SMITH STATE PRISON
Facility Information
- Original Design Capacity
- 750 (at 146% capacity)
- Bed Capacity
- 1,526 beds
- Current Population
- 1,093
- Active Lifers
- 291 (26.6% of population) · Aug 2026 GDC report
- Life Without Parole
- 194 (17.7%)
Read: Brown v. Plata - A Legal Roadmap for Georgia's Prison Crisis →
- Address
- 9676 Hwy 301 North, Glennville, GA 30427
- Phone
- (912) 654-5000
- Fax
- (912) 654-5305
- Mailing Address
- P.O. Box 726, Glennville, GA 30427
- County
- Tattnall County
- Opened
- 1993
- Operator
- GDC (Georgia Dept. of Corrections)
Leadership & Accountability (as of 2026 records)
Officials currently holding positional authority at this facility, with deaths attributed to GPS-tracked records during their leadership tenure. Inclusion reflects role-based accountability, not legal findings of personal culpability. Death counts shown as facility / career.
| Role | Name | Since | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warden (facility lead) | Mims, Charles Michael | 2025-01-01 | 4 / 36 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Warren, Willesha | 2022-01-01 | 26 / 26 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Carver, Keenan | 2024-01-01 | 10 / 10 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Kennedy, Ashley L | 2024-01-01 | 10 / 10 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Foulks, Rodney | 2024-01-01 | 7 / 7 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Edwards, Brianna | 2026-07-01 | — / — |
About
Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia, a close-security men's facility, has recorded 18 homicides since 2020, with a former warden indicted for operating a RICO contraband enterprise and a firearm smuggled in that killed a kitchen worker.
Mortality Statistics
40 deaths documented at this facility from 2020 to present.
Deaths by Year
- 2026: 5
- 2025: 1
- 2024: 6
- 2023: 11
- 2022: 5
- 2021: 7
- 2020: 5
County Public Health Department
Food service and sanitation at SMITH STATE PRISON fall under the jurisdiction of the Tattnall County Environmental Health Department. Incarcerated people cannot choose where they eat — public health inspectors carry an elevated responsibility to hold this kitchen to the same standards applied to any restaurant.
Contact
- Title
- EH Specialist
- Name
- Lance Dasher
- Address
-
P.O. Box 353
Glennville, GA 30427 - Phone
- (855) 473-4374
- Lance.Dasher@dph.ga.gov
- Website
- Visit department website →
Why this matters
GPS has documented black mold on chow-hall ceilings, cold and contaminated trays, spoiled milk, and pest contamination at Georgia prisons. The Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration and untreated diabetes tied to food and water deprivation. Advance-notice inspections let facilities stage temporary fixes that disappear once inspectors leave.
Unannounced inspections by the county health department are one of the few outside checks on kitchen conditions behind the fence.
How you can help
Write to the county inspector and request an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operation at this facility. A short, respectful letter citing Georgia food-safety regulations is more powerful than you think — inspectors respond to public concern.
Sample Letter
This is the letter Georgia Prisoners' Speak mailed to all county environmental health inspectors responsible for GDC facilities. Feel free to adapt it.
August 5, 2026
RE: Request for Unannounced Public Health Inspection of Food Service Operations at SMITH STATE PRISON
Dear Lance Dasher,
I am writing to respectfully request that your office conduct a thorough, unannounced inspection of food service and sanitation practices at SMITH STATE PRISON, located in Tattnall County.
Documented concerns
Georgia Prisoners' Speak, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit investigative newsroom, has published extensive investigative reporting on food safety and nutrition failures across Georgia's prison system, including:
- Dangerous sanitation conditions — black mold on chow hall ceilings and air vents, contaminated food trays, and spoiled milk served to inmates.
- Severe nutritional deficiency — roughly 60 cents per meal; inmates receive only 40% of required protein and less than one serving of vegetables per day.
- Preventable deaths — the U.S. Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration, renal failure, and untreated diabetes following food and water deprivation.
