HANCOCK STATE PRISON

State Prison Close Security GDC (Georgia Dept. of Corrections) Male

29 Source Articles 64 Events

Facility Information

Original Design Capacity: 500 (at 234% capacity)
→ Part of the system-wide architecture — see the receipts
Bed Capacity: 1,191 beds
Current Population: 1,169
Active Lifers: 260 (22.2% of population) · Oct 2026 GDC report
Life Without Parole: 215 (18.4%)

Why design capacity matters: Adding beds to a prison does not increase medical facilities, educational programs, kitchen capacity, counseling services, or recreation areas. In Brown v. Plata (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an order capping California's prisons at 137.5% of design capacity, after federal courts found that crowding was the primary cause of unconstitutional medical and mental-health care.
What the courts held in Brown v. Plata, and how Georgia compares →

Address: 701 Prison Boulevard, Sparta, GA 31087
Phone: (706) 444-1000
Fax: (706) 444-1137
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 339, Sparta, GA 31087
County: Hancock County
Opened: 1992
Operator: GDC (Georgia Dept. of Corrections)

Security Classification

Last updated: October 2, 2026

867 of the 1,168 people held here are classified Close security (74.2%), as of September 23, 2026.

Security level	People	Share
Close	867	74.2%
Medium	265	22.7%
Minimum	36	3.1%
Total	1,168

Earlier count (undated table, produced October 22, 2025): 885 of 1,195 Close (74.1%).

Restrictive housing beds

Program	Beds	Occupied
Tier II	83	82

Source: Georgia Department of Corrections records produced to GPS under the Open Records Act (R031471-090226, R024615-101925, R031710-091426). A person's security level is GDC's classification of that person, which can differ from the prison's own designation.

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Leadership & Accountability (as of 2026 records)

Officials currently holding positional authority at this facility, with deaths attributed to GPS-tracked records during their leadership tenure. Inclusion reflects role-based accountability, not legal findings of personal culpability. Death counts shown as facility / career.

Role	Name	Since	Deaths this facility / career
WARDEN 2 (facility lead)	Williams, JOE	2025-01-01	11 / 13
Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy)	Sanford, Paul Anthony	2023-01-01	12 / 12
Deputy Warden of Administration (facility deputy)	Adams, Chequita	2026-01-16	5 / 5
Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment (facility deputy)	Mitchell, Rashedah Fayola	2026-02-01	4 / 4
Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy)	Mahoney, Tamika	2026-07-16	1 / 1

About

Last updated October 18, 2026.(DS)

Hancock State Prison: A Facility Built for 500, Rated for 1,191, and Watched by Almost No One

Hancock State Prison sits outside Sparta in Hancock County, a close-security men's facility that opened in 1992 on a design capacity of 500 and today carries a rated capacity of 1,191. GPS's facility record puts the current population at 1,169 — 98.2 percent of rated capacity, and more than twice what the plant was drawn to hold. The prison holds many of the state's highest-risk prisoners under Tier I and Tier II close-custody management, with multiple segregation and isolation units and an annex area alongside dormitory housing. Its public record is not a record of isolated incidents. It is a record of a facility where the ratio of people to officers, the age of the locking hardware, and the density of gang affiliation have combined into a sustained mortality pattern: GPS's registry records 27 deaths at Hancock since January 1, 2020, 17 of them homicides. The threads below — the vacancy crisis, the named dead, the litigation and settlements, the September 2026 stabbing reports, and the food-service inspections that keep coming back clean — are the same story told from different angles.

Built for 500, Rated for 1,191, Staffed at a Fraction

The most concrete number in Hancock's public record is not a death count. It is a vacancy rate. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that 73.5 percent of correctional officer positions at Hancock State Prison were vacant as of October 2024 — one of the highest rates in the Georgia Department of Corrections — leaving 49 officers on staff for more than 1,100 prisoners. A separate AJC accounting put the figure above 70 percent vacant as of the same month. The same reporting described consultants finding that staffing vacancies at 20 of Georgia's 34 prisons had reached "emergency levels," making it impossible to keep up with even basic protocols, and that cell locks at many prisons are broken.

That last detail is not incidental at Hancock. GPS has documented a systemwide pattern in which most GDC facilities are 30 to 40-plus years old, with deferred maintenance producing broken cell-door locks, inoperative surveillance and fire-alarm systems, mold and water failures, and pest infestations — a pattern GPS treats as a force multiplier for the violence, classification, and mortality crises documented at the facility level. At Hancock, the vacancy rate and the hardware failure are the same fact viewed twice: a locking system that does not lock is only a security system if someone is watching it.

The state's own response has been fiscal. The AJC reported that Gov. Brian Kemp, citing the consultants' findings, proposed allocating an additional $600 million over 18 months for staffing, emergency repairs, and infrastructure. GPS has separately documented that officer vacancies across Georgia's prisons have run between 49.3 and 60 percent systemwide for multiple years against a national standard of no more than 10 percent, that the hiring pipeline cannot close the gap, and that Georgia ranks last of 50 states for correctional-officer pay. The October 2024 DOJ findings letter, as GPS has characterized it, concluded that GDC leadership had "lost control of its facilities" and faulted the Department for placing "too much blame on gangs and insufficient emphasis on understaffing."

GPS records show the staffing problem persisting into the present: 12 distinct sources reporting staffing shortages at this facility across five months of 2026, at severities ranging from critical to low.

The Named Dead: Twenty-Seven Deaths Since 2020

GPS's mortality registry records 27 deaths at Hancock State Prison since January 1, 2020 — a floor, not a ceiling, since GDC reports deaths roughly two months late. Seventeen are coded as homicides, four as unknown or pending, three as natural or medical, two as suicides, and one as other. The full list is maintained at GPS's facility death registry. The 25 most recent:

Albert Chapa died July 30, 2026, at Hancock State Prison at age 57; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending.
Jacorey Derrelle Pearson died April 7, 2026, at Hancock State Prison at age 36; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Jerrod Johnson died February 18, 2026, at Hancock State Prison at age 27; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Jaylin Bell died February 6, 2026, at Hancock State Prison at age 32; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Steven Monroe Wood died January 25, 2026, at Hancock State Prison at age 54; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Andre Rashad Weems died September 9, 2025, at Hancock State Prison at age 36; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Brian Smith died July 24, 2025, at Hancock State Prison at age 30; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending.
Corey Jose July died June 17, 2025, at Hancock State Prison at age 33; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
John T Childree died April 9, 2025, at Hancock State Prison at age 60; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending.
William Holeman died January 30, 2025, at Hancock State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Prince Porter died January 30, 2025, at Hancock State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Travon Montrell Walthour died October 13, 2024, at Hancock State Prison at age 29; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Ralph Thompson died October 8, 2024, at Hancock State Prison at age 53; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending.
Timothy Dale Hicks died August 22, 2023, at Hancock State Prison at age 37; GPS's registry lists the cause as Suicide.
Francisco Melgar-Saldivar died August 12, 2023, at Hancock State Prison at age 26; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Roland Lamont Phillips died June 28, 2023, at Hancock State Prison at age 33; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Norman Jackson Samples died December 27, 2022, at Hancock State Prison at age 59; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Zackery Phillip Brown died December 23, 2022, at Hancock State Prison at age 39; GPS's registry lists the cause as Suicide.
Terry Lee Bishop died October 18, 2022, at Hancock State Prison at age 49; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Antione Lamar Bush died June 18, 2022, at Hancock State Prison at age 32; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical.
Charles Tristen Mckee died May 23, 2022, at Hancock State Prison at age 24; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Terrill Bernard Howard died October 17, 2021, at Hancock State Prison at age 51; GPS's registry lists the cause as Other.
Michael Anthony Brown died June 26, 2021, at Hancock State Prison at age 54; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical.
Dwayne Zackery died February 12, 2021, at Hancock State Prison at age 22; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
Rashad Bolton died January 4, 2021, at Hancock State Prison at age 29; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.

