WASHINGTON STATE PRISON
Facility Information
- Original Design Capacity
- 500 (at 196% capacity)
- Bed Capacity
- 1,548 beds
- Current Population
- 980
- Active Lifers
- 329 (33.6% of population) · Oct 2026 GDC report
What the courts held in Brown v. Plata, and how Georgia compares →
- Address
- 13262 Hwy 24 East, Davisboro, GA 31018
- Phone
- (478) 348-5814
- Fax
- (478) 348-5613
- Mailing Address
- P.O. Box 206, Davisboro, GA 31018
- County
- Washington County
- Opened
- 1991
- Operator
- GDC (Georgia Dept. of Corrections)
Security Classification
Last updated: September 23, 2026
241 of the 980 people held here are classified Close security (24.6%), as of September 23, 2026.
| Security level | People | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Close | 241 | 24.6% |
| Medium | 704 | 71.8% |
| Minimum | 35 | 3.6% |
| Total | 980 |
Earlier count (undated table, produced October 22, 2025): 418 of 1,511 Close (27.7%).
Source: Georgia Department of Corrections records produced to GPS under the Open Records Act (R031471-090226, R024615-101925). A person's security level is GDC's classification of that person, which can differ from the prison's own designation.
Following Washington State Prison?
Leadership & Accountability (as of 2026 records)
Officials currently holding positional authority at this facility, with deaths attributed to GPS-tracked records during their leadership tenure. Inclusion reflects role-based accountability, not legal findings of personal culpability. Death counts shown as facility / career.
| Role | Name | Since | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARDEN 1 (facility lead) | Stewart, Veronica M | 2024-06-16 | 24 / 40 |
| Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment (facility deputy) | Jackson, Tarra L Tomlin | 2021-01-01 | 29 / 29 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Whipple, Tamishia V | 2024-01-01 | 15 / 15 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Powell, Tiauna F | 2026-09-16 | — / — |
| Deputy Warden of Administration (facility deputy) | King, Tywanda F | 2026-08-01 | — / — |
About
Last updated October 11, 2026.(DS)
Washington State Prison: A Gang War, a Lockdown That Never Ended, and 39 Deaths in Six Years
Washington State Prison sits on the edge of Davisboro, in Washington County, a medium-security facility for adult men that opened in 1991 and today holds a rated capacity of 1,548 — nearly triple its original design capacity of 500. It houses minimum- and medium-custody prisoners in dormitories and cellblocks, along with segregation and support units, and provides work details for surrounding communities plus limited educational, vocational, and faith-based programming. Its current population stands at 980, roughly 63 percent of rated capacity. What follows is an account of how a facility with that much empty bed space became, in the space of a single week in January 2026, the site of one of the deadliest episodes in the modern Georgia prison system — and of the six years of deaths, medical failures, and staff conduct that preceded it.
The January 2026 Gang War
The violence began during visitation hours. Multiple outlets, including the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, reported that a fight started among several incarcerated men on a sidewalk and spilled into a visitation area of Washington State Prison around 1:25 p.m. on January 11, 2026. The Georgia Department of Corrections described the incident as a suspected gang-affiliated disturbance; staff deployed non-lethal weapons and reported the situation under control by approximately 3 p.m.
Three men were pronounced dead at the scene: Teddy Jackson, 27, serving a 10-year sentence for aggravated assault out of Bibb County; Ahmod Hatcher, 23, serving 20 years for aggravated assault out of Richmond County; and Jimmy Trammell, 42, serving 20 years for first-degree burglary out of Fulton County and, by multiple accounts, days from release. Thirteen other incarcerated men and one correctional officer were injured; the officer's injuries were described as non-life-threatening. Teddy Jackson died hours later at Wellstar MCG hospital.
A fourth man, Silas Westbrook, 42, had been treated for what were described as minor injuries and transferred to the Metro Reentry Facility. He suffered a medical emergency on arrival on January 17 and was pronounced dead. The GDC's Office of Professional Standards opened an investigation into his death, which GPS's mortality registry classifies as a homicide. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Trammell's brother alleged the prison was responsible for his death and demanded answers.
The week's toll was five, not four. Dajhmere Ladaveon Hall, 30, was found dead on January 9 — two days before the riot — of an overdose, according to GPS's registry. GPS's own reporting has described the sequence as five deaths at Washington State Prison in a single week, and has separately documented that the gang violence erupted following a statewide cell-phone network shutdown.
