be dismissed. View the source document
Florida Reassignment discretionary verified	Permitted, not required, and reassignment is discretionary. For capital collateral proceedings the assignment rule is express: the chief judge must assign a judge qualified under rule 2.215(b)(10), and Rule 3.851(c)(1) requires that assignment within 30 days of the mandate on direct appeal — the trial judge qualifies but has no priority, because in 2001 the Court deleted the former requirement that the judge who presided over a capital trial preside over the collateral proceeding, and in 2008 it deleted rule 2.215(b)(10)(E), which had exempted such a judge from the capital-qualification requirements. For non-capital Rule 3.850 motions we found no rule text addressing which judge hears the motion; assignment falls under the chief judge's general power in rule 2.215(b)(4), and no provision requires or forbids the original trial judge. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: In re Implementation of Judicial Branch Governance Study Group Recommendations—Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration was not unanimous — PARIENTE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion..	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(4), (b)(10); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(c)(1) Case: In re Implementation of Judicial Branch Governance Study Group Recommendations—Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 121 So. 3d 1, 13 (Fla. 2012) (appendix reproducing rule 2.215(b)(4)); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.215, 992 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 2008) When assigning a judge to hear any type of postconviction or collateral relief proceeding brought by a defendant who has been sentenced to death, the chief judge shall assign to such cases a judge qualified to conduct such proceedings under subdivision (b)(10) of this rule. View the source document
Georgia Reassignment mandatory verified	For Georgia's exclusive collateral remedy — state habeas — the question is largely structural rather than discretionary: because venue lies in the superior court of the county of detention (§ 9-14-43), the original trial judge ordinarily has no role at all. For a petition challenging a death sentence for the first time, reassignment is mandatory and out-of-circuit: the clerk must notify the Council of Superior Court Judges, whose president must assign the case to a judge of a circuit other than the circuit of conviction (§ 9-14-47.1(b)). No statute or rule we could reach addresses whether the original trial judge may preside in the residual situation where § 9-14-43 places venue in the county of conviction because the petitioner is not in custody.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47.1(b); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-43 the president of the council shall, under guidelines promulgated by the executive committee of the council, assign the case to a judge of a circuit other than the circuit in which the conviction and sentence were imposed View the source document
Hawaii Unaddressed unverified	Unaddressed by rule. Hawaii post-conviction is heard in the court of conviction (Rule 40(b)), but no provision we could reach states whether the original trial judge may, must, or must not hear the Rule 40 petition, and none makes reassignment mandatory or discretionary. We read the full text of HRPP Rule 40 (all subsections), HRPP Rule 42.3 (which requires transmittal "to a judge" without identifying which), HRPP Rule 25 (judge disability — trial and post-verdict substitution only), and R. Cir. Cts. Haw. 2 and 33: all silent. Haw. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(6)(D) disqualifies a judge who "on appeal, previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court," which does not reach a Rule 40 petition (neither an appeal nor another court). The only textual acknowledgment that the Rule 40 judge may differ from the trial judge is Rule 40(f), which lists as receivable evidence the "certificate of any judge who presided at any hearing during the course of the proceedings" leading to the judgment — permissive, and not a reassignment rule. the published-opinion record full-text searches across Haw. and Haw. App. for "Rule 40 petition" + "same judge" (4 hits; the only pre-2019 one, Bryant v. State, 6 Haw. App. 331, uses the phrase about voir dire) and "Rule 40 petition" + "recusal" (4 hits: State v. Green (2024), Garcia v. State, 154 Haw. 410 (2024), Karamatsu v. State, 149 Haw. 172 (2021), Rosa v. Kaua'i Police Dep't (2025)) produced no reachable holding; all four recusal hits postdate the digitised case record coverage and exist only as Hawaii Judiciary PDFs, which are published only as image files.	Source No primary source reached.
Idaho Same judge permitted verified	The original trial/sentencing judge is permitted, not forbidden, to hear the post-conviction proceeding, and reassignment is neither mandatory nor available as of right. Because post-conviction is a civil proceeding, Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(a) would ordinarily give each party one disqualification without cause, but Rule 40(a)(8)(B) expressly withdraws that right where the post-conviction case has been assigned to the judge who entered the challenged judgment. Removal is therefore available only for cause under Rule 40(b) — including bias or prejudice — or by the judge's own voluntary disqualification, and the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to adopt any rule automatically disqualifying the sentencing judge.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(a)(8)(B); Idaho R. Civ. P. 40(b)-(d) Case: Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206 (1986) a judge in a post-conviction proceeding, when that proceeding has been assigned to the judge who entered the judgment of conviction or sentence being challenged by the post-conviction proceeding View the source document
Illinois Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is PERMITTED — and by supreme court statement preferred — to hear the post-conviction petition; reassignment is neither mandatory nor forbidden, and rests with the chief judge's general assignment authority under Ill. S. Ct. R. 21(b). Illinois once had the opposite rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-8 required that every post-conviction proceeding be conducted by 'a judge who was not involved in the original proceeding which resulted in conviction.' That section was held unconstitutional as a separation-of-powers encroachment on judicial assignment authority in People v. Joseph (1986) and was formally repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-2010. The appellate court has held there is likewise no per se rule requiring the original trial judge.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-8 (repealed by P.A. 96-1200, eff. 7-22-2010; held unconstitutional in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36 (1986)) Case: People v. Mamolella, 42 Ill. 2d 69, 73 (1969); People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 43-48 (1986); People v. Keener, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8-11 (2d Dist. 1995) In the absence of a showing that defendant would be substantially prejudiced, the post-conviction petition should be heard by the same judge who rendered the original judgment. View the source document
Indiana Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is permitted to hear the petition and does so by default; reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic. The petitioner's only route is a § 4(b) motion filed within ten days of the petition, supported by an affidavit of the judge's personal bias or prejudice plus counsel's good-faith certificate; the court must take the recited historical facts as true and grant the change only if they support a rational inference of bias or prejudice, and no change of venue from the county is permitted. Section 5 makes § 4(b) the exclusive change-of-judge route (displacing the otherwise-available civil procedures), and for an authorized successive petition § 12(c) sends the case back to the same judge who adjudicated the first petition "if that judge is available."	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 4(b); § 5; § 12(c) Case: Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 789–90 (Ind. 1999) Within ten days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the petitioner. View the source document
Iowa Same judge permitted verified	Permitted, not required, and reassignment is unaddressed. Iowa Code § 822.7 provides that the application "shall be heard in, and before any judge of the court in which the conviction or sentence took place," so the judge who tried or sentenced the case may hear the postconviction action but no particular judge is designated. We located no Iowa statute, court rule, or decision requiring reassignment to a different judge or barring the original trial judge — the ordinary recusal standards apply, and nothing in chapter 822 addresses the question.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.7 Case: Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1995) (quoting § 822.7) The application shall be heard in, and before any judge of the court in which the conviction or sentence took place. View the source document
Kansas Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is permitted but not required to hear the 60-1507 motion, and reassignment is neither mandatory nor prohibited — it is ordinary district-court docketing. The Court of Appeals squarely rejected the argument that "sentencing court" and "trial court" in K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule 183 mean the specific judge who tried and sentenced the movant, holding any judge of that district court has jurisdiction to hear it; conversely, Kansas appellate deference on 60-1507 review rests on an assumption that the same trial judge is deciding the motion (Gilkey), and displacing that judge requires the general change-of-judge procedure of K.S.A. 20-311d (timely motion, then a legally sufficient affidavit of prejudice ruled on by the chief judge or another judge), which the Supreme Court enforced in Carpenter by reinstating the trial judge's 60-1507 rulings after he was improperly disqualified.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 20-311d; Kan. S. Ct. R. 183 (contains no judge-assignment provision) Case: Morrow v. State, 18 Kan. App. 2d 236, 238-40, 849 P.2d 1004 (1993) In K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule 183, the phrases “sentencing court” and “trial court” refer to the district court, not a specific judge. View the source document
Kentucky Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is permitted, not forbidden, to hear the RCr 11.42 motion, and reassignment is not mandatory. In Sanborn the special judge who had presided over the retrial also sat as the judge in the RCr 11.42 proceeding; the Chief Justice denied the motion to recuse him, and the Court held the challenged remarks supplied no legal basis for disqualification, applying the ordinary Marlowe/Liteky standards. Haight likewise notes approvingly that the judge who heard the RCr 11.42 proceeding was the same judge who presided at trial. We found no Kentucky rule or statute addressing reassignment in post-conviction: we read RCr 11.42(1), (2), (3), (5) and (10) as set out verbatim in Fraser, Robertson, Gross and Palmer, and searched the published-opinion record Kentucky opinion corpus for RCr 11.42 together with recuse/disqualify/reassignment; nothing makes reassignment either required or prohibited. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Sanborn v. Commonwealth was not unanimous — STEPHENS, C.J., and COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. STUMBO, J., concurs in result only..	Source Case: Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998); Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001) Sanborn had sought to disqualify Special Judge Shadoan who had presided over the retrial and served as the judge in the RCr 11.42 proceeding. View the source document
Louisiana Not established unverified	Not established from a primary source. Louisiana's post-conviction title (La. C. Cr. P. arts. 924–930.11) directs the application to "the district court for the parish in which the petitioner was convicted" and thereafter speaks only of "the court" — it nowhere requires, permits, or forbids the original trial judge specifically, and we found no statute or statewide rule making reassignment mandatory or discretionary. The one express reassignment command in the title is narrower than this dimension: art. 926.2(C)(2) recuses the district judge who granted factual-innocence relief from a subsequent bench retrial, not from the post-conviction proceeding itself. Recusal in a criminal cause otherwise runs through the general grounds in art. 671. What we searched: every article of Title XXXI-A on legis.la.gov (arts. 924 through 930.11) plus arts. 671 and 926.2; Acts 2025 No. 393 and Acts 2024 2nd Ex. Sess. No. 10; and targeted searches for a Louisiana allotment or recusal rule for post-conviction applications. Two source paths failed: lasc.org (Rules for Louisiana District Courts, Title II) is not publicly retrievable, and the published-opinion record search API could not be retrieved.	Source Statute / rule: La. C. Cr. P. art. 926.2(C)(2) (closest express provision; governs retrial, not the post-conviction proceeding) the district judge who granted post conviction relief pursuant to this Article shall be recused and the case shall be allotted to a different judge in accordance with applicable law and rules of court View the source document
Maine Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is PERMITTED, but not required, to hear the post-conviction petition. The Chief Justice of the Superior Court or a designee assigns every PCR petition; the trial justice or judge who imposed sentence 'may be assigned' unless disqualified or otherwise unavailable, and if the trial judge is not assigned the petition 'may be assigned to any justice or judge.' Reassignment to a different judge is therefore discretionary with the assigning Chief Justice — not mandatory, and not forbidden.	Source Statute / rule: M.R.U. Crim. P. 69A(a)-(c); see also 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(C) (clerk forwards the petition to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court) the trial justice or trial judge who imposed sentence or ordered commitment under 15 M.R.S. § 103 may be assigned to the post-conviction review proceeding unless the trial justice or trial judge is disqualified or is otherwise unavailable View the source document
Maryland Reassignment mandatory verified	Maryland is one of the few states that expressly addresses this, and it forbids the trial judge by default: the post-conviction hearing 'shall not be held by the judge who presided at trial except with the consent of the petitioner' (Md. Rule 4-406(b)). Reassignment to a different judge is therefore the mandatory default, waivable only by the petitioner; Md. Rule 4-403 makes the county administrative judge the assignment authority by requiring the clerk to notify that judge on receipt. The same bar is imposed by statute for habeas corpus: Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(b)(2) forbids referral to the trial judge absent the applicant's written consent.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Rule 4-406(b); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-702(b)(2) The hearing shall not be held by the judge who presided at trial except with the consent of the petitioner. View the source document
Massachusetts Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is the presumptive decisionmaker, not a disqualified one: Rule 30(a) directs the motion to 'the trial judge,' Rule 30(b) speaks of 'the trial judge' granting a new trial, and Rule 30(c)(7) contemplates that judge hearing it. Sullivan states that the judge who presided at trial 'normally should hear' the new-trial motion, and reassigns only because that judge had retired. Reassignment is therefore neither mandatory nor forbidden — it is discretionary, and the Reporter's Notes published with the rule direct that recusal 'should thus be liberally exercised, particularly where it is requested by the moving party.' Searched: Rule 30 text and Reporter's Notes; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 385 Mass. 497, 498 n.1; McCastle, Petitioner, 401 Mass. 105; Rodwell (third motion heard by a Superior Court judge who was not the trial judge, without objection); SJC Rule 3:10; G.L. c. 211D. No rule, statute, or standing order requiring a different judge was found.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), (b), (c)(7) and Reporter's Notes Case: Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 385 Mass. 497, 498 n.1 (1981) However, for this same reason the trial judge may bring to the hearing a prejudice that another judge would not have. Recusal of the trial judge should thus be liberally exercised, particularly where it is requested by the moving party. View the source document
Michigan Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is REQUIRED to hear it; reassignment is the exception. MCR 6.504(A) directs that the motion 'shall be presented to the judge to whom the case was assigned at the time of the defendant's conviction,' and permits reassignment only where that judge is 'not available' (then under the court's ordinary reassignment procedure) or where the chief judge reassigns to correct docket-control problems. The same design is codified by statute for post-conviction DNA petitions, which 'shall be assigned to the sentencing judge or his or her successor' (MCL 770.16(2)); and a successive motion is referred to 'the judge to whom the case is assigned' for the gatekeeping decision (MCR 6.502(G)(2)). Subchapter 6.500 contains no recusal provision, so the only route to a different judge is the generally applicable disqualification rule, MCR 2.003, which requires a party motion (or the judge raising it) and grounds such as actual bias or a serious risk of actual bias under Caperton.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.504(A); MCL 770.16(2); MCR 2.003(B)-(C) The motion shall be presented to the judge to whom the case was assigned at the time of the defendant’s conviction. If the appropriate judge is not available, the motion must be assigned to another judge View the source document
Minnesota Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is PERMITTED, not required and not forbidden, to hear the postconviction petition, and reassignment to a different judge is nowhere made mandatory. Chapter 590 read in full contains only three references to judge identity — the chief judge 'shall promptly assign the matter to a judge in said district' (§ 590.02, subd. 3) and two references to 'the judge to whom the [matter/proceeding] has been assigned' (§§ 590.03, 590.04, subd. 2) — none naming or excluding the trial judge. Berg v. State, an intermediate appellate decision (review denied), squarely rejected a challenge to the trial judge sitting as the postconviction judge; removal is otherwise available only through the generally applicable bias/disqualification route.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 3; § 590.04, subd. 2 Case: Berg v. State, 403 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1987) Berg challenges the propriety of the post-conviction judge being the same judge who presided at trial. This is not improper. View the source document
Mississippi Unaddressed verified	Unaddressed. Neither the UPCCRA nor M.R.A.P. 22 names which judge hears a post-conviction motion filed in the court of conviction; the Act speaks only of 'the judge to whom it is assigned' (§ 99-39-11(1)) and of 'the convicting court' (M.R.A.P. 22(c)), so the original trial judge is neither required nor forbidden to hear it and reassignment is neither mandatory nor expressly discretionary. Disqualification is governed by general law rather than any post-conviction-specific provision — Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 bars a judge from presiding where related to a party, interested, or where he 'may have been of counsel.'	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(1); cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 The original motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. View the source document
Missouri Same judge default verified	The original sentencing judge is PERMITTED to hear the post-conviction motion and is the default decisionmaker — Rule 29.15(c)/24.035(c) direct the clerk to notify the sentencing judge, and no rule requires or forbids reassignment. Reassignment is NOT available as of right: Thomas v. State squarely holds that Rule 51.05, which gives civil litigants one change of judge without cause, does not apply in post-conviction proceedings, reasoning that the trial judge is best equipped to assess trial counsel's performance. Disqualification for cause remains available and is not time-limited, and where the motion is supported by an affidavit alleging facts outside the judge's own knowledge, a different judge must be assigned at least to decide the disqualification motion (Ferguson v. Corrigan). NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Thomas v. State was not unanimous — RENDLEN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. BILLINGS, J., not sitting..	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(c); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 51.05(d); §§ 508.090, 508.130 RSMo Case: Thomas v. State, 808 S.W.2d 364, 366-67 (Mo. banc 1991); State ex rel. Ferguson v. Corrigan, 959 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 1997) We hold that Rule 51.05 does not apply in post-conviction proceedings. View the source document
Montana Same judge mandatory verified	The original sentencing judge is required to hear the petition. Reading § 46-21-101(1)'s 'court that imposed the sentence' together with Coleman v. State, the Montana Supreme Court holds that postconviction proceedings must occur before the same judge who presided over sentencing, and that the specific postconviction venue statute overrides the general one-substitution right in § 3-1-804, MCA — so there is no right of judicial substitution in postconviction proceedings. Reassignment occurs only in two situations: the sentencing judge recuses (which requires 'the strongest showing of materiality and unavailability of evidence sought to be adduced from the sentencing judge'), in which case § 3-1-804(8) reinstates each party's substitution right (Patrick, ¶¶ 24-25); or the judge was already substituted out of the underlying criminal case, in which case that substitution carries over and bars him from the postconviction proceeding (Jordan, ¶ 13).	Source Statute / rule: § 46-21-101(1), MCA; § 3-1-804, MCA Case: Patrick v. State, 2011 MT 169, ¶¶ 15-16, 24-25, 361 Mont. 204 (following Coleman v. State, 194 Mont. 428, 633 P.2d 624 (1981)); Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶¶ 11-13, 338 Mont. 113, 162 P.3d 863 to require that postconviction proceedings occur in front of the same judge who presided over sentencing View the source document
Nebraska Same judge permitted verified	Postconviction is heard in the court of conviction, and the original trial judge is permitted — not forbidden and not required — to hear it. Reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic: the Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Herren that no rule of law automatically disqualifies the judge who presided at trial from later considering the post conviction proceeding, and the movant bears the burden of establishing bias or prejudice, with denial of a disqualification motion affirmed unless the record establishes bias as a matter of law. Sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 contain no provision on which judge hears the motion.	Source Case: State v. Herren, 212 Neb. 706, 325 N.W.2d 151 (1982) There is no rule of law which automatically disqualifies a judge who has presided at a trial from subsequently considering a post conviction proceeding. View the source document
Nevada Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is not merely permitted but statutorily preferred: a petition attacking the conviction or sentence must be filed with the record of the original proceeding and, 'whenever possible,' assigned to the original judge or court. Chapter 34 contains no provision for reassignment to a different judge, and in capital cases a petitioner who has previously filed in the same court must have the new petition assigned to the judge who considered the previous matter (NRS 34.820(3)). No post-conviction-specific rule making reassignment mandatory or discretionary was found; Nevada's general disqualification grounds appear at NRS 1.230 (actual or implied bias) and are not specific to post-conviction proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 34.730(4)(b); NRS 34.820(3) Case: Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737 (2006) If a petition challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence, it must be: (a) Filed with the record of the original proceeding to which it relates; and (b) Whenever possible, assigned to the original judge or court. View the source document
New Hampshire Unaddressed unverified	Unaddressed, so far as we could verify. RSA 526:2 routes the new-trial petition to 'the superior court in the county where the judgment was rendered' without designating a judge; RSA 534 designates no judge; RSA 651-D:2 designates no judge. We read the titles of all 53 New Hampshire Rules of Criminal Procedure and the full text of Rule 27 (Disability of Judge), Rule 39 (Assignment to Specific Judges) and Rule 40 (Recusal): Rule 39 vests superior court assignment in the chief justice (complex cases) or the clerk (assigned docketing), Rule 40 states a general waiver-based recusal procedure, and none of the three mentions post-conviction proceedings. Two the published-opinion record full-text searches of the New Hampshire Supreme Court corpus returned 0 opinions each: 'different judge' + 'new trial' + 'ineffective assistance', and 'different judge' + 'motion for new trial' + 'ineffective assistance'. Practice in the opinions we read is mixed: in State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 764 (2009) the same justice (Fauver, J.) is identified for both the trial rulings and the denial of the ineffective-assistance new-trial motion, while in Avery v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 138 (1988) and Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.H. 44 (2005) different justices handled the trial and collateral stages. We found no authority making reassignment mandatory, discretionary by rule, or forbidden. Caveat: the official site is not publicly retrievable, so the rule text was read from a archived capture of the official New Hampshire Judicial Branch rules site dated 2019, and Rules 27/39/40 may have been amended since.	Source Statute / rule: RSA 526:2; N.H. R. Crim. P. 39; N.H. R. Crim. P. 40
New Jersey Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is permitted to hear the PCR petition, and the Supreme Court has described that as the ordinary course in New Jersey. Reassignment is not mandatory and is not addressed by R. 3:22: R. 3:22-7 leaves assignment to the Criminal Presiding Judge, who 'shall forthwith refer the matter for disposition to a trial judge,' without designating or excluding the judge who tried the case. Recusal is discretionary with the judge in the first instance and requires an affirmative showing of bias, potential bias, or an objectively reasonable appearance of bias under R. 1:12-1; Marshall holds that prior adverse rulings, prior participation in the case, and even error in the earlier proceeding do not by themselves disqualify. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: State v. Marshall was not unanimous — For affirmance — Justices POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 4. For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER and O'HERN — 2..	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-7; N.J. Ct. R. 1:12-1(d), (f) Case: State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 275-80 (1997) Following the usual practice in this state, the same judge that presided over defendant's trial also heard his PCR petition. View the source document
New Mexico Not established unverified	Unverified, and only half-answerable from sources we could reach. The original trial judge is at least permitted to hear the petition: in Duncan v. Kerby the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed habeas relief granted by the district judge who had also presided over the petitioner's jury trial (quoted below), so there is no disqualification. Whether the trial judge is REQUIRED to hear it, and whether reassignment to a different judge is available or mandatory, we could not establish. Searches run: the published-opinion record full-text opinion search across all courts for "Rule 5-802" + "shall be assigned" (0 results), for "5-802(F)" (5 results, all false positives — the only New Mexico-relevant hit, Baca v. Cosper, 128 F.4th 1319 (10th Cir. 2025), matched "802 F.3d"), and for "pre-appointment review" (no New Mexico hits); DuckDuckGo for "Rule 5-802" with "assigned"/"trial judge"/"assignment" + "district judge" (no results); site-restricted searches of nmcourts.gov. An indexed excerpt of the official rule PDF refers to routing the petition 'to a judge presiding in the criminal division,' which does not resolve whether that is the sentencing judge.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802 NMRA (assignment provision not retrievable) Case: Duncan v. Kerby, 115 N.M. 344, 851 P.2d 466 (1993) District Judge William J. Schnedar, who also had presided over Duncan's jury trial, determined that Duncan had not received effective assistance of counsel at trial, granted the writ of habeas corpus View the source document
New York Same judge default verified	Unaddressed as such — no New York statute, court rule, or decision we could reach requires, permits by name, or forbids the original trial judge to hear a CPL 440 motion. CPL 440.10(1) designates only 'the court in which it was entered' and names no judge. Under the individual assignment system rule governing criminal actions in Supreme and County Court, the randomly assigned judge 'shall conduct all further proceedings therein,' and transfer of an action or 'any matter relating to an action' from one judge to another is authorized only as the Chief Administrator may allow (22 NYCRR 200.11[d][4]) — so by default the assigned trial judge retains the case. Recusal is otherwise the judge's own call: absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 (party, prior counsel, interest, or consanguinity within the sixth degree — none of which covers having presided at the trial), 'a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal' (People v. Moreno). Reassignment is therefore discretionary, never mandatory.	Source Statute / rule: 22 NYCRR 200.11(c), (d)(4); CPL 440.10(1); Judiciary Law § 14 Case: People v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 405 (1987) The judge thereby assigned shall be known as the "assigned judge" with respect to such action and, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d) of this section, shall conduct all further proceedings therein View the source document
North Carolina Reassignment discretionary verified	The original trial judge is permitted but not required to hear a postconviction MAR, and reassignment to a different judge is discretionary, not mandatory: every MAR filed in superior court is referred on filing to the senior resident superior court judge (chief district court judge in district court), who assigns it, and § 15A-1413(e) makes the assignment of a § 15A-1415 postconviction MAR expressly discretionary with that administrative judge; any judge empowered to act in criminal matters in the district where the judgment was entered may be assigned. By contrast, § 15A-1413(b) directs the trial judge only for the 10-day post-verdict motion under § 15A-1414. The former § 15A-1413(c), which allowed a judge who did not hear the case to refer the matter 'to the judge who heard the case,' was repealed by S.L. 2012-168, s. 2(a), effective December 1, 2012; no statute requires recusal of the trial judge.	Source Statute / rule: N.C.G.S. § 15A-1413(a), (b), (d), (e); former § 15A-1413(c), repealed by S.L. 2012-168, s. 2(a) The assignment of a motion for appropriate relief filed under G.S. 15A-1415 is in the discretion of the senior resident superior court judge or chief district court judge as appropriate. View the source document
North Dakota Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is permitted to hear it, and by rule is the presumptive judge; reassignment is neither mandatory nor available on demand. N.D.R.Ct. 3.3 directs that a postjudgment motion or proceeding be heard by the same judge who heard the underlying matter, excepting only where that judge is unable to act, where N.D.C.C. § 29-15-21(3) applies, and in nonfelony and child-support matters. The Act itself permits "any judge of the court in which the conviction took place" to consider the application (§ 29-32.1-03(7), quoted in Holbach v. City of Minot, 2012 ND 117, ¶ 15, 817 N.W.2d 340). There is no peremptory right to a different judge: Falcon holds the § 29-15-21 demand for change of judge does not apply to Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act proceedings, leaving only Code of Judicial Conduct disqualification.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.R.Ct. 3.3; N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-03(7) Case: Falcon v. State, 1997 ND 200, ¶¶ 1, 9-11, 570 N.W.2d 719 Any postjudgment motion or proceeding must be heard by the same judge before whom the underlying matter was heard, subject to the following exceptions: View the source document
Ohio Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is permitted to hear the postconviction petition; reassignment is neither mandatory nor automatic. The Ohio Supreme Court has held it is well settled that a judge who presided at trial will not be disqualified from hearing a postconviction petition absent evidence of bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest — and specifically that the very nature of a postconviction proceeding requires trial judges to evaluate and pass upon their own actions and conduct (citing R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)); that remains true where the petition alleges counsel was ineffective in not seeking the same judge's recusal. Removal is available only through an affidavit of disqualification filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court under R.C. 2701.03, decided by the Chief Justice, and the affiant bears the burden of specific allegations and supporting facts. We searched the full current text of R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 (no provision addresses which judge hears the petition), R.C. 2701.03, and Ohio Supreme Court disqualification decisions involving postconviction petitions.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code 2701.03(A)–(D); Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21 (silent on judicial assignment) Case: In re Disqualification of Nastoff, 134 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2012-Ohio-6339 (Feb. 16, 2012) It is well settled that a judge who presided at trial will not be disqualified from hearing a petition for postconviction relief in the absence of evidence of bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest. View the source document
Oklahoma Same judge permitted verified	Unaddressed as such: neither the Post-Conviction Procedure Act nor the OCCA Rules requires reassignment away from the original trial judge or forbids that judge from hearing the application, which is filed in the court that imposed judgment. The Act's only judge-specific limits presuppose that the same judge may preside — § 1084 bars a judge from presiding at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing if his own testimony is material, and § 1083(B) forbids the assigned judge from disposing of the application on personal knowledge not in the record. Removal otherwise requires the ordinary criminal disqualification procedure (Rule 15, Rules for District Courts; mandamus review under OCCA Rule 10.6(B)).	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 1084; 22 O.S. § 1083(B); Rule 10.6(B), Rules of the Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals A judge should not preside at such a hearing if his testimony is material. View the source document
Oregon Unaddressed unverified	Unaddressed by Oregon authority we could reach. Structurally the question is largely displaced: ORS 138.560(1) places venue in the circuit court of the county of imprisonment, so post-conviction is normally heard by a judge of a different circuit court than the court of conviction (e.g. Malheur County for Snake River, Marion County for the penitentiary). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act says nothing about which judge hears the petition, including where venue is the county of conviction because the petitioner is not imprisoned (138.560(1)) or was transferred there (138.560(4)); it addresses the trial judge only as a potential source of evidence (ORS 138.630, affidavit of 'the judge who presided at the trial'). We searched the full text of ORS 138.510–138.680 and ORS chapter 14 for 'judge,' 'trial judge,' 'same judge,' 'presiding,' 'assigned,' 'reassign,' and 'disqualif'; the only general mechanism found is the party-initiated disqualification of ORS 14.210 and ORS 14.250–14.270 (affidavit of belief that a fair hearing is unavailable, in 'any suit, action, matter or proceeding'), which is not post-conviction-specific. the published-opinion record searches of Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions for 'post-conviction' with 'judge who presided,' 'presided at petitioner's trial,' 'who presided over petitioner,' and 'recusal' returned no case deciding whether the original trial judge may or must hear a post-conviction petition.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.510 to 138.680 (silent); cf. ORS 138.560(1), (4); ORS 14.210; ORS 14.250 to 14.270 View the source document
Pennsylvania Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is the default and is PERMITTED — indeed directed — to hear the PCRA petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A) requires the clerk to transmit the petition and case file to the trial judge if available, and 903(C) provides that the trial judge shall proceed with and dispose of the petition unless the judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should be disqualified. Reassignment is therefore discretionary with the trial judge (self-disqualification) rather than mandatory; only when the trial judge is unavailable or disqualified does the administrative judge assign the case to another judge under 903(D). The rule's Comment confirms 'trial judge' includes the judge who accepted a guilty or nolo plea.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A), (C), (D) The trial judge, if available, shall proceed with and dispose of the petition in accordance with these rules, unless the judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should be disqualified. View the source document
Rhode Island Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is required to hear it. Superior Court Rules of Practice Rule 2.3(d)(4), quoted verbatim by the Supreme Court in Mattatall, directs the clerk to place post-conviction applications on the formal and special cause calendar and directs the calendar justice to submit the application for disposition by the justice who presided at the applicant's trial; only where that trial justice is no longer a member of the court is the application distributed, on a rotational basis, to the trial-calendar justices. Reassignment to a different judge is therefore not discretionary on request — the Court affirmed denial of a motion to recuse and reassign where the same justice had sentenced the applicant as a habitual offender and had already denied his earlier application, applying the ordinary Canon 3E standard placing the burden on the movant to show personal bias.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Super. Ct. R. Prac. 2.3(d)(4) Case: Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008) The justice assigned to the calendar shall submit the application, as the case may be, for disposition by the justice who presided at the trial of the applicant. View the source document
South Carolina Split by case type verified	Split by case type. In capital cases reassignment away from the trial bench is MANDATORY and express: § 17-27-160(A) states that 'the judge assigned as the post-conviction relief judge must not be the original sentencing judge.' In non-capital cases no provision requires, permits by name, or forbids the original trial judge: § 17-27-80 directs only that the application 'shall be heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place,' so any circuit judge sitting in that county may hear it and reassignment is neither mandated nor barred. Searched and found nothing on the non-capital question in: SC Code Title 17 ch. 27 (all sections) and ch. 17; Rule 71.1, SCRCP in full; the SC Judicial Branch full-text opinion search for "same judge who presided"+"post-conviction", "who also presided"+"PCR", "PCR judge"+"presided over his trial", and "recuse"+"post-conviction relief"+"trial judge"; and the SC Supreme Court court-order search for "post-conviction relief"+"assignment" — no rule, order, or opinion on point surfaced.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(A); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 The judge assigned as the post-conviction relief judge must not be the original sentencing judge. View the source document
South Dakota Reassignment mandatory verified	The original trial/sentencing judge is FORBIDDEN to hear the habeas application; reassignment to a different judge of the court of conviction is mandatory by statute. SDCL 21-27-14.1 bars proceedings before 'a judge who imposed sentence' or any judge who 'otherwise denied him relief concerning the subject matter,' which the South Dakota Supreme Court has read to also disqualify a judge who denied the applicant relief in a prior habeas.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-14.1 Case: Goodroad v. Weber, 2003 SD 132, ¶ 8, 671 N.W.2d 838 (also citing State v. Phipps, 406 N.W.2d 146, 150 n.2 (S.D. 1987)) This Court has recognized that, under SDCL 21-27-14.1, a judge who presides at trial cannot preside at a state habeas corpus hearing. View the source document
Tennessee Same judge default verified	The original trial judge is PERMITTED, not required and not forbidden, and is the default if no one acts. The presiding judge of the court assigns a judge to hear the petition and that judge 'may be the original hearing judge'; the statute adds that competency-of-counsel issues 'may be heard by a judge other than the original hearing judge' — permissive, not mandatory. If the presiding judge fails to assign and the Chief Justice designates no one, Rule 28 § 6(B)(1) directs that the original trial judge hears the petition. Reassignment is therefore discretionary with the presiding judge; nothing in the Act or Rule 28 makes it automatic.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 6(B)(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-105(b) The presiding judge shall assign a judge to hear the case who may be the original hearing judge. View the source document
Texas Same judge permitted verified	The original trial judge is permitted, and in capital cases statutorily preferred, to hear the post-conviction proceeding; reassignment is nowhere made mandatory. Art. 11.071 § 9(c) is the only provision in Chapter 11 designating which judge presides, and it directs the presiding judge of the convicting court, or the judge who presided over the original capital trial if that was someone else. For non-capital applications the statute is silent on the judge's identity: the clerk assigns the application to the convicting court (art. 11.07 § 3(b)), and § 3(d) lets that court resolve fact issues 'as well as using personal recollection,' which presupposes the judge who tried the case. Art. 11.072 § 6(b) likewise permits the court to 'rely on the court's personal recollection.'	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 9(c); see also art. 11.07 § 3(b), (d); art. 11.072 § 6(b) The presiding judge of the convicting court shall conduct a hearing held under this section unless another judge presided over the original capital felony trial View the source document
Utah Same judge default verified	The original sentencing judge is REQUIRED to hear the petition by default. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g) directs the clerk to assign and deliver the petition to the judge who sentenced the petitioner; reassignment 'in the normal course' occurs only if that judge is unavailable. Reassignment is therefore neither mandatory nor automatic, and the rule does not carve out cases where the claim is ineffective assistance or otherwise attacks the sentencing judge's own conduct. Because PCRA proceedings are civil and governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure (§ 78B-9-102(1)(a)), the only affirmative route to a different judge is a party's motion to disqualify under Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) on an affidavit showing bias, prejudice, or conflict of interest, filed within 21 days and decided by a reviewing judge.	Source Statute / rule: Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); Utah R. Civ. P. 63(a)-(c); Utah Code § 78B-9-102(1)(a) On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. View the source document
Vermont Reassignment mandatory verified	Forbidden by statute. The final sentence of 13 V.S.A. § 7131 disqualifies the judge who presided when the original sentence was imposed from hearing the PCR application, so reassignment to a different judge is mandatory and not discretionary — even though the petition is filed in the court of conviction. The reach of the clause beyond the sentencing judge is unsettled: the Supreme Court has twice declined to hold that it disqualifies a PCR judge who only ruled on pretrial motions in the underlying prosecution (In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, n.14; Towne v. State, No. 2004-390 (Vt. Oct. 28, 2005) (unpub. mem.)).	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 Case: Shequin v. Smith, 129 Vt. 578, 285 A.2d 708 (1971) (quoting the disqualification clause); In re Towne, 2018 VT 5, ¶ 10 & n.14, 182 A.3d 1149 However, the Superior or District judge who presided when the original sentence was imposed shall not hear the application. View the source document
Virginia Same judge permitted verified	Unaddressed by statute or rule, and reassignment is not mandatory: the original trial judge is permitted, not required, to hear the habeas petition. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1) fixes the court but is silent on the judge — it provides that 'only the circuit court that entered the original judgment or order resulting in the detention complained of in the petition shall have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus' — and Code § 19.2-153 (procuring a substitute judge) is limited by its terms to a circuit court 'in which a prosecution is pending,' not a civil habeas action. In Kozich the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the habeas case 'was assigned to the same judge who had previously presided over Kozich's sentencing hearing,' affirmed issuance of the writ, and — after the Commonwealth declined to object below — expressly declined in footnote 14 to decide whether that practice is proper. Searched: Va. Code §§ 8.01-654, 8.01-655, 8.01-658, 19.2-153, 17.1-105, 17.1-310; and Virginia caselaw for habeas combined with recusal / 'same judge' / 'judge who presided' / disqualification / reassignment — no Virginia authority requiring or forbidding it was found. NOTE ON AUTHORITY: Director of the Department of Corrections v. Kozich was not unanimous — Justice POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting..	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(B)(1) (silent as to the judge); cf. Va. Code § 19.2-153 (inapplicable — pending prosecutions) Case: Director of the Department of Corrections v. Kozich, 290 Va. 502, 779 S.E.2d 555 (2015) (n.14) Because the Commonwealth, as appellant, took this position in the habeas court and did not attempt to repudiate it on appeal, we leave for another day the question whether this practice should be encouraged or discouraged. View the source document
Washington Reassignment mandatory verified	Washington forbids the original trial judge, by express rule, whenever a post-conviction proceeding reaches the superior court: RAP 16.12 provides that 'the hearing shall be held before a judge who was not involved in the challenged proceeding,' and that applies both to a reference hearing and to a transfer for determination on the merits. Reassignment is therefore mandatory, not discretionary — and it is largely structural besides, because the initial merits screen is made by the Court of Appeals Chief Judge rather than any trial-level judge. The one gap: for a CrR 7.8 motion that the superior court retains instead of transferring, no judge-assignment provision exists in the rule's text.	Source Statute / rule: RAP 16.12 The hearing shall be held before a judge who was not involved View the source document
West Virginia Unaddressed unverified	No West Virginia primary source found that squarely states whether the original trial judge may, must, or may not preside over the post-conviction habeas. Habeas Rule 4(a) routes the petition to the circuit court under that court's ordinary case-assignment procedure and is otherwise silent; nothing in W. Va. Code §§ 53-4A-1 through -9 or in Rules 1-10 addresses the identity of the habeas judge, and no reassignment provision exists. We read the full text of §§ 53-4A-1, -3, -4, -7, -8 and all ten habeas rules; searched the West Virginia Trial Court Rules (which never use the word 'habeas'; TCR 17.01 supplies only the generic motion-to-disqualify route decided by the Chief Justice) and Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11, whose closest ground, Rule 2.11(A)(5)(d), reaches only a judge who 'previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court'; and ran the published-opinion record and web searches for West Virginia opinions on habeas recusal by the trial judge, which returned no case on point.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Trial Court Rule 17.01; W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(5)(d) in accordance with the procedure of the court for assignment of its business. The court shall promptly review whether the petition should be transferred to a venue set forth in Rule 3(a). View the source document
Wisconsin Same judge permitted verified	Postconviction proceedings stay in the court of conviction (§ 974.06(1); a § 974.06 motion 'is a part of the original criminal action'), and the original trial/sentencing judge is PERMITTED — not required by name, and not forbidden — to hear the motion. Rahhal v. State holds the sentencing judge is not disqualified from hearing a postconviction plea-withdrawal motion unless the judge became a material witness or is otherwise disqualified, in which case the judge 'should not hear the motion'; the general disqualification grounds are in Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2). Reassignment is therefore discretionary/for-cause, never automatic. Wisconsin's one-substitution-of-judge right under § 971.20 does not create a postconviction window: § 971.20(1) defines the 'action' as running only to 'final disposition at the trial level,' § 971.20(4) requires the request before arraignment, and § 971.20(7) opens a 20-day window after remittitur only 'if an appellate court orders a new trial or sentencing proceeding.'	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1), (2); Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2); Wis. Stat. § 971.20(1), (4), (7) Case: Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971); see also Rainey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 374, 222 N.W.2d 620 (1974) if a trial judge interjects himself into plea bargaining he may become a material witness or otherwise disqualify himself. Under such circumstances he should not hear the motion. View the source document
Wyoming Unaddressed verified	Unaddressed by statute or rule, and no reassignment mechanism exists. The petition goes to the court of conviction and the clerk 'shall docket the petition upon receipt and bring it promptly to the attention of the court' (§ 7-14-101(b)); nothing requires, names, or forbids the original trial judge. Wyoming's civil change-of-judge rule, W.R.C.P. 40.1 — which supplies both peremptory disqualification (40.1(b)(1)) and disqualification for cause (40.1(b)(2)) — is one of the rules § 7-14-101(c)(ii) expressly makes inapplicable to proceedings under the Act, so a post-conviction petitioner has no peremptory right to a different judge. This does not speak to recusal obligations arising from the Code of Judicial Conduct or due process, which the Act does not address.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(c)(ii); cf. § 7-14-101(b) Case: Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545, 548-49 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting W.R.C.P. 40.1(b), 'Change of judge — (1) Peremptory Disqualification … (2) Disqualification for Cause') Rules 3, 4, 14, 22, 23, 24, 38, 39, 40.1, 42, 47, 48, 51, 55, 59 and 64 through 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to proceedings under this act. View the source document

The trial record, and weighing the evidence again

Two questions about what a felony trial leaves behind and whether any court may look at the evidence a second time without the lens that favours the verdict.