The registry is a floor for the whole system as well: GPS has independently tracked 1,918 deaths in GDC custody since 2020.

What the Death Certificates and Incident Reports Describe

The AJC's death-by-death reconstruction of Hancock's violence supplies the detail the registry cannot. Rashad Bolton, 29, died January 4, 2021, from a puncture wound to the chest with a sharp object; his parents filed a lawsuit claiming he was stabbed to death. Dwayne Zackery Jr., 22, died February 12, 2021, from a stab wound to the chest with a homemade knife; death data state he was stabbed by his cellmate. Cesar Arnold Pastrana Morales, 33, died March 13, 2020, from a stab wound to the chest, with an incident report showing five other inmates involved.

The pattern continues without interruption. Charles "Tristen" James McKee, 24, died May 23, 2022, after being stabbed 13 times in the back and head. Terry Lee Bishop, 49, died October 18, 2022, from blunt force trauma, acute toxicity of methamphetamine, and acute toxicity of cannabinoids; death data show he was beaten to death by another prisoner. Norman Samples, 59, died December 27, 2022, from blunt force injuries to the head and torso. Roland Lamont Phillips, 33, died June 28, 2023, from multiple sharp-force injuries including 11 puncture wounds to the front torso and one to the neck; a murder warrant was served against his cellmate. Francisco Zaldivar Melgar-Saldivar, 26, died August 12, 2023, from strangulation and blunt force injuries.

Travon Walthour, 29, was killed October 13, 2024, with four other prisoners involved according to GDC incident report data. In September 2024, seven prisoners were disciplined for attacking an inmate in a gang-related assault, according to records the AJC obtained. On January 30, 2025, William Holeman, 34, and Prince Porter, 38, were found dead in the same dorm about 15 to 20 feet apart after what the AJC described as gang-related violence; Porter had a single puncture wound in his upper back, Holeman had no visible marks. A third prisoner was hospitalized. The coroner leaned toward homicide in at least one case.

McKee: The DOJ Finding, the Machete, and the Request to Be Moved

The McKee case is the one where the federal government's own findings enter Hancock's record directly. The AJC reported that the U.S. Department of Justice investigation found McKee tried to escape gang members who were beating and stabbing him by jumping through stair railings to the floor below, but the gang members continued to stab him there; another prisoner who tried to stop the attack was seriously wounded. McKee, 24, identified as LGBTQ. A lawsuit alleges he was placed in a dorm with known gang members who were hostile to LGBTQ inmates, and that staff failed to act on his repeated requests to be moved the day before he was murdered.

Cleveland Gary was convicted in Hancock County for the slaying — the AJC reported he struck McKee six times in the head with a 17-inch homemade machete after a fight had already ended. The state's own liability ledger records a $424,710 payout tied to Hancock State Prison in connection with the 2022 incident, per the Georgia Department of Administrative Services Risk Management settlement ledger obtained through open records.

That settlement is one of several. The same ledger records $437,500 tied to Hancock for the 2021 Rashad Bolton incident; $600,000 for the 2019 Geberyesus Yemane Selassie incident; $13,800 for Freedie Barnes (2016); $250 for Rico Sterling (2016); and $2,000 for Michael Bolick (2015). Separately, a claim filed against the state alleges Francisco Zaldivar Melgar-Saldivar was not provided appropriate medical care after being attacked by another prisoner. And the AJC reported that prison officials placed Amanuel Selassie Geberyesus in a regular cell contrary to a counselor's advice after he expressed suicidal thoughts, and he subsequently hung himself.

Corey July, Vershaun Smith, and the Locked Gate

On June 17, 2025, Corey Jose July was fatally stabbed in the Hancock State Prison yard. Prosecutors said surveillance video showed Vershaun Smith chasing July, cornering him at a locked gate, and stabbing him multiple times; WGXA reported the footage was shown at trial. A Hancock County jury convicted Smith of malice murder, and Judge Alison T. Burleson sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole, according to the Ocmulgee District Attorney's Office. July was 33.

GPS's own coverage of the July killing is not a source this page can lean on: an article titled "Death at a Locked Gate: Georgia Fences Men In, Then Locks the Only Way Out" carries an unresolved fact-check flag and is given no evidentiary weight here. The underlying facts above stand on the news reporting and the court outcome.

2026: Four Deaths, a Brawl, and a Stabbing Report Nobody Answered

Hancock's 2026 opened badly. Steven Wood, 54, serving life with possibility of parole for a murder conviction out of Cherokee County, died January 25, 2026, following an altercation with another inmate; his body was turned over to the county coroner for transport to the GBI crime lab. The GDC Office of Professional Standards opened an investigation, which the Department described as standard procedure. Jaylin Bell, 32, died February 6, 2026, following an altercation with his roommate, with the same coroner and GBI sequence and the same OPS investigation. Jerrod Johnson, 27, died February 18, 2026. Jacorey Derrelle Pearson, 36, died April 7, 2026; the GDC's Office of Professional Standards investigated, and the investigation was described as ongoing. Albert Chapa, 57, died July 30, 2026, with the cause still listed as unknown or pending in GPS's registry.

Between those deaths, on the night of January 13, 2026, at least two inmates were injured during a brawl inside the prison; officials did not detail the severity of the injuries or say whether the injured were taken to a hospital. News coverage also reported a fourth inmate death at Hancock in 2026 in connection with a statewide lockdown that followed a gang-related altercation at Smith State Prison — a different facility.

Then came September. Tyler Ryals, a former GDC officer, wrote on Facebook on September 3, 2026, that he had received information about potential gang tensions at Hancock, called the prison's main control and spoke with Captain Williamson, and was later told that the lieutenant on duty had gone to the affected area and asked whether everyone was okay "without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check." About an hour after that, Ryals wrote, he received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings, and that officers were unaware "because those buildings had been left without an officer present." He described calling again, being told an officer went only as far as the door, and the buildings being left without an officer once more. He put the number of injured at up to five, including two reportedly seriously wounded, and said that because staff allegedly provided no medical assistance, other incarcerated people were attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. He also relayed an allegation that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies and selling them in the dorms because incidents requiring people to treat one another had become so common.

These are Ryals's public account, not a GPS finding. Christal Pate shared the same account on Facebook on September 4, 2026, describing Ryals as a former correctional officer who rose to deputy warden at Telfair State Prison. On October 10, 2026, a post in the Ga. Prisons Exposed Facebook group, signed by Marcus Johnson as administrator of the Georgia Prison Reform Coalition, stated that a man named Keron had survived the stabbing and been sent back to the prison — and, per the post, returned to the same dorm and cell where the incident occurred.

