Solitary Confinement
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This topic brings 21 research collections together into one overview. GPS puts it to work in three ways:
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Key Findings
Critical data points synthesized across multiple research collections. Tap a card for the full finding, GPS commentary on why it matters, and its source.
78% of prisoners (141 of 182) in Georgia's Special Management Unit had been held in isolation for more than 2 years as of July 2017.
Long-term isolation was the usual experience in the one unit Georgia counts, and the larger Tier II program, which has no outer time limit in policy, has no comparable figure at all.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.- Gumm v. Jacobs litigation filings
39% of prisoners in Georgia's Special Management Unit had a diagnosed mental illness, despite the well-documented harm isolation inflicts on mental health.
Isolation and mental illness overlap in the unit Georgia counts, and the Southern Center for Human Rights reported serious mental illness among most people in Georgia State Prison's Tier II program, so the concern reaches beyond a single unit.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.- Gumm v. Jacobs litigation filings
This datapoint is DERIVED by arithmetic from the out-of-cell minimums quoted above. It states what GDC policy guarantees as a floor, not what any individual actually experiences, and not an observed average. A week contains 168 hours. Tier I (SOP 209.07, 5 hrs/week): 168 - 5 = 163 hours per week in cell; 163 / 7 = 23.3 hours per day average. On the two days outside the five-day exercise entitlement, the guaranteed out-of-cell time is zero, so the floor on those days is 24 hours in cell. Tier II (SOP 209.08, 5 hrs/week): 168 - 5 = 163 hours per week in cell; 163 / 7 = 23.3 hours per day average. No daily distribution is specified. Administrative Segregation generally (SOP 209.06, 1 hr/day x 5 days = 5 hrs/week): 168 - 5 = 163 hours per week in cell; 23.3 hours per day average; 24 hours on the two non-exercise days. RHA-JOAS, juveniles (SOP 209.11, 5 hrs/week): 168 - 5 = 163 hours per week in cell; 23.3 hours per day average. Tier II STEP (SOP 209.45, 4 hrs/day, 7 days/week): 4 x 7 = 28 hours per week out of cell; 168 - 28 = 140 hours in cell; 140 / 7 = 20.0 hours per day. Tier III / SMU (SOP 209.09, 4 hrs/day, Monday through Friday): 4 x 5 = 20 hours per week out of cell; 168 - 20 = 148 hours in cell; 148 / 7 = 21.1 hours per day average. Saturday and Sunday carry no guaranteed out-of-cell time, so the floor on those days is 24 hours in cell. Tier III STEP (SOP 209.55, 4 hrs/day, 7 days/week): 20.0 hours per day, as Tier II STEP.
- Georgia State Prison conditions lawsuit, SCHR
- Georgia Department of Corrections, "Tier Segregation System Fact Sheet" (2018), archived at Digital Library of Georgia
- SOP 227.02 official copy, Georgia Department of Corrections (PowerDMS)
- SOP 209.07: Segregation - Tier I: Disciplinary, Protective Custody and Transient Housing
- SOP 209.08: Administrative Segregation - Tier II
- SOP 209.09: Special Management Unit - Tier III Program (effective 6/18/2026)
- SOP 209.06: Administrative Segregation
- SOP 209.11: Restrictive Housing Assignment - Juvenile Offender Administrative Segregation (RHA-JOAS)
- SOP 209.45: Tier II Segregated Transition Education Program (Tier II STEP)
- SOP 209.55: Special Management Unit - Tier III Segregated Transition Education Program (Tier III STEP)
- GDC Annual Fiscal Report 2020
- Gumm v. Ford, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga.)