- Staged compliance — advance-notice inspections allow facilities to stage temporary improvements, then revert once inspectors leave.
Firsthand testimony
In Surviving on Scraps: Ten Years of Prison Food in Georgia, a person who has spent more than ten years in GDC custody describes no functional dishwashing sanitation, chronic mold on food trays, and roaches found on the undersides of trays at intake facilities. Full account: gps.press/surviving-on-scraps-ten-years-of-prison-food-in-georgia.
Specific requests
- Conduct an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operations at this facility, with particular attention to dishwashing equipment, tray sanitation procedures, and food storage conditions.
- Evaluate compliance with applicable Georgia food safety regulations, including O.C.G.A. § 26-2-370 and the Georgia Food Service Rules and Regulations (Chapter 511-6-1).
- Verify permit status and confirm whether the facility is subject to the same inspection schedule as other institutional food service establishments in the county.
- Make inspection results available to the public, as permitted under Georgia's Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70).
Incarcerated individuals cannot advocate for their own health and safety in the way a restaurant patron can — they cannot choose to eat elsewhere. This places an elevated responsibility on public health officials to ensure these facilities meet the same sanitation standards applied to any food service establishment.
Thank you for your attention to this important public health matter.
Sincerely,
[Your name]
Food Safety Inspections
Georgia Department of Public Health
What the score doesn't measure. DPH grades kitchen compliance on inspection day — food storage, temperatures, pest control. It does not grade whether today's trays are clean. GPS reporting has found broken dishwashers at most Georgia state prisons we've documented; trays go out wet, stacked, and visibly moldy — including at facilities with recent scores near 100.
Who inspects. Most Georgia state prisons sit in rural counties — often with fewer than 20,000 people, several with fewer than 10,000. The environmental health inspector lives in that community and often knows the kitchen staff personally. Rural inspection regimes don't have the structural independence you'd expect in a city-sized health department. Read the scores accordingly.
Read the investigation: “Dunked, Stacked and Served: Why Georgia Prison Trays Are Making People Sick”
Recent inspections
| Date | Score | Purpose | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 16, 2026 | 72 | Routine | |
| Jun 27, 2025 | 85 | Routine | |
| Jan 19, 2024 | 82 | Routine | |
| Jun 29, 2023 | 84 | Routine |
February 16, 2026 — Score 72
Routine · Inspector: Lance Dasher
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1A |
proper cold holding temperatures 511-6-1.04(6)(f) - time/temperature control for safety; cold holding (p) | 9 | Observed milk temperature at 44 F-45 F in dairy cooler, move contents out of unit until fixed |
| 10D |
food properly labeled; original container 511-6-1.04(7)(d) - other forms of information (c) | 3 | Observed trays of food in storage, cooked vegetables, no date and food labeling. Discard. |
| 11D |
thermometers provided and accurate 511-6-1.05(2)(x) - tmd, located in refrigerators/ hot holding (pf, c) Repeat | 3 | Observed walk in units missing thermometers and some units with thermometers installed at fan units. Move towards entrance of coolers. |
| 12A |
contamination prevented during food preparation, storage, display 511-6-1.04(4)(z) - miscellaneous sources of contamination (c) | 3 | Observed a jug of water stored in ice maker, remove and clean. |
| 14C |
single-use/single-service articles: properly stored, used 511-6-1.05(6)(r) - single-service/single-use articles, use limitations (c) | 1 | Observed single service cups being used to dispense food products at secondary dry storage. Use scoops with handles. |
| 16B |
plumbing installed; proper backflow devices 511-6-1.06(2)(r) - system maintained in good repair (p, c) | 2 | Observed foot valves not working on hand wash sink, and sink is not secured. Observed hose bibb/spigot at four compartment sink broken, will not shut off. Observed in dishwasher room spray nozzle/faucet is broken and will not shut off. Observed floor drains that are clogged with trash. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed wall damage in bakery room, clean and paint, observed mildew in dishwasher room, floor, wall, and ceiling. Observed floor in back dry storage in small room with food debris behind shelving. Observed ceiling damage in cage room, water damage. Observed floor by cook station pitting, small holes in flooring. Observed roll up door needing a new gasket. |
| 17D |
adequate ventilation and lighting; designated areas used 511-6-1.07(2)(i) - light bulbs, protective shielding (c) | 1 | Observed cage covers/light shields missing in walk in cooler units. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) Repeat | 3 | Observed roach activity at bakery room, and at tray making station. |