GPS records show the pattern at scale: 21 distinct sources reporting alleged inmate-on-inmate assaults at this facility across eight months of 2026 at critical and high severity, with an external complaint filed to the U.S. Department of Justice; four sources reporting alleged excessive force; six reporting alleged staff misconduct; six reporting alleged medical neglect; and four reporting unattended mental-health crises in October 2026 alone. GPS has received accounts of use of force at Hancock State Prison, and multiple sources at the facility report an in-custody death attributed to violence.

Inspections That Come Back Clean

Against all of that, the Georgia Department of Public Health's food-safety record at Hancock is nearly spotless. Inspector William Minton scored the facility 100 (Grade A) on October 13, 2023; 100 twice on June 25, 2024, alongside a 93 with two violations for eating/drinking/tobacco use and personal cleanliness; 100 twice on December 31, 2024; 100 and 96 on May 27, 2025, the 96 carrying one violation for food-contact surfaces cleaned and sanitized; 100 twice on December 18, 2025; and 100 twice on June 25, 2026. Every inspection was routine.

GPS has documented why those scores should not be read as a clean bill of health. GPS's systemic finding is that DPH inspection scores systematically fail to capture food-service sanitation failure across GDC kitchens — tray-sanitizing dishwashers broken for sustained periods, sustained roach and rodent infestation in kitchen and serving areas, meals served on visibly contaminated trays — because inspections are scheduled walkthroughs that do not assess equipment under load. The Marshall Project independently reported in May 2026 on rats in kitchens, insects in food, moldy trays, and visible malnutrition across Georgia facilities. GPS has also documented that GDC spends approximately $1.69 per person per day on food, under 60 cents per meal, against an FDA Thrifty Food Plan estimate of roughly $10 per day for an adult man's nutritionally adequate diet. A perfect score on a scheduled walkthrough and a broken dishwasher can both be true.

Contraband, Staff, and the Corruption Channel

GDC's own published contraband reports record 60 incidents at Hancock in GPS's dataset, with arrests reported across nearly every year from 2011 forward — four in 2011, six in 2012, ten in 2019, twelve in 2020, six in 2024, nine in 2025, and three in 2026. Staff-class actors appear throughout: ten listed as "Officer," three as "Correctional Officer," one as "Former Officer." GDC publishes no dispositions, and an arrest is not a conviction.

The most detailed case is instructive. The AJC reported that in January 2019, Hancock officer Jasmine Nicole Hall was caught with water bottles containing compartments filled with meth, pot, ecstasy and hydrocodone, and that phone evidence revealed an ongoing drug distribution scheme across eight prisons totaling over $5,000 in transactions. More broadly, the AJC reported that short-staffing, safety problems and corruption inside Georgia's prisons have allowed prisoners to operate large criminal enterprises from their cells, with 28 major drug-trafficking cases filed between 2015 and 2024. A federal indictment announced in January 2025 charged dozens of people for conspiring to distribute cocaine, methamphetamine, oxycodone and marijuana — including inmates at Wilcox, Telfair, Macon, Georgia Diagnostic and Correctional Prison, and the privately operated Wheeler and Jenkins facilities. Hancock was not named in that indictment; it is cited here only to show the scale of the channel.

A Facility in the System's Image

Hancock is not an outlier so much as a concentration. The DOJ's 2024 findings described violence, sexual assaults and gang-run prisons in Georgia fueled by a culture of indifference, and GPS has documented the systemwide frame: roughly 31 percent of the state's incarcerated population are validated members of 315 different security threat groups, more than double the national average, and DOJ and the Guidehouse 2024 assessment independently concluded that gangs effectively run multiple facilities, controlling access to phones, showers, food, and bed assignments. GPS treats staffing collapse and gang assumption of facility control as the integrated structural finding that explains the per-facility violence, classification, mortality, and infrastructure narratives — and Hancock, at 73.5 percent officer vacancy with 17 homicides in under seven years, is where that integration is most visible.

The facility's leadership as of this writing: Warden JOE Williams, in post since January 2025; Deputy Wardens of Security Paul Anthony Sanford and Tamika Mahoney; Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment Rashedah Fayola Mitchell; and Deputy Warden of Administration Chequita Adams. GPS records show five external complaints filed to oversight bodies regarding this facility in the past year, two of them to the DOJ Civil Rights Division, and six family-safety-concern signals at critical and high severity.

Sources

This analysis draws on reporting by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, WGXA, and 41NBC; Georgia Department of Public Health food-safety inspection records; the Georgia Department of Administrative Services Risk Management settlement ledger obtained through open records; GDC contraband reports as published by the Department; federal court filings and the U.S. Department of Justice's 2024 findings on Georgia's prisons; public Facebook posts by Tyler Ryals, Christal Pate, and the Georgia Prison Reform Coalition; GPS's mortality registry and intelligence records; and GPS's own systemic findings on staffing, infrastructure, food service, and gang control.

Mortality Statistics

31 deaths documented at this facility from 2020 to present.

Deaths by Year

2026: 9
2025: 6
2024: 2
2023: 3
2022: 5
2021: 4
2020: 2

View all deaths at this facility →

County Public Health Department

Food service and sanitation at HANCOCK STATE PRISON fall under the jurisdiction of the Hancock County Environmental Health Department. Incarcerated people cannot choose where they eat — public health inspectors carry an elevated responsibility to hold this kitchen to the same standards applied to any restaurant.

Contact

Title: Environmental Health Director
Address: P.O. Box 398
Sparta, GA 31087
Phone: (706) 444-6616
Email: hancock.eh@dph.ga.gov
Website: Visit department website →

Why this matters

GPS has documented black mold on chow-hall ceilings, cold and contaminated trays, spoiled milk, and pest contamination at Georgia prisons. The Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration and untreated diabetes tied to food and water deprivation. Advance-notice inspections let facilities stage temporary fixes that disappear once inspectors leave.

Unannounced inspections by the county health department are one of the few outside checks on kitchen conditions behind the fence.

How you can help

Write to the county inspector and request an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operation at this facility. A short, respectful letter citing Georgia food-safety regulations is more powerful than you think — inspectors respond to public concern.

Email the Inspector

Food Safety Inspections

Georgia Department of Public Health

Latest score: 100 (Jun 25, 2026)

View DPH report ↗

What the score doesn't measure. DPH grades kitchen compliance on inspection day — food storage, temperatures, pest control. It does not grade whether today's trays are clean. GPS reporting has found broken dishwashers at most Georgia state prisons we've documented; trays go out wet, stacked, and visibly moldy — including at facilities with recent scores near 100.

Who inspects. Most Georgia state prisons sit in rural counties — often with fewer than 20,000 people, several with fewer than 10,000. The environmental health inspector lives in that community and often knows the kitchen staff personally. Rural inspection regimes don't have the structural independence you'd expect in a city-sized health department. Read the scores accordingly.

