Georgia’s $40 Billion Mistake: How Bad Science and Federal Bribes Created a Constitutional Crisis

Estimated reading time: 38 minutes

Georgia traded $82 million in federal grants for what became a $40 billion catastrophe—enacting Truth in Sentencing laws based on the discredited “superpredator” myth that have made prisons deadlier, increased crime, and prompted federal intervention for constitutional violations.

The math is simple and devastating: Georgia received $82,211,036 in federal grants to get “tough on crime” in the 1990s. ¹ Three decades later, the state has spent approximately $40 billion on corrections while creating what the U.S. Department of Justice calls “among the most severe violations” of prisoners’ constitutional rights ever documented nationwide.

The federal grant covered less than 0.3% of the eventual costs.

As our previous investigation revealed, the crime wave Georgia responded to wasn’t caused by “moral poverty” or a generation of “superpredators”—it was caused by lead poisoning from gasoline, a preventable environmental crisis the government allowed for 70 years. Crime declined not because of mass incarceration, but because we stopped poisoning children’s brains.

Georgia’s leaders didn’t know that in the 1990s. But they could have known their “solution” wouldn’t work—because academic research now proves that the policies they enacted made everything worse.

The Smoking Gun: Academic Proof These Policies Backfire

In 2013, Princeton economist Ilyana Kuziemko published research in the Quarterly Journal of Economics that should have ended the debate about Truth in Sentencing. She analyzed Georgia’s own prison data covering 78,393 inmates from 1975-2006, focusing on the state’s 1998 policy requiring certain offenders to serve 90% of sentences before parole eligibility.

The results were unequivocal: removing parole incentives makes prisons more dangerous and increases crime after release. ²

Prison disciplinary infractions increased by 4.0% per month under the 90% policy—a 15% relative increase. Non-violent infractions drove these results, creating more chaotic and dangerous environments. Program participation collapsed simultaneously, with completion rates declining 12% and enrollment falling 13%—approximately a 14% overall decline in rehabilitation.

The most damaging finding: inmates under the 90% policy showed 2.4-2.5 percentage point increases in three-year recidivism rates, representing an 8% relative increase. Translation: the policy designed to keep communities safer actually made them less safe by releasing prisoners who were more likely to commit new crimes.

A 2024 Arizona study independently replicated these findings. Arizona’s 1993 Truth in Sentencing law produced even more dramatic results: 22-55% increases in rule infractions, 24% drops in education enrollment, and 4.8 percentage point increases in recidivism—a 23% relative increase. ³

Critically, Arizona judges had reduced sentences by 20% to offset the 85% requirement, meaning time served remained constant. This isolated the incentive mechanism—proving that removing early release hope alone increases recidivism, independent of how long people are actually locked up.

The policy implications are profound. When inmates have realistic parole prospects contingent on good behavior and program completion, they have something to lose. When parole is eliminated or pushed beyond realistic horizons, the “nothing to lose” mentality takes hold.

Kuziemko calculated that eliminating parole for all Georgia prisoners would increase the prison population by 10% and raise social costs per prisoner from $103,000 to $114,100—an 11% increase.

Those academic predictions proved conservative compared to what actually occurred.

Four Laws That Compound Into a Perfect Storm

Georgia didn’t enact a single Truth in Sentencing law—it created an interconnected system of four overlapping policies between 1995-1998 that compound into some of the nation’s harshest sentences.

The “Seven Deadly Sins” law (1995) established the foundation. Senate Bills 440 and 441, signed by Governor Zell Miller and effective January 1, 1995, designated seven “serious violent felonies”: murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated child molestation. ⁴

For armed robbery and kidnapping of victims over 14, the law mandated minimum 10-year non-parolable sentences. For sexual offenses and kidnapping of children, minimums jumped to 25 years. Murder required life with no parole eligibility for 25-30 years.

The law’s two-strikes provision made any second “deadly sin” conviction result in mandatory life without possibility of parole—even if the offenses were different. These sentences cannot be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or reduced through any means.

The 1996 parole abolition went further for six of the seven deadly sins (excluding murder). Anyone convicted on or after January 1, 1996 of these offenses must serve 100% of their sentence with absolutely no possibility of parole, good time, earned time, or any reduction mechanism. This turned mandatory minimums into mandatory maximums.

