WASHINGTON STATE PRISON
Facility Information
- Original Design Capacity
- 750 (at 162% capacity)
- Bed Capacity
- 1,548 beds
- Current Population
- 1,215
- Active Lifers
- 384 (31.6% of population) · Aug 2026 GDC report
Read: Brown v. Plata - A Legal Roadmap for Georgia's Prison Crisis →
- Address
- 13262 Hwy 24 East, Davisboro, GA 31018
- Phone
- (478) 348-5814
- Fax
- (478) 348-5613
- Mailing Address
- P.O. Box 206, Davisboro, GA 31018
- County
- Washington County
- Opened
- 1991
- Operator
- GDC (Georgia Dept. of Corrections)
Leadership & Accountability (as of 2026 records)
Officials currently holding positional authority at this facility, with deaths attributed to GPS-tracked records during their leadership tenure. Inclusion reflects role-based accountability, not legal findings of personal culpability. Death counts shown as facility / career.
| Role | Name | Since | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARDEN 1 (facility lead) | Stewart, Veronica M | 2024-01-01 | 27 / 43 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Dogan, Helen R | 2016-01-01 | 42 / 42 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Jackson, Tarra L Tomlin | 2021-01-01 | 41 / 41 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Whipple, Tamishia V | 2024-01-01 | 27 / 27 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Grier, Tamara | 2025-11-16 | 14 / 14 |
| Deputy Warden of Administration (facility deputy) | King, Tywanda F | 2026-08-01 | — / — |
About
Washington State Prison in Davisboro is a medium-security men's facility where a gang war on January 11, 2026, killed four incarcerated people and injured more than a dozen, exposing extreme understaffing and gang control; GPS has tracked 39 deaths at the prison since 2020 against systemic statewide failures.
Mortality Statistics
50 deaths documented at this facility from 2020 to present.
Deaths by Year
- 2026: 20
- 2025: 10
- 2024: 5
- 2023: 6
- 2022: 8
- 2021: 0
- 2020: 1
County Public Health Department
Food service and sanitation at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON fall under the jurisdiction of the Washington County Environmental Health Department. Incarcerated people cannot choose where they eat — public health inspectors carry an elevated responsibility to hold this kitchen to the same standards applied to any restaurant.
Contact
- Title
- Environmental Health Director
- Address
-
201 Morningside Drive
Sandersville, GA 31082 - Phone
- (478) 552-3210
- washington.eh@dph.ga.gov
- Website
- Visit department website →
Why this matters
GPS has documented black mold on chow-hall ceilings, cold and contaminated trays, spoiled milk, and pest contamination at Georgia prisons. The Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration and untreated diabetes tied to food and water deprivation. Advance-notice inspections let facilities stage temporary fixes that disappear once inspectors leave.
Unannounced inspections by the county health department are one of the few outside checks on kitchen conditions behind the fence.
How you can help
Write to the county inspector and request an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operation at this facility. A short, respectful letter citing Georgia food-safety regulations is more powerful than you think — inspectors respond to public concern.
Sample Letter
This is the letter Georgia Prisoners' Speak mailed to all county environmental health inspectors responsible for GDC facilities. Feel free to adapt it.
August 11, 2026
RE: Request for Unannounced Public Health Inspection of Food Service Operations at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON
Dear County Environmental Health Director,
I am writing to respectfully request that your office conduct a thorough, unannounced inspection of food service and sanitation practices at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON, located in Washington County.
Documented concerns
Georgia Prisoners' Speak, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit investigative newsroom, has published extensive investigative reporting on food safety and nutrition failures across Georgia's prison system, including:
- Dangerous sanitation conditions — black mold on chow hall ceilings and air vents, contaminated food trays, and spoiled milk served to inmates.
- Severe nutritional deficiency — roughly 60 cents per meal; inmates receive only 40% of required protein and less than one serving of vegetables per day.
- Preventable deaths — the U.S. Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration, renal failure, and untreated diabetes following food and water deprivation.