Whether jury selection is part of the trial record

What must be taken down in a non-capital felony jury trial, and specifically whether the questioning of prospective jurors is recorded as a matter of course or only on request. A claim about jury selection cannot be reviewed if no record of it exists.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Judge directed verified	In a non-capital Alabama felony jury trial voir dire is NOT mandatorily recorded: under Ala. R. Crim. P. 19.4(b) the court reporter takes full stenographic notes of voir dire and of the arguments of counsel only 'if directed to do so by the judge,' and the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a judge may refuse even a defendant's affirmative motion to have voir dire taken down (Young v. State, 724 So. 2d 69, 74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), following Carroll v. State, 701 So. 2d 47 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)). Mandatory, non-waivable takedown of voir dire and argument exists only in capital cases, under Rule 19.4(a). Oral testimony and the balance of the proceedings — expressly excluding argument of counsel — are taken down under Ala. Code § 12-17-275 'where directed by the judge or requested by a party thereto,' i.e. on judicial direction or party request rather than automatically.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 19.4(a)-(b); Ala. Code 1975 § 12-17-275 Case: Young v. State, 724 So. 2d 69, 74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) In all noncapital cases, the court reporter shall take full stenographic notes of the voir dire of the jury and of the arguments of counsel if directed to do so by the judge. View the source document
Alaska Mandatory record verified	Alaska takes no stenographic record at all: Administrative Rule 35(a) requires electronic recording equipment "installed in all courts for the purpose of recording all official court hearings," declares those recordings "the official court record," and makes each judicial officer responsible for ensuring "a clear and completely understandable record of all proceedings" — so in a non-capital felony jury trial voir dire, openings, testimony, colloquies and closings are all recorded automatically, with no request-only category and no motion required. Administrative Rule 15(j)(4) confirms jury selection is on that record ("Otherwise, the electronic record and log notes from jury selection are public"), and Administrative Rule 21(a) adds that "so far as practicable, all judicial business involving the trial of causes and conferences with members of the Bar or litigants shall be on the record and transacted in open court." What is request-driven in Alaska is TRANSCRIPTION, not takedown: Appellate Rule 210(a) puts "the electronic record of proceedings before the trial court" in the record on appeal, while Rule 210(b)(1)(A) makes the appellant designate which parts of that recording are transcribed, and Rule 210(b)(8) permits a statement in lieu of transcript only "[i]f there is no electronic recording from which a transcript can be prepared."	Source Statute / rule: Alaska R. Admin. P. 35(a); see also Alaska R. Admin. P. 21(a) and 15(j)(4); Alaska R. App. P. 210(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(8) courts for the purpose of recording all official court hearings. View the source document
Arizona Mandatory record verified	Voir dire is MANDATORY on the record, not request-only: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(f) provides that "In courts of record, voir dire examination must be conducted on the record," and the superior court — which tries all felonies — is a court of record (Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 14(4), § 30(A)); challenges for cause must likewise be made on the record (Rule 18.5(h)). What Arizona leaves to party request or judicial discretion is the MEDIUM of the record, not its scope: a court may use electronic recording devices in lieu of a court reporter (A.R.S. § 38-424(A)), and in a case arising out of an indictment or information a certified reporter must be supplied only if a party requests one in writing at least five court days before trial and a reporter is available (§ 38-424(B); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 30(b)(2)(c)); absent such a request "the record will be made in a manner within the court's sound discretion" (Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 30(b)(1)). When a stenographic reporter does take the record, A.R.S. § 12-223(A) requires notes of "all oral proceedings before the court" but excuses notes of arguments of counsel to a jury, and of argument of counsel to the court outside the jury's presence, unless the court or counsel requests them.	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(f), (h); see also Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 30(A); A.R.S. § 38-424(A)-(B), (E); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 30(b); A.R.S. § 12-223(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.8(b) In courts of record, voir dire examination must be conducted on the record. View the source document
Arkansas Mandatory record verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the circuit court must have the official court reporter make a verbatim record of ALL proceedings pertaining to any matter before the court or the jury — the rule enumerates colloquies with counsel and self-represented litigants, arguments, objections, testimony, jury instructions, court-jury communications, and audio in recordings — and Administrative Order No. 4(a) adds that this "may be waived by the parties in all matters except criminal cases," so takedown is mandatory and non-waivable in criminal cases; there is no request-only tier. Voir dire is within the mandate: in Mouse v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 12, the Court of Appeals remanded to supplement because "the transcript of the voir dire of the prospective jurors in this case is not included in the record," quoting Administrative Order No. 4, and Wilder v. State, 2023 Ark. 60, holds that "Administrative Order No. 4(a) requires a complete record of all proceedings." What is TRANSCRIBED for appeal is a separate question — Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 4(a) routes record designation to Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 6(b), under which the appellant "shall order from the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings as he has designated," and partial transcripts still occur (in Ellis v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 90, page 1 of the transcript read "JURY TRIAL – TESTIMONY ONLY (PER DEF ATTY REQUEST)," omitting jury selection, openings and closings, which forced a remand).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 4(a) (amended and effective Dec. 3, 2020); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-510(a); Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 4(a) (record designation governed by Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 6(b)) Case: Mouse v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 12; Wilder v. State, 2023 Ark. 60; Ellis v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 90 The circuit court shall require the official court reporter to make a verbatim record of all proceedings pertaining to any matter before the court or the jury View the source document
California Request only verified	In a non-capital felony, nothing is automatically taken down: Code of Civil Procedure § 269(a) requires the official reporter to report all testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas, sentences, arguments of the attorneys to the jury, and the judge's statements, remarks and oral instructions — but in a felony case only "on the order of the court or at the request of the prosecution, the defendant, or the attorney for the defendant" (Gov. Code § 69952(a)(1) separately lets the court "specifically direct the making of a verbatim record" in criminal matters at county expense). Voir dire appears nowhere in § 269's enumerated list, and California Rules of Court, rule 8.320(c)(3) defines the reporter's transcript on appeal as "[t]he oral proceedings at trial, but excluding the voir dire examination of jurors and any opening statement"; voir dire and opening statements reach the record only if a party applies under rule 8.324(b)(2)(A) and the judge orders as much as "the judge finds proper" — so voir dire is request-only, not mandatory. Capital cases are different: Penal Code § 190.9(a)(1) requires that "all proceedings conducted in the superior court, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present," and Gov. Code § 69957(a) forbids electronic recording as the official record in any felony case, so an unreported felony proceeding leaves no record at all.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 269(a)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.320(c)(3), 8.324(b)(2)(A); Cal. Gov. Code §§ 69952(a)(1), 69957(a); Cal. Penal Code § 190.9(a)(1) (capital) In a felony case, on the order of the court or at the request of the prosecution, the defendant, or the attorney for the defendant. View the source document
Colorado Judge directed verified	A verbatim record of Colorado district-court felony proceedings must be made either by an official court reporter or by digital (FTR) electronic recording, but no statute, rule, or directive names voir dire, opening statements, or closings as separately mandatory. C.R.S. § 13-5-127 requires the reporter, "on the direction of the court," to take down testimony, rulings, exceptions, oral instructions, and "other proceedings had during the trial"; Crim. P. 55(e) routes district-court practice to Chief Justice Directive 05-03, which requires the reporter or FTR operator to record "all of the proceedings that (s)he attends" (§§ II.D.3, III.A.3) while defining the content taken down as what "the assigned judge may designate" (§§ II.D.4, III.A.4). Voir dire is therefore recorded as part of the proceedings the reporter attends and is routinely transcribed in practice (see People v. Carmichael, 179 P.3d 47, 53-54 (Colo. App. 2007)), but the governing texts make the scope judge-designated rather than independently mandatory by subject matter.	Source Statute / rule: C.R.S. § 13-5-127; Colo. Crim. P. 55(e); Colo. Chief Justice Directive 05-03 §§ I.B–C, II.D.3–.4, III.A.3–.4 (amended eff. July 1, 2023) The court reporter shall take all the testimony, rulings, exceptions, oral instructions, and other proceedings during any case, as the assigned judge may designate. View the source document
Connecticut Judge directed verified	Connecticut's mandatory trial record is statutory, not rule-based: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-61 (a) directs the official court reporter (or court recording monitor) to make accurate records of all proceedings in court, and the Appellate Court holds that a defendant accordingly 'has a statutory right to have voir dire proceedings transcribed' — so voir dire is within the mandatory record rather than request-only — but that right is waivable and is waived where trial counsel moves to excuse the reporter during individual voir dire (State v. Sharp; Giannotti v. Warden). Arguments of counsel were the single carve-out in the text quoted in Giannotti: the reporter recorded them only 'on the request of any party,' and State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219 (1983), describes the accompanying practice that the reporter 'does not record the remarks of counsel unless so directed by the court.' The Practice Book itself prescribes a verbatim record only for enumerated proceedings — plea canvasses (§ 39-24) and pretrial-motion hearings (§ 41-7, 'A verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at a hearing on a pretrial motion') — and contains no rule defining the record of the trial itself.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-61(a) Case: State v. Sharp, 46 Conn. App. 269 (1997); Giannotti v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 125, 128 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 905 (1992); State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219 (1983) A defendant has a statutory right to have voir dire proceedings transcribed. General Statutes § 51-61 (a) . . . This statutory right, however, may be waived. View the source document
Delaware Request only verified	No Delaware statute or court rule enumerates a mandatory takedown list for a non-capital felony jury trial: 10 Del. C. § 525 charges Superior Court reporters with creating "a verbatim record of all evidence, opinions and other matters as the Superior Court may require," and Super. Ct. Crim. R. 56(b) requires that the court reporter "attend all proceedings of the court unless excused by the presiding judge." The only trial phase any rule expressly commands be recorded is sidebar and chambers conferences under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 26.1, and even that mandate yields when the trial judge determines in advance that no evidentiary or substantive issue is involved; voir dire is nowhere expressly required by statute or rule to be recorded. Consistent with that, Del. Supr. Ct. R. 9(e)(i) orders automatic transcription of a class A felony trial "excluding opening and closing arguments of counsel and jury selection" — voir dire and argument reach an appellate court only if a party designates them under Rule 9(e)(ii)–(iii) — while "in cases in which the death penalty is imposed the entire record shall be transcribed."	Source Statute / rule: 10 Del. C. § 525; Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 26.1; Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 56(b); Del. Supr. Ct. R. 9(e)(i) All sidebar conferences and chambers conferences during trial shall be recorded unless the trial judge determines, in advance, that neither evidentiary nor substantive issues are involved. View the source document
Florida Request only verified	No Florida statute or statewide court rule defines a mandatory verbatim record for a non-capital felony jury trial, and nothing statewide makes voir dire, opening statements, or closing arguments part of a required record — the only statewide takedown mandates touching the trial itself are the jury charge (Fla. Stat. § 918.10(2): charges 'shall be taken by the court reporter, transcribed, and filed') and the grounds/rulings on instruction objections (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(e)); separate rules mandate a record of plea colloquies (3.172(k)) and of 'the entire sentencing proceeding' (3.721), while an adversary preliminary hearing is recorded only 'at the request of either party' (3.133(b)(4)). What else gets reported is defined not by rule but by delegation: Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.535(h)(1) makes public-expense reporting turn on what is 'required to be reported by law, court rule, or administrative order,' and 2.535(h)(3) requires each circuit's chief judge to enter an administrative order adopting a circuit-wide court-reporting plan — so the operative scope of a felony trial record in Florida is circuit-by-circuit, not statewide. Capital cases differ sharply: Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(1)(A) requires that 'Transcripts of all proceedings conducted in the lower tribunal must be included in the record,' and Rule 2.535(i) forbids digital court reporting in death-penalty trials and capital postconviction proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. Stat. § 918.10(2); Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.535(h)(1), (h)(3); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.721, 3.172(k), 3.390(e), 3.133(b)(4); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(1)(A) All charges to the jury shall be delivered orally and shall be taken by the court reporter, transcribed, and filed. View the source document
Georgia Request only verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the only affirmative statutory mandate is testimony: O.C.G.A. § 17-8-5(a) directs that 'the presiding judge shall have the testimony taken down and, when directed by the judge, the court reporter shall exactly and truly record or take stenographic notes of the testimony and proceedings in the case, except the argument of counsel,' and O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41(d) adds that where a trial 'is reported by a court reporter, all motions, colloquies, objections, rulings, evidence… the charge of the court, and all other proceedings which may be called in question on appeal… shall be reported.' VOIR DIRE IS NOT MANDATORY: State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341 (1980), reaffirmed in Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 420 (2020) and Harper v. State, 312 Ga. 684 (2021), construes 'proceedings' in § 17-8-5(a) to mean 'objections, rulings and other matters which occur during the course of the evidence as well as any post-trial procedures,' so the questioning of jurors is transcribed only if a party specifically requests it (objections and rulings made during jury selection must still be reported), and argument of counsel is excepted from the statute outright. Capital cases differ: Graham and Allen note that voir dire must be made part of the record in death-penalty cases (Owens v. State, 233 Ga. 869 (1975)), and § 17-8-5(a) separately requires the transcript within 90 days where a death sentence is imposed.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 17-8-5(a); O.C.G.A. § 5-6-41(d) Case: Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 420 (2020) (reaffirming State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341 (1980)); accord Harper v. State, 312 Ga. 684 (2021) We also stated that if a defendant wants a more complete record of voir dire, he must make a specific request to that effect. View the source document
Hawaii Mandatory record verified	Hawai'i's mandatory record is defined by statute and is comprehensive rather than request-triggered: HRS § 606-12(a) requires the official court reporter to take verbatim notes of ALL oral proceedings before the court, with an inclusive (non-exhaustive) list expressly covering testimony, objections of counsel, offers of proof, arguments of counsel, rulings, the charge to the jury, and the verdict — the only discretionary category is "any other matter which the court may require." There is no request trigger and no at-the-judge's-direction trigger for any enumerated item, so opening and closing arguments are recorded automatically, and voir dire, being an oral proceeding before the court, falls inside the mandate even though it is not separately named. Where no reporter is in attendance, Rules of the Circuit Courts (RCCH) Rule 25.1(a) requires the court to order that "the testimony and other matters required to be preserved by a reporter" be preserved on tape or other device, so the same scope applies to Hawai'i's FTR digital-recording courtrooms.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 606-12(a) (Duties of official court reporters); Rules of the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawai'i Rule 25.1(a) take verbatim notes of all oral proceedings before the court, including the testimony of witnesses, objections of counsel, offers of proof, arguments of counsel, rulings of the court, charge to the jury, verdict of the jury View the source document
Idaho Mandatory record verified	Idaho mandates a far broader record than Georgia: voir dire is recorded by default, not on request. Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b) requires that the entire voir dire examination of all prospective jurors and the court's rulings on all challenges be reported verbatim unless all parties stipulate otherwise on the record; we.C.A.R. 27(a) separately requires a court reporter to attend all criminal trials in district court and to make a verbatim record of all oral communications by parties, counsel, witnesses, jurors and the judge (sidebars excepted when not feasible), waivable only in open court or by written stipulation approved by the judge, and we.C.A.R. 27(c) requires an electronic recording of all courtroom proceedings on top of any stenographic record.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b); Idaho Court Administrative Rule 27(a), (c); Idaho Code § 1-1103 Unless otherwise stipulated in the record by all parties to the action, the entire voir dire examination of all prospective jurors and the court's rulings on all challenges must be reported verbatim. View the source document
Illinois Mandatory record verified	In every Illinois criminal case, including non-capital felony jury trials, the mandatory report of proceedings must include opening statements by counsel, testimony and objections, offers of proof, arguments and rulings, the instructions offered and given, closing argument of counsel, and jury communications and supplemental instructions (Ill. S. Ct. R. 608(a)(7)); the court reporter's underlying statutory duty is to make "a full reporting by means of stenographic notes of the evidence and such other proceedings in trials" to which assigned (705 ILCS 70/5). VOIR DIRE IS MANDATORY TAKEDOWN BUT REQUEST-ONLY TRANSCRIPTION: Rule 608(a)(7) requires court reporting personnel to take the record of jury-selection proceedings, but that record "need not be transcribed unless a party designates that such proceedings be included in the record on appeal." Under Rule 608(b) the parties may also "designate or stipulate for less" than the full report of proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: Ill. S. Ct. R. 608(a)(7), (b) (amended June 22, 2017, eff. July 1, 2017); 705 ILCS 70/5; Ill. S. Ct. R. 46 the court reporting personnel as defined in Rule 46 shall take the record of the proceedings regarding the selection of the jury, but the record need not be transcribed unless a party designates that such proceedings be included in the record on appeal View the source document
Indiana Mandatory record verified	Mandatory and comprehensive, not request-only. Ind. Trial Rule 74(A), as amended effective January 1, 2024, requires the judge of each circuit, superior, probate, city and town court to arrange for audio recording of all hearings and trials in all case types, and the recording must include all oral evidence and testimony, all rulings on admission and rejection of evidence and objections thereto, and any other oral matters occurring during the hearing — which reaches openings, colloquies and closings; VOIR DIRE is separately and expressly mandatory under Jury Rule 12, which requires that jury selection, including all sidebar conferences, be recorded unless the parties agree otherwise (agreement of the parties is the only escape — a party's failure to request nothing). Both rules reach non-capital felony jury trials: Crim. R. 1.1 makes the Indiana Rules of Court applicable to all criminal proceedings unless they conflict with the Criminal Rules, and Jury Rule 1 governs petit jury selection in all Indiana courts.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Jury Rule 12; Ind. Trial Rule 74(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2024); Ind. Crim. Rule 1.1; Ind. Crim. Rule 6.1(D) (capital cases) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, jury selection shall be recorded including all sidebar conferences. View the source document
Iowa Mandatory record verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the record is mandatory and non-waivable: Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(3) makes trial reporting governed by Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.903(2) — which requires that 'all trial proceedings' be reported, expressly including 'the proceedings impaneling the jury,' opening statements, oral testimony and offers of proof, all objections and rulings, all oral comments or statements of the court, all motions made during trial, closing arguments, and the return of the verdict — and then forbids waiver: 'reporting may not be waived except for voir dire in misdemeanor cases.' Voir dire is therefore mandatory takedown in a felony, not takedown-on-request and not at the judge's discretion; the only carve-out in the criminal rules is misdemeanor voir dire. Openings, closings and the court's colloquies are likewise mandatory, and there is no capital-case variant because Iowa has no death penalty.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(3), incorporating Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.903(2) Reporting of the trial shall be governed by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903. However, reporting may not be waived except for voir dire in misdemeanor cases. View the source document
Kansas Judge directed verified	No Kansas statute or court rule defines a mandatory verbatim record for a non-capital felony jury trial: K.S.A. 20-917(b) merely delegates regulation of "the making of the records of all court proceedings" to the Supreme Court, and Supreme Court Rule 354 provides only that the official court reporter "will take verbatim notes of the proceedings tried before the court as the judge directs" — i.e., scope is at the judge's direction, not mandatory takedown. Voir dire is accordingly not mandated; for appeal, Rule 3.03(a) makes jury voir dire, opening statements and closing arguments transcript-on-request only (and under Rule 3.03(c) the appellee must pay if it wants them). The Kansas Supreme Court confirmed in State v. Lumbrera that "there is apparently no rule specifically requiring closing statements to be on the record," while nonetheless holding that closing arguments "should be of record" and that it was error not to have them recorded.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 20-917(b); Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 354; Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 3.03(a) Case: State v. Lumbrera, 252 Kan. 54, 73, 845 P.2d 609 (1992) Jury voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments of counsel will not be transcribed unless specifically requested. View the source document
Kentucky Mandatory record verified	Kentucky enumerates no phases that must be taken down; the courtroom video/audio system records the whole proceeding, and that electronic recording — not a transcript — is the official record on appeal (RAP 24(A)(3)-(4); CR 98(2)), so in a non-capital felony jury trial voir dire, opening statements and closing arguments are recorded by default rather than on request. The Administrative Office of the Courts' Circuit Court Clerks' Manual, which RCr 1.02(2) gives the same effect as if incorporated in the rules, directs that all proceedings be recorded unless the parties and counsel sign a waiver. Where no official recording was made, or the recording is not clearly understandable, the remedy is a trial-court-settled narrative statement under RAP 25(A).	Source Statute / rule: Ky. RAP 24(A)(3)-(4); Ky. CR 98(2); Ky. RCr 1.02(2); AOC Kentucky Circuit Court Clerks' Manual § 81 (July 2026) All proceedings are recorded unless a waiver is signed by the parties and counsel. View the source document
Louisiana Mandatory record verified	In every felony case Louisiana mandates verbatim recording of the entire trial with no request required, and voir dire is expressly named: La. C.Cr.P. art. 843 directs that the clerk or court stenographer 'shall record all of the proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors,' plus testimony, statements, rulings, orders, the court's charges, and counsel's objections, questions, statements and arguments. Request-only (or court-ordered) recording applies solely to ordinary misdemeanor cases, not to felonies, and art. 843 draws no capital/non-capital distinction — what differs on appeal is transcription, not takedown, because La. C.Cr.P. art. 914.1 furnishes only the portions designated in light of the assignments of error. Louisiana glosses the statute at the margins: State v. Hoffman holds that art. 843's 'objections' and 'arguments' normally reach only open-court objections and closing arguments, so unrecorded bench conferences are generally not an art. 843 violation.	Source Statute / rule: La. C.Cr.P. art. 843 (see also La. Const. art. I, § 19; La. C.Cr.P. art. 914.1) Case: State v. Hoffman, 98-KA-3118 (La. 4/11/00) the clerk or court stenographer shall record all of the proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors, the testimony of witnesses, statements, rulings, orders, and charges by the court, and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel. View the source document
Maine Mandatory record verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial every courtroom proceeding — including voir dire, opening statements, colloquies and closing arguments — must be electronically recorded and monitored; recording is mandatory, not takedown-on-request. 4 M.R.S. § 651-A directs the Supreme Judicial Court to prescribe rules ensuring a reviewable record; M.R.U. Crim. P. 27(a) routes to M.R. Civ. P. 76H(b)(2)(A) and Administrative Order JB-12-1, whose Section II(B) makes "Jury Trials" and "Criminal Matters" mandatory-record case types, while Section IV leaves to judicial discretion or party request only proceedings outside those categories (e.g., telephonic or chambers conferences). The request-only filter in Maine sits at transcription, not takedown: under M.R. App. P. 5(b)(1)(A) the standard criminal-appeal transcript covers testimony, bench conferences, closing arguments and the jury charge, so voir dire and openings are transcribed only if counsel adds them.	Source Statute / rule: 4 M.R.S. § 651-A; M.R.U. Crim. P. 27(a); M.R. Civ. P. 76H(b)(2)(A); Me. Admin. Order JB-12-1 (A. 9-17) §§ II(B), IV Unless testimony is being taken down by an official court reporter, all proceedings in the following case types that are being heard in a courtroom shall be recorded and monitored by a court clerk or other court personnel View the source document
Maryland Mandatory record verified	Maryland requires verbatim takedown of the entire proceeding in circuit court (the felony trial court), with no request-based or discretionary category: Rule 16-503(a)(1) commands that all trials, hearings, testimony and other judicial proceedings before a circuit court judge be recorded verbatim in their entirety, so voir dire, opening statements, bench conferences and closing arguments are mandatorily recorded, not recorded on request. The only carve-outs are an audio/audio-video recording offered as evidence (unless the court orders otherwise), simultaneous rather than consecutive interpretation, and waiver of recording before a magistrate, examiner or auditor — none of which applies to a felony jury trial. Method is flexible: any reliable method approved by the County Administrative Judge (Rule 16-503(b)), and under Rule 16-504(d) a court reporter need not be present if effectively monitored electronic recording is used.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Rule 16-503(a)(1) (Recording of Proceedings — In Circuit Court); see also Md. Rules 16-501, 16-503(b), 16-504(d) Case: Smith v. State, No. 1736, Sept. Term 2024 (Md. App. Ct. Apr. 6, 2026), slip op. at 13 n.9 (quoting Rule 16-503's mandatory verbatim-recording command) All trials, hearings, testimony, and other judicial proceedings before a circuit court judge held either in a courtroom or by remote electronic means shall be recorded verbatim in their entirety by a person authorized by the court to do so View the source document
Massachusetts Mandatory record verified	Mandatory and complete, with nothing left to request: Superior Court Administrative Directive No. 18-1 provides that all proceedings in criminal cases in the Superior Court — the court that tries every felony carrying more than five years — shall be recorded, either by an electronic recording system operated by an authorized court monitor (or, if no monitor is available, by the clerk) or by a per diem court reporter. Voir dire and empanelment, opening statements, colloquies and closing arguments are therefore on the record by default in a non-capital felony jury trial; no party motion or request is required, and the directive draws no capital/non-capital distinction. The only offense-based distinction is which method is used: whenever feasible the Administrative Office of the Superior Court assigns a live per diem reporter for jury trials of homicide, rape, or sexual offenses against minors, for trials raising a lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense, and for joined multi-defendant trials with separate counsel; all other criminal trials are electronically recorded, and that electronic record is the official one.	Source Statute / rule: Superior Court Administrative Directive No. 18-1 (adopted May 3, 2018, eff. July 1, 2018; amended Jan. 22, 2019, eff. Feb. 1, 2019); G.L. c. 221, §§ 82, 91B All proceedings in criminal cases in the Superior Court shall be recorded by either an electronic recording system or a per diem court reporter. View the source document
Michigan Mandatory record verified	In a Michigan felony jury trial the court reporter or recorder must take a verbatim record of voir dire, the testimony, the charge to the jury, the opening statements and final arguments, and the court's reasons for granting or refusing motions made during trial — MCR 8.108(B)(1)(a)-(e). Voir dire is mandatory takedown, not takedown-on-request and not left to the judge's direction; only matters beyond that enumerated list (e.g. bench/sidebar conferences) are recorded as 'other matters as may be prescribed by the court' under MCR 8.108(B)(1)(f). The rule excludes only small claims and municipal court actions, so it governs every circuit court felony trial.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 8.108(B)(1) (Michigan Court Rules, Chapter 8) take a verbatim record of the following: (a) the voir dire of prospective jurors; (b) the testimony; (c) the charge to the jury; (d) in a jury trial, the opening statements and final arguments View the source document
Minnesota Mandatory record verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the mandatory record is comprehensive, not request-only: Minn. Stat. § 486.02 requires a court reporter to make "a complete stenographic record of all testimony given and all proceedings had before the judge upon the trial of issues of fact, with or without a jury," plus verbatim takedown of all objections and their stated grounds, all rulings, exceptions, motions, orders, admissions, and the charge to the jury — with other matters recorded only "[w]hen directed so to do by the judge." Voir dire is separately and expressly mandatory by court rule: Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 4(1) provides that a verbatim record of the voir dire examination must be made. Minn. Stat. § 484.72, subd. 4 additionally forbids substituting electronic recording for a live stenographer in felony proceedings and in district court jury trials.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 486.02; Minn. Stat. § 484.72, subd. 4; Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 4(1) A verbatim record of the voir dire examination must be made. View the source document
Mississippi Mandatory record verified	In every felony jury trial the court reporter must record voir dire and jury selection, opening statements, bench and in-chambers conferences, and closing arguments — affirmatively, without any request by a party or direction from the judge (Miss. R. Crim. P. 20(a)); oral jury instructions must likewise be recorded (Rule 22(a)), and Miss. Code Ann. § 9-13-31 separately obliges the reporter to take full stenographic notes of all oral evidence. Voir dire is therefore mandatory in non-capital felonies, not request-only. The rule's only stated capital/non-capital difference is waivability: in death-penalty cases the Rule 20(a) duty "may not be abrogated by the judge or waived by the defendant," language whose negative implication is that in a non-capital felony it can be; in all non-felony circuit and county court cases the same items are recorded only "if directed to do so by the judge" (Rule 20(b)(1)).	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. Crim. P. 20(a) (eff. July 1, 2023); see also Miss. R. Crim. P. 20(b)(1), 22(a); Miss. Code Ann. § 9-13-31 In all felony cases, the court reporter shall make a record of the voir dire and selection of the jury, opening statements, bench and in-chambers conferences, and closing arguments, whether or not such is ordered by the judge or requested by either party. View the source document
Missouri Request only verified	Missouri's mandatory takedown in a non-capital felony jury trial is limited to the oral evidence, objections to the admissibility of testimony, the court's rulings on them, and exceptions: § 485.050 RSMo defines the official court reporter's duty in exactly those terms, and the parallel binding administrative rule, Court Operating Rule 19.03(b), repeats it verbatim ('shall make a verbatim record of the oral evidence offered in causes tried… together with all objections to the admissibility of testimony, the rulings of the court thereon, and all exceptions taken to such rulings'). VOIR DIRE IS THEREFORE NOT MANDATORY, and neither are opening statements, closing arguments, or bench/chambers colloquies — no Missouri statute or Supreme Court rule extends the reporter's duty to them (a full-text search of the Supreme Court Rules database returns only Rules 27.02, 67.02 and 69.025 for 'voir dire,' none of which concerns recording); a party who wants such a proceeding on the record must ask for it at the time (State v. Brown, 744 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Mo. banc 1988): 'it is the obligation of the party desiring to create a record to do so at the time the statement or event occurred'), and under Rule 30.04(c)(1) the appellant separately designates which portions are transcribed. The contrast is deliberate: Rule 24.03(a) does require the reporter to 'Record accurately all courts proceedings in connection with' a felony guilty plea, so where the Supreme Court wanted an all-proceedings record it said so.	Source Statute / rule: § 485.050 RSMo (Duties of official court reporters); Mo. Court Operating Rule 19.03(b); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 30.04(c)(1); cf. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.03(a) Case: State v. Brown, 744 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Mo. banc 1988) to take full stenographic notes of the oral evidence offered in every cause tried in said court, together with all objections to the admissibility of testimony, the rulings of the court thereon, and all exceptions taken to such rulings View the source document
Montana Judge directed verified	Montana defines the mandatory record by a single statute governing court reporters, not by a list of trial phases: the reporter must attend all sittings of the district court and take full stenographic notes of the testimony AND of all proceedings had there. Voir dire, opening statements, colloquies and closing arguments are therefore recorded by default, not on request — but the duty is expressly subject to the judge's power to dispense with the reporter's services 'in a particular cause or with respect to a portion of the proceedings,' so a Montana judge may unilaterally take a phase off the record. Montana draws no capital/non-capital distinction in the takedown rule; § 3-5-603, MCA applies to all district court sittings.	Source Statute / rule: § 3-5-603, MCA (Court Reporters — Duties); see also § 3-5-601(1), MCA Each reporter must, under the direction of the judge, attend all sittings of the court and take full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all proceedings given or had thereat except when the judge dispenses with the reporter's services View the source document
Nebraska Request only verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial in district court, the only proceedings that MUST be taken down are evidentiary ones: Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-105(A)(1) requires court reporting personnel to make an unwaivable verbatim record of 'the evidence offered at trial or other evidentiary proceeding,' including evidentiary objections and rulings, oral motions, and stipulations. Voir dire is NOT mandatory — under § 2-105(A)(2) voir dire examination, opening statements, arguments, pretrial matters, the court's remarks before the jury, objections to instructions, and posttrial proceedings are recorded only 'Upon the request of the court or of any party,' and § 2-105(A)(4) conclusively presumes no request was made unless it was filed with the clerk or made on the record. State v. Sierra confirms the trial court's record-making burden 'only extends to the evidence offered at trial and other evidentiary proceedings, and it may be waived for nonevidentiary proceedings.'	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-105(A)(1), (2), (4) (adopted under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1003; duty imposed on reporters by Neb. Ct. R. § 1-203) Case: State v. Sierra, 305 Neb. 249, 276-77 (2020) shall in all instances make a verbatim record of the evidence offered at trial or other evidentiary proceeding, including but not limited to objections to any evidence and rulings thereon, oral motions, and stipulations by the parties. This record may not be waived. View the source document
Nevada Mandatory record verified	Recording is now mandatory and categorical: N.R.Cr.P. 21 — part of the statewide Nevada Rules of Criminal Practice adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court under ADKT 491 and effective April 25, 2025 — directs that ALL criminal trial proceedings in the district courts be recorded by a court reporter or by electronic means, with no request trigger and no exception, so voir dire in a non-capital felony jury trial must be taken down (the rule's illustrative list names bench conferences and the settling of jury instructions, not voir dire by name, and no published decision construing Rule 21 was found). The older and still-unrepealed statutory duty is narrower and request-driven: under NRS 3.320(2)(a) the official reporter makes the record in a criminal action only 'on the order of the court, the district attorney or the attorney for the defendant,' and its enumerated categories (testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas, sentences, statements and remarks of the district attorney or judge, oral instructions) never mentioned voir dire. Capital cases are governed separately and more broadly by SCR 250(5)(a), which requires that all proceedings be reported AND transcribed, with daily transcripts.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. R. Crim. Prac. (N.R.Cr.P.) 21 (adopted ADKT 491, eff. Apr. 25, 2025); NRS 3.320(2)(a); NRS 3.380; SCR 250(5)(a) (capital) Case: Preciado v. State, 130 Nev. 40, 44-45, 318 P.3d 176, 180 (2014) All criminal trial proceedings shall be recorded by a court reporter or by electronic means, including but not limited to, bench conferences and settling of jury instructions. View the source document
New Hampshire Mandatory record verified	Voir dire recording is mandatory and categorical, not request-driven and not at the judge's direction: N.H. R. Crim. P. 22(c)(2) provides that in all cases all proceedings relating to the examination of prospective jurors shall be recorded, and the Rule 22 Comment adds that even a judge's private inquiry of an individual juror "must be recorded." The same rule set independently requires that juror orientation (Rule 22(a)), judge-juror communications during trial (Rule 28(a)), a defendant's jury-trial waiver (Rule 21), and motions to dismiss, mistrial motions and objections to the jury charge (Rule 24) be on the record. No New Hampshire statute prescribes the felony trial record — RSA Title LI (Courts) contains no court-reporter chapter and RSA 491:10-a merely lets a party record proceedings at its own expense by leave of court — and no rule separately commanding takedown of testimony, opening statements or closing arguments was located; those are captured by the superior court's audio recording that the Supreme Court's designated transcriber transcribes (N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 59), and the capital/first-degree-murder distinction in Rule 22(c)(3) governs who conducts voir dire, not whether it is recorded.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. R. Crim. P. 22(c)(2) (voir dire); N.H. R. Crim. P. 21, 22(a), 24, 28(a); N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 59; RSA 491:10-a (party self-recording, by leave, at own expense) All proceedings relating to the examination of prospective jurors shall be recorded and should be conducted in the presence of counsel, or the defendant, if self-represented. View the source document
New Jersey Mandatory record verified	New Jersey tries all felony (indictable) cases in the trial divisions of the Superior Court, where R. 1:2-2 requires that ALL proceedings in court be recorded verbatim, subject only to four exceptions — settlement conferences, case management conferences, calendar calls, and ex parte motions — none of which occurs during a jury trial; voir dire, opening statements, summations, sidebars, and colloquy are therefore recorded as of right, with no request required and no judicial discretion to omit them, and charge conferences (even in chambers or at sidebar) must be recorded verbatim under R. 1:8-7(a). The mandate is to RECORD, not to transcribe: R. 2:5-3(b) directs that the appellate transcript 'shall not, however, include opening and closing statements to the jury or voir dire examinations or legal arguments by counsel unless a question with respect thereto is raised on appeal, in which case the appellant shall specifically order the same in the request for transcript,' and the AOC's Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings repeats that instruction to reporters. There is no capital/non-capital distinction, because New Jersey eliminated the death penalty in 2007 (L. 2007, c. 204).	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 1:2-2 (Trial Courts; Verbatim Record of Proceedings); see also N.J. Ct. R. 1:8-7(a); N.J. Ct. R. 2:5-3(b) In the trial divisions of the Superior Court and in the Tax Court, all proceedings in court shall be recorded verbatim except, unless the court otherwise orders, settlement conferences, case management conferences, calendar calls, and ex parte motions. View the source document
New Mexico Mandatory record verified	New Mexico does not enumerate the phases of a felony trial that must be taken down; instead Rule 22-301(B) NMRA requires that the record of all judicial proceedings before a district judge be made — stenographically by a certified court reporter, or, where the judge has appointed a court monitor, by the court's audio-recording system. Because that mandate runs to 'all judicial proceedings' and is not conditioned on any party's request, voir dire — like opening statements and closing arguments — is recorded as a matter of course in a non-capital felony jury trial; New Mexico has no request-only carve-out of the Georgia type. The 'at the request of counsel' language in Rule 22-301(B) governs only whether a stenographer rather than the audio system reports the proceeding, not whether a record is made at all.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 22-301(B) NMRA (Rules Governing the Recording of Judicial Proceedings); definitions at Rule 22-101(B)(10), (13) NMRA If the district judge has appointed a court monitor, the record of all judicial proceedings before that judge shall be recorded by a recording device used by the courts. View the source document
New York Mandatory record verified	Judiciary Law § 295 makes takedown mandatory, not request-driven: the stenographer "must take full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all other proceedings in each cause tried or heard," and the Court of Appeals in People v. Harrison held that § 295 applies to criminal proceedings and that voir dire of prospective jurors is part of the trial within the statute, so a trial court may not refuse a defendant a stenographic record of jury selection. The single express request-conditioned category is narrower: in a jury trial, the judge's "each and every remark or comment" and the exceptions taken to rulings are recorded "when requested so to do by either party"; openings, summations and colloquies fall inside the general "all other proceedings" mandate. The duty is not self-enforcing, however — Harrison holds that verbatim recordation, "unless waived," is the better practice, that absence of a stenographic record is not per se reversible, and that reversal follows only where the missing portion cannot be accurately reconstructed.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Judiciary Law § 295 Case: People v. Harrison, 85 N.Y.2d 794 (1995) It is obvious from these facts that the trial court erred by foreclosing defendant from exercising his right to obtain a stenographic record of voir dire as Judiciary Law § 295 requires. View the source document
North Carolina Request only verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the reporter must make a true, complete and accurate record of all statements from the bench and all other proceedings EXCEPT three categories — (1) selection of the jury in non-capital cases, (2) opening statements and final arguments of counsel to the jury, and (3) arguments of counsel on questions of law — and those three are recorded only on motion of a party or on the judge's own motion. Voir dire is therefore NOT part of the mandatory record in a non-capital felony; it is request-only, as are openings and closings. In a capital case jury selection is mandatory, because exception (1) is written for non-capital cases only; separately, reporting of any trial may be waived by consent of the parties (§ 7A-95(d)), and private bench conferences are outside the statute entirely.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1241(a), (b) (as rewritten by S.L. 2025-70, s. 11(a)); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-95 Case: State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 497-98, 422 S.E.2d 692 (1992) (private bench conferences are not "statements from the bench"); State v. Price, 170 N.C. App. 57, 67, 611 S.E.2d 891 (2005) Upon motion of any party or on the judge's own motion, proceedings excepted under subsection (a) of this section must be recorded. View the source document
North Dakota Request only verified	Voir dire is NOT mandatorily recorded in a non-capital felony jury trial — a party must ask for it. The mandatory-record authority is a Supreme Court administrative rule, not a statute: N.D.Sup.Ct.Admin.R. 39, § 2 provides that, except in small claims and traffic cases, "the record of testimony and proceedings of the district court must be preserved using audio-recording software, video-recording software, or stenographic shorthand notes." Despite that categorical text, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that for nonevidentiary proceedings — jury voir dire and opening and closing arguments — the party who wants them recorded must request recording, and a district court's failure to conduct voir dire on the record does not by itself entitle a defendant to a new trial (State v. Entzi, 2000 ND 148, ¶¶ 6, 8, decided five years after Rule 39 took effect; following State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D. 1983), and Fenske v. Fenske, 542 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1996)). Evidentiary portions are treated differently — the absence of any trial transcript has produced reversal (State v. Hapip, 174 N.W.2d 717 (N.D. 1969), discussed in Rougemont). Transcription is a separate, weaker layer still: N.D.R.App.P. 10(b)(1)(D) provides that "a transcript of any record of jury voir dire is not required, unless specifically requested by a party."	Source Statute / rule: N.D.Sup.Ct.Admin.R. 39, § 2; N.D.R.App.P. 10(b)(1)(D) Case: State v. Entzi, 2000 ND 148, ¶¶ 6, 8, 615 N.W.2d 145 We have specifically addressed nonevidentiary proceedings, and have held one must request recording. View the source document
Ohio Mandatory record verified	In a non-capital felony jury trial the ENTIRE proceeding must be recorded automatically, with no request required — voir dire, opening statements, colloquies and closing arguments included — because Crim.R. 22 provides that in 'serious offense' cases all proceedings shall be recorded, and Crim.R. 2(C) defines 'serious offense' as 'any felony, and any misdemeanor for which the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement for more than six months.' The request-only regime is confined to petty offenses, where Crim.R. 22 records all proceedings only 'if requested by any party.' The recording method is the trial court's choice under App.R. 9(A)(2) (stenographic, audio and/or video), 'except that in all capital cases the proceedings shall be recorded by a stenographic/shorthand reporter'; R.C. 2301.20 separately commands that 'All civil and criminal actions in the court of common pleas shall be recorded.'	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Crim.R. 22; Ohio Crim.R. 2(C); Ohio App.R. 9(A)(2); R.C. 2301.20 In serious offense cases all proceedings shall be recorded. View the source document
Oklahoma Request only verified	Voir dire is within the mandatory record, not request-only: 20 O.S. § 106.4(A)(1) requires the assigned court reporter to make a full reporting of all proceedings, including the statements of counsel and the court and the evidence, so jury selection, openings and closings are taken down as a matter of course. The judge may excuse that reporting only with the consent of the parties, and under the amendment effective July 1, 2026 a trial may proceed without a reporter only where none is available remotely or in person, in which case the judge may order the proceedings electronically recorded. Transcription for appeal is a separate step: a complete stenographic record must be taken in all capital proceedings, while in non-capital cases the appellant bears the burden of ensuring a complete record on appeal.	Source Statute / rule: 20 O.S. § 106.4(A)(1) Case: Van White v. State, 1988 OK CR 47, 752 P.2d 814 The court reporter shall make a full reporting by means of stenographic hand, steno-mask or machine notes, or a combination thereof, of all proceedings, including the statements of counsel and the court and the evidence, in trials and other judicial proceedings View the source document Verified against a retained copy of the source; the cited site refuses automated retrieval.
Oregon Request only verified	Oregon has no mandatory-takedown rule for non-capital felony jury trials: ORS 8.340(4) makes a verbatim report discretionary with the judge on the judge's own motion and mandatory only on a party's request, and then only "to the extent required by the court or by the requesting party." Voir dire is therefore not separately mandated — it, like testimony, openings and closings, is reported at the court's direction or on request. When a report is required, ORS 8.340(5) permits it to be taken either by shorthand/typing device or by audio recording made under State Court Administrator policies; a party may also arrange and pay for its own certified stenographer under ORS 8.340(7).	Source Statute / rule: ORS 8.340(4)–(5), (7); see also ORS 8.350, 8.360, 19.385 upon the motion of the judge or justice of the peace may, and upon the request of either party shall, order a report of the proceedings View the source document
Pennsylvania Mandatory record verified	Recording is mandatory and broad, and voir dire is expressly included: Pa.R.Crim.P. 115(A) provides that in court cases (any case charging a misdemeanor, felony, or murder), after the defendant has been held for court, "proceedings in open court shall be recorded" — with no request or judicial-direction trigger — and Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(D) separately requires that voir dire, including the judge's rulings on all proposed questions, "shall be recorded in full unless the recording is waived." What is request-only in Pennsylvania is TRANSCRIPTION, not takedown: the voir dire record "will be transcribed only upon written request of either party or order of the judge" (Rule 631(D)), and transcripts generally are requested under Pa.R.J.A. No. 4007 (Rule 115(B)). The voir dire recording rule is not a capital-case special: its Comment states "This rule applies to all cases, regardless of potential sentence."	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(D); Pa.R.Crim.P. 115(A)-(B) shall be recorded in full unless the recording is waived. The record will be transcribed only upon written request of either party or order of the judge. View the source document
Rhode Island Mandatory record verified	Recording is mandatory and comprehensive, not request-driven: Rule 55 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that in trials in the Superior Court — where all felonies are tried, R.we. Gen. Laws § 8-2-15 — "all proceedings," expressly including testimony, opening statements and closing arguments, be stenographically or electronically recorded, and R.we. Gen. Laws § 8-5-5 independently commands that reporters "shall report" the proceedings in the trial of every criminal action in the Superior Court; neither provision conditions any portion of the record on a party's request or the judge's direction. Voir dire is not separately named in Rule 55's illustrative "including" list, but it falls within "all proceedings," and Rule 43 of the same rules treats "the impaneling of the jury" as a stage of "the trial" at which the defendant must be present. No Rhode Island decision construes the scope of Rule 55, so the answer rests on the rule's text; there is no request-only or discretion-only category anywhere in the rule or the statute.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 55; R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-5-5 (see also §§ 8-2-15, 8-5-3) In trials in the Superior Court, all proceedings, including the testimony of witnesses and the opening statements and closing arguments to the jury, shall be stenographically or electronically recorded. View the source document
South Carolina Mandatory record verified	In a South Carolina non-capital felony jury trial (Court of General Sessions), the whole trial — including voir dire/jury selection, opening statements and closing arguments — must be taken down verbatim as a matter of course; it is not request-only and not left to the judge's direction. The binding authority is the Court Reporter Manual issued by S.C. Court Administration 'pursuant to Order of the Supreme Court' (violations punishable as contempt, and incorporated by Rule 607(c), SCACR), § XI.A.2 of which states flatly that every proceeding of a criminal case must be recorded verbatim; § XII.A separately directs that 'In all criminal jury cases, the court reporter should maintain a record of all proceedings during the jury selection process.' The only express carve-outs are the jury-venire roll call (§ XI.A.1: 'Verbatim testimony of the jury venire roll call proceeding is not required') and bench conferences the judge elects to hold off the record (§ XIV.E).	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 14-15-30 (stenographer "shall take full stenographic notes of all proceedings including the rulings and charge of the court in every trial thereat"); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-13-10; Court Reporter Manual (S.C. Court Administration, approved Aug. 16, 2011, am. Mar. 1, 2017, upd. May 1, 2018) § XI.A.2, issued pursuant to order of the Supreme Court and referenced in Rule 607(c), SCACR Every proceeding of a criminal case must be recorded verbatim. View the source document
South Dakota Not established verified	South Dakota has no statute or court rule that enumerates which phases of a non-capital felony jury trial must be taken down, and none makes voir dire (or opening statements, closings, or even testimony) mandatory to record; the only rule defining the trial record is SDCL 23A-44-17 (S.D. Sup. Ct. R. 10-02), which says the record 'consist[s] of' the reporter's transcript, the exhibits, and the jury instructions, without specifying what the reporter must take down. Responsibility for '[a]rranging for the reporting of cases by court reporters or other authorized means' is delegated by statute to each circuit's presiding judge (SDCL 16-2-21(6)), so takedown scope is a circuit-level administrative matter rather than a statewide mandate. SDCL 15-15-1 confirms the conditional structure — it prescribes what a reporter must note 'When a court reporter is making a record' — and SDCL 15-15-2 provides for the case where 'there is no court reporter making such record'; the code's single express takedown exemption, for opening statements, sits in the civil-procedure title at SDCL 15-14-14.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 23A-44-17 (S.D. Sup. Ct. R. 10-02); accord SDCL 15-15-9. See also SDCL 16-2-21(6); SDCL 15-15-1, 15-15-2, 15-15-12; SDCL 15-14-14 The record of any hearing, court trial or jury trial shall consist of the transcript prepared by an official court reporter or court recorder or freelance reporter on contract with the Unified Judicial System, the exhibits offered in evidence and jury instructions. View the source document
Tennessee Mandatory record verified	In a Tennessee felony trial the designated court reporter must attend every stage and record verbatim ALL proceedings had in open court — the mandatory record is defined by locus, not by an enumerated list, so voir dire, opening statements and closing arguments are inside it with no request or motion required; only proceedings NOT had in open court (bench/chambers conferences) depend on the judge's direction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-301(3) limits Part 3 to trials of offenses "punishable by confinement in the state penitentiary," i.e. felonies, and § 40-14-317 (2011) separately entitles the defendant, "[n]otwithstanding the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, Rule 26 or any other law to the contrary," to a reporter "to record verbatim all proceedings that occur in open court." Recording is distinct from transcription: Layman v. State applied the statute (then numbered § 40-2035) to hold the reporter must take down open-court proceedings even where the defendant hires a private reporter, while noting "the record need not actually be transcribed unless it is needed."	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-307; see also §§ 40-14-301(3), 40-14-317 Case: Layman v. State, 464 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) A designated reporter shall attend every stage of each criminal case before the court and shall record verbatim, by a method prescribed or approved by the administrative director, all proceedings had in open court and other proceedings as the judge may direct. View the source document
Texas Contested verified	On the face of the rule, takedown is mandatory rather than request-only: Tex. R. App. P. 13.1(a) requires the official court reporter or recorder to make a full record of the proceedings unless excused by agreement of the parties, and the rule's 1997 comment states that this 'requires the reporter to make a record of voir dire and closing arguments unless excused by agreement of the parties.' The Court of Criminal Appeals has said the rule 'makes automatic a procedure that used to be conditioned upon a request,' but has also held that a party must still object at trial to the reporter's failure to record or the complaint is forfeited, and it expressly declined to decide whether the rule operates absent a request. The rule's validity is contested and unresolved: the Houston [1st District] court holds Rule 13.1(a) void, and the Dallas court holds it must yield, because Tex. Gov't Code § 52.046(a) requires a reporter to record only 'on request' — so in those districts voir dire is recorded only on request — while the Corpus Christi court holds the rule valid and self-executing.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. R. App. P. 13.1(a) & 1997 cmt.; Tex. Gov't Code § 52.046(a) Case: Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Polasek v. State, 16 S.W.3d 82, 88–89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); Langford v. State, 129 S.W.3d 138, 139 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Tanguma v. State, 47 S.W.3d 663, 670, 674 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd) attend court sessions and make a full record of the proceedings unless excused by agreement of the parties. View the source document
Utah Mandatory record verified	Utah requires a verbatim electronic record of the entire proceeding, not a testimony-only record: under Utah Code § 78A-2-405 the Judicial Council sets the means of maintaining the record, and its rule, CJA 4-201(1)(A), directs that a video or audio recording system shall maintain the verbatim record of all court proceedings in every court of record. Voir dire, opening statements, colloquies and closing arguments in a non-capital felony jury trial are therefore recorded by default, with no request or judicial direction needed. What is request-only in Utah is stenographic takedown by a certified court reporter: the court may request one in capital felonies (4-201(1)(B)), a party may arrange one only if the court approves (4-201(1)(C)), and a reporter may be used when a recording system is unavailable (4-201(1)(D)).	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code § 78A-2-405; Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-201(1)(A)-(D) A video or audio recording system shall maintain the verbatim record of all court proceedings. View the source document
Vermont Request only verified	We could not locate any Vermont statute, court rule, or judicial-branch administrative order that defines a mandatory scope of verbatim takedown for a non-capital felony jury trial, or that names voir dire, opening statements, or closing arguments as required parts of the record. What Vermont has is (i) 4 V.S.A. § 803(a), which is permissive as to method — recording equipment 'may be used' for 'any Superior Court' proceeding, and only 'to the same extent as any recording by a stenographer or reporter permitted or required under existing statutes' — while the statutes that had imposed reporter duties, 4 V.S.A. §§ 791-793, were repealed in 1979; (ii) V.R.Cr.P. 11(g), which expressly requires a verbatim record of plea proceedings, showing Vermont imposes record duties rule-by-rule and has no located trial analogue; and (iii) the Reporter's Notes to the 2021 amendments to V.R.A.P. 10, which state as a descriptive matter that 'In all superior courts, the record is made with an audio recording.' Transcription, as distinct from takedown, is plainly request-driven: V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1) makes the appellant order a transcript of 'all parts of the proceedings relevant to the issues raised' and provides that 'By failing to order a transcript, the appellant waives the right to raise any issue for which a transcript is necessary for informed appellate review.' Because the authority that would 'define the mandatory record' does not appear to exist — and a Reporter's Note describing practice is explanatory, not a duty-imposing rule — this cell is unverified rather than a negative assertion dressed as a finding.	Source Statute / rule: 4 V.S.A. § 803(a); V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1); V.R.Cr.P. 11(g) electronic sound or sound and video recording equipment may be used for the recording of any Superior Court or Judicial Bureau proceeding; testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas, sentences, statements, and remarks made by any attorney or judge; oral instructions given by the judge View the source document Verified against a retained copy of the source; the cited site refuses automated retrieval.
Virginia Mandatory record verified	Verbatim recording is MANDATORY and unconditional — not on request and not at the judge's discretion: Code § 19.2-165 requires the trial court, by order entered of record, to provide for verbatim recording of "the evidence and incidents of trial" in every criminal case in a court of record (the 2021 amendment broadened it from "all felony cases"), and the same section forbids the court to "direct the court reporter to cease recording any portion of the proceeding without the consent of all parties or of their counsel of record." The contrast with the civil statute is deliberate — § 17.1-128 says a civil court "may" order verbatim recording, § 19.2-165 says a criminal court "shall" — so there is no Georgia-style request-only tier for voir dire, openings, colloquies or closings. Virginia has no capital cases (death penalty abolished 2021), so no fuller capital record exists; the statute does not enumerate voir dire by name and no Virginia decision construes "incidents of trial" as to voir dire specifically, but nothing in the text conditions any portion of the record on a party's request.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 19.2-165 (cf. § 19.2-166; contrast § 17.1-128 (civil, "may")) Case: Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 8, 548 S.E.2d 230 (2001) In all criminal cases in a court of record, the court or judge trying the case shall by order entered of record provide for the recording verbatim of the evidence and incidents of trial View the source document
Washington Request only verified	No Washington statute or court rule automatically requires any portion of a non-capital felony jury trial — testimony, voir dire, openings, colloquies or closings — to be taken down; under RCW 2.32.200 the official reporter reports only if a party or counsel requests the reporter's services (a request the presiding judge 'shall grant') or if the judge on his or her own motion orders 'a full report of the testimony, exceptions taken, and all other oral proceedings,' and even then the statute lets 'the judge and attorneys dispense with his or her services with respect to any portion of the proceedings.' Voir dire is therefore request-driven, not separately mandatory: it is recorded only because a triggering request or sua sponte order sweeps in 'all other oral proceedings,' and no rule singles it out. Capital cases are different: SPRC 3 directs the trial court to designate reporters who 'will report all hearings' and requires the notes to be filed and indexed with the county clerk; there is no non-capital equivalent.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 2.32.200 (Duties of official reporter) if either party to the suit or action, or his or her attorney, request the services of the official reporter, the presiding judge shall grant such request, or upon his or her own motion such presiding judge may order a full report of the testimony View the source document
West Virginia Mandatory record verified	Voir dire is inside the mandatory record. West Virginia states the rule in case law rather than in a rule that names jury selection: the reporter's statutory duty is to take full notes of "the testimony and proceedings" (W. Va. Code § 51-7-2), and in State v. Bolling, 162 W. Va. 103 (1978), the Supreme Court of Appeals construed §§ 51-7-1 and 51-7-2 to require that all proceedings occurring in the criminal trial be reported, expressly adopting the federal standard that reporters record, though need not transcribe unless requested, "the voir dire examination of jurors." State v. Neal, 172 W. Va. 189 (1983), restates the duty for felony trials and holds a defendant does not waive it by failing to request a reporter. The remedy is qualified: a failure to report part of a proceeding is not reversible without a showing of identifiable prejudice (Bolling; applied to an unrecorded portion of voir dire in State v. Rexrode, No. 18-0498 (W. Va. 2020)). Recording is mandatory; transcription for appeal is on request.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code §§ 51-7-1, 51-7-2 (see also § 56-6-36(c); W. Va. R. App. P. 9(f)) Case: State v. Bolling, 162 W. Va. 103, 246 S.E.2d 631 (1978); State v. Neal, 172 W. Va. 189, 304 S.E.2d 342 (1983) Under such a rule all proceedings occurring in the criminal trial are required to be reported. View the source document Verified against a retained copy of the source; the cited site refuses automated retrieval.
Wisconsin Mandatory record verified	Wisconsin mandates a verbatim record of everything in a non-capital felony jury trial: SCR 71.01(2) requires that a verbatim record of ALL circuit-court proceedings be made, subject only to five narrow exceptions (de novo-reviewable court commissioner proceedings; settlement, pretrial and scheduling conferences; in a criminal case, matters preceding the filing of the complaint; videotape depositions accompanied by a certified transcript; and audio/audiovisual recordings played, marked and received as exhibits). Voir dire, opening statements, closing arguments, jury instructions, colloquies and sentencing are therefore mandatory takedown — none is request-only or left to the judge's direction, which is broader than Georgia's rule. The record may be made stenographically, by voice reporting, by monitored digital audio recording, or by other means approved by the director of state courts, SCR 71.01(3), and SCR 71.04(8)(b) separately requires the transcript index to list jury voir dire, opening statements and closing arguments as distinct segments.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Sup. Ct. R. (SCR) 71.01(2) and (3); see also SCR 71.04(8)(b), SCR 71.05(1) A verbatim record of all proceedings in the circuit court shall be made, except for the following: (a) A proceeding before a court commissioner that may be reviewed de novo; (b) Settlement conferences, pretrial conferences, and matters related to scheduling View the source document
Wyoming Mandatory record verified	In a Wyoming non-capital felony jury trial (tried in district court), the court reporter must report all testimony and all proceedings held in open court, and W.R.Cr.P. 55(a) expressly enumerates voir dire, opening statements, motions and final arguments as included — so voir dire is mandatory takedown, not request-only. The only request-only categories are informal discussions, informal instruction conferences and pre-trial conferences. Conferences with the presiding judge in open court and in chambers (bench conferences) are also mandatory; Rule 55 draws no capital/non-capital distinction.	Source Statute / rule: W.R.Cr.P. 55(a); accord Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-404; W.R.A.P. 3.02(a) Case: Mraz v. State, 2014 WY 73, 326 P.3d 931 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Rule 55(a) verbatim; "reporting is required and a complete record is necessary for this Court to provide meaningful review") In the district court, the court reporter shall report all testimony and all proceedings held in open court including but not limited to voir dire, opening statements, motions and final arguments View the source document