- Board of Corrections Rule 125-4-4-.08
- SOP 209.05, Stripped Cells and Temporary Confiscation of Personal Property
- SOP 209.07, Segregation - Tier I: Disciplinary, Protective Custody and Transient Housing
- Georgia Department of Corrections restrictive-housing and segregation SOPs — series 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 227, 507 and 508 (GPS curated policy-library topic 8)
Summing the most recent audit per facility that states a count gives 3,401 segregation cells across 30 facilities; restricting to state-operated facilities gives 3,182 across 28. On a single-cycle basis, the 23 state facilities with a structured Cycle 2 Pre-Audit Questionnaire figure total 2,967, rising to 3,078 across 25 when Wilcox (23 isolation plus 72 double-bunked segregation) and Montgomery (8 isolation plus 8 two-man segregation) are added from narrative. Four caveats: (1) This is a CELL count, not a bed count and not a population count. The audits themselves are explicit that these are different quantities and that many of these cells hold two people — Lee State Prison states '16 cells with 32 beds'; Wilcox '72 double bunked segregation cells'; Montgomery 'eight (8) two-man segregation cells'; Macon '48 double occupancy cells.' The bed count is materially higher than 3,401 and the number of people is a separate unknown. GPS has not interpolated either and should not. (2) It is a floor, not a total. At least six state facilities with published audits contribute zero because no audit of them ever states a figure: Arrendale State Prison (three audits), Augusta State Medical Prison (four audits), Walker State Prison (five audits), Helms Facility, Emanuel Unit, and McRae Women's Facility (no audit in the corpus under that name). (3) It mixes vintages. The figures span Cycle 2 (2017 to 2019), Cycle 3 (2019 to 2021) and Cycle 4 (2021 to 2025). The most recent audits of five of the nine Tier prisons — Georgia Diagnostic and Classification, Hays, Smith, Macon and Wilcox — dropped the segregation-cell field, so those facilities contribute older numbers. (4) It counts all segregation, not only Tier programme housing. Tier units are a subset. Comparison, flagged as a comparison of unlike measures: GDC's FY2014 Annual Fiscal Report states that 2,721 beds were converted to Tier beds at all Level V facilities. The PREA-derived figure of 3,401 is a cell count of all segregation across all facility types and a decade later. The two are not the same measure and must not be presented as a trend.
Built from facility audits because the state publishes no population figure, this floor puts Georgia's segregation capacity in the thousands of cells, though how many people those cells hold remains unknown.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.- Georgia Department of Corrections, "Close Security Facility Fact Sheet"
- SOP 209.45: Tier II Segregated Transition Education Program (Tier II STEP)
- GDC Annual Fiscal Report 2014
- PREA Telfair Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Valdosta SP Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Georgia SP Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Smith SP Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Hays Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Hancock SP Audit Cycle 4
- PREA Calhoun State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Macon State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Baldwin State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Phillips State Prison Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Autry State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Rogers State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Coastal State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Dooly State Prison Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Dodge State Prison Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Washington State Prison Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Rutledge State Prison Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Pulaski State Prison Audit Cycle 4
- PREA Montgomery State Prison Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Burruss Correctional Training Center Audit Cycle 2
- PREA Emanuel Women's Facility Audit Cycle 3
- PREA Whitworth Women's Facility Audit Cycle 4
- PREA West Central Integrated Treatment Facility Audit Cycle 4
- PREA Long Unit Audit Cycle 2
- GDC FY2014 Annual Fiscal Report
- GDC, PREA Ware - Audit (Cycle 2)
- GDC, PREA GDCP - Audit (Cycle 2)
- GDC, PREA Wilcox - Audit (Cycle 3)
- GDC, PREA Lee - Audit (Cycle 3)
- GDC, PREA Coffee CF - Audit (Cycle 4)
- GDC, PREA Wheeler CF - Audit (Cycle 4)
- GDC PREA Audit Reports Cycle 1-4 Archived Index
- GPS facility registry — derived from Georgia Department of Corrections facility data
A federal judge imposed a $2,500-a-day fine on Georgia Department of Corrections officials for failure to comply with an order to improve conditions at the Special Management Unit located at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison.
The strongest peer-reviewed numbers include North Dakota's 74.28% solitary reduction.