A Lockdown With No End Date
The day after the riot, Washington State Prison remained on lockdown. The GDC said the fight was still under investigation and offered no timeline for lifting it. It never did. GPS's reporting describes a facility that has remained on continuous lockdown since January 11, 2026 — more than five months at the time of that reporting — and has never reopened.
What that has meant inside is documented across multiple channels. GPS records show 12 family-safety-concern signals at this facility over the past 12 months at critical, high, and moderate severity, and 10 external complaints filed to oversight bodies — including the DOJ Civil Rights Division, the GDC Ombudsman, the GBI, and State Representative Billy Hitchens. Family members have described a facility under extended lockdown in which commissary access was withheld from the general population except for those on work details, with families unable to send food or commissary items — a practice those accounts characterize as collective punishment of the men who remained. GPS's own analysis indicates uninvolved prisoners were denied access to television, news, visitation, exercise, phones, the law library, and religious services, and were subjected to a $30-per-week commissary cap while others retained $80 weekly purchasing. One account passed to GPS described a commissary resale operation inside the facility generating more than $1,000 a week in profit after the January melee.
Twelve Charged, and the Question of Who Wasn't
On April 28, 2026, the Georgia Department of Corrections announced that 12 incarcerated men had been charged with felony murder, aggravated assault, gang participation, and unlawful acts of violence in a penal institution for their alleged roles in the disturbance. The AJC, 13WMAZ, WFXL, and 11Alive all carried the announcement. The GDC characterized those charged as believed to be involved with gang activity. The department confirmed the investigation remained active as of late April.
The charging announcement did not close the question of how the riot happened. GPS's intelligence system records 43 assault-by-inmate signals at this facility over the past 12 months across nine separate months, with severity ranging from moderate to critical, and 12 in January 2026 alone. GPS has received recurring accounts that the men charged were not the only ones involved — that some individuals identified in surveillance footage and reported to senior facility and regional administrators were neither sanctioned, charged, nor transferred, and that certain incarcerated men retained job assignments and free movement while the rest of the facility was locked down. GPS has also received accounts that staff showed surveillance footage of the incident to senior officials. These are accounts GPS holds, not findings of fact; the criminal cases remain the only formal adjudication.
Six Officers on Duty
The most concrete staffing fact to emerge from the riot came through an open records request. GPS's reporting, drawing on GDC's response to that request, documented that six officers were on duty at Washington State Prison when the gang war broke out on January 11, 2026.
That figure lands inside a systemwide collapse GPS has documented as an integrated structural finding. Officer vacancies in Georgia's prisons have run between 49.3 percent and 60 percent systemwide for multiple years, against a national standard of no more than 10 percent. The hiring pipeline cannot close the gap: acceptance rates run under 15 percent, and 82.7 percent of new hires leave within their first year. Georgia ranks last of 50 states for correctional-officer pay. The October 2024 DOJ findings letter concluded that "the leadership of the Georgia Department of Corrections has lost control of its facilities" and faulted GDC for placing "too much blame on gangs and insufficient emphasis on understaffing." Tyler Ryals, a former GDC sergeant forced out in 2024 after whistleblowing, told GPS he had personally been the only security person on the entire Telfair compound of roughly 1,250 maximum-security inmates; his witness statement was signed at Washington State Prison.
At this facility, GPS records show nine staffing-shortage signals over the past 12 months, spanning six months and ranging from moderate to critical severity. Multiple sources describe a facility where as few as one or two officers have been tasked with supervising six dormitories at once, where control rooms are routinely left unoccupied, and where a specialized housing unit is frequently left unmanned while the mailroom carries three to four staff. GPS has received accounts that a correctional officer left all gates and doors to a housing unit unlocked while away from the post — accounts that, if accurate, describe the physical precondition for what followed.
The Physical Plant as a Weapon Source
The AJC reported that a consultant study commissioned by Governor Brian Kemp in June 2024 found that buildings with maintenance issues enabled prisoners to strip materials to make weapons, that locks didn't work, allowing easy cell escapes, and that understaffing left movements unmonitored. Officers working alone, the consultants found, feared retribution for enforcing rules.
GPS treats infrastructure collapse as a force multiplier for the violence, classification, and mortality crises it has documented at the facility level. Most GDC facilities are 30 to 40 or more years old, with documented patterns of deferred maintenance producing broken cell-door locks, inoperative surveillance and fire-alarm systems, mold and water failures, broken kitchen sanitization equipment, and pest infestations. The DOJ's October 2024 findings, the Guidehouse 2024 assessment, and Commissioner Oliver's public "end of life" statements all corroborate the pattern.