Read the investigation: “Dunked, Stacked and Served: Why Georgia Prison Trays Are Making People Sick”

Recent inspections

Date	Score	Purpose
Jun 25, 2026	100	Routine
Dec 18, 2025	100	Routine
May 27, 2025	96	Routine
Dec 31, 2024	100	Routine
Jun 25, 2024	100	Routine
Oct 13, 2023	100	Routine

Source: Georgia Department of Public Health — data last refreshed October 4, 2026. Search all Georgia inspections ↗

Code	Violation	Pts	Inspector notes
2B	food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(7)(b) - food contact surfaces and utensils - cleaning frequency (p, c) Corrected	4	Observed black slimy substance in ice machine beside handwash station. Equipment Food-Contact Surfaces and Utensils.1. Equipment food-contact surfaces and utensils shall be cleaned:(i) Before each use with a different type of raw animal food such as beef, fish, lamb, pork, or poultry. It does not apply if the food-contact surface or utensil is in contact with a succession of different types of raw meat and raw poultry each requiring a higher cooking temperature as specified under DPH Rule 511-6-1.04(5)(a) than the previous type such as preparing raw pork followed by cutting raw poultry on the same cutting board; P(ii) Each time there is a change from working with raw foods to working with ready-to-eat foods; P(iii) Between uses with raw fruits and vegetables and with Time/Temperature Control for safety food; P(iv) Before using or storing a food temperature measuring device; P and(v) At any time during the operation when contamination may have occurred. P2. Except as specified in paragraph 3 of this subsection, if used with time/temperature control for safety food, equipment food-contact surfaces and utensils shall be cleaned at least every 4 hours throughout the day. P3. Surfaces of utensils and equipment contacting time/temperature control for safety food may be cleaned less frequently than every 4 hours if:(i) In storage, containers of time/temperature control for safety food and their contents are maintained at temperatures specified under DPH Rule 511-6-1-.04 and the containers are cleaned when they are empty;(ii) Utensils and equipment are used to prepare food in a refrigerated room or area that is maintained at one of the temperatures in the following chart and:(I) The utensils and equipment are cleaned at the frequency in the following chart that corresponds to the temperature:Temperature Cleaning Frequency41ºF (5.0ºC) or less 24 hours>41ºF - 45ºF (>5.0ºC - 7.2ºC) 20 hours>45ºF - 50ºF (>7.2ºC - 10.0ºC) 16 hours>50ºF - 55ºF (>10.0ºC - 12.8ºC) 10 hoursand(II) The cleaning frequency based on the ambient temperature of the refrigerated room or area is documented in the food service establishment.(iii) Temperature measuring devices are maintained in contact with food, such as when left in a container of deli food or in a roast, held at temperatures specified under DPH Rule 511-6-1- .04;(iv) Equipment is used for storage of packaged or unpackaged food, such as a reach-in refrigerator, and the equipment is cleaned at a frequency necessary to preclude accumulation of soil residues;(v) The cleaning schedule is approved based on consideration of:(I) Characteristics of the equipment and its use,(II) The type of food involved,(III) The amount of food residue accumulation, and(IV) The temperature at which the food is maintained during the operation and the potential for the rapid and progressive multiplication of pathogenic or toxigenic microorganisms that are capable of causing foodborne disease; or(vi) In-use utensils are intermittently stored in a container of water in which the water is maintained at 135ºF (57ºC) or more and the utensils and container are cleaned at least every 24 hours or at a frequency necessary to preclude accumulation of soil residues.4. Dining counters and table-tops shall be cleaned and sanitized routinely after removing all soiled tableware and food trays shall be cleaned and sanitized after each use by one of the following methods:(i) A two step method in which one cloth, rinsed in sanitizing solution is used to clean food debris from the surface and a second cloth in separate sanitizing solution is used to rinse;(ii) Sanitizing solution is sprayed onto the surface and the surface is then wiped clean with a disposable towel;(iii) If used for cleaning and sanitizing, single-use disposable sanitizer wipes shall be used in accordance with EPA-registered label use instructions; or(iv) Other methods approved by the Health Authority.(v) Food trays may be cleaned and sanitized the same as table ware.5. Except when dry cleaning methods are used as specified under subsection (7)(e) of this Rule, surfaces of utensils and equipment contacting food that is not time/temperature control for safety food shall be cleaned:(i) At any time when contamination may have occurred;(ii) At least every 24 hours for iced tea dispensers including nozzles and consumer self-service utensils such as tongs, scoops, or ladles;(iii) Before restocking consumer self-service equipment and utensils such as condiment dispensers and display containers; and(iv) In equipment such as ice bins and beverage dispensing nozzles and enclosed components of equipment such as ice makers, cooking oil storage tanks and distribution lines, beverage and syrup dispensing lines or tubes, coffee bean grinders, and water vending equipment:(I) At a frequency specified by the manufacturer; or(II) Absent manufacturer specifications, at a frequency necessary to preclude accumulation of soil or mold. Machine was turned off and employee began scrubbing.

View full inspector report on DPH →

Recent reports (26)

Source-attributed observations and allegations from news coverage and reports submitted to GPS. Each entry credits its source.

