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Recidivism & Reentry

17 Collections 1,237 Data Points Last Updated: Apr 5, 2026
Georgia releases 14,000–16,000 people from its prisons each year into communities with minimal preparation, support, or resources — yet the state's official recidivism rate of 25–27% obscures a far grimmer reality: when technical violations, arrests, and extended measurement windows are factored in, the true return-to-incarceration rate approaches 50%. With 528,000 Georgia residents under criminal justice supervision and an incarceration rate of 881 per 100,000 — higher than any nation on earth except El Salvador — the state's failure to invest meaningfully in reentry is not merely a policy gap but a documented engine of mass incarceration costing taxpayers $1.8 billion annually.

Key Findings

Critical data points synthesized across multiple research collections.

~50%
Adjusted return-to-incarceration rate in Georgia when technical violations, arrests, and extended measurement windows are included — roughly double the official 25–27% felony reconviction rate reported by GDC
14,000–16,000
People released from Georgia prisons each year into communities with minimal preparation — against a reentry infrastructure of just 2,344 transitional center beds across 12 facilities statewide
$343 million
Estimated annual cost avoidance from parole supervision in FY2024, calculated from the difference between $68.51/day incarceration cost and approximately $2/day community supervision cost — underscoring the fiscal case for reentry investment
881 per 100,000
Georgia's incarceration rate — 7th highest nationally and higher than any country in the world except El Salvador — reflecting a carceral system that has prioritized prison beds over reentry pathways for decades
80%
Reduction in violent rearrests achieved by San Francisco's RSVP program — one of dozens of evidence-based models Georgia has not adopted at scale despite a robust national evidence base
$1.8 billion
Annual cost of Georgia's state prison system (FY2025 actual: $1.823B; FY2027 approved: $1.779B) — a budget that continues to grow while reentry infrastructure remains critically underfunded

The Recidivism Gap: Official Numbers vs. Reality

Georgia's Department of Corrections reports a three-year felony reconviction rate of approximately 25–27%, a figure that places the state among the lowest reported recidivism rates nationally (*Recidivism & Reentry Failures in Georgia*). At first glance, this appears to be a success story. It is not. The official metric is constructed to look favorable: it counts only felony reconvictions, not rearrest, not technical parole violations, not misdemeanor convictions, and not outcomes beyond the three-year window. When those factors are incorporated — as researchers and advocates have done — the adjusted return-to-incarceration rate climbs to approximately 50%, roughly double the official figure (*Recidivism & Reentry Failures in Georgia*).

The gap between Georgia's reported rate and the national average is instructive but not comforting. Nationally, recidivism rates range from 39–44% depending on methodology, and close to two-thirds of people released from prison are rearrested within three years (*National Prison Reform Models & Georgia Comparison — Brennan Center 2026 Report*). Georgia's official figure appears lower not because its system works better, but because it measures less. This statistical sleight of hand has real consequences: it allows policymakers to avoid confronting the scale of reentry failure and to deprioritize the investments that evidence shows actually reduce recidivism.

The contradiction between Georgia's self-reported success and the lived experience of returning citizens is stark. Nearly 60% of formerly incarcerated people nationally remain unemployed a full year after release (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026*). Georgia's reentry infrastructure — 12 transitional centers with a total capacity of approximately 2,344 beds — serves a population of 14,000–16,000 annual releases (*Recidivism & Reentry Failures in Georgia*). The math does not work. 95% of incarcerated people will eventually be released, most having received almost no programming or support (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026 Report*). The data points to a system that measures its failures narrowly to avoid accounting for them fully.

Reentry Infrastructure: A System Built to Fall Short

Georgia operates 12 Transitional Centers statewide with approximately 2,344 beds total — a number that cannot come close to serving the 14,000–16,000 people released from Georgia prisons each year (*Recidivism & Reentry Failures in Georgia*). This structural mismatch is not incidental; it reflects decades of policy choices that have prioritized incarceration capacity over reentry capacity. The state received $82.2 million in federal Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grants between 1996 and 2001, funds used to create 4,132 new prison beds (*Truth in Sentencing & Fiscal Impact: The $40 Billion Story*). The investment went into building infrastructure to hold more people longer — not to prepare them to return home.