June 27, 2025 — Score 85
Routine · Inspector: Lance Dasher
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2A |
food stored covered 511-6-1.04(4)(c)1(iv) - packaged & unpackaged food, food stored covered(c) Corrected | 4 | Observed open of RTE deli meat uncovered in walk in cooler. Discarded. |
| 11D |
thermometers provided and accurate 511-6-1.05(2)(x) - tmd, located in refrigerators/ hot holding (pf, c) | 3 | Observed walk in cooler(s) with thermometers missing, move thermometers that are present towards door of units. |
| 15A |
food and nonfood-contact surfaces cleanable, properly designed, constructed, and used 511-6-1.05(1)(a) - materials, general requirements (p, c) | 1 | Observed raw wood from under shelving at four compartment sink station, remove. |
| 16B |
plumbing installed; proper backflow devices 511-6-1.06(2)(r) - system maintained in good repair (p, c) | 2 | Observed faucet heads missing in serve line, reinstall. Install pluming under sinks that are missing in tray wash room and prep room. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) | 1 | Observed walk in freezer floors that need cleaning, debris/trash. Observed inside warehouse roll up door is damaged and needs replacing, large gap at bottom. The storage area has issues with gaps at the floor/way juncture, allowing mice and roaches entry. Seal. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) Repeat | 3 | Observed flies, roaches, and rodent droppings at areas in facility, manager has been shown hot spots. Increase vector control. |
January 19, 2024 — Score 82
Routine · Inspector: Lance Dasher
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
proper eating, tasting, drinking, or tobacco use 511-6-1.03(5)(k)1&2 - eating, drinking, or using tobacco (c) Corrected | 4 | Observed drinks in kitchen not in a designated area away from prep and storage, in bakery, prep area, and serve line. |
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(6)(n) - manual and mechanical warewashing equipment, chemical sanitization-temperature, ph, concentration, hardness (p,pf) Corrected | 4 | Observed sanitizer level in sink not detectable, water dropped and refilled. |
| 15A |
food and nonfood-contact surfaces cleanable, properly designed, constructed, and used 511-6-1.05(6)(a) - good repair & proper adjustment (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed tilt skillet with wood used to provide support, remove (repeat). Observed latch to dairy cooler door broken, repair. |
| 16B |
plumbing installed; proper backflow devices 511-6-1.06(2)(r) - system maintained in good repair (p, c) Repeat | 2 | Observed faucet leaks at 4 compartment sink, prep sinks, tray machine room rinse station, utility room faucet. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed ceiling damage in areas of kitchen, pack out room, washing area, side door entrance. Bakery room has wall damage due to metal pans. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed rodent activity in side warehouse and at caged equipment/spices. Roach activity in tray machine room and serving line by side entrance. |
June 29, 2023 — Score 84
Routine · Inspector: Lance Dasher
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2D |
adequate handwashing facilities supplied & accessible 511-6-1.06(2)(o) - using a handwashing sink- operation & maintenance (pf) | 4 | Observed hand wash station with no faucet head, and no soap. |
| 12A |
contamination prevented during food preparation, storage, display 511-6-1.04(4)(z) - miscellaneous sources of contamination (c) Corrected | 3 | Observed plastic food trays and jug of water in bottom of ice maker, removed, clean unit. |
| 15A |
food and nonfood-contact surfaces cleanable, properly designed, constructed, and used 511-6-1.05(6)(a) - good repair & proper adjustment (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed steam and condensation buildup in tray washing room. Areas under machine and shelving has black mildew on surfaces. Observed pieces of wood used to level tilting skillets, remove and use metal or plastic to elevate. |
| 16B |
plumbing installed; proper backflow devices 511-6-1.06(2)(r) - system maintained in good repair (p, c) | 2 | Observed sinks at dishwashing area with leaks on faucets and drain pipes. Floor drain was clogged, but was cleared. Observed sinks that could not shut off water flow in tray serving areas. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed rollup door damaged at small warehouse, spice storage room needs ventilation and continue painting. Ceiling damage observed in pack out room, serve line, and dishwashing area. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed flies in kitchen, need to keep exterior hallway for garbage disposal closed as much as possible, plastic curtain not be used properly (tied back). Rodent activity is at a better level. |
Analysis written on August 2, 2026.