What Georgia's Tier System Says Out Loud
Georgia's isolation architecture is written down, in detail, and the policy text is the strongest evidence in the record. Tier I is short-term segregation under SOP 209.07, authorized at "all State Prisons, County CIs, Private Prisons, Intensive Treatment Facilities, Transitional Centers, Probation Detention Centers, and Probation Boot Camp" [#19247]. It is capped at 30 days — except for protective custody, where the cap is disapplied entirely [#19249]. Tier II, SOP 209.08, effective April 2016, is long-term administrative segregation with no maximum duration in the policy at all [#19252]. Tier III is the Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison: a five-phase program with a stated floor of 390 days and a nominal 24-month ceiling that the Department immediately reserves the right to override [#19260], [#19330].
The out-of-cell floors are the part that matters most. Tier I guarantees five hours of exercise per week, delivered on five days, leaving two days with no guaranteed out-of-cell time at all [#19270]. Tier II guarantees the same five hours per week with no daily distribution specified — the five hours may lawfully be delivered in any pattern across the week [#19269]. Run the arithmetic from GDC's own written minimums: 168 hours in a week minus five leaves 163 hours in cell, or 23.3 hours per day for Tier I, Tier II, generic administrative segregation and the juvenile program [#19272].
That number matters because the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners — the Nelson Mandela Rules — define solitary confinement in Rule 44 as 22 or more hours a day *without meaningful human contact* [#1476], and define prolonged solitary as anything past 15 consecutive days [#1450]. Georgia's Tier policies satisfy the first element of Rule 44 by arithmetic. Whether they satisfy the second turns on whether a person has a cellmate, and here the policy is silent in exactly the place it matters: Tier III requires single occupancy, Tier III STEP requires single occupancy, Tier II STEP expressly permits double occupancy, and SOP 209.08 says nothing about occupancy whatsoever [#19278]. SOP 209.06 treats single-celling in administrative segregation as an enumerated exception requiring justification — which implies that multiple occupancy is the ordinary condition [#19404]. At Hancock State Prison, the G-1 "Tier 2" unit is described in two consecutive audit cycles as housing "a maximum of 96 inmates, in double occupancy cells" [#19572].
Two further features of the written policy are worth naming. A single clause in SOP 209.08 lets the Warden or designee modify *every* Tier II condition — hygiene, food, exercise, telephone, visitation, counselling — on undefined "extenuating operational circumstances," with no time limit, no documentation requirement and no notice to the person held [#19276]. And in Tier II the appeal of each 90-day review is decided by the Warden, the same official who approved the placement in the first instance; the exit decision, by contrast, runs all the way to the Director of Field Operations [#19258], [#19256].
The Population Georgia Does Not Count
The single most consequential fact about solitary confinement in Georgia is that nobody outside the Department knows how many people are in it. A systematic review of 110 non-monthly Department of Corrections reports and all 34 distribution sections of the monthly Inmate Statistical Profile series found no published count of the Tier or restrictive-housing population anywhere [#19306]. Georgia submitted no response at all to the 2021 ASCA-Liman time-in-cell survey [#20818]. In 2025 the Department's own auditors could still write that people assigned to Tier II were "not being afforded a minimum of five (5) hours per week of exercise outside the cells" — a finding verified by pulling door sheets [#21525].
What can be counted is cell capacity, and the fragments are large. The FY2014 Annual Fiscal Report — the only system-wide quantification GDC has ever published — records that 2,721 beds were converted to Tier beds "at all Level V facilities" [#19297]. Georgia State Prison's own PREA audit tallied 424 stated Tier beds, more than twice the Special Management Unit's 192 [#19524]. Hays State Prison's Tier units held 303 stated beds, again larger than the entire SMU [#19393]. Smith State Prison's Cycle 4 audit describes one dorm housing 192 Tier 1 offenders and another housing 192 Tier 2 offenders, in 48 double-bunked cells per dorm at 96 people per dorm [#19427], [#19526]. Summing the most recent audit figure per facility gives at least 3,401 segregation cells across 30 facilities — a floor, not a total, mixing vintages from 2017 to 2025, and in many facilities holding two people per cell [#19398].