At Washington State Prison specifically, GPS has received accounts of a four-foot-by-four-foot hole cut in an exterior wall of a housing unit to receive contraband dropped by drone, left unsecured for over a week before being patched with plywood. GPS records six equipment-failure-or-install signals at this facility over the past 12 months across six months. State Representative Billy Hitchens alleged publicly that the prison system is not making meaningful progress toward preventing inmates from jamming or disabling cell-door locks, which allows inmates to roam freely and commit attacks. In January 2025, Georgia lawmakers allocated more than $600 million in new funding to the GDC to add staffing positions, improve salaries, and tackle a maintenance backlog including lock repair.
Medical Care: Cancelled Orders and Missing Providers
GPS's mortality registry records 39 deaths at Washington State Prison since January 1, 2020 — a floor, since GDC reports deaths roughly two months late. The causes break down as 12 homicides, 11 natural or medical, six overdoses, five unknown or pending, and one each of medical neglect, suicide, use of force, accident, and other. The full list is maintained at gps.press/georgia-prison-deaths/facility/washington-state-prison/.
The most recent 25:
- Isreal Moses Jones died June 14, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 68.
- Courtney Davis died June 13, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending, age 43.
- Deshawn Poole died June 9, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 34.
- Frank Smith died May 6, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending, age 75.
- Silas Rodrigioeuz Westbrook died January 17, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 42.
- Teddy Dewayne Jackson died January 11, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 27.
- Jimmy Lee Trammell died January 11, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 42.
- Ahmod Dewayne Hatcher died January 11, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 23.
- Dajhmere Ladaveon Hall died January 9, 2026, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Overdose, age 30.
- Taylor Allen Howard died December 16, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical, age 66.
- Benjamin Horne died December 15, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Overdose, age 51.
- Wayne Krier died November 5, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical, age 77.
- Darrin Gresham died August 8, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending, age 60.
- William Earl Long died July 16, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Accident, age 52.
- Michael Lareco Daniel died June 20, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 44.
- Lamontez Winkfield died May 11, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 22.
- Yoncey Jallah died April 23, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical, age 49.
- Robert Washington died January 14, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical.
- Dontavious Carter died January 7, 2025, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide.
- Devonte Tiger Williams died August 9, 2024, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Homicide, age 26. The AJC reported he died from multiple sharp force injuries to the torso, head, and neck.
- Torrey Wayne Forrester died July 1, 2024, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Natural/Medical, age 41.
- Johntavis Jermaine Kellom died May 2, 2024, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Overdose, age 36.
- Jacob Cole Henson died April 23, 2024, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Use of Force, age 31. The AJC reported that Henson, 31, died from multiple gunshot wounds after getting into a fight with a GDC officer who had taken him to a hospital to be treated for injuries from a stabbing earlier that day.
- Jimmy Lee Reed died April 2, 2024, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending, age 66.
- Ronald Wayne Kidd died October 30, 2023, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as Unknown/Pending, age 61.
The AJC's homicide-tracking coverage separately documented two earlier deaths at the facility: Michael Lee Jackson, 60, died August 17, 2022, from multiple blunt force injuries in the setting of hypertensive cardiovascular disease, with an incident report showing two other inmates involved; and Marquis Reshawn Jefferson, 26, died May 12, 2022, from stab wounds to the torso and arm, with an incident report dated May 11, 2022, indicating four other inmates were involved.
Behind those numbers, GPS has received a sustained body of accounts describing medical care at Washington State Prison as the worst the men there have encountered across multiple GDC facilities. GPS records seven medical-neglect signals over the past 12 months across six months, at critical, high, and moderate severity. The recurring themes in those accounts are medication gaps, cancelled orders, and absent providers. GPS has received accounts of medication gaps averaging four to five days per month, of diabetic patients going up to 10 days without medication, of insulin administered twice daily at fixed times regardless of mealtimes or blood sugar, of CPAP users unable to obtain distilled water, and of respiratory medications cancelled outright. Multiple accounts describe a nurse practitioner cancelling physician-ordered care — heart medications without an EKG, orthotic shoes without an examination, prescribed dietary supplements, and a special diet — and of co-pays charged for medications that were then never delivered. GPS has received accounts that the facility lacked upper-level medical providers and treating RNs in early 2025 after previously having one MD and two PA/NPs, that three different medical directors resigned over a 20-month period with no MD present by mid-2026, and that the infirmary was converted to offices and storage with its staff reduced to day shift only. GPS has received accounts naming Centurion Health Care Services as the healthcare contractor.