Whether any court weighs the evidence again

After a verdict, may a court consider whether the evidence actually supported it, rather than whether some evidence could support it? Who may do that, whether a refusal to do it is reviewable, and whether the review runs through the lens that favours the verdict.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Nominal, lensed verified	(a) Yes — Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1) empowers the trial judge, on the defendant's motion or on its own motion after sentence is pronounced, to grant a new trial 'for the reason that the verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of the evidence'; no written finding is required, and if the judge never rules the motion is denied by operation of law on the sixtieth day (Rule 24.4), a denial the appellate court then reviews. (b) The refusal is reviewable, but only if the weight ground was stated in a Rule 24.1 motion (Zumbado v. State, 615 So. 2d 1223, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Leitner v. State, 672 So. 2d 1371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (claim procedurally barred absent such a motion)), and the Court of Criminal Appeals may itself reverse on weight: Bell v. State, 461 So. 2d 855, 864-67 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), held it the court's 'duty to reverse' a verdict contrary to the great weight of the testimony and remanded 'for another trial' — the remedy is a new trial, not discharge. (c) That power is nearly theoretical: the presumption in favor of the verdict is overcome only in a 'limited category of cases,' the court 'will not substitute itself for the jury in determining the weight and probative force of the evidence,' and on that review it 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility choices in favor of the trier of fact' (Scott v. State, 334 So. 3d 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (CR-18-0945), quoting Buford v. State, 891 So. 2d 423, 429, and Thompson v. State, 97 So. 3d 800, 810). Alabama does not conflate weight with sufficiency — it expressly adopts the Tibbs v. Florida distinction (Johnson v. State, 555 So. 2d 818, 819-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)) — but on the weight question the lens is pro-verdict, not neutral.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1(a), (c)(1); Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.4 Case: Bell v. State, 461 So. 2d 855, 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Scott v. State, 334 So. 3d 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020); Johnson v. State, 555 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) It may be overcome, and it is our duty to reverse if we are convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the great weight of the testimony that such verdict is palpably wrong or unjust. View the source document
Alaska Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: under Criminal Rule 33(a) ("The court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required in the interest of justice") the judge sits as a "metaphorical 'thirteenth juror,'" independently weighing the evidence and making his or her own credibility determinations, and may set a verdict aside as unjust "even when the evidence is otherwise legally sufficient to support the verdict"; the rule requires no written findings, but the ruling must show the judge actually exercised that independent discretion, and a denial that instead recites the appellate "plainly unreasonable and unjust" or "any evidentiary basis" formulation is vacated and remanded — which is exactly what happened in Phornsavanh (2021) and Whisenhunt (2022), so the failure or refusal to exercise the discretion is itself reviewable. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: Alaska's appellate courts do not re-weigh the evidence themselves; they review the Rule 33 ruling only for abuse of discretion, and on a denial "an appellate court will find an abuse of discretion only if the evidence supporting the verdict is 'so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" The remedy is always a new trial or a remand to reconsider the motion, never dismissal — "Granting a motion for a new trial results only in a new trial; jeopardy does not attach." (c) THE LENS — the light-most-favorable-to-the-verdict lens belongs only to the Jackson sufficiency/judgment-of-acquittal inquiry, where the court "is not permitted to reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility"; on the weight question the trial judge takes a "personal view" of the evidence with no deference to the jury.	Source Statute / rule: Alaska R. Crim. P. 33(a) (grounds); Alaska R. Crim. P. 33(c) (non-newly-discovered-evidence motion due within 5 days after verdict) Case: Phornsavanh v. State, 481 P.3d 1145 (Alaska App. 2021); Whisenhunt v. State, 504 P.3d 268 (Alaska App. 2022); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 364 P.3d 439 (Alaska 2015) In contrast, when a trial court rules on a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the court must independently weigh the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. View the source document
Arizona Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1) permits a new trial where "the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence," and State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44 (2017), reaffirmed the thirteenth-juror power: the judge may reweigh evidence and make his or her own credibility findings and may set the verdict aside even if substantial evidence supports it (¶¶ 17, 21). Rule 24.1 contains no written-findings requirement, but Fischer ¶ 24 directs that the court "should explain with particularity the reasons why the jury's verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence" (citing civil Rule 59(i)); a refusal to exercise the discretion is reviewable, because a ruling on a weight-based new-trial motion — grant or denial — is reviewed for abuse of discretion (State v. West, 2 CA-CR 2013-0562, ¶ 47 (Ariz. App. Nov. 13, 2015), citing State v. Davis, 226 Ariz. 97, ¶ 5 (App. 2010)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no. Arizona appellate courts may not reverse a conviction because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence: "this court will not disturb a verdict on the ground that it is contrary to the weight of the evidence," and "[t]he appellate court does not sit as the 'fourteenth' juror" (Fischer ¶¶ 26, 28). The only weight-based remedy is a Rule 24.1 new trial ordered by the trial judge — retrial, never dismissal — and the State may appeal that order under A.R.S. § 13-4032(2). (c) THE LENS — on the weight question the trial judge does NOT view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; that lens belongs to Rule 20 sufficiency review (Fischer ¶ 17, contrasting Rule 20 with Rule 24.1(c)(1)). When an appellate court reviews an order granting a new trial it resolves "every conflict in the evidence in support of the order" — i.e. in favor of the trial court's order, not in favor of the verdict (Fischer ¶ 28).	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(a), (c)(1); A.R.S. § 13-4032(2) Case: State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 392 P.3d 488 (2017) (No. CR-15-0380-PR) The judge may weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, and set aside the verdict and grant a new trial even if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict. View the source document
Arkansas No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-130(c) provides that "[t]he court in which a trial is had upon an issue of fact may grant a new trial when a verdict is rendered against the defendant by which his substantial rights have been prejudiced" (quoted in State v. Cherry, 341 Ark. 924, 931-32 (2000)), one enumerated ground being that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence, § 16-89-130(c)(5), and Murchison v. State assigns that weighing function to the circuit judge: "It was for the trial court on review on motion for new trial to determine whether the jury's action was contrary to the evidence." Neither Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3 (which sets only filing, hearing and deemed-denied mechanics) nor the statutory grounds requires a written finding; the ruling is reviewable, but a grant or denial is reversed only for manifest abuse of discretion (Cherry). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: Arkansas has no manifest-weight review. The Supreme Court holds that a "motion for new trial on grounds the verdict is contrary to the evidence is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence" (Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420, citing Murchison), so the only evidentiary reversal available on appeal is for insufficiency — whose remedy is reversal and dismissal, retrial being barred, not a new trial. Arkansas courts do not use the "thirteenth juror" label at all. (c) THE LENS — with the lens: the reviewing court "views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and considers only evidence that supports the verdict" (Brown), and Murchison adds that this "is the extent of the scope of our review."	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-130(c), (c)(5); Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3; Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 8 Case: Murchison v. State, 249 Ark. 861, 874-75, 462 S.W.2d 853, 859 (1971); Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420; State v. Cherry, 341 Ark. 924, 20 S.W.3d 354 (2000) We can only say that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and this is the extent of the scope of our review. View the source document
California Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — the trial judge may grant a new trial under Penal Code § 1181(6) "[w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence," and must weigh the evidence independently rather than defer to the jury: Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125 holds the court "extends no evidentiary deference" and sits "in effect, as a '13th juror'"; § 1181 imposes no written-findings requirement. A trial judge who refuses to exercise that power because he believes himself bound by the jury commits reversible error — People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628 vacated both the judgment and the order denying a new trial and directed the court to rehear the motion, while noting that reviewing courts otherwise disturb a grant or denial only on "a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." (b) No — a California appellate court may not reverse on weight; its review of the evidence is Jackson-style sufficiency only, People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 ("we resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence"), and the only evidence-based appellate power in § 1181(6) is modification down to a lesser degree or lesser included offense, which is sufficiency-driven. The remedy when the trial court does grant relief is retrial, not dismissal: Porter holds "an order granting a new trial under section 1181(6) is not an acquittal and does not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds," and a court has no authority to grant an acquittal on an § 1181 motion. (c) The lens splits by forum — the trial court applies none (Porter's "no evidentiary deference"), while the appellate court reviews "in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume[s] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence" (Zamudio).	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Penal Code § 1181(6) Case: Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125; People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 The court extends no evidentiary deference in ruling on a section 1181(6) motion for new trial. Instead, it independently examines all the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove each required element beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge View the source document
Colorado No lens-free forum verified	(a) Colorado recognizes no thirteenth-juror power in the trial judge: Crim. P. 33(c) permits a new trial "if required in the interests of justice," reviewed only for abuse of discretion (People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4, ¶ 19, 409 P.3d 320, 325), but the supreme court has held that in ruling on a post-verdict attack on the evidence "the trial court should not attempt to serve as a thirteenth juror or invade the province of the jury in determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to various segments of the evidence" (People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo. 1982), quoting People v. Downer, 192 Colo. 264, 268-69 (1976); accord People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 130 (1973)); no written finding is required, and we located no Colorado decision authorizing a weight-based new trial, so the only reviewable question is abuse of discretion on the grounds the rule does recognize. (b) An appellate court may not reverse on weight-of-the-evidence grounds — there is no Colorado analogue to Ohio's Thompkins review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E; review is confined to legal sufficiency under the Bennett substantial-evidence test, and a successful sufficiency challenge yields vacatur of the conviction (retrial barred by Burks), never a weight-based new trial. (c) On both the trial-court and appellate side the evidence is viewed "as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution," with the prosecution given the benefit of every reasonable inference.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. Crim. P. 33(c) Case: Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291-93 (Colo. 2010); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973); People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1982); People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 778 (Colo. 1999) We do not sit as a thirteenth juror to determine the weight of the evidence presented to the jury. View the source document
Connecticut Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — on a motion to set aside the verdict / for a new trial under Practice Book § 42-53 the Connecticut trial judge weighs the evidence himself, and the claim is expressly distinct from sufficiency because it concedes the state's evidence would sustain the conviction if credited (State v. Hammond, 221 Conn. 264, 267 (1992)); no rule requires a separate written finding, and the judge's refusal is reviewable, but only for abuse of discretion (Hammond, 269-70: 'we now conclude that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion'). The claim is forfeited unless a weight-based new-trial motion was actually made below — a motion for judgment of acquittal does not preserve it (State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 202 (2000); State v. Williams, 350 Conn. 363 (2024), n.5, citing State v. Soto, 175 Conn. App. 739, 751 (2017)). (b) The appellate court does not re-weigh the evidence itself; it reverses only for abuse of the trial court's discretion, and the remedy is a new trial, not acquittal or dismissal — because the claim concedes sufficiency, retrial is not barred (Hammond: 'the defendant's motion for a new trial should have been granted'). (c) On the weight question the evidence is not viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict — the trial court may set a verdict aside 'even if the evidence was conflicting and there was direct evidence in favor of the party who prevailed with the jury,' the test being whether 'the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable' — while on review the deference runs to the trial judge's firsthand vantage and to the jury's credibility findings ('we do not sit as a thirteenth juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record,' State v. Adams, quoted in State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533 (2000)).	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Practice Book § 42-53 (motion for new trial; 'the judicial authority may grant a new trial if it is required in the interests of justice') Case: State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195 (2000); State v. Hammond, 221 Conn. 264 (1992) Within these parameters, furthermore, the trial court may set a verdict aside even if the evidence was conflicting and there was direct evidence in favor of the party who prevailed with the jury. View the source document
Delaware No lens-free forum verified	(a) The trial judge may grant a new trial under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33 "if required in the interest of justice," but only on a defendant's motion made within 7 days of verdict (2 years for newly discovered evidence); the rule requires no written finding, and the Delaware Supreme Court holds that "Delaware courts have exercised their power to grant a new trial with caution and extreme deference to the jury's findings," refusing to set a verdict aside unless "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not have reached the result" — a denial is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. (b) Delaware has no manifest-weight appellate review analogous to Ohio's Thompkins doctrine, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5) or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E: "This Court's role is not to re-weigh the evidence," so the only appellate route is reversal of a Rule 33 denial for abuse of discretion, whose remedy is a new trial, never dismissal or acquittal. (c) On the weight question the lens is deferential to the verdict, not independent: the Rule 33 test itself asks whether "a reasonable juror could not have reached the result," and "[w]hen the determination hinges on witness credibility, we do not substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact" (Ford, quoting Steele v. State, 319 A.3d 267 (Del. 2024) (TABLE)); separately, sufficiency is reviewed under Jackson by asking whether "any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find [a] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," with credibility "the sole province of the fact finder" (Mayhan v. State, No. 488, 2024 (Del. Jan. 20, 2026)).	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33 Case: Ford v. State, No. 299, 2023 (Del. May 1, 2025) (citing Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 2001); Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979)) A court will not set aside a jury's verdict unless "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not have reached the result." View the source document
Florida Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — the trial judge must grant a new trial if 'the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence,' Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.600(a)(2), sitting as a 'seventh juror' (Florida non-capital juries are six) who, per Tibbs n.9, may 'weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses so as to act, in effect, as an additional juror'; the test is 'whether a greater amount of credible evidence supports an acquittal' (State v. Bohler, 263 So. 3d 291, 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)). No written finding is required — a court 'is not required to use magic words' — but whether the judge applied the weight standard rather than the sufficiency standard is reviewed de novo, and the ruling itself for abuse of discretion, so a refusal to exercise the discretion is reviewable (McBride v. State, No. 1D2022-2298 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 21, 2024)); the State may likewise appeal a grant under Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(C). (b) No — Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981), abolished appellate weight review outright ('Henceforth, no appellate court should reverse a conviction or judgment on the ground that the weight of the evidence is tenuous or insubstantial'), leaving appellate courts only legal sufficiency (which bars retrial) plus discretionary 'interest of justice' relief under Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(i); because weight reversal no longer exists there is no weight remedy on appeal, and where the trial court grants relief on weight the remedy is a new trial, not discharge, with retrial permitted (Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982)). (c) The lenses diverge: the trial judge applies no light-most-favorable lens and weighs the evidence and credibility 'just as a juror would' (Bohler), whereas the appellate court, confined to sufficiency, asks whether 'after all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment' (Tibbs, 397 So. 2d at 1123).	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.600(a)(2); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(C), 9.140(i) Case: Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982); State v. Bohler, 263 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) Henceforth, no appellate court should reverse a conviction or judgment on the ground that the weight of the evidence is tenuous or insubstantial. View the source document
Georgia Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: O.C.G.A. §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 authorize the trial judge alone to sit as the 'thirteenth juror' and grant a new trial where the verdict is 'contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity' or 'decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence'; no written finding is required, because absent affirmative evidence to the contrary the appellate court presumes the judge exercised that discretion (Sims v. State, S26A0143 (Ga. June 2, 2026), quoting Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 61 (2026)). The judge's REFUSAL is not reviewable on its merits, but whether the judge exercised the discretion at all is reviewable: an order showing the judge applied only the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard is vacated and remanded (Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262 (2013); White v. State, 293 Ga. 523 (2013)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: 'this Court does not have authority to grant a motion for new trial based on OCGA § 5-5-20 or 5-5-21' (Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22 (2023)); appellate review of the evidence is confined to legal sufficiency under Jackson, so there is no appellate weight remedy at all — the only relief tied to weight is vacatur-and-remand for the trial judge to perform the thirteenth-juror review. Where the trial court does grant relief, the remedy is a new trial 'before another jury' (§ 5-5-20) — retrial, never dismissal or acquittal. (c) THE LENS — on weight the trial judge does NOT view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; the judge must 'consider some of the things that he cannot when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence' (Weston v. State, 320 Ga. 472 (2024), quoting Hinton v. State, 312 Ga. 258 (2021)), whereas the appellate court, reviewing only sufficiency, does apply the light-most-favorable-to-the-verdict lens.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. §§ 5-5-20, 5-5-21 Case: Weston v. State, 320 Ga. 472 (2024) (quoting Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98 (2024)); Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22 (2023) this Court reviews whether the trial court exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror, but the decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is vested solely in the trial court and is not subject to our review View the source document
Hawaii Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: HRS § 635-56 lets the court "set aside the verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury," and HRPP Rule 33 allows a new trial "if required in the interest of justice"; neither provision requires a written finding, and the refusal to grant relief IS reviewable — "the granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion" (State v. Bringas, 149 Hawai'i 435 (2021), quoting State v. Stone, 147 Hawai'i 255, 270 (2020)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no independent weight review: under State v. Batson, even if the conviction is against the weight of the evidence the appellate court affirms so long as substantial evidence supports it; the appellate court's only weight-adjacent power is abuse-of-discretion review of the trial judge's § 635-56 / Rule 33 ruling, and the remedy on reversal is a new trial, never dismissal or acquittal (§ 635-56 authorizes only setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial). (c) THE LENS — on sufficiency the evidence "must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution"; the trial judge's § 635-56 weight ruling carries no light-most-favorable lens, but the statutory threshold is stricter than bare thirteenth-juror disagreement — the verdict must be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate jury bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 635-56 (Grounds for new trial); Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 33 Case: State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992), quoted in State v. Calaycay, 145 Hawai'i 186, 449 P.3d 1184 (2019); State v. Bringas, 149 Hawai'i 435 (2021) even if it could be said in a bench trial that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence, as long as there is substantial evidence to support the requisite findings for conviction, the trial court will be affirmed View the source document
Idaho Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: yes, by statute — Idaho Code § 19-2406(6) permits a new trial "[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence," and we.C.R. 34(a) lets the court "vacate any judgment and grant a new trial on any ground permitted by statute"; § 19-2406 supplies the exclusive grounds (State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 675 (1997): we.C.R. 34 "does not provide an independent ground for a new trial"). Neither the statute nor Rule 34 requires a written finding. A refusal is reviewable: denial of a Rule 34 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion under the four-part Lunneborg test, and the trial court has "wide discretion" not disturbed "absent a showing of manifest abuse" (State v. Rodriguez, 173 Idaho 340, 545 P.3d 1 (2024), quoting Cantu). (b) APPELLATE COURT: no. Idaho has no manifest-weight review comparable to Ohio, New York or Massachusetts; appellate evidentiary review is limited to sufficiency, and the court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences" (State v. Gomez-Alas, 167 Idaho 857, 861 (2020)). (c) THE LENS: on appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State/prosecution — the Jackson v. Virginia lens — with no unlensed weight inquiry available at the appellate level.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-2406(6); Idaho Criminal Rule 34(a) Case: State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 931 P.2d 1191 (1997); State v. Gomez-Alas, 167 Idaho 857, 477 P.3d 911 (2020); State v. Rodriguez, 545 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2024) When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence. View the source document
Illinois No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: the judge "may grant the defendant a new trial" following a guilty verdict under 725 ILCS 5/116-1(a); the statute prescribes no standard and requires no written finding — only the defendant's motion must be written and specify its grounds (§ 116-1(b), (c)) — and a denial is reviewable on the defendant's direct appeal, while Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) does not list an order granting a new trial among the orders the State may appeal. (b) APPELLATE COURT: no — an Illinois reviewing court has no weight-of-the-evidence power over a criminal verdict; it reviews only Jackson sufficiency and "will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses" (People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48), reversing only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt. Because such a reversal is for insufficiency, the REMEDY is a judgment of acquittal that bars retrial under the double jeopardy clause — not a new trial (id. ¶ 53, citing Tibbs v. Florida; accord People v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 52). (c) THE LENS: the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (Brown, ¶ 48; People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35).	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/116-1(a)-(c); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1); Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) Case: People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶¶ 48, 53; accord People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35 Therefore, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. View the source document
Indiana Trial judge only verified	(a) YES at the trial level — Ind. Trial Rule 59(J)(7), which applies in criminal cases through Crim. R. 1.1, provides that "In reviewing the evidence, the court shall grant a new trial if it determines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is against the weight of the evidence," and in that posture the judge sits as a "thirteenth juror" who may weigh evidence and judge witness credibility (Tancil v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1204, 1207–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, 963 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind. 2012)). Written findings ARE required when relief is granted: T.R. 59(J) commands special findings on each material issue that "relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is granted," and the ordinary consequence of omitting them is reinstatement of the jury's verdict (State v. Hollars, 887 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), quoting Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind. 2008)); the thirteenth-juror remedy is confined to a new trial — the judge may not enter judgment or a reduced conviction on that ground (State v. Kleman, 503 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Ind. 1987)) — and a refusal to grant one IS reviewable, for abuse of discretion (Tancil, 956 N.E.2d at 1208). (b) NO at the appellate level — Indiana has no manifest-weight reversal power comparable to Ohio's Thompkins review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5) or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E; appellate courts "neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility," and after an approved verdict the reviewing court "can only consider whether there is any evidence which, if believed, will support the verdict" (Tancil, 956 N.E.2d at 1208, quoting Caruthers v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Ind. 2010), and Harvey v. State, 541 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)), so no weight-reversal remedy — new trial or dismissal — arises. (c) THE LENS is pro-verdict on appeal: the court considers "only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict" and takes conflicting evidence "most favorably to the trial court's ruling" (Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)); the trial judge acting under T.R. 59(J)(7) applies no such lens and evaluates the evidence and witnesses subjectively.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Trial Rule 59(J)(7); Ind. Crim. Rule 1.1; Ind. Crim. Rule 5.3 Case: Tancil v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; State v. Kleman, 503 N.E.2d 895 (Ind. 1987); Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007) when ruling on a motion for a new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59(J)(7) in a criminal case, a trial court must evaluate the evidence and witnesses subjectively, in keeping with its role as the so-called thirteenth juror View the source document
Iowa Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7) lets the district court grant a new trial 'When the verdict is contrary to law or contrary to the weight of the evidence,' and State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Iowa 1998), adopting Tibbs v. Florida, held the judge 'may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses' and set the verdict aside where it is contrary to the weight of the evidence and a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, a discretion to be exercised 'carefully and sparingly' and invoked 'only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict'; rule 2.24 prescribes no written finding (the supreme court reviews the oral ruling as well as the written order), but the ruling must show the weight standard was actually applied, and denying the motion under a sufficiency standard is an error at law requiring reversal and remand (State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706-07 (Iowa 2016); State v. Jackson, No. 24-1112 (Iowa May 15, 2026, amended July 20, 2026)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: an Iowa appellate court may not itself set a verdict aside as against the weight of the evidence, because 'appellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question'; Reeves expressly declined to reach a weight point because doing so 'would entail, on our part, a re-weighing of the evidence.' The appellate remedy when the district court misapplies the standard is to reverse/vacate and remand for a proper ruling (Ellis; Ary; Jackson), and the only relief available on a successful weight claim is a new trial, never dismissal — 'a successful weight-of-the-evidence challenge merely allows the court to grant a new trial' and does not bar retrial. (c) THE LENS — no light-most-favorable lens on weight: that is the sufficiency lens, and in Jackson the supreme court held the district court applied the wrong standard precisely because its order twice recited that it viewed the evidence '[i]n the light most favorable to the state' and never independently weighed it or assessed credibility; Reeves quotes Commonwealth v. Widmer with approval that 'the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.'	Source Statute / rule: Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7) Case: State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 2003); State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 1998); State v. Jackson, No. 24-1112 (Iowa May 15, 2026) On a weight-of-the-evidence claim, appellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. View the source document
Kansas No lens-free forum verified	(a) The district court may grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice," K.S.A. 22-3501(1); Kansas has no separate statutory "against the weight of the evidence" ground and no findings requirement, and older Kansas authority frames the judge's post-verdict duty as deciding, in "best judicial discretion," whether to "approve the verdict" — expressly the same duty a civil trial judge has (State v. Smith, 187 Kan. 42, 45-46 (1960); State v. Kimmel, 202 Kan. 303, 310 (1968)) — though we found no decision under the 1970 code restating that language. A refusal to grant a new trial is reviewable, but only for abuse of discretion (State v. Davidson, 315 Kan. 725, 728, 510 P.3d 701 (2022)). (b) Kansas appellate courts have no manifest-weight power: review is Jackson sufficiency only, and reweighing is "not the proper function of a reviewing court" (State v. Frantz), so no weight-based reversal — and hence no weight remedy, new trial or otherwise — exists. (c) On that review the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and credibility and evidentiary conflicts are not reassessed.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-3501(1) Case: State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. 708, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022) in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. View the source document
Kentucky No lens-free forum verified	(a) A Kentucky trial judge may grant a new trial under RCr 10.02(1) only "for any cause which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial, or if required in the interest of justice"; Kentucky has no thirteenth-juror weight power, because Commonwealth v. Bailey treats a new-trial motion as directed at errors committed during trial and channels an attack on the evidence itself into an RCr 10.24 motion for judgment of acquittal, which raises only whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Written grounds are required only when the court orders a new trial on its own initiative (RCr 10.02(2): "in the order shall specify the grounds therefor"), and a refusal to grant a new trial is reviewable — for abuse of discretion (Bedingfield v. Commonwealth, 260 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2008)). (b) No Kentucky appellate court may reverse a conviction because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; the only post-verdict evidentiary review is sufficiency under the directed-verdict standard of Commonwealth v. Benham (reversal is warranted only if, on the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt), and the remedy is a directed verdict of acquittal, not a new trial. (c) On that review the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth — all fair and reasonable inferences are drawn in the Commonwealth's favor and credibility and weight are reserved to the jury.	Source Statute / rule: Ky. RCr 10.02(1)-(2); Ky. RCr 10.24 Case: Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 75-76 (Ky. 2002); Bedingfield v. Commonwealth, 260 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2008) A reviewing court does not reevaluate the proof because its only function is to consider the decision of the trial judge in light of the proof presented. View the source document
Louisiana Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: the judge shall grant a new trial when 'the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence,' La. C.Cr.P. art. 851(B)(1), and in ruling he 'independently assesses credibility and weighs the evidence,' acting as a thirteenth juror (State v. Bourg, 2019-K-00038 (La. 12/11/19)); no separate written finding of 'injustice' is required because State v. King treats that showing as 'an implicit finding,' and neither a grant nor a refusal on that ground is reviewable — La. C.Cr.P. art. 858 bars review 'except for error of law,' and State v. Skelton, 340 So.2d 256, 259 (La. 1976) (quoted in King) holds that refusal to grant an art. 851(1) motion 'presents nothing for our review.' (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: Louisiana appellate courts have no weight-of-the-evidence jurisdiction at all, because La. Const. art. V, § 10(B) (courts of appeal) and § 5(C) (supreme court) confine criminal appellate jurisdiction to questions of law, and State v. King, 15-1283 (La. 9/18/17), 232 So.3d 1207, holds the constitution 'does not permit fact-finding and credibility assessments by an appellate court in a criminal case.' There is therefore no weight remedy — neither new trial nor dismissal — the only post-verdict evidentiary review available on appeal is Jackson legal sufficiency, whose remedy under La. C.Cr.P. art. 821 is a post verdict judgment of acquittal or modification of the verdict to a lesser included responsive offense. (c) THE LENS — the appellate sufficiency lens is expressly pro-verdict, evidence 'viewed in a light most favorable to the state' (art. 821(B)); the trial judge ruling under art. 851(B)(1) applies no such lens and instead puts himself in the position of a juror, which is precisely why his factual conclusion is unreviewable.	Source Statute / rule: La. C.Cr.P. arts. 851(B)(1), 858, 821(B); La. Const. art. V, §§ 5(C), 10(B) Case: State v. King, 15-1283 (La. 9/18/17), 232 So.3d 1207; State v. Bourg, 2019-K-00038 (La. 12/11/19) In criminal cases its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law. View the source document
Maine No lens-free forum verified	(a) M.R.U. Crim. P. 33 lets the trial court grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice," but Maine expressly rejects thirteenth-juror weighing: on a motion for acquittal or for a new trial the judge applies the identical sufficiency test and "may not independently appraise the believability of testimony or weigh its value," State v. Call, 322 A.2d 64, 66 & n.1 (Me. 1974) (footnote distinguishing the contrary federal Rule 33 practice), followed in State v. Littlefield, 389 A.2d 16 (Me. 1978). No written finding is required by rule, and denial of a Rule 33 motion is reviewable for abuse of discretion with underlying findings reviewed for clear error, State v. Lowery, 2025 ME 3, ¶ 24. (b) The Law Court has no manifest-weight jurisdiction analogous to Ohio's Thompkins review, CPL 470.15(5), or G.L. c. 278 § 33E — "[t]he weight to be given to the evidence and the determination of witness credibility are the exclusive province of the jury," State v. Flynn, 2026 ME 54, ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1312 (Me. 1996)) — so no weight remedy, neither new trial nor dismissal, exists; the sole evidentiary ground is Jackson-type sufficiency. (c) That review is conducted in the light most favorable to the State, deferring to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences, State v. Flynn, 2026 ME 54, ¶ 16; Maine therefore collapses weight into sufficiency at both trial and appellate levels.	Source Statute / rule: M.R.U. Crim. P. 33 Case: State v. Call, 322 A.2d 64, 66 & n.1 (Me. 1974); State v. Flynn, 2026 ME 54, ¶¶ 16, 19; State v. Lowery, 2025 ME 3, ¶ 24 Upon a motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial, the trial Judge is limited in his review of the evidence to determining whether there was relevant evidence from which the jury could have properly concluded that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt View the source document
Maryland Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — the trial judge may set aside a guilty verdict as against the weight of the evidence on a motion for new trial filed within ten days of verdict under Md. Rule 4-331(a) ('in the interest of justice'), and In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 326 (1988), holds the judge has authority to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility in doing so, granting relief only where the evidence 'preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand'; the Court expressly declined to adopt the 'thirteenth juror' label 'eo nomine' while adopting its substance. No written finding is required: Rule 4-331(f) requires only that the court 'state its reasons for setting aside a judgment or verdict and granting a new trial,' on the record in open court, and imposes no statement requirement when the motion is denied. A refusal is reviewable — a denial 'will be reviewed on appeal if it is claimed that the trial court abused its discretion' (Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 57 (1992), applied to Rule 4-331(a) in Williams v. State, 462 Md. 335, 344 (2019)) — but because the discretion is at its broadest on weight grounds it 'will rarely, if ever, be disturbed on appeal' (Buck, 328 Md. at 59). (b) No — Maryland has no manifest-weight reversal power comparable to Ohio's Thompkins doctrine, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E; appellate review of the evidence is confined to Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency, and weighing credibility 'requires assessment of credibility and assignment of weight to evidence — a task for the trial judge' (Buck, 328 Md. at 61), with State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 547 (2003), reversing the intermediate court for having 'strayed from its appellate function and began to weigh the evidence as if it was the fact-finder.' The only appellate route is reversal of a Rule 4-331(a) denial for abuse of discretion, and the remedy is a new trial, never acquittal or dismissal: the new-trial motion, 'if granted, results only in a new trial' (In re Petition, 312 Md. at 325). (c) The light-most-favorable-to-the-prosecution lens attaches to the acquittal/sufficiency inquiry, not to weight: on sufficiency the evidence 'must be read from the viewpoint most favorable to the prosecution' and '[w]eight and credibility are not at issue,' whereas on the new-trial motion 'a court has more latitude in considering it, and may take into account factors such as credibility' (In re Petition, 312 Md. at 325, quoted in Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 582 (1989)).	Source Statute / rule: Md. Rule 4-331(a), (f) Case: In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 325-27, 539 A.2d 664 (1988) (overruling State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360 (1971), in relevant part); Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 582-83 (1989); Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 57-61 (1992) We simply hold that reviewing weight of the evidence of necessity involves a weighing process, and part of that weighing may implicate consideration of credibility. View the source document
Massachusetts Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: under G.L. c. 278, § 11 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2) the judge may, on the defendant's motion, set aside a guilty verdict and order a new trial or reduce it to a lesser included offense because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence even though legally sufficient; rule 25(b)(2) requires no written findings (Preston observes that findings are 'a requirement of rule 30 (b) not found in rule 25 (b) (2)'), though the SJC does 'expect a judge to state the reasons for a reduction in verdict' (Woodward, Gaulden), and the ruling either way is reviewable — but only for abuse of discretion or error of law (Woodward, quoting Gaulden; Riva, affirming a denial). (b) APPELLATE COURT — weight review on appeal exists only under G.L. c. 278, § 33E and only in a statutory 'capital case,' meaning a conviction of murder in the first degree or a third habitual-offender conviction under G.L. c. 279, § 25(b), which Commonwealth v. Billingslea (2020) holds the Appeals Court itself must review plenarily; the § 33E remedy is an order of a new trial or the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt with remand for sentencing — never dismissal or acquittal. In every other felony appeal there is no weight review at all: 'The Appeals Court does not possess the powers which are given to the Supreme Judicial Court alone in capital cases by G. L. c. 278, § 33E,' and 'may not set aside a verdict of guilty on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence' (Riva; accord Cullen, 'this court has no authority under that statute'). (c) THE LENS — on the weight question there is no light-most-favorable-to-the-verdict lens: § 33E review 'consider[s] the whole case, both the law and the evidence, to determine whether there has been any miscarriage of justice' (Billingslea, quoting Dickerson), and under rule 25(b)(2) a judge 'may review all the evidence, including the defendant's version of the facts, in deciding whether the verdict comports with justice, even when the evidence warranted the jury's verdict' (Woodward); the light-most-favorable lens belongs to Latimore/Jackson sufficiency review, which Doucette says is applied 'without reference to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence.'	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2); G.L. c. 278, § 11; G.L. c. 278, § 33E; G.L. c. 279, § 25(b) Case: Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454 (1990); Commonwealth v. Riva, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 713 (1984); Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606 (2020); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659 (1998); Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318 (1984) Pursuant to rule 25 (b) (2), a trial judge has discretion to award a new trial on the ground that the verdict, although supported by legally sufficient evidence, was against the weight of the evidence View the source document
Michigan Nominal, lensed verified	(a) The trial judge may order a new trial because the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence (MCR 6.431(B); MCL 770.1), but Michigan rejected the 'thirteenth juror' role in People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625 (1998) (overruling People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466 (1993)): relief requires that the evidence preponderate heavily against the verdict so that letting it stand would be a miscarriage of justice, and conflicting or partly impeached testimony is an insufficient ground (id. at 647). No separate written finding is required, but MCR 6.431(B) commands that the court 'state its reasons for granting or denying a new trial orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record,' and either ruling is reviewable for abuse of discretion (Lemmon, 456 Mich at 648 n 27; People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469 (2009)). (b) An appellate court may grant relief on a great-weight claim — in a jury trial it must first be raised by a motion for new trial or a motion to remand (MCR 7.211(C)(1)(c)); unpreserved, review is for plain error (People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218 (2003)) — but the reviewing court applies the abuse-of-discretion lens to the trial court's ruling and 'may not attempt to resolve credibility questions anew' (People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28 (1998)). The remedy is a new trial, not acquittal or dismissal: MCR 6.431(D) sends the acquittal question to sufficiency by requiring a weight-or-sufficiency new-trial motion to be treated as including a motion for directed verdict of acquittal. (c) The light-most-favorable-to-the-verdict lens belongs to the sufficiency/directed-verdict inquiry, not to weight (Lemmon, 456 Mich at 633-635); on weight the court assesses the evidence directly but must defer to the jury on credibility unless the contradictory testimony was deprived of all probative value, contradicted indisputable physical facts, or defied physical realities (id. at 643-646).	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.431(B) and (D); MCL 770.1 Case: People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576 NW2d 129 (1998) A trial judge does not sit as the thirteenth juror in ruling on motions for a new trial and may grant a new trial only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict View the source document
Minnesota No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: the district court may grant a new trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1) on grounds that include "1. The interests of justice" and "7. A verdict or finding of guilty that is not justified by the evidence, or is contrary to law"; the rule requires no written findings (contrast subd. 3, which requires written findings to vacate judgment and dismiss), and a denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. App. 2016) ("we review the denial of a new-trial motion for an abuse of discretion"), citing State v. Green, 747 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2008). (b) APPELLATE COURT: no — Minnesota appellate courts review legal sufficiency only and are barred from re-weighing; the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed this in State v. Firkus, No. A23-0973 (Minn. Feb. 25, 2026), quoting State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 166 (Minn. 2020), so the Ohio/New York remedy question does not arise and the only weight-like relief is a district court new trial. (c) THE LENS: deferential — the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the jury's credibility determinations and its freedom to accept part and reject part of a witness's testimony are assumed in the verdict's favor. We found no Minnesota decision articulating a distinct "thirteenth juror" weight standard for the district court under ground 7, so that prong rests on the rule's text rather than on construing case law.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1) (grounds 1 and 7); Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(7) Case: State v. Firkus, No. A23-0973 (Minn. Feb. 25, 2026) (quoting State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 166 (Minn. 2020)); State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. App. 2016) Consequently, our precedent does not permit us to re-weigh the evidence View the source document
Mississippi Nominal, lensed verified	(a) Yes — the trial judge may vacate the judgment and grant a new trial "if the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence," Miss. R. Crim. P. 25.1(b)(2); the rule requires a written motion by the defendant but imposes no written-finding requirement on the judge, and after Little v. State the "thirteenth juror" role belongs to the trial court "and the trial court alone" (¶19). The refusal to grant a new trial is reviewable — appellate courts "review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion" (Little ¶21). (b) Yes, but only in that deferential posture: the appellate court does not itself sit as thirteenth juror, reweigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve evidentiary conflicts (Little ¶¶1, 20); when it does reverse, the remedy is a new trial, not discharge — Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844, holds that a weight reversal, "unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict" and that "the proper remedy is to grant a new trial." (c) The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict — the same directional lens as sufficiency review, which is what distinguishes Mississippi from Ohio's Thompkins-style manifest-weight review; the two doctrines remain distinct in remedy (reverse-and-render for sufficiency, new trial for weight) rather than in lens.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. Crim. P. 25.1(b)(2) Case: Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288 (Miss. 2017); Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005) Our role as appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence View the source document
Missouri Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: the judge may grant a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, under Rule 29.11(a) ('The court may grant a new trial upon good cause shown') and § 547.020(5) RSMo ('When the verdict is contrary to the law or evidence'); Rule 29.11 prescribes no written finding, and the grant is unreviewable in both directions — the State cannot appeal it (the order is interlocutory and is not one of the four orders in § 547.200.1), and a refusal is equally unreviewable because 'the weight of the evidence is not an open question' in the appellate court (State v. Hodge, 399 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. 1966)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: Missouri appellate courts have no weight-of-the-evidence power in criminal cases and review only Jackson sufficiency, expressly declining to force themselves into the posture of a thirteenth juror (State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 413 (Mo. banc 1993)); there is thus no appellate weight remedy at all, and when the TRIAL court grants a weight-based new trial the remedy is retrial, which double jeopardy does not bar (State v. Johnston, 450 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014), citing Tibbs v. Florida) — as distinct from a new trial granted for insufficiency, which does bar retrial (Hudson v. Louisiana). (c) THE LENS — the light-most-favorable lens belongs only to the sufficiency question: on a motion for judgment of acquittal the trial court 'is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict' and 'is not permitted to weigh the evidence,' whereas on the weight question the judge 'made its own credibility determinations and assessed the evidence,' which is what marks the ruling as a weight rather than a sufficiency analysis (Johnston, 450 S.W.3d at 460 & n.2).	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.11(a); § 547.020(5) RSMo; § 547.200.1 RSMo Case: State v. Johnston, 450 S.W.3d 457, 459-60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014); State v. Hodge, 399 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo. 1966); State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 413 (Mo. banc 1993) Furthermore, a trial court order granting a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal. View the source document
Montana No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — § 46-16-702(3), MCA lets the judge, 'if justified by law and the weight of the evidence,' grant a new trial or modify the verdict, including entering a finding of not guilty; but the Montana Supreme Court construes an evidence-based § 46-16-702(3) motion as a sufficiency motion governed by the Jackson standard, so the judge does not sit as a thirteenth juror making independent weight and credibility findings (State v. Dulaney, 2025 MT 67, ¶¶ 50-53, rejecting the defendant's asserted 'plenary power' theory). No written finding — indeed no hearing at all — is required (State v. Kalina, 2025 MT 70, ¶ 45; State v. Geren, 2012 MT 307, ¶ 30), and the ruling is reviewable: de novo where the motion rests on the evidence (Dulaney, ¶ 51), abuse of discretion on other new-trial grounds (State v. Gomez, 2020 MT 73, ¶ 46). (b) APPELLATE COURT — Montana has no manifest-weight reversal power comparable to Ohio, New York or Massachusetts; the Supreme Court reviews only legal sufficiency, de novo, under the same standard the trial court applies (Dulaney, ¶¶ 49, 52). The remedy when a post-verdict evidence challenge succeeds is a JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, not a new trial — retrial is barred on double-jeopardy grounds (Dulaney, ¶ 52, citing State v. Warren, 192 Mont. 436, 441-42). (c) THE LENS — with the light-most-favorable-to-the-prosecution lens, at both levels: 'The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are exclusively within the province of the trier of fact' and this Court 'will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury' (State v. Torres, 2021 MT 301, ¶ 55).	Source Statute / rule: § 46-16-702, MCA Case: State v. M. Dulaney, 2025 MT 67, ¶ 51 However, we review rulings on § 46-16-702(3) motions "based on the sufficiency of the evidence," including motions to modify or vacate a jury verdict based on "the weight of the evidence," de novo. View the source document
Nebraska No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101(4) lets the trial judge grant a new trial because 'the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law' — a sufficiency-framed ground; Nebraska has never adopted a separate weight-of-the-evidence or 'thirteenth juror' standard, and that phrase appears in no Nebraska appellate decision. The judge is 'vested with considerable discretion' and is owed deference because the trial judge 'has a special perspective on the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record' (State v. Lenhart; State v. Oldson); where the motion states facts materially affecting substantial rights, § 29-2102(2) requires the court to hold a hearing and 'make findings of fact and conclusions of law.' Refusal to grant is reviewable on appeal, but only for abuse of discretion (State v. Nelson). (b) APPELLATE COURT: No — Nebraska has no Ohio/New York-style manifest-weight review; an appellate court reviews the evidence only for Jackson sufficiency and 'does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence,' so no weight-based reversal (and therefore no weight-based new-trial or dismissal remedy) exists. (c) LENS: on the only evidence review available, the court views the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101(4); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2102(2) Case: State v. Evans, 321 Neb. 841 (2026); State v. Lenhart, 317 Neb. 787, 796-97 (2024); State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718, 800 (2016); State v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 775 (2011) An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution View the source document
Nevada Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes. Under the 'any other grounds' branch of NRS 176.515 (subsection 4), a Nevada district judge may independently evaluate conflicting evidence and order a new trial when, resolving the conflict differently from the jury, the judge believes the totality of the evidence fails to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; State v. Purcell, 110 Nev. 1389, 887 P.2d 276 (1994) (quoting Washington v. State and State v. Busscher) and State v. Walker, 109 Nev. 683, 857 P.2d 1 (1993). The judge must identify a conflict in the evidence but need not catalogue each conflict, and neither NRS 176.515 nor Purcell requires a written finding; the power is permissive, and a refusal to exercise it is reviewable but reversible only for 'palpable' abuse of discretion (Alfaro v. State, 139 Nev. 216, 221 n.2 (2023)). This weight power lives only in the new-trial statute — the post-verdict acquittal motion under NRS 175.381(2) is decided on a pure sufficiency standard and does not let the judge sit as a thirteenth juror (Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1193 (1996); Kassa v. State, 137 Nev. 150 (2021)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no. Nevada has no manifest-weight review analogous to Ohio's Thompkins, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E: the Supreme Court 'will not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses,' and reviews only sufficiency plus the district court's discretion on a new-trial motion — so the only weight-adjacent appellate remedy is reversal of a new-trial ruling, which yields a new trial (NRS 177.265 permits ordering a new trial), never dismissal. (c) THE LENS — on appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (Jackson-style sufficiency); the district court's Purcell/Walker weight review carries no such lens, because the whole point is that the judge may resolve the conflicting evidence differently from the jury.	Source Statute / rule: NRS 176.515(1), (4); NRS 175.381(2); NRS 177.265 Case: State v. Purcell, 110 Nev. 1389, 887 P.2d 276 (1994); Alfaro v. State, 139 Nev. 216, 221 n.2, 534 P.3d 138 (2023); Dickey v. State, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 2, 540 P.3d 442 (2024) Nevada has empowered the trial court in a criminal case where the evidence of guilt is conflicting, to independently evaluate the evidence and order another trial if it does not agree with the jury's conclusion View the source document
New Hampshire Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: yes — the trial judge may set aside a guilty verdict and grant a new trial because it is conclusively against the weight of the evidence, sitting as a "thirteenth juror" and disagreeing with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony, but must exercise that power with caution and "only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict" and "where a miscarriage of justice may have resulted" (State v. Spinale, 156 N.H. 456, 465-66 (2007)); no authority requiring a written finding was located, and a refusal is reviewable — denial is reviewed for unsustainable exercise of discretion (State v. Durgin, 165 N.H. 725 (2013), affirming a denial on that standard). (b) APPELLATE COURT: the New Hampshire Supreme Court does not itself re-weigh; it reviews only the trial court's exercise of discretion, deference is asymmetric (a grant is "more closely scrutinized" than a denial), "[w]hether we, sitting as trial judges, would have reached the same or a different result is immaterial," and when it reverses a grant it reinstates the jury's findings rather than re-examining the facts (Spinale; Durgin). New Hampshire therefore has no independent appellate weight review of the Ohio Thompkins / N.Y. CPL 470.15(5) / Mass. c. 278 § 33E kind; the remedy for weight relief is a NEW TRIAL, never acquittal, and double jeopardy does not bar retrial (Spinale, applying Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-43 (1982)). (c) THE LENS: no light-most-favorable lens applies on weight — that lens belongs to sufficiency/JNOV review, where the court asks whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt "considering all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State"; on weight the trial court weighs credibility and asks whether the State carried its burden of persuasion, and the appellate court asks only whether the record supplies an objective basis for the trial court's ruling. Weight and sufficiency are expressly distinct in New Hampshire and are not treated as identical.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. R. Crim. P. 25(e) (motion to set aside verdict; filed within ten days after its rendition, stating all reasons and arguments relied upon) Case: State v. Spinale, 156 N.H. 456, 464-68 (2007); State v. Durgin, 165 N.H. 725 (2013) The often-confused concepts of weight and sufficiency of the evidence are distinct and are governed by different standards. View the source document
New Jersey Nominal, lensed verified	(a) Yes — R. 3:20-1 lets the trial judge grant a new trial 'if required in the interest of justice,' but permits setting aside a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence only where, 'having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law'; no written finding is required (R. 1:7-4(a) allows findings 'by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral,' and R. 2:5-3(b) contemplates reasons given either on the record or in a filed written statement). The refusal is reviewable — but only if the defendant actually moved for a new trial below, because R. 2:10-1 makes a weight-of-the-evidence claim 'not cognizable on appeal' absent that motion, and R. 3:20-2 gives only 10 days after verdict to make it. (b) Yes — R. 2:10-1 permits an appellate court to reverse the trial court's ruling where 'it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law'; the remedy is a NEW TRIAL, not dismissal, since a judgment of acquittal is available only for legal insufficiency under R. 3:18-1 and R. 3:18-2. (c) The reviewing court does not recite a 'light most favorable to the verdict' lens; it defers instead to the jury's credibility function and must 'weigh heavily the trial court's views of credibility of witnesses, their demeanor, and [its] general feel of the case' (State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 96 (1982), quoting State v. Sims, 65 N.J. 359, 373 (1974)). In substance, however, New Jersey collapses weight into sufficiency: 'There is no miscarriage of justice when any trier of fact could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the crime were present.' State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 413-14 (2012) (quoting State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 178 (1993)).	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:20-1; N.J. Ct. R. 2:10-1; see also N.J. Ct. R. 3:20-2, R. 3:18-2 Case: State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 413-14 (2012); State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 96 (1982); State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990) against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law. View the source document
New Mexico No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: State v. Griffin, 117 N.M. 745, 877 P.2d 551 (1994), expressly overruled State v. Chavez (Chavez II), which had forbidden the judge to act as a 'thirteenth juror,' and held that a new trial may be granted for factual error or because the judge believes substantial justice was not done; Griffin also requires that the court 'must clearly set forth the grounds for grant of a new trial,' and states that 'The standard of review of an order granting or denying a new trial is clear and unmistakable abuse of discretion' — so a refusal to exercise the discretion is reviewable, for abuse. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: New Mexico has no manifest-weight review; the appellate test is the Jackson sufficiency standard and the court 'may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the jury' (State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314 (1988); reaffirmed in State v. Weinrick, No. A-1-CA-41602 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2025): 'we do not reweigh the evidence'), so weight-based appellate relief exists only by holding the denial of a Rule 5-614 NMRA new-trial motion an abuse of discretion, and the remedy is a new trial, not dismissal — Griffin cites Tibbs v. Florida for the rule that weight-based relief does not bar retrial. (c) THE LENS — sufficiency review, in both the appellate court and the trial court entertaining a post-verdict acquittal motion, views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict (Sutphin; State v. Martinez, 2022-NMSC-004, 503 P.3d 313); the trial court ruling on a weight-based new-trial motion applies no such lens, because the question is whether the evidence so heavily preponderates against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.	Source Case: State v. Griffin, 117 N.M. 745, 877 P.2d 551 (N.M. 1994) (No. 21,136) it has long been the law in New Mexico that a new trial also may be granted because of factual error or because the trial court subjectively believes that substantial justice has not been done View the source document
New York Appellate weight review verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: no thirteenth-juror power at all. CPL 330.30(1) confines a post-verdict motion to grounds that would require reversal "as a matter of law," and People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 536 (1984), holds that trial judges are not "authorized to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence" — the power to grant a new trial because the verdict was "clearly against evidence" existed under the old Code of Criminal Procedure (§ 465[6]) but "was not carried forward into the Criminal Procedure Law"; there is therefore no written-finding requirement and no discretion whose non-exercise could be reviewed. (b) APPELLATE COURT: yes, but only the intermediate appellate court (the Appellate Division on a felony appeal) — CPL 470.15(5) deems a determination "that a verdict of conviction resulting in a judgment was, in whole or in part, against the weight of the evidence" a reversal on the facts, and People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 (1987), calls it "a review which may take place only in an intermediate appellate court" and "expressly withheld from the trial court and even from this court." The REMEDY is dismissal, not retrial: CPL 470.20(5) requires the court to "dismiss the accusatory instrument or any reversed count," the CPL revisors having deliberately upgraded the old new-trial remedy because "[t]he People, having had full opportunity to prove their case at trial and having failed to do so, should not be accorded another chance" (Bleakley). (c) THE LENS: no light-most-favorable lens. Bleakley reversed an Appellate Division that had asked only whether, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution," a rational trier could convict; on weight the court must first decide whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable and then "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences," sitting "as a thirteenth juror" (People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348 (2007)), while still according great deference to the jury's opportunity to see the witnesses.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. CPL 470.20(5) (see also CPL 470.15(5); CPL 330.30(1)) Case: People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987); People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530 (1984); People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342 (2007) Upon a reversal or modification of a judgment after trial upon the ground that the verdict, either in its entirety or with respect to a particular count or counts, is against the weight of the trial evidence, the court must dismiss the accusatory instrument. View the source document
North Carolina No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: within 10 days after entry of judgment the defendant may move for appropriate relief on the ground that "[t]he verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence," N.C.G.S. § 15A-1414(b)(2); no written findings are required (findings are mandated only where the court must take evidence, § 15A-1420(c)(4), and no evidentiary hearing is required on a § 15A-1414 motion, § 15A-1420(c)(2)); the judge's refusal is reviewable, but only for abuse of that discretion. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: North Carolina has no manifest-weight review; § 15A-1447 authorizes a new trial only for "reversible error which denied the defendant a fair trial," and the sole evidence-based appellate ground is legal insufficiency, whose remedy is reversal and dismissal (or remand on a supported lesser included offense), and the Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals precisely for having "improperly weighed the evidence." (c) THE LENS — on appellate evidence review the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State with the benefit of all reasonable inferences and leaves contradictions to the jury (State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379); North Carolina's decisions treat the trial court's § 15A-1414(b)(2) ruling purely as a discretionary matter and articulate no lens for it, and the state's courts do not use the "thirteenth juror" formulation.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1414(a), (b)(2); § 15A-1447(a), (c); § 15A-1420(c)(2), (c)(4) Case: State v. Freeman, 313 N.C. 539, 549, 330 S.E.2d 465 (1985); accord State v. Fletcher, 301 N.C. 709, 712-13, 272 S.E.2d 859 (1981); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 702, 259 S.E.2d 883 (1979); State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379, 381, 526 S.E.2d 451 (2000) A motion to set aside the verdict as being against the greater weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable absent an abuse of discretion. View the source document
North Dakota No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: N.D.R.Crim.P. 33(a) lets the district court "vacate any judgment and grant a new trial to that defendant if the interest of justice so requires," and insufficiency of the evidence is an accepted ground (State v. Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 46); on such a motion the trial court "is clothed with a wide discretion" (State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 725 (N.D. 1967)). Rule 33 requires no written finding (contrast N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(f), which does require a written memorandum in civil cases), and we found no North Dakota authority authorizing the judge to sit as a thirteenth juror and re-weigh the evidence against the verdict. The refusal is reviewable: a defendant may appeal "an order denying a motion for a new trial" as of right under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(4), and the denial is reviewed only for abuse of discretion (State v. Ratliff, 2014 ND 156, ¶ 13). (b) APPELLATE COURT: No — North Dakota has no Thompkins/CPL 470.15(5)-style manifest-weight power; when a defendant challenges the evidence, even through a Rule 33 new-trial motion, the Supreme Court applies the Jackson sufficiency standard and refuses to re-weigh (Hidanovic ¶ 46; Ratliff ¶ 30: "we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses"), so the remedy question does not arise on a weight theory; a successful sufficiency challenge yields reversal without a new trial and discharge of the defendant (N.D.C.C. § 29-28-30), while trial error yields a new trial. (c) THE LENS: light most favorable to the verdict, and that same lens is applied even when the challenge reaches the court through a Rule 33 motion rather than a Rule 29 motion (Hidanovic ¶ 46; Ratliff ¶ 30).	Source Statute / rule: N.D.R.Crim.P. 33(a); N.D.C.C. §§ 29-28-06(4), 29-28-30 Case: State v. Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 46, 747 N.W.2d 463; State v. Ratliff, 2014 ND 156, ¶¶ 13, 30, 849 N.W.2d 183 The jury judged the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence admitted at trial, and we do not reweigh that evidence. View the source document
Ohio Appellate weight review verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: Crim.R. 33(A) enumerates six new-trial grounds and none is weight of the evidence; effective July 1, 2021 the Supreme Court of Ohio deleted the words 'is not sustained by sufficient evidence or' from Crim.R. 33(A)(4) (Staff Note, citing State v. Ramirez, 2020-Ohio-602), leaving only 'That the verdict is contrary to law,' and no written finding is prescribed — Ohio's civil rule by contrast retains an express weight ground, Civ.R. 59(A)(6). (a, cont.) A defendant loses nothing by not moving, because Crim.R. 33(F) provides that 'A motion for a new trial is not a prerequisite to obtain appellate review,' so the weight question reaches the court of appeals directly. (b) APPELLATE COURT: yes — under State v. Thompkins a court of appeals may reverse a jury conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence, sitting as the 'thirteenth juror,' but Ohio Const. art. IV, § 3(B)(3) requires that 'No judgment resulting from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence except by the concurrence of all three judges hearing the cause.' The REMEDY is a new trial, not dismissal, and retrial is not barred: Crim.R. 33(D) provides that 'when a new trial is awarded on appeal, the accused shall stand trial upon the charge or charges of which he was convicted,' consistent with Tibbs v. Florida as applied in Thompkins ¶ 26. (c) THE LENS: the reviewing court does NOT view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict — it reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences and assesses witness credibility (Thompkins ¶ 25, approving State v. Martin; accord id. at 390 (Cook, J., concurring): a court reviewing weight 'is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution'), deferring only to the trier of fact's conclusions under State v. DeHass.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Const. art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Ohio Crim.R. 33(A), (D), (F) Case: State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52 The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice View the source document
Oklahoma No lens-free forum verified	(a) The trial court may grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to law or evidence, 22 O.S. § 952 (Sixth); no written finding is required by §§ 952-953, and denial of a new-trial motion is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion (Spence v. State, 2008 OK CR 4, ¶ 8: reviewing "the denial of the motion for new trial, for abuse of discretion"). Oklahoma has no thirteenth-juror doctrine by that name; the Court of Criminal Appeals construes the § 952 ground as asking whether enough legal and competent evidence was adduced to render it safe to allow the verdict to stand, a responsibility resting on the trial court in the first instance (Gorum v. State, 1936 OK CR 141, 63 P.2d 765). (b) The Court of Criminal Appeals does not conduct weight-of-the-evidence review; it reviews only legal sufficiency under Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132 (adopting Jackson v. Virginia), so there is no Ohio/New York/Massachusetts-style weight reversal and no distinct weight remedy — 22 O.S. § 1066 gives only the general power to reverse, affirm or modify and, if necessary or proper, to order a new trial. (c) On that review the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices accepted if they tend to support the verdict.	Source Statute / rule: 22 O.S. § 952 (Sixth); 22 O.S. § 1066 Case: Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, 709 P.2d 202, ¶ 7; Parker v. State, 1994 OK CR 56, 887 P.2d 290 whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt View the source document Verified against a retained copy of the source; the cited site refuses automated retrieval.
Oregon No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: ORS 136.535(1) applies ORCP 64 B to criminal actions, so a defendant may move for a new trial for "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict" (ORCP 64 B(5)), but Oregon has no thirteenth-juror power — Article VII (Amended), section 3 forbids any court to re-examine a fact tried by a jury "unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict," which State v. Mendez, quoting Van Lom, read as eliminating the common-law power to set a verdict aside as against the weight of the evidence. A written statement of grounds is required only when the court grants a new trial on its own initiative (ORCP 64 G; ORS 19.430), and a refusal to grant a new trial is not reviewable at all on the defendant's appeal unless the motion rested on juror misconduct or newly discovered evidence (ORS 138.105(4)(a); State v. Tooley, 265 Or App at 32; State v. Puckett, 332 Or App at 65-66) — though the State may appeal an order granting one (ORS 138.045(1)(j)). (b) APPELLATE COURT: No weight-of-the-evidence reversal exists in Oregon; ORS 138.105(2) confines review to "questions of law appearing on the record" and ORS 138.257(2) makes appellate disposition expressly "[s]ubject to Article VII (Amended), section 3," so post-verdict evidentiary review is Jackson-style sufficiency only — the remedy question does not arise, and a sufficiency reversal is an outright reversal, not a new trial. (c) THE LENS: the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State (State v. Tooley, 265 Or App at 33, citing State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63 (1994)), and Article VII (Amended), section 3's "no evidence to support the verdict" test is itself verdict-favorable; Oregon courts use no lens-free weight standard.	Source Statute / rule: Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3; ORS 136.535(1); ORCP 64 B(5), 64 G; ORS 19.430; ORS 138.105(2), (4)(a); ORS 138.257(2); ORS 138.045(1)(j) Case: State v. Mendez, 211 Or App 311, 321, 155 P3d 54 (2007) (quoting Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or 89, 99, 210 P2d 461 (1949)); State v. Tooley, 265 Or App 30, 32-33, 333 P3d 348, rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014); State v. Puckett, 332 Or App 64, 548 P3d 167, rev den, 372 Or 787 (2024) was to preclude courts from reexamining and setting aside jury verdicts based on a judicial assessment of the weight and persuasiveness of the evidence View the source document
Pennsylvania Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the trial judge's discretion and, if granted, produces a new trial; under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 the claim must be raised with the trial judge orally on the record or by written motion before sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion, or it is waived. No rule requires a written finding, but under Widmer the appellate scope of review is confined to the reasons the trial judge actually states, and the judge's grant or denial is itself reviewable — "the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is not unfettered." (b) APPELLATE COURT — no independent weight review: "Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence," and Clay reversed the Superior Court for having "stepped into the shoes of the trial judge and revisited the underlying question"; the remedy when a weight claim succeeds is always a new trial, never discharge, because such a claim "concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict" and "if granted would permit a second trial." (c) THE LENS — the trial court decides the weight question WITHOUT the verdict-favorable lens ("the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner"), while the appellate court applies no lens to the evidence at all — it asks only whether the record supports the trial judge. Pennsylvania expressly rejects the thirteenth-juror model: "Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror."	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 Case: Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745 (2000); Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013) Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. View the source document
Rhode Island Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — on a Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion founded on the weight of the evidence the trial justice "sits as a thirteenth juror," independently assessing credibility and weight through a three-step analysis (evidence in light of the charge; independent credibility/weight assessment; whether the justice would have reached a different result), and, if he or she disagrees with the verdict, a fourth step asking whether the verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and fails to do substantial justice; no written decision is required (the record need only reflect a few sentences of reasoning on each point), and the ruling is reviewable — in State v. Garcia the Supreme Court held the trial justice "clearly wrong," vacated the denial and remanded for a new hearing. (b) The Supreme Court does not itself re-weigh the evidence: it asks only whether the trial justice discharged the thirteenth-juror function, and will not disturb an adequately articulated ruling unless the justice "overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong"; the remedy when that standard is met is a new trial or a remand for a new hearing on the motion — never dismissal, which follows only from a sufficiency (Rule 29 judgment-of-acquittal) holding. (c) No light-most-favorable lens applies on the weight question — the trial justice weighs the evidence and picks which testimony to accept; Rhode Island reserves the "light most favorable to the prosecution, without assessing the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses" lens for the separate sufficiency branch of a new-trial motion, so weight and sufficiency are expressly not conflated.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 (motion within 10 days of verdict on non-newly-discovered-evidence grounds) Case: State v. Whitaker, No. 2007-145-C.A. (R.I. Nov. 13, 2013); State v. Garcia, No. 2024-265-C.A. (R.I. Apr. 27, 2026) a trial justice sits as a thirteenth juror and exercises his or her own independent judgment, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and other evidence, and must 'choose which conflicting testimony and evidence to accept and which to reject.' View the source document
South Carolina No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — the grant or refusal of a new trial is discretionary, and South Carolina appellate courts do entertain 'thirteenth juror' claims in criminal appeals, but the power is capped by the verdict: 'Where there is competent evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, the judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury' (State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 752 S.E.2d 263 (2013), quoting State v. Prince; accord State v. Miller, 287 S.C. 280, 283, 337 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1985)), so in criminal cases the inquiry collapses into a competent-evidence check rather than genuine reweighing. No written finding is required — Rule 29, SCRCrimP prescribes only the ten-day timing for post-trial motions and imposes no findings requirement — and a grant on the facts is practically unappealable by the State, which 'may only appeal a new trial order if, in granting it, the trial judge committed an error of law' (State v. DiCapua, Op. No. 26684 (S.C. 2009), quoting State v. Johnson). A refusal to grant a new trial IS reviewable, but only for abuse of discretion (State v. Garrett, 350 S.C. 613, 619, 567 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ct. App. 2002)); Curry itself reviewed and rejected such a claim. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no. There is no South Carolina analogue to Ohio manifest-weight review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5) or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E: the Supreme Court 'shall constitute a court for the correction of errors at law' (S.C. Const. art. V, § 5), and 'In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by factual findings of the trial court unless an abuse of discretion is shown,' and 'does not reevaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial judge's ruling is supported by any evidence' (State v. Blackwell-Selim, 392 S.C. 1, 3, 707 S.E.2d 426, 427 (2011)). Because no weight reversal exists, there is no weight remedy — the only evidence-based appellate reversal is for legal insufficiency. (c) THE LENS — deferential to the verdict throughout: 'An appellate court reviews the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State' (State v. Gilliland, 402 S.C. 389, 397, 741 S.E.2d 521, 525 (Ct. App. 2012), quoted in State v. Thompson, Op. No. 5492 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017)). No South Carolina court reviews a criminal verdict without that lens.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Const. art. V, § 5; Rule 29, SCRCrimP Case: State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 752 S.E.2d 263 (2013) (Op. No. 27335) (quoting State v. Prince, 316 S.C. 57, 64, 447 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1993)); accord State v. Miller, 287 S.C. 280, 283, 337 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1985); State v. Blackwell-Selim, 392 S.C. 1, 3, 707 S.E.2d 426, 427 (2011) Where there is competent evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, the judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury. View the source document
South Dakota Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: SDCL 23A-29-1 routes criminal new-trial motions through the civil rule, and SDCL 15-6-59(a)(6) makes 'Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law' a ground that criminal defendants do invoke (State v. Ramsay, 2007 S.D. 130, ¶ 15) — but South Dakota is not a thirteenth-juror state: the judge may not reweigh conflicting evidence and substitute his own judgment simply because he disagrees with the verdict, and may set the verdict aside only where the jury's finding is 'so unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported by the evidence' (Lewis v. Storms). A written order specifying 'each and every ground' is required only when a new trial is GRANTED (SDCL 15-6-59(g)); no written finding is required to deny, and a denial is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion (SDCL 23A-32-11; Ramsay ¶ 14; State v. Shelton, 2021 S.D. 22, ¶ 27). (b) APPELLATE COURT: No — South Dakota has no weight-of-the-evidence reversal power analogous to Ohio's Thompkins review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E; the Supreme Court reviews legal sufficiency only, so there is no weight remedy, whether new trial or dismissal. (c) THE LENS: on appeal the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the verdict — the Court 'do[es] not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence on appeal' (State v. Richter, 2025 S.D. 58, ¶ 32) — while at the trial level no light-most-favorable lens is prescribed for a new-trial motion, only the narrow unreasonableness test of Lewis.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 23A-29-1; SDCL 15-6-59(a)(6) and 15-6-59(g); SDCL 23A-32-11 Case: Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Storms, 290 N.W.2d 494 (S.D. 1980); State v. Ramsay, 2007 S.D. 130; State v. Richter, 2025 S.D. 58, ¶ 32 the mere presence of a conflict in the evidence does not license a trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, simply because it disagrees with the verdict View the source document
Tennessee Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(d) (renumbered from 33(f) in 2006) provides that "[t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence," and State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 120-22 (Tenn. 1995), holds the thirteenth-juror duty is "mandatory" in every criminal case and that approval is "a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a valid judgment"; NO written or explicit finding is required — where the judge simply overrules the new-trial motion the appellate court presumes approval. The judge's failure or refusal to exercise the function IS reviewable: where the record shows dissatisfaction with the weight of the evidence or a misapprehension of the thirteenth-juror role, reversal follows (State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn. 1995)); for a successor judge, whether he can act as thirteenth juror is reviewed de novo (State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2015)). (b) APPELLATE COURT — no. Tennessee appellate courts may not reverse on weight-of-the-evidence grounds; "the accuracy of a trial court's thirteenth juror determination is not a subject of appellate review" and once the verdict is approved "appellate review is limited to determining the sufficiency of the evidence" (Moats, 906 S.W.2d at 435, quoting State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). The only weight-related appellate action is to order a NEW TRIAL — never dismissal — when the trial court failed to discharge the thirteenth-juror duty; Moats holds a new trial is the sole remedy and rejects remand for the judge to perform it later. (c) THE LENS — split by forum: the trial judge as thirteenth juror weighs independently, with no deference lens (he "must weigh the evidence, pass upon the issues, and decide whether they are supported by the evidence" and "must be satisfied, as well as the jury," Curran v. State, quoted in Carter, 896 S.W.2d at 121); the appellate court, confined to Jackson sufficiency, views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" (Moats, 906 S.W.2d at 435), and the trial judge's approval as thirteenth juror "accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State" (State v. Grace, quoted in Moats, 906 S.W.2d at 433).	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(d) (formerly Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(f)) Case: State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2015) (n.12); State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. 1995) the duty of an appellate court is limited to reviewing whether a trial court performed its obligation as the thirteenth juror and does not include reweighing or reassessing the evidence View the source document
Texas No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: A Texas trial judge may grant a new trial 'when the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence' (Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(h)), but the Court of Criminal Appeals construes that ground as raising 'a sufficiency challenge and only a sufficiency challenge,' and holds a judge 'may not grant a new trial on mere sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or simply because he believes the defendant received a raw deal or is innocent' — there is no thirteenth-juror re-weighing power. Findings of fact are optional and may be oral or written, though a grant must be by written order (Rule 21.8(b)); a ruling on the motion, grant or denial, is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, so a refusal to grant is reviewable but nearly unreversible. (b) APPELLATE COURT: No — Brooks v. State overruled Clewis v. State and abolished factual-sufficiency (weight) review in Texas criminal appeals, leaving Jackson v. Virginia as the only sufficiency standard; a successful Jackson challenge yields acquittal, not a new trial, so it bars retrial. The one surviving pocket of weight review is a jury's rejection of an affirmative defense on which the defendant carried the burden of proof, where the remedy is reversal and remand for a new trial (Matlock v. State). (c) LENS: Light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury's credibility and weight determinations; only the narrow Matlock affirmative-defense review views the evidence in a neutral light.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(h); Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(b) Case: Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)); State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590, 594–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) We, therefore, overrule Clewis and decide that the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense View the source document
Utah No lens-free forum verified	(a) No Utah judge sits as a thirteenth juror: Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) permits a new trial only "in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party" and — unlike civil Rule 59(a)(6), which expressly lists "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict" — states no weight ground, and the trial judge's post-verdict evidentiary review (Rule 23 arrest of judgment) is measured by the identical standard an appellate court applies to a sufficiency claim, State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 15; neither Rule 23 nor Rule 24 requires the judge to make a written finding (Rule 24(b) requires only that the motion be in writing), and the judge's refusal is reviewable — Robbins itself reversed a denial. (b) Appellate courts do not reverse on weight: "we are not normally in the business of reassessing or reweighing evidence, and we resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict" (State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 32); the sole evidence-based ground is sufficiency, and its remedy is acquittal, not a new trial — Robbins remanded "with instructions for the trial court to enter an acquittal" (¶ 25). (c) The lens is with the verdict: on a motion to arrest judgment the court reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict" (Robbins ¶ 14, quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ¶ 11). The single narrow qualification is Robbins' "inherent improbability" exception, which lets a court disregard a sole witness's testimony only where there are material inconsistencies and no other direct or circumstantial evidence of guilt (¶ 19) — still a sufficiency doctrine, not weight review.	Source Statute / rule: Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (new trial); Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (arrest of judgment) Case: State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶¶ 14-15, 19, 25, 210 P.3d 288; State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 398; State v. Castillo, 2026 UT 26, ¶¶ 92-94 The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. View the source document
Vermont Trial judge only verified	(a) Yes — under V.R.Cr.P. 33 a Vermont trial judge may grant a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but Vermont expressly REJECTED the 'thirteenth juror' standard: relief lies 'only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise result' (State v. Ladabouche, 146 Vt. 279, 285 (1985)); no Vermont authority located requires written findings; and the ruling is reviewable, because it 'will stand on appeal unless defendant can show that the court's discretion was either totally withheld or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or unreasonable' (State v. Elkins, 155 Vt. 9, 18 (1990)) — so a judge who declines to exercise the discretion at all is reversible. (b) The Vermont Supreme Court has no independent weight-review power comparable to Ohio's Thompkins review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E; it reviews the trial court's Rule 33 ruling for abuse of discretion applying the same 'preponderates heavily' test, and the remedy on the weight track is a new trial, not dismissal — acquittal is available only on the separate sufficiency track under V.R.Cr.P. 29. (c) On the weight question the court does NOT view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict: 'A motion for a new trial requires the court to weigh the evidence,' and Ladabouche contrasts Rule 33 (where 'the trial court may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses') with Rule 29 (where evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the State).	Source Statute / rule: V.R.Cr.P. 33 Case: State v. Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 227 (1999); State v. Ladabouche, 146 Vt. 279, 285 (1985); State v. Elkins, 155 Vt. 9, 18 (1990) A motion for a new trial requires the court to weigh the evidence, but permits a new trial “only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” View the source document
Virginia No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — no thirteenth-juror power: Rule 3A:15(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia lets a circuit court set aside a guilty verdict only "for error committed during the trial or if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction," and Rule 3A:15(c) requires a judgment of acquittal (not a new trial) when the set-aside is for insufficiency; no written finding is required, and the civil "set aside as contrary to the evidence" mechanism of § 8.01-430 is limited by its own terms to "a civil action." The ruling is reviewable — § 8.01-680 reaches a criminal jury case and the court's "granting or refusing to grant a new trial" on a motion to set aside "on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence" — but only under the deferential "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it" standard, which Virginia treats as sufficiency review, not reweighing. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no weight-of-the-evidence reversal exists in Virginia; there is no analogue to Ohio's Thompkins manifest-weight review, N.Y. CPL 470.15(5), or Mass. G.L. c. 278 § 33E. Commonwealth v. Barney holds that an appellate court "does not 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt'" and that it "has long been deemed 'an abuse of the appellate powers to set aside a verdict and judgment, because an appellate court, from the evidence as written down, would not have concurred in the verdict.'" The only evidentiary reversal available is for legal insufficiency, and its remedy is reversal and dismissal (acquittal barring retrial), not a new trial. (c) THE LENS — the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party below, discarding the accused's conflicting evidence; there is no lens-free weight inquiry at any level.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-680; Rules of Sup. Ct. of Va. 3A:15(b), (c); cf. Va. Code § 8.01-430 (civil only) Case: Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84 (2023) (Record No. 211126, decided Mar. 16, 2023) the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it View the source document
Washington No lens-free forum verified	(a) CrR 7.5(a)(7) permits the trial judge to grant a new trial when 'the verdict or decision is contrary to law and the evidence,' but Washington construes that ground narrowly — 'In this state a trial judge is not deemed a "thirteenth juror"'; where there is substantial evidence on both sides of an issue the jury's finding is final and it is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial merely because the judge disagrees with the verdict (State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 221-22 (1981), expressly rejecting the contrary rule of State v. Brent). A written statement is required: CrR 7.5(d) requires an order granting a new trial to state whether it rests on the record or on matters outside it and to give 'definite reasons of law and facts.' Both the grant and the denial of a new-trial motion are reviewable — 'A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion' (State v. Moran, 181 Wn. App. 316 (2014)), and granting one on a ground not enumerated in the rule is itself an abuse of discretion (Williams). (b) No appellate weight review exists in Washington: post-verdict appellate review of the evidence is sufficiency-only under Jackson v. Virginia as adopted in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 (1980), and 'This court must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence' (State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821 (2004)); because there is no weight ground, the only evidentiary reversal available is for insufficiency, and its remedy is dismissal, not a new trial — 'Retrial following reversal for insufficient evidence is "unequivocally prohibited" and dismissal is the remedy' (State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97 (1998)). (c) The lens is verdict-favorable at every level: 'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant' (State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (1992)), and Washington recognizes no separate, lens-free weight inquiry in either the trial or the appellate court.	Source Statute / rule: CrR 7.5(a)(7), (d) (Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R.) Case: State v. Williams, 96 Wn.2d 215, 221-22, 634 P.2d 868 (1981) It has been repeatedly pointed out, however, that such discretion does not give a trial court license to weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the jury, simply because it may disagree with the verdict. View the source document
West Virginia No lens-free forum verified	(a) TRIAL COURT: the only textual grant is W. Va. R. Crim. P. 33 — "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice" — which requires no written finding; a ruling granting or denying a Rule 33 motion is reviewable and "will be reversed on appeal when it is clear that the trial court has acted under some misapprehension of the law or the evidence" (Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Blevins, 231 W. Va. 135, 744 S.E.2d 245 (2013), quoted in State v. Wilson, No. 20-0528 (W. Va. Aug. 27, 2021)). (b) APPELLATE COURT: no — West Virginia has no manifest-weight review; under State v. Guthrie the Supreme Court of Appeals reviews only Jackson sufficiency and "will not weigh evidence or determine credibility," setting a verdict aside "only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," so no separate weight remedy (new trial or dismissal) exists. (c) THE LENS: the reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and "must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution."	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. R. Crim. P. 33 Case: State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) (Syl. Pt. 3); State v. Blevins, 231 W. Va. 135, 744 S.E.2d 245 (2013) (Syl. Pt. 2) On review, we will not weigh evidence or determine credibility. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. View the source document
Wisconsin Appellate weight review verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — Wisconsin has no thirteenth-juror power: the only provision listing 'the verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of evidence' as a new-trial ground, Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1), is a civil rule that State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶ 66 holds 'is not a proper vehicle for a criminal defendant to seek a new trial,' so a defendant must ask for a new trial in the interest of justice in a timely Wis. Stat. § 974.02 / Rule 809.30 postconviction motion (Henley ¶¶ 63-65); no criminal rule imposes a written-finding requirement (§ 805.15(2)'s 'reasons… set forth on the record, or in the order or in a written decision' is civil), and a circuit court's ruling on such a motion is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion (State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶ 23). (b) APPELLATE COURT — yes, but the power is the appellate courts' alone: under Wis. Stat. § 752.35 (court of appeals) and § 751.06 (supreme court) a reviewing court may reverse whenever 'the real controversy has not been fully tried' or 'it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried,' and the remedy is a new trial, not dismissal or acquittal — the statute authorizes the court to 'remit the case to the trial court… for a new trial'; the power is confined to 'exceptional cases' and the court must expressly analyze why the case is exceptional (State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶ 52). (c) THE LENS — on the miscarriage-of-justice prong the court does NOT use Jackson's pro-verdict lens; it must be 'convinced that the defendant should not have been found guilty and that justice demands the defendant be given another trial' (Lock v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 110, 118 (1966), quoted in State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681 (1985)) — but State v. Kucharski, 2015 WI 64, ¶¶ 34, 36 forbids 'a bare reweighing of what the evidence means,' holding a § 752.35 reversal may not 'put the reviewing court in the shoes of the trier of fact,' while pure sufficiency review remains light-most-favorable-to-the-verdict under State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493 (1990). Wisconsin is thus roughly the mirror image of Georgia: weight-flavored relief sits with the appellate courts, not the trial judge.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. § 752.35 (court of appeals) and § 751.06 (supreme court); cf. Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1)-(2) (civil only) and § 974.02 Case: State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶¶ 23, 38, 345 Wis. 2d 407; State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶¶ 63-66; State v. Kucharski, 2015 WI 64, ¶¶ 34, 36 The supreme court and the court of appeals may set aside a conviction through the use of our discretionary reversal powers, though the circuit court does not have such discretionary powers. View the source document
Wyoming Trial judge only verified	(a) TRIAL COURT — yes: the judge may grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice" under W.R.Cr.P. 33(a), and in Ken v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court credited a district court's determination that it would have granted a new trial because the conviction was contrary to the weight of the evidence, reversing for ineffective assistance because counsel failed to file that motion; Rule 33 imposes no written-finding requirement (its sole writing requirement, in Rule 33(c), applies to newly-discovered-evidence motions decided without a hearing), and a refusal is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion, Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 28, 131 P.3d 963. (b) APPELLATE COURT — no: Wyoming has no manifest-weight review; the Supreme Court reviews legal sufficiency only and "do[es] not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses," Duncan v. State, 2026 WY 86, ¶ 10 (quoting Wilson v. State, 2024 WY 34, ¶ 3, 545 P.3d 435, 436–37). The remedy when weight relief is granted is a new trial, not dismissal — Ken, ¶ 34 n.5, holds retrial is not barred where the trial court concludes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (citing Tibbs v. Florida). (c) THE LENS — on appeal the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State; the trial judge ruling on a Rule 33 weight motion is not confined to that lens, as Ken shows the same district court found the evidence legally sufficient (denying acquittal) yet contrary to its weight.	Source Statute / rule: W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) Case: Ken v. State, 2011 WY 167, 267 P.3d 567 (Wyo. 2011) the court would have granted it on the ground that the attempted first degree murder conviction was contrary to the weight of the evidence and may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice View the source document

Counsel for a person under sentence of death

Six questions about appointed counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings, asked because a witness told the Committee on 21 August 2026 that Georgia is the only state with no mechanism for it.

Is a person under sentence of death entitled to appointed post-conviction counsel?