The only Tier population GDC publishes is a side effect: the SMU at Jackson is carried as a facility row, and held 154 people on September 1, 2026, within a range of 149 to 195 across 75 monthly snapshots [#19304]. Against 192 beds [#19302], that is a unit running below capacity. The Tier II units, which sit inside ordinary prisons, are absorbed invisibly into those prisons' totals. Recent operating figures, obtained separately, show how tight the rest of the system runs: Hays 151 of 151 Tier II beds occupied, Telfair 117 of 117, Ware 138 of 138, Hancock 82 of 83, Macon 119 of 121 [#20750], [#20754], [#20756], [#20749], [#20751], [#20766]. Hays alone holds what is described as the largest restrictive-housing program outside the SMU [#20767].
The Department does report movement, and the numbers do not reconcile. FY2018 states the extended restrictive-housing population fell 41 percent, or 671 people, since January 2017 [#19298]. FY2019 states 40 percent, or 675 people, from the same baseline [#19299]. The two figures cannot both be right; neither is accompanied by the population it started from.
Duration Without a Ceiling
The best public snapshot of Georgia's isolation duration comes from a single unit in July 2017: of 182 people in the Special Management Unit, 78 percent — 141 people — had been held more than two years [#1448]. Forty-four percent had passed four years [#1516]; 26 percent had passed five [#1517]. The Southern Center for Human Rights, drawing on the litigation record, put the average at three to four years and the share held six years or more at about 20 percent [#6609], [#6610]. Individual cases run longer still: Timothy Gumm spent seven and a half years in the SMU despite 14 separate recommendations over four years that he be transferred out [#1518]; Johnny Mack Brown spent nine years [#1519]; Robert Watkins eight to ten [#1520]; Daniel Barfield eight [#6611].
Against the Mandela Rules' 15-day threshold for prolonged solitary confinement, the policy floors are not close. Tier I's 30-day cap is twice the threshold, and is disapplied entirely for protective custody [#19329]. Tier III's 390-day minimum is 26 times the threshold, and its nominal 24-month ceiling roughly 49 times [#19329]. Tier II has no ceiling at all [#19252]. Where audit documents describe Tier II duration, they say "long-term segregation/270 days" at Hays — a figure that appears nowhere in SOP 209.08 [#19403] — and "from nine months to indefinite" and "from 270 days to an indefinite date" at Macon [#19496], [#19497]. Georgia State Prison's audit recorded "up to two years" for Tier II progression [#19478].
The written rules also route people *into* prolonged confinement rather than out of it. Tier II is designated in the discipline policy as the mechanism for continuing confinement once the 30-day disciplinary-isolation cap is reached — in a section whose stated premise is a finding of guilt, and in direct tension with SOP 209.08's own statement that Tier II "is not a punishment measure" [#19292]. Refusal to participate in Tier I is itself a ground for escalation to Tier II [#19487]. Board of Corrections Rule 125-3-2-.10 requires Division Director review and approval for any isolation past 30 days [#19350], which means a Central Office approval record exists for every long-stay admission — a countable floor that GPS has identified as a records target [#19351].
Mental Illness Inside the Box
By the Department's own classification, 39 percent of people in the Special Management Unit had a diagnosed mental illness [#1449]. At the October 2017 inspection, Dr. Craig Haney found 70 of the SMU's roughly 180 prisoners designated mentally ill, and called it "dangerous" to house them there [#6606], [#20413]. He described a cell block "full of inmates with serious mental illness," a man locked for months in a pitch-black cell, and a naked, psychotic man whose cell was covered in blood [#6643]; the E Wing as "bedlam-like" [#21840]; and the SMU overall as "one of the harshest and most draconian" facilities he had seen "in decades of conducting evaluations" [#6624], with harm that "may be irreversible and even fatal" [#1510]. A retired SMU warden, Jose Morales, put the same observation in plain terms to GPB in 2021: "from the day that they arrive, to a year later, they decompensate. They're normal mentally, but then they start talking to themselves. They start to hallucinate" [#21868].