These are accounts GPS holds, not adjudicated findings. But they sit against a documented systemwide pattern: GDC spends approximately $1.69 per person per day on food (2024) and has proposed $1.60 per day in FY27 — under 60 cents per meal — against an FDA Thrifty Food Plan estimate of roughly $10 per day for an adult man's nutritionally adequate diet, while spending approximately 14 times more on medical care ($432 million) than on food. The Marshall Project independently reported on May 16, 2026, documenting rats in kitchens, insects in food, moldy trays, and visible malnutrition across Georgia facilities.
Food, Water, and the Limits of Inspection Scores
The Georgia Department of Public Health has inspected Washington State Prison's food service repeatedly, and the scores tell a story of their own. A routine inspection on June 1, 2026 produced a score of 100 (Grade A) — and, on the same date, a second routine inspection produced an 88 (Grade B) with three violations including improper hot holding temperatures and the presence of insects, rodents, or animals. On November 7, 2025, two routine inspections produced scores of 91 (Grade A), one with a single violation for food separation and protection, the other with three violations including food-contact surfaces not cleaned and sanitized. On December 30, 2024, scores of 94 and 98 (both Grade A). On March 22, 2024, scores of 97 and 95 (both Grade A). On June 29, 2023, a score of 77 (Grade C) with four violations including improper cold holding temperatures — alongside an 88 (Grade B) the same day with violations for hot holding and the presence of pests.
GPS has documented a systemic pattern of food-service sanitation failure across GDC kitchens that DPH inspection scores systematically fail to capture: tray-sanitizing dishwashers broken for sustained periods, sustained roach and rodent infestation in kitchen and serving areas, and meals served on visibly contaminated trays. The pattern is hidden from DPH scores because inspections are scheduled walkthroughs that do not assess equipment under load, and because GPS has documented professional overlap between inspectors and facility staff in small-county settings. High DPH scores at GDC facilities coexist with sustained witness reports of equipment failure and food contamination — the contradiction is the analytical center of GPS's investigation "Dunked, Stacked, and Served."
Physical evidence submitted to GPS from Washington State Prison shows meals served in styrofoam bowls — rice with a tomato-based sauce — and commissary restriction notices imposing spending caps and item-level limits on rice, soup, water, drink mix, chips, candy bars, soda, cupcakes, pies, cookies, and meat. GPS records four food-quality-complaint signals and four sanitation-failure signals at this facility over the past 12 months. Family members describe commissary restrictions leaving incarcerated people with inadequate food access and relying on commissary purchases to supplement meals described as inadequate. One message passed to GPS put it plainly: "There giving us spoiled milk at washington! Only 30 in store for the last 6 months we are losing weight rapidly! Help us! Please!"
Classification Drift and Gang Control
GPS has received recurring accounts that multiple dormitory housing units at Washington State Prison have been under near-total control of security threat groups for the past one to two years, and that a significant proportion of the medium-security facility's population is classified at the higher close-security level. GPS records nine overcrowding signals at this facility over the past 12 months across five months. Physical evidence submitted to GPS shows overcrowded or cramped cell conditions; GPS staff who reviewed a photographed cell assessed it as appearing consistent with a standard general population housing unit.
The accounts describe a housing system where assigned beds are not enforced. Multiple sources report that non-gang-affiliated men are required to live in showers, under stairs, in television rooms, or on the floors of other men's cells, and that security threat groups effectively control cell assignments. GPS has received accounts that a large proportion of a dorm's residents were living in the wrong cell, that a man with a medical profile precluding three-person placement was housed in a three-man room with a bed only inches off the floor, and that a senior staff member had to escort one man to his assigned bed and order the previous occupant to relocate. GPS has received accounts that Bloods gang members were assigned to nearly all positions granting free movement around the prison, and that laundry and sanitation details — described as primary conduits for contraband — were exclusively controlled by a single gang.
The systemwide context GPS has documented: approximately 31 percent of the state's roughly 49,000 incarcerated population are validated members of 315 different security threat groups, more than double the national average. The DOJ and the Guidehouse 2024 consultant assessment independently concluded that gangs effectively run multiple facilities, controlling access to phones, showers, food, and bed assignments. GPS treats staffing collapse and gang assumption of facility control as the integrated structural finding that explains the per-facility violence, classification, mortality, and infrastructure-failure narratives.