The 1998 “90% policy” extended similar restrictions to a broader range of crimes. On December 9, 1997, Georgia’s Board of Pardons and Paroles adopted a policy requiring offenders convicted after January 1, 1998 of 20 specified violent felonies to serve minimum 90% of sentences before first parole hearing eligibility. The Board’s stated goal was explicit: “Make Georgia the toughest state in the nation for time-served for violent felonies.” ⁵

A 2002 federal court found the Board applied this policy in 8,654 of 8,664 cases—a 99.88% rate that made the “discretionary” policy effectively mandatory.

The recidivist statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7) completes the system. A second felony conviction triggers maximum sentencing. A fourth felony conviction—even for non-violent offenses—requires serving 100% of the maximum sentence with no parole eligibility.

These laws interact and compound. A first-time armed robbery conviction means 10-20 years with zero early release possibility. A second serious violent felony means mandatory life without parole, regardless of age or circumstances. Someone convicted of four felonies—even if the later ones are non-violent—loses all parole eligibility.

The system eliminates both judicial discretion on the front end and parole board discretion on the back end, creating what critics call a “one-way valve” into the prison system.

The federal government rewarded this approach. Georgia received those $82 million in grants from fiscal years 1996-2001, ranking 9th among all states, with the largest check—$23.9 million—coming in 1997. ⁶

But an Urban Institute study later found these grants had “limited influence” on state policies—most states, including Georgia, had already begun reforms before federal funding. ⁷ The $82 million was a reward for bad decisions already made, not the cause of them.

Lead Raises the Baseline, But Doesn’t Eliminate Aging Out

As documented in Part 1 of this series⁸, childhood lead exposure increases propensity for impulsive violence by damaging the prefrontal cortex—the brain region governing impulse control, decision-making, and emotional regulation. ⁹ Lead poisoning doesn’t eliminate the age-crime curve; instead, it raises the baseline and intensifies the peak. Lead-exposed populations start from a higher rate of offending, experience more severe surges during peak offending years, but still show the characteristic decline with age—just from that elevated starting point.

The Cincinnati Lead Study tracked 250 primarily African American children from birth through age 33, documenting that 54% had been arrested by early adulthood, with 78% of those with elevated childhood blood lead arrested as adults. But the study tracked participants only through their early thirties—during peak offending years. The research doesn’t show these individuals remained criminally active into their forties, fifties, and sixties. In fact, studies consistently show that older offenders—even those with histories of violent crime—have extremely low recidivism rates.

Multiple Mechanisms Drive the Decline

Several biological and social factors drive the age-crime decline, and most operate even in people with lead-damaged brains:

Continued brain development: The prefrontal cortex continues maturing into the mid-to-late twenties, even in lead-exposed individuals. While the damage is permanent, partial compensation and neuroplastic adaptation still occur. A 45-year-old with lead damage has a more developed prefrontal cortex than that same person at age 22, even if both are damaged relative to unexposed individuals.

Hormonal changes: Testosterone and other hormones contributing to aggression and risk-taking decline with age in all men, regardless of lead exposure. This biological reality means an impulsive 22-year-old with lead damage poses far greater risk than an impulsive 52-year-old with identical brain damage.

Physical decline: The physical capability to commit violent crimes decreases with age. Strength, speed, and stamina all diminish, reducing both the ability and inclination toward physical violence.

Life experience accumulates: Even people with impaired impulse control learn from consequences over decades. Repeated incarcerations, lost relationships, and accumulated regrets shape behavior regardless of neurological damage.

Social bonds form: Marriage, employment, children, and community ties develop over time. These “stakes in conformity” increase the cost of criminal behavior—creating the “something to lose” factor that inhibits crime even in those with neurological vulnerabilities.

Opportunity decreases: Older people have less contact with high-risk situations, peer groups, and environmental triggers that facilitate crime. The social contexts that produce criminal behavior change dramatically from age 25 to age 50.

The Neuroscience Supports Age-Based Risk Assessment

Brain imaging from the Cincinnati Lead Study shows that lead damage is permanent—gray matter volume loss in the prefrontal cortex documented in childhood persists into adulthood and doesn’t reverse. But the behavioral expression of that damage changes dramatically with age.

Consider two snapshots of the same individual with identical lead-induced prefrontal cortex damage:

Age 22: High testosterone, incomplete brain development, strong peer influence, few responsibilities, minimal life experience, peak physical capability, limited social bonds → High risk for impulsive violence

Age 52: Low testosterone, maximally developed brain (even if damaged), weak peer influence, many responsibilities, extensive life experience, significant physical decline, established social bonds → Low risk for impulsive violence

The neural substrate remains damaged, but the behavioral outcome transforms. This is why California’s Proposition 36 releases achieved only 2% recidivism compared to the state’s 16% average—many released prisoners were in their forties, fifties, and sixties, well past peak offending years despite whatever neurological damage they carried from California’s leaded gasoline era. ¹⁰

Georgia Imprisons People Decades Past Peak Risk

This scientific reality exposes multiple absurdities in Georgia’s sentencing structure. The state’s average sentence of approximately 26 years means most prisoners serve from their twenties into their late forties or early fifties—extending incarceration far beyond peak offending years into the period of natural decline.