Whether statute, rule or controlling decision entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction or habeas petition, and whether the entitlement is mandatory or discretionary. Where the state has no death penalty, the cell records what remains on the books.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Mandatory, prospective only verified	MANDATORY, but only prospectively. Under the Fair Justice Act (Act 2017-417), codified at Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b), the trial court 'shall appoint' separate counsel for post-conviction relief within 30 days of pronouncing a death sentence, for any indigent capital defendant. The entitlement is limited by § 13A-5-53.1(j): 'This section shall apply to any defendant who is sentenced to death after August 1, 2017.' For a person sentenced to death on or before that date — which covers most of Alabama's existing death row — no mandatory provision applies; appointment then rests on Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) ('If the court does not summarily dismiss the petition, and if it appears that the petitioner is indigent… and it further appears that counsel is necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner, the court shall appoint counsel') and Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a) (judge 'may appoint counsel'), both of which are conditional and, under Rule 32.7(c), available only after a petition has been filed and survived summary dismissal.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b) (mandate); § 13A-5-53.1(j) (limited to death sentences imposed after August 1, 2017); Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) and Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a) (conditional/discretionary regime for earlier death sentences) Case: Ex parte State of Alabama (In re State v. Donnie Lee Abernathy), No. CR-2023-0825 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024) (appointment of separate postconviction counsel 'as required by § 13A-5-53.1(b)'); Belcher v. State, No. CR-2023-0206 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting § 13A-5-53.1(b) in full; FJA applies 'because Belcher was sentenced to death after August 2017') the trial court, within 30 days of the entry of the order pronouncing the defendant's death sentence, shall appoint the defendant a separate counsel for the purposes of post-conviction relief under this section. View the source document
Alaska No death penalty verified	No capital-specific entitlement exists, because Alaska has no capital sentence: the territorial legislature repealed the death penalty in 1957 (Ch. 132, SLA 1957) and it has never been restored, so no one is or can be under sentence of death. The generally applicable rule, which would govern a capital case if one existed, is MANDATORY for a first, timely application: AS 18.85.100(c) entitles an indigent person to representation at public expense 'for purposes of bringing a timely application for post-conviction relief under AS 12.72,' and Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1) provides that if the applicant is indigent 'counsel shall be appointed consistent with AS 18.85.100 to assist the applicant' (verified verbatim at https://courts.alaska.gov/rules/docs/crpro.pdf). The same statute withholds appointed counsel for untimely or successive applications, for petitions for review/certiorari, and for federal habeas. The Alaska Supreme Court has also grounded the first-PCR right to competent counsel in the state due process clause (Grinols v. State, 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003)).	Source Statute / rule: AS 18.85.100(c); Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1) Case: Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977) (n.5) (death penalty repealed 1957); Wassillie v. State, 331 P.3d 1285 (Alaska App. 2014) An indigent person is entitled to representation under (a) and (b) of this section for purposes of bringing a timely application for post-conviction relief under AS 12.72. View the source document
Arizona Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Arizona statute directs that once the Arizona Supreme Court affirms a death sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court (or, if it so authorizes, the presiding judge of the county of origin) SHALL appoint counsel for the capital defendant in the state post-conviction relief (Rule 32) proceeding. A.R.S. § 13-4041(B). The companion statute, A.R.S. § 13-4234(D), states the entitlement in terms of the prisoner: 'All indigent state prisoners under a capital sentence are entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent them in state postconviction proceedings,' and adds that on a SUCCESSIVE capital notice the trial court 'shall appoint the previous postconviction relief counsel' absent waiver or good cause. Court rule is to the same effect: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b) ('the Supreme Court or its designee must appoint counsel who meets the standards of Rules 6.5 and 6.8 and A.R.S. § 13-4041'). Indigency is the only condition (§ 13-4041(E) permits withdrawal if the court later finds the defendant not indigent); the defendant may personally waive counsel before the trial court under § 13-4041(D), but the offer of counsel is not discretionary.	Source Statute / rule: A.R.S. § 13-4041(B); A.R.S. § 13-4234(D); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b) the supreme court or, if authorized by the supreme court, the presiding judge of the county from which the case originated shall appoint counsel to represent the capital defendant in the state postconviction relief proceeding View the source document
Arkansas Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Arkansas entitles an indigent person under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction (Rule 37) petition, by statute and by court rule. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(a)(1)(A)(i) (Act 925 of 1997, the 'Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act of 1997') directs that on affirmance of a capital conviction the circuit court 'shall' hold a hearing within two weeks and enter a written order appointing counsel. Appointment is conditioned, not discretionary: § 16-91-202(a)(1)(B) requires a finding of indigency plus acceptance (or inability to make a competent decision), and (a)(1)(C) permits the court to decline 'only upon a written finding' that the petitioner rejects counsel or is not indigent. The parallel court rule, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1997 to 'opt in' under AEDPA, requires a hearing within 21 days of the mandate (Rule 37.5(b)(1)(A)) and appointment under Rule 37.5(b)(2); the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that Rule 37.5(b)(2) 'requires the court to appoint an attorney meeting the qualifications of Rule 37.5(c), if the person under the sentence of death is indigent and desires an appointed attorney' (Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001)). The appointment 'shall remain effective through any appeal of the post-conviction proceeding in state court.' § 16-91-202(a)(1)(A)(ii).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(a)(1)(A)(i) If a capital conviction and sentence are affirmed on direct appeal, the circuit court in which the conviction was obtained shall, within two (2) weeks after the affirmance, conduct a hearing and enter a written order appointing counsel to represent the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding View the source document
California Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Gov. Code § 68662 (as amended by Prop. 66, 2016) requires the superior court that imposed the death sentence to offer to appoint counsel for state postconviction proceedings and to enter an order; where the prisoner is indigent and accepts the offer (or cannot competently decide), subdivision (a) requires 'The appointment of one or more counsel to represent the prisoner in proceedings pursuant to Section 1509 of the Penal Code.' The only alternatives are a finding of knowing rejection (subd. (b)) or of non-indigency (subd. (c)). The California Supreme Court has characterized this as a statutory right: In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932 (majority opn.) held 'in California an indigent prisoner who is under a court judgment of death has a statutory right to the assistance of appointed counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief' (citing Gov. Code, § 68662). Morgan construed the pre-Prop. 66 version, under which the Supreme Court made the offer; Prop. 66 shifted the appointing court to the sentencing superior court but retained the 'shall offer to appoint' command. The right is statutory, not state-constitutional.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Gov. Code § 68662 Case: In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932 The superior court that imposed the sentence shall offer to appoint counsel to represent a state prisoner subject to a capital sentence for purposes of state postconviction proceedings, and shall enter an order containing one of the following: View the source document
Colorado No death penalty; provision remains verified	MANDATORY on the books, but the mechanism is now dormant. Colorado's unitary review scheme for death-sentenced defendants requires the trial court, at the advisement hearing held immediately after a death sentence is imposed, to appoint new postconviction counsel for an indigent defendant who elects to pursue postconviction review. The duty is conditional only in that the court shall NOT appoint if the defendant has retained counsel, knowingly waives counsel, or knowingly elects to keep trial counsel (thereby waiving ineffective-assistance claims). Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)(we) parallels the statute ('Appoint new counsel… absent waiver by the defendant'). Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020 and no one is under sentence of death, so the provision has no living occupant; it remains in force in the CRS 2025 printout and would govern a death sentence for an offense charged before July 1, 2020. Note the statute's own limit: § 16-12-205(5), 'The ineffectiveness of counsel during postconviction review shall not be a basis for relief.'	Source Statute / rule: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-205(1); accord Colo. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)(I) if the defendant chooses to pursue postconviction review, the trial court shall enter an order appointing new postconviction counsel for the defendant if the trial court finds that the defendant is indigent and either the defendant requests and accepts such appointment View the source document
Connecticut Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, but by way of the general habeas-counsel statute, not a capital-specific one. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a) provides that in 'any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter' the court 'shall,' upon an indigency determination, designate a public defender. Connecticut's collateral vehicle for a person under sentence of death is a state habeas petition under § 52-466, so a capital petitioner falls squarely inside § 51-296(a); the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kaddah described § 51-296(a) as one that 'requires the appointment of counsel' in any such proceeding. The duty is conditioned on the petitioner requesting counsel (the Judicial Branch petition forms JD-CV-175/176/177 contain a request box) and on an indigency investigation by the public defender. No statute, Practice Book rule or Supreme Court order singles out capital post-conviction counsel. Connecticut abolished the death penalty prospectively in 2012 (P.A. 12-5) and the Supreme Court voided all remaining death sentences in 2015-16, so no one is currently under sentence of death; the residual capital provisions that remain on the books are §§ 53a-46a and 53a-46b (limited to capital felonies committed before April 25, 2012) and the capital carve-out in § 52-470(f)(3).	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a); Conn. Practice Book § 23-26 Case: Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548 (2017) the right to counsel in § 51-296 (a), which requires the appointment of counsel in ''any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter.'' View the source document
Delaware No death penalty; provision remains verified	MANDATORY on the books, but now dormant. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 — the exclusive Delaware collateral remedy (Rule 61(a)(2)) — provides in subdivision (e)(2) that the judge SHALL appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion and contemporaneous request for counsel where the motion seeks to set aside one of three things, the third of which is, verbatim, '(iii) a sentence of death.' Rule 61(l)(1) separately guarantees that a defendant seeking to set aside a death sentence 'shall have a right to one postconviction proceeding.' The entitlement is a COURT RULE, not a statute, and it is unconditional for capital movants (no merit screen, unlike the discretionary provisions in (e)(3)-(e)(4) for guilty-plea and other cases). Because Delaware's death penalty was held unconstitutional in 2016 and repealed in 2024, and no one is under sentence of death, the provision currently has no possible occupant. Note the renumbering: this clause was Rule 61(e)(1)(iii) from June 4, 2014 until the Mar. 23, 2017 amendment moved it to (e)(2)(iii); pre-2014 Rule 61(e)(1) was purely discretionary.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(iii); see also R. 61(l)(1) The judge shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant’s first timely postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel if the motion seeks to set aside: View the source document
Florida Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. An indigent Florida prisoner under sentence of death is entitled to appointed counsel for a first state postconviction proceeding, by statute and by court rule. Fla. Stat. § 27.702(1) directs that the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) 'shall represent each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state' in collateral actions; § 27.702(2) repeats that CCRC 'shall represent persons convicted and sentenced to death within the region in collateral postconviction proceedings, unless a court appoints or permits other counsel to appear as counsel of record.' Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1) makes appointment automatic and non-discretionary: on issuance of the mandate affirming a death sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida 'must at the same time' appoint CCRC or direct the trial court to appoint registry counsel. Rule 3.851(b)(6) forbids a death-sentenced defendant from self-representing in state capital postconviction, so representation is not merely available but compulsory. The Florida Supreme Court characterizes this as a 'statutory right to counsel' — but it is a right to be represented only: §§ 27.7002(1)-(2) and 27.711(10) bar any claim that postconviction representation was inadequate, and the court held in Barwick and again in Silvia (2026) that there is no right to EFFECTIVE assistance of capital postconviction counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. Stat. § 27.702(1)-(2); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1), (b)(6) Case: Silvia v. State, No. SC2026-1162 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2026) The capital collateral regional counsel shall represent each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed against such person in the state courts View the source document
Georgia None verified	ABSENT. No Georgia statute, court rule, or decision entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state habeas petition — neither mandatory nor discretionary. The habeas article (O.C.G.A. §§ 9-14-40 to 9-14-53) and the death-penalty-specific section (§ 9-14-47.1) contain no counsel provision, and Uniform Superior Court Rule 44 (44.1–44.13, the capital state-habeas rule adopted by Supreme Court order effective 11 January 1996) sets schedules only. The Supreme Court of Georgia held in Gibson v. Turpin that there is no state or federal constitutional right to appointed habeas counsel, capital or not, and that creating one is for the General Assembly. Gibson remains controlling; nothing enacted since 1999 changes it.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47.1 (capital state-habeas procedure — no counsel provision); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42 Case: Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 856 (1999) (513 S.E.2d 186) It is well settled that there is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed counsel in Georgia habeas corpus proceedings. View the source document
Hawaii No death penalty verified	No capital-specific entitlement exists: ABSENT. Hawaii abolished capital punishment in 1957, has no death penalty, and no person can be under sentence of death, so no capital post-conviction counsel provision is on the books. What remains, and what would govern a death-sentenced petitioner if Hawaii had one, is a MANDATORY general provision: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) directs that when an indigent files a Rule 40 petition (Rule 40 is the exclusive post-conviction vehicle and 'shall encompass all common law and statutory procedures for the same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis'), the court 'shall refer' the petition to the public defender, subject only to a patent-frivolousness screen. The Hawaii Supreme Court treats this as an entitlement, not a discretion.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) (Rule 40 proceedings; Indigents) If the petition alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to afford counsel, the court shall refer the petition to the public defender for representation as in other penal cases View the source document
Idaho Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) ('Mandatory Appointment of Counsel for Post-Conviction Review After Imposition of Death Penalty') requires the sentencing district judge, immediately after imposing a death sentence, to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, which must assign at least two attorneys to pursue any post-conviction remedy under we.C. § 19-2719(4). The appointed attorneys must be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant before the death sentence. This displaces the general (discretionary) UPCPA counsel provision, we.C. § 19-4904, under which a court-appointed attorney only 'may be made available' at county expense; we.C. § 19-6009(3) expressly carves out cases in which the SAPD has jurisdiction under § 19-5905. The Idaho Supreme Court has described the rule as conferring a 'statutory right to counsel' on death-sentenced post-conviction petitioners (Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610 (2013)).	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) (adopted Jan. 26, 2022, eff. Feb. 1, 2022; amended Nov. 1, 2024); cf. Idaho Code § 19-4904 Case: Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013) Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge who sentenced the defendant must appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, who must assign at least two attorneys View the source document
Illinois No death penalty verified	ABSENT — and affirmatively repealed, not merely dormant. Illinois abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2011 (725 ILCS 5/119-1), so no person can be under sentence of death. Until 2024 the Post-Conviction Hearing Act still carried a MANDATORY capital-counsel provision, former § 122-2.1(a)(1): the court had to ask a death-sentenced indigent petitioner whether he wanted counsel and 'shall appoint counsel' if he did, with no frivolity screening (contrast the non-capital first-stage dismissal in § 122-2.1(a)(2)). P.A. 103-51 (HB 3762, eff. Jan. 1, 2024) struck that paragraph; the codified section now reads only '(1) (Blank).' The quote below is from the enrolled Public Act, where '(Blank).' is the inserted text and the sentence following it is the deleted (struck-through) language. Indigent post-conviction petitioners generally still get appointed counsel at the second stage under 725 ILCS 5/122-4, but that is the non-capital track.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (now '(Blank)'); 725 ILCS 5/119-1 (1) (Blank). If the petitioner is under sentence of death and is without counsel and alleges that he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. View the source document
Indiana Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.1(H) (the restyled successor to former Crim. R. 24(H)) requires that, within thirty days after rehearing on direct appeal is completed, either privately retained counsel or the State Public Defender 'must enter an appearance in the trial court' and give notice of intent to petition for post-conviction relief. The obligation is worded as a duty, not a discretion, and it is triggered automatically by the completion of direct review rather than by any motion from the prisoner. It is backed by Ind. Code § 33-40-1-2(a), which provides that the state public defender 'shall represent' an indigent person confined in an Indiana penal facility 'in a postconviction proceeding testing the legality of the person's conviction, commitment, or confinement, if the time for appeal has expired.' Note the one qualifier: the general post-conviction rule, Ind. P-C.R. 1(9)(a), frames the Public Defender's representation as available where the office 'determines the proceedings are meritorious and in the interests of justice,' and § 9(c) allows withdrawal on a no-merit certification; neither section contains an express capital carve-out. The capital-specific rule and the office's own published policy nevertheless make appearance in a death case automatic.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(H) (formerly Ind. Crim. R. 24(H)); Ind. Code § 33-40-1-2(a) Within thirty days following completion of rehearing, private counsel retained by the inmate or the State Public Defender (by deputy or by special assistant in the event of a conflict of interest) must enter an appearance in the trial court View the source document
Iowa No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital provision. Iowa has no death penalty and no person under sentence of death, so no state law entitles anyone to counsel for capital post-conviction. The death penalty was abolished by 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8), approved February 24, 1965; the maximum sentence for murder in the first degree — a class "A" felony under Iowa Code § 707.2(2) — is life imprisonment under § 902.1(1). Iowa Code ch. 822 (Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act) contains no occurrence of "capital," "death penalty" or "sentence of death," and neither do Iowa Code ch. 815 (indigent defense), ch. 13B (state public defender), or the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure (Iowa Ct. R. ch. 2) — each fetched and searched in full. Iowa's only post-conviction counsel provisions are the general, non-capital ones (Iowa Code §§ 815.10(1)(a), 822.5).	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 902.1(1) (2026); see also Iowa Code § 707.2(2); 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 the court shall enter a judgment of conviction and shall commit the defendant into the custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections for the rest of the defendant's life View the source document
Kansas Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2) requires that when a person 'convicted of capital murder and under a sentence of death' files a state habeas petition or a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court 'shall make a determination on the record' whether the movant is indigent and, upon finding indigency and acceptance (or incapacity to decide), 'shall appoint one or more counsel.' Unlike the non-capital rule in 22-4506(b) — which conditions appointment on the court finding 'substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact' — subsection (d) contains no merits screen. Counsel may be refused only if the movant is found competent and not indigent, or knowingly rejects the offer after a record finding. 22-4506(d)(3) bars trial/direct-appeal counsel from the PC appointment absent an express joint request; 22-4506(c) extends appointment to the appeal. One structural limit: the statutory right attaches upon the FILING of the petition, not before.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2); cf. K.S.A. 22-4506(b) Case: Kleypas v. State, 522 P.3d 304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022) (No. 124,152) Upon a finding that the petitioner or movant is indigent and accepts the offer of representation or is unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the offer, the court shall appoint one or more counsel View the source document
Kentucky Conditionally mandatory verified	CONDITIONALLY MANDATORY — but with no counsel as of right at the filing stage, and no capital-specific provision at all. Kentucky has no statute or rule that singles out prisoners under sentence of death; a capital prisoner uses the same vehicle as everyone else, RCr 11.42 (motion to vacate in the sentencing court). Under RCr 11.42(5) the trial court 'shall… appoint counsel' — no discretion — but only once three conditions converge: the Commonwealth's answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be resolved on the face of the record, the movant is indigent and without counsel of record, and the movant makes a 'specific written request.' There is NO entitlement to appointed counsel to investigate, draft, or file the initial capital RCr 11.42 motion. KRS 31.110(2)(c) separately provides that a needy person detained under a conviction 'is entitled to be… [r]epresented in any other post-conviction… proceeding, including any appeal,' subject to a merit screen ('if the department and the court… determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense, there shall be no further right to be represented by counsel'). But Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Ky. 2001), expressly overruled Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980) to the extent Ivey read KRS 31.110(2)(c) to compel judicial appointment on request; Fraser holds the statute governs when DPA MAY serve without appointment, while RCr 11.42(5) governs when a judge MUST appoint. Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132 (Ky. 2006) reaffirmed Fraser after the 2002 amendment to KRS 31.110 and described the rule-plus-statute package as a 'statutory right to counsel' carrying a right to minimally competent representation; the Moore dissent called that right 'conditional and incomplete.'	Source Statute / rule: KRS 31.110(2)(c) Case: Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001); Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132 (Ky. 2006) if the movant is without counsel of record and if financially unable to employ counsel, shall upon specific written request by the movant appoint counsel to represent the movant in the proceeding, including appeal View the source document
Louisiana Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. La. R.S. 15:178 requires the sentencing court, within thirty days of imposing a death sentence on an indigent whose trial counsel was appointed, to order the office of the state public defender to enroll a separate attorney for state post-conviction proceedings (in addition to appellate counsel). The 2025 amendment (Acts 2025, No. 393, §2, eff. Aug. 1, 2025) deleted the former qualifier 'if appropriate' and the former 'shall appoint the office… if appropriate' phrasing, leaving an unqualified 'shall order… to have enrolled.' The Louisiana Supreme Court had already treated the earlier version as conferring an enforceable entitlement: State v. Chester, 27 So. 3d 837, 838 (La. 2010) ('an indigent inmate on death row has a statutory right to appointed counsel to pursue post-conviction relief "if appropriate," La. R.S. 15:178'), while holding the right is statutory only (not compelled by Murray v. Giarratano) and therefore waivable by a competent prisoner. Two limits on the statute's face: it speaks to cases 'in which the trial counsel was provided to an indigent defendant' and 'in which the jury imposed the death penalty.'	Source Statute / rule: La. R.S. 15:178 (as amended by Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 22, §1, and Acts 2025, No. 393, §2) Case: State v. Chester, 27 So. 3d 837 (La. 2010) (per curiam) the court, within thirty days of the imposition of the sentence of death, shall order the office of the state public defender to have enrolled at least one attorney for direct appeal and at least one separate attorney for state post conviction proceedings View the source document
Maine No death penalty verified	ABSENT — and structurally inapplicable. Maine has no death penalty and no one under sentence of death, so no state law entitles (or could entitle) a capitally sentenced prisoner to appointed post-conviction counsel. For murder, Maine's most serious crime, the only authorized sentence is imprisonment: 17-A M.R.S. § 1603 requires life or a term of not less than 25 years, and the exhaustive list of sentencing alternatives in 17-A M.R.S. § 1502(2) contains no death sentence. Maine's post-conviction review chapter, 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (§§ 2121-2132), contains no capital-specific counsel provision of any kind; we read the full section list of the chapter. The only counsel route it provides is the general one in § 2129(1)(B) ('If the petitioner desires to have counsel appointed, the petitioner shall file an affidavit of indigency in the form prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Court'), which is the non-capital mechanism surveyed elsewhere.	Source Statute / rule: 17-A M.R.S. § 1603 (see also 17-A M.R.S. § 1502(2); 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132) Case: Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945) A person convicted of the crime of murder must be sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any term of years that is not less than 25. View the source document
Maryland No death penalty verified	No capital-specific entitlement exists: Maryland abolished the death penalty in 2013, and the same Act repealed Criminal Procedure Title 7, Subtitle 2 ("Proceedings After Death Sentences," former §§ 7-201 through 7-204) and struck the words "death or" from § 7-101 (scope) and § 7-103(b) (deadline). What remains is the general Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act entitlement, which is MANDATORY for a first petition — § 7-108(a) says a person "is entitled" to counsel and a hearing, with the only exception being a motion to reopen under § 7-104, where counsel is discretionary. The Court of Appeals applied § 7-108 to a petitioner then under sentence of death in Grandison v. State, 425 Md. 34 (2012), holding "the Act grants the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, except that in a request to reopen, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel should be given." Note that as amended, § 7-101 now reaches only a person "confined under sentence of imprisonment" or on parole/probation — the death-sentence hook is gone from the statute's text.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a) (general UPPA counsel entitlement); capital provisions repealed by 2013 Md. Laws ch. 156 Case: Grandison v. State, 425 Md. 34, 38 A.3d 352 (2012) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is entitled to assistance of counsel and a hearing on a petition filed under this title. View the source document
Massachusetts No death penalty verified	ABSENT — and necessarily so: Massachusetts has no death penalty and no one under sentence of death. No Massachusetts statute, court rule, or decision entitles (or has ever entitled) a person under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction or state habeas proceeding. The predicate is gone: G.L. c. 265, § 2 makes life imprisonment without parole the punishment for murder in the first degree, the only offense Massachusetts ever made capital in the modern era. The residual death-penalty statutes at G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 (held unconstitutional, never repealed) contain no post-conviction counsel provision of any kind.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 2(a) Case: Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) any person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to section 133A of chapter 127 View the source document
Michigan No death penalty verified	ABSENT — and necessarily so: Michigan's constitution forbids the legislature from ever enacting a death penalty, so no person can be under sentence of death in Michigan and no capital post-conviction counsel entitlement exists in any statute or court rule. The only post-conviction counsel provision on the books, MCR 6.505(A) (subchapter 6.500, 'Postappeal Relief'), is discretionary and contains no capital carve-out. Statutory abolition dates to 1846; the constitutional bar took effect January 1, 1964.	Source Statute / rule: Mich Const 1963, art 4, § 46 No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death. View the source document
Minnesota No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital-specific entitlement, because Minnesota has no death penalty and therefore no person under sentence of death. No Minnesota statute or rule creates a capital post-conviction counsel right: full-text checks of Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (postconviction relief), ch. 589 (habeas corpus), ch. 611 (public defender) and ch. 609 (criminal code) return zero occurrences of 'capital', 'death penalty', 'sentence of death' or 'punishable by death'. What remains on the books is a sentence-neutral general provision: Minn. Stat. § 590.05 lets an indigent postconviction petitioner apply to the state public defender, whose duty to represent is mandatory ('shall represent') only for a petitioner who has not already had a direct appeal, and discretionary ('may represent') for everyone else. Minn. Stat. § 611.14(2) parallels this. The maximum felony sentence is life imprisonment (Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1; § 609.185).	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.05 (indigent petitioners); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14(2), 609.10, subd. 1, 609.185 A person financially unable to obtain counsel who desires to pursue the remedy provided in section 590.01 may apply for representation by the state public defender. View the source document
Mississippi Mandatory verified	MANDATORY for the first state post-conviction proceeding. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(c) — adopted/amended by Supreme Court order in 1999-2000 and applicable only to 'Post-conviction Proceedings Filed by Persons Under Sentence of Death' — provides that the capital petitioner 'shall be represented by qualified counsel' unless he makes an informed, voluntary, on-the-record election to proceed pro se (in which case appointed counsel remains as advisor). Rule 22(c)(1)(ii) requires the Supreme Court, immediately after deciding the direct appeal, to order the convicting court to determine indigence and whether the petitioner wants appointed counsel. The statutory counterpart, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9), directs that in death cases 'appointment of post-conviction counsel shall be made by the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel upon order entered by the Supreme Court' (quoted in the Mississippi Attorney General's Oct. 6, 2025 28 U.S.C. § 2265 application). The entitlement attaches to the initial petition; Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017), holds Rule 22(c) does not apply to successive petitions.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (court rule); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9) Case: Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017) (Rule 22(c) governs initial, not successive, capital PCR) The petitioner shall be represented by qualified counsel unless the petitioner has elected to proceed pro se, and the convicting court finds, after a hearing on the record, that the petitioner's election is informed and voluntary. View the source document
Missouri Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Missouri provides appointed counsel as of right — indeed TWO lawyers — to a prisoner under sentence of death who files a first state post-conviction motion. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.16(a) (conviction after trial) directs that within 30 days after a Rule 29.15 motion to set aside a death sentence is filed, 'the court shall cause two counsel to be appointed for the movant.' The parallel Rule 24.036(a) applies to a death sentence following a guilty plea. The statutory counterpart, Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.1, conditions the appointment on a finding of indigency ('the court shall find on the record whether the movant is indigent. If the movant is indigent, the court shall cause to be appointed two counsel'); the rule states the duty unconditionally. Either way the verb is 'shall.' The movant may not even refuse the appointment unless the court first finds on the record that he is competent to decide and understands the legal consequences of refusing.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(a) (and parallel R. 24.036(a)); Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.1 Within 30 days after a motion is filed as provided in Rule 29.15 to set aside a sentence of death, the court shall cause two counsel to be appointed for the movant. View the source document
Montana Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) creates a self-executing entitlement for a person under sentence of death. Within 30 days after a capital conviction becomes final the sentencing court SHALL notify the prisoner of the right; within 75 days it SHALL order the Office of the State Public Defender to assign counsel, pending OPD's indigency determination and the prisoner's acceptance. The court may deny or rescind the order only if the petitioner is found not indigent, or if the prisoner knowingly rejects the offer after findings; if a non-indigent petitioner later becomes indigent, the court 'shall order the assignment of counsel.' This is distinct from the non-capital rule in § 46-21-201(2), which is conditioned on a hearing being required or the interests of justice. Caveat a hostile reader will raise: § 46-21-201(3)(f) provides that 'Violation of this subsection (3) is not a basis for a claim or relief under this chapter' — the right is mandatory but not itself remediable in post-conviction.	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) (also §§ 46-21-201(3)(b), (3)(d), (3)(f)) the court will order the office of state public defender to assign counsel who meets the Montana supreme court's standards and the office of state public defender's standards for competency of assigned counsel in proceedings under this chapter for an indigent person sentenced to death. View the source document
Nebraska Discretionary verified	DISCRETIONARY. Nebraska has no capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision. A prisoner under sentence of death proceeds under the same Nebraska Postconviction Act as everyone else, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004, and § 29-3004 provides only that the district court 'may appoint' up to two attorneys. There is no 'shall appoint' for capital cases anywhere in Chapter 29 (the only mandatory post-conviction appointment in the chapter is § 29-4122, for DNA-testing motions, which is not capital-specific). Nebraska case law adds a floor rather than an entitlement: appointment is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and where the motion presents a justiciable issue of law or fact an indigent movant is entitled to counsel (State v. Wiley, 228 Neb. 608 (1988)); where the claims are procedurally barred or meritless, denial is not error. The Nebraska Supreme Court applied exactly that framework to a death-sentenced prisoner in State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306 (1993), affirming the denial of appointed counsel to Clarence Victor for his first state post-conviction motion, and holding that neither the Eighth Amendment nor due process requires a state to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state post-conviction relief.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 Case: State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993) The district court may appoint not to exceed two attorneys to represent the prisoners in all proceedings under sections 29-3001 to 29-3004. View the source document
Nevada Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. NRS 34.820(1)(a) directs that where a petitioner has been sentenced to death and the petition is the first one challenging the judgment of conviction or sentence, the court 'shall' appoint counsel and stay the execution. The mandate is textually unconditional: unlike the general discretionary provision (NRS 34.750(1), court 'may appoint counsel'), NRS 34.820 states no separate indigency finding and no discretion. It is, however, triggered by the filing of a first petition — the statute speaks to what the court must do once 'the petition is the first one,' not to appointing counsel before any petition exists. Limited to the FIRST petition; successive capital petitions fall back to the discretionary NRS 34.750.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.820(1)(a) (cf. § 34.750(1)) Case: Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997) (appointment under this scheme is 'by statutory mandate') If a petitioner has been sentenced to death and the petition is the first one challenging the validity of the petitioner's judgment of conviction or sentence, the court shall: (a) Appoint counsel to represent the petitioner View the source document
New Hampshire Discretionary verified	No mandatory entitlement. New Hampshire has no capital-specific post-conviction counsel statute; a person under sentence of death is covered only by the generally applicable indigent-defense statute, RSA 604-A:2, we, under which the court 'shall appoint counsel… when the interests of justice or judicial economy require' — i.e., appointment turns on a case-by-case judicial finding rather than on the fact of a death sentence. The state agency that administers the appointment (the NH Judicial Council) itself describes the power as one the court 'exercises its discretion' to use. Trial-level appointed counsel does not carry over: under N.H. R. Crim. P. 5(j) the appearance of appointed counsel 'shall be deemed to be withdrawn thirty days after sentence is imposed' (subject to appeal under Sup. Ct. R. 32), so a new appointment must be sought for collateral proceedings. No New Hampshire decision construing the post-conviction clause in a capital case was located.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:2, I In a post-conviction proceeding in which a defendant seeks to attack the validity of an underlying conviction, the court shall appoint counsel or approve a request for services other than counsel when the interests of justice or judicial economy require. View the source document
New Jersey No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital-specific right, because New Jersey has no death penalty: L.2007, c.204 (approved December 17, 2007) eliminated it and deleted N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 subsections c. through h. (the capital sentencing scheme). No capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision exists or ever existed as a separate instrument. What applies instead is the general, non-capital rule: R. 3:22-6(a) makes assignment of the Office of the Public Defender MANDATORY ('shall as of course') on an indigent defendant's FIRST post-conviction relief petition attacking an indictable conviction — which is the provision that would reach a murder conviction. Assignment is conditioned on the prisoner first filing a petition with a sworn statement of indigency and on the Criminal Presiding Judge finding indigency; it is not automatic on the sentence. The one capital-specific PCR provision that survived abolition, R. 3:22-12(b) ('Capital Causes; Petition'), was deleted by the Supreme Court effective September 1, 2017, so nothing capital-specific remains on the books.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a); L.2007, c.204 (amending N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3) the court shall as of course, unless defendant affirmatively states an intention to proceed pro se, by order assign the matter to the Office of the Public Defender if the defendant's conviction was for an indictable offense View the source document
New Mexico Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, by court rule. Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA (Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts, habeas corpus) directs that when a sentence of death has been imposed, the district court 'shall promptly appoint counsel' upon issuance of the Supreme Court mandate affirming the death sentence. Appointment is automatic and trigger-based — it does not require a request, a filed petition, or a threshold merits screen, and unlike the non-capital track (Rule 5-802(H)(2)(c), which conditions appointment on non-dismissal and on 'the standards of the Indigent Defense Act, Section 31-16-3 NMSA 1978'), paragraph L contains no indigency or merits qualifier. Rule 5-802 governs the whole of New Mexico state post-conviction practice; paragraph H expressly applies only 'If a sentence of death has not been imposed,' and paragraph L supplies the separate capital track. The rule is a Supreme Court rule, not a statute; New Mexico has no capital post-conviction counsel statute that we could locate.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA Death penalty cases. If a sentence of death has been imposed (1) upon issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court affirming the sentence of death, the district court shall promptly appoint counsel to represent the defendant; View the source document
New York No death penalty; provision remains verified	MANDATORY, on the books. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b) entitles a defendant who is financially unable to obtain adequate representation to appointed counsel 'after the entry of a judgment imposing a sentence of death but before final resolution of a direct appeal… and of an appeal… from an order denying an initial post judgment motion pursuant to section 440.10 or 440.20.' § 35-b(2) makes the assignment obligatory and allocates it: the trial (superior) court 'shall assign' lead counsel for the initial CPL 440.10/440.20 motion, and the Court of Appeals 'shall assign' counsel for the appeal from its denial. The entitlement is expressly limited to the FIRST post-judgment motion: 'In the event such defendant seeks to file any subsequent motion, he or she shall not be eligible for the appointment of counsel pursuant to this section' (§ 35-b(1)). The provision is dormant, not repealed: New York's death-sentencing statute has been unenforceable since People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004), and no one has been under sentence of death since People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007).	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b), (2) With respect to an initial motion pursuant to section 440.10 or 440.20 of the criminal procedure law, and any appeal therefrom, the appropriate court shall assign lead counsel only. The trial court shall assign counsel in connection with such a motion View the source document
North Carolina Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, conditioned on the prisoner filing a timely application. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(c) provides that an indigent defendant 'who is under a sentence of death and desires counsel may apply to the Office of Indigent Defense Services for the appointment of counsel to represent the defendant in preparing, filing, and litigating a motion for appropriate relief,' with the application due no later than 10 days from the latest of three specified events (issuance of the N.C. Supreme Court's direct-appeal mandate with the U.S. cert. period expired; denial of cert.; or the U.S. Supreme Court leaving the death sentence undisturbed). Subsection (c1) then removes all discretion: a defendant previously adjudicated indigent 'shall be presumed indigent' and IDS 'shall appoint two counsel'; if not previously adjudicated indigent, IDS asks the superior court to determine indigency and, on a finding of indigency, IDS 'shall then appoint two counsel.' Two counsel, not one. No merit screening, no leave of court, and no hearing is required — § 7A-451(c2) provides the defendant has no right to be present and the appointment 'need not be made in open court.' Section 7A-451(e) bars appointing prior trial or direct-appeal counsel unless the defendant expressly requests it and waives future ineffective-assistance allegations. The one real gate is the prisoner's own 10-day application window; counsel is not appointed sua sponte.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(c), (c1), (c2), (e) Case: State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276 (1998) If the defendant was previously adjudicated indigent, the defendant shall be presumed indigent for purposes of this subsection, and the Office of Indigent Defense Services shall appoint two counsel to represent the defendant. View the source document
North Dakota No death penalty verified	No capital-specific provision exists, because North Dakota has no death penalty: N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01 divides all offenses into seven classes whose highest maximum penalty is life imprisonment without parole, and murder (§ 12.1-16-01) is a class AA felony. What remains on the books is the general Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act counsel provision, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1), which is MANDATORY on request plus a finding of indigency ('counsel shall be provided at public expense') and would govern any post-conviction applicant, capital or not. There is thus no capital post-conviction counsel entitlement to classify as mandatory, discretionary or absent — the underlying sentence cannot be imposed.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1) (residual general provision); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-32-01, 12.1-16-01 If an applicant requests counsel and the court is satisfied that the applicant is indigent, counsel shall be provided at public expense to represent the applicant. View the source document
Ohio Mandatory verified	MANDATORY for a first, timely state post-conviction petition. Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(1) (current version effective April 12, 2021) directs that when a person sentenced to death intends to file a post-conviction petition, the court SHALL appoint counsel on a finding of indigency, and may decline only on a finding that the person knowingly rejects counsel or is not indigent. Ohio appellate courts construe 'a petition under this section' in the first clause as reaching only a timely-filed FIRST petition — successive or untimely capital petitions carry no statutory right to appointed counsel (State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 26-29 (10th Dist.), following State v. Conway, 2013-Ohio-3741, State v. Waddy, 2016-Ohio-4911, and State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-4995). Section 2953.21(J)(2) also bars any ineffective-assistance claim arising from that appointed representation.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(1) Case: State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 26-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. May 22, 2025) If a person sentenced to death intends to file a petition under this section, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the person upon a finding that the person is indigent View the source document
Oklahoma Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. An indigent prisoner under sentence of death gets appointed counsel for the original state capital post-conviction application. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) commands that the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS) 'shall represent all indigent defendants in capital cases seeking post-conviction relief' once the district court appoints it after an indigency hearing, and Rule 1.14(D)(2), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, requires trial counsel in every capital case where the defendant is indigent for appeal to 'ensure the appropriate application is presented to the District Court for the appointment of counsel both for direct appeal and application for post-conviction relief' (https://www.okcca.net/rules/rule-1.14/). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held the entitlement is statutory rather than constitutional and carries with it a right to reasonably effective counsel (Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11, ¶ 24), and has refused to let a death-sentenced petitioner waive it (Stouffer v. State, 2007 OK CR 4). Textual nuance a hostile reader will press: the statute phrases the duty as running to OIDS 'upon appointment by the appropriate district court' rather than saying in terms that the court 'shall appoint'; the appointment obligation is supplied by Rule 1.14(D)(2) and by the OCCA's own characterization of OIDS as the agency 'charged with representing all indigent capital post-conviction applicants.'	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) (version effective 11/1/2022, operative as of Sept. 2026) Case: Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11, ¶ 24, 531 P.3d 649; Stouffer v. State, 2007 OK CR 4, ¶ 7, 154 P.3d 88 The Oklahoma Indigent Defense System shall represent all indigent defendants in capital cases seeking post-conviction relief upon appointment by the appropriate district court after a hearing determining the indigency of any such defendant. View the source document
Oregon Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Oregon has no separate capital post-conviction statute; the general Post-Conviction Hearing Act counsel provision, ORS 138.590, governs and expressly contemplates petitioners under sentence of death. A petitioner unable to pay the expenses of a proceeding or to employ 'suitable counsel possessing skills and experience commensurate with the nature of the conviction and complexity of the case' is ordered to proceed as a financially eligible person, and in that order 'the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel.' Capital-specific subsections confirm the entitlement reaches the death-sentenced: ORS 138.590(2) ('If the court finds that a petitioner who has been sentenced to death is not competent to decide whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel, the court shall appoint counsel'); (3) (waiver colloquy and on-the-record findings required if a death-sentenced petitioner rejects appointment); (9) (court may not appoint prior trial or automatic-review counsel absent express request by petitioner and counsel). Two limits a hostile reader should know: the duty is conditioned on financial eligibility, and it attaches to a petition already filed — counsel is appointed by the court 'in which the petition is filed' and may move to amend within 15 days after appointment (ORS 138.590(5)).	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.590(2), (3), (4), (9) (2025 ed.) In the order to proceed as a financially eligible person, the circuit court shall appoint suitable counsel to represent petitioner. Counsel so appointed shall represent petitioner throughout the proceedings in the circuit court. View the source document
Pennsylvania Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, by court rule rather than statute. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1) (redesignated 904(h)(1) by order of April 21, 2026, effective November 1, 2026) directs that at the conclusion of direct review in a death penalty case, upon remand of the record, the trial judge SHALL appoint new counsel for first post-conviction collateral review. Appointment is automatic and, unlike Rule 904(C)/(c) for non-capital petitioners, is not textually conditioned on the defendant first filing a petition or satisfying the judge of indigency; it is excused only if (i) the defendant elects pro se status or waiver after an on-record competency colloquy, (ii) the defendant knowingly waives ineffectiveness claims and keeps trial/appellate counsel, or (iii) the defendant has engaged counsel. The appointment runs 'throughout the post-conviction collateral proceedings, including any appeal.' The PCRA statute itself (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546) contains no counsel provision; the Supreme Court has held the rule-based right carries an enforceable right to EFFECTIVE post-conviction counsel (Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699-700 (Pa. 1998), a capital case).	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1) (234 Pa. Code Rule 904; subdivision redesignated (h)(1) eff. Nov. 1, 2026, 56 Pa.B. 2555) Case: Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015) (quoting and applying Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1) in a capital PCRA case) upon remand of the record, the trial judge shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction collateral review View the source document
Rhode Island No death penalty verified	No capital-specific provision exists, because Rhode Island has no death penalty and no one can be under sentence of death (R.we. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 fixes life imprisonment as the penalty for first-degree murder; the death sentence was struck from § 11-23-2 by P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 1, as the History of Section on that page shows). The residual provision that would govern is the general post-conviction counsel statute, R.we. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5, which is MANDATORY and unqualified: every indigent applicant — for any conviction, of any severity — is entitled to the public defender, and the court must assign substitute counsel if the public defender cannot serve. Rhode Island's PCR chapter (§§ 10-9.1-1 to -12) contains no capital carve-out, no separate capital-counsel section, and no capital exception.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 (residual, generally applicable); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (no death sentence) Case: Pona v. State, No. 2022-150-M.P. (R.I. Feb. 3, 2025) (holding 'shall' in § 10-9.1-5 mandatory for a first-time indigent applicant) An applicant who is indigent shall be entitled to be represented by the public defender. View the source document
South Carolina Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B), enacted as part of the South Carolina Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Act No. 448, § 6), directs that where a person sentenced to death files a post-conviction relief application and is indigent and desires counsel, 'two counsel shall be immediately appointed.' The entitlement is conditioned on (i) indigency and (ii) the applicant wanting counsel — the same subsection permits the applicant to elect to proceed pro se on an on-the-record waiver. It is triggered by the filing of the application: subsection (A) provides that the application is filed in the county of indictment and forwarded to an assigned PCR judge, and subsection (B) opens 'Upon receipt of the application.' The South Carolina Supreme Court has treated the provision as conferring a 'state-created right to qualified counsel' in capital PCR (Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016)). Nothing in Title 17 provides counsel to prepare and file the initial application itself.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B) Case: Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016) If the applicant is indigent and desires representation by counsel, two counsel shall be immediately appointed to represent the petitioner in this action. View the source document
South Dakota Discretionary verified	DISCRETIONARY, and not capital-specific. South Dakota's only state collateral remedy is habeas corpus under SDCL ch. 21-27, and the sole counsel provision — SDCL 21-27-4 — applies to every indigent habeas applicant alike; nothing in SDCL ch. 21-27 or in the capital-punishment chapter (SDCL ch. 23A-27A, whose 68 sections we read section-by-section) entitles a person under sentence of death to appointed post-conviction counsel as of right. Under 21-27-4 the court appoints only if (a) the application is made 'in good faith' — construed in State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, ¶ 13, to mean non-frivolous — and (b) the judge affirmatively finds appointment 'necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding.' The South Dakota Supreme Court applied the current text in Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38, ¶ 21 (statutory right 'under certain conditions'), and the dissent there restated the settled rule that '[a]ppointment of counsel for a habeas petition is at the habeas court's discretion,' reviewed only for abuse of discretion (¶ 60). The 'shall' in the statute is therefore conditional on a judicial finding, not an entitlement. Note the 2012 amendment (SL 2012, ch. 118, § 4) inserted the necessity-finding condition and simultaneously provided that ineffectiveness of collateral counsel 'is not grounds for relief under this chapter.'	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-4 Case: Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38; State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, 793 N.W.2d 63 the court or judge shall, if the judge finds that such appointment is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding, appoint counsel for the indigent person pursuant to chapter 23A-40 View the source document
Tennessee Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Tennessee entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel on a first state post-conviction petition. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a) commands that once a filed petition states a colorable claim the judge 'shall' enter a preliminary order appointing counsel for an indigent petitioner; Rule 28 governs all post-conviction proceedings, including capital ones (see id. § 6(B)(8), addressing 'capital cases involving indigent petitioners,' and § 11, 'Withdrawal of Post-Conviction Petition in Capital Case'). The same mandate appears in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(d)(1)(D) (post-conviction proceedings are a 'covered case' in which the court must advise the party that counsel will be appointed if indigent) and § 1(e)(3) ('Upon finding a party indigent, the court shall enter an order appointing counsel'). The entitlement is conditioned, not unconditional: it attaches after a petition has been filed and survives colorable-claim screening. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107(b)(1) is the parallel statutory provision, but we could not fetch its text from a primary source (Justia, FindLaw, casetext and tncourts.gov all blocked we), so the verified authority here is the Supreme Court rule.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, §§ 1(d)(1)(D), 1(e)(3) In the event a colorable claim is stated, the judge shall enter a preliminary order which: (a) appoints counsel, if petitioner is indigent View the source document
Texas Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2 entitles an indigent person sentenced to death to appointed counsel for the initial state habeas application. Section 2(a) requires that 'an applicant shall be represented by competent counsel' unless he makes a knowing pro se election found valid after a hearing. Section 2(b) requires the convicting court, immediately after the death judgment is entered under art. 42.01, to determine indigence and whether the defendant wants habeas counsel; if so the court 'shall appoint' the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs. Section 2(c) requires that appointment 'at the earliest practical time, but in no event later than 30 days' after those findings. The duty is triggered automatically at judgment — the prisoner need not file anything first.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2(a), (b), (c) An applicant shall be represented by competent counsel unless the applicant has elected to proceed pro se and the convicting trial court finds, after a hearing on the record, that the applicant's election is intelligent and voluntary. View the source document
Utah Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, and automatic. Under Utah Code § 78B-9-202(1)(a) (current text effective 5/6/2026, added by H.B. 495, Laws of Utah 2026, ch. 345), within 30 days after the Utah Supreme Court remits a case following affirmance of a conviction and death sentence, the sentencing court 'shall' both advise the individual of the Postconviction Remedies Act and appoint postconviction counsel under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. No request by the prisoner is required — under the prior version (eff. 5/4/2022, superseded 5/6/2026) appointment was mandatory only 'If a petitioner requests the court to appoint counsel.' The individual may retain private counsel or waive appointment, but § 78B-9-202(1)(c) requires the court to make a finding on the individual's understanding of the consequences of proceeding without counsel. Trial and direct-appeal counsel may not be appointed (§ 78B-9-202(1)(d)). The entitlement is statutory, not constitutional: § 78B-9-202(4) provides that nothing in the chapter creates a right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel and bars relief on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective. For a SECOND or successive petition, public-expense appointment is prohibited except for newly-discovered-evidence claims (§ 78B-9-104(1)(e)(i)) or new-rule claims (§ 78B-9-104(1)(g)) that could not have been raised earlier (§ 78B-9-202(2)).	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(1)(a) (effective May 6, 2026) the sentencing court shall: (i) advise the individual, in open court and on the record, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the individual's conviction and sentence; and (ii) appoint counsel to represent the individual on a petition for postconviction relief View the source document
Vermont No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital-specific entitlement, and moot: Vermont has no death penalty and no one under a state sentence of death. There is no statute, court rule or decision entitling a person under sentence of death to appointed counsel for state post-conviction, because no state death sentence can be imposed — 13 V.S.A. § 2303 caps murder at life without parole, the treason death penalty was struck out of 13 V.S.A. § 3401 by 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, and the entire execution subchapter, 13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107, was repealed by § 8 of the same act, both effective June 6, 2024. What Vermont law does provide, and what would reach a death-sentenced prisoner if one existed, is the ordinary collateral-review scheme: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 lets 'a prisoner who is in custody under sentence of a court' move to vacate the sentence, and 13 V.S.A. § 7137 makes counsel DISCRETIONARY in terms ('The court may appoint counsel'), while the Defender General act is mandatory in terms — 13 V.S.A. § 5232 provides that 'Counsel shall be assigned under section 5231 of this title to represent needy persons in… habeas corpus and other proceedings wherein the person is confined in a penal or mental institution in this state and seeks release therefrom,' and 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3) extends assigned-counsel services to 'any other postconviction proceeding which may have more than a minimal effect on the length or conditions of detention,' subject to the assigned attorney's own merit assessment. Nothing in any of these provisions is capital-specific; none mentions a death sentence.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7137 (assignment of counsel in petitions for review); 13 V.S.A. §§ 5231, 5232(2), 5233(a)(3); 13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107 (repealed eff. June 6, 2024); 13 V.S.A. § 3401 (as amended 2024); 13 V.S.A. § 2303 The court may appoint counsel if the prisoner is unable financially to employ counsel View the source document
Virginia No death penalty verified	ABSENT — and moot. Virginia abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2021 (2021 Acts Sp. Sess. We, cc. 344, 345), and the same act repealed Article 4.1 of Chapter 10 of Title 19.2 ('Counsel in Capital Cases'), which had contained the only state entitlement to appointed counsel for a death-sentenced prisoner in state habeas. Before repeal, Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 was MANDATORY: after affirmance of a death sentence the court 'shall' appoint habeas counsel within 30 days. No capital-counsel provision remains on the books; the current § 19.2-163.7 page in the Code reads only 'Repealed.'	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 and § 19.2-163.8 (repealed by 2021 Acts Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345, cl. 2, eff. July 1, 2021) §§ 19.2-163.7, 19.2-163.8. Repealed. Repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2021. View the source document
Washington No death penalty; provision remains verified	MANDATORY on the books, but now dormant. RCW 10.73.150 opens 'Counsel shall be provided at state expense to an adult offender convicted of a crime… when the offender is indigent… and the offender:' and item (3) of that list is a person 'under a sentence of death' who 'requests counsel be appointed to file and prosecute a motion or petition for collateral attack as defined in RCW 10.73.090.' So for a FIRST state collateral attack the entitlement is mandatory on request (the prisoner must ask); for a second or subsequent one the same subsection is discretionary ('Counsel may be provided at public expense… if the court determines that the collateral attack is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 or 10.73.140'). RCW 10.73.150 has not been amended since 1995 (1995 c 275 s 2) and was NOT touched by the 2023 death-penalty repeal (2023 c 102), so the capital provision remains in the current code. It has no one to operate on: Washington's death penalty was held unconstitutional in 2018 and the death-penalty statutes were repealed in 2023, and the implementing court rule was rescinded effective September 1, 2026.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.150(3) Is under a sentence of death and requests counsel be appointed to file and prosecute a motion or petition for collateral attack View the source document
West Virginia No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital-specific entitlement, because West Virginia has no death penalty and no one can be under sentence of death. W. Va. Code § 61-11-2 abolished capital punishment (1965) for all offenses and did so retroactively, barring execution of anyone 'heretofore or hereafter convicted.' No capital-specific post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books. The residual, non-capital-specific provision is W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a), which directs the court to appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction habeas petitioner, but only on findings that the petition was filed in good faith and 'has merit or is not frivolous' — a conditional, screened right, not an automatic one, and it contains no capital track.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 61-11-2 (capital punishment abolished); residual: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) Case: Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W. Va. 137, 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975) Capital punishment is hereby abolished for all offenses against the laws of the State of West Virginia, and no person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any offense in violation of said laws shall be executed View the source document
Wisconsin No death penalty verified	ABSENT as a capital-specific right, because Wisconsin has no death penalty (abolished 1853) and therefore no one under sentence of death. No provision of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Rules of Appellate Procedure (ch. 809), or the Public Defender Board's administrative code creates any capital post-conviction counsel entitlement; nothing capital-specific remains on the books. The only appointment channel that would reach a collateral attack by any prisoner is Wis. Stat. s. 974.06(3)(b), which is conditional and non-mandatory: the circuit court refers the movant to the State Public Defender only 'if it appears that counsel is necessary,' and the SPD then makes its own indigency and merits decisions under ch. 977. Wis. Stat. s. 940.01(1)(a) makes first-degree intentional homicide a Class A felony, and s. 939.50(3)(a) fixes the Class A penalty at life imprisonment — death is not among the penalties for any felony class.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. s. 974.06(3)(b) If it appears that counsel is necessary and if the defendant claims or appears to be indigent, refer the person to the state public defender for an indigency determination and appointment of counsel under ch. 977. View the source document
Wyoming Authorities conflict verified	Split authority on the face of the code, and no Wyoming court has reconciled it. Two current statutes point opposite ways. (1) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104 is captioned 'No right to appointed counsel' and provides in subsection (c) that an indigent petitioner seeking relief under the post-conviction act 'is not entitled to representation by the state public defender or by appointed counsel' — with no capital exception. Subsections (a) and (b), which as of the 1988 amendment had authorised discretionary appointment on stated findings (that text is quoted in Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 1988)), were repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 95, § 2. (2) The Public Defender Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii), still entitles a needy person to be represented, 'in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed… in proceedings under W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108' — i.e. in the post-conviction act itself. The general post-conviction entitlement that formerly sat at § 7-6-104(c)(iii) (1987 text quoted in Aden, 761 P.2d at 89) was repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 121, § 2; what survives is the clause tied to death-penalty cases. The serial construction of (c)(ii) is ambiguous — the death-penalty qualifier may govern only the certiorari item, or both the certiorari item and the post-conviction item — but a person under sentence of death falls inside (c)(ii) on EITHER reading, so the grammar does not change the capital answer. Where it applies the entitlement is mandatory in form ('is entitled'), not discretionary; no Wyoming statute or rule confers discretion on a court to appoint capital post-conviction counsel, and W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(1) extends the criminal right to counsel only 'from the first appearance in the court through appeal.' In practice the Office of the State Public Defender has supplied counsel to the death-sentenced petitioner in every Wyoming capital post-conviction case (see capital_pc_practice).	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii); contra Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c) in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed or in such other cases as the state public defender deems appropriate, in a writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court, and in proceedings under W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 View the source document