Staff Conduct, Contraband, and the Whistleblower Problem
GPS records 12 named-staff-misconduct signals and 11 unnamed-staff-misconduct signals at this facility over the past 12 months, spanning six months each and ranging from moderate to critical severity. GPS has received accounts that a correctional officer was on the payroll of both the Bloods and the Muslims, that a correctional sergeant accepted payment to move gang-affiliated men from general population into a more desirable housing assignment, that a CERT officer was paid to facilitate transfers into an honor dorm, and that staff announced shakedowns in advance so contraband could be moved and replaced within hours. GPS has received accounts that a staff member overseeing laundry and sanitation resigned following the January 2026 melee, that an investigator and a correctional officer were transferred, and that a CERT officer was arrested following the disturbance.
In the immediate aftermath of the riot, the GBI and the Ocmulgee Drug Task Force arrested Washington State Prison officer Adriana Carnelio, 27, roughly three days after the January 11 riot, on charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine and firearms offenses, with a co-defendant identified as Q. Peacock.
Contraband movement at this facility is not a marginal phenomenon. Luis Alfonso Ramirez was indicted federally, along with six accomplices, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances after an investigation by Homeland Security Investigations and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation; the operation involved seizure of 35 kilograms of methamphetamine and 3.5 kilograms of fentanyl valued at $225,000, plus $145,000 in cash. WGXA reported that Ramirez directed a drug trafficking network from Washington State Prison using contraband cellphones. Separately, the AJC reported that Jeffery White, serving a 20-year sentence, led a methamphetamine network from the facility believed to have distributed more than 200 pounds of crystal meth in Volusia County, Florida, in one year, prompting nearly 40 arrest warrants. The DOJ's 2024 findings described sophisticated gangs running prison black markets trafficking in drugs, weapons, and electronic devices including drones and smartphones.
GPS has received accounts of retaliation against men who raise complaints — including that officers tell incarcerated people they will not be removed from dangerous situations, will not be protected, and will not intervene in fights. GPS records four due-process-violation signals at this facility over the past 12 months. One account describes a disciplinary hearing resulting in a 90-day restriction of all phone, visitation, and commissary privileges; another describes a TACT squad late-night raid in which a man's tablet was seized and a disciplinary report issued while, by the same account, another man was not disciplined. GPS has received accounts that a mass store restriction was imposed on an entire housing unit after contraband was found on multiple people including one assigned to the warden's office, with no individual discipline following.
Leadership
Veronica M. Stewart has served as Warden of Washington State Prison since June 16, 2024. Her deputies are Tiauna F. Powell (Deputy Warden of Security, since September 2026), Tamishia V. Whipple (Deputy Warden of Security, since January 2024), Tywanda F. King (Deputy Warden of Administration, since August 2026), and Tarra L. Tomlin Jackson (Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment, since January 2021). In November 2025, Commissioner Tyrone Oliver announced the appointment of Tamara Grier as Deputy Warden of Security, bringing more than 22 years of experience in Georgia's correctional system.
GPS has received accounts that the warden was present during a medical visit with nursing staff in 2026, that the warden was unaware a medevac helicopter had been called until it arrived, and that staff had to physically intervene to stop the warden from using force against a handcuffed incarcerated person during an on-camera incident. GPS has received accounts of a use-of-force incident involving the warden shortly after the warden's arrival in 2024, and that a senior staff member was recorded striking a handcuffed incarcerated person with a radio, resulting in a one-month suspension. These are accounts GPS holds; none has been adjudicated in a forum GPS can cite.
What the Record Shows
Washington State Prison was built for 500 men and now holds 980 against a rated capacity of 1,548. It runs limited educational, vocational, and faith-based programming, and work details for surrounding communities. Its food service scores well on scheduled inspections and its medical department, by the accounts GPS has collected, does not function. Its staffing, by the department's own open-records response, stood at six officers on the afternoon a gang war killed four men and injured fourteen more.
The facility has been on continuous lockdown since January 11, 2026. GPS has recorded 39 deaths there since the start of 2020, and 1,896 deaths in GDC custody systemwide since that year. Twelve men have been charged with felony murder. The question the record leaves open is not who was in the room — it is who was supposed to be watching the door.
Sources
This analysis draws on reporting from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 13WMAZ, WFXL, 11Alive, WGXA, WTOC, and 41NBC; Georgia Department of Public Health food-safety inspection records; Georgia Department of Corrections statements and open-records responses; the October 2024 U.S. Department of Justice findings letter and the 2024 Guidehouse consultant assessment commissioned by Governor Brian Kemp; federal court filings and the GA DOAS Risk Management settlement ledger; GPS's mortality registry, which records 39 deaths at Washington State Prison since January 1, 2020; and inmate, family, and staff accounts collected by GPS. GPS's own prior reporting on the January 2026 riot and its aftermath is cited throughout.