- Staged compliance — advance-notice inspections allow facilities to stage temporary improvements, then revert once inspectors leave.
Firsthand testimony
In Surviving on Scraps: Ten Years of Prison Food in Georgia, a person who has spent more than ten years in GDC custody describes no functional dishwashing sanitation, chronic mold on food trays, and roaches found on the undersides of trays at intake facilities. Full account: gps.press/surviving-on-scraps-ten-years-of-prison-food-in-georgia.
Specific requests
- Conduct an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operations at this facility, with particular attention to dishwashing equipment, tray sanitation procedures, and food storage conditions.
- Evaluate compliance with applicable Georgia food safety regulations, including O.C.G.A. § 26-2-370 and the Georgia Food Service Rules and Regulations (Chapter 511-6-1).
- Verify permit status and confirm whether the facility is subject to the same inspection schedule as other institutional food service establishments in the county.
- Make inspection results available to the public, as permitted under Georgia's Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70).
Incarcerated individuals cannot advocate for their own health and safety in the way a restaurant patron can — they cannot choose to eat elsewhere. This places an elevated responsibility on public health officials to ensure these facilities meet the same sanitation standards applied to any food service establishment.
Thank you for your attention to this important public health matter.
Sincerely,
[Your name]
Food Safety Inspections
Georgia Department of Public Health
What the score doesn't measure. DPH grades kitchen compliance on inspection day — food storage, temperatures, pest control. It does not grade whether today's trays are clean. GPS reporting has found broken dishwashers at most Georgia state prisons we've documented; trays go out wet, stacked, and visibly moldy — including at facilities with recent scores near 100.
Who inspects. Most Georgia state prisons sit in rural counties — often with fewer than 20,000 people, several with fewer than 10,000. The environmental health inspector lives in that community and often knows the kitchen staff personally. Rural inspection regimes don't have the structural independence you'd expect in a city-sized health department. Read the scores accordingly.
Read the investigation: “Dunked, Stacked and Served: Why Georgia Prison Trays Are Making People Sick”
Recent inspections
| Date | Score | Purpose | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 7, 2025 | 91 | Routine | |
| Dec 30, 2024 | 98 | Routine | |
| Mar 22, 2024 | 95 | Routine | |
| Jun 29, 2023 | 88 | Routine |
November 7, 2025 — Score 91
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(7)(b) - food contact surfaces and utensils - cleaning frequency (p, c) | 4 | Observed bulk ice machines with black substance on deflector plates. In equipment such as ice bins and beverage dispensing nozzles and enclosed components of equipment such as ice makers, cooking oil storage tanks and distribution lines, beverage and syrup dispensing lines or tubes, coffee bean grinders, and water vending equipment:(I) At a frequency specified by the manufacturer; or(II) Absent manufacturer specifications, at a frequency necessary to preclude accumulation of soil or mold.Increase cleaning frequency of ice machines. Machine should be sanitized before being put back into use. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed live pests and evidence of rodents and pests. The presence of insects, rodents, and other pests shall be controlled to minimize their presence on the premises by:1. Routinely inspecting incoming shipments of food and supplies;2. Routinely inspecting the premises for evidence of pests;3. Using methods, if pests are found, such as trapping devices or other means of pest control as specified under subsections (6)(e), (6)(m), and (6)(n) of this Rule; Pf and4. Eliminating harborage conditions. |
December 30, 2024 — Score 98
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
March 22, 2024 — Score 95
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10D |
food properly labeled; original container 511-6-1.04(4)(d) - food storage containers identified with common name of food (c) Corrected | 3 | Observed storage container with dry ingredients with no label. Could not determine if it was sugar or salt by looking at it. Except for containers holding food that can be readily and unmistakably recognized, such as dry pasta, working containers holding food or food ingredients that are removed from their original packages for use in the food establishment, such as cooking oils, flour, herbs, potato flakes, salt, spices, and sugar shall be clearly and legibly identified, in English, with the common name of the food. |
| 15A |