ALLEGATION According to WGXA Recorded by GPS: Sep 21, 2026
Vershaun Smith chased down and stabbed fellow inmate Corey Jose July multiple times, killing him, as shown in surveillance footage presented at trial.
"The jury was shown surveillance footage of Smith chasing down and stabbing July to death, according to the Oculmulgee District Attorney's Office."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to 41NBC Published: Aug 13, 2026
Smith chased July, cornered him at a locked gate, and stabbed him multiple times in the prison yard.
"Prosecutors said surveillance video showed Smith chasing July, cornering him at a locked gate, and stabbing him multiple times."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025
A lawsuit alleges Charles 'Tristen' James McKee was placed in a dorm with known gang members who were hostile to LGBTQ inmates, contributing to his death.
"A lawsuit alleges he was placed in a dorm with known gang members who were hostile to LGBTQ inmates."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025
A claim filed against the state alleges Francisco Zaldivar Melgar-Saldivar was not provided appropriate medical care after being attacked by another prisoner.
"A claim filed against the state alleges that he wasn't provided appropriate medical care after being attacked by another prisoner."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025
Prison officials placed Amanuel Selassie Geberyesus in a regular cell contrary to a counselor's advice after he expressed suicidal thoughts, and he subsequently hung himself.
"He told counselors that he had thoughts of suicide but contrary to a counselor's advice prison officials placed him in in a regular cell, where he hung himself in March 2019."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025
Staff failed to act on Charles 'Tristen' McKee's repeated requests to be moved the day before he was murdered by gang members.
"McKee, who identified as LGBTQ, was beaten and stabbed by multiple gang members after he jumped through stair railings trying to escape. The day before, the report says, he had repeatedly asked to be moved, stating that his life was in danger."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to 41NBC Published: Feb 10, 2026
Inmate Jaylin Bell died following an altercation with his roommate at Hancock State Prison.
"According to the GDC, Bell died following an altercation with his roommate on February 6."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 14, 2026
A 2024 U.S. Department of Justice report described violence, sexual assaults and gang-run prisons in Georgia, fueled by a culture of indifference.
"In 2024, a report published by the U.S. Department of Justice described violence, sexual assaults and gang-run prisons in Georgia, fueled by a culture of indifference."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Hancock State Prison has one of the GDC's highest correctional officer vacancy rates, with 73.5% of positions vacant as of October, leaving only 49 officers on staff for over 1,100 prisoners.
"But Hancock has struggled with one of the GDC's highest correctional officer vacancy rates. In October, the agency reported that 73.5% of correctional officer positions were vacant, with only 49 officers on staff."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Consultants found that staffing vacancies at 20 of Georgia's 34 prisons have reached 'emergency levels,' making it impossible to keep up with even basic protocols, and that cell locks at many prisons are broken.
"Consultants hired last year by Gov. Brian Kemp found that staffing vacancies for correctional officers at 20 of Georgia's 34 prisons have reached 'emergency levels,' making it impossible to keep up with even basic protocols, according to a copy of the consultants' draft report obtained by the AJC. Compounding the risks, the consultants reported that cell locks at many prisons are broken, allowing prisoners to roam and gang members to intimidate other inmates."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Short-staffing, safety problems and corruption inside Georgia's prisons have allowed prisoners to operate large criminal enterprises from their cells, with 28 major drug-trafficking cases filed between 2015 and 2024.
"The short-staffing, safety problems and corruption inside Georgia's prisons have also allowed prisoners to operate large criminal enterprises from their cells. From 2015 to 2024, the AJC found that prosecutors filed 28 major cases involving drug-trafficking operations run from inside Georgia state prisons."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Cleveland Gary was convicted of killing fellow inmate Charles Tristen McKee by striking him six times in the head with a 17-inch homemade machete after a fight had already ended.
""The altercation ended, but Gary was not finished. He walked over to McKee and struck him six times in the head with a 17-inch homemade machete," Barksdale said in the announcement."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Mar 31, 2025
More than 70% of correctional officer jobs at Hancock State Prison were vacant as of October 2024.
"According to staffing records obtained by the AJC, about two-thirds of the correctional officer jobs at Macon State Prison were not filled as of October, and at Hancock more than 70% of the correctional officer jobs were vacant."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Gang-related violence at Hancock State Prison resulted in two prisoner deaths, with the coroner leaning toward homicide in at least one case.
"Based on the circumstances, Andrews said he is 'leaning toward homicide' in Porter's case but is unsure at this point how to describe Holeman's death."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Hancock State Prison has one of the GDC's highest correctional officer vacancy rates, with 73.5% of positions vacant, creating dangerous conditions.
"In October, the agency reported that 73.5% of correctional officer positions were vacant, with only 49 officers on staff."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Consultants found staffing vacancies at 20 of Georgia's 34 prisons have reached 'emergency levels,' making it impossible to maintain basic protocols, and broken cell locks allow prisoners to roam and gang members to intimidate other inmates.
"Consultants hired last year by Gov. Brian Kemp found that staffing vacancies for correctional officers at 20 of Georgia's 34 prisons have reached 'emergency levels,' making it impossible to keep up with even basic protocols, according to a copy of the consultants' draft report obtained by the AJC. Compounding the risks, the consultants reported that cell locks at many prisons are broken, allowing prisoners to roam and gang members to intimidate other inmates."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
Short-staffing, safety problems and corruption inside Georgia's prisons have allowed prisoners to operate large criminal enterprises from their cells, with 28 major drug-trafficking cases filed from 2015 to 2024.
"The short-staffing, safety problems and corruption inside Georgia's prisons have also allowed prisoners to operate large criminal enterprises from their cells. From 2015 to 2024, the AJC found that prosecutors filed 28 major cases involving drug-trafficking operations run from inside Georgia state prisons."
Read source →
ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 31, 2025
A U.S. Department of Justice report found stunning violence, rampant sexual assaults and other dangerous conditions in Georgia's prisons.
"McKee's case was among those described in the U.S. Department of Justice report released last year that found stunning violence, rampant sexual assaults and other dangerous conditions in the state's prisons."
Read source →
ALLEGATION Submitted via GPS public submission form Incident: Mar 15, 2026
INCIDENT — HANCOCK STATE PRISON: Report of a stabbing incident in the visitation area at Hancock State Prison. Multiple…
Read source →
ALLEGATION Submitted via GPS public submission form Incident: Mar 21, 2026
INCIDENT — HANCOCK STATE PRISON: GF (Gangster Disciples) inmates attacked Crips inmates while they were sleeping in H1 dormitory…
Read source →
OBSERVATION According to Facebook, Ron Chezz Published: Oct 10, 2026
Ron Chezz wrote in the Ga. Prisons Exposed Facebook group on October 10, 2026: "UPDATE ON THE STABBING AT HANCOCK STATE PRISON I have received an update that Mr. Keron survived the stabbing and was sent back to the prison. However, I have been told that he was returned to the same dorm and cell where the incident occurred. If this information is accurate, serious questions must be asked about his safety and the steps being taken to protect him from further harm. I have also heard from multiple incarcerated individuals who report that this happens at other prisons throughout Georgia. These reports raise serious concerns about how incarcerated individuals are protected after violent incidents. No one should have to fear being placed right back into the same environment where they were attacked. The Georgia Department of Corrections must take safety, accountability, and appropriate housing decisions seriously. Nothing has changed since the DOJ’s Georgia prison findings. We continue to hear reports of violence and serious safety concerns. Families deserve answers, and incarcerated individuals deserve meaningful protection. This is why prison reform and accountability cannot wait. Marcus Johnson, Administrator Georgia Prison Reform Coalition (GPRC) GPRCLA@protonmail.com"
"UPDATE ON THE STABBING AT HANCOCK STATE PRISON I have received an update that Mr. Keron survived the stabbing and was sent back to the prison. However, I have been told that he was returned to the same dorm and cell where the incident occurred. If this information is accurate, serious questions must be asked about his safety and the steps being taken to protect him from further harm. I have also heard from multiple incarcerated individuals who report that this happens at other prisons throughout Georgia. These reports raise serious concerns about how incarcerated individuals are protected after violent incidents. No one should have to fear being placed right back into the same environment where they were attacked. The Georgia Department of Corrections must take safety, accountability, and appropriate housing decisions seriously. Nothing has changed since the DOJ’s Georgia prison findings. We continue to hear reports of violence and serious safety concerns. Families deserve answers, and incarcerated individuals deserve meaningful protection. This is why prison reform and accountability cannot wait. Marcus Johnson, Administrator Georgia Prison Reform Coalition (GPRC) GPRCLA@protonmail.com"
Read source →
OBSERVATION According to Facebook, Christal Pate Published: Sep 4, 2026
Christal Pate wrote on Facebook on September 4, 2026: "This post came from Tyler Ryals who is an ex correctionaln officer all the way to Deputy Warden at Telfair State Prison (georgia). It's no wonder there are so many deaths of inmates in the state of Georgia. It's an astounding amount. Ga state prisons ya'll must do better Read until the end. Your not going to believe what happens on the daily in our prisons. WHY, JUST WHY -------------------------------------------------------------,--------- URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those […]"
"This post came from Tyler Ryals who is an ex correctionaln officer all the way to Deputy Warden at Telfair State Prison (georgia). It's no wonder there are so many deaths of inmates in the state of Georgia. It's an astounding amount. Ga state prisons ya'll must do better Read until the end. Your not going to believe what happens on the daily in our prisons. WHY, JUST WHY -------------------------------------------------------------,--------- URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those incarcerated that she had been instructed to place them on lockdown—but that she was not going to do so at that time. She reportedly told them to get their showers and ice “just in case.” These reports require an immediate, hands-on emergency response—not an officer standing at a doorway and asking whether everyone is okay. Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections must immediately: Send adequate security personnel inside E-1 and E-2. Conduct individual welfare and medical checks—not a verbal inquiry from the doorway. Locate every injured person and provide professional emergency treatment. Secure and account for all medical supplies, including suture kits. Preserve all surveillance footage, radio communications, control-room logs, incident reports and staffing records. Explain why these buildings were reportedly left without adequate officer supervision despite advance notice of potential violence. People who are seriously injured may be afraid—or unable—to speak openly while surrounded by those involved. Asking from the doorway whether “everyone is okay” is not a proper security search, medical assessment, or emergency response. At this time, these details are based on urgent reports received from inside the facility and have not all been independently confirmed. That is exactly why GDC must investigate immediately and publicly account for the safety and medical condition of everyone in E-1 and E-2. If these reports are inaccurate, GDC can establish that through an immediate documented inspection. If they are accurate, every minute of inaction places lives in greater danger. We are demanding immediate intervention, medical attention, proper staffing, and complete transparency from Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections. Someone should not have to die before officials decide to enter the building."
Read source →
OBSERVATION According to Facebook, Tyler Ryals Published: Sep 3, 2026