Parole represents one of the few structured reentry mechanisms in Georgia, and its outcomes are mixed. In FY2024, the Parole Board released 5,443 people from prison — 420 fewer than the prior year — out of 19,328 parole-eligible cases considered (*Georgia's Parole System: Denial Rates, Life Sentences & Fiscal Impact*). The 72% successful parole completion rate exceeds the national average of approximately 60%, but that figure covers only those who make it onto parole and survive supervision without technical violations (*Georgia's Parole System*). The broader parole population shrank from 16,369 to 15,105 during FY2024, suggesting that fewer people are being placed on parole even as the prison population holds at approximately 53,000 (*Georgia Incarceration Trends: Population, Demographics & National Context*).

The fiscal logic of this failure is clear even on the state's own terms. The daily cost to incarcerate a person in a Georgia state prison is $68.51, compared to approximately $2 per day for community supervision (*Georgia's Parole System: Denial Rates, Life Sentences & Fiscal Impact*). The Parole Board estimated that parole supervision generated more than $343 million in cost avoidance to the state in FY2024 alone. Yet the state continues to underfund the community-side infrastructure — employment services, housing assistance, substance use treatment, mental health support — that determines whether someone successfully completes parole or cycles back through the system.

What Works: The Evidence Base Georgia Is Ignoring

The research on effective reentry intervention is not contested. Cognitive-behavioral programs like Thinking for a Change (T4C) have shown that participants recidivated at a rate of 23% compared to 36% in control groups during six-month follow-up periods — a statistically significant reduction (*Evidence-Based Rehabilitation Curricula*). Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R), validated across multiple international contexts including the UK, Spain, Australia, and Scandinavia, reduces reoffending by approximately 14% compared to control groups (*Evidence-Based Rehabilitation Curricula*). Trauma-informed curricula like California's SEED program — a 37-lesson, 166.5-hour intervention — address the underlying conditions that drive criminal behavior in ways that punitive approaches do not (*California Prison Programs: From Brown v. Plata to National Model — CDCR's Rehabilitative Transformation*).

Program models from other states demonstrate what scaled investment looks like. The Prison Entrepreneurship Program (PEP) in Texas reaches over 6,000 men annually across 80 TDCJ units, has graduated over 3,500 participants since its 2004 founding, and employs a staff that is 90% program graduates — a full pipeline from participant to professional (*Prison Program Structure Models*). The Bard Prison Initiative enrolls 400 students full-time in college degree programs across seven New York prisons. San Francisco's Resolve to Stop the Violence Project (RSVP), operating at 50 hours per week intensity in a dedicated housing unit of 44 people, achieved up to an 80% reduction in violent rearrests among participants (*Prison Program Structure Models*). California's Innovative Programming Grants program has funded 299 programs since 2014, investing $4 million per year in the current 2025–2028 cycle across 25 funded organizations (*California Prison Programs — CDCR*).

Georgia is not without models to draw from, but the state has systematically failed to invest in them at scale. The Anti-Recidivism Coalition in California — with nearly 200 staff, 80% of whom are formerly incarcerated — demonstrates the power of credible messenger programs built by and for people with lived experience of incarceration (*California Prison Programs — CDCR*). The national evidence base is robust, replicated, and peer-reviewed. Georgia's failure to deploy it is a choice, not an oversight.

Fiscal Reality: Spending $1.8 Billion to Produce Failure

Georgia's state prison system cost $1.823 billion in actual FY2025 expenditures, with an amended FY2026 budget of $1.799 billion and an approved FY2027 budget of $1.778 billion (*Georgia Department of Corrections Budget FY2026-FY2027*). The FY2027 budget approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee totals $1,770,903,120 in state funds — an $8.8 million increase over the Governor's proposed budget, with $15.6 million added for a $2,000 correctional officer salary adjustment (*FY2027 GDC Approved Budget — HB 974 Senate Appropriations Committee Substitute*). Health spending alone reached $432.2 million in FY2027, an increase of $54.8 million over the original FY2026 budget — driven by per diem increases, outside-the-wire medical care, and additional bed capacity (*GDC Budget FY2026-FY2027*). The trajectory is consistent: more spending on incarceration, staffing, and healthcare within prison walls; marginal investment in the conditions that determine whether people return.

The FY2027 budget does introduce one new funding stream worth noting: $8.6 million from the Opioid Settlement Trust Fund, split between detention centers and state prisons — though budget analysts note this represents a shift from State General Funds rather than genuinely new spending (*FY2027 GDC Approved Budget — HB 974*). It is a telling signal about priorities that opioid settlement money — funds derived from the harms of an addiction epidemic — flows into carceral facilities rather than community-based treatment and reentry support that could address the root causes of drug-related incarceration.