The placement rules push people with mental illness toward the weakest protection. Tier III excludes both Mental Health Level III and Level IV; Tier II excludes only Level IV and admits Level III on a mental-health recommendation [#19254]. The documented effect is that the higher-need group stays eligible for the program whose policy floor is five hours out of cell per week, while those routed away from Tier III go to a specialized mental health unit. At Georgia State Prison, more than 70 percent of the roughly 300 people in the Tier II program were reported to have serious mental illness [#6614], [#20888]. The Department's mental-health staffing policy ranks Tier II among its highest-need settings — alongside death row, the SMU and acute care — and assigns a 1:20 counsellor ratio [#19288].
The professional consensus runs the other way. The American Psychiatric Association opposes prolonged segregation of people with serious mental illness, defining prolonged as longer than three to four weeks [#6628], [#6887]. The National Commission on Correctional Health Care recommends prohibiting solitary for the seriously mentally ill, juveniles and pregnant people, and capping it at under 15 days for everyone else [#6630]. In *Madrid v. Gomez* the court called prolonged solitary for the mentally ill "the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe" [#6635], [#6876]; in 2024 the Third Circuit held it clearly established that a person with known serious mental illness has a constitutional right not to be held in prolonged solitary without penological justification [#6636]. But the Eleventh Circuit, which governs Georgia, has issued no definitive ruling on the constitutional limits of solitary confinement [#1503], and the Supreme Court never has [#1584].
The juvenile program is the hardest version of this. SOP 209.11 sets the same five-hours-per-week exercise floor as adult Tier II, producing the same 23.3 hours a day in cell for a child [#19266], and provides that on turning 18 a juvenile is "reassigned to the same phase of Tier II as the current Phase of RHA-JOAS" — carried from the juvenile program into the adult one [#19265].
The Court Record: Gumm, the Settlement, and the Contempt
Timothy Gumm filed a handwritten complaint in 2015, after five years in the Special Management Unit following a failed escape attempt [#1521]. The certified class was the SMU at Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison. The findings the court adopted described cells "smaller than the average parking space," as little as five hours a week out of cell, no outside light, no congregate programming and frequently locked food-port flaps [#19326]. The January 2019 settlement required minimum out-of-cell time in common areas plus outdoor recreation, programming and GED classes, tablets in cells, mental health evaluations, a general 24-month cap on SMU confinement, and committee review before release [#1523]; it carried $425,000 in attorney's fees [#6641].
Compliance did not follow. At contempt proceedings, six prisoners testified about being denied showers, out-of-cell time, programming, cell cleanout and access to kiosks and book carts [#1529]. One described a cell whose toilet was broken and filled with feces and urine from prior occupants; he urinated in a cup and poured it in the sink, and had no mattress, no clothing, and was held in freezing temperatures — testimony the Department's attorney did not refute [#1528]. Others described "strip cells" on arrival, clothing taken and people left naked or near-naked for hours or days [#1526]. In April 2024 the court held the Department in contempt and imposed monetary sanctions [#20404], reported at $2,500 a day [#21953]. Chief U.S. District Judge Marc Treadwell described SMU officials as "obstinately disobedient," making no real effort to change anything at all [#21866]. The court also recorded that SMU officials could produce no documentation of the mental health screening and counselling the settlement promised [#21871]. Ricardo Castavio Daughtry, the case's lead plaintiff, died at the Special Management Unit in June 2024 [#21904].