Who provides the lawyer, and how

A statewide capital post-conviction defender, a resource centre, appointment from a qualified list, or nothing; and who pays.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Court appointment verified	Court appointment of private counsel by the sentencing circuit court — not a defender office. Alabama has no statewide capital post-conviction defender office and no state resource center; § 13A-5-53.1(b) directs 'the trial court' to appoint 'separate counsel.' Compensation runs through Ala. Code Title 15, Chapter 12, administered by the Office of Indigent Defense Services (OIDS), a fiscal/administrative office within the Alabama Department of Finance (Ala. Code § 15-12-1(8); § 15-12-21(e) — bills are submitted to OIDS and paid by the State Comptroller). Funding is state: Ala. Code § 12-19-252 appropriates from the Fair Trial Tax Fund 'such amount as may be necessary to pay the fees of counsel… and such other necessary expenses of indigent defense as are provided by law,' with any shortfall appropriated from the State General Fund. Capital post-conviction counsel's total fee is statutorily capped at $7,500, waivable by the OIDS Director; the general post-conviction cap under § 15-12-23(d) is $1,500 at $70/hour.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b); Ala. Code §§ 15-12-1(8), 15-12-21(e), 15-12-23(d); Ala. Code § 12-19-252 (Fair Trial Tax Fund) the total fee awarded shall not exceed seventy-five hundred dollars ($7,500), which may be waived by the Director of the Office of Indigent Defense Services for good cause shown. View the source document
Alaska No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction defender office, capital PCR unit, or resource center in Alaska — there is no capital sentence for one to serve. For post-conviction relief generally, the lawyer is a state public defender: AS 18.85.010 creates the Public Defender Agency in the Department of Administration, and the trial court appoints counsel under Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1) 'consistent with AS 18.85.100.' Where the Agency has a conflict, the Office of Public Advocacy takes the case under AS 44.21.410(a)(5), which directs OPA to provide representation 'in cases involving indigent persons who are entitled to representation under AS 18.85.100 and who cannot be represented by the public defender agency because of a conflict of interests.' AS 18.85.100(b) directs that the attorney services, facilities and court costs 'shall be provided at public expense.' Both agencies are executive-branch state agencies funded by state appropriation; no county or federal funding source appears in the enabling statutes.	Source Statute / rule: AS 18.85.010; AS 18.85.100(b)-(c); AS 44.21.410(a)(5); Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1) There is created in the Department of Administration a Public Defender Agency to serve the needs of indigent defendants. View the source document
Arizona Court appointment from list verified	Court appointment from a statewide roster, NOT a defender office. The Arizona Supreme Court must 'establish and maintain a list of persons who are qualified to represent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings,' and 'shall appoint counsel from the list.' A.R.S. § 13-4041(C). The appointing authority is the Supreme Court itself, or the presiding judge of the originating county if the Supreme Court authorizes it (§ 13-4041(B); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b), which also requires the presiding judge to file a copy of any appointment order with the Supreme Court). Appointees may be private counsel or attorneys 'employed by a publicly funded office' (§ 13-4041(F)). FUNDING is mixed and county-first: 'The trial court shall compensate appointed counsel from county funds' (§ 13-4041(G)), at up to $100/hour, or up to $200/hour if the county board of supervisors approves (§ 13-4041(F)); the county then 'shall request reimbursement,' and 'The state shall pay a portion of the fees incurred by the county out of monies appropriated to the supreme court for these purposes,' capped at the amount appropriated in the general appropriations act (§ 13-4041(H)). Investigative and expert funds are separately authorized by the trial court (§ 13-4041(we)). Arizona DID once have a statewide capital PCR defender office — the State Capital Postconviction Public Defender Office, created by Laws 2006, ch. 369 — but the same act terminated it on July 1, 2011 and repealed its enabling chapter (Title 41, ch. 41) on January 1, 2012. No successor office exists; A.R.S. Title 41 as currently published contains no capital post-conviction defender provision.	Source Statute / rule: A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), (C), (F), (G), (H), (I); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b); Laws 2006, ch. 369, § 6 (former A.R.S. § 41-3011.11) The supreme court shall establish and maintain a list of persons who are qualified to represent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings. View the source document
Arkansas Court appointment from list verified	Court appointment of private/qualified counsel from a list maintained by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission — NOT a dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(d)(2) lets the presiding circuit judge contact the Commission for a list of counsel meeting the § 16-91-202(c) criteria and appoint from it; § 16-91-202(d)(1) makes appointment from qualified counsel obligatory ('Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, appointments of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings and in appeals therefrom shall be made from counsel who qualify'). FUNDING is state: § 16-91-202(f)(1) has the court fix compensation and expert/investigative expenses, and § 16-91-202(f)(2) provides that 'All compensation and reasonable expenses authorized by the court pursuant to this subchapter shall be paid by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission,' a state agency (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-202). Critically, the Commission does not run the representation: § 16-91-202(d)(3) provides that 'Neither the commission nor any of its components shall possess any supervisory authority over counsel appointed to represent a petitioner in capital post-conviction proceedings or in appeals therefrom.' The Commission's in-house capital unit, the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-205), is by its terms a TRIAL-level office created 'to represent indigent defendants when the death penalty is sought and the trial public defender's office is unable to represent the defendant' — it is not a capital post-conviction office, though circuit courts have in fact appointed it to Rule 37.5 cases (Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001)).	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(d)(2), (f)(2); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-205 The presiding judge may contact the Arkansas Public Defender Commission for a list of counsel who meet the criteria of subsection (c) of this section and may appoint counsel from that list. View the source document
California Statewide capital defender verified	Two-track: (1) a statewide capital post-conviction defender office — the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC), created in the judicial branch of state government by Gov. Code § 68661 (Stats. 1997, SB 513, operative Jan. 1, 1998), statutorily capped at 34 attorneys who 'may be appointed pursuant to Section 68662'; and (2) court appointment from a qualified list. Post-Prop. 66 the appointing authority is the sentencing superior court, which under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.561(e)(2) must appoint from a statewide panel compiled by regional Court of Appeal habeas panel committees (rule 4.562), or from an entity employing qualified attorneys (HCRC, public defender, alternate public defender), or from attorneys qualified under a local rule adopted per rule 4.562(g). HCRC maintains the statewide list of death-sentenced persons and the panel roster (rule 4.561(c), rule 4.562(d)(4)(B)). Funding: state — HCRC is a state judicial-branch agency funded by legislative appropriation; the HCRC's 2025 annual report states that private panel counsel have 'no source of funding to compensate' them, and that HCRC's repeated budget change proposals to lift the 34-attorney cap have been denied 'year after year.'	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Gov. Code § 68661; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.561, 4.562 The superior court must appoint an attorney or attorneys from the statewide panel of counsel compiled under rule 4.562(d)(4); an entity that employs qualified attorneys, including the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the local public defender's office, or alternate public defender's office View the source document
Colorado Court appointment verified	No standalone capital post-conviction defender office. The appointing authority is the TRIAL COURT, which appoints one or more private/contract attorneys who satisfy the minimum qualifications of § 16-12-205(2) and who must be independent of trial counsel (§ 16-12-205(4): new postconviction counsel 'shall not be… associated or affiliated with trial counsel'). Compensation and reasonable litigation expenses are borne by the Office of the State Public Defender or the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, 'whichever is appropriate.' The OADC is 'an agency of the judicial department of state government' (§ 21-2-101(1)) and its contract counsel are 'paid from state funds appropriated therefor' (§ 21-2-105(2)(a)) — so funding is a state appropriation, not county money and not a federal grant.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-205(6); see also §§ 21-2-101(1), 21-2-105(2)(a) The office of the public defender or the office of alternate defense counsel, created in section 21-2-101, C.R.S., whichever is appropriate, shall pay the compensation and reasonable litigation expenses of defendant's counsel incurred during the unitary review proceeding. View the source document
Connecticut Court appointment from list verified	There is no dedicated capital post-conviction defender office and no state-funded capital resource center. The lawyer comes from the Division of Public Defender Services (Office of Chief Public Defender), a state agency created by chapter 887 of the General Statutes: § 51-296(a) directs the court to designate a public defender, assistant public defender or deputy assistant public defender. Where the Division has a conflict or lacks capacity — routine in capital and habeas work — the case goes to 'Assigned Counsel' (formerly 'Special Public Defenders') drawn from lists the Chief Public Defender maintains under § 51-291(11) for 'habeas corpus proceedings arising from criminal matters,' with the individual lawyer 'selected by a judge of the court before which the matter is to be heard.' Compensation for those lawyers is set by the Chief Public Defender with commission approval and 'paid from the budget of the Public Defender Services Commission' (§ 51-291(12); see also § 51-293(a)(2)) — i.e., a state appropriation to a judicial-branch agency, not county money and not federal grant money. Internally the Division ran a Habeas Corpus Unit (Chief of Habeas Corpus Services plus staff attorneys, investigators and paralegals) and, while the death penalty existed, a separate Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit for trial-level capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-296(a), 51-291(11)-(12), 51-293(a)(2) In any criminal action, in any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter … the court before which the matter is pending shall … designate a public defender, assistant public defender or deputy assistant public defender to represent such indigent defendant View the source document
Delaware Court appointment verified	Court appointment. There is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no capital PCR unit, and no state-funded resource center in Delaware. The Superior Court judge appoints under Rule 61(e)(2); Rule 44(b) directs that 'The assignment procedures for implementing the right set out in subdivision (a) shall be those provided by 29 Del. C., c. 46, by this rule or by administrative order.' Chapter 46 creates the Office of Defense Services, 'comprised of 3 branches: Central Administration, the Public Defender's Office and the Office of Conflicts Counsel' (29 Del. C. § 4601). Because Rule 61(l)(3) bars trial or appellate counsel from carrying a capital postconviction case absent an on-the-record waiver, the appointee is normally conflicts counsel or other private counsel appointed under 29 Del. C. § 4605, compensated by the Chief Defender through the Office of Conflicts Counsel. Residual court-assigned counsel outside that structure are paid under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44(e)(2) at 'a rate not exceeding $60 per hour' with a $2,000 felony cap, waivable under R. 44(e)(3) 'for extended or complex representation'; those fees are 'subject to the approval of the Administrative Office of the Courts' (R. 44(d)). Both the Office of Defense Services (Title 29, State Government) and the AOC are state agencies; Delaware has no county-funded indigent defense.	Source Statute / rule: 29 Del. C. §§ 4601, 4605; Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44(b), (d), (e) the court may, on its own motion or upon the application of the Office of Defense Services or the indigent person, appoint the Office of Conflicts Counsel, or other qualified counsel, to represent the indigent person at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal View the source document
Florida Statewide capital defender verified	Two-track state mechanism. PRIMARY: the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — three statewide, state-created capital postconviction defender offices (Northern, Middle, Southern regions), each headed by a regional counsel appointed by the Governor from three nominees of the Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission and confirmed by the Senate (Fla. Stat. § 27.701). BACKUP: where CCRC has an actual conflict, withdraws, or fails to appear within 30 days, the Justice Administrative Commission's executive director notifies the sentencing court and 'the court must immediately appoint an attorney, selected from the current registry' — a statewide registry of private counsel compiled and maintained by JAC (§ 27.710(1), (5)). Appointment is triggered by the Supreme Court of Florida itself under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1). FUNDING: state. CCRC salaries and office expenses are paid from state funds 'as provided in the General Appropriations Act' (§ 27.705(1)); the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Trust Fund sits within JAC (§ 27.715); registry counsel and conflict counsel are paid by JAC from state appropriations (§§ 27.703(2), 27.711(3)-(7)). One partial federal offset: § 27.702(3)(a) requires CCRC to seek 18 U.S.C. § 3006A compensation for its FEDERAL habeas work and deposit those receipts into the trust fund.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. Stat. §§ 27.701, 27.702(2), 27.703(2), 27.705(1), 27.710(1), (5), 27.715 There are created three regional offices of capital collateral counsel, which shall be located in a northern, middle, and southern region of the state. View the source document
Georgia Resource center verified	No appointing authority and no state defender office for capital post-conviction. Georgia's statewide capital defender — the Georgia capital defender division of the Georgia Public Defender Council — is expressly capped at the criminal case: O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d) provides its defense 'shall include all proceedings in the trial court and any appeals to the Supreme Court of Georgia,' and forbids it to assist with federal habeas; it has no state-habeas mandate. What exists instead is a line-item appropriation, not an appointment mechanism: the Judicial Branch section of the FY 2027 General Appropriations Act (HB 974, 2026 Session), § 6.7 'Resource Center,' gives $900,000 in state general funds to the Georgia Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center, Inc. ('Georgia Resource Center'), a private 501(c)(3) law office founded in 1988. A death-sentenced prisoner has no way to compel that office — or any lawyer — to take the case; the Center takes cases as capacity allows and otherwise recruits volunteers.	Source Statute / rule: Ga. L. 2026, HB 974 (FY 2027 General Appropriations Act), Judicial Branch § 6.7; O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d) The purpose of this appropriation is to provide direct representation to death penalty sentenced inmates and to recruit and assist private attorneys to represent plaintiffs in habeas corpus proceedings. View the source document
Hawaii Public defender verified	There is no capital post-conviction defender office and no capital resource center, because there are no capital cases. The general mechanism is the Office of the State Public Defender, a state agency created by HRS s 802-8 and placed within the department of budget and finance. HRPP Rule 40(i) refers the indigent Rule 40 petitioner directly to that office. If OPD has a conflict or the interests of justice require, the court appoints private counsel under HRS s 802-5(a), compensated by the State ('payment shall be made upon vouchers approved by the director of finance and warrants drawn by the comptroller'), with OPD and the judiciary submitting the required amount to the department of budget and finance each fiscal biennium (HRS s 802-5(c)). Funding is therefore a state appropriation; no county or federal-grant component is stated.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. Rev. Stat. s 802-8 (office created); s 802-5(a), (c) (appointment, compensation, budgeting); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) (referral) An office of state public defender is hereby created within the department of budget and finance for administrative purposes. View the source document
Idaho Statewide capital defender verified	A statewide state-funded appellate/capital defender office: the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD). Idaho Code § 19-5905(1) directs that the SAPD, upon appointment by the court, shall provide representation for indigent defendants in an enumerated list of cases, of which subsection (g) is 'Post-conviction relief proceedings in district court in capital cases.' The appointing authority is the district judge who imposed the death sentence (we.C.R. 44.2(a)). The SAPD is a state agency created 'in the department of self-governing agencies' (we.C. § 19-5903) and is state-appropriated; when the SAPD is conflicted out, we.C. § 19-5906 provides that 'the state appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender.' we.C.R. 44.2(b)(1) sets a floor of $100/hour for lead capital post-conviction counsel not employed by a publicly funded office, and 44.2(b)(2) requires the trial court to authorize investigative, expert and other preparation expenses.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-5905(1)(g); Idaho Code §§ 19-5903, 19-5906; Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a)-(b) the state appellate public defender, upon appointment by the court, shall provide representation for indigent defendants in the following cases View the source document
Illinois None verified	NONE today. Illinois formerly had one of the more developed state mechanisms: former 725 ILCS 5/122-4 authorized a circuit court or the Illinois Supreme Court to appoint the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to provide capital post-conviction representation, with OSAD paying assigned counsel's bills 'from funds appropriated for this purpose'; former 725 ILCS 105/10(d) required OSAD to seek a direct appropriation from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund for 'representing petitioners in capital cases in post-conviction proceedings under Article 122' and for counsel 'approved by or contracted with' OSAD; and OSAD operated a 'Capital Post Conviction Unit' (named in former 725 ILCS 105/10, struck by P.A. 97-1003, eff. Aug. 17, 2012). All of it is gone: the Capital Crimes Litigation Act (725 ILCS 124) and its Trust Fund were repealed by P.A. 96-1543 effective Jan. 1, 2012 (remaining balance transferred to the Death Penalty Abolition Fund), 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5) and (d) are now '(Blank)', and the capital paragraph of § 122-4 was struck by P.A. 103-51. No capital post-conviction defender office, capital PCR unit, or state-funded capital resource center appears anywhere in the current Chapter 725 act list. Quote below is the struck § 122-4 language from the enrolled Public Act.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (capital paragraph struck by P.A. 103-51); 725 ILCS 105/10(c)(5), (d) (blanked by P.A. 97-1003); 725 ILCS 124 (Capital Crimes Litigation Act, repealed by P.A. 96-1543) A Circuit Court or the Illinois Supreme Court may appoint the State Appellate Defender to provide post-conviction representation in a case in which the defendant is sentenced to death. View the source document
Indiana Public defender verified	A single statewide office: the Public Defender of Indiana (the State Public Defender), a judicial-branch agency whose head is appointed by the Indiana Supreme Court for a four-year term (Ind. Code § 33-40-1-1) and who is statutorily charged with representing indigent confined persons in post-conviction proceedings (Ind. Code § 33-40-1-2). There is no separate capital post-conviction defender office and no CCRC-style resource center; capital post-conviction is handled by deputy public defenders in that office, with a 'special assistant' substituted when the office has a conflict of interest (Crim. R. 6.1(H)). Funding is a state appropriation: Ind. Code § 33-40-1-6 provides that all salary and expense claims are approved by the supreme court and that 'There is appropriated annually out of funds of the state not otherwise appropriated a sufficient amount to pay salaries and expenses' authorized by that chapter; § 33-40-1-5 further lets the office order transcripts 'at the expense of the state.' (By contrast, Crim. R. 6.1(C) and (K) hourly/salary compensation for capital TRIAL and APPELLATE counsel runs through the county of appointment — that county-funded track does not govern post-conviction.) The office's own published policy states the capital arrangement plainly.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. Code §§ 33-40-1-1, 33-40-1-2, 33-40-1-5, 33-40-1-6; Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(H) In capital cases, representation by the Public Defender of Indiana is automatic if the petitioner is indigent. The office will enter an appearance within thirty days of completion of rehearing on direct appeal, as required by Ind. Criminal Rule 24(H). View the source document
Iowa No death penalty verified	No capital mechanism of any kind: Iowa has no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital resource center, no capital appointment roster, and no capital PCR unit — because it has no death penalty. For ordinary ch. 822 postconviction proceedings the district court "shall appoint the state public defender's designee pursuant to section 13B.4" (Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(a)); if the State Public Defender cannot serve, the court appoints a contract attorney (§ 815.10(2)), and only if none is available a noncontract attorney (§ 815.10(3)). Funding is a state appropriation: costs of court-appointed representation under chapter 822 "shall be paid from moneys appropriated by the general assembly to the office of the state public defender" and deposited in the indigent defense fund (Iowa Code § 815.11(1)). Full-text searches of Iowa Code chs. 13B, 815 and 822 and of the State Public Defender's administrative rules (Iowa Admin. Code ch. 493, agency compilation dated 6/10/2026) returned zero occurrences of "capital," "death penalty" or "sentence of death."	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(a); Iowa Code § 815.11(1) shall appoint the state public defender's designee pursuant to section 13B.4 to represent an indigent person at any stage of the criminal, postconviction View the source document
Kansas Statewide capital defender verified	The appointing authority is the sentencing district court, but the lawyer is supplied through the Kansas State Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS/SBIDS), a state agency. K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(1) directs BIDS to provide by rule and regulation for (A) assignment of panel attorneys to represent death-sentenced persons on the filing of a habeas petition or 60-1507 motion, (B) competency/qualification standards, and (C) reasonable compensation and litigation expenses. BIDS staffs a dedicated statewide Capital Habeas Office (Merriam, Kansas; established FY 2015) as one of its four Death Penalty Units, alongside the Death Penalty Defense Unit (Topeka/Wichita), Capital Appellate Defender, and Capital Appeals & Conflicts Office; prequalified private counsel from the capital panel are used when BIDS conflicts out. Funding is a state appropriation — BIDS's capital defense unit was budgeted at $3.1 million 'all from the State General Fund (SGF)' in FY 2021 per Kansas Legislative Research Department.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(1); K.S.A. 22-4522 The state board of indigents' defense services shall provide by rule and regulation for: (A) The assignment of attorneys to the panel for indigents' defense services to represent indigent persons, who have been convicted of capital murder and are under sentence of death View the source document
Kentucky Public defender verified	A statewide public defender agency, not a dedicated capital post-conviction office. The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) is an independent state agency attached to the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet (KRS 31.010). Within DPA's Post-Trial Division, the Post-Conviction Branch handles collateral attacks statewide; the Appeals Branch handles direct appeals 'ranging from capital cases to minor felonies.' DPA's public organizational listing today shows four post-trial branches — Appeals, Post-Conviction, Juvenile Post-Disposition, and the Kentucky Innocence Project — and does NOT list a separately named capital post-conviction branch, although a 'Capital Post-Conviction Unit, Department of Public Advocacy' appeared of record in Kentucky death-penalty litigation in the 1990s (Bowling v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 667, 667 (Ky. 1996), counsel listing). HOW: the prisoner files a pro se RCr 11.42 motion plus a motion asking the court to appoint DPA's Post-Conviction Branch and an affidavit of indigency; the court then appoints DPA. The legislature uses the same routing elsewhere: KRS 422.285(2)(a) directs the court, on a capital-offense DNA-testing request, to 'appoint the Department of Public Advocacy to represent the petitioner… pursuant to KRS 31.110(2)(c).' FUNDING: DPA is state-appropriated — its FY22 budget was $74,530,056, of which $68,344,200 was Defender General Funds and $6,185,856 Defender Non-General Funds (federal/state grants, client fees, DUI service fees). But litigation expenses are not all state-borne: under KRS 31.185(3)-(6), direct expenses of representing needy persons, expressly including 'needy persons confined in a state correctional institution,' are charged against the county and paid from a special Finance and Administration Cabinet account funded by a mandatory county appropriation of 12.5 cents per capita, with the Treasury as backstop when that account is depleted.	Source Statute / rule: KRS 31.010; KRS 31.110(2)(c); KRS 31.185(3), (4), (6); KRS 422.285(2)(a) responsible for representing indigent adults and youthful offenders throughout all 120 Kentucky counties who are collaterally attacking their criminal convictions View the source document
Louisiana Statewide capital defender verified	A statewide public defender agency, not county appointment. La. R.S. 15:169(A) makes the office of the state public defender responsible, once a death sentence is imposed, for promptly causing counsel to be enrolled, using staff counsel or other (contract) counsel working under the office's supervision, to seek post-conviction relief in state court; the office must also adopt rules for investigative and expert services with compensation and expense maximums. The office of the state public defender was created by Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 22 (SB 8), which abolished the Louisiana Public Defender Board's authority and transferred it to the office; the state public defender is appointed by the governor (La. R.S. 15:152(A)). The still-codified 2002 rule, La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § XV-503(B)-(D), describes the same model — enrollment of post-conviction counsel within 30 days of finality of the capital appeal, through a separate entity created or contracted with, and otherwise through certified contract counsel — and § XV-309(A)(5) names the entity as the Capital Post-Conviction Project of Louisiana (a New Orleans nonprofit). FUNDING: state appropriation to the office; La. R.S. 15:169(B) bars state-appropriated funds for representation of capital defendants in federal court, and R.S. 15:169(A) permits the office to seek federal or other public/private funds for post-conviction representation. Acts 2025, No. 393, §2 added R.S. 15:169(C): if the state public defender finds insufficient funds for pending capital post-conviction litigation, he may request case-by-case supplemental funding from the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget out of the Overcollections Fund.	Source Statute / rule: La. R.S. 15:169(A)-(C); La. R.S. 15:152(A); La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § XV-503 other counsel, who will work under the supervision of the office, as are necessary to provide counsel to represent capital defendants on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana and to seek post-conviction relief if appropriate in state and federal court View the source document
Maine Court appointment verified	NOTHING capital-specific. Maine has no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital resource center, and no capital appointment list. Indigent representation statewide is delivered by the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services (PDS), renamed from the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services by PL 2023, c. 558 and c. 638, through public defenders and employed counsel it hires, contract counsel, and private attorneys assigned from its rosters (4 M.R.S. §§ 1801, 1802, 1804(3)(A)). A post-conviction petitioner reaches that system by filing an affidavit of indigency with the petition under 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B); the appointing authority is the Superior Court. Funding is a state appropriation: the commission must 'Approve and submit a biennial budget request to the Department of Administrative and Financial Services, Bureau of the Budget' (4 M.R.S. § 1804(3)(we)). No county or federal funding stream is identified in the enabling chapter.	Source Statute / rule: 4 M.R.S. § 1801 (see also 4 M.R.S. §§ 1802(4), 1804(3)(A), (3)(I); 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B)) The Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, established by Title 5, section 12004-G, subsection 25-A, is an independent commission whose purpose is to provide high-quality, effective and efficient representation and promote due process for persons who receive indigent legal services View the source document
Maryland Public defender verified	No capital post-conviction defender office or resource center exists in Maryland. Counsel for any post-conviction proceeding carrying a Title 7 right is supplied by the Office of the Public Defender, a State executive-branch agency (Crim. Proc. § 16-202), either through staff attorneys or through a panel attorney appointed by the district public defender (§ 16-208(b)(1)). Funding is a state appropriation: panel attorney "fees and expenses… shall be paid out of funds appropriated by the State budget" (§ 16-208(d)(5)). Before repeal, capital appointments ran through OPD's Capital Division — Grandison v. State, 425 Md. 34 (2012), recites that counsel of record in his capital collateral proceedings were "each appointed by the Public Defender" and that the head of "the Capital Division of the Office of the Public Defender" decided whether replacement counsel would be appointed. That division no longer exists as a capital unit.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 16-204(b)(1)(iii); see also §§ 16-202, 16-208(b)(1), (d)(5) Indigent defendants or parties shall be provided representation under this title in: … (iii) a postconviction proceeding for which the defendant has a right to an attorney under Title 7 of this article View the source document
Massachusetts No death penalty verified	NOTHING capital-specific. Massachusetts has no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital resource center, and no qualified capital-PC appointment list, because it has no capital sentences. The only route to post-conviction counsel of any kind is discretionary judicial appointment under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5), implemented through the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS), the statewide indigent-defense agency. The SJC has held that appointment under that rule is by discretion, not right. Because there is no capital mechanism, there is no capital funding line to identify.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5) Case: Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) Assignment of counsel under this rule is by discretion of the judge, however, and not by right View the source document
Michigan None verified	No capital mechanism of any kind: no capital post-conviction defender office, no resource center, no qualified-counsel list, no capital unit in any defender agency. For post-conviction generally, the appointing authority is the convicting circuit court under MCR 6.505(A), which 'may appoint' counsel on an indigent defendant's request and must appoint only if the court orders oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. Funding for that appointment is not addressed in the rule; Michigan's separate Appellate Defender Act (MCL 780.711–780.719) and Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act (MCL 780.981–780.1003) appear in the compiled-law index but their text could not be fetched from we (legislature.mi.gov unreachable), and neither is capital-specific.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.505(A) If the defendant has requested appointment of counsel, and the court has determined that the defendant is indigent, the court may appoint counsel for the defendant at any time during the proceedings under this subchapter. View the source document
Minnesota Public defender verified	No capital post-conviction defender office, capital resource center, or capital appointment list exists in Minnesota. The residual, sentence-neutral provider is the statewide public defender system: the chief appellate public defender (Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender), appointed by and accountable to the State Board of Public Defense, who 'shall represent, without charge' a person pursuing a postconviction proceeding who has not already had a direct appeal, and 'may represent' other indigent § 590.01 petitioners (Minn. Stat. § 611.25, subd. 1). Funding is a state appropriation to the Board of Public Defense, and state liability is capped at that appropriation: Minn. Stat. § 611.27, subd. 1 ('Money appropriated to the State Board of Public Defense… shall be expended as determined by the board') and subd. 7 ('The state's obligation for the costs of the public defender services is limited to the appropriations made to the Board of Public Defense.'). No county or federal component is provided for postconviction representation.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 611.25, subd. 1; Minn. Stat. § 611.27, subds. 1, 7 a person convicted of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor who is pursuing a postconviction proceeding and who has not already had a direct appeal of the conviction View the source document
Mississippi Statewide capital defender verified	A statewide capital post-conviction defender office: the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel (CPCC), an independent state agency created by the Capital Post-Conviction Counsel Act, H.B. 1228, 2000 Miss. Laws ch. 569, codified at Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-101 to 99-39-119, 'to provide representation to indigent parties under sentences of death in post-conviction proceedings' (§ 99-39-105). Under Rule 22(c)(1)(ii) the Supreme Court's post-affirmance order is served on the convicting court AND on CPCC, and CPCC then advises the convicting court which attorney it has selected; CPCC is the presumptive appointee. Where CPCC has a conflict or its caseload makes representation impracticable, the Director may retain qualified private counsel, whose fees and expenses are court-approved and paid from appropriated funds (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-117), at an hourly rate capped at 80% of the federal habeas rate (§ 99-15-18(2)). FUNDING: state appropriation — for FY2026 the Legislature appropriated the nine-person office $1,996,447 from the State General Fund plus $206,000 from the State Treasury (2025 Miss. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., H.B. 33), per the Mississippi Attorney General's Oct. 6, 2025 § 2265 application; § 99-39-119 additionally authorizes CPCC to accept gifts and grants.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-101 to 99-39-119 (esp. §§ 99-39-105, 99-39-117); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1)(ii) Such order shall be forwarded to the convicting court and the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel upon entry. The Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel shall advise the convicting court of the attorney selected to represent the petitioner pursuant to Section 99-39-23 and these rules. View the source document
Missouri Public defender verified	Two-part mechanism. The APPOINTING AUTHORITY is the sentencing (motion) court, which must appoint two counsel within 30 days of the capital post-conviction motion (R. 29.16(a); sec. 547.370.1). The PAYING AUTHORITY is the Missouri State Public Defender: Rule 29.16(d) and Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.4 both provide that as to any counsel appointed under the provision, 'the state public defender shall provide counsel with reasonable compensation and shall provide reasonable and necessary litigation expenses.' Counsel must certify to the state public defender that they meet the qualification standards before entering an appearance (R. 29.16(b)). So appointed counsel may be MSPD staff or private counsel, but MSPD carries the compensation and expense obligation in either case. FUNDING is state: Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 600.040.2 provides that 'A complete budget for the state public defender system shall be provided through an annual appropriation subject to approval by the governor and the general assembly,' and sec. 600.040.1 provides that the state pays all expenses of the system other than office space and utilities, which the city or county furnishes. NOT VERIFIED HERE: MSPD publicly describes internal Capital and Appellate/PCR divisions, but publicdefender.mo.gov was unreachable from we (connection failure, not a block page), so no primary source for the division structure was read; the office name and funding above rest on the statutes actually fetched.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.4; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(d); funding: Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 600.040.1-.2 As to any counsel appointed as provided in this section, the state public defender shall provide counsel with reasonable compensation and shall provide reasonable and necessary litigation expenses. View the source document
Montana Public defender verified	Court-ordered assignment routed to a statewide state agency, not a dedicated capital post-conviction defender office and not a resource center. The sentencing court orders the Office of the State Public Defender (OPD) — the statewide public defender system created by the Montana Public Defender Act, Title 47, ch. 1, headed by a director hired by the director of the Department of Administration, § 2-15-1029 — to assign counsel; OPD then makes the assignment (§ 47-1-104(3)), and § 47-1-104(4)(a)(iv) lists post-conviction petitioners 'as provided in 46-21-201' among the cases in which a court may order assignment. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-104(1)(c) separately authorizes any court of record to order OPD to assign counsel in a Title 46, ch. 21 proceeding where 'a statute specifically mandates the appointment of counsel' — which § 46-21-201(3) does. OPD may NOT assign counsel who previously represented the person at any stage unless both expressly agree (§ 46-21-201(3)(c)). FUNDING: the statute places the cost on the state defender agency, not the county — § 46-21-201(3)(e).	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-21-201(3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(e); 2-15-1029; 47-1-104; 46-8-104(1)(c) The expenses of counsel assigned pursuant to this subsection (3) must be paid by the office of state public defender. View the source document
Nebraska Court appointment verified	Court appointment by the sentencing district court under § 29-3004 — there is no dedicated capital post-conviction defender office and no state resource center. The appointing court may name private counsel (whom the county board must pay under § 29-3004), the county public defender, or the Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy (NCPA), a statewide agency created by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3923 whose 'capital litigation division shall be available to assist in the defense of capital cases in Nebraska, subject to caseload standards of the commission' (§ 29-3930(1)). The NCPA does not initiate representation; it accepts appointments the courts make. Its published case guidelines state it can accept post-conviction and state habeas appointments for defendants convicted of first or second degree murder or sentenced to life — which covers Nebraska's death-sentenced population, all of whom are first-degree-murder convicts. Funding is mixed: private appointed counsel are paid by the county under § 29-3004, while the NCPA is funded, per legislative intent, 'solely' from the Commission on Public Advocacy Operations Cash Fund (§ 29-3921), which is fed by a $3 indigent-defense fee taxed on every case filed in Nebraska courts (§ 33-156) — total agency revenue of $883,458.83 in FY 2024-2025.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3004, 29-3923, 29-3930(1), 29-3921, 33-156 The Commission can accept appointments of cases on postconviction or in state habeas corpus if the defendant was convicted of first degree murder or second degree murder, or if the defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment. View the source document
Nevada Court appointment from list verified	Case-by-case appointment by the district court in which the petition is filed. There is NO statewide capital post-conviction defender office and no state resource center. Under Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250(2)(h) each judicial district must maintain a list of qualified capital defense counsel and select from it on a 'fair, equal and consecutive basis'; SCR 250(2)(f) permits only ONE appointed counsel on a first post-conviction petition (two are required at trial). Funding is STATE, not county: NRS 7.155 excepts postconviction habeas from the county-treasury default and directs payment 'from money appropriated to the Department of Indigent Defense Services,' with the Reserve for Statutory Contingency Account as backstop; NRS 34.750(2) says the same for costs. Hourly rates for counsel appointed to a postconviction habeas petition are set by regulation of the Board on Indigent Defense Services, NRS 180.320(3)(b).	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(2)(f)-(h); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 7.155, 34.750(2), 180.320(3)(b) Each judicial district shall maintain a list of qualified defense counsel and shall establish procedures to ensure that defense counsel are considered and selected for appointment to capital cases from the list in a fair, equal and consecutive basis. View the source document
New Hampshire Court appointment verified	There is no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital PCR unit, and no state-funded resource center. The supplier of record is the New Hampshire Judicial Council, the state agency that administers all indigent defense: its September 2015 'Eligibility Guidelines and Performance Standards: Capital Post-Conviction Representation' provides that if a court appoints capital post-conviction counsel, the Council must locate qualified counsel and supervise performance, with its Indigent Defense Subcommittee receiving reports on the case. Statutorily, appointments under RSA 604-A:2, II run in a fixed order — the New Hampshire Public Defender program (RSA 604-B), then a Judicial Council contract attorney (RSA 604-A:2-b), then any qualified attorney. Fees and expert/ancillary costs are certified by the court and paid by the Judicial Council from the state indigent-defense appropriation (RSA 604-A:4, :6, :8; RSA 604-A:1-b).	Source Statute / rule: N.H. Judicial Council, Eligibility Guidelines and Performance Standards: Capital Post-Conviction Representation (approved Sept. 2015) (agency guideline, not a statute or court rule); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:2, II; § 604-A:8 In the event that a New Hampshire court exercises its discretion to appoint counsel for a defendant in State-court capital post-conviction proceedings, it will be the Judicial Council’s obligation to find qualified counsel to represent the defendant View the source document
New Jersey Public defender verified	The New Jersey Office of the Public Defender (OPD), by court order of assignment under R. 3:22-6(a). There is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no capital PCR unit and no state resource center; the OPD's capital work ended with abolition. Before abolition the OPD ran capital representation in-house through a Director of Capital Litigation (New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report, Jan. 2007, at 31-32), supplemented by 'pool attorneys' (private counsel retained by OPD on conflicts). Funding is a state appropriation: N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-3 establishes the OPD 'in the Executive Branch of the State Government,' allocated within the Department of the Treasury but independent of it. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5 is the duty provision that carries OPD representation past conviction into post-conviction proceedings.	Source Statute / rule: N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5; N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-3; N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6(a) Representation as herein provided for shall include any direct appeal from conviction and such post-conviction proceedings as would warrant the assignment of counsel pursuant to the court rules. View the source document
New Mexico Public defender verified	Court appointment by the district court, channelled through the state public defender. There is no dedicated capital post-conviction defender office or state-funded capital resource center in New Mexico — nothing analogous to Florida's CCRC, Arizona's capital PCR unit, or Texas OCFW. Rule 5-802(L)(1) makes the district court the appointing authority. Rule 5-802(G)(1)-(2) requires the clerk, on receipt of any habeas petition, to forward it to 'the public defender department post-conviction unit' (the Law Offices of the Public Defender's Habeas / Post-Conviction Division, 505 Marquette NW, Albuquerque, per the agency's own habeas page), which is the institutional provider. For the appeal stage of a capital case, Rule 12-302(G) NMRA requires that 'the district court, in the case of indigent defendants, shall order the Law Offices of the Public Defender to appoint one (1) or more qualified attorneys.' In practice appointed counsel has included private contract lawyers: the last two capital habeas petitioners, Fry and Allen, were represented by McGarry Law Office, Jacquelyn Robins, Melissa Hill and Ray Twohig (counsel listing, Fry v. Lopez). The rules do not state a funding source; LOPD is a state agency and the Legislative Finance Committee's 2025 fiscal impact report on SB 187 lists LOPD's death-penalty costs as recurring General Fund.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802(G)(1) NMRA; see also Rule 12-302(G) NMRA Upon receipt of the petition or revised petition, the clerk of the court shall immediately forward a file-stamped copy of the petition and any attachments to the district attorney and to the public defender department post-conviction unit View the source document
New York Statewide capital defender verified	Court assignment from a screened roster, backed by a statewide capital defender office — all state-funded. Judiciary Law § 35-b(3) creates the Capital Defender Office (CDO), governed by a three-member board appointed by the Chief Judge, the Senate's temporary president, and the Assembly speaker. § 35-b(5)(a) establishes a four-member screening panel in each of the four judicial departments (two members appointed by the CDO board, two by the presiding justice) which 'shall establish and periodically update a roster of attorneys qualified for appointment as lead counsel.' For an initial capital 440.10/440.20 motion the trial court assigns lead counsel only (§ 35-b(2)); if no roster attorney is available the court may appoint a County Law article 18-B attorney 'who is competent to represent defendants charged with murder and other serious felonies.' The CDO may also be appointed to represent the defendant directly, with its consent, or may designate a legal aid society/public defender office under an agreement (§ 35-b(2), (4)(b)(vi)). Funding is STATE: § 35-b(9) makes every fee and expense 'a state charge' paid on court-approved vouchers on the Comptroller's warrant, not a county charge. IMPORTANT: the CDO's branch offices closed in 2005 and 2008 (see capital_pc_practice), so the office that screens applicants and supplies the roster no longer operates.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(2), (3), (4)(b), (5)(a), (9) Any compensation, fee or expense to be paid pursuant to this section shall be a state charge payable on vouchers approved by the court which fixed the same, after audit by and on the warrant of the comptroller. View the source document
North Carolina Court appointment from list verified	The appointing authority is the Office of Indigent Defense Services (IDS), created by the Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000 within the Administrative Office of the Courts but empowered to 'exercise its prescribed powers independently of the head of the Administrative Office of the Courts' (§ 7A-498.2(a), (b)). There is NO dedicated capital post-conviction defender office. Instead, under IDS Rule 2C.2(a) the IDS Director personally appoints two private lawyers drawn from a statewide roster of qualified capital post-conviction counsel that the Director maintains under Appendix 2C, and signs and distributes the appointment order to the defendant, the clerk of superior court, the district attorney, the attorney general and appointed counsel. The Office of the Capital Defender is trial-level only ('represents indigent adult clients charged with potentially capital cases at the trial level'). The statewide Appellate Defender supplies the pipeline: § 7A-498.8(b)(5) charges that office with 'Recruiting qualified members of the private bar who are willing to provide representation in State and federal death penalty postconviction proceedings,' and § 7A-498.8(b)(6) permits the Appellate Defender in his discretion to serve as counsel of record in capital cases in state court. FUNDING is a state appropriation: IDS's budget 'shall be a part of the budget of the Administrative Office of the Courts' (§ 7A-498.2(d)), and IDS 'shall allocate and disburse funds appropriated for legal representation and related services' (§ 7A-498.3(d)). No county contribution and no federal-grant dependency; § 7A-498.8(b)(7) confines the Appellate Defender's federal capital work to matters that are 'fully federally funded,' keeping the state and federal streams separate.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-451(c), (d); 7A-498.2(a), (b), (d); 7A-498.3(d); 7A-498.8(b)(5)-(7); IDS Rules Part 2, Rule 2C.2(a) The IDS Director shall appoint two lawyers as post-conviction counsel in each indigent capital post-conviction case in accordance with G.S. 7A-451(c). View the source document
North Dakota Court appointment verified	No capital post-conviction defender office, resource center or capital appointment list exists in North Dakota, and none is provided for by statute or court rule. The residual mechanism for any indigent post-conviction applicant is court-ordered appointment under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1), with services delivered by the North Dakota Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents (N.D.C.C. ch. 54-61), a state agency created in 2005 that supplies contract counsel and regional public defenders. Chapter 54-61 describes its services as 'state-funded' and directs the commission to submit a biennial budget request to the office of the budget (§ 54-61-02(1)(e)); § 29-32.1-05(2) directs that post-conviction counsel fees 'be reimbursed in the same manner as are costs and expenses incurred in the defense of criminal prosecutions.'	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 54-61-01(1); N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(2) The commission on legal counsel for indigents is established for the purpose of developing and monitoring a process for the delivery of state-funded legal counsel services for indigents View the source document
Ohio Court appointment verified	Court appointment by the common pleas court in which the petition is filed — there is NO dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. The appointee may be the Office of the Ohio Public Defender (Ohio Rev. Code § 120.06(F) expressly addresses a court appointing that office for a death-sentenced § 2953.21 petitioner), a county or joint county public defender (§§ 120.16, 120.26), or private counsel appointed under §§ 120.33 and 2941.51; § 2953.21(J)(3) itself enumerates counsel 'appointed by the court under this section or section 120.06, 120.16, 120.26, or 120.33.' Funding is MIXED and runs through the counties: the county pays appointed counsel at the rate set by the statutory capital case attorney fee council (§§ 2941.51(B), 120.33(D)), and the state public defender then reimburses 'the costs and expenses of conducting the defense in capital cases' (§ 120.35) — but reimbursement is capped by the General Assembly's appropriation and prorated across counties if the appropriation is insufficient (§ 120.34(A)). Where the state public defender itself is appointed, it bills the county 100% and the county then seeks state reimbursement (§ 120.06(D)(1)-(2)).	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code §§ 120.06(F), 120.33(C) & (D), 120.34(A), 120.35, 2941.51(B) If a court appoints the office of the state public defender to represent a petitioner in a postconviction relief proceeding under section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, the petitioner has received a sentence of death, and the proceeding relates to that sentence View the source document
Oklahoma Statewide capital defender verified	A statewide state defender agency: the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, created by the Indigent Defense Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1355–1370.1, headquartered in Norman. The district court that imposed sentence appoints OIDS after an indigency hearing (§ 1089(B); OCCA Rule 1.14(C)–(D)). OIDS carries capital post-conviction for the entire state — including cases from Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties, where it does not do trial work — through its Appellate Program (Appellate Divisions East and West); a distinctly named 'Capital Post-Conviction Division' appears in OIDS counsel listings in reported capital PC opinions of the 1990s–2000s (e.g., Hatch v. State, 924 P.2d 284; Slaughter v. State, 1998 OK CR 63). Where OIDS has a conflict, the case is contracted to private counsel at agency rates, with compensation capped by § 1355.13 at $20,000 for non-System lead counsel and $5,000 for co-counsel, exceedable only on an Executive Director determination approved by the Board that the case is exceptional. Funding is state: the agency's FY 2026 Budget Performance Review to the Legislature (047 – Oklahoma Indigent Defense System) funds Appellate West at $2,282,014 and Appellate East at $2,380,408 from the 'Appropriations' column plus a small revolving-fund component (https://oksenate.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/FY'26-OIDS-BPR_0.pdf).	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B); Indigent Defense Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1355–1355.15 (§ 1355.6(A) responsibility for all capital cases; § 1355.13 non-System capital counsel fee caps) The System is responsible for all capital post-conviction appeals in the State, including those where the indigent appellant was represented by a county defender on direct appeal. View the source document
Oregon Court appointment from list verified	Court appointment from a state-certified panel — not a dedicated capital post-conviction defender office. The petition is filed in the circuit court for the county where the petitioner is imprisoned (ORS 138.560(1); Oregon State Penitentiary is in Marion County), and that court appoints counsel under ORS 138.590(4). The lawyer is a private/contract or panel attorney certified by the Oregon Public Defense Commission (OPDC, renamed from the Public Defense Services Commission by Or Laws 2023 ch 281); OPDC establishes and supervises the certified panel and may contract with nonprofit defender organizations and private firms (ORS 151.216(5), (6)), and the court may not substitute one appointed counsel for another except under OPDC policies and standards (ORS 138.590(4)). Funding is state: the OPDC executive director pays petitioner's expenses and appointed counsel's compensation 'from funds available for the purpose' (ORS 138.590(6)), i.e. the Public Defense Services Account (ORS 151.225); a payment denial is appealable to the presiding judge (ORS 138.590(7)). Oregon statutes create no capital post-conviction resource center or capital PCR unit analogous to Florida's CCRC or Texas's OCFW.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.590(4), (6), (7); ORS 138.560(1); ORS 151.216(5)-(6); ORS 151.225 the compensation to appointed counsel for petitioner as provided in this subsection shall be paid by the executive director of the Oregon Public Defense Commission from funds available for the purpose View the source document
Pennsylvania Court appointment verified	Court appointment by the trial judge of the sentencing county — there is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no state resource center, and no capital-specific state appropriation. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court Prothonotary must notify every defendant whose death sentence is affirmed that 'the trial judge will appoint new counsel' (Pa.R.Crim.P. 900(B)(4)), and the trial judge then appoints from among attorneys who satisfy Pa.R.Crim.P. 801; the Continuing Legal Education Board maintains the list of attorneys meeting the educational criteria (Rule 801(2)(c)). Delivery and payment are county functions: the Public Defender Act, 16 P.S. § 9960.1 et seq., requires every county (save Philadelphia's separately constituted Defender Association) to maintain a public defender whose statutory duty covers post-conviction proceedings, funded by the county (Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016)). Since the 2023-24 budget the Commonwealth has added its first state money for indigent defense — $7.5 million a year distributed by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency's Indigent Defense Advisory Committee ($22.5 million over three years) — but those formula grants go to county defender offices generally, are not capital-specific, and, per the Governor's office, 'supplement, not replace' county funding, which state law still makes the primary source. In practice a large share of Pennsylvania capital PCRA petitioners are represented by the federally funded Capital Habeas Units of the Federal Community Defender (E.D. Pa.) and Federal Public Defender (W.D. Pa.) rather than by county-paid appointees — a federal, not state, mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 900(B)(4); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1); Public Defender Act, 16 P.S. §§ 9960.1-9960.13 Case: Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016) the trial judge will appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction collateral review, unless: View the source document
Rhode Island Public defender verified	There is no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital resource center, and no capital appointment panel in Rhode Island — none is possible, since no one is under sentence of death. The generally applicable mechanism under § 10-9.1-5 is a two-step one: the statewide Office of the Public Defender (created by R.we. Gen. Laws § 12-15-1, 'There is created the office of public defender') represents the indigent applicant in the first instance; if the public defender has a conflict or is otherwise unable to serve, the Superior Court assigns private counsel. Funding is a state appropriation: R.we. Gen. Laws § 12-15-7 directs that 'The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum or sums that it may deem necessary' for the public defender's salaries and expenses, drawn on the general treasurer. No county or federal funding stream appears in the statute.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-15-1, 12-15-3, 12-15-7 If the public defender is excused from representing the applicant because of a conflict of interest or is otherwise unable to provide representation, the court shall assign counsel to represent the applicant. View the source document
South Carolina Court appointment from list verified	Case-by-case court appointment of two private lawyers by the circuit judge assigned to the capital PCR application under § 17-27-160(A) — there is NO statewide capital post-conviction defender office in South Carolina. Rule 608(f)(1)(A), SCACR, governs the selection: lead counsel is drawn from the county appointment list of attorneys death-penalty certified by the Supreme Court, except that an uncertified lawyer may be appointed lead counsel in a capital PCR action if the lawyer has previously represented a death-sentenced inmate in state or federal PCR 'as provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160.' Rule 608(b)(7) defines a 'Death Penalty Case' to include 'any post conviction relief action challenging a proceeding in which a death sentence was imposed.' FUNDING is a state appropriation: appointed capital PCR counsel are paid from the funds provided in § 16-3-26 — the Death Penalty Trial Fund administered by the Office of Indigent Defense (S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense), which § 17-3-380 funds 'by appropriations to the commission in the state General Appropriations Act' — at the § 16-3-26(B)(2) trial rates ($50/hr out of court, $75/hr in court, $25,000 cap, exceedable on written certification under § 16-3-26(D)); § 16-3-26(we)'s in-state-residency restriction is expressly made inapplicable. Counsel on appeal from a capital PCR denial is funded through the appellate-defense funds (statute says 'Office of Appellate Defense pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 17,' now the Division of Appellate Defense within the Office of Indigent Defense, § 17-3-360).	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B); § 16-3-26(B), (C), (G); § 17-3-380; Rule 608(f)(1)(A) and 608(b)(7), SCACR Counsel appointed in these cases shall be compensated from the funding provided in Section 16-3-26 in the same manner and rate as appointed trial counsel View the source document
South Dakota Court appointment verified	No capital post-conviction defender office and no state-funded capital resource center. At first instance, the appointing authority is the circuit judge hearing the habeas application, who appoints a private attorney 'pursuant to chapter 23A-40' (SDCL ch. 23A-40, the general indigent-defense chapter; its 21 sections contain no capital provision). FUNDING at that stage is the COUNTY: SDCL 21-27-4 makes counsel fees and expenses 'a charge against and be paid by the county from which the person was committed,' payable only on written order of the issuing judge. Separately, South Dakota created a statewide Office of Indigent Legal Services in 2024 (SL 2024, ch. 95, codified at SDCL ch. 23A-51), state-funded through the Unified Judicial System budget (SDCL 23A-51-12) and overseen by a Commission on Indigent Legal Services — but SDCL 23A-51-8 limits it to 'direct appeals in criminal cases, habeas corpus appeals, and abuse or neglect of a child appeal cases.' It therefore reaches a capital habeas APPEAL, not the first-instance capital habeas proceeding, unless the commission expands its scope. Net: court appointment from the private bar, county-paid at trial level, state-paid on habeas appeal — mixed.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-4; SDCL 23A-51-7, 23A-51-8 (Office of Indigent Legal Services, SL 2024, ch. 95) Such counsel fees or expenses shall be a charge against and be paid by the county from which the person was committed, or for which the person is held as determined by the court. View the source document
Tennessee Statewide capital defender verified	A dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office, plus court appointment from a qualified roster as a fallback. The Office of the Post-Conviction Defender (OPCD), Nashville, was created by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1995 and opened April 1, 1996, succeeding the closed Tennessee Capital Case Resource Center; it is now governed by the Post-Conviction Defender Oversight Commission Act of 2011, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201 to -210. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a) makes representation of indigent death-sentenced persons in collateral proceedings the defender's primary responsibility (quoted below by the Tennessee Supreme Court from the 2003 codification; the U.S. Attorney General's July 2026 certification still cites § 40-30-206(a), (c) and § 40-30-205(g) for the same duties). Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(4)(A) directs that on appointing counsel the court 'shall appoint… the state post-conviction defender's office' where qualified and conflict-free; if OPCD is conflicted or unqualified the court designates private counsel from the Rule 13 § 1(b) roster, compensated at $90/hour under Rule 13, § 3(k)(3). Funding is a state appropriation: OPCD salaries are set by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-209, and Rule 13's explanatory comment to § 5 records that OPCD expert and investigative work 'is paid from funds appropriated by the General Assembly on July 1, 2023 to the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender.' Counties bear no part of the capital post-conviction cost.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a) (Post-Conviction Defender Oversight Commission Act, §§ 40-30-201 to -210); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(4)(A) Case: Holton v. State, 201 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006) It is the primary responsibility of the post-conviction defender to represent … any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state who is without counsel and who is unable to secure counsel due to indigency View the source document
Texas Statewide capital defender verified	A statewide capital post-conviction defender office plus a court-appointment fallback. First choice is the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW), created by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 781 (S.B. 1091) as the Office of Capital Writs and renamed by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1215 (S.B. 1743); it is the state post-conviction public defender and has operated since 2010. If OCFW cannot take the case (conflict, insufficient resources, inability to comply with professional-conduct rules, or other good cause — Tex. Gov't Code § 78.054(a)), the convicting court appoints private counsel from a statewide list maintained by the presiding judges of the administrative judicial regions (Gov't Code § 78.056). The appointing authority in both paths is the convicting (trial) court, which must notify the Court of Criminal Appeals of the appointment. FUNDING: OCFW is state-funded — Gov't Code § 78.052(b) directs funds 'as specified in the General Appropriations Act' and from the fair defense account under § 79.031. Appointed private counsel is compensated by the county under art. 11.071 § 2A(a), with state reimbursement capped at $25,000 per application and any excess 'the obligation of the county' — hence mixed.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 §§ 2(c), 2(f), 2A(a); Tex. Gov't Code §§ 78.052, 78.054, 78.056 the convicting court shall appoint the office of capital and forensic writs or, if the office of capital and forensic writs does not accept or is prohibited from accepting an appointment under Section 78.054 View the source document
Utah Court appointment from list verified	Court appointment of private counsel from a statewide qualified list — not a defender office. The SENTENCING COURT makes the appointment (§ 78B-9-202(1)(a)(ii)), and § 78B-9-202(1)(e) directs that 'the Supreme Court shall maintain a list of postconviction counsel qualified to represent an individual who has been sentenced to death on a petition for postconviction relief.' Utah has no capital post-conviction defender office and no state-funded resource center for this work; the Indigent Defense Act (Utah Code tit. 78B, ch. 22) is built around city/county 'indigent defense systems' and does not carry this function. FUNDING is state, not county: § 78B-9-202(3)(a) directs that reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses 'be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance.' Utah R. Crim. P. 8(h) confirms the split — trial-level appointed counsel is paid 'as described in Chapter 22 of Title 78B,' while '[l]itigation expenses and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel will be paid pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-9-202.' The 2026 amendment set presumptive caps of $250/hour up to $120,000 in fees and $40,000 in litigation expenses (investigator, mitigation specialist, mental-health and forensic experts, support personnel), exceedable only on a good-cause showing under § 78B-9-202(3)(c)–(g); the prior presumptive caps were $60,000 and $20,000.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(1)(e), (3)(a), (3)(c)–(d) Attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation provided for in this section and that the court has determined are reasonable shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance View the source document
Vermont Public defender verified	No capital post-conviction defender office, no capital resource center, no capital appointment list — none has ever been needed. The provider of post-conviction counsel generally is the Office of the Defender General, a statewide state agency created by 13 V.S.A. § 5251, which under 13 V.S.A. § 5253(a) 'has the primary responsibility for providing needy persons with legal services under this chapter' and the express 'duty of providing legal services to those persons in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections.' It may deliver those services through staff public defenders (§ 5254(a)), or 'through attorneys-at-law' under contract (§ 5253(b)), with contracts approved by the Secretary of Administration. Court-assigned counsel outside the Defender General's contracts are compensated at rates the Vermont Supreme Court prescribes (13 V.S.A. § 5205(a)), and an assigned counsel coordinator, himself under contract with but not supervised by the Defender General, determines reimbursable expenses (§ 5205(b)). Funding is a state appropriation: § 5205(c) directs that 'Payment and expenses of assigned counsel, and of the assigned counsel coordinator, shall be made from funds appropriated to the Office of the Defender General for the compensation of assigned counsel.' Separately, 13 V.S.A. § 7137 authorizes the sentencing court to order costs, expenses and 'reasonable compensation for legal services' paid by the State 'from the appropriation to the court where the sentence was imposed' — a second, court-budget funding path specific to petitions for review. No county funding and no federal grant funding appears in any of these provisions.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. §§ 5251, 5253(a)-(b), 5254(a), 5205(a)-(c), 7137 The Defender General has the primary responsibility for providing needy persons with legal services under this chapter. He or she shall have also the duty of providing legal services to those persons in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections. View the source document
Virginia None verified	NONE today. There is no capital post-conviction defender office, no state resource center, and no qualified-list appointment mechanism in current Virginia law. Until July 1, 2021 the mechanism was court appointment: under repealed § 19.2-163.7 the court appointed habeas counsel from a list maintained jointly by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission (§ 19.2-163.8), with the Supreme Court of Virginia holding exclusive jurisdiction over death-sentence habeas (former § 8.01-654(C)). The surviving VIDC statute, § 19.2-163.01, now confers no capital and no post-conviction function — its enumerated duties reach only court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants under § 19.2-159 and the public defender offices.	Source Statute / rule: Former Va. Code § 19.2-163.7 (repealed 2021); cf. current § 19.2-163.01 (VIDC powers and duties, no capital or habeas function) the court shall, within 30 days after the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, appoint counsel … to represent an indigent prisoner under sentence of death in a state habeas corpus proceeding View the source document
Washington Court appointment from list verified	No standalone capital post-conviction defender office (no CCRC/OCFW analogue). The appointing authority was the Washington Supreme Court itself, which had exclusive original jurisdiction over personal restraint petitions by persons under sentence of death and appointed counsel from a list of qualified attorneys 'recruited and maintained by a panel created by the Supreme Court,' retaining 'final discretion in the appointment' (former RAP 16.25). Funding is state: RCW 10.73.150 provides counsel 'at state expense,' and RCW 2.70.020(1)(b) makes the director of the Washington State Office of Public Defense responsible to 'Administer all state-funded services in the following program areas:… (b) Appellate indigent defense, as provided in this chapter and RCW 10.73.150' (verified at https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=2.70.020). As of September 1, 2026 the appointment rule is gone — Order No. 25700-A-1699 (Wash. June 4, 2026) rescinded RAP 16.19 through 16.27 and amended RAP 16.3 to delete the Supreme Court's exclusive capital-PRP jurisdiction — leaving RCW 10.73.150(3) as a statutory funding promise with no implementing rule. URL cited is the Internet Archive capture of the official courts.wa.gov rule PDF, because the live PDF at that same path now carries only '[RESCINDED]'.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.150; RCW 2.70.020(1)(b) upon a request by petitioner to the Clerk of the Supreme Court and upon a finding that the petitioner is indigent, the Supreme Court shall appoint counsel to assist in preparing and presenting a first personal restraint petition View the source document
West Virginia No death penalty verified	No capital post-conviction mechanism exists: West Virginia has no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no capital PCR unit, and no state-funded capital resource center, because it has no death penalty. The only residual mechanism is generic and non-capital: under W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a) the circuit court (or the Supreme Court of Appeals) itself appoints counsel for a qualifying indigent habeas petitioner. Compensation of appointed counsel is a state charge — § 53-4A-4(b) directs that costs be paid 'out of the treasury of the state from the appropriation for criminal charges,' with appointed-attorney fees paid under W. Va. Code ch. 29, art. 21 (Public Defender Services). West Virginia Public Defender Services is a state agency; nothing in ch. 29, art. 21 mentions capital or death-penalty representation.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-4(a)-(b) the court shall order that the petitioner proceed in forma pauperis, and the court shall appoint counsel for the petitioner View the source document
Wisconsin Public defender verified	There is no capital post-conviction defender office, capital PCR unit, or resource center in Wisconsin, because there are no capital cases. The single statewide provider of post-conviction counsel is the Office of the State Public Defender, which under Wis. Stat. s. 977.05(4)(j) may prosecute a habeas, postconviction or other collateral proceeding for an indigent person on that person's request or on a court's referral — but only 'if the state public defender determines the case should be pursued,' i.e. at the agency's discretion, not as of right. When the SPD accepts a case it either assigns staff counsel or appoints certified private counsel from its certification lists under Wis. Stat. s. 977.08 and Wis. Admin. Code ch. PD 1. Funding is a state appropriation to the Public Defender Board: Wis. Stat. s. 20.550(1)(a) appropriates biennially 'the amounts in the schedule for the operation of the office of the state public defender' (with minor program-revenue and federal-aid accounts at s. 20.550(1)(g), (L), (m)).	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. s. 977.05(4)(j); see also ss. 977.08, 20.550(1)(a) prosecute a writ of error, appeal, action or proceeding for habeas corpus or other postconviction or post-commitment remedy on behalf of the person before any court, if the state public defender determines the case should be pursued. View the source document
Wyoming Public defender verified	The Office of the State Public Defender — a single statewide agency created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-103(a), headed by a State Public Defender appointed by the governor (§ 7-6-103(b)) and staffed by full- and part-time assistant public defenders in each judicial district (§ 7-6-103(f)). It is the office named in § 7-6-104(c)(ii) as the provider of representation in proceedings under the post-conviction act in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. There is NO separate capital post-conviction defender office, no state-funded resource center, no capital unit, and no statutory registry or qualified list for capital post-conviction appointments. A district court may, on its own motion or on application of the State Public Defender or the defendant, appoint an attorney other than the public defender 'at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal,' with compensation set with regard to complexity and paid by the State Public Defender (§ 7-6-109(a)-(c)). Funding is mixed by statute: § 7-6-113 fixes total state and federal funding at eighty-five percent (85%) of the State Public Defender's budget, with the counties appropriating the remaining fifteen percent (15%) under an equitable formula. The office's own public description of its functions states that it represents 'individuals seeking post-conviction relief' (https://wyodefender.wyo.gov/what-we-do, fetched 2026-09-07 — agency webpage, offered as corroboration only, not as the primary authority for this cell).	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-6-103(a), 7-6-104(c)(ii), 7-6-109, 7-6-113 There is created the office of the state public defender. The office of the state public defender shall be deemed a state agency for budgeting purposes View the source document

Qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel

Whether a statute, rule or court order sets experience, training or prior-capital-work requirements for the lawyer appointed.

46 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Standards by rule verified	Qualification standards for capital counsel exist, but by administrative rule and framed in trial terms. Alabama Department of Finance Administrative Code r. 355-9-1-.08 (OIDS rule) sets mandatory minimums for 'Lead Counsel in a capital case' (five years' criminal litigation experience; familiarity with capital jurisprudence; a capital case litigated to verdict, hung jury or plea as associate counsel, or four homicide cases; substantial familiarity with expert and scientific/medical evidence; 10 hours of capital-defense CLE every two years) and for 'Associate Counsel' (three years' experience; four jury trials to verdict or hung jury; a capital seminar every two years). Since October 1, 2018 an attorney must file an OIDS capital certification form before appointment to be paid from the Fair Trial Tax Fund. The rule's criteria are expressed in trial terms and we found no statute, court rule, or decision expressly applying them to — or exempting — an appointment as post-conviction counsel under § 13A-5-53.1(b). Ala. Code § 13A-5-54 (five years' criminal-law experience) by its terms reaches persons 'indicted,' i.e. trial counsel. There is no capital post-conviction-specific standard on the books.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Finance) r. 355-9-1-.08 (statutory authority Ala. Code § 41-4-322(h)); cf. Ala. Code § 13A-5-54 Capital Murder – to act as Lead Counsel in a capital case, the attorney, whether appointed or public defender, must … possess the following minimum qualifications: 1. Must have at least five (5) years of criminal litigation experience. View the source document
Alaska Not established unverified	None found, and none could operate: Alaska has no capital sentencing. The word 'capital' does not appear anywhere in the Alaska Court System's consolidated Rules of Criminal Procedure (crpro.pdf, fetched and searched in full), and 'death penalty,' 'capital punishment,' and 'sentence of death' appear nowhere in either the Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Administration (adm.pdf, fetched and searched in full). The only requirements Alaska places on appointed post-conviction counsel are procedural duties, not qualifications: Crim. R. 35.1(e)(2)-(3) requires appointed counsel, within 60 days of appointment, to file an amended application, a statement proceeding on the pro se application, or a no-merit certificate describing the claims considered, the materials reviewed, the investigations conducted, and the reasons for concluding the claims lack arguable merit. Alaska R. Admin. P. 12(e)(1) requires only that a court-appointed attorney outside the PD/OPA system be 'a member of the Alaska Bar Association,' with 'the complexity of the case and the level of experience required by counsel' considered only when departing from rotation-list order. No years-of-experience, prior-capital-work, or training standard exists. Marked unverified because no source affirmatively states the absence; the finding rests on exhaustive negative searches of the two rule sets.	Source Statute / rule: Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(2)-(3); Alaska R. Admin. P. 12(e)(1)
Arizona Standards by statute verified	YES — both statutory and by court rule. A.R.S. § 13-4041(C) requires appointees from the Supreme Court's list to (1) 'Be a member in good standing of the state bar of Arizona for at least five years immediately preceding the appointment'; (2) 'Have practiced in the area of state criminal appeals or postconviction proceedings for at least three years immediately preceding the appointment'; and (3) 'Not previously have represented the capital defendant in the case either in the trial court or in the direct appeal, unless the defendant and counsel expressly request continued representation and waive all potential issues that are foreclosed by continued representation.' The same subsection authorizes the Supreme Court to 'establish by rule more stringent standards of competency,' and to refuse to certify or to remove an otherwise-qualified attorney it finds 'incapable or unable to adequately represent a capital defendant.' It has done so: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b) requires counsel 'who meets the standards of Rules 6.5 and 6.8 and A.R.S. § 13-4041' (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-19-0012, eff. Jan. 1, 2020). CAVEAT: we could not retrieve the current text of Rule 6.8 itself from a primary source; the Arizona Supreme Court described its content in Fitzgerald v. Myers, No. CR-16-0285-PR (Ariz. Sept. 26, 2017) — appointed capital PCR counsel 'must meet the qualifications prescribed in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.8(a) and (c) and shall be familiar with and guided by the performance standards in the 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines' (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8(c)(4)).	Source Statute / rule: A.R.S. § 13-4041(C)(1)-(3); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8 and 32.5(b) Case: Fitzgerald v. Myers, No. CR-16-0285-PR (Ariz. Sept. 26, 2017) Have practiced in the area of state criminal appeals or postconviction proceedings for at least three years immediately preceding the appointment. View the source document
Arkansas Standards by statute verified	YES — detailed, capital-specific, and framed as exclusive. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(c)(1) declares the listed standards 'the exclusive criteria which counsel must satisfy in order to be appointed.' Under § 16-91-202(c)(2), at least one appointed attorney must: (A) have represented a death-sentenced inmate in state or federal post-conviction proceedings within the preceding five years, OR have been defense counsel in at least three state/federal post-conviction proceedings from felony convictions within five years, at least two involving violent crimes including one murder case; (B) have conducted at least two evidentiary hearings in state or federal post-conviction proceedings within five years; (C) have been licensed at least five years, three of them in Arkansas; and (D) have completed at least six hours of Arkansas CLE-approved training in capital trial, appellate, or post-conviction advocacy within the preceding two years. Section 16-91-202(e) allows appointment of counsel not meeting all criteria only on a written finding of unique training/experience, after a hearing, with counsel admitted at least five years and having at least three years' experience handling capital prosecutions or capital post-conviction proceedings. Section 16-91-202(d)(5) requires the judge to enter a written order specifying the appointed counsel's qualifying credentials. Parallel qualification standards appear in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(c), including 37.5(c)(5), which bars appointing trial or direct-appeal counsel unless the petitioner requests it and a second attorney is added. The Arkansas Supreme Court enforces the rule as a precondition: 'for an attorney to be appointed by an Arkansas state court to represent an indigent capital defendant who is sentenced to death, that attorney must satisfy the criteria set out in Rule 37.5.' Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480 (2005). NOTE: Act 662 of 2025, § 61, amended only § 16-91-202(e)(2)(A) (the alternative-qualification route) to add capital rape and treason prosecutions; subsection (c) was not touched.	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(c), (d)(5), (e); Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(c) The following standards are the exclusive criteria which counsel must satisfy in order to be appointed under subsection (a) of this section. View the source document
California Standards by rule verified	YES — binding minimum qualifications by rule of court, mandated by statute. Gov. Code § 68665(a) directs that 'The Judicial Council and the Supreme Court shall adopt, by rule of court, binding and mandatory competency standards for the appointment of counsel in death penalty direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.' The operative rule is Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.652 (adopted eff. Apr. 25, 2019), which conditions inclusion on a panel or appointment by any court on satisfying stated minimums: (c)(1) 'Active practice of law in California for at least five years'; (c)(2) case experience via one of three routes, e.g. (C) 'at least eight completed appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, or jury trials in felony cases, including as counsel of record for a petitioner in at least two habeas corpus proceedings, each involving a serious felony in which the petition has been filed'; (c)(3)(A) within three years, 'at least 15 hours of appellate criminal defense or habeas corpus defense training approved for Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California, at least 10 hours of which address death penalty-related habeas corpus proceedings'; plus writing samples and two attorney recommendations. Rule 8.652(e) requires an attorney lacking trial experience to associate experienced counsel if an evidentiary hearing is ordered; (g)(1) deems HCRC and the California Appellate Project-San Francisco qualified as entities, but they may not assign lead counsel unless that individual is qualified under (c) or (d). Superior courts adopting a local rule under 4.562(g) must still 'require attorneys to meet the minimum qualifications under rule 8.652(c).'	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Gov. Code § 68665; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.652 An attorney included on a panel, appointed by the Supreme Court, or appointed by a court under a local rule as provided in rule 4.562, must satisfy the following minimum qualifications: View the source document
Colorado Standards by statute verified	YES — binding statutory minimum qualifications, plus discretionary factors. § 16-12-205(2) sets mandatory floors the appointed team must meet alone or in combination: Colorado licensure or pro hac admission; at least one attorney with five years' criminal-law litigation experience including trials and postconviction proceedings; at least one with three years trying felonies (five felony verdicts in the preceding five years, or twenty-five felony trials total); and at least one with three years handling felony appeals, having served as counsel in at least five felony appeals. § 16-12-205(3) adds permissive factors the court 'may also consider,' including prior appearance as counsel in a capital case, a first-degree-murder verdict, capital-specific CLE within the preceding five years, and the attorney's workload. These are statutory, not a supreme-court qualification order.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-205(2), (3) shall appoint one or more attorneys who, alone or in combination, meet all of the following minimum qualifications: … At least one of the appointed attorneys shall have a minimum of five years' experience in criminal law litigation, including work on trials and postconviction proceedings View the source document
Connecticut No standards verified	ABSENT as to capital post-conviction. No Connecticut statute, Practice Book rule or Supreme Court order sets experience, prior-capital-work or training qualifications for counsel appointed in a capital state habeas. The only provision governing who may be assigned to habeas work is § 51-291(11), which directs the Chief Public Defender merely to 'maintain one or more lists of trial lawyers who may be available' for habeas proceedings, with the individual 'selected by a judge of the court before which the matter is to be heard' — it states no qualification criteria. The training/practice/caseload standards the legislature did mandate, in § 51-296(c)(3), apply only to child protection and family relations representation, not to habeas. Searched: CGS ch. 887 (§§ 51-289 to 51-299), CGS ch. 915 (§ 52-470), CGS ch. 952 (§§ 53a-46a, 53a-46b), and Practice Book ch. 23 (Habeas Corpus, §§ 23-21 to 23-42) — no capital counsel qualification standard in any of them. The closest thing is agency practice, not law: the Chief Public Defender's annual report states that 'Per American Bar Association (ABA) standards, capital cases require the appointment of two attorneys per case who meet the standards for representing clients in capital felony cases,' but that passage describes trial-level capital felony cases handled by the Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit and is not stated for habeas.	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-291(11) (no qualification criteria); cf. § 51-296(c)(3) (standards limited to child protection/family matters) Maintain one or more lists of trial lawyers who may be available to represent persons in habeas corpus proceedings arising from criminal matters View the source document
Delaware No standards verified	NONE located. No capital-specific qualification standard — years of experience, prior capital work, mandatory training, or a qualified-counsel roster — appears anywhere in the sources that govern this appointment. We read the full current text of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Superior Court of Delaware (2026 Edition), including Rule 61 and Rule 44, the full text of 29 Del. C. ch. 46 (Office of Defense Services, §§ 4600-4608), and the full Rules of the Supreme Court of Delaware (including Rule 26, appointment of counsel in criminal appeals, and Rule 35, review and stay of death penalty); none contains a qualification criterion for capital or capital post-conviction counsel. We also checked the Delaware AOC's Operating Procedures for the Judicial Branch (case-management chapter), which references a capital-murder speedy-trial policy but no counsel-qualification policy. The only qualification language in the operative sources is generic: counsel must be 'qualified counsel' (29 Del. C. § 4605) and licensed in Delaware (§ 4603(b), quoted). Caveat for a hostile reader: this is a not-found result as to statutes, court rules, and supreme-court orders; we did not obtain any internal Office of Defense Services policy manual, which would not be a rule or order in any event.	Source Statute / rule: 29 Del. C. § 4603(b); cf. § 4605 ('other qualified counsel'); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44, 61; Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26, 35 Assistant Public Defenders and attorneys contracting with the Office of Conflicts Counsel must be licensed to practice in this State. View the source document
Florida Standards by rule and statute verified	Yes — both by court rule and by statute. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.112(k), adopted by Supreme Court order and applicable to all lead counsel in capital postconviction cases appointed or retained on or after April 1, 2015, requires lead counsel to have been a bar member at least 5 years, to have at least 3 years' experience in postconviction litigation, and to have participated in a combined total of 5 capital proceedings (capital trials, capital sentencings, capital postconviction evidentiary hearings, capital collateral postconviction appeals, or capital federal habeas), at least 2 of which must be postconviction or federal habeas. Rule 3.112(l) permits deviation only where the trial court enters a written order finding 'exceptional circumstances.' Statutory standards run in parallel: full-time assistant CCRC counsel need 3 years' criminal practice plus 5 qualifying felony/capital proceedings (§ 27.704(1)); private registry counsel must certify they meet § 27.704(2) (3 years' criminal practice; 2 capital trials or sentencings, 5 felony appeals, or 5 capital postconviction evidentiary hearings, or 5 in combination) and must have taken 10 hours of capital-defense CLE within the last year (§ 27.710(1)-(2)). Separately, § 27.7045 disqualifies for 5 years any attorney twice found in a capital postconviction proceeding to have rendered constitutionally deficient representation where relief was granted.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.112(c), (k), (l); Fla. Stat. §§ 27.704(1)-(2), 27.710(1)-(2), 27.7045 In order to serve as lead counsel, as set forth in rule 3.851, for the defendant in a capital postconviction proceeding, an attorney must have: (1) been a member of any bar for at least 5 years View the source document
Georgia No standards verified	NONE for capital post-conviction. Because there is no appointment mechanism there is nothing to qualify for: no statute, Uniform Superior Court Rule (44.1–44.13 were read in full), or Supreme Court order sets experience, prior-capital-work, or training requirements for capital state-habeas counsel. Georgia's only statutory capital-counsel competence standard is O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(c), quoted here, and it governs representation of a person 'accused of a capital offense for which the death penalty is sought' — i.e. the trial-and-direct-appeal scheme whose scope § 17-12-12(d) caps at 'any appeals to the Supreme Court of Georgia.' It does not reach a habeas petitioner, who is convicted rather than accused.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(c), (d) No person shall be assigned the primary responsibility of representing an indigent person accused of a capital offense for which the death penalty is sought unless such person is authorized to practice law in this state View the source document
Hawaii No standards verified	None. No Hawaii statute or court rule sets any qualification standard for post-conviction counsel, capital or otherwise: no years-of-experience requirement, no prior-capital-work requirement, no training requirement. HRPP Rule 40(i) sets the standard by cross-reference only, directing representation 'as in other penal cases.' HRPP Rule 44 ('Appointed-Counsel Fees and Necessary Expenses') is purely a billing rule and imposes no qualifications. HRS ch. 802 likewise imposes none: s 802-5(a) simply commands appointment, quoted here, with the only criteria being the petitioner's indigency and the chapter's coverage. The word 'capital,' the phrase 'death penalty,' and the phrase 'sentence of death' do not appear anywhere in the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. Rev. Stat. s 802-5(a); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i); Haw. R. Penal P. 44 when it shall appear to a judge that a person requesting the appointment of counsel satisfies the requirements of this chapter, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the person at all stages of the proceedings, including appeal, if any View the source document
Idaho Standards by rule verified	Yes — by Idaho Supreme Court rule. We.C.R. 44.3 ('Standards for the Qualification of Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases') applies where the defendant is indigent, counsel is not privately retained, and 'the death penalty may be or has been imposed.' Rule 44.3(c) requires that attorneys appointed under Rule 44.2(a) (the capital post-conviction appointment) be selected by the State Public Defender or the State Appellate Public Defender, who must ensure they are qualified to provide team representation and that the representation 'meets applicable indigent defense standards.' Rule 44.2(a) adds two structural qualification requirements specific to capital post-conviction: at least two attorneys must be assigned, and they must be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant before the death sentence was imposed. The rule states no numeric years-of-experience threshold on its face; the numeric thresholds sit in the executive-branch indigent defense standards that Rule 44.3(c) incorporates by reference (see notes).	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3(a), (c); Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) must be selected by the State Public Defender or the State Appellate Public Defender, as appropriate, who must ensure that such attorneys are qualified to provide team representation View the source document
Illinois No standards verified	NONE, and none ever attached to post-conviction counsel specifically. Illinois' capital qualification rule was Supreme Court Rule 714 (Capital Litigation Trial Bar), and by its terms it reached TRIAL counsel only — 'trial counsel must meet the following minimum requirements': lead counsel needed five years of criminal litigation experience within the last seven years, eight completed felony jury trials (two of them murder prosecutions), and 12 hours of approved capital training or equivalent expert-evidence experience. The Illinois Supreme Court repealed and reserved Rules 43, 416 and 714 by order in M.R. 3140 entered February 6, 2013, and by the same order deleted the capital carve-outs from Rule 651 (post-conviction appeals). The current rules confirm 'Rule 416. Reserved' and 'Rule 714. Reserved.' Rule 651(c), which governs appointment of post-conviction counsel, imposes no experience, prior-capital-work, or training qualification.	Source Statute / rule: Ill. S. Ct. R. 714 (repealed and reserved eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Ill. S. Ct. R. 416 (same); Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) Case: Ill. Sup. Ct. order, M.R. 3140 (entered Feb. 6, 2013) Repealed and Reserved Rule 714 Rule 714. Capital Litigation Trial Bar Reserved. (a) Statement of Purpose. This rule is promulgated to insure that counsel who participate in capital cases possess the ability, knowledge and experience to do so in a competent and professional manner. View the source document
Indiana No standards verified	NO qualification standards specific to capital POST-CONVICTION counsel are presently in force. Criminal Rule 6.1 sets detailed standards for capital TRIAL counsel — lead counsel needs five years of criminal litigation experience, five completed felony jury trials, prior capital lead/co-counsel experience, and twelve hours of capital-defense training within two years (Rule 6.1(B)(1)); co-counsel needs three years, three felony jury trials, and the same twelve hours (Rule 6.1(B)(2)) — and for capital APPELLATE counsel (Rule 6.1(J)(1): three years' criminal litigation experience, three prior felony appeals within five years, twelve hours of capital training). We read the full current text of Rule 6.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2024, republished in the Jan. 1, 2025 restyled criminal rules) and it contains no analogous provision for post-conviction counsel; the post-conviction rule, P-C.R. 1(9), imposes no experience requirement either. That gap is confirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court's own October 2025 rules proposal, which would for the first time require the State Public Defender to 'appoint at least two qualified post-conviction attorneys,' each an 'experienced and active post-conviction practitioner' with mental-health/forensic-expert and mitigation experience, twelve hours of capital training within two years, and a cap of two pending capital post-conviction cases per attorney. As of this writing the published rules are still the Jan. 1, 2025 version; the proposal has not been adopted.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(B)(1)-(2), 6.1(J)(1) (trial and appellate standards only); proposed Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(K)(2)-(4) (October 2025, not adopted) The proposed amendment would also add requirements for counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings for capital cases. View the source document
Iowa No standards verified	No capital-specific qualification standards exist — no statute, court rule, or supreme court order creates any, and the words "capital," "death penalty" and "sentence of death" appear nowhere in Iowa Admin. Code ch. 493, Iowa Code chs. 13B/815/822, or the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. The operative standard for any postconviction counsel is Iowa Admin. Code r. 493—11.3(3): two years of criminal practice or judicial clerkship, five hours of criminal-law CLE per year, State Public Defender postconviction-relief basic training (waivable if the attorney has completed three prior PCR proceedings), and three judicial references. For the most serious offense grade Iowa has — class "A" felonies, including first-degree murder — trial counsel must have "practiced criminal law for four years or more" (r. 493—11.3(4)(a)), and Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(b) permits (does not require) appointment of two attorneys in class "A" felony cases. None of these is capital-specific.	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Admin. Code r. 493—11.3(3); r. 493—11.3(4)(a); Iowa Code § 815.10(1)(b) To be eligible to contract to represent indigent persons in postconviction relief cases at the trial level, an attorney must: a. Have practiced criminal law or served as a judicial law clerk for two years or more View the source document
Kansas Standards by rule verified	Yes, by regulation. K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(1)(B) directs BIDS to adopt 'standards of competency and qualification for the appointment of counsel in capital cases under this section.' BIDS implemented this in K.A.R. 105-3-2(a)(6), which requires that any attorney assigned or appointed for a death-sentenced person 'in postconviction proceedings' be prequalified by the Board. The substantive screening criterion the Board applies to capital counsel is ABA 'guideline 5.1 qualifications of defense counsel,' pages 35–36 of the February 2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, adopted by reference in K.A.R. 105-3-2(a)(4). Critically, K.A.R. 105-3-2(b) carves capital postconviction appointments out of the judge's ordinary power to waive the qualification requirements — a judge may not substitute an unqualified attorney of the judge's own choosing.	Source Statute / rule: K.A.R. 105-3-2(a)(6), (a)(4), (b); K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(1)(B) Each attorney assigned or appointed to represent an indigent person who has been convicted of capital murder and who is under a sentence of death in postconviction proceedings shall be prequalified by the board as meeting this regulation. View the source document
Kentucky Not established unverified	NONE FOUND — no qualification standard for capital post-conviction counsel appears in Kentucky statute, court rule, or supreme-court order. RCr 11.42(5), the only Kentucky provision that compels appointment of post-conviction counsel, specifies no years of experience, no prior capital work, and no training requirement; it says only that the court shall appoint 'counsel.' we checked and found nothing on point in: KRS Chapter 31 (Department of Public Advocacy — full section list reviewed, including the repeal of KRS 31.071 in 2024); KRS Chapter 532 (including KRS 532.130/.135/.140, which govern pretrial intellectual-disability and serious-mental-illness determinations in capital cases and contain no counsel-qualification language); the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure Title XI (Judgment; Execution); the Rules of the Supreme Court (Parts we-X, none addressing capital counsel); and the Administrative Procedures of the Court of Justice (Parts we-XXI; Part X, 'Capital Construction Program,' concerns buildings, not capital cases). The only standard-setting hook is agency-internal and generic: KRS 31.030(6) authorizes DPA to issue rules, promulgate regulations, and establish 'standards as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.' DPA's public manual series (bail, collateral consequences, DUI, evidence, expert funds, mental health, pretrial release, suppression, litigating race issues, defending children) includes no capital manual and no published capital-representation standard. Recorded as unverified because an absence cannot be affirmatively quoted; a hostile reader who locates an unpublished DPA internal capital standard would be correcting this cell, not the statutes and rules we searched.	Source Statute / rule: KRS 31.030(6) (only general DPA standard-setting authority); RCr 11.42(5) (appointment provision, silent on qualifications)
Louisiana Standards by rule verified	YES — role-specific certification standards adopted by rule. The capital defense guidelines codified at La. Admin. Code tit. 22, Part XV, Chapter 9 (LPDB Capital Defense Guidelines) apply 'from the moment the client is taken into custody' through 'state and federal post-conviction review' (§ XV-901(B)(1)), require a defense team of no fewer than two attorneys certified under § XV-915 with at least one qualified as lead counsel (§ XV-913(A)(1)(a)), and create separate certification categories for 'Post-Conviction Lead Counsel' and 'Post-Conviction Associate Counsel' (§ XV-915(C)(1)). Qualified Post-Conviction Lead Counsel must have at least five years of criminal post-conviction litigation experience; have been counsel of record in at least five felony post-conviction/habeas proceedings (including at least one murder conviction) and in two death-penalty post-conviction/habeas proceedings in which a petition was filed; have been lead counsel in a capital post-conviction proceeding with an evidentiary hearing (or two felony post-conviction evidentiary hearings); and be familiar with Louisiana capital post-conviction practice and federal habeas law (§ XV-915(D)(1)(e)). Associate counsel needs three years of criminal trial/appellate/post-conviction experience or two years at a Louisiana capital defense organization; the state public defender may waive experience for equivalent alternative experience, but lead counsel must in all cases have five years at the bar (§ XV-915(D)(1)(f)-(g)). Non-waivable training: a comprehensive capital training program completed within the preceding two years (§ XV-915(E)(1)), plus continuing training under § XV-923. An older, still-codified certification rule for capital post-conviction counsel (three years' criminal defense experience plus a prior capital post-conviction or death-sentence case) appears at § XV-309. The quote below is from the Louisiana Public Defender Board's own published text of LAC 22:XV Chapter 9; the identical language is in the codified rule at Cornell LII (https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/louisiana/La-Admin-Code-tit-22-SS-XV-915), which we also fetched and read.	Source Statute / rule: La. Admin. Code tit. 22, § XV-915(D)(1)(e) (LPDB Capital Defense Guidelines, LAC 22:XV.Chapter 9; promulgated LR 36:998 (May 2010) under La. R.S. 15:148); see also §§ XV-901(B)(1), XV-913(A)(1)(a), XV-923, XV-309 have at least five years of criminal post-conviction litigation experience View the source document
Maine Standards by rule verified	NO capital qualification standards exist. 4 M.R.S. § 1804(2)(B) directs the commission to adopt 'Standards prescribing minimum experience, training and other eligibility requirements' for assigned, contract, employed counsel and public defenders, and it has done so in rule 94-649 ch. 3, 'Eligibility Requirements for Specialized Panels' (adopted 2025). Section 1(20) of that rule enumerates sixteen specialized panels — Homicide; Sex Offenses; Major Felonies; OUI; Domestic Violence; Juvenile Defense; Child Protective; Child Protective Appeals; Homicide Appeals; Other Criminal Appeals; Post-Conviction Review; In-Custody Lawyer of the Day; Walk-In Lawyer of the Day; Juvenile Lawyer of the Day; Resource Counsel; PDS Liaison — none capital. The words 'capital' and 'death penalty' appear nowhere in the rule (we searched the full 42,000-character text; zero hits for either). The nearest operative standard, quoted here, is the Post-Conviction Review panel requirement; the Homicide panel separately requires ten years' criminal defense experience-tier requirements and prior homicide trial experience.	Source Statute / rule: 94-649 C.M.R. ch. 3 § 3(10) (PDS rule, 2025 amendment, filing 649c003-2025-189); rulemaking authority 4 M.R.S. § 1804(2)(B) Post-Conviction Review. To be Eligible for post-conviction review cases, an attorney must: A. Practice Experience: Have at least three years of criminal defense experience; View the source document
Maryland No death penalty verified	There are NO capital-specific qualification standards in Maryland statute or rule — the capital scheme was repealed in 2013. The only statutory qualification framework is generic and delegated to the Public Defender: panel attorneys must be admitted to practice in Maryland and are placed on panels according to criteria the Public Defender sets based on the nature and complexity of the offense, the attorney's trial or appellate experience, and any other factor necessary to ensure competent representation (Crim. Proc. § 16-208(a)(2)). No years-of-experience threshold, prior-capital-work requirement, or training mandate appears in the statute; none was located in the Criminal Procedure Article or in any Maryland court order fetched for this pass.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 16-208(a)(2) placed on various panels in accordance with qualification criteria that the Public Defender sets forth, based on: 1. the nature and complexity of the offense requiring representation; 2. the trial or appellate experience of the attorney View the source document
Massachusetts No death penalty verified	NONE. There are no qualification standards (experience, prior capital work, training) for capital post-conviction counsel in Massachusetts, because there is no capital post-conviction proceeding. The only Massachusetts statute still on the books addressing assignment of counsel in a 'capital' case, G.L. c. 277, § 47, is a trial-stage provision that makes assignment permissive and prescribes no experience, training, or certification criteria whatsoever. Nothing in G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 or in Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 imposes qualification standards for post-conviction counsel, capital or otherwise. Note that 'capital crime'/'capital case' in current Massachusetts usage means murder in the first degree, not a death-eligible offense (G.L. c. 278, § 33E).	Source Statute / rule: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 47 If a prisoner, under indictment for a capital crime, pleads guilty, upon being arraigned, the court shall award sentence against him; if he does not plead guilty, the court may assign him counsel and take all other measures preparatory to a trial View the source document
Michigan No death penalty verified	NONE. There are no qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel because there is no capital post-conviction litigation. The governing rule, MCR 6.505, addresses only whether and when counsel is appointed — it prescribes no experience, prior-capital-work, or training criteria. A text search of the official Michigan Court Rules as updated July 31, 2026 returns no occurrence of 'capital case,' 'capital offense,' 'death penalty,' or 'penalty of death' anywhere in the rules; the only uses of the word 'capital' are 'capital stock' and 'capital letters.'	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.505(A) Counsel must be appointed if the court directs that oral argument or an evidentiary hearing be held. View the source document
Minnesota No standards verified	No capital-specific qualification standards exist (no experience, prior-capital-work, or capital-training requirement appears anywhere in Minn. Stat. ch. 590, 589 or 611). The only statutory qualification for the lawyers who handle postconviction work is bar licensure: Minn. Stat. § 611.24, subd. 1(b) for assistant state public defenders, and the same subdivision requires the chief appellate public defender to be 'a full-time qualified attorney, licensed to practice law in this state.' No Minnesota Supreme Court order imposes capital post-conviction counsel standards, because there is no capital sentencing to which such standards could attach.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 611.24, subd. 1(b) An assistant state public defender shall be a qualified attorney licensed to practice law in this state. View the source document
Mississippi Standards by rule verified	YES — express qualification standards, imposed by Supreme Court rule rather than statute. Miss. R. App. P. 22(d) requires that at least one attorney with primary responsibility be (1) a Mississippi Bar member in good standing for at least five years immediately preceding appointment (or admitted pro hac vice with equivalent standing), (2) admitted in Mississippi's federal courts and the Fifth Circuit, (3) have practiced three years in criminal trials/direct appeals or post-conviction/habeas, (4) not have represented the petitioner at trial or on direct appeal absent express request and waiver, (5) have substantial knowledge of capital law plus the required training, and (6) have demonstrated proficiency and commitment to zealous advocacy. A trial court may waive requirements (1)-(3) for an attorney with substantially equivalent complex-litigation experience. Rule 22(e) adds that, effective July 31, 2000, capital post-conviction counsel must have completed twelve hours of accredited capital-defense training within the year before appointment or employment. Separately, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-107 bars CPCC attorneys from any other law practice and from participating in capital trials or direct appeals.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. App. P. 22(d), 22(e) (court rule); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-107 At least one (1) attorney representing those under a sentence of death seeking post-conviction relief shall have primary responsibility for and personally appear at proceedings, and shall, (1) Be admitted to practice law in Mississippi View the source document
Missouri Standards by rule verified	YES — explicit, quantified standards, stated identically in the court rule and the statute. Rule 29.16(b) / sec. 547.370.2: all appointed counsel must be members of The Missouri Bar or admitted pro hac vice under Rule 9, and AT LEAST ONE of the two must (1) have completed, within the two years preceding appointment, at least twelve hours of training on the post-conviction phase of a criminal case and on federal and state aspects of death-penalty cases; (2) have at least three years of criminal litigation experience; (3) have participated as counsel or co-counsel to final judgment in at least five post-conviction motions involving class A felonies in state or federal trial courts; and (4) have participated to final judgment in at least three felony jury trials OR five direct criminal appeals in felony cases. Counsel must certify compliance to the state public defender before filing an entry of appearance. Rule 29.16(c) / sec. 547.370.3 additionally bar appointment of trial or direct-appeal counsel, and Rule 29.15(f) requires any successor counsel in a death case to have at least the same Rule 29.16 qualifications as the withdrawing counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(b)-(c); Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.2-.3; see also Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(f) Have attended and successfully completed within two years immediately preceding the appointment at least twelve hours of training or educational programs on the post-conviction phase of a criminal case and federal and state aspects of cases in which the death penalty is sought View the source document
Montana Standards by court order verified	YES — and they are capital-post-conviction-specific, adopted by Montana Supreme Court order rather than by statute. The Court's 'Standards for Competency of Counsel for Indigent Persons in Death Penalty Cases' (AF 97-326, adopted June 29, 1999, amended July 16, 2002) contain a separate Part III, POSTCONVICTION PHASE, applying 'to counsel appointed by the district court to represent indigent petitioners in postconviction proceedings under Title 46, Chapter 21, who are sentenced to death.' It requires the district court to appoint TWO counsel (one may be admitted pro hac vice). Lead counsel must be an active member in good standing of the Montana bar or admitted pro hac vice; must have at least 5 years of criminal trial, criminal appellate, or state or federal post-conviction experience; and must have completed or taught, in the 2 years before appointment or within 90 days after, at least 12 CLE hours on the defense of persons accused or convicted of capital crimes. The two appointed counsel, individually or in combination, must also have experience as counsel for either side in the trial of one deliberate homicide case, the trial of three felony cases, and three cases involving state post-conviction or federal habeas claims. Section 46-21-201(3)(a) makes these standards, plus OPD's own standards, the operative qualification for the assignment; OPD's Practice Standards § VI.B.a in turn require lead capital counsel to meet the Supreme Court's standards and the ABA Guidelines (rev. ed. 2003). Part IV of the order, tracking § 46-21-201(3)(f), states that failure to adhere to the post-conviction appointment standards 'may not serve as a basis for a claim for postconviction relief.'	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3)(a) (incorporating the standards); Mont. Sup. Ct. Order AF 97-326 (June 29, 1999, as amended July 16, 2002), Standards Part III Case: In re Amending This Court's Standards for Competency of Counsel for Indigent Persons in Death Penalty Cases, No. 97-326 (Mont. July 16, 2002) He or she must have at least 5 years criminal trial, criminal appellate, or state or federal postconviction experience, which experience may have been obtained in Montana or in another jurisdiction. View the source document
Nebraska No standards verified	NO qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel. The only operative language is the generic sentence in § 29-3004 that appointed post-conviction counsel 'shall be competent and shall provide effective counsel' — no years of practice, no prior capital experience, no training requirement, and no capital-specific tier. We looked for and did not find any capital-counsel standard in: Chapter 29 (searched the full section index — the only counsel provisions are §§ 29-3004, 29-3901 to 29-3908 (trial-level), and § 29-4122 (DNA)); Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1467, the statewide Supreme Court rule on appointment of counsel, which requires each judicial district only to keep a public list and a transparent process and does not mention experience, capital cases, or post-conviction; the Lancaster County local rule adopted under it (Rule 3-13.001), whose appointment categories top out at 'Homicide-(Murder 1 or 2) & Felony 1 Cases' with no capital or post-conviction tier; and Neb. Admin. Code Title 70 (Commission on Public Advocacy), whose 16 chapters are organizational and contain no attorney-qualification chapter, notwithstanding the Commission's authority under § 29-3927(1)(g) to adopt guidelines on 'attorney eligibility and qualifications for court appointments.' The one capital-experience requirement in Nebraska statute is § 29-3928, which requires the NCPA's chief counsel to have been licensed five years and to be 'experienced in the practice of criminal defense, including the defense of capital cases' — that governs who runs the office, not who is appointed to a given capital post-conviction case.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 (cf. § 29-3928; Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1467) The attorney or attorneys shall be competent and shall provide effective counsel. View the source document
Nevada Standards by rule verified	YES — by Supreme Court rule, not statute. SCR 250(2)(c) sets the district-court post-conviction standard: at least two prior felony post-conviction proceedings as counsel, plus a general competence finding. SCR 250(2)(d) sets the appellate standard (at least two prior felony appeals). Two caveats a hostile reader will find: (i) the bar is markedly lower than Nevada's trial standard, SCR 250(2)(b), which requires five felony trials including a murder trial plus co-counsel work in a completed capital trial; and (ii) SCR 250(2)(e) lets the court appoint an attorney who does NOT meet the minimum after a hearing on competence. SCR 250(3)(a) also imposes contemporaneous record-keeping duties on post-conviction counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(2)(c)-(e), 250(3)(a) Counsel appointed to represent a petitioner for post-conviction relief in the district court must have acted as counsel in at least two post-conviction proceedings arising from felony convictions and must otherwise satisfy the court that counsel is capable and competent. View the source document
New Hampshire Standards by guideline verified	Yes — but by agency guideline, not by statute or court rule. The New Hampshire Judicial Council adopted dedicated 'Eligibility Guidelines and Performance Standards: Capital Post-Conviction Representation' in September 2015, still published on the Council's forms-and-publications page as of January 5, 2026. Lead counsel must have 5 years' bar membership and 3 years' post-conviction litigation experience, must be familiar with all state and federal appellate and post-conviction options, must submit a written pre-appointment proposal showing capacity to handle the record, must know execution-date and stay procedures, and must be able to preserve the client's right to federal review; 37 numbered performance standards follow. By contrast, the statutes and court rules contain no capital qualification standard: RSA 604-A prescribes none (its only capital-specific counsel language is permissive and trial-stage — 'in any case in which the defendant is charged with a capital offense, the court may appoint 2 counsel'), Sup. Ct. R. 47 treats capital murder only as a fee tier, Sup. Ct. R. 32 is silent, and the N.H. Rules of Criminal Procedure mention capital cases only as to individual voir dire.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. Judicial Council, Eligibility Guidelines and Performance Standards: Capital Post-Conviction Representation (approved Sept. 2015) (agency guideline, not a statute or court rule) Counsel shall have been a member of any bar for at least 5 years and must possess at least 3 years of experience in the field of post-conviction litigation. View the source document
New Jersey No standards verified	NONE — no qualification standards for capital post-conviction counsel exist in New Jersey. R. 3:22-6 sets no experience, prior-capital-work or training criteria; it simply directs the matter to the Office of the Public Defender. R. 3:22 as a whole contains no occurrence of 'capital' or 'death' since the 2017 deletion of R. 3:22-12(b). The only operative screening document for outside post-conviction counsel is the OPD's Pool Attorney Guidelines (revised August 2024), which contains no capital or death-penalty category at all: post-conviction applicants are screened by a writing sample plus an interview with the regional deputy or managing attorney on 'the requisite skills and experience.' Searched and not found: any capital-counsel qualification rule, Supreme Court order, or provision in N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-1 et seq.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-6; OPD Pool Attorney Guidelines (rev. Aug. 2024) Applicants who seek to represent clients in Appeals or Conviction Integrity cases (post-conviction relief) must also provide a writing sample with their application. View the source document
New Mexico Standards by rule unverified	None for the district-court capital habeas proceeding itself. We read Rule 5-802 NMRA in full: paragraph L imposes no experience, prior-capital-work, or training requirement on the counsel the district court must appoint, and neither does any other paragraph of the rule. The only capital-counsel qualification standard in the New Mexico rules is Rule 12-302(G) NMRA, which governs capital APPELLATE counsel: two attorneys, at least one first-chair qualified; first chair requires five years of criminal trial or appellate experience, lead or co-counsel on six felony jury conviction appeals in the last three years (two of them murder), and twelve hours of capital-representation training approved by the Law Offices of the Public Defender within the prior two years; second chair requires three years and four felony appeals in eighteen months. Because Rule 5-802(L)(7) provides that 'the Rules of Appellate Procedure shall govern the appeal to the Supreme Court' from a capital habeas ruling, Rule 12-302(G) would by its terms reach counsel on a capital habeas appeal — but that is an inference from the two rules' interaction, not a holding, and we found no decision applying 12-302(G) to a habeas appeal. At the district-court stage the answer is simply that no standard is prescribed.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 12-302(G) NMRA (capital appellate counsel); Rule 5-802 NMRA (no standard) The defendant in any appeal in a case in which a sentence of death may be imposed must be represented by at least two (2) attorneys View the source document
New York Standards by rule verified	YES — a separate, stricter standard for capital STATE POST-CONVICTION counsel, adopted as a Court of Appeals rule. Judiciary Law § 35-b(4)(b)(iv) directs the CDO, with the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, to propose minimum standards 'submitted for approval to the court of appeals.' The resulting rule is 22 NYCRR Part 515, 'Standards for Appellate and State Post-Conviction Counsel in Capital Cases.' Section 515.2(1)(a) requires that lead counsel on an initial CPL 440.10/440.20 motion in a capital case demonstrate: (1) at least six years of criminal trial, criminal appellate, or state or federal post-conviction experience, or four years of concentrated criminal or civil litigation; (2) familiarity with New York trial and appellate practice AND with federal habeas corpus practice; (3) twelve trials to verdict, decision or hung jury in serious and complex civil or criminal cases; (4) primary responsibility for at least five felony appeals, three for the defendant and three orally argued; (5) substantial familiarity and extensive experience with expert witnesses and scientific/medical evidence including mental health and pathology; and (6) two of four case-specific criteria (five homicides tried to verdict, eight homicide representations to disposition, three capital state or federal post-conviction proceedings, or five 440.10/440.20 motions with evidentiary hearings). A screening panel may waive a requirement on the CDO's recommendation (§ 515.2(1)(b)). Applicants file with the CDO and must submit memoranda, briefs, references and a description of capital training attended (§ 515.2(2)).	Source Statute / rule: 22 NYCRR § 515.2(1)(a) (Court of Appeals rule adopted under N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(4)(b)(iv)) To be eligible to be appointed as lead counsel on an initial motion pursuant to section 440.10 or 440.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and any appeal therefrom in a capital case, an attorney must demonstrate that he or she: View the source document
North Carolina Standards by rule verified	YES — binding qualification standards exist, adopted by the IDS Commission rather than by statute or supreme-court order. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-498.5(c)(7) directs the Commission to develop 'Standards for qualifications and performance in capital cases, consistent with any rules adopted by the Supreme Court,' and § 7A-451(d) makes appointment under § 7A-451(c) subject to IDS rules. Appendix 2C to the IDS Rules for Capital Cases, § 2C.1(a) (App.), sets the operative test: to be eligible for appointment on a capital Motion for Appropriate Relief and any appeal therefrom, an attorney must show the requisite legal knowledge and skill and must meet five requirements — (i) at least five years of criminal or civil trial experience, OR five years criminal or civil appellate experience, OR five years state or federal post-conviction experience, OR three years of concentrated criminal litigation as a public defender, prosecutor or attorney in a capital defense organization, OR current practice in a capital defense organization; (ii) familiarity with ethics, current N.C. criminal practice, and U.S./N.C. Supreme Court capital jurisprudence; (iii) familiarity with N.C. trial and appellate practice including MAR procedure and with federal habeas practice; (iv) primary responsibility for a party in at least three criminal or civil appeals or criminal post-conviction proceedings; and (v) substantial familiarity with expert witnesses and scientific and medical evidence 'including mental health, social history, and pathology evidence.' IMPORTANT CAVEAT for a hostile reader: § 2C.1(b) (App.) lets the IDS Director 'waive such requirement(s) or defer any requirement(s) for a reasonable time' and place the attorney on the roster in the interim, so the standards are not absolute floors. Appendix 2C.2-2C.3 add an application, roster-creation, reconsideration and removal procedure.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-451(d), 7A-498.5(c)(7); IDS Rules Part 2 Appendix, § 2C.1 (App.) (amended eff. May 29, 2015) has at least five years criminal or civil trial experience; or has at least five years criminal or civil appellate experience View the source document
North Dakota No standards verified	There are no capital-specific qualification standards — no statute, court rule or supreme-court order in North Dakota prescribes death-penalty experience, capital training or a capital counsel roster, and the words 'capital' and 'death penalty' appear nowhere in ch. 29-32.1, ch. 54-61, N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 18 or the Commission's standards. The generic standards are statutory (N.D.C.C. § 54-61-02(1)(a)(3) requires the commission to develop 'Standards prescribing minimum experience, training, and other qualifications for contract counsel and public defenders') and administrative: the Commission's 'Minimum Qualifications for Contract Counsel and Public Defenders' (adopted June 22, 2006) and its Minimum Attorney Performance Standards for Appellate and Post-Conviction Matters, § 2.1 (2025 update), quoted here. Both require only North Dakota licensure plus 'sufficient training' — no tiered or offense-severity-based qualification.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 54-61-02(1)(a)(3); ND Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents, Minimum Attorney Performance Standards — Appellate and Post-Conviction Matters § 2.1 (2025 update) An attorney who undertakes representation of clients as an appointed counsel must have sufficient training and appellate or post-conviction experience to provide effective representation. View the source document
Ohio Standards by statute verified	YES — capital certification is a statutory precondition to appointment. Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(2) bars appointing the petitioner's trial counsel (absent joint express request) and permits appointment ONLY of an attorney certified to represent capital defendants; §§ 120.06(F) and 120.33(C) impose the same certification requirement on the state public defender's attorneys and on private appointees. IMPORTANT CROSS-REFERENCE CAVEAT: the statutes still cite 'Rule 20 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio,' but Sup.R. 20 through 20.05 were repealed effective February 1, 2015 and relocated into a freestanding set, the Rules for Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases (Appt.Coun.R.), administered by the Supreme Court's Commission on Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases. Under those rules certification requires, inter alia, 'substantial knowledge and understanding of the relevant state, federal, and international law' and skill in mitigation and mental-status evidence (Appt.Coun.R. 3.01(B)); appellate certification requires at least three years of criminal litigation experience and counsel experience in at least three felony appeals in the prior three years (Appt.Coun.R. 3.04(B)), plus 12 hours of accredited capital training every two years (Appt.Coun.R. 4.01, 4.03). The Appt.Coun.R. by their own terms (1.04, 5.02, 5.03) govern trial and appellate appointments; the post-conviction certification requirement comes from the statute, and courts apply it as requiring 'capital-certified' counsel (State v. Ahmed, 2023-Ohio-3464, ¶ 7-8 (7th Dist.)).	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(2); Ohio Rules for Appointment of Counsel in Capital Cases 3.01-3.05, 4.01, 4.03 Case: State v. Ahmed, 2023-Ohio-3464, ¶ 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Sept. 27, 2023) The court shall appoint as counsel under division (J)(1) of this section only an attorney who is certified under Rule 20 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio View the source document
Oklahoma Not established verified	No statute, court rule, or supreme-court/OCCA order prescribes years-of-experience, prior-capital-work, or training criteria specifically for capital POST-CONVICTION counsel. The Indigent Defense Act instead delegates qualification-setting to the agency: § 1355.4(C)(9) makes it the Executive Director's duty to maintain 'a separate list of persons eligible for appointment to capital cases, who meet the qualifications set by the System,' and § 1355.6(C) lets the Director select attorneys 'who meet the qualifications established by the System for such assignments.' At the agency level, the OIDS Board has adopted the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases — stated on the face of the agency's Capital Trial Counsel Application (https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/oids/documents/ques_trl.pdf) — but the published minimum-qualification questionnaire built on those Guidelines governs the roster for capital LEAD/CO-COUNSEL 'at the trial level'; the parallel OIDS 'Appellate Counsel Application' states only that information will be used to make assignments 'in accordance with the experience level and interests of the private attorney.' What we looked for and did not find: a capital post-conviction qualification rule in the OCCA Rules (index checked; Rule 9.7 is procedure only, Rule 1.14 is indigency only), and an Oklahoma Administrative Code Title 200 chapter setting capital counsel qualifications. Because most capital PC work is done by salaried OIDS staff, agency hiring rather than a published standard is the operative filter.	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1355.4(C)(9) (current version, superseded 1/1/2027); see also § 1355.6(C) To solicit and maintain a separate list of persons eligible for appointment to capital cases, who meet the qualifications set by the System View the source document
Oregon Standards by rule verified	Yes — commission-adopted qualification standards with a capital post-conviction tier, issued under ORS 151.216(1)(k) (OPDC shall 'set minimum standards by which appointed counsel are trained and supervised') and ORS 151.216(2)(c) (ability, training and experience must match the nature and complexity of the case). The OPDC Attorney Qualification Standards adopted July 16, 2025 (effective February 16, 2026) create PCR Attorney 3, the certification required to accept post-conviction appointments where the underlying conviction is aggravated murder — Oregon's only death-eligible crime. PCR Attorney 3 requires three years at PCR Attorney 2, five PCR evidentiary hearings with multiple witnesses, demonstrated 'substantial knowledge and understanding of the relevant state, federal and international law, both procedural and substantive, governing capital cases,' skill in mitigation investigation and presentation, understanding of ABA Guidelines 10.2-10.15.2 for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and the ABA Supplementary Mitigation Guidelines, five PCR Attorney 2 cases and two co-counseled PCR Attorney 3 cases to resolution, plus three letters from PCR Attorney 3-qualified lawyers attesting ability 'to provide competent representation for defendants in post-conviction status on Capital Murder cases.' The predecessor PDSC Qualification Standards (rev. Dec. 19, 2019), Standard IV § 16, similarly governed 'Post-Conviction Proceedings in Murder and Capital Murder Cases.' These are agency standards, not a court rule or statute.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 151.216(1)(k), (2)(c) (authorizing); OPDC Attorney Qualification Standards, PCR Attorney 3 (adopted July 16, 2025, effective Feb. 16, 2026) an attorney certified by OPDC as a PCR Attorney 3 may accept appointments in all post-conviction relief proceedings under ORS Chapter 138 in which the underlying conviction is aggravated murder View the source document
Pennsylvania Standards by rule verified	YES — binding statewide qualification standards adopted by Supreme Court rule, expressly applicable to post-conviction counsel. Pa.R.Crim.P. 801 requires that counsel (1) be a member in good standing of the Pennsylvania Bar; (2) be 'an active trial practitioner with a minimum of 5 years criminal litigation experience'; (3) have served as lead or co-counsel in at least 8 'significant cases' given to a jury — with the alternative that 'if representation is to be only in an appellate court, prior appellate or post-conviction representation in a minimum of 8 significant cases shall satisfy this requirement'; and (4) have completed at least 18 hours of CLE-approved capital training in the preceding 3 years, expressly including 'post-conviction litigation in state and federal courts.' The Comment states the requirements 'may not be waived by the trial or appellate court,' and the Comment to Rule 904 repeats that an attorney may not represent a capital defendant unless the Rule 801 criteria are met.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 801 (234 Pa. Code Rule 801); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 Comment Case: Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015) (appointed attorneys withdrew or were replaced on discovering they lacked Rule 801 qualifications) These requirements apply to counsel at all stages of a capital case, including pretrial, trial, post-conviction, and appellate. View the source document
Rhode Island No standards verified	ABSENT. There are no qualification standards — capital or otherwise — for post-conviction counsel in Rhode Island. Section 10-9.1-5 is the entire operative appointment provision, and it is three sentences long: it names the public defender, directs assignment of substitute counsel on conflict, and addresses ancillary costs. It sets no years-of-experience, prior-capital-work, or training requirement, and neither does the sentence quoted here, which is the remainder of the section. We also read the full Public Defender chapter (R.we. Gen. Laws §§ 12-15-1 through 12-15-11, index and text of §§ 12-15-1, -3, -7) and Rule 44 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure ('the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to an attorney and assign an attorney to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding'); none imposes a qualification standard. A capital-specific standard could not exist, since Rhode Island has no capital sentencing.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5; R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 44 (checked, no standards) An indigent applicant is entitled, to the extent deemed appropriate by the court, to be provided with stenographic, printing, and other costs necessary to proceed under this chapter. View the source document
South Carolina Standards by statute verified	YES — statutory qualification standards specific to capital post-conviction counsel. Under § 17-27-160(B), at least one of the two appointed attorneys must EITHER have previously represented a death-sentenced inmate in state or federal post-conviction proceedings, OR (1) meet the minimum qualifications in § 16-3-26(B) and (F) — i.e. five years as a licensed attorney and three years' actual felony trial experience, and Supreme Court death-penalty certification, implemented by Rule 421(b), SCACR — AND (2) have completed within the previous two years at least twelve hours of S.C. Bar-approved CLE or professional training 'primarily involving advocacy in the field of capital appellate and/or post-conviction defense.' The statute also bars appointing trial or direct-appeal counsel absent a joint on-the-record request or good cause, and authorizes the Supreme Court to 'promulgate additional standards.' In Robertson (2016) the Supreme Court construed the second branch to require the twelve hours to be specifically in capital appellate/PCR work, rejecting a looser reading that circuit judges had been following since a 2003 memorandum from Chief Justice Toal.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-26(B), (F); Rule 421, SCACR Case: Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016) At least one of the attorneys appointed to represent the applicant must have previously represented a death-sentenced inmate in state or federal post-conviction relief proceedings or (1) must meet the minimum qualifications set forth in Section 16-3-26(B) and Section 16-3-26(F) View the source document
South Dakota No standards verified	NONE specific to capital post-conviction. We read the full section lists and operative text of SDCL ch. 21-27 (habeas corpus), ch. 23A-27A (capital punishment), ch. 23A-40 (counsel for indigent defendant) and ch. 23A-51 (indigent legal services), and the Unified Judicial System's court-appointed-attorney directory page: no years-of-experience requirement, no prior-capital-work requirement, and no capital-qualified appointment list exists. The only appointment-related standards machinery in South Dakota law is generic: SDCL 23A-51-6(4)(a) empowers the Commission on Indigent Legal Services to promulgate rules establishing minimum training standards and caseload caps (quoted), and SDCL 23A-40-21 requires every court-appointed defense attorney to complete mental-illness training — the only certification the UJS directory tracks. Neither is capital-specific, and neither is directed at post-conviction counsel. The negative finding is a documented absence, not a quotable affirmative provision; the quote below establishes what South Dakota's standards regime actually consists of.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 23A-51-6(4)(a); SDCL 23A-40-21 Establish minimum training standards, maximum caseloads allowed, and procedures to reassign conflict cases View the source document
Tennessee Standards by rule verified	YES — express qualification standards adopted by Tennessee Supreme Court order, not by statute. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 3(h) sets two alternative experience paths for appointed capital post-conviction counsel (either the qualifications for appointed capital appellate counsel under § 3(g) — three years of criminal trial and appellate litigation plus capital-appeal or three-felony-appeal experience and six hours of capital training — or counsel-of-record experience in state post-conviction proceedings in three felony cases, two murder cases, or one capital case). It adds a federal-habeas knowledge requirement satisfiable by six hours of specialized training, and a conflict bar: counsel 'must not have previously represented the defendant at trial or on direct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made, unless the defendant and counsel expressly consent to continued representation.' Rule 13, § 3(i) requires that at least one attorney appointed in an execution-competency proceeding be qualified under § 3(h). Rule 13's stated purposes include, at § 1(a)(C), 'to establish qualifications and provide for compensation of appointed counsel in capital cases, including capital post-conviction proceedings.' These standards were adopted by order of April 3, 1997, effective July 1, 1997, in direct response to a federal ruling that Tennessee's prior standards were insufficient.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 3(h) (adopted by order filed April 3, 1997, eff. July 1, 1997); see also § 3(g), § 3(i), § 1(a)(C) Counsel eligible to be appointed as post-conviction counsel in capital cases must have the same qualifications as appointed appellate counsel, or have trial and appellate experience as counsel of record in state post-conviction proceedings in three felony cases, two murder cases, or one capital case. View the source document
Texas Standards by statute verified	YES, but thin and statutory rather than experience-based. For the fallback appointment list, Tex. Gov't Code § 78.056(a) sets two criteria only: the attorney must 'exhibit proficiency and commitment to providing quality representation to defendants in death penalty cases,' and must not have been found by a state or federal court to have rendered ineffective assistance in the trial or appeal of a death penalty case. There is no years-of-practice, prior-capital-case, or CLE/training requirement in the statute (contrast art. 26.052, which does set experience criteria for capital trial and direct-appeal counsel). For OCFW's own lawyers, Gov't Code § 78.053(b) provides only that 'to be employed by the director, an attorney may not have been found by a state or federal court to have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial or appeal of a criminal case.' The overarching statutory standard is art. 11.071 § 2(a)'s 'competent counsel,' which the Court of Criminal Appeals has construed as competence measured at the time of appointment, not by the work product delivered (Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Gov't Code § 78.056(a); see also § 78.053(b); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2(a) Case: Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) Each attorney on the list: (1) must exhibit proficiency and commitment to providing quality representation to defendants in death penalty cases; and (2) may not have been found by a state or federal court to have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel View the source document
Utah Standards by rule verified	YES — binding qualification standards specific to capital POST-CONVICTION counsel, set by court rule and incorporated by the statute. Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e) ('Post-conviction cases') requires the court to appoint one or more attorneys and to 'make a finding that counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases.' The combined experience of appointed counsel must include: (1) at least three felony or post-conviction appeals as counsel; (2) service as counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at an evidentiary hearing or on appeal, or other demonstrated proficiency in post-conviction litigation; (3) within the last five years, completion or teaching of an approved CLE dealing in substantial part with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with post-conviction proceedings in death penalty cases; (4) three civil jury or felony cases tried to judgment or verdict in the past four years, or ten total; and (5) at least five years in the active practice of law. Rule 8(g) provides that mere noncompliance with the rule is not itself grounds for establishing ineffective assistance. Rule 8's current text (effective 11/1/2024) still cross-references 'Utah Code section 78B-9-202(2)(a)' — the subsection renumbered to § 78B-9-202(1)(a)(ii) by the 2026 amendment; the statute in turn expressly incorporates 'Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.'	Source Statute / rule: Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e) (eff. Nov. 1, 2024), incorporated by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(1)(a)(ii) To be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following requirements: (1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction appeals View the source document
Vermont No death penalty verified	ABSENT. No Vermont statute sets any experience, prior-capital-work, or training qualification for post-conviction counsel, capital or otherwise. The only statutory qualification provisions in the public-defender chapter are generic: 13 V.S.A. § 5273(a) requires that the Deputy Defender General and a public defender 'must be licensed to practice law in this State and otherwise competent to counsel and defend a person charged with crime,' and 13 V.S.A. § 5253(b)(1) requires that contract attorneys' services 'meet the professional standards that this chapter prescribes for services performed by the Office of the Defender General.' Section 5253(c) makes the Defender General responsible for supervising training and permits him or her to 'establish a training course,' but prescribes no content and no capital tier. Chapter 163 (§§ 5201-5277) and the petition-for-review subchapter (13 V.S.A. §§ 7131-7137) were read section-list to section text; neither contains the words capital or death in any counsel-qualification sense. Since the June 6, 2024 repeal of every capital-punishment statute there is nothing for a capital qualification standard to attach to. CAVEAT ON COMPLETENESS: Vermont's court rules and administrative orders are not published as free text by the Judiciary — vtcourts.gov states that 'All Vermont court rules are available through LexisNexis' — so a rule-by-rule reading of V.R.Cr.P. 44, V.R.C.P. 80.12 and the Supreme Court's administrative orders could not be completed from we; targeted searching surfaced no Vermont capital-counsel qualification rule.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 5273(a); see also 13 V.S.A. § 5253(b)(1), (c) The Deputy Defender General and a public defender must be licensed to practice law in this State and otherwise competent to counsel and defend a person charged with crime. View the source document
Virginia No standards verified	NONE today — repealed with the rest of Article 4.1. Until July 1, 2021, § 19.2-163.8 required the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Indigent Defense Commission, with the Virginia State Bar, to adopt qualification standards and maintain a list of attorneys qualified to represent defendants 'charged with capital murder or sentenced to death,' weighing criminal-litigation background, felony trial and appellate experience, death-penalty litigation experience, current death-penalty and forensic/DNA training, and demonstrated proficiency. Subsection D expressly barred any relief claim from noncompliance or from habeas counsel's performance. The current Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia contain no capital-counsel standard (the words 'capital case,' 'capital murder' and 'death penalty' do not appear).	Source Statute / rule: Former Va. Code § 19.2-163.8 (repealed by 2021 Acts Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345, cl. 2) The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defense Commission, in conjunction with the Virginia State Bar, shall adopt standards for attorneys admitted to practice law in Virginia who are qualified to represent defendants charged with capital murder or sentenced to death View the source document
Washington No standards verified	YES — by court rule, until September 1, 2026. Former RAP 16.25 required that appointed capital PRP counsel 'have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplifies the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases,' and that 'At least one attorney so appointed must have at least three years of experience in handling appeals or collateral reviews on criminal convictions and must be learned in the law of capital punishment by training or experience.' The rule also barred appointment of trial counsel and (absent joint request) direct-appeal counsel. That rule was rescinded effective September 1, 2026, so no qualification standard for capital post-conviction counsel is currently in force. The surviving capital qualification rule, SPRC 2, reaches only trial and direct appeal ('At least two (2) lawyers shall be appointed for the trial and also for the direct appeal'), and SPRC 1(a) provides that 'These rules do not apply in any case in which imposition of the death penalty is no longer possible' (both verified at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/SPRC/SUP_SPRC_02_00_00.pdf and…/SUP_SPRC_01_00_00.pdf). URL cited is the Internet Archive capture of the official courts.wa.gov rule PDF; the live PDF now reads only '[RESCINDED]'.	Source Appointed counsel must have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplifies the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. At least one attorney so appointed must have at least three years of experience in handling appeals or collateral reviews on criminal convictions View the source document
West Virginia No standards verified	None. No statute, court rule, or order of the Supreme Court of Appeals sets qualification standards (years of experience, prior capital work, training) for capital post-conviction counsel, because no capital post-conviction proceeding is possible. The operative appointment rule — Rule 6 of the West Virginia Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings — enumerates the only conditions on appointment, and they are indigency (Rule 3(a)), good faith, and that appointment is 'warranted'; it imposes no experience, prior-capital-work, or training criterion. The complete text of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings (Rules 1-10 plus Appendices A and B) as fetched contains zero occurrences of the words 'death' or 'capital' — there is no capital track anywhere in the rule set.	Source Counsel may only be appointed if the petitioner qualifies for the appointment of counsel under Rule 3(a), and the court has determined that the petition was filed in good faith and that the appointment of counsel is warranted. View the source document
Wisconsin No death penalty verified	No capital qualification standard exists, because no capital tier exists. The SPD's certification rules, Wis. Admin. Code s. PD 1.04, grade attorneys by felony class, and the top tiers stop at Class A felony — the most serious offense class in Wisconsin. For trial-level Class A felony cases, s. PD 1.04(3)(d) requires a significant criminal-law practice, service as sole or lead trial counsel in at least two Class A–D felony jury trials to final resolution within the preceding five years, peer review, and an approved writing sample. For appeals and s. 809.30 postconviction motions the highest tier is 'level two appellate certification' (Class A–F felonies), requiring two Wisconsin briefs-in-chief filed under s. 809.30 within five years, one SPD-approved brief, three contested circuit court hearings including one evidentiary hearing, and appellate or criminal-law CLE. General certification requirements (Wisconsin license, residence/principal office, six CLE credits annually) are at s. PD 1.035.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Admin. Code s. PD 1.04(13)(b); see also s. PD 1.04(3)(d), s. PD 1.035 Level two appellate case certification includes appellate appointments in level one cases and in class A to F felony cases. View the source document
Wyoming Not established unverified	None found. Nothing in the Public Defender Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-6-101 through 7-6-114), the post-conviction act (§§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108), the capital sentencing and automatic-review statutes (§§ 6-2-101 through 6-2-103) or the death-warrant chapter (§§ 7-13-901 through 7-13-910) imposes years-of-experience, prior-capital-work or training requirements on counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings. The only qualification standards in the Act run to the State Public Defender personally — § 7-6-103(c)(i)-(ii) require Wyoming bar membership and 'experience in defense or prosecution of persons accused of crime in this state' — and the only rulemaking delegated to that officer is a standard fee schedule (§ 7-6-103(c)(vi), quoted). W.R.Cr.P. 44 governs assignment of counsel, but its right 'extends from the first appearance in the court through appeal,' and the only standard the Supreme Court adopted under it (Rule 44(d), 'adopted as required by W.S. 7-6-103(c)') is a standard of INDIGENCY, not of attorney qualification. The Wyoming Judicial Branch court-rules index (https://www.wyocourts.gov/court-rules/, fetched 2026-09-07) lists no capital-case or capital-counsel rule. Marked unverified because the sources we read establish an absence rather than an affirmative rule; a hostile reader should also check the Wyoming Supreme Court's General Orders, which are not fully indexed on the public rules page.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-103(c)(vi) (only rulemaking delegated to the State Public Defender) Promulgate rules and regulations establishing a standard fee schedule for services provided by attorneys appointed pursuant to W.S. 7-6-109 View the source document