Mortality Statistics
50 deaths documented at this facility from 2020 to present.
Deaths by Year
- 2026: 20
- 2025: 10
- 2024: 5
- 2023: 6
- 2022: 8
- 2021: 0
- 2020: 1
County Public Health Department
Food service and sanitation at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON fall under the jurisdiction of the Washington County Environmental Health Department. Incarcerated people cannot choose where they eat — public health inspectors carry an elevated responsibility to hold this kitchen to the same standards applied to any restaurant.
Contact
- Title
- Environmental Health Director
- Address
-
201 Morningside Drive
Sandersville, GA 31082 - Phone
- (478) 552-3210
- washington.eh@dph.ga.gov
- Website
- Visit department website →
Why this matters
GPS has documented black mold on chow-hall ceilings, cold and contaminated trays, spoiled milk, and pest contamination at Georgia prisons. The Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration and untreated diabetes tied to food and water deprivation. Advance-notice inspections let facilities stage temporary fixes that disappear once inspectors leave.
Unannounced inspections by the county health department are one of the few outside checks on kitchen conditions behind the fence.
How you can help
Write to the county inspector and request an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operation at this facility. A short, respectful letter citing Georgia food-safety regulations is more powerful than you think — inspectors respond to public concern.
Sample Letter
This is the letter Georgia Prisoners' Speak mailed to all county environmental health inspectors responsible for GDC facilities. Feel free to adapt it.
October 11, 2026
RE: Request for Unannounced Public Health Inspection of Food Service Operations at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON
Dear County Environmental Health Director,
I am writing to respectfully request that your office conduct a thorough, unannounced inspection of food service and sanitation practices at WASHINGTON STATE PRISON, located in Washington County.
Documented concerns
Georgia Prisoners' Speak, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit investigative newsroom, has published extensive investigative reporting on food safety and nutrition failures across Georgia's prison system, including:
- Dangerous sanitation conditions — black mold on chow hall ceilings and air vents, contaminated food trays, and spoiled milk served to inmates.
- Severe nutritional deficiency — roughly 60 cents per meal; inmates receive only 40% of required protein and less than one serving of vegetables per day.
- Preventable deaths — the U.S. Department of Justice's 2024 report confirmed deaths from dehydration, renal failure, and untreated diabetes following food and water deprivation.
- Staged compliance — advance-notice inspections allow facilities to stage temporary improvements, then revert once inspectors leave.
Firsthand testimony
In Surviving on Scraps: Ten Years of Prison Food in Georgia, a person who has spent more than ten years in GDC custody describes no functional dishwashing sanitation, chronic mold on food trays, and roaches found on the undersides of trays at intake facilities. Full account: gps.press/surviving-on-scraps-ten-years-of-prison-food-in-georgia.
Specific requests
- Conduct an unannounced inspection of the kitchen and food service operations at this facility, with particular attention to dishwashing equipment, tray sanitation procedures, and food storage conditions.
- Evaluate compliance with applicable Georgia food safety regulations, including O.C.G.A. § 26-2-370 and the Georgia Food Service Rules and Regulations (Chapter 511-6-1).
- Verify permit status and confirm whether the facility is subject to the same inspection schedule as other institutional food service establishments in the county.
- Make inspection results available to the public, as permitted under Georgia's Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70).
Incarcerated individuals cannot advocate for their own health and safety in the way a restaurant patron can — they cannot choose to eat elsewhere. This places an elevated responsibility on public health officials to ensure these facilities meet the same sanitation standards applied to any food service establishment.
Thank you for your attention to this important public health matter.
Sincerely,
[Your name]
Food Safety Inspections
Georgia Department of Public Health
What the score doesn't measure. DPH grades kitchen compliance on inspection day — food storage, temperatures, pest control. It does not grade whether today's trays are clean. GPS reporting has found broken dishwashers at most Georgia state prisons we've documented; trays go out wet, stacked, and visibly moldy — including at facilities with recent scores near 100.
Who inspects. Most Georgia state prisons sit in rural counties — often with fewer than 20,000 people, several with fewer than 10,000. The environmental health inspector lives in that community and often knows the kitchen staff personally. Rural inspection regimes don't have the structural independence you'd expect in a city-sized health department. Read the scores accordingly.