The national picture reinforces the perversity of Georgia's spending pattern. The United States reduced its prison population by 25% between 2009 and 2021 — from over 1.6 million to under 1.2 million — while crime continued to fall (*The Case for Decarceration in Georgia: An Evidence Base*). By 2024, violent crime rates were 53% lower than their 1991 peak and property crime rates were 66% lower (*The Case for Decarceration in Georgia*). The COVID-19 pandemic provided a natural experiment: when prison admissions fell 40% and the population dropped 15% in 2020, crime did not spike (*The Case for Decarceration in Georgia*). Georgia is spending $1.8 billion annually to maintain an incarceration rate higher than virtually any nation on earth — and the evidence consistently shows it is not making communities safer.

Structural Barriers: What Returning Citizens Actually Face

The barriers facing people released from Georgia prisons are not merely logistical — they are systemic, overlapping, and in many cases legally enforced. Employment discrimination against people with felony records is pervasive; nearly 60% of formerly incarcerated people nationally remain unemployed a year after release (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026*). Housing instability, barriers to public benefits, driver's license suspension for drug offenses, and the collateral consequences embedded in Georgia's legal code compound the difficulty of establishing stable post-release lives. These conditions do not reflect individual failure; they reflect a policy architecture designed around punishment that extends well beyond the prison sentence itself.

Georgia's community supervision apparatus is vast but not reentry-focused. Some 356,000 people are on probation or parole in Georgia — part of a total of 528,000 residents under criminal justice supervision (*Georgia Incarceration Trends: Population, Demographics & National Context*). Probation and parole can function as reentry scaffolding, but in Georgia's resource-constrained environment they more often function as surveillance with revocation as the primary enforcement tool. Technical violations — failing a drug test, missing an appointment, changing an address without notification — send people back to prison not for new crimes but for compliance failures, swelling the population and masking the true picture of post-release outcomes. The $343 million in estimated annual cost avoidance from parole supervision (*Georgia's Parole System*) underscores that community supervision is far cheaper than incarceration — but only if it is resourced to succeed rather than set up to fail.

For specific populations, the barriers are even more acute. Domestic violence survivors sentenced under mandatory minimums, people serving life sentences on parole-ineligible charges, and individuals whose post-conviction claims have been foreclosed by Georgia's increasingly restrictive habeas corpus jurisprudence face structural barriers that no reentry program can fully address without accompanying legal reform. The 2024 Senate Study Committee on the Department of Corrections and the Georgia Survivor Justice Act (HB 582) — which passed with only three dissenting votes — represent recent legislative acknowledgments that the system produces unjust outcomes for identifiable populations (*Georgia Survivor Justice Act HB 582*). But acknowledgment without investment, and reform without infrastructure, leaves most returning citizens on their own.

What Reform Requires: Lessons from National Models

The Brennan Center's 2026 national comparison documents what Georgia could be doing differently. Approximately 450,000 people return home from U.S. prisons each year (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026*), and the states that have achieved meaningful recidivism reduction share common features: robust in-prison programming, structured reentry planning beginning well before release, community-based support systems with credible messengers, and supervision frameworks oriented toward success rather than surveillance. More than 80% of likely voters believe formerly incarcerated people deserve a second chance (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026*) — the political will for reform exists; what has been lacking is the policy follow-through.

Georgia's transition center model — 12 facilities, 2,344 beds, serving a fraction of 14,000–16,000 annual releases — needs dramatic expansion and programmatic deepening. The evidence base for cognitive-behavioral therapy, vocational training, peer mentorship, and trauma-informed care is strong enough that the question is no longer whether these programs work but why Georgia has not deployed them at scale. Texas's PEP model, New York's Bard Prison Initiative, California's CDCR rehabilitative transformation — each offers a blueprint adapted to different correctional contexts. The common thread is sustained investment, not episodic programming.

The Department of Justice had 43 open investigations into correctional facilities as of February 2026, including investigations into entire state correctional systems (*National Prison Reform Models — Brennan Center 2026*). Georgia's prison homicide surge — from 8 in 2018 to over 100 in 2024 — and its documented conditions of confinement have positioned the state as a candidate for federal intervention (*The Case for Decarceration in Georgia: An Evidence Base*). Reform driven by litigation and federal oversight is slower and more contentious than reform driven by policy leadership. Georgia faces a choice: invest in reentry infrastructure and evidence-based programming on its own terms, or continue spending $1.8 billion annually on a system that returns half its graduates to incarceration and generates the conditions for federal intervention.