The scope of that victory is its most important feature. Every operative settlement term is written in SMU and Tier III vocabulary — the 24-month cap, the mental-health exclusion, the 60- and 90-day out-of-cell evaluations, the four-member statewide panel, the personal approval required to hold anyone past 24 months. GDC codified it into SOP 209.09 alone. SOP 209.08, governing Tier II, has none of it and has not been revised since April 2016 [#19324]. The protections attached to the unit that was litigated and to no other part of the system; the program with the least protection is the larger one. The Department's own auditors found that Valdosta State Prison was not conducting required 30-day reviews, leaving people in Tier I longer than policy allows [#21528].
The federal government's findings point the same direction. The Department of Justice concluded in October 2024 that GDC "fails to control violence even in its segregated housing units and exposes incarcerated persons to an unreasonable risk of harm due to its inappropriate use of segregated housing" [#6904]. Its separate restrictive-housing investigation, opened in April 2024, has not produced public findings [#6661].
Harm, Death, and the People Who Died
People in solitary confinement make up roughly 6 to 8 percent of prison populations and account for approximately half of all prison suicides [#5922], [#1447]. In a New York City jail study, 7.3 percent of admissions involved any solitary confinement but 53.3 percent of self-harm acts occurred within that group, and people punished with solitary were 6.9 times as likely to commit self-harm after controlling for stay length, serious mental illness and demographics [#6625], [#6626]. A 2025 meta-analysis across 171,300 incarcerated people found significantly greater psychological distress and more psychiatric symptoms among those in disciplinary confinement [#1458]. Hagan and colleagues found 43 percent of people with solitary exposure screened positive for PTSD, against 16 percent without [#7278]. Restrictive housing is also associated with elevated mortality after release: hazard ratio 1.24 for all causes within a year, 1.78 for suicide, 2.27 for opioid overdose within two weeks [#20524].
Georgia's own record is thinner than its reputation and worse than its disclosure. GDC has not publicly disclosed suicide and self-harm incidents by tier and facility, mental health classification breakdowns of the Tier II or Tier III populations, or length-of-stay distributions for restrictive housing [#6669]. What exists comes from litigation, press and audits: two suicides in the SMU in 2017 [#6603]; five deaths in the Tier II program by suicide or homicide across 2020 and 2021 [#20865]; at least 12 suicides at Georgia State Prison in the two years before the 2021 lawsuit, some of the men in solitary at the time [#31415]. In February 2023 a man was found dead in his restrictive-housing cell at Calhoun State Prison; staff had shut off his water, closed the food flap, and no one had entered the cell for two days. The cause was dehydration with renal failure [#6902], [#6655]. The Department of Justice documented a transgender woman who filed PREA complaints and asked to be moved from isolation; her request was refused, and she died by suicide in the isolation unit the next day [#25948], [#20406]. Queer and transgender prisoners reported being placed in solitary after reporting assault [#1536]; at Ware, a man who reported a sexual assault had been in segregation nine months by the time DOJ interviewed him [#23267].
The conditions documented at Valdosta State Prison in 2025 and 2026 show what the floor looks like when staffing collapses. Multiple men reported no out-of-cell time for periods of two to 13 months [#21520], and lockdowns of three to 10 months imposed not for discipline but because there was nowhere else to house them [#21529]. One man described a consistent two-to-three-inch layer of odorous brown water on his cell floor while locked in 24 hours a day [#24215]. A GDC record shows no officers at all manning the solitary units on February 26, 2026 [#21513]. A man in a serious medical emergency went two to three hours without an officer responding [#21533]; another, after expressing suicidal ideation, was held for days in a kiosk cage with no sink or toilet and could not get a mental health assessment because he was "not in [the] ACU" [#21531]. A 2023 internal audit found severe lapses in segregation rounds in at least nine prisons, with some days carrying no documented checks at all [#2621].
GPS's death registry names the people behind these categories:
- Miguel Angel Duran died March 1, 2026, at Central State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as suicide.
- Sheqweetta Vaughan died July 9, 2025, at Arrendale State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as unknown or pending. She was found in a segregation cell at the height of summer, and a pathologist stated that the decomposition was inconsistent with required 30-minute welfare checks [#6894].