food and nonfood-contact surfaces cleanable, properly designed, constructed, and used 511-6-1.05(2)(a) - equipment and utensils, constructed of durable materials (c) | 1 | Observed dry goods being stored in broken storage bin in bakery area. Equipment and utensils shall be designed and constructed to be durable and to retain their characteristic qualities under normal use conditions. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
June 29, 2023 — Score 88
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1B |
proper hot holding temperatures 511-6-1.04(6)(f) - time/temperature control for safety; hot holding (p) | 9 | Observed several food items (see comments) being hot held below 135F in Cambro units . Except during preparation, cooking, or cooling, or when time is used as the public health control, time/temperature control for safety food shall be maintained at 41°F (5°C) or below or 135°F (57°C) or above, except that roasts cooked to a temperature and for a time specified in subsection (5)(a)2 of this Rule and reheated using the same temperature and time conditions as cooking may be held at a temperature of 130°F (54°C) or above. Reheated. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed live pests and evidence of rodents and pests. The presence of insects, rodents, and other pests shall be controlled to minimize their presence on the premises by:1. Routinely inspecting incoming shipments of food and supplies;2. Routinely inspecting the premises for evidence of pests;3. Using methods, if pests are found, such as trapping devices or other means of pest control as specified under subsections (6)(e), (6)(m), and (6)(n) of this Rule; Pf and4. Eliminating harborage conditions. |
Analysis written on August 10, 2026.
Washington State Prison opened in 1991 in Davisboro as a medium-security facility for adult men, originally designed to hold 750 people but now operating with a rated capacity of 1,548; in August 2026 its population stood at approximately 1,215, or 78.5 percent of its expanded capacity. That expansion, however, masks a lethal mix of classification drift, gang dominance, and severe staffing shortages that culminated in one of the deadliest prison riots in Georgia’s recent history. On January 11, 2026, a gang war erupted during visiting hours, killing four men, injuring more than a dozen, and forcing the facility into a continuous lockdown that GPS reporting indicates has never been lifted. This analysis examines that riot and the conditions that produced it, drawing on GPS mortality records, news reporting, state documents, and the accounts of incarcerated people and their families.
The January 2026 Gang War and Its Toll
On the afternoon of January 11, 2026, a series of fights involving multiple gang-affiliated groups broke out inside Washington State Prison. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that the brawl began around 1:25 p.m. on a sidewalk and quickly spilled into the visitation area, endangering family members who were present. Three incarcerated people were killed in the melee: Jimmy Trammell, 42, who was days away from release after serving time for a burglary conviction; Ahmod Hatcher, 23; and Teddy Jackson, 27. Trammell and Hatcher were pronounced dead at the scene; Jackson died later at Wellstar MCG hospital. Fourteen additional people — thirteen incarcerated men and one correctional officer — were injured, according to Georgia Department of Corrections statements cited by multiple outlets. A fourth man, Silas Westbrook, 42, who had been treated for minor injuries from the riot and transferred to Metro Reentry Facility, suffered a medical emergency upon arrival on January 17 and died; GDC’s Office of Professional Standards is investigating his death. The department described the disturbance as gang-affiliated and stated that staff deployed non-lethal weapons to regain control by approximately 3:00 p.m.
What made the outcome predictable was the staffing level at the time. A GPS open-records production obtained by Georgia Prisoners’ Speak documents that only six officers were on duty at the facility when the fighting erupted — a figure that underscores the systemic understaffing detailed below. Inmate witnesses described correctional officers standing by as gang members moved freely between housing units and passed contraband, including knives. One witness told 13WMAZ that the prison was “the worst” he had attended, a place where people carried and used deadly knives daily without intervention.
Two days before the riot, Dajhmere Hall, 30, was found dead at the prison; his cause of death remains undetermined. In the single week from January 9 to January 17, five men died at Washington State Prison — a cluster that drew national attention. GPS published an investigation titled “They Knew: Empty Posts, Broken Locks, and Georgia’s Deadliest Prison Week” documenting the sequence and the warnings that went unheeded.