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Contributing Collections

Research collections that contribute data to this topic.

Sources

100 cited sources across all contributing collections.

Primary Official report
1997 Parole Board 90% Sentence Requirement Policy
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles (Jan 1, 1997)
Primary Academic
2014 Phone Contact and Recidivism Study
(Jan 1, 2014)
Primary Legislation
2015 State Law — Pardon Notification to Victims and Prosecutors
Georgia General Assembly (Jan 1, 2015)
Primary Official report
ABA Plea Bargain Task Force Report (2023)
ABA Plea Bargain Task Force — American Bar Association (Jan 1, 2023)
Primary Official report
Anti-Recidivism Coalition
Primary Academic
Balawajder EF, et al. — JAMA Network Open (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Academic
Harvard Kennedy School
Primary Academic
Binswanger IA, et al. — New England Journal of Medicine (Jan 11, 2007)
Primary Official report
BJS 2023 Report
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Jan 1, 2023)
Primary Academic
Bard Prison Initiative / PubMed Central
Primary Academic
Brennan Center for Justice analysis
Brennan Center for Justice
Primary Official report
Bureau of Justice Assistance VOI/TIS Final Report
Bureau of Justice Assistance
Primary Official report
Bureau of Justice Assistance
Primary Data portal
Bureau of Justice Statistics - 2023 National Context Data
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (Jan 1, 2023)
Primary Data portal
Bureau of Justice Statistics - Annual Survey of Jails
E. Ann Carson, Todd Minton, Zhen Zeng — U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics
Primary Data portal
Bureau of Justice Statistics - Census of Jails
E. Ann Carson, Todd Minton, Zhen Zeng — U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics
Primary Data portal
Bureau of Justice Statistics — Parole Completion Rates
Bureau of Justice Statistics
Primary Official report
Bureau of Justice Statistics
Primary Official report
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Jan 1, 2023)
Primary Official report
Cal State LA San Quentin Expansion
California State University, Los Angeles
Primary Academic
California 1972 Prisoner Visitation Study
(Jan 1, 1972)
Primary Official report
California Model — Peer Mentorship
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Primary Official report
CDCR CBI Page
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Primary Official report
CDCR Division of Rehabilitative Programs
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Primary Official report
CDCR OMCP Page
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Primary Official report
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Primary Official report
Central GA Tech Reentry
Central Georgia Technical College
Primary Legal document
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2004)
Primary Official report
Collateral Costs: Incarceration's Effect on Economic Mobility
Pew Charitable Trusts (Jan 1, 2010)
Primary Academic
Columbia University Justice Lab (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
Connecticut Free Prison Calls Program Data
Connecticut Department of Correction (Jan 1, 2022)
Primary Legal document
Cook v. State (2022)
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2022)
Primary Legal document
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2022)
Primary Official report
Correctional Counseling, Inc.
Gregory Little, Kenneth Robinson — Correctional Counseling, Inc. (Jan 1, 1985)
Primary Official report
Council of State Governments Justice Center
Primary Data portal
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Primary Official report
CSU Project Rebound
California State University
Primary Data portal
Georgia Commission on Family Violence
Primary Official report
Sentencing Project (Jan 1, 2018)
Primary Academic
Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing Parole: The Long-term Impacts on Prisons and Crime
Thomas B. Marvell, Carlisle E. Moody — Criminology (Jan 1, 1996)
Primary Official report
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Jenni Gainsborough, Marc Mauer — The Sentencing Project (Jan 1, 2000)
Primary Official report
DOJ Findings Report — Investigation of Georgia Prisons (October 2024)
U.S. Department of Justice (Oct 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
DOJ Investigation of Georgia Prisons (October 2024)
U.S. Department of Justice (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
U.S. Sentencing Commission (Jan 1, 2017)
Primary Official report
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Finnish Prison Service (Jan 1, 2021)
Primary Academic
Florida 2008 Prisoner Visitation and Recidivism Study
(Jan 1, 2008)
Primary Official report
GAO Truth in Sentencing State Grants Report 1998
Government Accountability Office (Jan 1, 1998)
Primary Official report
GDC FY2026 Budget
Georgia Department of Corrections (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Data portal
GDC Inmate Record: Harper, Richard J (GDC ID 0000397759)
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Data portal
GDC Inmate Record: Penn, Aaron Keith (GDC ID 0000493124)
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Data portal