Smith State Prison, located in Glennville, Tattnall County, is a close-security prison for men that opened in 1993. Designed for 750 but expanded to hold up to 1,526, the facility currently houses 1,106 incarcerated individuals. It has emerged as one of the most violent and dysfunctional institutions in the Georgia Department of Corrections, a system already under federal investigation for widespread Eighth Amendment violations. GPS’s mortality database records 38 deaths at Smith since 2020, 18 of them homicides — a toll driven by a convergence of corrupt leadership, severe understaffing, and the unchecked dominance of prison gangs.
The Yves Saint Laurent Squad: How a Prison Warden’s Contraband Empire Unraveled
Smith State Prison became the epicenter of one of the most brazen contraband and racketeering schemes in recent GDC history. Former Warden Brian Adams was arrested in February 2023 and later indicted by a Tattnall County grand jury in May 2026 on six felony counts: violation of Georgia’s RICO Act, bribery, making false statements (two counts), tampering with evidence (two counts), and two counts of violating his oath as a public officer. The indictment, presented by the Georgia Attorney General’s Office after a 39-month wait, followed an investigation into the “Yves Saint Laurent Squad,” a prison-based enterprise allegedly led by inmate Nathan Weekes.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Adams accepted U.S. currency through a pattern of racketeering activity, with Weekes and his associates orchestrating at least three murders from inside the prison using contraband cell phones. Among them was the 2021 shooting death of 88-year-old Bobby Kicklighter, killed in his bed in a case of mistaken identity — Weekes had allegedly ordered a hit on a correctional officer who lived next door. The Georgia Virtue detailed that Adams remained warden for some 18 months after GDC learned of the murders and that he had falsely denied, during a 2022 GBI interview, ever being solicited or bribed by an inmate. A civil suit filed in Tattnall County State Court in May 2026 also names former Correctional Officer Ireon Moore, alleging the two facilitated a criminal conspiracy to kill a non-complicit officer by allowing cell phones, narcotics, and weapons into the facility.
The AJC further noted that GDC does not research the credit or financial histories of its applicants, leaving financially vulnerable employees susceptible to corruption — a vulnerability that Adams’ case exemplified. GDC’s own wireless-device policy (SOP 204.09) requires tracking of all communication devices at security checkpoints, yet as the AJC documented, contraband cell phones remained ubiquitous. Inmate Weekes’ reported operation led to criminal charges that shook the agency; meanwhile, the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to hear Adams and Moore’s appeal in June 2026, clearing the way for trial.
A Cascade of Violence: Homicides, a Smuggled Firearm, and a Corrections Officer Killed
The violence at Smith State Prison is neither sporadic nor isolated. GPS’s records show 18 homicides since 2020, a count that includes the killing of a correctional officer, a food service worker, and numerous incarcerated men. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s homicide-tracking coverage documented the deadly sequence: in 2020, a prisoner was tied up, beaten, waterboarded, and sexually assaulted by his cellmate, with bars of soap used in the assault falling from his body at the hospital; that same year, Taylor Harrison Brooks and John Bretleir Reyes Cardona were stabbed to death. In 2021, Desmond Hill was strangled after calling his mother to say his cellmate had threatened him; Hiwatha Abdulcah Hakeem Jr. was stabbed by four prisoners who, a lawsuit contended, had known histories of violence and were not adequately supervised. Justin Nathaniel Wilkerson was asphyxiated, and his mother later testified about his mental health struggles and prior attacks. In 2023, Correctional Officer Robert Danford Clark, 42, was fatally stabbed with a homemade weapon. Anthony Joseph Zino III, 71, was found badly decomposed in his cell — his body had likely lain dead for days before discovery, a failure attributed to chronic understaffing.