Tyler Ryals, a former GDC officer, wrote on Facebook on September 3, 2026: "URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those incarcerated that she had been instructed to place them on lockdown—but that she was not going to do so at that time. She reportedly told them to get their showers and ice “just in case.” These reports require an immediate, hands-on emergency response—not an officer standing at a doorway and asking whether everyone is okay. Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections must immediately: Send adequate security personnel inside E-1 and […]"
"URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those incarcerated that she had been instructed to place them on lockdown—but that she was not going to do so at that time. She reportedly told them to get their showers and ice “just in case.” These reports require an immediate, hands-on emergency response—not an officer standing at a doorway and asking whether everyone is okay. Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections must immediately: Send adequate security personnel inside E-1 and E-2. Conduct individual welfare and medical checks—not a verbal inquiry from the doorway. Locate every injured person and provide professional emergency treatment. Secure and account for all medical supplies, including suture kits. Preserve all surveillance footage, radio communications, control-room logs, incident reports and staffing records. Explain why these buildings were reportedly left without adequate officer supervision despite advance notice of potential violence. People who are seriously injured may be afraid—or unable—to speak openly while surrounded by those involved. Asking from the doorway whether “everyone is okay” is not a proper security search, medical assessment, or emergency response. At this time, these details are based on urgent reports received from inside the facility and have not all been independently confirmed. That is exactly why GDC must investigate immediately and publicly account for the safety and medical condition of everyone in E-1 and E-2. If these reports are inaccurate, GDC can establish that through an immediate documented inspection. If they are accurate, every minute of inaction places lives in greater danger. We are demanding immediate intervention, medical attention, proper staffing, and complete transparency from Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections. Someone should not have to die before officials decide to enter the building."
Read source →
OBSERVATION According to Facebook, Tyler Ryals Published: Sep 5, 2026
Tyler Ryals, a former GDC officer, wrote on Facebook on September 5, 2026: "GDC AND KEMP’S TORTURE CAMPS: BY EVERY MEANS NECESSARY—WHEN INCARCERATED PEOPLE HAVE NO ONE TO CALL On Thursday, September 3, 2026, an emergency reportedly unfolded inside a dormitory at Hancock State Prison while incarcerated people were left without meaningful officer presence or intervention for hours. The crisis itself is disturbing—but what these men reportedly had to do because no one was responding is even more alarming. When violence erupts inside a locked prison dormitory, incarcerated people cannot simply walk outside. They cannot leave the building, drive to safety, or call 911 like anyone else could. They are completely dependent upon correctional officers to remain at their assigned posts, monitor the dormitory, respond to emergencies, and protect human life. But on September 3, the reported reality was: Chaos inside. Danger escalating. No officers responding for hours. With the prison’s normal channels failing them, incarcerated people were reportedly forced to reach beyond the prison walls and alert someone outside the facility so help could be summoned. That should never be necessary. When an incarcerated person takes extraordinary measures to obtain emergency assistance, it should not automatically be labeled misconduct. It must also be examined as evidence of institutional failure. A person trapped inside a violent dormitory may take enormous risks because he believes that if he does nothing, someone could be seriously injured or killed. That leaves him with a horrifying choice: Remain trapped and hope someone eventually comes—or take whatever action is necessary to make the outside world aware that lives are in danger. No human being should ever be forced to make that choice. These men may risk retaliation, disciplinary reports, segregation, transfer, further restrictions, physical harm, or even death simply for attempting to get help. That is how desperate conditions become when prison supervision and emergency-response systems fail. Hancock State Prison already has a documented history of serious and deadly violence. The United States Department of Justice has cited Hancock in its findings concerning Georgia’s failure to protect incarcerated people from harm. Recent reporting has also documented deadly violence at the facility, including a fatal stabbing in 2026. Against that background, leaving a dormitory without adequate officer supervision during an active crisis cannot be dismissed as a minor staffing issue. It is a matter of […]"
"GDC AND KEMP’S TORTURE CAMPS: BY EVERY MEANS NECESSARY—WHEN INCARCERATED PEOPLE HAVE NO ONE TO CALL On Thursday, September 3, 2026, an emergency reportedly unfolded inside a dormitory at Hancock State Prison while incarcerated people were left without meaningful officer presence or intervention for hours. The crisis itself is disturbing—but what these men reportedly had to do because no one was responding is even more alarming. When violence erupts inside a locked prison dormitory, incarcerated people cannot simply walk outside. They cannot leave the building, drive to safety, or call 911 like anyone else could. They are completely dependent upon correctional officers to remain at their assigned posts, monitor the dormitory, respond to emergencies, and protect human life. But on September 3, the reported reality was: Chaos inside. Danger escalating. No officers responding for hours. With the prison’s normal channels failing them, incarcerated people were reportedly forced to reach beyond the prison walls and alert someone outside the facility so help could be summoned. That should never be necessary. When an incarcerated person takes extraordinary measures to obtain emergency assistance, it should not automatically be labeled misconduct. It must also be examined as evidence of institutional failure. A person trapped inside a violent dormitory may take enormous risks because he believes that if he does nothing, someone could be seriously injured or killed. That leaves him with a horrifying choice: Remain trapped and hope someone eventually comes—or take whatever action is necessary to make the outside world aware that lives are in danger. No human being should ever be forced to make that choice. These men may risk retaliation, disciplinary reports, segregation, transfer, further restrictions, physical harm, or even death simply for attempting to get help. That is how desperate conditions become when prison supervision and emergency-response systems fail. Hancock State Prison already has a documented history of serious and deadly violence. The United States Department of Justice has cited Hancock in its findings concerning Georgia’s failure to protect incarcerated people from harm. Recent reporting has also documented deadly violence at the facility, including a fatal stabbing in 2026. Against that background, leaving a dormitory without adequate officer supervision during an active crisis cannot be dismissed as a minor staffing issue. It is a matter of life and death. The Georgia Department of Corrections is responsible for maintaining security, protecting incarcerated people from foreseeable violence, providing emergency intervention, and ensuring that calls for help are answered. That responsibility cannot be abandoned and shifted onto incarcerated people. Incarcerated people are not correctional officers. They should not be expected to supervise dormitories, restore order, separate violent conflicts, provide emergency medical care, close wounds, or place themselves in even greater danger while trying to obtain outside assistance. They should never have to gamble with their lives because the people responsible for protecting them are nowhere to be found. GDC CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO INVESTIGATE AND CLEAR ITSELF What reportedly happened on September 3 demands an independent investigation. An internal GDC investigation alone cannot provide the transparency or public confidence this situation requires. GDC should not be solely responsible for investigating allegations involving its own staffing failures, abandoned posts, delayed emergency response, and possible retaliation. The public deserves answers: * How long was the dormitory left without adequate officer supervision? * How many officers were assigned to the area, and where were they while the emergency unfolded? * Were assigned security posts abandoned? * Did incarcerated people attempt to summon officers, and were those calls ignored? * Were emergency alarms, radios, cameras, intercoms, telephones, and other communication systems working? * Why did incarcerated people believe that contacting someone outside the prison was their only remaining option? * How many people were injured, stabbed, assaulted, or placed in danger? * Did those who were injured receive immediate professional medical treatment? * Were incarcerated people forced to treat wounds because medical personnel and officers failed to respond? * Did staffing shortages, lockdown procedures, post abandonment, or other operational failures contribute to the crisis? * Has all video footage, radio communication, staffing documentation, telephone activity, medical information, and other evidence been preserved? * Have the people who reported the emergency been threatened with retaliation or disciplinary punishment? Most importantly, there must be a clear distinction between someone who creates a dangerous situation and someone who takes desperate action while attempting to survive one. Those are not the same thing. The only question should not be: “Why did the incarcerated person break the rules?” The more important question is: “Why did he believe breaking the rules was the only way to get someone to come help?” Georgia owes the public—and every person confined inside Hancock State Prison—a truthful answer. THIS CANNOT BECOME NORMAL A prison does not become safe simply because its doors are locked. Safety requires adequate staffing, active supervision, functioning communication systems, immediate emergency intervention, access to medical treatment, and real accountability. When those systems fail, the people behind the walls are left exposed to violence, suffering, and death. What reportedly happened at Hancock State Prison on September 3 must be treated as a serious warning. No incarcerated person should have to risk his life to convince the outside world that help is needed. If people must resort to drastic measures because every legitimate avenue for obtaining assistance has failed, the focus must be placed on the institutional failure—not simply on punishing those who were desperate enough to seek help. We demand transparency regarding what occurred at Hancock State Prison. We demand to know why incarcerated people were reportedly left without adequate officer intervention for hours. We demand confirmation of how many people were injured and whether they received proper medical treatment. We demand protection from retaliation for everyone who reported the emergency or attempted to obtain help. We demand an independent investigation—not another internal process in which GDC is permitted to investigate and clear itself. We demand immediate corrective action before another preventable emergency ends in death. People may be incarcerated, but they are not disposable. Their sentences may deprive them of liberty. They do not deprive them of their humanity or their right to survive. When an emergency occurs behind prison walls: Someone must answer. Someone must respond. Someone must provide protection. And when that protection fails, someone must be held accountable. Stephanie Navarrete Founder & CEO WorldWide Chain Breakers Sources: U.S. Department of Justice findings concerning conditions inside Georgia prisons: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/media/1371541/dl?inline= WGXA reporting regarding a 2026 homicide at Hancock State Prison: https://wgxa.tv/.../inmate-dies-after-being-stabbed..."
Read source →
OBSERVATION According to Facebook (public post by Tyler Ryals, former GDC officer) Recorded by GPS: Sep 4, 2026
Former GDC officer Tyler Ryals reports that he received advance warning of possible violence at Hancock State Prison and telephoned the facility's main control to report it, and that stabbings were reported in the E-1 and E-2 housing units roughly two hours later. According to reports relayed to him from inside, staff responded by asking from a doorway whether everyone was okay without entering the buildings, the units were left without an officer present, and up to five people were injured — two seriously — without receiving medical care, with other incarcerated people attempting to close the wounds themselves. Ryals states the details are not all independently confirmed and has called on GDC to enter the units, treat the injured, and preserve control-room logs, radio traffic and staffing records. GPS has not independently confirmed the events inside the facility.
""Someone should not have to die before officials decide to enter the building.""
FAMILY REPORT Received as Family or inmate communication Recorded by GPS: May 5, 2026
Family member reports incarcerated brother in solitary 6+ weeks with no communication.
"My brother was placed in solitary 6 weeks ago and we have not heard from him."