Whether the capital deadline waits for counsel

Whether the post-conviction filing period runs from, is tolled for, or waits on the appointment of counsel, or runs regardless.

49 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Runs from brief verified	The clock does NOT run from appointment. Under § 13A-5-53.1(c) a capital Rule 32 petition must be filed within 365 days of the filing of the defendant's first brief on direct appeal — the FJA requires post-conviction to be pursued 'concurrently and simultaneously with the direct appeal.' Because appointment is due within 30 days of the death sentence, counsel is structurally in place before the limitations clock starts, but the clock is keyed to the appellate brief, not to appointment. One appointment-anchored deadline does exist: if counsel files late or fails to file, § 13A-5-53.1(f)(3) lets the court 'Appoint new and different counsel… and establish a new filing deadline for the petition, which may not be more than 270 days after the date the circuit court appoints new counsel.' Otherwise only one 90-day extension is available (§ 13A-5-53.1(d)), and the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that equitable tolling has no application under the FJA (Belcher, Aug. 22, 2025). For death sentences imposed on or before August 1, 2017, the FJA does not apply and Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) governs: one year after issuance of the certificate of judgment, running regardless of whether counsel has been appointed.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(c), (d), (f)(3); Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) (pre-FJA cases) Case: Ex parte State of Alabama (In re State v. Abernathy), No. CR-2023-0825 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024) (circuit court had no authority to grant a 270-day extension absent an untimely or unfiled petition and appointment of new counsel); Belcher v. State, No. CR-2023-0206 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2025) (no equitable tolling under the FJA) unless the petition, including any amendments to the petition, is filed within 365 days of the filing of the appellant defendant's first brief on direct appeal View the source document
Alaska Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of whether counsel has been appointed. AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) bars a claim brought more than 18 months after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, more than one year after the appellate decision is final; Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(c) requires that 'An application must be filed within the time limitations set out in AS 12.72.020 or AS 12.72.025.' Nothing runs the period from, or tolls it for, appointment of counsel; the statutory excuses in AS 12.72.020(b) are disability, state obstruction, and newly discovered evidence of innocence, not lack of a lawyer. Appointment matters only after filing: under Crim. R. 35.1(e)(2) appointed counsel has 60 days from appointment to file an amended application, a notice of intent to proceed on the pro se application, or a no-merit certificate. AS 12.72.025 supplies a separate one-year window, running from finality of the decision on the prior application, for a claim that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The current text was corroborated by Hall v. State, Op. No. 2821 (Alaska App. Nov. 28, 2025), which recites both the one-year post-appeal limit and the 18-month measure.	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A); AS 12.72.025; Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(c), (e)(2) Case: Brian F. Hall v. State of Alaska, Op. No. 2821 (Alaska App. Nov. 28, 2025) if the claim relates to a conviction, 18 months after the entry of the judgment of the conviction or, if the conviction was appealed, one year after the court's decision is final under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure View the source document
Arizona Runs from appointment verified	The clock runs from the FILING OF THE NOTICE, not from appointment of counsel — but in a capital case the notice and the appointment are triggered by the same event, so counsel is appointed at the start of the period rather than after it has begun running. In a capital case the defendant files nothing to start the case: 'the Supreme Court clerk must expeditiously file a notice requesting post-conviction relief with the trial court upon the issuance of the mandate affirming the defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal' (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(C); accord A.R.S. § 13-4234(D)), and counsel is appointed 'After the Supreme Court has affirmed an indigent capital defendant's conviction and sentence' (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b)). The petition is then due 'no later than 12 months after the first notice is filed' (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.7(a)(2)(A)), with one 60-day good-cause extension available and further extensions for good cause after considering the victim's rights (Rule 32.7(a)(2)(C)); on a successive capital notice the petition is due 30 days after the notice (Rule 32.7(a)(2)(B)). A change of counsel does not move the deadline: 'The time limits in which to file a petition shall not be extended due solely to the change from appointed counsel to self-representation' (§ 13-4041(D)). NOTE A CONFLICT: A.R.S. § 13-4234(D) still says 'a defendant has sixty days from the filing of the notice in which to file a petition' and § 13-4234(G) calls the time limits jurisdictional; the Supreme Court's rule, adopted later under its rulemaking power, sets 12 months. We did not locate a decision resolving that conflict, and the shorter statutory figure appears superseded in practice, but a hostile reader should be told the statute has not been conformed.	Source Statute / rule: Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.7(a)(2)(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(b)(3)(C), 32.5(b); cf. A.R.S. § 13-4234(D), (F), (G); A.R.S. § 13-4041(D) In a capital case, the defendant must file a petition no later than 12 months after the first notice is filed. View the source document
Arkansas Runs from appointment verified	The capital post-conviction clock RUNS FROM APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, not from the mandate. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(e) gives 90 days measured from entry of the appointment order required by Rule 37.5(b)(2). The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted the rule verbatim and applied it in Simpson v. State, 347 Ark. 564, 65 S.W.3d 878 (2002), reversing a circuit court that had instead applied the general 60-days-from-mandate limit of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c): 'the provision of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(e), allowing ninety days after the appointment of counsel, is an exception to the sixty-day time limit imposed in non-death cases by 37.2(c).' Rule 37.5(a) makes the special rule govern for anyone under sentence of death. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also relieved a capital petitioner of the 90-day bar on fundamental-fairness grounds where the appointment mechanism broke down — in Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001), appointed Commission counsel moved to withdraw for conflict and replacement counsel was named only after the 90 days ran; the court reversed the untimeliness dismissal. The statute, § 16-91-202, sets downstream deadlines (status conference within 50 days of filing, hearing within 180 days, findings within 30/120 days) but not the filing period itself.	Source Statute / rule: Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5(e); cf. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(g)-(i) Case: Simpson v. State, 347 Ark. 564, 65 S.W.3d 878 (2002) petition for relief under this rule shall be filed within ninety days after the entry of the order required in subsection (b)(2) View the source document
California Runs from appointment verified	The clock is keyed to the counsel order, not to the judgment. Penal Code § 1509(c) (added by Prop. 66) provides that the initial capital habeas petition 'must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code' — i.e. the superior court's order appointing counsel, or finding a knowing rejection of counsel, or finding non-indigency. Because the one-year period runs only from that order, no deadline runs at all against a death-sentenced person for whom the superior court has never entered a § 68662 order; the HCRC's 2025 report identifies 346 such people. § 1509(d) makes an untimely initial petition, or any successive petition, subject to dismissal unless the court finds actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence by a preponderance. § 1509(g) supplies a transition rule: where judgment predated Prop. 66's effective date and no petition had been filed, the petition could be filed within one year of that effective date or within the time allowed under prior law, whichever is earlier. § 1509(f) separately directs the superior court to resolve an initial petition within one year of filing, and in no instance longer than two years.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Penal Code § 1509(c) Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code. View the source document
Colorado Runs from appointment verified	The clock is keyed to the appointment event, not to the judgment. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3) requires the court to hold the advisement hearing within 7 days after imposition of a death sentence; at that same hearing it must appoint new postconviction counsel absent waiver, and must direct that postconviction review motions be filed within 154 days (22 weeks) of the advisement date. So counsel is appointed on day one of the running period rather than the deadline expiring while a prisoner is unrepresented. Extensions require 'extraordinary circumstances that could not have been foreseen and prevented' (Rule 32.2(b)(6)), and § 16-12-209(1) bars further postconviction review after the rule's deadline except for state interference, newly discoverable facts, or a new retroactive constitutional right (motion due within 35 days of discovery, § 16-12-209(2)). The rule applies to class one felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1998.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3), (b)(6); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-209 Within 7 days after the imposition of a sentence of death, the court shall hold a hearing (advisement date) … the court shall: (I) Appoint new counsel … (V) Direct that any post-conviction review motions be filed within 154 days (22 weeks) of the advisement date View the source document
Connecticut No fixed deadline verified	For a capital petitioner the clock does not run at all — the question of whether it waits on counsel never arises. Connecticut's habeas timeliness regime (P.A. 12-115, codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(b)-(e)) creates a rebuttable presumption that a first petition filed more than five years after final judgment, and a subsequent petition filed more than two years after judgment on the prior petition, was 'delayed without good cause.' Subsection (f)(3) expressly exempts from subsections (b) through (e) 'a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed under section 53a-46a.' So a person under sentence of death faces no filing deadline and no good-cause-for-trial screening. The presumption periods that apply to non-capital petitioners run from finality of the conviction or of the prior habeas judgment — not from appointment of counsel — and § 52-470(c) and (d) each provide that the periods 'shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction.' Counsel enters the timeliness analysis only at § 52-470(e), which gives 'the petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner's counsel' a meaningful opportunity to investigate and respond to an order to show cause; and the Supreme Court has held ineffective assistance can itself be good cause for late filing (348 Conn. 333).	Source Statute / rule: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470(f)(3) (capital exemption); § 52-470(c)-(e) Subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of this section shall not apply to … (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed under section 53a-46a. View the source document
Delaware Tolled until counsel verified	The capital clock WAITS ON THE RESOLUTION OF COUNSEL; it does not run regardless. Rule 61(i)(1)'s general one-year bar runs from finality of the judgment, but Rule 61(l)(1) provides that in a capital case 'The other subdivisions of this rule shall apply except insofar as they are inconsistent with the special provisions of this subdivision.' Rule 61(l)(3) requires that when direct review concludes 'the court shall promptly schedule a session with the defendant and defense counsel to determine the status of representation,' bars trial/appellate counsel from continuing absent an on-the-record waiver, and provides that 'If the defendant requests the appointment of new counsel, the court shall promptly rule on that request.' Only then does the filing clock start: under Rule 61(l)(4) the scheduling order issues after the status of representation 'has been determined,' and the motion is due 60 days from that scheduling order (submitted for decision within 270 days; one enlargement of up to 60 days for compelling cause). So the capital deadline is measured from a court order that by rule cannot be entered until the counsel question is settled — the sequencing runs appointment-first, clock-second. Rule 61(l)(5) then imposes a sanction, including dismissal with prejudice, for missing that schedule.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(l)(1), (l)(3), (l)(4); cf. R. 61(i)(1) When the status of representation has been determined, the court shall enter an order setting the schedule of the postconviction proceeding within the following time limits. The motion for postconviction relief shall be filed within 60 days of the date of the scheduling order View the source document
Florida Runs from finality verified	The clock does NOT run from appointment of counsel — it runs from finality of the judgment. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) gives one year after the judgment and sentence become final, with finality defined as expiration of the 90-day U.S. Supreme Court certiorari period after the Florida Supreme Court's direct-appeal decision becomes final, or disposition of a filed certiorari petition. In practice, however, appointment necessarily PRECEDES the start of the clock: under Rule 3.851(b)(1) counsel is appointed on issuance of the direct-appeal mandate, and counsel must appear or move to withdraw within 30 days (Rule 3.851(b)(2)), while the one-year period does not begin until at least 90 days later. There is no tolling provision keyed to appointment; the only counsel-related escape is Rule 3.851(d)(2)(C), which permits an otherwise untimely motion where 'postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.' Rule 3.851(c)(4)-(5) further keys record and file transfer to the date of appointment (trial counsel must deliver the file within 45 days of appointment of postconviction counsel; the record goes to the repository within 30 days after appointment). If a death warrant is signed before the one-year period expires, Rule 3.851(d)(4) supplies a compressed schedule instead.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1), (d)(2)(C), (d)(4); cf. 3.851(b)(1)-(2), (c)(4)-(5) Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final. View the source document
Georgia No fixed deadline verified	No interaction, because there is no state filing deadline to interact with. O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) imposes a one-year (misdemeanor) / four-year (felony) limitation period but carves out 'one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death,' so a first capital state habeas petition is subject to no statutory limitations period. Nothing runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel — the concept does not appear in the statute. USCR 44.3–44.12 impose post-filing schedules (answer in 20 days, evidentiary hearing within 180 days of filing, ruling within 90 days of briefing) that run from the FILING of the petition regardless of whether the petitioner has a lawyer. In practice the operative clock is the federal AEDPA one-year period, which is not a state mechanism and is out of scope here.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c); Uniform Superior Court Rules 44.3, 44.9, 44.12 within four years in the case of a felony, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death View the source document
Hawaii No fixed deadline verified	There is no interaction, because there is no deadline to interact with. HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) permits a post-conviction petition '[a]t any time but not prior to final judgment.' In Akau v. State the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Rule 40 carries no limitations period, that the omission was deliberate (the drafters considered and rejected an Illinois 20-year template), and refused to import laches as a judicially crafted substitute. Nothing therefore runs from, tolls for, or waits on the appointment of counsel; a petition filed decades after conviction is timely, and an unrepresented prisoner forfeits nothing by delay. Akau himself prevailed after a 25-year gap.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(1) Case: Akau v. State, No. SCWC-13-0003754 (Haw. Mar. 5, 2019) (published) HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) contains no statute of limitations for bringing petitions and, instead, explicitly states that Rule 40 petitions seeking relief from a judgment of conviction may be brought "[a]t any time" so long as they are not brought "prior to final judgment[.]" View the source document
Idaho Runs regardless verified	The clock runs from the judgment, NOT from appointment of counsel. Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) requires the defendant to file any known or reasonably knowable legal or factual challenge within 42 days of the filing of the judgment imposing death; a second 42-day window for ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims runs from the Idaho Supreme Court's final remittitur. Section 19-2719 contains no reference to counsel and no tolling or extension tied to appointment. The interaction is handled on the front end instead: we.C.R. 44.2(a) requires appointment 'immediately following the imposition of the death penalty,' so counsel is in place at or near the start of the 42-day window. The only judicially recognized softening is for claims that could not reasonably have been known within 42 days, which must then be raised 'within a reasonable time'; the Idaho Supreme Court has held § 19-2719 is a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar and has declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's Hoffman v. Arave rule for same-counsel ineffectiveness claims (Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010)).	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Code § 19-2719(3), (5); Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) Case: Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010) Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must file any legal or factual challenge View the source document
Illinois Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) gives 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court; 6 months from the date a certiorari petition was due if none is filed; or 3 years from conviction if no direct appeal was taken — excused only on a showing that the delay was not due to the petitioner's culpable negligence (and inapplicable to an actual-innocence claim). Nothing runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel. The former capital-specific timing provisions were likewise not counsel-triggered: the deleted capital paragraph of § 122-1(c) ran from the certiorari proceedings, and the deleted sentence of § 122-2.1(b) required that a death-sentenced petitioner's petition 'be docketed for further consideration and hearing within one year of the filing of the petition.' Both were struck by P.A. 103-51.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. View the source document
Indiana No fixed deadline verified	There is no filing deadline at all: Ind. P-C.R. 1(1)(a) permits a person to 'institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure relief,' and the State Public Defender's office states there are no state-court deadlines (laches is the only time-based defense). What is time-limited is the EXECUTION date, and that clock is expressly conditioned on counsel's appearance. Under Crim. R. 6.1(F) the sentencing court sets an execution date one year out; the Supreme Court stays it; and under Rule 6.1(G)(2) the Court resets an execution date on the thirtieth day after rehearing 'unless counsel has appeared and requested a stay in accordance with section (H).' Counsel's Rule 6.1(H) appearance therefore both triggers the extended stay and starts the case-management schedule, which the trial court submits for Supreme Court approval consistent with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i). The only statutory clocks in § 35-50-2-9(i) run from the filing of the petition and the close of the hearing (90 days each), not from appointment of counsel — and § 35-50-2-9(i) expressly makes the court's failure to meet the 90-day hearing-setting deadline 'not a basis for additional post-conviction relief.'	Source Statute / rule: Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(G)(2), 6.1(H); Ind. P-C.R. 1(1)(a); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(i) On the thirtieth day following completion of rehearing, the Supreme Court must enter an order setting an execution date, unless counsel has appeared and requested a stay in accordance with View the source document
Iowa Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of whether counsel has been appointed. Iowa Code § 822.3 imposes a flat three-year limitation running from the date the conviction or decision becomes final, or on appeal from issuance of the writ of procedendo. There is no capital exception, no trigger tied to appointment of counsel, and no tolling for the period before counsel is appointed; the only escape is "a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period." The statute expressly forbids tolling or relation back based on ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel. (A separate 90-day period applies only to prison-disciplinary claims under § 822.2(1)(f).)	Source Statute / rule: Iowa Code § 822.3 All other applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. View the source document
Kansas Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of whether counsel has been appointed. Kansas has NO capital-specific post-conviction deadline; death-sentenced prisoners use the general K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) one-year period, which runs from the final order of the last state appellate court on direct appeal, or denial of certiorari, or the disposition of a prior 60-1507 motion. Nothing in 60-1507(f) runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel; the only escape is a judicial extension 'to prevent a manifest injustice' under 60-1507(f)(2), whose inquiry is limited to why the prisoner failed to file on time or a colorable actual-innocence claim. K.S.A. 21-6619 (automatic death-sentence review) adds no PC deadline or counsel provision. The interaction runs the other way: the 22-4506(d) right to counsel is 'triggered upon the filing' of the motion, so as a matter of law the limitation period runs while the prisoner is unrepresented. In practice BIDS closes that gap administratively — it assigned Capital Habeas Office counsel to Kleypas after his direct appeal became final (mandate April 11, 2017) to prepare and file the motion (filed January 23, 2018), which Kleypas described as a 'preemptive' assignment made 'before his right to counsel under the statute attached.'	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 60-1507(f) Case: Kleypas v. State, 522 P.3d 304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022) Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (A) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction View the source document
Kentucky Runs regardless verified	THE CLOCK RUNS REGARDLESS OF COUNSEL. RCr 11.42(10) fixes a three-year limitation running from finality of the judgment — not from appointment of counsel, and with no tolling for the period a death-sentenced prisoner is unrepresented. The only two escapes are newly discovered facts that could not have been found with due diligence, and a newly recognized, retroactively applicable constitutional right; in either case the motion must be filed within three years after the triggering event. Because Kentucky provides no counsel to prepare the initial motion (see capital_pc_counsel_right), the limitations period and the period of self-representation overlap entirely: the capital prisoner must file pro se, and only then can the court appoint counsel. The Kentucky Supreme Court has also held the three-year period gives a capital prisoner no protected window: in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky. 1996) — decided after the Governor replaced a 90-day post-certiorari grace policy with a 3-day one and signed death warrants against four men who had not yet filed — the Court said 'There should be no misunderstanding as to the effect of the three-year provision in RCr 11.42(10). This provision serves only as an outer time limit on the bringing of such actions and in no way affects the prerogatives of the Governor with respect to enforcement of criminal judgments,' and held that a 'notice of intent to file an RCr 11.42 motion' cannot support a stay of execution; only a filed RCr 11.42 motion can.	Source Statute / rule: RCr 11.42(10) Case: Bowling v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1996) Any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years after the judgment becomes final View the source document
Louisiana Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel — it is keyed to finality of the conviction and sentence, not to appointment, and there is no counsel-based tolling anywhere in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Two years from finality under arts. 914/922, with exceptions only for newly discovered facts, a new retroactive constitutional ruling, the transitional window, and the innocence/plea articles (926.1, 926.2). Art. 930.8(F) makes 'all of the limitations set forth in this Article… jurisdictional' and provides they 'shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney,' so a court cannot excuse a late filing caused by delayed enrollment of counsel. The interaction runs the other way: La. R.S. 15:178 obliges the court to order enrollment of post-conviction counsel within 30 days of the death sentence — i.e., years before the limitation period begins at finality of direct review — and State v. Clark directs the trial judge, on receiving the art. 923 finality notice, to give the defender agency 'reasonable time' to enroll counsel and litigate expeditiously. IMPORTANT CHANGE: until Aug. 1, 2025, death-sentenced petitioners were exempt from the two-year limitation altogether. Acts 2025, No. 393 (HB 675) repealed that exception; the House Legislative Services digest states that proposed law 'removes the following from the time limitation exceptions for the filing of a post conviction relief application:… (2) The person asserting the claim has been sentenced to death' (https://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1408188), and the current text of art. 930.8(A) contains no such exception. New art. 930.8(A)(4) gives a transitional window for otherwise-barred applications filed on or before Aug. 1, 2027, and art. 930.8(B)(2) requires that, once an execution warrant issues, any application containing a new claim be filed no later than 45 days before the execution date.	Source Statute / rule: La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A), (B)(2), (F) (as amended by Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 10, and Acts 2025, No. 393, §1) No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922 View the source document
Maine Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel. 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) sets a one-year limitation period running from the latest of (A) final disposition of the direct appeal or expiration of the time to appeal, (B) initial recognition of a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right by the Law Court or the U.S. Supreme Court, or (C) the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence; time during which a properly filed certiorari petition is pending is excluded. Nothing in § 2128-B keys the trigger, tolling, or running of the period to the appointment of counsel, and there is no capital-specific deadline anywhere in ch. 305-A.	Source Statute / rule: 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B(1) A one-year period of limitation applies to initiating a petition for post-conviction review seeking relief from a criminal judgment under section 2124, subsection 1 or 1-A. The limitation period runs from the latest of the following: View the source document
Maryland Runs regardless verified	The clock runs from sentencing, not from appointment of counsel. Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b) allows a petition within 10 years after the sentence was imposed, unless extraordinary cause is shown; nothing in Title 7 tolls that period for, or starts it from, the appointment of counsel. The capital carve-out is gone: former § 7-103(b)(2) provided that "In a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed, Subtitle 2 of this title governs the time of filing a petition," and 2013 Md. Laws ch. 156 struck that paragraph together with Subtitle 2 itself, leaving a single undifferentiated 10-year clock.	Source Statute / rule: Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 7-103(b) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed. View the source document
Massachusetts No fixed deadline verified	NO INTERACTION — there is no capital post-conviction deadline in Massachusetts, and no general post-conviction filing deadline either. The vehicle for post-conviction relief, Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, is expressly open-ended: a motion for a new trial may be granted 'at any time,' and a Rule 30(a) motion attacking unlawful restraint may likewise be filed at any time. Because no clock runs at all, no clock can run from, toll for, or wait on the appointment of counsel. The related question that does turn on timing in Massachusetts first-degree-murder cases is the G.L. c. 278, § 33E gatekeeper (post-rescript motions require leave of a single justice), which is not a filing deadline and is not tied to appointment of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) Case: Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591 (2012) The trial judge upon motion in writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done. View the source document
Michigan No fixed deadline unverified	No capital clock exists. In Michigan post-conviction generally, no deadline is tied to appointment of counsel and no deadline governs the filing of a first motion for relief from judgment: MCR 6.502 imposes form and one-motion-only limits (MCR 6.502(G)) but no limitations period. Appointment has one timing consequence in the defendant's favor — MCR 6.505(B) gives appointed counsel 56 days to amend or supplement the motion. The only running clock is appellate: MCR 6.509(A) provides that the 6-month period for a delayed application for leave to appeal runs from the decision on the motion, not from any appointment of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: MCR 6.509(A); MCR 6.502(G); MCR 6.505(B) The 6-month time limit provided by MCR 7.205(A)(4)(a), runs from the decision under this subchapter. View the source document
Minnesota Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel; it is not keyed to, tolled by, or started by an appointment of counsel. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) sets a two-year limit running from the later of entry of judgment of conviction or sentence (if no direct appeal is filed) or an appellate court's disposition of the direct appeal. The five statutory exceptions in subd. 4(b) (physical disability or mental disease, newly discovered evidence, new retroactive interpretation of law, subd. 3 petitions, and interests of justice) contain no counsel-appointment trigger, and any exception petition must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises (subd. 4(c)). There is no capital-specific deadline. Note the Revisor's annotation that subd. 4 was held unconstitutional as applied to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 motions in Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016).	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 Case: Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016) (noted in the Revisor's annotation to subd. 4) No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of View the source document
Mississippi Runs from appointment verified	The capital filing clock is expressly tied to appointment of counsel. Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(5)(i) sets the deadline for the application for leave to file a capital PCR motion at 180 days after counsel is appointed OR 60 days after denial of rehearing on direct appeal, whichever is LATER — so the clock cannot expire before counsel is appointed. Rule 22(c)(4)(i) separately requires counsel (or a pro se petitioner) to file a merit statement within 60 days of appointment. A parallel statutory one-year limitation runs from finality of the judgment, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(b), and both the Mississippi Supreme Court in Brown (2017) and the Mississippi Attorney General's Oct. 6, 2025 § 2265 application describe the Rule 22 deadlines as the operative, appointment-anchored schedule for initial capital PCR. Successive petitioners get no benefit from Rule 22(c) and must instead satisfy the UPCCRA time and successive-writ bars (Brown).	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(5)(i); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(4)(i); cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(b) Case: Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017) An application for leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief shall be filed in the Supreme Court not later than one hundred eighty (180) days after counsel is appointed or sixty (60) days following denial of rehearing View the source document
Missouri Runs regardless verified	BOTH — the two clocks work differently, and a hostile reader will want the distinction. (1) The INITIAL pro se motion clock runs regardless of counsel: Rule 29.15(b) requires the Rule 29.15 motion to be filed within 90 days after the appellate mandate issues (or 180 days after sentencing if no appeal was taken), and 'Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule 29.15 shall constitute a complete waiver.' Appointment of counsel is triggered BY that filing (30 days after it), so it cannot extend it. (2) The AMENDED motion clock — the pleading that actually frames the capital claims — is keyed to appointment. Rule 29.16(e), which displaces Rule 29.15(g) in death cases, gives 180 days running from the earlier of (i) the date both the mandate issued AND counsel is appointed, or (ii) the date both the mandate issued AND non-appointed counsel entered an appearance; the court may extend for good cause up to 90 more days. That is triple the 60-day amended-motion window non-capital movants get under Rule 29.15(g), and it was lengthened from 60 to 180 days by the Supreme Court of Missouri's order of April 28, 2020, effective January 1, 2021.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(e) (amended motion, 180 days from mandate + appointment); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(b) (initial motion, 90 days from mandate, runs regardless of counsel) An amended motion shall be filed within 180 days of the earlier of: (1) the date both the mandate of the appellate court is issued and counsel is appointed View the source document
Montana Runs regardless verified	The clock runs from finality of the conviction REGARDLESS of appointment; it does not run from, toll for, or wait on counsel. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1) gives every petitioner — capital and non-capital alike — one year from the date the conviction becomes final (measured by expiration of the time to appeal, or to petition for certiorari, or the date the U.S. Supreme Court issues its final order). The only exception, § 46-21-102(2), is for newly discovered innocence evidence; there is no capital carve-out and no appointment-triggered tolling anywhere in Title 46, ch. 21. The capital appointment sequence is instead NESTED INSIDE that one year: § 46-21-201(3)(a) gives the court 30 days after finality to notify the prisoner, and § 46-21-201(3)(b) gives it 75 days after finality to order the assignment — so counsel appointed at the statutory outer limit has roughly nine and a half months of the one-year period left. Once a capital petition is filed, § 46-21-201(1)(b) pushes the other way, requiring a prompt scheduling conference and a decision within 90 days of the hearing or of the filing of briefs, enforceable by writ of mandate.	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(1)-(2); see also §§ 46-21-201(3)(a)-(b), 46-21-201(1)(b) a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final View the source document
Nebraska Runs regardless verified	The clock runs REGARDLESS of appointment of counsel. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) imposes a one-year limitation period running from the later of five listed triggers — finality of the direct appeal, discovery of the factual predicate, removal of a state-created impediment, recognition of a new retroactive right, or certiorari denial/affirmance. Appointment of counsel is not one of them, and nothing in the statute tolls for the period a death-sentenced prisoner is unrepresented. The Nebraska Supreme Court confirmed this in a capital case in 2025: Aubrey Trail, under sentence of death, asked the trial court for post-conviction counsel and waited 62 days for the appointment, then 15 more days after his first appointed lawyer withdrew on a conflict; his motion was nonetheless dismissed as time barred, and the court held that § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling even in capital cases, that the statutory tolling in § 29-3001(4)(c) does not apply where the prisoner still had time to file within the year, and that only the Legislature — not the court — can extend the deadline for a prisoner abandoned by counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4) Case: State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84 (2025) For those same reasons, even in capital cases, § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling. View the source document
Nevada Runs regardless verified	The clock RUNS REGARDLESS of appointment. NRS 34.726(1) gives one year from entry of judgment, or one year from the appellate court's remittitur if an appeal was taken, with no capital carve-out and no appointment trigger; the only relief valve is 'good cause shown for delay,' defined as delay not the petitioner's fault plus undue prejudice from dismissal. Because NRS 34.820 conditions appointment on a first petition already being before the court, a death-sentenced prisoner must get a petition filed inside that year — in practice often pro se — before the mandatory-appointment duty attaches. The only appointment-keyed clock runs the other way: NRS 34.750(3) gives appointed counsel 30 days after the later of the appointment or the order to respond to file supplemental pleadings. NRS 34.726(2) separately bars any stay of execution merely because the one-year window is open.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.726(1)-(2), 34.750(3), 34.820(1) Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction View the source document
New Hampshire Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel. New Hampshire has no capital-specific post-conviction statute and no filing deadline keyed to appointment of counsel. The two collateral vehicles are (1) a petition for new trial under RSA 526, barred by RSA 526:4 unless filed within three years after rendition of the judgment — measured from the judgment, not from any appointment; and (2) state habeas corpus under RSA 534, which contains no statutory filing deadline at all (RSA 534:1-:3 impose none). Neither statute tolls for, runs from, or waits on the appointment of counsel. The Judicial Council's capital post-conviction standards address limitations only as to the FEDERAL clock, directing counsel to ensure the client 'is not time barred from seeking relief' in federal habeas — confirming that no state appointment-triggered clock exists to manage.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 526:4; see also § 534:1-:3 (no deadline) A new trial shall not be granted unless the petition is filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment complained of, or the failure of the suit. View the source document
New Jersey Runs regardless verified	The clock runs REGARDLESS of counsel, and does not wait on or restart at appointment. R. 3:22-12(a)(1) runs 5 years from the date of entry of the judgment of conviction under R. 3:21-5, subject only to excusable-neglect/fundamental-injustice relief; R. 3:22-12(b) provides that 'These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein.' The sequence in R. 3:22-6(a) is the reverse of a counsel-triggered clock: the prisoner must file the petition (pro se, with a sworn indigency statement) BEFORE the court assigns the Public Defender. The only capital-specific timing rule New Jersey ever had — former R. 3:22-12(b), 'Capital Causes; Petition,' requiring a death-sentenced defendant to file within 30 days of denial of certiorari on direct appeal — was deleted by the Supreme Court's order of July 28, 2017, effective September 1, 2017, ten years after abolition. It too ran from an appellate event, not from appointment of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(1), (b); former R. 3:22-12(b) (deleted eff. Sept. 1, 2017) no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged View the source document
New Mexico Runs from appointment verified	The capital clock runs FROM appointment of counsel, not from finality of the conviction. Rule 5-802(L)(3) gives the defendant 180 days 'after appointment' to file the habeas petition, extendable for good cause; the State then has 180 days after service to respond (L)(4), and the court must schedule a hearing within 30 days of the response (L)(5). Rule 5-802(L)(2) also stays the execution on issuance of the mandate 'pending further proceedings under this paragraph,' so nothing about the capital timetable can run against a prisoner who has no lawyer yet. Separately, Rule 5-802 sets no limitation period at all for petitions challenging a conviction or sentence: the rule's only one-year limit (paragraph C) applies to petitions challenging NMCD disciplinary decisions and conditions of confinement.	Source Statute / rule: Rule 5-802(L)(3) NMRA unless an extension of time is granted for good cause shown, within one-hundred eighty (180) days after appointment, the defendant shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus; View the source document
New York No fixed deadline verified	There is NO post-conviction filing deadline in New York, so nothing runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel. CPL 440.10(1) and 440.20(1) both permit the motion 'at any time after the entry of a judgment.' The capital-specific timing runs the other way — the execution waits for the motion, not the motion for the clock: CPL 460.40(3) directed the Court of Appeals to adopt rules ensuring a death-sentenced defendant 'is granted a stay of the execution of any death warrant… to allow the defendant an opportunity to prepare and timely file an initial motion pursuant to section 440.10 or 440.20… and to allow the motion and any appeal from the denial thereof to be timely determined'; the implementing rule is 22 NYCRR § 510.4(b), under which the stay continues until the time to appeal the 440 denial expires or the Court of Appeals decides that appeal. What IS time-bounded is the counsel entitlement itself: Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b) supplies counsel only until final resolution of the direct appeal and of the appeal from denial of the initial 440 motion, and § 35-b(1) denies appointed counsel for any subsequent motion (matched by CPL 460.40(3) and 22 NYCRR § 510.4(c), under which a stay for a successive 440 motion issues 'only for good cause shown'). § 35-b(11) then ends the section's application ten days after a final judgment or order not subject to further review, at which point County Law article 18-A/18-B applies.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(1); § 440.20(1); § 460.40(3); 22 NYCRR § 510.4(b)-(c); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1), (11) At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that: View the source document
North Carolina Runs from appointment verified	The capital MAR clock EXPRESSLY WAITS ON APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a) gives a capital defendant 120 days to file a postconviction motion for appropriate relief, running 'from the latest of any of the following' six events; subdivisions (1)-(5) are judgment/mandate/certiorari events, and subdivision (6) is the appointment of postconviction counsel for an indigent capital defendant. Because the period runs from the LATEST of the six, the 120 days for an indigent capital petitioner who applies under § 7A-451(c) cannot begin before counsel is appointed — the clock does not run against an unrepresented death-sentenced prisoner who has applied. Two qualifications a hostile reader will press: (a) the trigger is appointment, not the § 7A-451(c) application, so a prisoner who never files the 10-day application never starts subdivision (6) and is left with the (1)-(5) triggers; and (b) § 15A-1415(d) separately allows an extension of time 'for good cause shown,' presumptively up to 30 days, longer on a finding of extraordinary circumstances. Contrast the noncapital track, § 15A-1415(a1), which runs seven years from events (1)-(5) only and contains no appointment-of-counsel trigger. A 2025 amendment also now requires the MAR hearing to be held within 24 months of filing absent written findings of extraordinary circumstances.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(a)(6); see also § 15A-1415(a1), (d); § 7A-451(c) The appointment of postconviction counsel for an indigent capital defendant. View the source document
North Dakota Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) fixes a two-year limit measured from the date the conviction becomes final (expiration of time to appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court; or expiration of time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court; or the date the U.S. Supreme Court issues a final order). Neither that subsection nor the exceptions in § 29-32.1-01(3) — newly discovered evidence including DNA, physical disability or mental disease, or a new retroactive interpretation of law — makes any reference to appointment of counsel, and there is no tolling for an unrepresented applicant. Section 29-32.1-03(6) requires only that the clerk notify an unrepresented applicant that 'assistance of counsel may be available.' No capital-specific deadline exists.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2); see also §§ 29-32.1-01(3), 29-32.1-03(6) Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. View the source document
Ohio Runs regardless verified	The clock runs REGARDLESS of appointment; it neither runs from nor tolls for the appointment of counsel. Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a) a capital petition must be filed no later than 365 days after the date the trial transcript is filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio on direct appeal (365 days after the transcript is filed in the court of appeals for non-capital cases). Nothing in § 2953.21 keys the deadline to appointment of counsel, and § 2953.23 supplies the only exceptions (unavoidable ignorance of facts / new retroactive federal right, plus DNA actual-innocence). The relationship runs the other way: because the appointment right attaches only to a timely first petition, a petitioner whose 365 days expire before counsel is appointed loses both. The separate serious-mental-illness petition under § 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv) had its own 365-day window running from the April 12, 2021 effective date of H.B. 136 (§ 2953.21(A)(2)(b)) — again not from appointment.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a)-(b); Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.23 Case: State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 26, 29 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2025) three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death View the source document
Oklahoma Runs regardless verified	The clock runs from direct-appeal briefing, NOT from appointment of counsel, and there is no tolling provision keyed to appointment. Section 1089(D)(1) gives 90 days from the filing of the appellee's brief on direct appeal (or 90 days from a reply brief); OCCA Rule 9.7(A)(2) repeats the same trigger (https://www.okcca.net/rules/rule-9.7/). Oklahoma reconciles this with representation by front-loading the appointment: Rule 1.14(D)(2) requires trial counsel in a capital case to have the application for appointment of counsel for BOTH direct appeal and post-conviction presented to the district court at the appeal stage, so capital PC counsel is in place while the direct appeal is still being briefed, and the application is filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals in the first instance. The OCCA also stays and resets the deadline by order when a counsel question intervenes: in Stouffer, 2007 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, the Court had stayed the filing deadline pending a self-representation hearing and then ordered that 'counsel shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Order' to file. Statutory extension authority in § 1089(D)(1) itself is limited on its face to cases briefed before November 1, 1995.	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(1); OCCA Rule 9.7(A)(2); OCCA Rule 1.14(D)(2) Case: Stouffer v. State, 2007 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, 154 P.3d 88 The application for post-conviction relief shall be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety (90) days from the date the appellee's brief on direct appeal is filed View the source document
Oregon Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of counsel. ORS 138.510(3) gives every post-conviction petitioner, capital included, two years from finality (entry of judgment if no appeal; the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts; or denial of certiorari / final judgment after remand), subject only to the escape clause for grounds that could not reasonably have been raised. Nothing runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel — and because appointment under ORS 138.590(4) presupposes a petition already on file (appointed counsel 'may move to amend the petition within 15 days following counsels appointment,' ORS 138.590(5)), the death-sentenced prisoner must get the initial petition filed pro se or through volunteer counsel to trigger the appointment duty. A separate capital timetable governs the stay of execution rather than the filing deadline: ORS 138.686(3) stays execution 30 days after resolution of certiorari to allow filing a notice of intent to seek post-conviction relief, stays it until final resolution if a first petition is filed within 90 days after that notice, and otherwise requires the petitioner to apply to extend the stay. Or Laws 2026 ch 131 § 7 (SB 1515) added an exception to ORS 138.510(3) for discredited-forensic-science claims; it created no counsel-based tolling.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.510(3); ORS 138.686(3); cf. ORS 138.590(4)-(5) A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition View the source document
Pennsylvania Runs regardless verified	The clock does NOT run from, toll for, or wait on the appointment of counsel. Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) and (b)(3) — restated in the mandatory notice of Pa.R.Crim.P. 900(B)(1)-(2) — a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, i.e. at the conclusion of direct review including certiorari, subject only to the three statutory exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). What Pennsylvania does instead is synchronize the two events: Rule 904(H)(1) fixes the appointment trigger at the same moment the limitations clock starts ('at the conclusion of direct review… upon remand of the record'), so appointed capital counsel is in place for the whole of the one-year period rather than the petitioner having to file pro se to obtain a lawyer. There is no capital-specific extension; Rule 909 then imposes deadlines on the COURT (20 days to review, 90 days to dispose, extendable once by 30 days, with clerk notice to the Supreme Court on non-compliance).	Source Statute / rule: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (b)(3); Pa.R.Crim.P. 900(B)(1)-(2); Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B) A petition for post-conviction collateral relief must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, except as otherwise provided by statute. View the source document
Rhode Island No fixed deadline verified	There is no deadline to interact with. Rhode Island's post-conviction remedy has NO statute of limitations: R.we. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 provides that an application 'may be filed at any time,' and no filing fee is required. Because no clock runs, the question whether the period runs from, tolls for, or waits on appointment of counsel does not arise — a Rhode Island applicant, capital or not, cannot be time-barred by statute for filing before counsel is appointed. (Rhode Island courts have applied an equitable laches defense to stale applications; we did not verify a laches decision against a primary source in this pass, so it is flagged rather than asserted.)	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-3 A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the appropriate court. An application may be filed at any time. View the source document
South Carolina Runs regardless verified	The clock RUNS REGARDLESS of appointment of counsel. § 17-27-45(A) — which contains no capital carve-out and applies to capital applicants — requires the application to be filed within one year after entry of the judgment of conviction or one year after the remittitur/final decision on appeal, whichever is later. The capital-specific section reverses the order: § 17-27-160(A)-(B) provides that the application is filed first and that only 'Upon receipt of the application' are two counsel 'immediately appointed.' The subsequent deadlines § 17-27-160 creates run from filing (State's return within thirty days), from the return (status conference within thirty days), and from the conference (merits hearing within one hundred eighty days) — not from appointment. There is no provision starting, tolling, or extending the one-year period for want of counsel. In Robertson the PCR court dismissed the capital application in part as time-barred; the Supreme Court held it timely only through the separate § 17-27-45(C) newly-discovered-facts branch, because the prior counsel's lack of qualification was not discovered until federal counsel was appointed in 2011.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A), (C); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(A)-(C) Case: Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016) An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court View the source document
South Dakota Runs regardless verified	The clock runs REGARDLESS of whether counsel has been appointed. SDCL 21-27-3.3 (added by SL 2012, ch. 118, § 3) imposes a two-year limitation on 'all applications for relief under this chapter,' running from the latest of four triggers: (1) the date the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek it; (2) removal of a state-created impediment; (3) initial recognition of a retroactive new constitutional right; or (4) the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence. Appointment of counsel is not among the triggers, and there is no capital-specific tolling anywhere in ch. 21-27 or ch. 23A-27A. The only counsel-independent timing rule is SDCL 21-27-3.1, which bars maintaining a habeas proceeding while direct appeal is pending or the appeal time is running. Because appointment under SDCL 21-27-4 requires the judge first to review the filed application for good faith and necessity, a death-sentenced applicant must draft and file within the two years before any lawyer can be appointed — the statute sequences the petition before the counsel decision, not the reverse.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-3.3; SDCL 21-27-3.1 A two-year statute of limitation applies to all applications for relief under this chapter. View the source document
Tennessee Runs regardless verified	THE CLOCK RUNS REGARDLESS OF COUNSEL. Tennessee's one-year post-conviction limitation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), runs from final action of the highest state appellate court on direct appeal (or, absent appeal, from finality of judgment) — quoted verbatim below by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Whitehead. Nothing keys it to appointment. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 4(B) restates that 'A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within the statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102,' and the official Rule 28 form petition asks the petitioner to explain why the bar should not apply 'If more than one (1) year has passed since the date of final action on your direct appeal by the state appellate courts.' The sequencing is the reverse of a counsel-triggered clock: under Rule 28, § 6(B)(3) counsel is appointed only after the prisoner has already filed a petition that survives colorable-claim screening, so a death-sentenced prisoner must get the initial petition in pro se (or with informal OPCD assistance) before any appointment right attaches. Rule 28, § 6(C)(8) provides that a withdrawn petition 'does not toll the statute of limitations.' Tennessee courts recognize a judge-made due-process tolling doctrine for attorney abandonment (Whitehead), but that is an equitable exception, not a statutory wait-for-counsel rule. We found no capital-specific tolling or appointment-triggered deadline provision.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, §§ 4(B), 6(B)(3), 6(C)(8) Case: Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615 (Tenn. 2013) within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken View the source document
Texas Runs from appointment verified	The clock RUNS FROM APPOINTMENT. Art. 11.071 § 4(a) sets the filing date at the later of (i) the 180th day after the convicting court appoints counsel under § 2, or (ii) the 45th day after the State's original brief is filed on direct appeal. Because appointment is itself mandatory and must occur within 30 days of the post-judgment findings, no limitations period can run against an unrepresented death-sentenced applicant before counsel exists. Section 4(b) permits one 90-day extension for good cause. If appointed counsel files late or not at all, § 4A directs the Court of Criminal Appeals to take corrective action, including appointing new counsel and setting a new filing date, rather than treating the application as time-barred against the applicant.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 4(a); see also §§ 4(b), 4A Case: Ex parte Medina, 361 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) An application for a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the court of criminal appeals, must be filed in the convicting court not later than the 180th day after the date the convicting court appoints counsel under Section 2 View the source document
Utah Runs regardless verified	The clock runs REGARDLESS of appointment, and the statute says so expressly. Utah Code § 78B-9-202(5) provides that appointment of capital postconviction counsel 'does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 78B-9-107.' The generally applicable one-year limitation governs capital petitions: § 78B-9-107(1) ('A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the day on which the cause of action has accrued'), accruing under § 78B-9-107(2) on the later of the last day to appeal, entry of the appellate decision, the certiorari deadline or denial, discovery of the evidentiary facts, or establishment of a new rule — none of which is the appointment date. Tolling is limited to § 78B-9-107(3)–(4) (state action violating the U.S. Constitution, physical or mental incapacity, force/fraud/coercion for § 78B-9-104(1)(h) claims, and pendency of DNA-testing or factual-innocence petitions). The 30-day appointment trigger in § 78B-9-202(1)(a) (remittitur after affirmance) is close in time to, but legally independent of, the § 78B-9-107(2) accrual date. Separately, § 78B-9-201 bars applying for or entertaining a post-conviction remedy within 30 days before a scheduled execution unless the grounds developed or first became known in that period.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(5); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1)–(4) The appointment of counsel under this section does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 78B-9-107. View the source document
Vermont No fixed deadline verified	NO INTERACTION, because there is no deadline at all. Vermont's collateral-review statute has no limitations period: 13 V.S.A. § 7131 provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence 'may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.' Nothing in §§ 7131-7137 runs a clock from conviction, from finality of direct appeal, or from the appointment of counsel; the only successive-petition control is discretionary and untimed — 13 V.S.A. § 7134 provides that 'The court is not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.' Section 7136 sequences remedies rather than timing them, barring a habeas application by a prisoner who 'has failed to apply for relief under this subchapter and 12 V.S.A. §§ 3953 and 3957' unless the motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Because Vermont has no death penalty, there is likewise no capital-specific filing period, no capital tolling provision, and no provision conditioning any period on appointment of counsel.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. § 7131; see also 13 V.S.A. §§ 7134, 7136 may at any time move the Superior Court of the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence View the source document
Virginia Runs regardless verified	The clock now runs regardless of counsel, and there is no capital-specific deadline at all. Current § 8.01-654(A)(2) sets a single limit for any habeas petition attacking a conviction or sentence — two years from final trial-court judgment or one year from final disposition of the direct appeal (or expiry of the time to appeal), whichever is later — with no appointment-of-counsel trigger and no capital carve-out (the 'except as provided in § 8.01-654.1 for cases in which a death sentence has been imposed' clause was struck by the 2021 act). Until repeal, the deadline DID wait on counsel: former § 8.01-654.1 gave a death-sentenced prisoner 60 days from cert denial/affirmance, but provided that 'an indigent prisoner may file such a petition within 120 days following appointment, made under § 19.2-163.7, of counsel to represent him.' Rule 5:7(a)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia now restates the § 8.01-654(A)(2) periods with no capital exception.	Source Statute / rule: Va. Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) (current); former § 8.01-654.1 (repealed 2021) A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence shall be filed within two years from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from either final disposition of the direct appeal in state court View the source document
Washington Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of appointment. RCW 10.73.090(1) bars any collateral attack 'filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final,' with finality fixed by RCW 10.73.090(3) at trial-court filing, issuance of the mandate on direct appeal, or denial of certiorari — none of it keyed to counsel. Neither RCW 10.73.150(3) (which conditions counsel on the prisoner's own request) nor former RAP 16.25 contained any tolling, extension, or 'within one year after appointment of counsel' language; the rule expressly left funding statutes untouched ('Statutes providing for payment of expenses with public funds are not superseded by this rule'). The one capital-specific timing accommodation was upstream, not in the counsel provision: RAP 12.5(c)(3) delays the mandate in a death case until the time for certiorari expires or the U.S. Supreme Court disposes of the application, which pushes back the start of the one-year period. In practice the Supreme Court appointed PRP counsel and then set the petition deadline by order (see capital_pc_practice).	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.73.090(1), (3) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final View the source document
West Virginia No fixed deadline verified	No interaction, and no deadline at all. There is no capital post-conviction deadline because there is no capital post-conviction. More fundamentally, West Virginia's post-conviction habeas statute imposes NO limitations period of any kind: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) provides that a petition 'may be filed at any time' after conviction and sentence have been rendered and imposed and the time for appeal has expired or the right of appeal has been exhausted. Nothing runs from, tolls for, or waits on the appointment of counsel — there is no clock to run. (Timeliness is instead policed on the back end through the § 53-4A-1(b)-(c) previously-and-finally-adjudicated and waiver bars, not through a filing deadline.)	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(f) A petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in accordance with the provisions of this article may be filed at any time after the conviction and sentence in the criminal proceedings have been rendered and imposed View the source document
Wisconsin No fixed deadline verified	No capital deadline exists. For collateral attack generally, Wisconsin imposes no filing deadline at all: Wis. Stat. s. 974.06(2) provides that a postconviction motion is part of the original criminal action and 'may be made at any time,' so no clock runs against, tolls for, or waits on the appointment of counsel; s. 974.06(1) only requires that the time for direct postconviction relief under s. 974.02 have expired. On the direct-appeal track the clocks are keyed to counsel and the record rather than to a fixed post-sentencing period: Wis. Stat. (Rule) 809.30(2)(b) requires a notice of intent within 20 days of sentencing; s. 809.30(2)(e) then requires the SPD to appoint counsel and order transcripts within 30 days (50 if indigency must be determined) of receiving the clerk's materials; and s. 809.30(2)(h) sets the postconviction motion or notice of appeal at 60 days after the later of service of the transcript or the circuit court case record.	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. s. 974.06(2); see also Rule 809.30(2)(b), (e), (h) A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time. View the source document
Wyoming Runs regardless verified	The clock runs regardless of whether counsel has been appointed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) bars any petition filed more than five years after the judgment of conviction was entered. Nothing keys that period to, tolls it for, or makes it wait on the appointment of counsel, and § 7-14-104(c) in the same chapter disclaims any entitlement to counsel without adjusting the deadline. Because the five years run from entry of the judgment of conviction — not from the conclusion of direct review — a capital petitioner's period can be largely consumed by the automatic Wyoming Supreme Court review that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(a) requires. That is what happened in both post-1990 capital cases: Harlow's judgment was entered December 7, 1998, his direct appeal was not decided until April 14, 2003, and his post-conviction petition was filed December 2, 2003 — five days inside the bar (Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 4, 105 P.3d 1049). Eaton's petition was likewise filed on the eve of the five-year mark. What the pendency of post-conviction proceedings does affect is the EXECUTION date, not the filing deadline: the Wyoming Supreme Court has continued stays of execution 'pending the filing and during the pendency' of a capital post-conviction proceeding (Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 144, 78 P.3d 1044; Eaton v. State, 2009 WY 36, 202 P.3d 1076).	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) Case: Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 4, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005) No petition under this act shall be allowed if filed more than five (5) years after the judgment of conviction was entered. View the source document