On April 28, 2026, GDC charged twelve incarcerated men with felony murder, aggravated assault, gang participation, and unlawful acts of violence in a penal institution for their alleged roles in the January riot. The charges were reported by multiple outlets, including the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and 13WMAZ. The prison has remained on continuous lockdown ever since.
A Pattern of Violence: Gang Control and Understaffing
The January riot was not an aberration but an escalation of violence that had been building for years. GPS has tracked 39 deaths at Washington State Prison since 2020 — 12 of them homicides — and inmate witnesses describe a facility where stabbings are routine and several large housing units have been under the de facto control of security threat groups for the past two years. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution documented earlier homicides at the prison: Devonte Tiger Williams, 26, died of multiple sharp force injuries in August 2024; Jacob Cole Henson, 31, was fatally shot by a GDC officer during a hospital transport in April 2024; Michael Lee Jackson, 60, died of blunt force injuries in August 2022; and Marquis Reshawn Jefferson, 26, died of stab wounds in May 2022.
This violence occurs in the context of a staffing crisis that the U.S. Department of Justice has called a root cause of the state’s loss of control over its prisons. GPS has documented that officer vacancy rates across Georgia’s prisons have run between 49 and 60 percent for years, against a national standard of no more than 10 percent. At Washington State Prison, the six-officer count on the day of the riot is consistent with broader inmate reports that as few as one officer regularly supervised all three East-side housing units on weekends and holidays. A consultant study commissioned by Governor Brian Kemp, cited by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, found that officers working alone feared retribution if they enforced rules, and that buildings with maintenance problems allowed incarcerated people to strip materials and fashion weapons. The DOJ’s October 2024 findings letter explicitly concluded that GDC leadership “has lost control of its facilities” and placed too much of the blame on gangs rather than on understaffing.
In this vacuum, gangs have assumed operational control. Inmate accounts collected by GPS describe security threat groups — primarily the Bloods, Gangster Disciples, and Muslims — controlling cell assignments, operating contraband networks, and collecting debts through violence. Multiple witnesses report that gang members occupy nearly all free-movement job assignments, such as barbers and orderlies, and receive advance warning of shakedowns. In the derived data underlying this analysis, GPS documented evidence that a correctional officer was on the payroll of both the Bloods and Muslims gangs. Three days after the January riot, GBI and the Ocmulgee Drug Task Force arrested Washington State Prison officer Adriana Carnelio, 27, on charges of trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine; she was booked with a co-defendant on weapons charges as well.
Classification drift compounds the danger. Although Washington State Prison is designated medium security, inmate witnesses and GPS’s reporting indicate that it houses a substantial number of people classified at the close-security level. Men serving life sentences for violent offenses have been classified as medium security without clear explanation. When bunks are full, non-affiliated people have been forced to sleep in showers, under stairwells, or on the floors of other inmates’ cells — a direct consequence, multiple accounts attest, of gang control over housing assignments.
Medical Neglect: A Nurse Practitioner at the Center of Repeated Denials
Beyond violence, the most persistent complaint documented at Washington State Prison concerns medical care. GPS internal analysis and family attestations point to a nurse practitioner who, since at least 2024, has repeatedly overruled or cancelled physician-ordered prescriptions, medical equipment, and special diets. GPS has received reports that the nurse practitioner discontinued an incarcerated person’s heart medication without an exam or EKG; cancelled an order for orthotic shoes immediately after the shoes were provided; removed a shower chair prescribed by a telemedicine doctor, stating the facility does not provide such equipment; and cancelled dietary snacks for diabetic patients multiple times, forcing the warden to intervene to restore them.
These reports are not isolated. Family members describe emailing the GDC Ombudsman repeatedly about medical issues and receiving no response. One incarcerated person reported being charged co-pays for medications that were never dispensed after the nurse practitioner terminated the orders. GPS’s mortality database includes one death classified as “Medical Neglect,” and the broader pattern suggests systemic gaps: diabetic inmates have experienced lapses of up to ten days without insulin, and respiratory medications have been cancelled without alternative treatment. A family member reported that as of June 2026, a prescribed shower chair had still not been delivered, and that the incarcerated person had been without thyroid medication for over a week. The warden was reportedly present during a medical visit in 2026, but that did not permanently resolve the cancellations.