Read the investigation: “Dunked, Stacked and Served: Why Georgia Prison Trays Are Making People Sick”
Recent inspections
| Date | Score | Purpose | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 1, 2026 | 88 | Routine | |
| Nov 7, 2025 | 91 | Routine | |
| Dec 30, 2024 | 98 | Routine | |
| Mar 22, 2024 | 95 | Routine | |
| Jun 29, 2023 | 88 | Routine |
June 1, 2026 — Score 88
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1B |
proper hot holding temperatures 511-6-1.04(6)(f) - time/temperature control for safety; hot holding (p) Corrected | 9 | Observed peas in Cambro unit at 99 F. Except during preparation, cooking, or cooling, or when time is used as the public health control, time/temperature control for safety food shall be maintained at 41°F (5°C) or below or 135°F (57°C) or above, except that roasts cooked to a temperature and for a time specified in subsection (5)(a)2 of this Rule and reheated using the same temperature and time conditions as cooking may be held at a temperature of 130°F (54°C) or above.PIC discarded food item. |
| 1B |
proper hot holding temperatures 511-6-1.04(6)(f) - time/temperature control for safety; hot holding (p) Corrected | 9 | Observed rice in Cambro unit at 125 F. Except during preparation, cooking, or cooling, or when time is used as the public health control, time/temperature control for safety food shall be maintained at 41°F (5°C) or below or 135°F (57°C) or above, except that roasts cooked to a temperature and for a time specified in subsection (5)(a)2 of this Rule and reheated using the same temperature and time conditions as cooking may be held at a temperature of 130°F (54°C) or above.Rice was removed from Cambro unit and reheated to 165 F. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed evidence of pests in WIC containing dry goods.The presence of insects, rodents, and other pests shall be controlled to minimize their presence on the premises by:1. Routinely inspecting incoming shipments of food and supplies;2. Routinely inspecting the premises for evidence of pests;3. Using methods, if pests are found, such as trapping devices or other means of pest control as specified under subsections (6)(e), (6)(m), and (6)(n) of this Rule; Pf and4. Eliminating harborage conditions. |
November 7, 2025 — Score 91
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2B |
food-contact surfaces: cleaned & sanitized 511-6-1.05(7)(b) - food contact surfaces and utensils - cleaning frequency (p, c) | 4 | Observed bulk ice machines with black substance on deflector plates. In equipment such as ice bins and beverage dispensing nozzles and enclosed components of equipment such as ice makers, cooking oil storage tanks and distribution lines, beverage and syrup dispensing lines or tubes, coffee bean grinders, and water vending equipment:(I) At a frequency specified by the manufacturer; or(II) Absent manufacturer specifications, at a frequency necessary to preclude accumulation of soil or mold.Increase cleaning frequency of ice machines. Machine should be sanitized before being put back into use. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed live pests and evidence of rodents and pests. The presence of insects, rodents, and other pests shall be controlled to minimize their presence on the premises by:1. Routinely inspecting incoming shipments of food and supplies;2. Routinely inspecting the premises for evidence of pests;3. Using methods, if pests are found, such as trapping devices or other means of pest control as specified under subsections (6)(e), (6)(m), and (6)(n) of this Rule; Pf and4. Eliminating harborage conditions. |
December 30, 2024 — Score 98
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) Repeat | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
March 22, 2024 — Score 95
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10D |
food properly labeled; original container 511-6-1.04(4)(d) - food storage containers identified with common name of food (c) Corrected | 3 | Observed storage container with dry ingredients with no label. Could not determine if it was sugar or salt by looking at it. Except for containers holding food that can be readily and unmistakably recognized, such as dry pasta, working containers holding food or food ingredients that are removed from their original packages for use in the food establishment, such as cooking oils, flour, herbs, potato flakes, salt, spices, and sugar shall be clearly and legibly identified, in English, with the common name of the food. |
| 15A |
food and nonfood-contact surfaces cleanable, properly designed, constructed, and used 511-6-1.05(2)(a) - equipment and utensils, constructed of durable materials (c) | 1 | Observed dry goods being stored in broken storage bin in bakery area. Equipment and utensils shall be designed and constructed to be durable and to retain their characteristic qualities under normal use conditions. |
| 17C |
physical facilities installed, maintained, and clean 511-6-1.07(5)(a),(b) - good repair, physical facilities maintained; cleaning, frequency & restrictions, cleaned often enough to keep them clean (c) | 1 | Observed broken pipe from 3-compartment sink in pots and pan area draining directly onto the floor. Observed floor tiles broken, missing throughout the facility. Some areas holding water. All areas should be maintained in good condition. This has been an ongoing issue for years. Some of the tiles have been removed in large areas. Continue efforts toward compliance. |
June 29, 2023 — Score 88
Routine · Inspector: Justin Jones
| Code | Violation | Pts | Inspector notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1B |
proper hot holding temperatures 511-6-1.04(6)(f) - time/temperature control for safety; hot holding (p) | 9 | Observed several food items (see comments) being hot held below 135F in Cambro units . Except during preparation, cooking, or cooling, or when time is used as the public health control, time/temperature control for safety food shall be maintained at 41°F (5°C) or below or 135°F (57°C) or above, except that roasts cooked to a temperature and for a time specified in subsection (5)(a)2 of this Rule and reheated using the same temperature and time conditions as cooking may be held at a temperature of 130°F (54°C) or above. Reheated. |
| 18 |
insects, rodents, and animals not present 511-6-1.07(5)(k) - controlling pests (pf, c) | 3 | Observed live pests and evidence of rodents and pests. The presence of insects, rodents, and other pests shall be controlled to minimize their presence on the premises by:1. Routinely inspecting incoming shipments of food and supplies;2. Routinely inspecting the premises for evidence of pests;3. Using methods, if pests are found, such as trapping devices or other means of pest control as specified under subsections (6)(e), (6)(m), and (6)(n) of this Rule; Pf and4. Eliminating harborage conditions. |
Recent reports (39)
Source-attributed observations and allegations from news coverage and reports submitted to GPS. Each entry credits its source.