How the mechanism operates in fact

An applied example or authoritative description: a decision appointing counsel under the provision, a defender office's enabling statute, a court order, or a finding that the office exists on paper but is unfunded or vacant.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Applied example verified	The mandate is operating in real cases, and is being litigated. In Ex parte State (In re State v. Abernathy) (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024), the State itself moved the circuit court to appoint separate postconviction counsel 'as required by § 13A-5-53.1(b)'; the court had earlier designated an attorney as 'standby counsel' for post-conviction matters, direct-appeal counsel later showed that attorney had gone to work for the District Attorney's Office, and the circuit court then appointed new counsel (Angela Morgan) — while the Court of Criminal Appeals struck the accompanying 270-day extension as beyond the court's authority. In Belcher v. State (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2025) the circuit court's dismissal order recorded that 'Rule 32 counsel was appointed to Belcher on April 10, 2019.' What operates is court-by-court appointment of private counsel under a $7,500 fee cap; no state office is staffed to do this work, and the mandate reaches only defendants sentenced to death after August 1, 2017.	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b) Case: Ex parte State of Alabama (In re State of Alabama v. Donnie Lee Abernathy), No. CR-2023-0825 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024) the State filed a motion requesting that the circuit court, "if the court has not already done so," appoint Abernathy separate counsel for the purpose of seeking postconviction relief, as required by § 13A-5-53.1(b). View the source document
Alaska No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice to describe — no capital sentence has been available in Alaska since 1957, no one is under sentence of death, and no capital post-conviction office exists. How the general mechanism operates in fact is shown in Wassillie v. State, 331 P.3d 1285 (Alaska App. 2014): the court stated that under the Alaska Constitution a defendant litigating a first petition for post-conviction relief has the right to competent counsel and that 'under AS 18.85.100(c)… if the defendant is indigent, the defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense'; because the Public Defender Agency had filed a no-merit certificate that the applicant had to attack on appeal, the court held that 'the duty of providing an attorney for Wassilie falls to the Office of Public Advocacy under AS 44.21.410(a)(5).' That is the appointment pipeline any Alaska post-conviction applicant, capital or not, would enter.	Source Statute / rule: AS 18.85.100(c); AS 44.21.410(a)(5) Case: Wassillie v. State, 331 P.3d 1285 (Alaska App. 2014) the duty of providing an attorney for Wassilie falls to the Office of Public Advocacy under AS 44.21.410(a)(5) View the source document
Arizona Office operating verified	The mechanism is live and is described as obligatory by the Arizona Supreme Court itself. In State v. Montoya, No. CR-22-0106-AP (Ariz. Aug. 15, 2024) — a capital direct appeal decided under the current rules — the court rejected a claim premised on the defendant having no PCR counsel, holding that 'Arizona statute and court rules require a court to appoint counsel to an indigent pleading capital defendant for his or her first petition for Rule 32 post-conviction relief,' citing A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), (E) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b). Earlier, in Fitzgerald v. Myers, No. CR-16-0285-PR (Ariz. Sept. 26, 2017), the court described its own routine practice: 'In capital cases, once a mandate affirming the defendant's conviction and death sentence has issued, this Court automatically files a PCR notice with the trial court and appoints defense counsel for the PCR proceedings.' Fitzgerald also fixes the limits of the right: it is a statutory right to appointed counsel, not a right to a competent (i.e., mentally competent) client or to effective assistance, and the court held that neither § 13-4041(B) nor Rule 32.5 requires a competency determination before capital PCR proceeds. Two practical qualifications appear on the face of the statute: counsel is paid only if 'A petition is timely filed' or, failing that, 'a notice is timely filed stating that counsel has reviewed the record and found no meritorious claim' (§ 13-4041(F)); and the state's share of the cost is capped at the legislative appropriation (§ 13-4041(H)), with the county bearing the remainder. We found no source indicating the appointment mechanism is currently unfunded or vacant.	Source Statute / rule: A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), (E), (F); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b) Case: State v. Montoya, No. CR-22-0106-AP (Ariz. Aug. 15, 2024) Arizona statute and court rules require a court to appoint counsel to an indigent pleading capital defendant for his or her first petition for Rule 32 post-conviction relief. View the source document
Arkansas Office operating verified	The mechanism operates in fact and is still operating. In Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515, after the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Latavious Johnson's capital-murder conviction and death sentence in 2016, the Lee County Circuit Court appointed new counsel (Bill Luppen) for post-conviction; Johnson filed a Rule 37.5 petition in April 2017, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing in February 2018 at which trial counsel testified, and the Supreme Court reviewed the denial on the merits. Earlier practice is documented in Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001), where the circuit court 'appointed the Capital Conflicts and Appellate Office of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission' within the Rule 37.5 window and, after that office withdrew for conflict, appointed private counsel Jeff Rosenzweig. A significant practice caveat: because Arkansas has no standing capital post-conviction defender office, federal public defenders had been filling the gap. In Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480, 215 S.W.3d 589 (2005), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that federal appointment does not carry into state court — 'the federal court appointment of the FPD for indigent capital defendants in federal habeas corpus matters does not carry over to state proceedings' — and that counsel for unexhausted state remedies 'must comply with the criteria for appointment set out in Rule 37.5.' That decision confirms the state mechanism is the exclusive route, and confirms that federal § 3599-type appointment is not a substitute.	Source Case: Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515; Jackson v. State, 343 Ark. 613 (2001); Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480 (2005) the circuit court appointed Bill Luppen as Johnson’s new counsel View the source document
California Office unfunded or vacant verified	The mandate exists but is largely inoperative for want of counsel and funding — documented by the statutorily required HCRC annual report (Gov. Code § 68661(l)). Per 'Annual Report: 2025 in Review' (pub. May 14, 2026): at the end of 2025, 346 people (348 judgments) awaited appointment of initial state habeas counsel, having waited an average of 18 years; 138 had waited 20+ years and 2 over 30 years; 391 people — 70% of the state's death-sentenced population — were awaiting appointment and/or funding of state habeas counsel. California courts made just 1 new habeas appointment in 2025 (accepted by HCRC); in 2024 there were zero first-time appointments. Of the 25 oldest judgments HCRC flagged for priority in May 2019 under rule 4.561(d), 18 still lack counsel (3 died awaiting appointment; 1 was resentenced to LWOP). Since Prop. 66 took effect, essentially only HCRC has been appointed; 'Other than the HCRC, just one attorney licensed to practice in California is qualified under the rules of court to represent capitally-sentenced people in their habeas corpus proceedings,' and 'There is no source of funding to compensate that attorney for his work' — he has never been appointed. The statewide panel shrank in 2025 when two attorneys' six-year terms expired (rule 4.562(d)(4)(C)) with no replacements. HCRC remains capped at 34 attorneys; the 2008 Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice recommended expansion to 150, never adopted. The California Supreme Court has itself recognized 'a critical shortage of qualified attorneys willing to represent capital prisoners in state habeas corpus proceedings' (In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932; see also People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 951, 957), and in Morgan the petitioner had invoked the § 68662 right 'some 13 years ago' without the court being able to find willing counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Gov. Code § 68661(l) Case: In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932 The 346 people sentenced to death in California awaiting initial state habeas counsel have been waiting an average of 18 years for appointment of qualified counsel. View the source document
Colorado Applied example verified	The mechanism did operate in fact, and is now dormant. In the only two Colorado cases in which a death sentence was imposed under the unitary review system, the Colorado Supreme Court recorded that each defendant was advised under the scheme and appointed a separate, independent set of postconviction counsel, who then litigated postconviction motions and discovery disputes (People v. Owens, 2014 CO 58, 330 P.3d 1027, ¶¶ 4-5 — Owens filed his postconviction motion in July 2012). Nothing suggests an unfunded or vacant office; the appointing court draws on private counsel paid by OSPD/OADC. But the pipeline is now empty: after the 2020 repeal and Governor Polis's commutation of all three death sentences, the Colorado Supreme Court held the unitary review process no longer applied in the pending capital appeals (People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42, ¶ 3; People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 1), retaining jurisdiction only over the direct appeals.	Source Case: People v. Owens, 2014 CO 58, 330 P.3d 1027 As contemplated by this statutory scheme, each defendant was appointed a new set of counsel for purposes of pursuing post-conviction motions and a separate, new set of counsel for appeal of his convictions and death sentence. View the source document
Connecticut Office operating verified	The mechanism did operate for death-sentenced prisoners while Connecticut had a death penalty, and it operated principally through state-paid Assigned Counsel rather than staff defenders. The Chief Public Defender's FY 2012-13 annual report describes the consolidated capital habeas litigation brought by Connecticut's death-row prisoners (the racial-disparity claims, tried at Northern Correctional Institution and denied by the habeas court, Sferrazza, J.) as 'largely handled by Assigned Counsel' — lawyers selected from the § 51-291(11) lists and paid from the Public Defender Services Commission's budget. The same report records a staffed Habeas Corpus Unit (Chief of Habeas Corpus Services, a supervisory assistant public defender, four permanent attorneys, two investigators, three paralegals) and a Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit whose staffing was cut after P.A. 12-5 (two trial attorneys, two investigators, one paralegal and two mitigation specialists eliminated). Individual death-sentenced prisoners did litigate counselled state habeas petitions to judgment: e.g. Webb v. Commissioner of Correction, 322 Conn. 318 (2016), in which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 'with direction to order the trial court to resentence the defendant according to law' under Santiago and Peeler. Since 2015-16 there is no capital habeas practice to observe: no one is under sentence of death, so the capital application of § 51-296(a) and the § 52-470(f)(3) carve-out are dormant rather than unfunded.	Source Case: Webb v. Commissioner of Correction, 322 Conn. 318 (2016) The consolidated habeas racial disparity in death penalty litigation trial, largely handled by Assigned Counsel, was held at Northern Correctional Institution and concluded at the end of 2012. View the source document
Delaware Applied example verified	The mechanism was used in fact, and is now without occupants. In Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2010), a capital case, the Delaware Supreme Court recites that after the death sentence was affirmed and Zebroski filed a pro se Rule 61 motion, 'The Superior Court appointed new counsel for Zebroski,' who then filed an amended motion, expanded the record, and litigated a full evidentiary hearing; the Superior Court later appointed a second lawyer (Jennifer-Kate Aaronson) for further Superior Court proceedings in 2008. The opinion expressly describes capital postconviction counsel as 'appointed by the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 61(e)(1) and (l)(3)' — the predecessor numbering of the provision now at Rule 61(e)(2)(iii). Note the appointment there predated the June 2014 amendment that made capital appointment mandatory, so it shows the discretionary-era practice under Rule 61(l)(3). The provision is dormant today for a reason unrelated to funding: Delaware has no one under sentence of death. Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69, 70-71 (Del. 2016), held Rauf retroactive and directed that Powell's 'death sentence must be vacated,' and the legislature repealed the capital sentencing statute in 2024. There is no unfunded or vacant office to report because Delaware never created a capital post-conviction office; appointment ran through the ordinary Office of Defense Services / assigned-counsel machinery.	Source Statute / rule: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1), (l)(3) (2010 numbering) Case: Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2010) On December 10, 1998, Zebroski filed a pro-se motion for post conviction relief. The Superior Court appointed new counsel for Zebroski. View the source document
Florida Office operating verified	The mechanism operates and is funded. In Silvia v. State, decided under an active death warrant on August 12, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court held that the appointment of CCRC-Middle Region discharged the prisoner's statutory right to counsel, describing CCRC as 'a statutorily created office established for the very purpose of providing competent capital postconviction counsel' and citing §§ 27.701 and 27.704(1). Silvia had discharged counsel in 2012; Rule 3.851(i)(11), added in 2022, required that collateral counsel be reappointed in such cases, and CCRC-M was appointed when the warrant issued. The opinion lists four CCRC-Middle attorneys of record. The offices are staffed and appear regularly in the Florida Supreme Court's capital docket (CCRC-South and CCRC-Middle in Lambrix, 217 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2017); CCRC-Middle in Robinson, 95 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 2012)). The known weak point is the private-counsel track rather than the offices: § 27.711(4) caps registry counsel at $100/hour with stage maximums ($2,500 on appointment; $20,000 for the initial motion; $20,000 through the trial court's final order; $20,000 on appeal; $5,000 total once a death warrant issues), § 27.711(5) caps investigators at $15,000, and § 27.7002(5)-(6) authorizes JAC to strike permanently from the registry any attorney who seeks more.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. Stat. §§ 27.701, 27.704(1), 27.711(4)-(6), 27.7002(5)-(6) Case: Silvia v. State, No. SC2026-1162 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2026) Here, Silvia’s statutory right to counsel was satisfied by the appointment of CCRC-M. CCRC-M is a statutorily created office established for the very purpose of providing competent capital postconviction counsel. View the source document
Georgia Office operating verified	The arrangement operates as discretionary charity plus volunteer recruitment, and it demonstrably fails. The Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, in a 2005 Special Examination requested by the Senate Appropriations Committee (Report 06-05), described the delivery model in the quoted terms and found the Center's FY 2004 expenditures were $806,504, of which $800,000 (99%) were state-funded, the lowest per-case expenditure among the seven states compared (~$13,000/case vs. ~$24,000+ elsewhere). The same audit states: 'Unlike most states, however, Georgia does not have a statutory mandate that death-sentenced inmates be provided with legal representation in post-conviction proceedings.' The applied example is Gibson itself: the Supreme Court of Georgia recorded that the Resource Center 'repeatedly claimed that it lacked the staff to directly represent him,' that the habeas court 'invited Ms. Wells to represent Gibson, but she refused,' and the capital evidentiary hearing went forward anyway with the death-sentenced petitioner unrepresented. The office is funded but chronically under-resourced: the FY 2027 conference committee declined the requested 'Increase funds to offset reductions in other funding sources' (line 265, $0), holding the appropriation flat at $900,000, and as of September 2026 the Center's own site states it 'is searching for its next Executive Director.'	Source Case: Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 855-856 (1999) The Resource Center may provide direct representation or may assist private attorneys who volunteer their time to represent the plaintiff pro bono (without compensation). View the source document
Hawaii No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Hawaii to describe: no death sentence has been available since 1957. The general mechanism, however, demonstrably operates as a compulsion on the trial court rather than a paper right. In Rapozo v. State the Hawaii Supreme Court reviewed a pro se EIGHTH Rule 40 petition filed by a man serving a sentence for murder (Hawaii's most serious offense, carrying life without parole), held that HRPP Rule 40(i) entitles an indigent petitioner who states a colorable claim to representation at the Rule 40(f) hearing, vacated the denial, and in footnote 34 directed that counsel be appointed on remand, expressly granting the petitioner's own motion for counsel. The Office of the State Public Defender is a funded, staffed state agency, not a vacant one; it simply has no capital unit because Hawaii generates no capital cases.	Source Statute / rule: Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i), 40(f) Case: Rapozo v. State, No. SCWC-16-0000532 (Haw. Oct. 22, 2021) (published) As Rapozo stated colorable claims as discussed below, he must be appointed counsel on remand. View the source document
Idaho Office operating verified	The mechanism operates in fact: the SAPD staffs capital post-conviction cases with its own deputies. In Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013), two named SAPD lawyers were handling Erick Virgil Hall's capital post-conviction proceeding under we.C. § 19-2719 when a conflict of interest surfaced; the Idaho Supreme Court held that a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief from a death sentence has a statutory right to conflict-free counsel under we.C.R. 44.2 (then numbered 44.2(1)), and vacated the district court's orders appointing independent conflict counsel of the court's own choosing and directing the SAPD to pay for him. The opinion also confirms the funding route in practice — conflict counsel is compensated 'out of the budget of the state appellate public defender' (then we.C. § 19-871, now we.C. § 19-5906). A more recent illustration, which we read only in partial preview and therefore do not rely on for any cell, is SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District (Idaho 2023) (mandamus arising from the SAPD's conflict in Azad Abdullah's capital post-conviction case, in which the SAPD reported that 'anybody who has ever done capital representation in the state of Idaho has touched this case').	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2; Idaho Code § 19-5906 Case: Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013) Mark Ackley and Paula Swensen from the State Appellate Public Defender’s (SAPD) office, handling Hall’s post-conviction proceedings in Hall I View the source document
Illinois Applied example verified	No capital post-conviction proceeding can arise in Illinois today, so the only applied example is historical — and it shows the mechanism worked. In People v. Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d 37 (2001), a Du Page County judge summarily dismissed a death-sentenced petitioner's pro se successive petition without asking whether he wanted counsel. The State confessed error; the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded so counsel could be appointed, holding that a capital petition could not be screened as 'frivolous or patently without merit' at all and that the State had to file a responsive pleading before any ruling. The petitioner was represented on that appeal by the Office of the State Appellate Defender — the office that then ran a Capital Post Conviction Unit funded by appropriation from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund. The provision Thomas enforced now reads '(Blank).'	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 1998) (repealed) Case: People v. Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d 37, 743 N.E.2d 552 (2001) the circuit judge did not determine whether the defendant wanted to be represented by counsel, as the judge was required to do in capital cases under section 122-2.1(a)(1) of the Act View the source document
Indiana Office operating verified	The mechanism is live and staffed, not a paper office. In Corcoran v. State, Nos. 24S-SD-222 & 02S00-0508-PD-350 (Ind. Dec. 10, 2024) — decided eight days before Indiana carried out its first execution in nearly fifteen years — the State Public Defender litigated successive capital post-conviction petitions and stay motions on behalf of a death-sentenced prisoner over his own objection, and the Court noted that if it authorized the successive petitions 'Corcoran would have a right to appointed counsel' with the case returning to the trial court under P-C.R. 1(12)(c). The same office had handled Corcoran's first-round capital post-conviction litigation two decades earlier (Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 and 827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005), 'Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana' as counsel of record). The pattern is routine across Indiana's capital docket: in William Clyde Gibson, III v. State, Nos. 22S00-1601-PD-00009 & 22S00-1608-PD-00411 (Ind. Oct. 24, 2019), the Public Defender of Indiana plus five deputy public defenders appeared for a death-sentenced post-conviction appellant; likewise Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. 2012) and Weisheit v. State (Ind. 2018). No source we found reports the office as unfunded or vacant for capital post-conviction work.	Source Case: Corcoran v. State, Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 (Ind. Dec. 10, 2024) the State Public Defender filed two motions for permission to file two separate successive petitions for post-conviction relief and two accompanying motions to stay the execution while those petitions are litigated. View the source document
Iowa No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Iowa and no case applying a capital-counsel provision, because no such provision exists. The authoritative current description comes from the Iowa Legislative Services Agency's Fiscal Note on S.F. 357 (90th G.A., 2023), a bill to create a death penalty: its Background states that first-degree murder under Iowa Code § 707.2 is a class A felony "punishable by lifetime imprisonment." The same fiscal note shows that the capital-counsel apparatus does not presently exist and would have to be built: the bill would have required the Supreme Court "to establish standards for the competency of counsel in death penalty cases," charged the State Public Defender with "providing or contracting with qualified lead and co-counsel for death penalty cases" and with specialized training, and required the State to supply counsel where an indigent person is not afforded appointed counsel in federal postconviction proceedings. S.F. 357 was not enacted — the 2026 Iowa Code still carries no death penalty. An earlier bill, H.F. 271 (89th G.A., 2021), likewise proposed creating those standards and also failed.	Source Murder in the first degree under Iowa Code section 707.2 is a Class A felony. A Class A felony is punishable by lifetime imprisonment. View the source document
Kansas Applied example verified	The mechanism has actually operated, and has been enforced against a district court that ignored it. Kleypas is the first appeal of a capital 60-1507 proceeding since Kansas reinstated the death penalty in 1994. After Kleypas's direct appeal became final, BIDS assigned Julia Spainhour of the Kansas Capital Habeas Defender Office plus private co-counsel Paul S. McCausland; they filed a 47-ground 60-1507 motion and a contemporaneous motion for formal appointment. The district court never made the 22-4506(d)(2) findings and dismissed with prejudice on the strength of a pro se letter from Kleypas; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the dismissal 'violated Kleypas' statutory right to counsel under K.S.A. 22-4506(d).' Capital Habeas Office lawyers then briefed the appeal. CAVEAT ON CAPACITY: BIDS's own FY 2027 budget narrative to the Kansas Division of the Budget lists the Capital Habeas Office's Chief Public Defender as 'Vacant' as of FY 2025 — the office is funded and staffed but its chief position is unfilled — and states that as death penalty cases move into the habeas stage the work was historically contracted out to private counsel and has only partly been 'brought back in house as part of the Capital Habeas Office.'	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-4506(d) Case: Kleypas v. State, 522 P.3d 304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022) SBIDS assigned Paul S. McCausland of Young Bogle McCausland Wells & Blanchard P.A. and Julia Spainhour of the Kansas Capital Habeas Defender Office to prepare a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on Kleypas' behalf. View the source document
Kentucky Office operating verified	The mechanism functions: DPA lawyers do in fact carry Kentucky capital collateral cases, and have for decades. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427 (Ky. 2011) traces a man 'sentenced to death for the two murders' through DPA representation on direct appeal, then an RCr 11.42 motion filed in 1993 by DPA, then a CR 60.02 motion litigated on appeal by an assistant public advocate. The 1996 four-defendant Bowling opinion lists 'Karl R. Keys, Capital Post-Conviction Unit, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort' for two death-sentenced appellants. What the mechanism does NOT do is engage automatically. DPA's own public guidance to prisoners states: 'However, Kentucky does not automatically appoint an attorney to your case. Instead, you must file your own motion called a "pro se" motion, and also ask for a lawyer to be appointed to your case,' and directs that 'In order to get an attorney appointed to represent you in a post-conviction matter, the defendant must first file a pro se post-conviction motion with the court, along with a motion requesting the court to appoint DPA Post-Conviction Branch to the case' with an affidavit of indigency (https://dpa.ky.gov/kentucky-department-of-public-advocacy/about-dpa/post-trial/ptfaqs/). So the practical picture for a Kentucky capital prisoner is a funded, competent state office that will litigate the case — reached only after the prisoner himself drafts and files the initial motion within the three-year window, and (under Fraser) formally compelled to be appointed only if the case reaches an evidentiary hearing. We found no source stating the office is unfunded or vacant; DPA reported a $74.5M FY22 budget and staffed post-trial branches.	Source Case: Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427 (Ky. 2011) In 1993, again represented by the DPA, including attorneys who had participated in his direct appeal, Appellant filed a RCr 11.42 motion in the trial court seeking post-conviction relief View the source document
Louisiana Applied example verified	The mechanism operates through the Louisiana Supreme Court's standing capital decretal. In State v. Clark, 2012-KA-0508 (La. 6/26/19), affirming a death sentence, the court directed the trial judge — on receiving notice of finality of direct appeal and before signing an execution warrant — to notify the state defender agency and give it reasonable time to enroll state post-conviction counsel under La. R.S. 15:178 and to litigate the application expeditiously. The same directive appears in the court's earlier capital opinions (e.g., State v. Clark (La. 12/19/16)); it names the Louisiana Public Defender Board and the pre-2025 'if appropriate' language, both since superseded by Acts 2024, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 22 (office of the state public defender) and Acts 2025, No. 393 (30-day, unqualified duty). State v. Chester, 27 So. 3d 837 (La. 2010), shows the right being litigated in practice: a death-row prisoner had appointed and pro bono post-conviction counsel, was refused substitute counsel (no right to a particular attorney), and the court remanded to determine whether he could waive the statutory right and proceed pro se. CAPACITY CAVEAT, on the face of the statute rather than from advocacy: the legislature in 2025 enacted La. R.S. 15:169(C), which presupposes that in a given fiscal year the state public defender may determine 'that insufficient funds exist to provide counsel for these cases' and lets him seek case-by-case supplemental appropriations from the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget out of the Overcollections Fund. We found no state authority stating the capital post-conviction unit is vacant or unfunded, and we did not treat press reporting on the 2024-25 defender restructuring as a source.	Source Statute / rule: La. R.S. 15:178; La. R.S. 15:169(C) Case: State v. Clark, 2012-KA-0508 (La. 6/26/19) immediately notify the Louisiana Public Defender Board and provide the Board with reasonable time in which: (1) to enroll counsel to represent the defendant in any state post-conviction proceedings, if appropriate, pursuant to its authority under La.R.S. 15:178 View the source document
Maine No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Maine to describe: capital punishment was abandoned in 1887 (P.L. 1887, ch. 133, § 1) and no one has since been under sentence of death. 'Capital offense' survives in Maine law only as a vestigial category — Me. Const. art. We, § 10 denies bail as of right for crimes 'which now are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of the Constitution, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, whatever the punishment of the crimes may be,' and Me. Const. art. We, § 7 requires indictment for a 'capital or infamous crime.' In Harnish the Law Court applied that bail clause to a murder indictee and, in its own bracketed interpolation into a quoted 1853 treatise passage about forfeiting bail 'to save his life,' spelled out what is actually at stake in a Maine murder case today: imprisonment, not death. A Maine prisoner serving the state's most severe sentence who seeks collateral relief uses the ordinary machinery — affidavit of indigency under 15 M.R.S. § 2129(1)(B) and assignment of counsel from the PDS Post-Conviction Review panel.	Source Statute / rule: Me. Const. art. I, § 10 Case: Harnish v. State, 531 A.2d 1264 (Me. 1987) There is nothing that a man may not be induced to forfeit to save his life [or in Maine, to save himself from a prison sentence of at least 25 years and potentially for life] View the source document
Maryland Office operating verified	Nothing operates today — Maryland has no one under sentence of death, so the question is historical. When the mechanism did operate, it operated: in Grandison v. State, 425 Md. 34 (2012), a capital petitioner's first post-conviction proceedings were conducted with counsel appointed by the Public Defender (his 2007 counsel of record, Gary Proctor and Michael Lawlor, were "each appointed by the Public Defender," and the OPD's Capital Division decided on replacement counsel after he moved to discharge them). The Court of Appeals held that the § 7-108 right covers the petition itself but not later collateral motions: on a motion to reopen, § 7-108(b)(1) leaves counsel to the court's discretion, and the court affirmed the denial of appointed counsel for Grandison's motions even though it was a capital case. The last death sentences were commuted in January 2015 (Grandison v. State, 234 Md. App. 564 (2017)).	Source Case: Grandison v. State, 425 Md. 34, 38 A.3d 352 (2012) he was represented by counsel throughout his criminal trial, direct appeal, resentencing, and first set of postconviction proceedings View the source document
Massachusetts No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice to describe: Massachusetts has had no enforceable death penalty since October 18, 1984 and no one under sentence of death. What operates in fact for any prisoner — including a first-degree murder ('capital case' in the Massachusetts statutory sense) prisoner — is discretionary appointment under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5). Mains v. Commonwealth is an applied example: the prisoner sought appointed counsel for a new-trial motion, the judge did not appoint, and the SJC held there was no entitlement. The rule as quoted by the SJC reads as set out here. Separately, the death-penalty machinery of G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 (including § 71's automatic SJC review of a death sentence) is still printed in the General Laws but is a dead letter and contains no post-conviction counsel provision.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(5) Case: Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) The judge in his discretion may assign or appoint counsel in accordance with the provisions of these rules to represent a defendant in the preparation and presentation of motions filed under subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule View the source document
Michigan No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice to describe. The Michigan Supreme Court stated in 2022 that Michigan was the first state to abolish the death penalty, that abolition came a decade after statehood (1837), and that the last execution under Michigan law was in 1830; the Court described mandatory life without parole as 'the most severe sentence available in Michigan.' The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc in a federal capital case arising from a Michigan murder, likewise treated Michigan as 'a State that lacks the death penalty.' No Michigan court has ever had occasion to appoint capital post-conviction counsel.	Source Case: People v Parks, Docket No. 162086 (Mich, July 28, 2022) (slip op at 24 & n 10) Michigan was the first state in the nation to abolish the death penalty; it was abolished a decade after the state was admitted to the Union. The last execution to take place under Michigan law was in 1830. View the source document
Minnesota No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice to describe: no Minnesota offense carries death. Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1 exhaustively lists the sentences a court may impose on a felony conviction — life imprisonment, a fixed term of years, a fine, restitution, a local correctional fee — and death is not among them; Minn. Stat. § 609.185 fixes life imprisonment for murder in the first degree. The operative change is on the books as a session law: Laws of Minnesota 1911, ch. 387 (H.F. No. 2) amended R.L. 1905 § 4876 so that first-degree murder 'shall be punishable by imprisonment for life in the state prison,' with the marginal heading quoted below, approved April 22, 1911. Consequently the only postconviction representation that operates in fact for Minnesota's most serious offenders (life and life-without-release prisoners) is the general appellate public defender mechanism of §§ 590.05 and 611.25, subject to the Board of Public Defense's appropriation cap in § 611.27, subd. 7.	Source Statute / rule: Laws of Minnesota 1911, ch. 387 (H.F. No. 2), approved April 22, 1911; Minn. Stat. §§ 609.10, subd. 1, 609.185 Murder in first degree punishment by imprisonment for life. View the source document
Mississippi Office operating verified	The mechanism operates and is funded. The Mississippi Attorney General's Oct. 6, 2025 application to the U.S. Attorney General for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 2265 walks through a live application of the rule: after Godbolt v. State, 407 So. 3d 86 (Miss. 2024), the mandate issued April 30, 2025, and within two weeks the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered CPCC to appoint counsel and directed the trial court to determine indigence; the trial court held a hearing on July 10, 2025, confirmed indigence, and accepted Godbolt's election to be represented by CPCC. The same document reports that since the office's creation the State is aware of no eligible petitioner who declined CPCC as initial post-conviction counsel, and that CPCC has handled nearly all initial capital PCR cases except two conflict cases and a few associations of outside counsel. CPCC's own site and its FY2026-2030 strategic plan describe a staff of five attorneys, two mitigation specialists, one investigator and an office administrator (nine PIN positions), with the plan noting that staff instability 'has been lacking in this Office's history' but that 'Staff is now stabilized.' This is a state AG advocacy filing seeking Chapter 154 opt-in status; it is cited here for its description of Mississippi's own mechanism, and no view is expressed on whether DOJ granted certification.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9); Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1)(ii) Case: Godbolt v. State, 407 So. 3d 86 (Miss. 2024) (direct appeal); Order, Godbolt v. State, No. 2025-DR-00524-SCT (Miss. May 12, 2025) Within two weeks, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(9) and Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(c)(1)(ii), the Court ordered CPCC to appoint counsel to represent Godbolt in post-conviction proceedings and directed the trial court to determine Godbolt's indigence and desire for representation. View the source document
Missouri Office operating verified	The mechanism operates in fact, and the reported litigation is about the ADEQUACY of the funding rather than its existence. In Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004) — a Rule 29.15 proceeding by a movant sentenced to death — the Supreme Court of Missouri recorded that although Hutchison had retained private counsel at trial, 'he was represented by the public defender's office throughout the postconviction and appellate proceedings.' Hutchison then litigated a Rule 29.16(d) claim that the state public defender had failed to fund his post-conviction investigation: he asked MSPD for $15,000 to investigate his life history and received about $7,500. The Court rejected the claim on the ground that claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel are categorically unreviewable (citing State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 871 (Mo. banc 1992)), noting the motion court's finding that post-conviction counsel had in fact spent over $27,000 on expert testimony. The Court granted penalty-phase relief on other grounds. Two lessons for a comparative table: Missouri's capital post-conviction counsel provision is real and used, but the state supplies no judicially enforceable guarantee that the appointed lawyer performs adequately, and the litigation-expense entitlement in R. 29.16(d) is administered by MSPD rather than by the court.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(d) Case: Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004) (No. SC 85548) Hutchison was represented by private attorneys at his trial but he was represented by the public defender's office throughout the postconviction and appellate proceedings. View the source document
Montana Not established verified	The mechanism is real and state-funded, but essentially untested — and that should be stated plainly rather than dressed up. Standing machinery exists: under Standard V of AF 97-326 the Clerk of the Montana Supreme Court maintains a registry of counsel qualified under the standards and available for capital appointment, which district courts may draw on, though the order expressly places the duty to verify qualifications on the appointing district court. OPD is a functioning statewide agency, not a vacant or unfunded office. However, we found NO reported Montana decision applying § 46-21-201(3): a full-text search of the published-opinion record for '46-21-201(3)' returns three Montana Supreme Court results, two of which are the Court's own standards orders (1999, 2002) and one of which (State v. Sullivan, 285 Mont. 235 (1997)) is unrelated to capital post-conviction counsel. Montana's most recent reported capital post-conviction decision is Smith v. State, 2000 MT 327, 303 Mont. 47, 15 P.3d 395, in which Ronald Allen Smith — sentenced to death a third time in 1995, certiorari denied 1997 — petitioned in November 1998 and was dismissed on procedural-bar grounds; that opinion does not discuss appointment of counsel, so it cannot be cited as an application of the provision. A search of Montana Supreme Court opinions filed after 2001 for capital post-conviction returned none. The straightforward explanation is volume, not dysfunction: only two men remain under sentence of death (Smith and William Gollehon), both sentenced long before the 1997 enactment, and no new Montana death sentence has produced a first capital post-conviction petition since.	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3)(b), (3)(e) Case: Mont. Sup. Ct. Order AF 97-326, Standard V (registry of qualified capital counsel) For the convenience of the district courts, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall maintain a registry of counsel who are qualified under these standards, who are available for appointment in capital cases View the source document
Nebraska Applied example verified	The discretionary mechanism does operate for death-sentenced prisoners, and Nebraska appellate review has teeth — but it is court-by-court, not automatic. In State v. Mata, the district court denied death-sentenced prisoner Raymond Mata both an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel without ever determining whether his motion presented 'any justiciable issue which would entitle Mata to appointment of counsel.' In Mata III, 280 Neb. 849 (2010), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that an abuse of discretion, reversed, and remanded 'with directions to appoint Mata counsel'; counsel was appointed a week after the mandate issued. The contrast with State v. Trail, 319 Neb. 84 (2025) is the point: Trail also got appointed post-conviction counsel — twice, after his first appointee withdrew — yet his petition was dismissed as untimely because the one-year clock never stopped for the appointment. On the office side, the NCPA's capital litigation division is real and staffed, not a paper agency: its 2024-2025 annual report records representation of indigent defendants 'at trial, on direct appeal, and in postconviction,' four pending cases in which the State is seeking death, and long-running post-conviction representation (e.g. State v. Jack Harris, Douglas County, appointed 2002 and litigated continuously since). But it is a small agency funded solely from a $3-per-filing court fee — $883,458.83 in total revenue for FY 2024-2025 across all divisions and all its statutory functions — and it accepts appointments only subject to its own caseload standards.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 Case: State v. Mata, 304 Neb. 326 (2019) (recounting State v. Mata, 280 Neb. 849 (2010) (Mata III)) The mandate in Mata III was issued on March 8, 2011, and Mata was appointed postconviction counsel on March 15. View the source document
Nevada Applied example verified	The mechanism demonstrably operates. In McNelton v. State the Nevada Supreme Court recorded that the death-sentenced petitioner filed a proper-person (pro se) post-conviction habeas petition on August 6, 1996, that counsel was appointed thereafter under NRS 34.820(1)(a), and that the appointment being mandatory carried with it an entitlement to effective assistance of that post-conviction counsel. That consequence — a state-law right to effective post-conviction counsel flowing from the statutory mandate — was established in Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303, 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997), which held that 'a petitioner who has counsel appointed by statutory mandate is entitled to effective assistance of that counsel,' expressly contrasting counsel 'appointed pursuant to the court's discretion.' The McNelton sequence also illustrates the practical gap flagged in the deadline cell: the prisoner filed unrepresented and counsel followed.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.820(1)(a) Case: McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 990 P.2d 1263 (1999); Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997) Apparently, post-conviction counsel was appointed in late 1996 or early 1997 pursuant to NRS 34.820(l)(a), so McNelton was entitled to effective assistance of that counsel. View the source document
New Hampshire Not established verified	The mechanism has apparently never been used. New Hampshire's only person under sentence of death, Michael Addison, commenced state habeas corpus in Merrimack County Superior Court on December 16, 2016 (Addison v. Zenk, No. 217-2016-CV-00726), amended it in 2020 to raise repeal-based claims, and after dismissal is now before the New Hampshire Supreme Court on a Rule 11 original-jurisdiction petition, No. 2025-0273, argued March 26, 2026. His counsel of record on that brief are private lawyers — Jonathan Cohen of Cohen and Winters, PLLC (Concord) and Michael Wiseman and Jon Cioschi of Wiseman, Schwartz, Cioschi & Trama (Philadelphia), both admitted pro hac vice — not the New Hampshire Public Defender and not any capital post-conviction office. The filings before me do not state whether that representation was court-appointed and Judicial Council-funded or privately arranged, and no reported New Hampshire decision appointing counsel under RSA 604-A:2, we in a capital case was located. Separately, the NH Public Defender's contract with the Judicial Council carves out trial-level capital cases (as documented in the Sixth Amendment Center's 2022 report on the right to counsel in New Hampshire — a secondary source, flagged as such).	Source Case: Petition of Michael Addison, No. 2025-0273 (N.H., argued Mar. 26, 2026), from Addison v. Zenk, No. 217-2016-CV-00726 (N.H. Super. Ct., Merrimack Cty.) On December 16, 2016, Mr. Addison commenced habeas corpus proceedings challenging his conviction and sentence in Merrimack County Superior Court. View the source document
New Jersey No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in New Jersey and no one to whom it could apply. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619, 624 (2009), recites that the Legislature eliminated the death penalty on December 17, 2007 and that the Governor had commuted the death sentences of the eight capital defendants then on death row to life without parole the day before. That commutation mattered: L.2007, c.204 did not convert existing death sentences automatically — the new N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b required each death-sentenced inmate to move for resentencing within 60 days and waive further sentencing appeals, failing which 'the inmate shall remain under the sentence of death previously imposed.' The executive commutations closed that gap. As to how the mechanism had operated before abolition, the Public Defender told the Death Penalty Study Commission in January 2007 that 'Since 1982, the Public Defender's Office has dedicated itself to providing the highest level of legal representation to its clients facing the death penalty at both the trial and post-conviction stages' (Report at 88), with a capital caseload of 19 cases as of August 2006 run by a Director of Capital Litigation (Report at 31). Both the unit and the caseload are gone.	Source Statute / rule: N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b Case: State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619 (2009) The previous day, the Governor commuted the death sentences to life without parole for the eight capital defendants then on death row. View the source document
New Mexico Office operating verified	The mechanism is on the books and unamended, but currently dormant: New Mexico has had no one under sentence of death since June 28, 2019, so Rule 5-802(L) has no one to operate on. Before that it did operate. In Fry v. Lopez and Allen v. LeMaster, 2019-NMSC-013, the Supreme Court recorded that the two men on death row were litigating state habeas claims in district court — 'Petitioners' cases were in postconviction habeas proceedings when the Legislature repealed the death penalty effective July 1, 2009' — and that each 'appeals now to this Court from his ongoing pursuit of state habeas corpus claims in district court.' Both were represented by counsel of record throughout (Kathleen McGarry and Jacquelyn Robins for Fry; Melissa Hill and Ray Twohig for Allen), and the district court granted them interlocutory appeals and stayed their executions. The Court then vacated both death sentences as statutorily disproportionate and remanded for life sentences. Timothy Allen's capital habeas litigation had already reached the Supreme Court once on discovery and privilege questions, Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, 267 P.3d 806 (we could not fetch that opinion's text — see notes). We found no decision or order construing Rule 5-802(L)(1) itself, and no evidence of an unfunded or vacant capital post-conviction office, because no such office was ever created.	Source Case: Fry v. Lopez, 2019-NMSC-013, 447 P.3d 1086 Petitioners' cases were in postconviction habeas proceedings when the Legislature repealed the death penalty effective July 1, 2009. View the source document
New York Office operating verified	The mechanism exists on paper but its administering office is gone and there is no client population. The New York State Archives' authority record for the Capital Defender Office states the office 'operated from 1995 to 2007,' that its Rochester branch closed October 31, 2005 and its Albany and New York City branches closed June 13, 2008, and that because the Legislature never revised the death penalty statute after People v. LaValle 'there were no additional death penalty cases in the State of New York.' we read both controlling decisions directly: LaValle held 'the jury deadlock instruction prescribed in CPL 400.27 (10) is unconstitutional under article we, § 6 of the State Constitution' and that the defect 'can only be cured by a new deadlock instruction from the Legislature' (3 N.Y.3d 88, 90 (2004)); Taylor held that 'under the doctrine of stare decisis, defendant's death sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for resentencing' (9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007)), ending the state's last death sentence. We searched the published-opinion record for New York opinions combining Judiciary Law § 35-b, the Capital Defender Office and CPL 440.10 and found NO reported decision appointing counsel under § 35-b(2) for an initial capital post-conviction motion; we do not claim none ever occurred, only that we found none. So: statutory entitlement intact, standards rule intact, appropriation and office defunct, zero eligible clients.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(3), (4) ('Within the amounts appropriated therefor') Case: People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004); People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007) The Rochester branch office of the Capital Defender Office was closed on October 31, 2005 and the Albany and New York City branch offices were closed on June 13, 2008. View the source document
North Carolina Office operating verified	The mechanism is funded and operating, not a paper right. IDS's annual report to the General Assembly under § 7A-498.9 for FY 2020-21 reports 179 assigned-private-counsel cases in the combined 'Capital appeals/post-conviction' category at a total cost of $1,068,413 (Appendix B, Cost and Case Data), and describes active management of these cases as a cost-control measure — the quoted passage. The N.C. Supreme Court has described § 7A-451(c) as mandatory in substance: in State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29 (1998), reading the 1996 'Act to Expedite the Postconviction Process in North Carolina,' the Court listed among its capital-only provisions one that 'requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants, N.C.G.S. § 7A-451(c),' alongside the 120-day MAR limit and the § 15A-1415(f) complete-files discovery right. (Bates construed the pre-IDS version; the 2000 IDS Act and the 2009 addition of § 7A-451(c1) moved the appointing authority to IDS without disturbing the two-counsel requirement.) LIMIT WORTH REPORTING: the entitlement covers the first post-conviction round only. An IDS policy effective August 9, 2024 requires appointed counsel to obtain the IDS Director's pre-approval, on a showing of claims warranting investigation, before being compensated from IDS funds for investigating or litigating a SUCCESSOR MAR for a client under sentence of death; the Director 'may… Direct that counsel will not be compensated for services performed or expenses incurred.' That policy was first adopted in 2010, rescinded in July 2019, and reinstated in 2024.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-498.9 (annual report); IDS Policy 04.01.07 (eff. 2024-08-09) Case: State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276 (1998) IDS has increased oversight of expensive capital post-conviction cases to provide safeguards against unexpected costs. This oversight includes a pre-budgeting procedure for new counsel and a second level of review of requests for expert authorizations. View the source document
North Dakota No death penalty verified	The capital mechanism does not operate at all, because no one can be under a North Dakota state sentence of death. The last state execution was John Rooney's hanging in 1905; the legislature retroactively abolished the penalty for most offenses in 1915 and abolished it for all state crimes in the 1973 criminal code recodification, effective July 1, 1975. The North Dakota Supreme Court's official history (by Justice Dale V. Sandstrom) records that the only modern capital trial arising in the state — the Alfonso Rodriguez case — was prosecuted in FEDERAL court in Fargo, where counsel comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and not from any state provision. There is accordingly no state decision appointing capital post-conviction counsel, no enabling statute for a capital defender office, and no court order creating one.	Source Although the hanging of John Rooney in 1905 was the last state-sanctioned execution in North Dakota, the Alfonso Rodriguez case in federal court in Fargo is not the first capital trial in the state since then. View the source document
Ohio Applied example verified	The mechanism demonstrably operates. In State v. Ahmed, 2023-Ohio-3464 (7th Dist.), the Belmont County Common Pleas Court appointed capital-certified attorney Kimberly Shank under R.C. 2953.21(J) to pursue a serious-mental-illness post-conviction petition for a death-sentenced petitioner; when the trial court later revoked the appointment (finding Ahmed competent to reject counsel) and denied all fees, the court of appeals reversed, holding the appointment itself 'gave rise to her entitlement to payment for services rendered on that petition' and remanding with instructions to grant the fee application. The counterweight is scope, not funding: in State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844 (10th Dist.), a death-sentenced petitioner was denied appointed counsel for a THIRD post-conviction petition, the court holding the statutory right reaches only a timely initial petition. No unfunded or vacant office was found — Ohio has no standalone capital PC office to be vacant; compensation is county-paid at council-set rates with state reimbursement capped by appropriation (R.C. 120.34(A)).	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(1) Case: State v. Ahmed, 2023-Ohio-3464 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Sept. 27, 2023) With these filings before it, the trial court appointed Attorney Shank to View the source document
Oklahoma Office operating verified	The mechanism operates, and the OCCA polices it. In Stouffer v. State, 2007 OK CR 4, a death-sentenced petitioner obtained a district-court finding that he had knowingly waived counsel and his appointed capital post-conviction lawyer moved to withdraw; the OCCA denied both the pro se motion and the withdrawal, holding that the State's interest in 'requiring him to accept representation by an attorney schooled in the complexities of collateral capital post-conviction appeals' outweighed his interest in self-representation, and describing OIDS as the agency charged with representing all indigent capital post-conviction applicants, citing § 1089(B). Reported capital PC opinions routinely list OIDS lawyers as counsel of record (e.g., Randy A. Bauman, Deputy Division Chief, Capital Post-Conviction, OIDS, in Hatch v. State, 924 P.2d 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) and Rojem v. State, 925 P.2d 70 (1996); Wyndi Thomas Hobbs, OIDS, in Davis v. State, 2005 OK CR 21). The agency is funded and staffed for the work rather than existing only on paper: its FY 2026 Budget Performance Review to the Legislature states its mission as 'providing trial, appellate, and capital post-conviction criminal defense services to persons who have been judicially determined to be entitled to legal counsel at State expense,' with the Appellate East and West divisions carrying that function on state appropriations. One caveat: on SUBSEQUENT applications the petitioner is not always OIDS-represented — in Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11 (second application) counsel of record were private/outside counsel in Oklahoma City, not identified as OIDS.	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) Case: Stouffer v. State, 2007 OK CR 4, ¶ 7, 154 P.3d 88 the lawyers and investigators of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System; the agency charged with representing all indigent capital post-conviction applicants. View the source document
Oregon Applied example verified	Applied example: Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 333 P3d 288 (2014) — the petitioner was convicted of eight counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, and was represented by appointed counsel throughout his state post-conviction trial and appeal; the Oregon Supreme Court describes ORS 138.590 (PCHA § 9) as one of two provisions 'requiring that indigent petitioners be provided with counsel,' and holds that a represented petitioner may not also litigate pro se. The mechanism therefore operated in fact for a death-sentenced petitioner, through court-appointed counsel paid by the state defender agency rather than through a capital-specific office. Current caveat: since Governor Brown's commutations took effect December 14, 2022 there is no one in Oregon under sentence of death, so the capital-specific subsections of ORS 138.590 presently have no subjects; petitioners whose convictions were capital now litigate post-conviction while serving life without parole.	Source Case: Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 333 P3d 288 (2014) petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner was represented by counsel. View the source document
Pennsylvania Applied example verified	The mechanism demonstrably operates. In Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015), after the Supreme Court affirmed Staton's death sentence and he filed a pro se PCRA petition, the Blair County PCRA court appointed Timothy Burns, Esquire, to represent him; the same opinion records that at trial 'five separate attorneys' were appointed and replaced as each was found to lack the Rule 801 capital qualifications, and it quotes Rule 904(H)(1) as the governing appointment provision (counsel was ultimately held forfeited after Staton assaulted appointed counsel in the courtroom). Two practical qualifications a careful reader needs: (a) compensation of appointed capital PCRA counsel is a county charge — Pennsylvania provided no state indigent-defense money at all until the $7.5 million first appropriated in the 2023-24 budget, and none of it is earmarked for capital post-conviction; and (b) much of the actual capital PCRA workload is carried by the federally funded Capital Habeas Unit of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, whose appearances in state PCRA proceedings the Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought to bar (In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia, 790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015)). That federal resource is not a Pennsylvania state mechanism and is not counted as one here.	Source Case: Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015) Timothy Burns, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant. View the source document
Rhode Island No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Rhode Island to describe — no one has been under a Rhode Island sentence of death since the mandatory death sentence was struck from the murder statute in 1984. The generally applicable mechanism, however, is live and enforced. In Pona v. State (R.we. Feb. 3, 2025), the Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed Superior Court orders summarily dismissing a first-time indigent applicant's post-conviction applications because no hearing had established that his pro se appearance was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his § 10-9.1-5 right to counsel; the Court reaffirmed Campbell v. State that 'counsel must be appointed prior to summary dismissal of even a seemingly meritless application.' The applicant on review was represented by the Rhode Island Public Defender, per the opinion's cover sheet. So the office is funded, staffed, and actually appearing — it simply has no capital docket.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 Case: Pona v. State, No. 2022-150-M.P. (R.I. Feb. 3, 2025) 10-9.1-5 cannot be satisfied with anything less than a meaningful attorney-client relationship between appointed counsel and his or her client. View the source document
South Carolina Applied example verified	The mechanism demonstrably operates, and a controlling decision shows both its application and a long period of under-enforcement of its qualification standard. In Robertson v. State the Supreme Court stayed the execution so Robertson could pursue PCR, appointed a circuit judge to preside, and that judge appointed two lawyers (Michael Langford Brown, Jr. and Joseph D. Matlock) to represent him — appointment thus occurred in September 2005, before the March 2006 application was filed. Robertson later showed that neither appointed lawyer met § 17-27-160(B); the PCR court, relying on an August 13, 2003 memorandum from Chief Justice Toal circulated to all circuit judges (which had told judges that anyone qualified to try a capital case and current on CLE was qualified for capital PCR), rejected the challenge. The Supreme Court reversed in 2016, holding that reading wrong and that an allegation of unqualified capital PCR counsel is itself a 'sufficient reason' permitting a successive application under § 17-27-90. Structurally, representation is by court-appointed private counsel at § 16-3-26 rates rather than by an institutional office: the S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense's Capital Trial Division reported to the House Legislative Oversight Committee that its 'primary mission… is to undertake direct representation of indigent defendants facing a death penalty prosecution in South Carolina at the trial level,' with three attorneys — it is not a post-conviction office.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B) Case: Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016) Based on our construction of section 17-27-160(B), we find the PCR judge erred in ruling that compliance with section 17-27-160(B) only required capital PCR counsel to have capital trial experience. View the source document
South Dakota Not established verified	In fact, South Dakota's one death-sentenced prisoner has had appointed counsel in state habeas, but by ordinary discretionary appointment, not by any capital mechanism. Briley Piper — 'on death row in South Dakota for 20 years' per the Eighth Circuit (Piper v. A.G. of S.D., No. 25-2617, 8th Cir. May 4, 2026, at 3) — litigated two state habeas rounds; his brief to the South Dakota Supreme Court in his second capital habeas (No. 28153, decided as Piper v. Young, 2019 S.D. 65) records that court-appointed substitute counsel took over the habeas appeal (quoted). The counterweight is that the same statute routinely produces NO lawyer: in Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38 (June 17, 2026), the habeas court dismissed a ten-ground application 'without a hearing or the appointment of counsel' after telling the applicant appointment 'will be addressed in accordance with SDCL 21-27-4 if your grounds for relief are not frivolous'; the Supreme Court affirmed, with one justice dissenting who would have remanded to appoint counsel. Nothing in the record we could locate distinguishes a capital applicant from Guzman under the statute — a death-sentenced South Dakotan's counsel depends on the habeas judge's necessity finding and on the committing county's willingness to pay. The Piper citation is a party brief filed in and published by the South Dakota Supreme Court, not a judicial holding; flagged as such.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-4 Case: Piper v. Young, 2019 S.D. 65 (No. 28153); Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38 Substitute counsel was appointed and reviewed the Certificate of Probable Cause. View the source document
Tennessee Office operating verified	The mechanism is funded, staffed, and federally certified as operating. On July 10, 2026 the U.S. Attorney General published in the Federal Register a certification under 28 U.S.C. § 2265 that Tennessee has an established capital post-conviction counsel mechanism meeting chapter 154's requirements, and has had one continuously since July 1, 1997 — resting on Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 and the OPCD statutes. That notice records that 'Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 provides for court-ordered appointment of postconviction counsel for indigent prisoners under sentence of death,' and that representation is 'normally provided by salaried post-conviction defenders.' OPCD's own account states it opened April 1, 1996 and now has nineteen employees — a director, eight assistant post-conviction defenders, four investigators, four paralegals, an administrative assistant and an office administrator — with three of nine Oversight Commission seats currently vacant. TWO LIMITS a hostile reader should see: (1) in Holton v. State, 201 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court held OPCD may NOT initiate a post-conviction action for a death-sentenced inmate who has not signed and verified the petition — § 40-30-206(a) 'extends only to those who are unable to secure counsel and who the court determines requires the appointment of counsel' — so a prisoner who declines to file gets no counsel; (2) OPCD assistance before a petition is filed is informal, since the Rule 28 appointment right does not attach until after filing.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-205 to -209 Case: Holton v. State, 201 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006) I determine and certify that Tennessee has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in state postconviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death View the source document
Texas Office operating verified	The mechanism operates in fact. In Ex parte Medina (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) the convicting court had timely appointed habeas counsel, counsel filed a document the CCA held was not a cognizable art. 11.071 application, and the CCA proceeded under § 4A(b) to appoint the state capital post-conviction defender office (then the Office of Capital Writs) and reset the 180-day filing clock — i.e., both the appointment duty and the appointment-triggered deadline were enforced by the court. OCFW itself is funded and staffed, describing itself as 'the post-conviction public defender for the State of Texas,' operating since 2010. The weak point is the fallback pool, not the entitlement: the OCFW director's written testimony to the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence (posted in the Legislature's 86R handouts, 2020 interim) reported that when OCFW cannot take a case, private counsel is appointed from the presiding judges' list and 'there are currently just 14 different attorneys on this list,' 11 of whom accept appointments statewide.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 4A(b) Case: Ex parte Medina, 361 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) Under that section we shall appoint new counsel, specifically the Office of Capital Writs, to represent applicant. We establish a new filing date for the application to be filed in the convicting court as being 180 days from the date of this order. View the source document
Utah Applied example verified	The mechanism funds real capital post-conviction litigation, and the reported friction is over the SIZE of the funding, not its existence. In Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the post-conviction court's denial of ADDITIONAL PCRA funding and recounted what had already been paid: the court described the § 78B-9-202(3) presumptive limits then in force ($60,000 fees / $20,000 costs) and found that Menzies's lead post-conviction counsel had been paid over $194,000 and allowed over $60,000 in litigation expenses — more than three times the presumptive cap — funding investigators, experts, and interviews of prior counsel, before the court began limiting further requests as duplicative or speculative (¶¶ 37–39). The same opinion marks the statutory, non-constitutional character of the entitlement: it notes that 'post-conviction petitioners are neither entitled to counsel nor funding for counsel' as a matter of federal constitutional law, and quotes § 78B-9-202(4)'s bar on ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claims — a provision the legislature added in 2008 in response to Menzies v. Galetka (Menzies III), 2006 UT 81, which had recognized a statutory right to effective post-conviction counsel. The current text is only months old (effective 5/6/2026); no published decision applying the new automatic-appointment procedure or the Supreme Court's new qualified-counsel list was found.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(3) (as applied) Case: Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶¶ 37–38, 344 P.3d 581 his lead counsel was paid over $194,000 and permitted over $60,000 in litigation expenses View the source document
Vermont No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Vermont to observe, and no unfunded or vacant office either — the category does not exist. The Legislature's own account of the 2024 repeal, in the Office of Legislative Counsel's summary of Act 161 (H.878), describes the act as 'repealing the Vermont statutes related to capital punishment, which have been unconstitutional and unenforceable since 1972.' The operative text bears that out: Sec. 7 of the act amended 13 V.S.A. § 3401 so that a person convicted of treason 'shall suffer the punishment of death be imprisoned for not less than 25 years with a maximum term of life' (strike-and-insert as printed in the enrolled act), and Sec. 8 repealed 13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107 — sentence and warrant, pardon, place of execution, manner of confinement, persons present at execution, manner of execution, and returns of the Commissioner. Long before that, the Vermont Supreme Court had already described the death penalty as gone for practical purposes: in State v. Pray it wrote that 'A capital offense is one in which the death penalty may be inflicted, and Vermont has abolished the death penalty except in certain cases not here applicable. 13 V.S.A. § 2303.' What operates in fact for Vermont prisoners seeking collateral relief is the ordinary machinery — a § 7131 petition for review litigated by the Office of the Defender General or by state-paid assigned counsel under 13 V.S.A. §§ 5205, 5232(2), 5233(a)(3) and 7137. TRAP FOR THE UNWARY: capital defense litigation has occurred in Vermont, but only in federal court (United States v. Fell, D. Vt., nine published opinions on the published-opinion record between 2002 and 2016), where counsel is supplied by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005 and 3599 — a federal mechanism that is not a Vermont state mechanism and must not be counted as one.	Source Statute / rule: 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.) (H.878), §§ 7-8, eff. June 6, 2024 Case: State v. Pray, 133 Vt. 537, 346 A.2d 227 (1975) repealing the Vermont statutes related to capital punishment, which have been unconstitutional and unenforceable since 1972 View the source document
Virginia No death penalty verified	The repealed mechanism did operate in fact while it existed: in Anthony Juniper's capital state habeas the Supreme Court of Virginia let conflicted habeas counsel withdraw, appointed replacement counsel, and gave 60 days to amend the petition. Nothing comparable can happen now. The 2021 act converted every unexecuted death sentence to life without parole by operation of law (cl. 3) and forbids any future death sentence (cl. 4), so no one is under sentence of death and no capital post-conviction proceeding can arise. The Fourth Circuit confirmed both the conversion and the statutory repeal in Juniper's subsequent federal case: 'On July 1, 2021, however, his sentence was commuted to life without parole after Virginia abolished the death penalty by legislation,' and, as to the capital habeas deadline statute, 'The Virginia General Assembly repealed that statute when it abolished the death penalty.' Note: any counsel Juniper had in federal habeas came from 18 U.S.C. § 3599, which is NOT a state mechanism and is not counted here.	Source Case: Juniper v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, Record No. 062556 (Va. Mar. 4, 2011), 707 S.E.2d 290 On March 2, 2007, this Court granted counsel's request to withdraw, appointed new counsel, and granted petitioner 60 days in which to file an amended petition, if necessary. View the source document
Washington Applied example verified	The mechanism was real and used. In the capital PRP of Cecil Emile Davis the Washington Supreme Court described its own action: after affirming the death sentence on direct appeal it appointed collateral-attack counsel and fixed the PRP filing date by order. Justice Gordon McCloud's concurrence in the same case describes the machinery from the inside — 'it's an exceptional case in which we, ourselves, are responsible for petitioner's counsel — we maintain the list of qualified counsel, and we appoint qualified counsel from that list' — and litigates whether the two lawyers appointed satisfied RAP 16.25's experience requirement, which shows the standard was applied, not nominal. The mechanism is now defunct in fact as well as on paper: no one is under sentence of death in Washington (all death sentences were converted to life in 2018), the death-penalty statutes were repealed in 2023, and the appointment rule was rescinded effective September 1, 2026.	Source Case: In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, No. 89590-2 (Wash. May 18, 2017) (slip op.) After our opinion was released, we appointed counsel for Davis's collateral attack against his death sentence and set October 11, 2014, as the deadline for filing his personal restraint petition. View the source document
West Virginia No death penalty verified	The mechanism does not operate because it cannot: no West Virginia court can impose a death sentence, so no West Virginia court has ever appointed post-conviction counsel under a capital-specific provision. The Supreme Court of Appeals has stated the operative consequence directly in Lycans v. Bordenkircher: after the 1965 amendment to § 61-11-2, 'no person convicted of any offense could thereafter be punished by execution.' This is corroborated on the sentencing side by W. Va. Code § 62-3-15, which as currently published makes life imprisonment the maximum for first-degree murder ('he or she shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life'), with parole eligibility only on a jury recommendation of mercy. This is not a paper mechanism that is unfunded or vacant — it is the absence of any capital sentence to litigate.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 62-3-15 Case: Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W. Va. 137, 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975) W. Va. Code 1931, 61-11-2, as amended in 1965, abolished capital punishment in West Virginia. Upon the passage thereof, no person convicted of any offense could thereafter be punished by execution. View the source document
Wisconsin No death penalty verified	There is no capital post-conviction practice in Wisconsin to describe: the legislature abolished capital punishment by session law in 1853, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the abolition three years later in Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856), while construing a 1854 act that preserved 24 peremptory challenges for offenses 'which would have been punishable with death before the law of 1853.' No Wisconsin prisoner has been under a state sentence of death since, so no office, appointment list, or funding line addresses capital collateral review. In practice the only post-conviction appointment machinery is the SPD's: a court refers an apparently indigent s. 974.06 movant under s. 974.06(3)(b), and the SPD decides under s. 977.05(4)(j) whether the case 'should be pursued,' assigning staff or certified private counsel under s. 977.08 and Wis. Admin. Code ch. PD 1.	Source Case: Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856) Although capital punishment was abolished by chapter 108 of the Session Laws of 1853 View the source document
Wyoming Office operating verified	The mechanism is not a paper one: in every Wyoming capital post-conviction case the Office of the State Public Defender has actually supplied the lawyer. In Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 — 'an appeal from the district court's denial of James Martin Harlow's petition for post-conviction relief from a capital murder conviction' — the petitioner, then under sentence of death with his execution stayed, was represented by the State Public Defender himself (Ken Koski) and a senior assistant public defender; the Wyoming Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the merits without questioning the office's authority to appear notwithstanding § 7-14-104(c). Earlier, in Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991) (capital post-conviction; death sentence vacated), the petitioner was represented by the 'Wyoming Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Deputy State Public Defender' — though that petition was docketed in 1987, under the pre-1990 statute. Dale Wayne Eaton, the only other person to reach capital state post-conviction, likewise proceeded 'through counsel' (Eaton v. State, 2009 WY 36, 202 P.3d 1076). Caveats a careful reader needs: the sample is three cases; the representation comes out of the general public defender appropriation (§ 7-6-113) rather than any dedicated capital post-conviction line; there is no capital post-conviction unit or resource centre; and with no one presently under sentence of death in Wyoming the provision is dormant, so there is no current staffing or funding to inspect.	Source Case: Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005) Representing Petitioner: Ken Koski, Public Defender; and Marion Yoders Senior Assistant Public Defender. View the source document