Timeline (71)

October 10, 2026

Ron Chezz wrote in the Ga. Prisons Exposed Facebook group on October 10, 2026: "UPDATE ON THE STABBING AT HANCOCK STATE PRISON I have received an update that Mr. Keron survived the stabbing and was sent back to the prison. However, I have been told that he was returned to the same dorm and cell where the incident occurred. If this information is accurate, serious questions must be asked about his safety and the steps being taken to protect him from further harm. I have also heard from multiple incarcerated individuals who report that this happens at other prisons throughout Georgia. These reports raise serious concerns about how incarcerated individuals are protected after violent incidents. No one should have to fear being placed right back into the same environment where they were attacked. The Georgia Department of Corrections must take safety, accountability, and appropriate housing decisions seriously. Nothing has changed since the DOJ’s Georgia prison findings. We continue to hear reports of violence and serious safety concerns. Families deserve answers, and incarcerated individuals deserve meaningful protection. This is why prison reform and accountability cannot wait. Marcus Johnson, Administrator Georgia Prison Reform Coalition (GPRC) GPRCLA@protonmail.com" report

September 21, 2026

Vershaun Smith chased down and stabbed fellow inmate Corey Jose July multiple times, killing him, as shown in surveillance footage presented at trial. report

September 16, 2026 (approx.)

Vershaun Smith convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life without parole other

A Hancock County jury convicted Vershaun Smith of malice murder after being shown surveillance footage of Smith chasing down and stabbing July to death, according to the Oculmulgee District Attorney's Office. Smith was sentenced to life without the possibility of…