At the facility level, Washington State Prison has undergone eight routine food-safety inspections by the Georgia Department of Public Health since mid-2023, scoring as high as 98 (Grade A) and as low as 77 (Grade C). These scores, however, co-exist with a reality GPS has documented system-wide: roach infestations in kitchen equipment, dishwashers broken for sustained periods, and meals served on visibly contaminated trays — conditions that scheduled walkthroughs often fail to capture. The Marshall Project’s May 2026 investigation of Georgia prison food independently corroborated many of these findings.
Conditions of Confinement: Food, Infrastructure, and Collective Punishment
GDC spends approximately $1.69 per person per day on food — roughly 60 cents per meal — a figure that GPS has found yields chronically inadequate meals. Physical evidence submitted to GPS shows a typical meal at Washington State Prison consisting of rice with a tomato-based sauce in a styrofoam bowl. Families report that incarcerated people rely heavily on commissary purchases to supplement these meals, yet the prison has imposed strict per-item quantity limits and spending caps. Photographs of commissary restriction notices show limits on drink mixes, cupcakes, pies, cookies, meat items, rice, soup, chips, candy bars, water, and soda. In the aftermath of the January riot, a $30 weekly commissary cap was imposed on the general population while certain people — notably those with gang-affiliated work assignments — were permitted to spend up to $80 per week, according to GPS analysis.
The infrastructure itself is deteriorating. Family members describe black mold on shower walls, ceiling sections falling, rusted bunks, and ongoing roof problems. Inmate accounts collected by GPS detail holes cut in exterior walls to receive drone-dropped contraband, doors that do not lock, and a garment factory that lacks air conditioning and reaches temperatures over 100 degrees in the summer. GPS’s systemic findings on infrastructure collapse indicate that these conditions are not unique to Washington State Prison but reflect decades of deferred maintenance across the GDC system. The Guidehouse consultant assessment, commissioned by Governor Kemp in 2024, confirmed that non-functional locks and building deterioration enable the manufacture of weapons and facilitate unsupervised movement.
After the riot, the facility imposed a continuous lockdown that GPS reporting describes as never having been lifted. During this period, the entire population was denied television, news, visitation, exercise, phones, law library access, and religious services. Outdoor recreation was eliminated. Inmate witnesses report that food and medication distribution were disrupted, that insulin went unadministered, and that commissary access was withheld from everyone except work-detail participants — measures that families characterize as collective punishment of people uninvolved in the violence.
Deaths in Custody: A Fatal Week and a Growing Toll
The five deaths in the January 9–17 window — Dajhmere Hall, the three riot victims, and Silas Westbrook — elevated Washington State Prison’s already dangerous mortality profile. GPS’s tracking database records 39 deaths at the facility since 2020. Of these, 12 are classified as homicides, 9 as natural or medical, 9 remain unknown or pending, 6 were overdoses, 1 was a suicide, 1 was classified as medical neglect, and 1 fell into another category. The homicide count includes the four riot victims as well as the fatal stabbings of Devonte Tiger Williams, Michael Lee Jackson, and Marquis Reshawn Jefferson, and the officer-involved shooting of Jacob Cole Henson. In June 2026, three more deaths occurred in rapid succession: Deshawn Poole, 34, died on June 9 and is classified as a homicide in GPS records; Courtney Davis, 43, died on June 13 with the GDC stating there were no signs of foul play (GPS records list the cause as unknown); Isreal Jones, 68, died on June 14 and is also listed as a homicide by GPS, despite GDC’s statement that the cause was undetermined and no altercation was apparent. Both deaths are under investigation by GDC’s Office of Professional Standards, which the department describes as standard procedure.
The cumulative toll from a single medium-security prison — more than three dozen deaths and a homicide rate that far exceeds any national benchmark for comparable facilities — speaks to the severity of the systemic failures at play.