June 2024 brought an entirely new level of security failure. Inmate Jaydrekus Hart obtained a loaded handgun and shot 24-year-old Aramark food service employee Aureon Shavea Grace to death in the prison kitchen before turning the gun on himself. Investigators believe the firearm was smuggled in by drone, though state officials have not publicly explained how it entered the facility. A lawsuit filed by Grace’s mother, Deshonda Hagins, alleges that prison staff had been repeatedly warned about the gun but failed to lock down the facility or conduct a thorough search. The shooting prompted a system-wide lockdown and led Governor Brian Kemp to announce a 12-month assessment of the entire corrections system by consultants Guidehouse Inc.
After the shooting, the AJC reported that Hart had been permitted to violate rules with impunity and that no guards were present in the kitchen at the time. The weapon’s presence inside a close-security prison underscored the near-total loss of control that the DOJ would later cite in its statewide findings. In 2025, a former Smith employee was charged with sexually assaulting a corrections employee, further widening the staff-misconduct record.
The lethal pattern persisted. In April 2026, a gang-related altercation in a Smith dorm left two inmates injured badly enough to require airlift to hospitals and triggered a system-wide lockdown of all GDC facilities. GPS received multiple reports from sources inside the facility that gangs had been discussing coordinated retaliation against staff, and the altercation appeared to fit that profile. GPS records three additional recent deaths at Smith: Nicholas Shafer, 24, died from homicide in February 2026; Dwayne Albritton, 65, from medical neglect in March 2026; and Dreeonnie Lee Hart, 25, died in May 2026, with cause still unknown.
Staffing Collapse and the Rise of Gang Control
The violence at Smith cannot be separated from its staggering staffing deficit. By early 2025, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that only 53 correctional officers remained at a facility designed for 160 — a two-thirds vacancy rate. Former officer Andrew Phillips, profiled by The Marshall Project, described being the sole officer assigned to an area of 600 men, facing a mass mattress fire with empty extinguishers and having to escort a stabbing victim to the hospital after 11 consecutive days of work. He and colleagues described the environment as “too brutal, too disgusting,” and Phillips ultimately resigned. The same investigation found that overstretched staff failed to notice Zino’s decomposing body for five days and that guards working alone had watched fatal attacks without immediately intervening.
This staffing collapse is a systemic feature. GPS has documented that officer vacancies system-wide run between 49% and 60%, with Georgia ranking last among states in correctional officer pay. The DOJ’s October 2024 findings letter concluded that “the leadership of the Georgia Department of Corrections has lost control of its facilities” and that GDC placed too much blame on gangs and not enough on understaffing. Approximately 31% of the incarcerated population are validated members of 315 different security threat groups — more than double the national average — and both the DOJ and the Guidehouse assessment found that gangs effectively run multiple facilities, controlling access to phones, showers, food, and bed assignments.
At Smith, that dynamic was dramatically apparent. The contraband empire orchestrated by Weekes relied not only on bribes to the warden but also on widespread staff complicity. The AJC documented that over 425 GDC employees had been arrested for on-the-job crimes since 2018, many for smuggling contraband, and that corrupt officers were rapidly replaced by new ones. GPS’s intelligence monitoring has continued to flag multiple reports of gang-coordinated threats and violence against staff at Smith throughout early 2026, a pattern corroborated by the April lockdown and the earlier indictments. The systemic GPS finding — that staffing collapse plus gang assumption of facility control is the integrated structural driver of violence — is starkly visible here.