- ALLEGATION According to WGXA Published: May 27, 2026Luis Alfonso Ramirez directed a drug trafficking network from Washington State Prison using contraband cellphones.
"A Washington state prison inmate, Luis Alfonso Ramirez, has been indicted for allegedly directing a major fentanyl and methamphetamine trafficking network from inside Georgia’s Washington State Prison using contraband cellphones, according to federal prosecutors."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 21, 2025A GDC officer fatally shot inmate Jacob Cole Henson during a fight at a hospital while transporting him for medical treatment.
"He was fatally shot after getting into a fight with a GDC officer who had taken him to a hospital to be treated for injuries he suffered in a stabbing incident earlier that day, according to police."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to 11Alive Recorded by GPS: May 5, 2026GDC alleges the inmates involved in the deadly brawl were believed to be involved with gang activity.
"The inmates involved in Sunday's deadly brawl at Washington State Prison were believed to be involved with gang activity, according to a press release from the Georgia Department of Corrections."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to 13WMAZ Recorded by GPS: May 5, 2026The GDC alleged that the inmates involved in the deadly brawl were believed to be involved with gang activity.
"The inmates involved in Sunday's deadly brawl at Washington State Prison were believed to be involved with gang activity, according to a press release from the Georgia Department of Corrections."
Read source → - ALLEGATION According to Atlanta Journal-Constitution Published: Jan 12, 2026Buildings with maintenance issues enabled prisoners to strip materials to make weapons, locks didn't work allowing easy cell escapes, and understaffing left movements unmonitored.
"Consultants hired for a yearlong study in June 2024 by Gov. Brian Kemp found that buildings with maintenance issues enabled prisoners to strip off materials from walls and ceilings to make weapons. They could also easily leave cells because the locks didn't work. Understaffing meant there often were no officers around to monitor the movements, the consultants reported, and officers working alone reported being fearful of retribution if they enforced the rules."
Read source →
Timeline (107)
Source Articles (55)
Former leadership
Officials who previously held leadership roles at this facility.
| Role | Name | Tenure | Deaths this facility / career |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warden (facility lead) | Wilkes, Scott W | 2022-04-01 → 2024-06-15 | 15 / 15 |
| Warden (facility lead) | Fort, Karl D | 2020-07-01 → 2022-03-31 | 3 / 3 |
| Warden 1 (facility lead) | Walker, Victor L | 2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22 | — / 69 |
| WARDEN 1 (facility lead) | White, Jermaine M | 2018-01-01 → 2019-12-31 | — / 23 |
| DEPUTY WARDEN (facility deputy) | Dogan, Helen R | 2016-01-01 → 2025-12-31 | 30 / 30 |
| Deputy Warden of Security (facility deputy) | Grier, Tamara | 2025-11-16 → 2026-09-15 | 14 / 14 |
| Deputy Warden (facility deputy) | Sanford, Paul Anthony | 2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22 | — / 12 |
| Deputy Warden (facility deputy) | Alexander, Ricky | 2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22 | — / — |
| Chaplain (specialty lead) | Harris, Warren | 2026-08-27 → 2026-08-27 | — / — |
| Chaplain (specialty lead) | Harris Sr., Warren | 2023-11-22 → 2023-11-22 | — / — |