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Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Data portal
GDC Live Offender Query (March 15, 2026)
Georgia Department of Corrections (Mar 15, 2026)
Primary Data portal
GDC Local Database (293K records)
Georgia Department of Corrections (Mar 15, 2026)
Primary Press release
GDC Press Releases
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Official report
GDC Reentry & Cognitive Programming
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Official report
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles
Primary Official report
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles
Primary Legal document
Georgia Constitution — Provisions on Board of Pardons and Paroles
Georgia Constitution
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Community Supervision
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections — Incarceration Cost Data
Georgia Department of Corrections (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections — Performance Incentive Credit (PIC) Program Data
Georgia Department of Corrections (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections Population and Release Data (2024-2025)
Georgia Department of Corrections (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Official report
Georgia Department of Corrections
Primary Official report
Georgia Incarceration Length of Stay Data (2014-2023)
Georgia Department of Corrections (Jan 1, 2023)
Primary Press release
Georgia Innocence Project (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Gps original
GPS — Georgia Prisoners' Speak (Jan 1, 2026)
Primary Gps original
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Georgia Prisoners' Speak (Apr 3, 2026)
Primary Legal document
Georgia Rule 3.8 (adopted 2025)
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Official report
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles Data (FY2019-FY2024)
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Official report
Governor's Budget Report Amended FY 2026 and FY 2027 - Department of Corrections
Office of the Governor, State of Georgia — Governor's Budget Report (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Official report
Governor's Budget Report Amended FY 2026 and FY 2027 — Department of Corrections
Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, State of Georgia (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Official report
Governor's Office of Planning and Budget
Primary Gps original
GPS analysis of Georgia state budget documents
Georgia Prisoners' Speak
Primary Gps original
GPS Managed Communication vs. Prohibition Research
Georgia Prisoners' Speak (Apr 3, 2026)
Primary Gps original
GPS Research Update (March 15, 2026)
Georgia Prisoners' Speak (Mar 15, 2026)
Primary Gps original
Georgia Prisoners' Speak (May 1, 2025)
Primary Academic
Graves BD, Fendrich M — Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Academic
Green TC, et al. — JAMA Psychiatry (Apr 1, 2018)
Primary Academic
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Primary Official report
GRIP Training Institute
GRIP Training Institute
Primary Academic
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Primary Legal document
Harper v. State (2009)
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2009)
Primary Legal document
Georgia Supreme Court (Jan 1, 2009)
Primary Legislation
HB 1059 (2006) — Life Sentence Parole Eligibility Increase
Georgia General Assembly (Jan 1, 2006)
Primary Legislation
HB 974 (FY 2027G) — Senate Appropriations Committee Substitute to the General Appropriations Act
Senate Appropriations Committee — Georgia General Assembly (Mar 24, 2026)
Primary Legislation
HB68 (2025 Session) — Georgia General Assembly
Georgia General Assembly (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Academic
How Effective Is Correctional Education, and Where Do We Go from Here?
RAND Corporation (Jan 1, 2013)
Primary Academic
How Should Inmates Be Released from Prison? An Assessment of Parole Versus Fixed-Sentence Regimes
Ilyana Kuziemko — Quarterly Journal of Economics (Jan 1, 2013)
Primary Official report
Hustle 2.0
Primary Academic
Incarceration, Recidivism and Employment
Manudeep Bhuller, Gordon B. Dahl, Katrine V. Løken, Magne Mogstad — Journal of Political Economy (Jan 1, 2020)
Primary Academic
Influence of Truth-in-Sentencing Reforms on Changes in States' Sentencing Practices and Prison Populations
William J. Sabol et al. — Urban Institute (Jan 1, 2002)
Primary Official report
Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS) — Membership and Rules
Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (Jan 1, 2024)
Primary Legal document
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (Sep 1, 2024)
Primary Academic
Iowa 2019 Prisoner Visitation Study
(Jan 1, 2019)
Primary Official report
IPG 2022-2025 Awards
CDCR Division of Rehabilitative Programs (Jan 1, 2022)
Primary Official report
IPG 2025-2028 Awards
CDCR Division of Rehabilitative Programs (Jan 1, 2025)
Primary Official report
Center for New York City Affairs at The New School
Primary Official report
NYC Council Data Team — NYC Council
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