Food Safety Fails and the Broader Sanitation Crisis
The decline in food-safety conditions at Smith mirrors the violence and neglect. Georgia Department of Public Health inspection records show that the kitchen scored an 84 (Grade B) in June 2023, an 82 (B) in January 2024, an 85 (B) in June 2025, and then a 72 (Grade C) in February 2026 — a drop that landed the facility in Grade C territory for the first time in four years. The 2026 inspection cited violations for proper cold holding temperatures, food labeling, and thermometer calibration. While DPH scores can mask chronic problems, that downward trajectory is consistent with GPS’s systemic finding that food-service sanitation failures are widespread across GDC kitchens, often invisible to scheduled walkthrough inspections.
GPS’s investigation “Dunked, Stacked, and Served” documented photographs from another state prison showing contaminated food trays, the result of tray-sanitizing dishwashers broken for extended periods and cleaning by hand using chemical barrels. The Marshall Project confirmed in a May 2026 investigation that kitchens across Georgia had rats, insects in food, moldy trays, and visible malnutrition. The state spends approximately $1.69 per person per day on food — roughly 14 times less than its spending on medical care — and the FY27 budget proposal dropped that figure to $1.60, well under the FDA’s Thrifty Food Plan estimate of roughly $10 per day for a nutritionally adequate diet. At Smith, the kitchen that failed its inspection is the same kitchen where Aureon Grace was fatally shot while her Aramark employer provided meals. The convergence of sanitation decay, a contraband firearm, and a homicide inside the food-service area captures the layered crisis.
Legal Reckoning: Settlements, Lawsuits, and the Path Forward
The human toll at Smith has drawn a series of legal actions and state payouts. Georgia Department of Administrative Services settlement ledgers, obtained through open records, show that the state paid $1.45 million for the death of Christopher Heath in 2020, $450,000 to Julia Roberts for a 2023 incident, $15,000 for Rufus Newberry’s 2018 case, $3,472 for Micki Antonio Brown in 2022, and $75,000 for Ricardo Tavera Jaramillo in 2014. Those payouts total over $2 million, all directly tied to Smith.
In addition, the Kicklighter family filed a wrongful death suit alleging that Adams and Moore facilitated the criminal enterprise that led to the 88-year-old’s murder. Deshonda Hagins’ lawsuit over the Grace shooting seeks a jury trial and unspecified damages, asserting that repeated warnings about the gun were ignored. A separate suit brought by the family of Hiwatha Hakeem Jr. contends that officials housed him with known violent attackers and failed to provide timely medical care after the fatal stabbing. The Southern Center for Human Rights sued GDC in 2021 broadly over poor prison conditions.
Criminal accountability has also advanced. The Tattnall County grand jury’s true bill against Adams in May 2026 followed GBI arrest warrants for bribery, criminal attempt to violate RICO, false statements, and tampering. Meanwhile, Adams’ replacement as warden is Charles Mims, who began his tenure on July 5, 2026, inheriting a facility under intense external scrutiny and internal instability.
A Facility Mirrors Georgia’s Prison Crisis
Smith State Prison is not an outlier; it is a concentrated expression of the systemic failures that GPS has documented across Georgia’s correctional system. The DOJ’s October 2024 letter concluded that sexual assault is “rampant,” that GDC does not reasonably protect incarcerated people from sexual harm, and that Georgia has never submitted a PREA certification of full compliance in the law’s two-decade history. The 2020 waterboarding and sexual assault at Smith — bars of soap falling from an inmate’s body — exemplifies the type of violence the DOJ flagged. GPS has independently tracked 1,859 deaths in GDC custody since 2020, and Smith’s 38 fatalities represent a disproportionate share of that toll: 18 homicides, 6 suicides, 1 overdose, 2 medical neglect deaths, 2 natural deaths, and 9 still pending investigation.