Source: WGXA

September 5, 2026

Tyler Ryals, a former GDC officer, wrote on Facebook on September 5, 2026: "GDC AND KEMP’S TORTURE CAMPS: BY EVERY MEANS NECESSARY—WHEN INCARCERATED PEOPLE HAVE NO ONE TO CALL On Thursday, September 3, 2026, an emergency reportedly unfolded inside a dormitory at Hancock State Prison while incarcerated people were left without meaningful officer presence or intervention for hours. The crisis itself is disturbing—but what these men reportedly had to do because no one was responding is even more alarming. When violence erupts inside a locked prison dormitory, incarcerated people cannot simply walk outside. They cannot leave the building, drive to safety, or call 911 like anyone else could. They are completely dependent upon correctional officers to remain at their assigned posts, monitor the dormitory, respond to emergencies, and protect human life. But on September 3, the reported reality was: Chaos inside. Danger escalating. No officers responding for hours. With the prison’s normal channels failing them, incarcerated people were reportedly forced to reach beyond the prison walls and alert someone outside the facility so help could be summoned. That should never be necessary. When an incarcerated person takes extraordinary measures to obtain emergency assistance, it should not automatically be labeled misconduct. It must also be examined as evidence of institutional failure. A person trapped inside a violent dormitory may take enormous risks because he believes that if he does nothing, someone could be seriously injured or killed. That leaves him with a horrifying choice: Remain trapped and hope someone eventually comes—or take whatever action is necessary to make the outside world aware that lives are in danger. No human being should ever be forced to make that choice. These men may risk retaliation, disciplinary reports, segregation, transfer, further restrictions, physical harm, or even death simply for attempting to get help. That is how desperate conditions become when prison supervision and emergency-response systems fail. Hancock State Prison already has a documented history of serious and deadly violence. The United States Department of Justice has cited Hancock in its findings concerning Georgia’s failure to protect incarcerated people from harm. Recent reporting has also documented deadly violence at the facility, including a fatal stabbing in 2026. Against that background, leaving a dormitory without adequate officer supervision during an active crisis cannot be dismissed as a minor staffing issue. It is a matter of […]" report

September 4, 2026

Christal Pate wrote on Facebook on September 4, 2026: "This post came from Tyler Ryals who is an ex correctionaln officer all the way to Deputy Warden at Telfair State Prison (georgia). It's no wonder there are so many deaths of inmates in the state of Georgia. It's an astounding amount. Ga state prisons ya'll must do better Read until the end. Your not going to believe what happens on the daily in our prisons. WHY, JUST WHY -------------------------------------------------------------,--------- URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those […]" report

September 4, 2026

Former GDC officer Tyler Ryals reports that he received advance warning of possible violence at Hancock State Prison and telephoned the facility's main control to report it, and that stabbings were reported in the E-1 and E-2 housing units roughly two hours later. According to reports relayed to him from inside, staff responded by asking from a doorway whether everyone was okay without entering the buildings, the units were left without an officer present, and up to five people were injured — two seriously — without receiving medical care, with other incarcerated people attempting to close the wounds themselves. Ryals states the details are not all independently confirmed and has called on GDC to enter the units, treat the injured, and preserve control-room logs, radio traffic and staffing records. GPS has not independently confirmed the events inside the facility. report

Published by Tyler Chase Ryals on 2026-08-30 as a public urgent alert. Ryals worked for the Georgia Department of Corrections from 2014 to 2024, rising to CERT Commander; his employment history is verified against state payroll records. FIRSTHAND TO RYALS.…

September 3, 2026

Tyler Ryals, a former GDC officer, wrote on Facebook on September 3, 2026: "URGENT ALERT: REPORTED STABBINGS AND INJURED PEOPLE INSIDE HANCOCK STATE PRISON A few hours ago, I received information concerning potential gang tensions and the possibility of violence at Hancock State Prison. I immediately called the prison’s main control and spoke with Captain Williamson to report the warning. Approximately one hour later, I was informed that the lieutenant on duty went to the affected area and simply asked whether everyone was okay—without entering the buildings or conducting a meaningful security and medical check. About another hour later, I received reports that stabbings had occurred inside the E-1 and E-2 buildings. According to the information provided to me, officers were reportedly unaware because those buildings had been left without an officer present. I called Hancock State Prison again. I informed the main control officer about the reported stabbings, and she stated that she would notify the shift leader and have someone sent to the buildings. What reportedly happened next is unacceptable. I was told that one officer went only as far as the door—did not enter the buildings—and asked whether everyone was okay. The incarcerated individuals responded that everything was fine. The officer then allegedly left, and the buildings were once again left without an officer present. I have now received reports that up to five people may be injured, including two who are reportedly seriously wounded. Because staff allegedly have not provided medical assistance, other incarcerated individuals are reportedly attempting to close and patch the wounds themselves. Even more disturbing, it has been alleged that a former medical orderly had been stealing suture kits and medical supplies from the medical department and taking them into the dorms and selling them because incidents requiring incarcerated people to treat one another had become so common. Many of these stolen supplies are reportedly still on the compound. I was also informed that the captain went through the area telling those incarcerated that she had been instructed to place them on lockdown—but that she was not going to do so at that time. She reportedly told them to get their showers and ice “just in case.” These reports require an immediate, hands-on emergency response—not an officer standing at a doorway and asking whether everyone is okay. Hancock State Prison and the Georgia Department of Corrections must immediately: Send adequate security personnel inside E-1 and […]" report

August 13, 2026 (approx.)

Conviction of Vershaun Smith for malice murder arrest

A Hancock County jury convicted Vershaun Smith of malice murder for the June 2025 fatal stabbing of fellow Hancock State Prison inmate Corey July. Judge Alison T. Burleson sentenced Smith to life in prison without parole.

Source: 41NBC

Source Articles (25)

Inmate sentenced to life without parole after malice murder conviction in Hancock County

Other · by Addison White · Sep 21, 2026

Death at a Locked Gate: Georgia Fences Men In, Then Locks the Only Way Out

Aug 15, 2026

Muerte en una puerta cerrada: Georgia encierra a los hombres y luego bloquea la única salida

Aug 15, 2026

The Quiet Purge: Calhoun Edition

Apr 9, 2026

Inmate dies at Hancock State Prison, investigation underway

Google API · Apr 8, 2026

Former leadership

Officials who previously held leadership roles at this facility.

Role	Name	Tenure	Deaths this facility / career
Interim Warden (facility lead)	Ivey, George	2010-01-01 → 2024-12-31	15 / 15
Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy)	Mahoney, Tamikia Nicole	2013-01-01 → present	27 / 28
DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy)	Foston, Jeremy Andrew	2019-01-01 → 2025-12-31	22 / 22
Deputy Warden (facility deputy)	Washington, Calpurnia Frederica	2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22	— / —
DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy)	Wells, Katherine	2018-01-01 → 2018-12-31	— / —
Deputy Warden (facility deputy)	Ivey Jr, George	2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22	— / —
Chaplain (specialty lead)	Larkin, Rechard A	2023-11-22 → 2026-08-27	— / —

View full GDC Leadership Accountability page →

Location

701 Prison Boulevard, Sparta, GA 31087 33.24570, -82.95100

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Aerial View

Satellite image: Esri World Imagery. Architecture documents what the building was designed to hold. See the system-wide receipts at gps.press/warehouse.

Then and now

Aerial photo of HANCOCK STATE PRISON, March 14, 1981 — **March 14, 1981**USGS aerial photo (NHAP NB1NHAP800306139)

Aerial photo of HANCOCK STATE PRISON, February 27, 1988 — **February 27, 1988**USGS aerial photo (NAPP 693-108)

Aerial photo of HANCOCK STATE PRISON, January 28, 1993 — **January 28, 1993**USGS aerial photo (NAPP 6559-004, 6559-006)

Aerial photo of HANCOCK STATE PRISON, Today — **Today**Esri World Imagery

Each photo shows the same 1.2 km square, north up, so buildings line up from one year to the next. The older photos are U.S. Geological Survey aerial photographs. The photos from 1988 and earlier were taken on film and lined up with the later ones by their roads, so their positions are approximate. The early-1980s photos were taken from very high up and are less sharp. Select a photo to see it full size.