A System in Crisis: DOJ Findings and Statewide Failures
Washington State Prison is not an outlier; it is a concentrated example of the statewide crisis that Georgia Prisoners’ Speak, the U.S. Department of Justice, and news organizations have documented across Georgia’s correctional system. The DOJ’s October 2024 findings letter concluded that Georgia prison officials are “deliberately indifferent” to unchecked violence, sexual abuse, and extortion, that gangs run multiple facilities, and that understaffing is the principal enabler. GPS has independently tracked 1,860 deaths in GDC custody since 2020. Systemic findings by GPS show that officer vacancies have been at crisis levels for years, that the state spends roughly $1.69 per day on food per person, that infrastructure is collapsing in facilities 30–40 years old, and that sexual violence — documented in the 2024 DOJ investigation — remains pervasive.
State lawmakers allocated more than $600 million in new GDC funding in 2025 for staffing, salaries, and maintenance, according to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, but the results at Washington State Prison — a facility that has been locked down for months with no reopening date, where gang war killed four people in an afternoon while only six officers watched — suggest that the underlying conditions have not changed. Former incarcerated people interviewed by 13WMAZ described the riot as the predictable outcome of years of neglect, and GPS’s investigation, “They Knew,” documented warnings that regional administrators ignored. As of August 2026, the facility remains sealed, its population enduring what multiple inmate accounts describe as a punitive mass lockdown with no end in sight.
Sources: This analysis draws on reporting from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 13WMAZ, 11Alive, WFXL, WGXA, and other Georgia news outlets; Georgia Department of Corrections public statements and open-records responses; Department of Public Health inspection reports; the U.S. Department of Justice’s October 2024 findings and the Kemp-commissioned Guidehouse consultant assessment; GPS’s own mortality database and internal investigative records; and inmate and family accounts collected by GPS staff.
Recent reports (26)
Source-attributed observations and allegations from news coverage and reports submitted to GPS. Each entry credits its source.
- ALLEGATION According to WGXA Published: May 27, 2026Luis Alfonso Ramirez directed a drug trafficking network from Washington State Prison using contraband cellphones.
"A Washington state prison inmate, Luis Alfonso Ramirez, has been indicted for allegedly directing a major fentanyl and methamphetamine trafficking network from inside Georgia’s Washington State Prison using contraband cellphones, according to federal prosecutors."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025A GDC officer fatally shot inmate Jacob Cole Henson during a fight at a hospital while transporting him for medical treatment.
"He was fatally shot after getting into a fight with a GDC officer who had taken him to a hospital to be treated for injuries he suffered in a stabbing incident earlier that day, according to police."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to 11Alive Recorded by GPS: May 5, 2026GDC alleges the inmates involved in the deadly brawl were believed to be involved with gang activity.
"The inmates involved in Sunday's deadly brawl at Washington State Prison were believed to be involved with gang activity, according to a press release from the Georgia Department of Corrections."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to 13WMAZ Recorded by GPS: May 5, 2026The GDC alleged that the inmates involved in the deadly brawl were believed to be involved with gang activity.
"The inmates involved in Sunday's deadly brawl at Washington State Prison were believed to be involved with gang activity, according to a press release from the Georgia Department of Corrections."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 12, 2026Buildings with maintenance issues enabled prisoners to strip materials to make weapons, locks didn't work allowing easy cell escapes, and understaffing left movements unmonitored.
"Consultants hired for a yearlong study in June 2024 by Gov. Brian Kemp found that buildings with maintenance issues enabled prisoners to strip off materials from walls and ceilings to make weapons. They could also easily leave cells because the locks didn't work. Understaffing meant there often were no officers around to monitor the movements, the consultants reported, and officers working alone reported being fearful of retribution if they enforced the rules."
Read source →
Timeline (95)
Source Articles (50)
Former leadership
Officials who previously held leadership roles at this facility.
| Role | Name | Tenure | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARDEN 1 (facility lead) | White, Jermaine M | 2018-01-01 → 2019-12-31 | — / 19 |