The verdict: does the state have a mechanism at all?

One of five answers for each state: counsel must be appointed; counsel may be appointed; no state mechanism; the state has no death penalty; or the authorities conflict. Federal habeas counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 is excluded by design, so no state is credited with a federal mechanism.

50 of 50 states verified.

Show the fifty-state table

State	Rule	Source
Alabama Mandatory verified	Alabama has a statutory mechanism: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b) requires the trial court to appoint separate post-conviction counsel for an indigent capital defendant within 30 days of the death sentence. The mandate is unqualified in form ('shall appoint') but limited in reach by § 13A-5-53.1(j) — it applies only to defendants sentenced to death after August 1, 2017. A prisoner sentenced to death on or before that date has no mandatory entitlement; for that cohort appointment is conditional under Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.7(c) and Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a), and under Rule 32.7(c) can occur only after a petition is filed and survives summary dismissal — so the petition itself must be prepared without appointed counsel. A reader comparing Alabama to Georgia should record 'mandatory, prospective only,' not simply 'mandatory.'	Source Statute / rule: Ala. Code § 13A-5-53.1(b), (j) Case: Ex parte State of Alabama (In re State v. Donnie Lee Abernathy), No. CR-2023-0825 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2024) the trial court, within 30 days of the entry of the order pronouncing the defendant's death sentence, shall appoint the defendant a separate counsel for the purposes of post-conviction relief under this section. View the source document
Alaska No death penalty verified	Alaska abolished capital punishment in 1957, two years before statehood, and has not restored it. The Alaska Supreme Court has twice said so: Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1964) ('in 1957 the legislature abolished the death penalty as punishment in Alaska for any crime'), and Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977) n.5. Current law confirms it: the authorized sentences a court may impose (AS 12.55.015) include no death sentence, first-degree murder is punished by a term of years up to 99 (AS 12.55.125(a)), and the word 'capital' appears nowhere in the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently no capital post-conviction counsel provision exists on the books, and none is needed. The only residual capital reference in Alaska law is the bail clause of Alaska Const. art. We, § 11 ('to be released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great'), which Carman treated as inoperative for exactly this reason. Any Alaska prisoner, however sentenced, is entitled to appointed counsel for a timely first post-conviction application under AS 18.85.100(c) and Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(e)(1).	Source Statute / rule: AS 12.55.015; AS 12.55.125(a); AS 18.85.100(c) Case: Carman v. State, 564 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1977); Green v. State, 390 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1964) statutory authorization for the death penalty was repealed by the territorial legislature in 1957. Ch. 132, SLA 1957. View the source document
Arizona Mandatory verified	Arizona provides appointed counsel to indigent prisoners under sentence of death in first (and successive) state post-conviction proceedings as a matter of statutory entitlement, reinforced by court rule. The Supreme Court clerk files the PCR notice automatically on the direct-appeal mandate and the Supreme Court (or an authorized county presiding judge) must appoint qualified counsel from a Supreme Court-maintained roster. There is no capital post-conviction defender office; counsel are compensated from county funds with partial, appropriation-capped state reimbursement.	Source Statute / rule: A.R.S. § 13-4234(D); A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), (C); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5(b) Case: State v. Montoya, No. CR-22-0106-AP (Ariz. Aug. 15, 2024) All indigent state prisoners under a capital sentence are entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent them in state postconviction proceedings. View the source document
Arkansas Mandatory verified	Arkansas has a mandatory state mechanism for appointed counsel in capital post-conviction, resting on two mutually reinforcing sources adopted in 1997 to 'opt in' under AEDPA: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-91-201 to -206 (Act 925 of 1997) and Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5. The circuit court must hold a hearing (21 days from mandate under Rule 37.5(b)(1)(A); two weeks after affirmance under § 16-91-202(a)(1)(A)(i)) and must appoint qualified counsel for an indigent death-sentenced petitioner who accepts the appointment; the court may decline only on a written finding of non-indigency or knowing rejection. Counsel must satisfy exclusive statutory/rule qualification criteria, the appointment carries through the post-conviction appeal, and the Arkansas Public Defender Commission pays compensation and expenses from state funds. Arkansas is therefore squarely a counterexample to the claim that Georgia is the only state without a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202; Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5 Case: Hill v. State, 363 Ark. 480, 215 S.W.3d 589 (2005) Our Rule 37.5 provides an elaborate process for appointing qualified legal counsel for indigent capital defendants who desire representation for post-conviction relief. View the source document
California Mandatory verified	California entitles an indigent person under sentence of death to appointed counsel for the first state habeas petition. Gov. Code § 68662 commands the sentencing superior court to offer to appoint counsel and to enter an order; on findings of indigency and acceptance (or inability to decide) the order must be an appointment. The California Supreme Court's majority opinion in In re Morgan calls this a 'statutory right.' The entitlement is mandatory on paper and, as of the HCRC's 2025 annual report, unfulfilled for 346 of the state's 562 death-sentenced people.	Source Statute / rule: Cal. Gov. Code § 68662 Case: In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932 in California an indigent prisoner who is under a court judgment of death has a statutory right to the assistance of appointed counsel to pursue habeas corpus relief. View the source document
Colorado No death penalty verified	Colorado abolished the death penalty by SB 20-100, codified at § 16-11-901 and effective March 23, 2020, for offenses charged on or after July 1, 2020; the same day Governor Polis commuted the sentences of all three men on Colorado's death row to life without parole, leaving no one under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: the capital post-conviction counsel mechanism remains fully on the books and is MANDATORY in form — § 16-12-205(1) ('the trial court shall enter an order appointing new postconviction counsel' for an indigent death-sentenced defendant who elects postconviction review) and Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)(we) ('Appoint new counsel… absent waiver'), with statutory qualification standards, a 154-day clock running from the appointment hearing, and compensation paid by the state public defender or alternate defense counsel. So Colorado is emphatically NOT a state that lacks a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism; it is a state whose mandatory mechanism no longer has any occupant.	Source Statute / rule: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-901 (SB 20-100); residual mechanism at § 16-12-205 and Colo. R. Crim. P. 32.2 Case: People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42, ¶ 3 (unitary review process no longer applied after commutation) For offenses charged on or after July 1, 2020, the death penalty is not a sentencing option for a defendant convicted of a class 1 felony in the state of Colorado. … This section does not apply to a person currently serving a death sentence. View the source document
Connecticut No death penalty verified	Connecticut abolished the death penalty prospectively by P.A. 12-5 (effective April 25, 2012), and in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015), the Supreme Court held that executing anyone who committed a capital felony before that date would violate the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment; State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016), reaffirmed it. No one is under sentence of death. Residual capital provisions remain on the books: §§ 53a-46a and 53a-46b (expressly limited to capital felonies committed before April 25, 2012) and § 52-470(f)(3)'s exemption of death-sentence challenges from the habeas timeliness bar. Had a death sentence survived, the counsel mechanism would be MANDATORY: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-296(a) requires the court to designate a public defender for an indigent petitioner in 'any habeas corpus proceeding arising from a criminal matter,' which includes a first state habeas by a person under sentence of death — but through the general habeas-counsel statute, with no capital-specific office, entitlement or qualification standard.	Source Statute / rule: Public Acts 2012, No. 12-5; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-46a, 51-296(a), 52-470(f)(3) Case: State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015); State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (2016) this state's death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. View the source document
Delaware No death penalty verified	Delaware has abolished the death penalty and has no one under sentence of death, so no capital post-conviction counsel mechanism can currently operate. The capital sentencing procedures in 11 Del. C. § 4209 were held unconstitutional in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016), made Rauf retroactive and vacated the death sentence of a prisoner then in collateral review; and HB 70 of the 152nd General Assembly, signed 9/26/24 (84 Del. Laws ch. 433), repealed § 4209(b)-(h), leaving only the life-without-parole penalty quoted here. A RESIDUAL PROVISION REMAINS ON THE BOOKS AND IS MANDATORY: Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2)(iii) still commands that 'The judge shall appoint counsel' for a first timely postconviction motion seeking to set aside 'a sentence of death,' and Rule 61(l) still guarantees a capital defendant 'a right to one postconviction proceeding' with a counsel-first scheduling sequence. So had Delaware retained capital punishment, its answer to this survey would be 'mandatory' — the Georgia Resource Center's claim would not have failed here.	Source Statute / rule: 11 Del. C. § 4209(a), (b)-(h) [Repealed] (84 Del. Laws ch. 433 (2024)); residual: Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(iii), (l) Case: Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Powell v. State, 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016) Any person who is convicted of first-degree murder for an offense that was committed after the person had reached the person’s eighteenth birthday shall be punished by imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life without benefit of probation or parole View the source document
Florida Mandatory verified	Counsel must be appointed. Florida is close to the opposite pole from the claim being tested: appointment is automatic and court-initiated rather than something the prisoner must request. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1) requires the Supreme Court of Florida, simultaneously with the mandate affirming a death sentence on direct appeal, to enter an order appointing CCRC or directing the trial court to appoint registry counsel; Fla. Stat. § 27.702(1) independently commands that CCRC 'shall represent each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state' in collateral proceedings, and § 27.710(5) requires immediate registry appointment whenever a death-sentenced person becomes unrepresented. Rule 3.851(b)(6) bars self-representation in capital postconviction, and Rule 3.851(b)(5) requires counsel to continue 'until a judge allows withdrawal or until the sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out.' The entitlement is to representation only, not to effective representation: §§ 27.7002(1)-(2) and 27.711(10) foreclose challenges to the adequacy of that representation.	Source Statute / rule: Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(b)(1); Fla. Stat. §§ 27.702(1), 27.710(5) Case: Silvia v. State, No. SC2026-1162 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2026) the Supreme Court of Florida must at the same time issue an order appointing the appropriate office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel or directing the trial court to immediately appoint counsel from the Registry of Attorneys maintained by the Justice Administrative Commission View the source document
Georgia None verified	No state mechanism for appointed counsel in capital post-conviction. The Supreme Court of Georgia squarely held there is no constitutional right and expressly assigned the creation of any such right to the legislature; the General Assembly has not created one in the 27 years since. The state's capital defender is statutorily confined to trial and direct appeal (O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d)), the capital-habeas statute (§ 9-14-47.1) and rule (USCR 44) are silent on counsel, and there is no compensation authority for appointed habeas counsel. The one thing that must be said against a flat 'nothing': Georgia appropriates $900,000/yr in state general funds to a private 501(c)(3), the Georgia Resource Center, to represent death-sentenced people in habeas. That is state money, and a hostile reader will say so — but it is a grant to a charity, not an entitlement, an appointment, a qualification standard, or a compensation scheme, and a prisoner the Center cannot take has no remedy.	Source Statute / rule: O.C.G.A. § 17-12-12(d); O.C.G.A. § 9-14-47.1 Case: Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 862 (1999) A law requiring appointed counsel for capital habeas petitioners is not constitutionally compelled, and therefore, the decision to create such a law rightfully belongs to the General Assembly. View the source document
Hawaii No death penalty verified	Hawaii abolished capital punishment in 1957 by Act 282, 1957 Session Laws of Hawaii, while still a Territory and two years before statehood. The Hawaii Supreme Court states the fact directly in Huihui v. Shimoda, quoted here. The maximum penalty for first degree murder is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (HRS s 706-656); no Hawaii statute authorizes a death sentence and no one is or can be under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: none capital-specific. Nothing in the Hawaii Revised Statutes or the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure addresses capital post-conviction counsel. What is on the books is a general, mandatory post-conviction counsel provision, HRPP Rule 40(i), which would supply appointed counsel through the Office of the State Public Defender to any indigent Rule 40 petitioner stating a non-frivolous claim, including, hypothetically, one under sentence of death. Hawaii is thus not a state that 'provides nothing'; it is a state where the capital question does not arise, and whose general post-conviction counsel right is stronger than Georgia's.	Source Statute / rule: Act 282, 1957 Session Laws of Hawaii (abolition); Haw. Rev. Stat. s 706-656 (life without parole is the maximum for first degree murder); Haw. R. Penal P. 40(i) (general post-conviction counsel) Case: Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527 (1982) This statute was amended only once since its enactment in 1892, when capital punishment was abolished in this state in 1957. View the source document
Idaho Mandatory verified	Idaho requires appointment of counsel for a death-sentenced prisoner's first state post-conviction proceeding. Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a) — a rule adopted by Idaho Supreme Court order, not by statute — commands the sentencing judge to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender immediately after imposing death, and the SAPD must assign at least two qualified attorneys, none of whom may be prior counsel. Idaho Code § 19-5905(1)(g) makes 'Post-conviction relief proceedings in district court in capital cases' a statutory duty of the SAPD upon court appointment, funded from the SAPD's state budget. Idaho is therefore not a state that leaves capital post-conviction petitioners to proceed pro se: the entitlement is mandatory, the provider is a named statewide state-funded office, and qualification standards are set by we.C.R. 44.3.	Source Statute / rule: Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2(a); Idaho Code § 19-5905(1)(g) Case: Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013) the district judge who sentenced the defendant must appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, who must assign at least two attorneys to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any post-conviction remedy referred to in Idaho Code § 19-2719(4) View the source document
Illinois No death penalty verified	Illinois abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2011 (P.A. 96-1543, adding 725 ILCS 5/119-1), and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books. Former 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (mandatory appointment for a death-sentenced petitioner) and the capital paragraph of 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (appointment of the State Appellate Defender for capital post-conviction representation) were struck by P.A. 103-51, eff. Jan. 1, 2024; the OSAD capital funding provisions in 725 ILCS 105/10 were blanked by P.A. 97-1003 in 2012; the Capital Crimes Litigation Act was repealed effective Jan. 1, 2012; and Supreme Court Rules 43, 416 and 714 were repealed and reserved Feb. 6, 2013. For the Georgia committee's purpose Illinois cannot be counted either for or against the 'other 49 states' claim as a present-tense matter — but as a historical datapoint it cuts toward the claim: while Illinois had a death penalty it gave capital post-conviction petitioners counsel as of right, on more generous terms than its non-capital rule, through a state-funded defender unit.	Source Statute / rule: 725 ILCS 5/119-1 Sec. 119-1. Death penalty abolished. (a) Beginning on July 1, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act 96-1543), notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed. View the source document
Indiana Mandatory verified	Indiana provides counsel for capital state post-conviction by mandatory court rule, delivered through a state-funded statewide office. Criminal Rule 6.1(H) requires the State Public Defender (or privately retained counsel) to enter an appearance in the trial court within thirty days after direct-appeal rehearing is completed and to announce an intent to petition for post-conviction relief; the Public Defender of Indiana describes that capital representation as 'automatic if the petitioner is indigent.' Ind. Code § 33-40-1-2(a) supplies the parallel statutory duty ('shall represent'), and Ind. Code § 33-40-1-6 supplies a standing state appropriation. Indiana is therefore squarely in the column of states with a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism — a data point against the claim that Georgia is the only state without one. The qualification a hostile reader is entitled to: the entitlement is to the office's appearance, and P-C.R. 1(9)(c) lets appointed counsel withdraw on a certified no-merit finding without a capital exception, so this is not an unconditional right to litigate to judgment with counsel.	Source Statute / rule: Ind. R. Crim. P. 6.1(H) Within thirty days following completion of rehearing, private counsel retained by the inmate or the State Public Defender (by deputy or by special assistant in the event of a conflict of interest) must enter an appearance in the trial court View the source document
Iowa No death penalty verified	Iowa abolished capital punishment in 1965. 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8), captioned "DEATH PENALTY ABOLISHED" and approved February 24, 1965, struck the death penalty from Iowa Code §§ 690.2, 690.5 and 706.3 (1962), substituted life imprisonment, and repealed ch. 792 (execution procedure); conforming amendments followed in ch. 436 (H.F. 595), approved May 14, 1965. No capital sentence can be imposed today and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books: "capital," "death penalty" and "sentence of death" appear nowhere in Iowa Code ch. 822 (postconviction), ch. 815 (indigent defense) or ch. 13B (state public defender), in the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in the State Public Defender's rules (Iowa Admin. Code ch. 493). Indigent ch. 822 applicants — including people serving life without parole for first-degree murder, Iowa's harshest sentence — do receive appointed counsel and state-paid representation costs under Iowa Code §§ 815.10(1)(a), 815.11(1) and 822.5, but that is a general, non-capital mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 435 (H.F. 8) AN ACT to abolish the death penalty as a punishment for certain crimes View the source document
Kansas Mandatory verified	Kansas provides appointed counsel as of right to an indigent person under sentence of death in state post-conviction proceedings. K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2) says the court 'shall appoint one or more counsel' on an indigency finding, with no merits screening of the kind that governs non-capital 60-1507 movants under 22-4506(b). The Kansas Court of Appeals has construed the provision as conferring 'an absolute right to counsel in district court' and reversed a dismissal entered without the statute's procedures. Counsel is drawn from BIDS's statewide Capital Habeas Office or from a Board-prequalified capital panel, funded by state appropriation, under qualification standards fixed by K.A.R. 105-3-2 that a judge may not waive for capital post-conviction appointments. The one honest qualification: the entitlement attaches upon the filing of the petition rather than before it, so the 60-1507(f) one-year clock runs before the statutory right is triggered.	Source Statute / rule: K.S.A. 22-4506(d)(2) Case: Kleypas v. State, 522 P.3d 304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022) Under K.S.A. 22-4506(d), an indigent person convicted of capital murder has a statutory right to counsel in district court upon a filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion attacking sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507. View the source document
Kentucky Mandatory verified	Kentucky HAS a state mechanism, and where Kentucky law speaks to appointment it speaks in mandatory terms — but the mandate is conditional and arrives late. RCr 11.42(5) says the court 'shall… appoint counsel'; no Kentucky statute or rule gives a judge discretion to refuse once the conditions are met, so 'discretionary' would be inaccurate. Equally, 'mandatory' should not be read as counsel-of-right on filing: the duty attaches only when the Commonwealth's answer raises a material fact issue requiring a hearing and the movant makes a specific written request, and Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Ky. 2001) overruled the contrary reading of KRS 31.110(2)(c) in Commonwealth v. Ivey. The practical mechanism is institutional rather than rule-driven: a state-appropriated statewide defender agency (DPA, Post-Conviction Branch) that a court appoints on the prisoner's own pro se motion, backed by a statutory entitlement to post-conviction representation in KRS 31.110(2)(c) subject to a DPA-plus-court merit screen. There is no capital-specific entitlement, no capital post-conviction defender office, and no capital counsel qualification standard. For the Georgia committee's purposes: Kentucky is not a state with 'nothing,' but neither is it a Florida-CCRC-style automatic-appointment state.	Source Statute / rule: RCr 11.42(5); KRS 31.110(2)(c) Case: Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Ky. 2001) RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant and that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the DPA may provide legal services even without judicial appointment View the source document
Louisiana Mandatory verified	Louisiana has an express, mandatory statutory mechanism for appointed counsel in capital state post-conviction proceedings: the sentencing court must, within 30 days of a death sentence, order the statewide office of the state public defender to enroll a separate attorney for state post-conviction, and that office must cause staff or supervised contract counsel to be enrolled (La. R.S. 15:169(A)). The Louisiana Supreme Court has treated the entitlement as a 'statutory right' (State v. Chester) and enforces it through its standing capital decretal (State v. Clark). This is the opposite of the Georgia pattern; nothing in the record supports treating Louisiana as lacking a mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: La. R.S. 15:178 Case: State v. Chester, 27 So. 3d 837 (La. 2010) the court, within thirty days of the imposition of the sentence of death, shall order the office of the state public defender to have enrolled at least one attorney for direct appeal and at least one separate attorney for state post conviction proceedings View the source document
Maine No death penalty verified	Maine abolished capital punishment in 1887 and no capital-counsel provision of any kind remains on the books. The Law Court stated the abolition and its consequence directly in Gosselin, citing the abolishing session law. Confirming that nothing residual survives: 15 M.R.S. ch. 305-A (post-conviction review, §§ 2121-2132) has no capital section; 4 M.R.S. ch. 37 (the public-defense commission) has no capital unit or capital standard; and PDS rule 94-649 ch. 3 lists sixteen specialized counsel panels, none capital, with zero occurrences of 'capital' or 'death.' The only residue of the word 'capital' in Maine law is constitutional and non-capital in effect: the pretrial bail clause of Me. Const. art. We, § 10 and the grand-jury clause of art. We, § 7.	Source Statute / rule: P.L. 1887, ch. 133, § 1 (abolition); 17-A M.R.S. § 1603 Case: Gosselin, 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945) Capital crimes or offenses have been unknown in this jurisdiction since capital punishment was abandoned in 1887, P. L. 1887, Chap. 133, Sec. 1 View the source document
Maryland No death penalty verified	Maryland repealed the death penalty by Chapter 156 of the Acts of 2013 (S.B. 276), approved May 2, 2013 and effective October 1, 2013. The same Act repealed the capital post-conviction subtitle — Crim. Proc. §§ 7-201 through 7-204 and the subtitle heading "Proceedings After Death Sentences" — and deleted the death-sentence references from §§ 7-101, 7-103(b) and 7-107(b). First-degree murder is now punishable only by life without parole or life (Crim. Law § 2-201(b)). Residual provisions: the Governor may still "change a sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole" (Corr. Servs. § 7-601(a)(1)), and any post-conviction petitioner — capital or not — has a mandatory statutory right to counsel on a first petition under Crim. Proc. § 7-108(a), delivered by the Office of the Public Defender under § 16-204(b)(1)(iii). There is no capital-specific counsel mechanism left on the books.	Source Statute / rule: 2013 Md. Laws ch. 156 (S.B. 276), §§ 1-5 Case: Grandison v. State, 234 Md. App. 564, 174 A.3d 388 (2017) (commutation of the last death sentences) SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That Section(s) 7–201 through 7–204 and the subtitle “Subtitle 2. Proceedings After Death Sentences”; 8–108 and 11–404 of Article – Criminal Procedure of the Annotated Code of Maryland be repealed. View the source document
Massachusetts No death penalty verified	Massachusetts's death penalty was invalidated by the Supreme Judicial Court: District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980) struck the 1979 statute under art. 26 (cruel punishment), and Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) struck the successor statute, St. 1982, c. 554, under art. 12. No capital-sentencing statute has been enacted since; G.L. c. 265, § 2 fixes life without parole for first-degree murder. Residual provisions remain on the books — G.L. c. 279, §§ 68-71 (trial, sentencing and automatic SJC death-sentence review) and G.L. c. 277, § 47 (permissive trial-stage counsel in 'capital' cases) — but NONE of them provides post-conviction counsel. For the Georgia committee's purposes, Massachusetts cannot be counted among states that supply a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism; it supplies none, and needs none.	Source Statute / rule: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, §§ 68-71 (residual, inoperative); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 2 Case: Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) The death penalty provisions enacted in St. 1982, c. 554, violate art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. They impermissibly burden both the right against self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial guaranteed by that article. View the source document
Michigan No death penalty verified	Michigan has no death penalty: capital punishment was abolished by statute in 1846 and is prohibited outright by Const 1963, art 4, § 46, effective January 1, 1964, which forecloses the legislature from enacting one. No residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books — the Michigan Court Rules (updated July 31, 2026) contain no capital or death-penalty provision at all, and the sole post-conviction counsel rule, MCR 6.505(A), is discretionary and non-capital-specific. Michigan therefore cannot be counted either for or against the proposition that 49 states provide capital post-conviction counsel; it is a state where the question cannot arise.	Source Statute / rule: Mich Const 1963, art 4, § 46 Case: People v Parks, Docket No. 162086 (Mich, July 28, 2022) (slip op at 24 n 10) No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death. View the source document
Minnesota No death penalty verified	Minnesota has had no death penalty since 1911. The gravest homicide, first-degree murder, carries life imprisonment (Minn. Stat. § 609.185), and § 609.10, subd. 1 lists no death sentence among the felony sentences available. No one is or can be under sentence of death, so the capital post-conviction counsel question does not arise. Residual provision on the books: none is capital-specific — Minn. Stat. § 590.05 and § 611.25, subd. 1 give an indigent postconviction petitioner a mandatory claim on the chief appellate public defender only if the petitioner has not already had a direct appeal, and a discretionary one otherwise. For the Georgia committee's purpose, Minnesota is not a state that supplies capital post-conviction counsel; it is a state with nothing to supply it for.	Source Statute / rule: Minn. Stat. § 609.185 Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life View the source document
Mississippi Mandatory verified	Mississippi provides appointed counsel as of right for indigent prisoners under sentence of death in their FIRST state post-conviction proceeding, through a dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. The duty is stated in mandatory terms: the Supreme Court 'shall' order the indigence/counsel determination immediately after the direct appeal, and appointment 'shall be made by the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel' (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9)). The petitioner may decline and proceed pro se only after an informed, voluntary, on-the-record election, in which case appointed counsel remains as advisor. The entitlement is limited to initial petitions; there is no Rule 22(c) right to appointed counsel for successive capital PCR petitions, though CPCC represents many successive petitioners in fact.	Source Statute / rule: Miss. R. App. P. 22(c)(1)(ii); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(9) Case: Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Sept. 14, 2017) Where a petitioner is sentenced to death the Supreme Court shall, immediately after the announcement of the decision on direct appeal, order that the convicting court determine whether the petitioner is indigent and, if so, whether the petitioner desires appointment of counsel View the source document
Missouri Mandatory verified	MANDATORY, and among the stronger provisions in the country: not one appointed lawyer but two, on a 30-day deadline, with statutory qualification standards, a bar on trial/direct-appeal counsel serving, a state-funded compensation-and-expenses obligation on the State Public Defender, and a rule that the prisoner may not even waive the appointment absent a competency finding. The duty appears BOTH in a statute enacted by the General Assembly in 1997 (Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370, from S.B. 56) and in Supreme Court of Missouri Rules 29.16 and 24.036, so it does not depend on either source alone. The claim that Georgia is the only state without a mechanism is not contradicted or supported by Missouri in isolation, but Missouri plainly HAS a mechanism.	Source Statute / rule: Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 547.370.1 (L. 1997 S.B. 56); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.16(a); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.036(a) Case: Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004) If the movant is indigent, the court shall cause to be appointed two counsel to represent the movant. View the source document
Montana Mandatory verified	Montana law entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction petition, by statute, on the court's own initiative, at state expense. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) obliges the sentencing court to notify the prisoner within 30 days of finality and to order the Office of the State Public Defender to assign qualified counsel within 75 days; the entitlement survives a change in financial circumstances ('the court shall order the assignment of counsel'); counsel must meet capital-specific competency standards adopted by the Montana Supreme Court (AF 97-326, Part III); and OPD pays. Montana is therefore NOT in Georgia's position. The honest qualifications for a hostile reader: the right is mandatory but unenforceable through post-conviction itself (§ 46-21-201(3)(f)), the qualification standards rest on a court order rather than a statute, and the provision has no reported application because Montana's death row is two men, both sentenced before it was enacted.	Source Statute / rule: Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) Case: In re Amending This Court's Standards for Competency of Counsel for Indigent Persons in Death Penalty Cases, No. 97-326 (Mont. July 16, 2002) (Standards Part III, postconviction phase) If a petitioner entitled to counsel under this subsection (3) is determined not to be indigent but becomes indigent at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, the court shall order the assignment of counsel as provided in subsection (3)(b)(i). View the source document
Nebraska Discretionary verified	Nebraska provides a mechanism, but it is discretionary and not capital-specific. A prisoner under sentence of death seeking first state post-conviction relief is governed by the general Nebraska Postconviction Act; § 29-3004 says the district court 'may appoint' up to two attorneys, and the Nebraska Supreme Court reviews a refusal only for abuse of discretion. Nebraska case law supplies a floor — a movant who presents a justiciable issue of law or fact is entitled to appointment, and the court has reversed a denial and ordered counsel appointed for a death-sentenced prisoner (Mata III) — but a death sentence itself triggers nothing. State v. Victor squarely applied the discretionary rule to a death row inmate and affirmed the denial of counsel. So Nebraska is neither Georgia (nothing at all) nor Florida/Arizona (a mandatory capital PC office): it is court-appointment-on-discretion, with a statewide defender office (the NCPA capital litigation division) available to take the appointment when a court makes one.	Source Statute / rule: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3004 Case: State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993) This power is within the discretion of the district court, and failure to appoint counsel in postconviction proceedings is not error in the absence of an abuse of discretion. View the source document
Nevada Mandatory verified	Nevada mandates appointment of counsel for an indigent prisoner under sentence of death on a first state post-conviction habeas petition. NRS 34.820(1) uses 'shall' and pairs appointment with a mandatory stay of execution. Delivery is by district-court appointment from each judicial district's SCR 250 list rather than through a dedicated capital post-conviction defender office, and compensation is charged to the state Department of Indigent Defense Services rather than to counties. The one qualification a careful reader should carry forward is sequencing, not entitlement: the duty attaches once a first petition is filed, and the NRS 34.726 one-year deadline runs from remittitur whether or not counsel has yet been appointed.	Source Statute / rule: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.820(1) Case: Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997) the court shall: (a) Appoint counsel to represent the petitioner; and (b) Stay execution of the judgment pending disposition of the petition and the appeal. View the source document
New Hampshire Discretionary verified	New Hampshire is not a 'no mechanism' state, but neither does it guarantee counsel. Appointment in a capital post-conviction proceeding rests on the general indigent-defense statute, RSA 604-A:2, we, which conditions the duty to appoint on a judicial finding that 'the interests of justice or judicial economy require' it; the NH Judicial Council's own capital post-conviction guidelines describe this as the court exercising 'its discretion to appoint counsel.' If a court does appoint, the Judicial Council must supply counsel meeting its September 2015 capital post-conviction eligibility and performance standards, paid from the state indigent-defense appropriation. There is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office, no automatic or mandatory appointment, and no deadline keyed to counsel. Death penalty repealed prospectively in 2019; RSA 630:5 remains in force and one person remains under sentence of death, so the machinery is live rather than vestigial.	Source Statute / rule: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:2, I In a post-conviction proceeding in which a defendant seeks to attack the validity of an underlying conviction, the court shall appoint counsel or approve a request for services other than counsel when the interests of justice or judicial economy require. View the source document
New Jersey No death penalty verified	New Jersey abolished the death penalty by L.2007, c.204, approved and effective December 17, 2007, and no one has been under sentence of death since the Governor's contemporaneous commutation of the eight remaining death sentences (State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619, 624 (2009)). NO residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books: the sole capital-specific PCR rule, R. 3:22-12(b) ('Capital Causes; Petition'), was deleted effective September 1, 2017, and neither R. 3:22-6 nor N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-1 et seq. has ever contained a capital-specific counsel clause. The generally applicable rule — mandatory, not capital-specific — is R. 3:22-6(a): on a first PCR petition from an indigent defendant convicted of an indictable offense, the court 'shall as of course' assign the Office of the Public Defender. Under R. 3:22-3, PCR is 'the exclusive means of challenging a judgment rendered upon conviction of a crime,' so there is no separate state habeas track with its own counsel rule.	Source Statute / rule: L.2007, c.204 (approved Dec. 17, 2007), amending N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 Case: State v. Fortin, 198 N.J. 619 (2009) AN ACT to eliminate the death penalty and allow for life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, revising various parts of the statutory law, repealing P.L.1983, c.245, and supplementing Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. View the source document
New Mexico No death penalty verified	New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009 — H.B. 285, Laws 2009, ch. 11, 'ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY; PROVIDING FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE OR PAROLE' — but only prospectively: section 6 applies the act 'to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009,' which left Robert Fry and Timothy Allen under sentence of death until the Supreme Court vacated both sentences on June 28, 2019 (Fry v. Lopez, 2019-NMSC-013). No one is now under sentence of death. RESIDUAL PROVISION: the capital post-conviction counsel mechanism remains on the books and is MANDATORY. Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA still requires that, upon the mandate affirming a death sentence, 'the district court shall promptly appoint counsel to represent the defendant,' with the 180-day habeas deadline running from that appointment and the execution stayed meanwhile. So had New Mexico a death row, its answer would be 'mandatory' — appointment automatic on affirmance, no indigency screen in the capital paragraph, and the clock keyed to counsel rather than to finality.	Source Statute / rule: N.M. Laws 2009, ch. 11 (H.B. 285), §§ 1, 5-6; residual provision: Rule 5-802(L)(1) NMRA Case: Fry v. Lopez and Allen v. LeMaster, 2019-NMSC-013, 447 P.3d 1086 RELATING TO CAPITAL FELONY SENTENCING; ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY; PROVIDING FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE OR PAROLE. View the source document
New York Mandatory verified	New York law mandates appointed, state-paid counsel for an indigent person under sentence of death on a first state post-conviction motion. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b) provides that such a defendant 'shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel'; § 35-b(2) provides that the trial court 'shall assign' lead counsel for the initial CPL 440.10/440.20 motion and the Court of Appeals 'shall assign' counsel for the appeal; § 35-b(9) makes the cost a state charge; and 22 NYCRR § 515.2 sets qualification standards specific to capital post-conviction counsel. The mandate is real on the books but DORMANT: New York's death-sentencing statute has been unenforceable since People v. LaValle (2004), the last death sentence was vacated in People v. Taylor (2007), no one is under sentence of death, and the Capital Defender Office that administers the roster closed in 2008. New York therefore is not a working comparator for a live capital post-conviction system, but neither is it a state whose law provides nothing — the entitlement, the appointing courts, the state funding and the qualification standards all remain enacted law.	Source Statute / rule: N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35-b(1)(b), (2), (9) the defendant shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel and investigative, expert and such other reasonably necessary services in accordance with the provisions of this section. View the source document
North Carolina Mandatory verified	MANDATORY. North Carolina is a clean counterexample to the claim that Georgia's absence of a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism is unique. An indigent prisoner under sentence of death who applies to the Office of Indigent Defense Services within 10 days of the triggering direct-appeal event (§ 7A-451(c)) is presumed indigent if previously adjudicated indigent, and IDS 'shall appoint two counsel' (§ 7A-451(c1)) — a duty, not a discretion, exercisable without a hearing (§ 7A-451(c2)) and implemented by IDS Rule 2C.2(a) ('The IDS Director shall appoint two lawyers'). The N.C. Supreme Court has read the statute the same way, describing it as one that 'requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants.' Counsel are private lawyers from a statewide qualification roster, appointed and paid by a state-appropriated agency; the 120-day MAR deadline runs from the latest of six events, one of which is the appointment of that counsel (§ 15A-1415(a)(6)). The single honest qualification: the entitlement is triggered by the prisoner's own timely application rather than appointed sua sponte, and it covers the first MAR — successor MARs require the IDS Director's pre-approval for compensation.	Source Statute / rule: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(c), (c1) Case: State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276 (1998) requires appointment of two counsel to prepare a motion for appropriate relief for indigent capital defendants View the source document
North Dakota No death penalty verified	North Dakota abolished capital punishment for all state crimes in the 1973 criminal code, effective July 1, 1975. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01 is an exhaustive classification — 'Offenses are divided into seven classes, which are denominated and subject to maximum penalties' — whose most severe class, class AA felony, carries a maximum of life imprisonment without parole; murder is a class AA felony (§ 12.1-16-01). No capital post-conviction counsel provision remains on the books. The residual provision that would apply to any such petitioner is N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-05(1), which makes appointment of counsel MANDATORY for any indigent post-conviction applicant who requests it, delivered through the state-funded Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents. North Dakota therefore neither supports nor refutes the Georgia Resource Center's '49 states' claim on its own terms: it has no capital post-conviction mechanism because it has no capital sentences, while its general post-conviction counsel guarantee is mandatory.	Source Statute / rule: N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01 Class AA felony, for which a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed. View the source document
Ohio Mandatory verified	Ohio has a mandatory statutory mechanism. R.C. 2953.21(J)(1) requires the common pleas court to appoint counsel for an indigent person under sentence of death who intends to file a post-conviction petition, and R.C. 2953.21(J)(2) limits the appointment to capital-certified counsel. The mandate is bounded: Ohio appellate courts read it as reaching only a timely-filed FIRST petition, so successive or untimely capital petitions carry no right to appointed counsel, and R.C. 2953.21(J)(2) forecloses any ineffective-assistance challenge to the appointed lawyer's performance. There is no dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office; appointment is by the trial court, with county payment and capped state reimbursement.	Source Statute / rule: Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(J)(1) Case: State v. Conway, 2025-Ohio-1844, ¶ 25-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2025) the court shall appoint counsel to represent the person upon a finding that the person is indigent and that the person either accepts the appointment of counsel or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel View the source document
Oklahoma Mandatory verified	Oklahoma provides appointed counsel for capital state post-conviction as a matter of statutory right. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) directs that OIDS 'shall represent all indigent defendants in capital cases seeking post-conviction relief' on district-court appointment after an indigency hearing; OCCA Rule 1.14(D)(2) requires the appointment application to be made for post-conviction as well as direct appeal in every indigent capital case; and the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice treated the entitlement as binding — holding in Davison that the statutory right entails reasonably effective counsel, and in Stouffer that a death-sentenced petitioner may not discharge appointed capital post-conviction counsel to proceed pro se.	Source Statute / rule: Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(B) Case: Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11, ¶ 24, 531 P.3d 649 We recognize the right to be represented by capital post-conviction counsel, though not guaranteed in the Constitution, is granted by Oklahoma statute; and that right, if it means anything, means the right to reasonably effective counsel. View the source document
Oregon Mandatory verified	Oregon law entitles an indigent petitioner under sentence of death to appointed counsel in state post-conviction proceedings: on a finding of financial eligibility the circuit court 'shall appoint suitable counsel' (ORS 138.590(4)), the statute expressly presumes that a death-sentenced petitioner 'qualifies for the appointment of counsel under this section' and requires a competency finding or an on-the-record waiver colloquy before he proceeds without it (ORS 138.590(2)-(3)), and counsel is paid by the Oregon Public Defense Commission (ORS 138.590(6)). The entitlement is delivered by case-by-case court appointment of OPDC-certified counsel, not by a capital post-conviction defender office, and it attaches only once a petition has been filed.	Source Statute / rule: ORS 138.590(3), (4) Case: Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 333 P3d 288 (2014) If a petitioner who has been sentenced to death qualifies for the appointment of counsel under this section but rejects the appointment, the court shall determine, after a hearing if necessary, whether the petitioner rejected the offer of counsel View the source document
Pennsylvania Mandatory verified	Pennsylvania mandates appointment of new counsel for a death-sentenced prisoner's first state post-conviction proceeding. The duty is imposed by Supreme Court rule (Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1), redesignated (h)(1) effective Nov. 1, 2026), not by the PCRA statute, and is triggered automatically on remand of the record at the conclusion of direct review, subject only to three on-the-record waiver/retained-counsel exceptions. Counsel must satisfy the statewide capital qualification standards of Pa.R.Crim.P. 801, and the appointment continues through PCRA appeal. Provision is by trial-court appointment funded at county level; there is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office.	Source Statute / rule: Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H)(1) (234 Pa. Code Rule 904) Case: Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) the trial judge shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction collateral review, unless: View the source document
Rhode Island No death penalty verified	Rhode Island abolished capital punishment: R.we. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 makes life imprisonment the penalty for first-degree murder, with no death option, the death sentence having been removed by P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 1 (shown in the History of Section on the cited page) after the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the mandatory death penalty unconstitutional in 1979. Title 13 (Criminals — Correctional Institutions) contains no chapter for execution of a death sentence, and the only reference to death as a punishment in the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure is Rule 46(a)(2), which concerns extradition to a demanding state. RESIDUAL PROVISION: R.we. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-5 gives every indigent post-conviction applicant a mandatory statutory right to the public defender (court-assigned counsel on conflict), with no capital carve-out and no severity threshold — so if Rhode Island had a person under sentence of death, that person would have counsel as of right.	Source Statute / rule: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 Case: Pona v. State, No. 2022-150-M.P. (R.I. Feb. 3, 2025) Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for life. View the source document
South Carolina Mandatory verified	South Carolina provides appointed counsel as of right in capital state post-conviction proceedings. § 17-27-160(B) commands that two counsel 'shall be immediately appointed' for an indigent death-sentenced applicant who desires representation, imposes statutory qualification standards on at least one of them, and directs compensation from state Death Penalty Trial Fund appropriations. The duty is mandatory in form ('shall'), but is conditioned on indigency and on the applicant not waiving counsel, and it is triggered by the filing of the PCR application — no state provision supplies counsel to draft and file the initial application, and the § 17-27-45(A) one-year clock runs independently of appointment. The Supreme Court has described the provision as creating a 'state-created right to qualified counsel.' Delivery is by case-by-case court appointment (Rule 608(f)(1)(A), SCACR), not by a statewide capital post-conviction defender office.	Source Statute / rule: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-160(B) Case: Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 S.E.2d 29 (2016) If the applicant is indigent and desires representation by counsel, two counsel shall be immediately appointed to represent the petitioner in this action. View the source document
South Dakota Discretionary verified	South Dakota has a state mechanism, but it is a general habeas-counsel statute, not a capital-counsel guarantee. SDCL 21-27-4 directs the circuit judge to appoint counsel for an indigent habeas applicant ONLY on a finding that appointment 'is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding,' and only where the application is made in good faith (i.e., non-frivolous, State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, ¶ 13). The South Dakota Supreme Court treats that decision as discretionary and reviews it for abuse of discretion; in Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38, it affirmed dismissal of a habeas application on which counsel was never appointed. A person under sentence of death receives no different treatment: there is no capital post-conviction defender office, no capital qualification standard, no capital tolling rule, and no capital carve-out anywhere in SDCL ch. 21-27 or ch. 23A-27A. So on the Georgia comparison the honest answer is neither 'mandatory' nor 'none' — South Dakota is 'discretionary,' with county funding at first instance.	Source Statute / rule: SDCL 21-27-4 Case: Guzman v. Sullivan, 2026 S.D. 38; State v. Reed, 2010 S.D. 105, 793 N.W.2d 63 the court or judge shall, if the judge finds that such appointment is necessary to ensure a full, fair, and impartial proceeding, appoint counsel for the indigent person View the source document
Tennessee Mandatory verified	Tennessee has a mandatory appointment mechanism for capital state post-conviction, backed by a dedicated statewide capital post-conviction defender office. Two Tennessee Supreme Court rules supply the command: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(3) ('Upon finding a party indigent, the court shall enter an order appointing counsel'), which by § 1(d)(1)(D) covers proceedings initiated by a petition for post-conviction relief, and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a), which requires the judge to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner once the petition states a colorable claim. Rule 13, § 1(e)(4)(A) makes the state Office of the Post-Conviction Defender the appointee of first resort, and Rule 13, § 3(h) imposes capital-specific competency standards. The one qualification: the duty attaches only after the prisoner has filed a petition that survives colorable-claim screening, so it is a mandatory-on-filing entitlement rather than an automatic appointment upon affirmance of a death sentence. Tennessee is emphatically not a 'no mechanism' state.	Source Statute / rule: Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(e)(3) (with § 1(d)(1)(D), § 1(e)(4)(A), § 3(h)); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(3)(a); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201 to -210 Case: Holton v. State, 201 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006) Upon finding a party indigent, the court shall enter an order appointing counsel. View the source document
Texas Mandatory verified	Texas mandates appointed counsel for an indigent death-sentenced prisoner's initial state habeas application. Art. 11.071 § 2(b) requires the convicting court, immediately after the death judgment, to determine indigence and desire for counsel and, if the defendant wants counsel, to appoint the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs; § 2(c) requires that appointment within 30 days, with private counsel from a statewide qualified list if OCFW cannot accept. The entitlement is to 'competent' counsel measured at appointment; Ex parte Graves holds there is no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel, so the right is to appointment and funding, not to a remedy for counsel's later performance.	Source Statute / rule: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2(b) Case: Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) If the defendant desires appointment of counsel for the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus, the court shall appoint the office of capital and forensic writs to represent the defendant as provided by Subsection (c). View the source document
Utah Mandatory verified	Utah entitles an indigent prisoner under sentence of death to appointed counsel for a first state post-conviction petition, and does so automatically: the sentencing court 'shall' appoint qualified counsel within 30 days after remittitur following affirmance on direct appeal, without any request from the prisoner. Counsel must satisfy Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e) and be drawn from a qualified list the Utah Supreme Court is required to maintain; fees and litigation expenses are paid from STATE funds by the Division of Finance at up to $250/hour ($120,000 fees, $40,000 expenses presumptive caps, exceedable for good cause). The prisoner may waive appointment only after an on-the-record finding of understanding. Limits: the entitlement is statutory only — § 78B-9-202(4) disclaims any right to effective assistance and bars relief on ineffectiveness claims; appointment does not toll the one-year limitation period (§ 78B-9-202(5)); and public-expense appointment is unavailable for second or successive petitions except for newly-discovered-evidence or new-rule claims. Utah is therefore a clear counterexample to the claim that Georgia's absence of a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism is unique.	Source Statute / rule: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(1)(a) (effective May 6, 2026; Laws of Utah 2026, ch. 345 (H.B. 495)) Case: Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, 344 P.3d 581 (applying the § 78B-9-202 funding provisions) the sentencing court shall: (i) advise the individual, in open court and on the record, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the individual's conviction and sentence; and (ii) appoint counsel to represent the individual on a petition for postconviction relief View the source document
Vermont No death penalty verified	Vermont has no death penalty and no residual capital post-conviction counsel provision. The last substantive capital penalty (treason) and the entire execution subchapter were removed by 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7-8, effective June 6, 2024; the Vermont Statutes Online now carries the notation '§§ 7101-7107. Repealed. 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024' under a chapter 221 subchapter still headed 'EXECUTION OF DEATH SENTENCE.' Murder is capped at life without parole (13 V.S.A. § 2303(a)) and kidnapping at life (13 V.S.A. § 2405(b)). Nothing capital-specific about counsel remains on the books. Had a death sentence survived, the generally applicable rule would be closer to MANDATORY than discretionary: 13 V.S.A. § 5232 says counsel 'shall be assigned' to needy persons in habeas and other confinement-release proceedings and § 5233(a)(3) covers 'any other postconviction proceeding' with more than minimal effect on detention, though the petition-for-review statute itself, 13 V.S.A. § 7137, is permissive ('may appoint counsel'). This state therefore neither confirms nor refutes the Georgia Resource Center's 49-state claim on its own terms: Vermont provides no capital mechanism because it has no capital sentences, not because it withholds counsel.	Source Statute / rule: 13 V.S.A. §§ 7101-7107 (repealed by 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024); 13 V.S.A. § 3401 (as amended by § 7 of the same act); 13 V.S.A. § 2303 Case: State v. Pray, 133 Vt. 537, 346 A.2d 227 (1975) §§ 7101-7107. Repealed. 2023, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. June 6, 2024. View the source document
Virginia No death penalty verified	Virginia abolished the death penalty effective July 1, 2021. The abolition act barred any future death sentence, converted every unexecuted death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, and repealed the entire capital post-conviction apparatus — Article 4.1 of Chapter 10 of Title 19.2 (§§ 19.2-163.7 and 19.2-163.8, the mandatory capital habeas counsel appointment and the qualified-attorney list) and §§ 8.01-654.1 and 8.01-654.2 (the capital habeas deadline and procedures). NO residual capital post-conviction counsel provision remains in the Code or in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Virginia therefore supplies no data point either way for the proposition that 49 states have a capital post-conviction counsel mechanism: it had a mandatory one until 2021, and now has neither the mechanism nor anyone who could invoke it.	Source Statute / rule: 2021 Acts of Assembly, Sp. Sess. I, ch. 344 (H.B. 2263), cll. 2, 3, 4; see also Va. Code § 18.2-10(a) That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on or after the effective date of this act for any violation of law. View the source document
Washington No death penalty verified	Washington has no death penalty. State v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018), held the death penalty unconstitutional under article we, section 14 of the state constitution and converted every existing death sentence to life imprisonment ('All death sentences are hereby converted to life imprisonment.'). The legislature followed in 2023, repealing RCW 10.95.040 through 10.95.200 and amending RCW 10.95.030 so that aggravated first degree murder carries only life without release or parole (2023 c 102 §§ 21, 23). RESIDUAL PROVISION: RCW 10.73.150(3) survives untouched and still promises, in mandatory terms, that 'Counsel shall be provided at state expense' to an indigent person 'under a sentence of death' who requests counsel for a first collateral attack — so had Washington kept the death penalty, its answer would be 'mandatory.' The implementing court rule, RAP 16.25 (Supreme Court appoints qualified counsel on a capital PRP), was rescinded effective September 1, 2026 by Order No. 25700-A-1699, leaving the statute without machinery.	Source Statute / rule: RCW 10.95.030, as amended by 2023 c 102 s 23 (death-penalty provisions repealed by 2023 c 102 s 21); residual capital-counsel provision at RCW 10.73.150(3) Case: State v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018) (slip op.) Under article I, section 14, we hold that Washington's death penalty is unconstitutional, as administered, because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. View the source document
West Virginia No death penalty verified	West Virginia abolished capital punishment in 1965 by Chapter 40, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1965, now W. Va. Code § 61-11-2, which remains in force as published on the official state code site. The abolition is retroactive by its own terms, so no one is or can be under sentence of death. NO residual capital-specific counsel provision remains on the books: neither W. Va. Code ch. 53, art. 4A nor the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings nor the Public Defender Services act (ch. 29, art. 21) contains any capital or death-penalty provision. What West Virginia does have, and what would govern if the death penalty were ever restored, is the generic § 53-4A-4(a) directive that the court 'shall appoint counsel for the petitioner' in post-conviction habeas — but that right is screened, not automatic: it is conditioned on the court finding indigency, good faith, and that the petition 'has merit or is not frivolous.' For the purpose of the Georgia claim, West Virginia can be counted neither as a state that provides capital post-conviction counsel nor as one that denies it; the question does not arise there.	Source Statute / rule: W. Va. Code § 61-11-2 Case: Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W. Va. 137, 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975); State ex rel. Campbell v. Wood, 151 W. Va. 807, 155 S.E.2d 893 (1967) Capital punishment is hereby abolished for all offenses against the laws of the State of West Virginia, and no person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any offense in violation of said laws shall be executed View the source document
Wisconsin No death penalty verified	Wisconsin abolished capital punishment in 1853 and has no death penalty today, so the capital post-conviction counsel question does not arise and no residual capital-counsel provision remains on the books. Current law confirms the absence from the top down: Wis. Stat. s. 940.01(1)(a) makes first-degree intentional homicide — the gravest offense — a Class A felony, and Wis. Stat. s. 939.50(3) enumerates the penalty for every felony class, with Class A capped at life imprisonment and death appearing nowhere in the schedule. Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856), records the 1853 abolition. What Wisconsin does provide to any post-conviction movant, capital or not, is discretionary: court referral under s. 974.06(3)(b) 'if it appears that counsel is necessary,' and SPD representation under s. 977.05(4)(j) only if the agency 'determines the case should be pursued.'	Source Statute / rule: Wis. Stat. s. 939.50(3)(a); see also s. 940.01(1)(a) Case: Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856) For a Class A felony, life imprisonment. View the source document
Wyoming Authorities conflict verified	A mechanism exists and has been used, but Wyoming's two governing statutes contradict each other on the face of the code and no Wyoming decision has reconciled them. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii) entitles a needy person to public defender representation in proceedings under the post-conviction act 'in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed'; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c), under the caption 'No right to appointed counsel,' says an indigent petitioner under that act 'is not entitled to representation by the state public defender or by appointed counsel,' with no capital carve-out. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-108 ('W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 shall not repeal any existing laws') cuts in favour of the capital entitlement surviving, and so does practice: the Office of the State Public Defender represented the death-sentenced petitioner in Engberg (1991), Harlow (2005) and Eaton (2009). This verdict is emphatically NOT 'none' — Wyoming is not a state that leaves a death-sentenced prisoner to file pro se. It is a state where the entitlement rests on a single clause of the Public Defender Act that a later and facially more specific post-conviction provision appears to contradict, and where no court has ever been asked to choose between them.	Source Statute / rule: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(ii); contra Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-104(c) Case: Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, 105 P.3d 1049 (Wyo. 2005) in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed or in such other cases as the state public defender deems appropriate, in a writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court, and in proceedings under W.S. 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 View the source document

Procedure pass verified 31 July 2026; trial-record and weight pass 16 August 2026; capital-counsel pass 7 September 2026. 734 of 750 cells verified against their primary sources. Corrections: accountability@gps.press.

Footnotes

2) appointment when a death-sentenced petitioner is not competent to decide; (3) waiver findings; (4) substitution only per OPDC standards; (9) bar on reappointing trial/automatic-review counsel). 2) Qualification standards are adopted by the Oregon Public Defense Commission under ORS 151.216(1)(k), not by court rule or statute; the operative document is the Attorney Qualification Standards adopted July 16, 2025, effective February 16, 2026, whose PCR Attorney 3 tier governs aggravated-murder post-conviction appointments. The prior PDSC standards (rev. Dec. 19, 2019, Standard IV § 16) remain posted at https://www.oregon.gov/opdc/Forms/PDSC%20Attorney%20Qualification%20Standards.pdf. 3) There is no statewide capital post-conviction defender office; appointment is by the circuit court where the petition is filed, funded by the state through OPDC (ORS 138.590(6); ORS 151.225). 4) ORS 138.500(2)(a) provides that 'when a defendant has been sentenced to death, the request for appointed counsel shall be made to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall appoint suitable counsel' — that provision sits in the appeals article and speaks of a 'defendant,' so it plainly covers automatic and direct review; whether it also covers a capital petitioner's post-conviction appeal (which ORS 138.650 routes to the Court of Appeals) is not resolved by the text, and this survey does not treat it as the capital post-conviction mechanism. 5) Currency check: the posted chapter text is the 2025 edition. The 2026 A&R tables (https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/lawsstatutes/2026OrLawAR.pdf) show that in chapter 138 only ORS 138.510 was amended in 2026 (Or Laws 2026 ch 14 § 5 (HB 4041); ch 131 §§ 7, 9 (SB 1515[↩]
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