- Justin Waymon Hollingsworth died June 26, 2025, at Rogers State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as suicide.
- Dominique Cornelius Cole died June 8, 2025, at Wilcox State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as homicide. He had been transferred from a mental health facility days before his death [#22731].
- Ricardo Castavio Daughtry died June 10, 2024, at the Special Management Unit; GPS's registry lists the cause as unknown or pending.
- Christina Marie Buttery died December 21, 2022, at Pulaski State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as unknown or pending.
- Bedarius Jarkeez Clark died August 21, 2021, at Baldwin State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as homicide. He was found unresponsive in the prison's segregation unit [#25143].
- Melissa Christine Thacker died July 25, 2021, at Pulaski State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as suicide.
- Thomas Henry Giles died October 28, 2020, at Augusta State Medical Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as homicide. The Department settled his estate for $5 million [#24021].
- James Wheeler died October 29, 2017, at Wilcox State Prison; the cause shown is suicide, taken from the Department's own cause coding in its 2015–2019 series, obtained by the UCLA Law Behind Bars Data Project through an open records request — not an autopsy finding.
- Demitri Carter died October 29, 2017, at Phillips State Prison; the cause shown is suicide, taken from the Department's own cause coding in the same series — not an autopsy finding.
Georgia has paid for these deaths in some cases: $2,200,000 to the family of Jenna Mitchell, a transgender woman who died by suicide in solitary at Valdosta in 2017 [#6774], $750,000 over James Wheeler [#6798] and $700,000 over Demitri Carter [#6799].
What Has Worked, and What Georgia Has Not Tried
The comparative evidence base is unusually concrete for a correctional topic. North Dakota reduced its use of solitary confinement by 74.28 percent between 2016 and 2020 [#7761], a figure corroborated at roughly 74 percent in an independent account that also records significant decreases in restrictive housing placements for people with serious mental illness [#4685]. Thirty people were returned from long-term solitary to general population in the weeks immediately after North Dakota officials visited Norway in 2015 [#30451]. Colorado cut its administrative segregation population from roughly 1,500 people — 7 percent of its prison population — in 2011 to under 200 by 2017 [#6665]; after banning solitary in two mental health prisons, assaults, forced cell entries and heavy restraint use declined 40 percent [#6666]. Haney testified that Mississippi's drastic reduction in supermax segregation produced an *overall* reduction in misconduct and violence system-wide [#19005]. Oregon's randomized Step Up comparison found 10.0 percent of the step-down group maintained a mental health classification against 53.9 percent of the comparison unit [#20825]; Virginia's step-down program saw the share of people with a mental health diagnosis fall from 47 percent to 32 percent [#20829].
Statutes have moved where case law has not. New York's HALT Act limits solitary to 15 consecutive days and requires four hours of out-of-cell programming daily [#1492], [#1494]; Connecticut and Nevada enacted 15-day caps in 2023 [#1498]; New Jersey set a 20-day maximum in 2020 [#1499]; seven states passed solitary legislation in 2021 alone [#1491], and four — Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota and Vermont — reported holding no one under restrictive-housing definitions at all [#1500]. The National Institute of Justice has called step-down and gang-exit programs "a positive move toward jointly reducing the influence of gangs and overuse of restrictive housing" [#3698] — a model Georgia does not run: the state has no structured gang renouncement or exit program [#3715].
The obstacle is not conceptual. Solitary confinement "requires twice as many guards" per the comparative analysis [#7671], and Georgia's Tier units are already operating under a documented staffing collapse — the same collapse the Department blamed when it told a court that taking men to the outdoor exercise pen was impossible [#21869]. GDC has said publicly that it "recognizes the national reforms surrounding restrictive housing, and we are actively engaged in moving forward with internal procedures that address these trends" [#20870]. House Bill 714 would have prohibited consecutive periods in restrictive housing and capped total time at 90 days a year absent a danger finding; it did not pass [#20873].
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