The crisis is not new. In December 2010, Smith was one of at least six Georgia prisons where incarcerated people launched a coordinated six-day strike, described as one of the largest prison protests in U.S. history. At the time, strikers cited overcrowding, substandard heat, denial of medical care, and forced labor. Fifteen years later, the same grievances remain, magnified by a collapse in staffing, a culture of corruption, and the lethal consequences now catalogued in homicide counts, settlement checks, and a federal investigation. GPS’s systemic finding — that deferred infrastructure maintenance, gang control, and a broken hiring pipeline operate as force multipliers for violence — is borne out at Smith with rare clarity. Until the structural drivers are addressed, the violence that has defined this facility will continue to extract its toll.
Sources
This analysis draws on reporting from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Georgia Virtue, Georgia Public Broadcasting, The Marshall Project, and In These Times; federal and state court filings and settlement records; Georgia Department of Public Health food-safety inspection reports; Georgia Department of Corrections official statements; GPS’s internal mortality database, systemic findings, and intelligence monitoring; and inmate and family accounts collected by GPS staff.
Recent reports (62)
Source-attributed observations and allegations from news coverage and reports submitted to GPS. Each entry credits its source.
- ALLEGATION According to The Georgia Virtue Published: Jun 22, 2026Adams and Moore facilitated a criminal enterprise within the prison that led to Kicklighter's murder.
"The lawsuit, filed by the family of Bobby C. Kicklighter, alleges that Adams and Moore facilitated a criminal enterprise operating from within the prison, which led to Kicklighter's murder in a botched murder-for-hire scheme in 2021."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to The Georgia Virtue Published: Jun 22, 2026Adams and Moore facilitated a criminal enterprise within the prison that led to Kicklighter's murder.
"The lawsuit, filed by the family of Bobby C. Kicklighter, alleges that Adams and Moore facilitated a criminal enterprise operating from within the prison, which led to Kicklighter's murder in a botched murder-for-hire scheme in 2021."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to WTOC Published: May 1, 2025A former employee sexually assaulted a corrections employee.
"A former employee of Smith State Prison in Georgia has been charged with sexual assault involving a corrections employee."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to The Georgia Virtue Published: May 13, 2026Adams allegedly participated in a RICO organization (Yves Saint Laurent Squad) and accepted currency bribes through a pattern of racketeering associated with the enterprise run by inmate Nathan Weekes.
"They also contended that Adams participated in a RICO organization, being Yves Saint Laurent Squad run by then-Smith State Prison inmate Nathan Weekes, and he committed the offenses of Bribery and False Statements and Writings in furtherance of the RICO organization. Adams, they said, was bribed when he accepted currency through a pattern of racketeering associated with the RICO enterprise."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to The Georgia Virtue Published: May 13, 2026Agents alleged that Adams provided false statements in an April 13, 2022 interview when he stated he had not been solicited or bribed by a GDC inmate in the past 10 years.
"Agents alleged that Adams provided false statements in an April 13, 2022 interview when he stated he has not been solicited or bribed by a Georgia Department of Corrections inmate in the past 10 years."
Read source →
Timeline (136)
Source Articles (40)
Former leadership
Officials who previously held leadership roles at this facility.
| Role | Name | Tenure | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARDEN 3 (facility lead) | Beasley, Jacob | 2023-01-01 → 2024-12-31 | 17 / 57 |
| Warden (facility lead) | Adams, Brian | 2019-10-01 → 2023-02-08 | 17 / 17 |
| CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT (facility lead) | Todd, Curtis J | 2025-01-01 → 2025-01-31 | — / 1 |
| Warden (facility lead) | Mims, Charles | 2026-07-05 → present | — / — |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | McFarlane, Andrew M | 2019-01-01 → 2022-12-31 | 17 / 51 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Henderson, Marcus | 2019-01-01 → 2023-01-01 | 17 / 17 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | COX, Eric | 2021-01-01 → 2021-12-31 | 7 / 51 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Epperson, Alicia | 2022-01-01 → 2022-12-31 | 5 / 5 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Brown, Vashti J | 2019-01-01 → 2020-12-31 | 5 / 5 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Smith, Tarmarshe A | 2016-01-01 → 2017-12-31 | — / 36 |