Georgia’s 13% of prisoners over age 55 cost far more to house due to healthcare needs while posing minimal public safety risk. Research consistently shows older offenders have extremely low recidivism rates—yet Truth in Sentencing laws keep them imprisoned regardless of current risk assessment. A 60-year-old serving year 35 of a life sentence for a crime committed at 25 is neurologically, hormonally, physically, and socially a different person than the 25-year-old who committed that crime. Yet Georgia treats them identically.

The state’s nearly 10,000 prisoners serving life or life without parole will age through their peak offending years, through middle age, and into elderly status behind bars—despite declining risk profiles that would make them excellent candidates for supervised release. The 1995 two-strikes law eliminates any consideration of aging: someone sentenced to life without parole for two crimes committed in their twenties will serve that sentence into their sixties and seventies, long after they’ve aged past any meaningful risk.

Parole Exists Precisely for This Assessment

The very purpose of parole systems is to evaluate current risk, not past behavior. Kuziemko’s research showed that Georgia’s parole board, when it had discretion, effectively conditioned release on risk assessment—keeping dangerous offenders longer while releasing those who’d matured, aged, and demonstrated rehabilitation. ¹¹

Georgia’s Truth in Sentencing laws eliminated this discretion entirely for the most serious offenses and severely restricted it for others. The result: people who pose minimal risk remain imprisoned for decades at enormous cost, while the system gains no additional public safety benefit. This is particularly egregious given that many of Georgia’s prisoners are victims of the lead poisoning documented in Part 1—meaning the state is keeping brain-damaged individuals imprisoned long after they’ve aged out of the behavior that brain damage facilitated.

This is why parole boards exist—and why Truth in Sentencing is fundamentally at odds with biology. A parole system allows reassessment as people age through their peak offending years into lower-risk phases of life. It asks: “Is this 50-year-old with 25 years of incarceration the same threat as the 25-year-old who committed the crime?” The answer is almost always no—and even California’s high-risk “Three Strikes” releases proved it with just 2% recidivism. Georgia’s TIS laws eliminate this assessment entirely, mandating that a biologically transformed person serve every day of a sentence calibrated to their decades-younger self. It’s like requiring someone to keep taking chemotherapy after the cancer is gone—the original threat has been eliminated by time and biology, but the punishment continues regardless. This isn’t justice; it’s willful ignorance of science.

The Double Injustice

Georgia’s approach compounds injustice upon injustice. First, the government permitted lead poisoning that damaged developing brains, increasing propensity for impulsive violence during peak offending years. Second, when that damage manifested as criminal behavior, the state responded with the longest sentences in the nation rather than addressing the environmental cause. Third, the state now refuses to reassess risk even as these individuals age through and past their peak offending years, keeping them imprisoned despite drastically reduced threat levels.

A 50-year-old who committed armed robbery at 20—whose prefrontal cortex was damaged by government-permitted lead exposure—poses minimal risk compared to his 20-year-old self. Yet Georgia’s laws mandate he serve every day of a 10-20 year minimum, and possibly much longer. The brain damage is permanent, but its behavioral expression has transformed. Biology, time, and life experience have done what Georgia’s sentencing structure refuses to acknowledge: fundamentally altered this person’s risk profile.

This is the mechanism that makes Truth in Sentencing not merely cruel, but wasteful. Billions of dollars continue incarcerating people who no longer pose meaningful threats, while understaffing and inadequate conditions make prisons more dangerous for everyone. Understanding that aging out occurs even with neurological damage exposes Truth in Sentencing as policy divorced from both science and common sense—a monument to the superpredator panic that science has thoroughly debunked.

The Solution Is Simple: Repeal These Laws

The evidence is unequivocal. Georgia’s Truth in Sentencing laws:

• Increase prison violence by 15%
• Reduce rehabilitation by 14%
• Raise recidivism by 8%
• Cost $40 billion over 30 years
• Created constitutional violations the DOJ calls “among the most severe” nationwide
• Deny basic biology about aging and criminal behavior

These laws must be repealed. Not reformed. Not tweaked. Repealed.

Specifically:

Repeal the Seven Deadly Sins mandatory minimums (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1). Restore judicial discretion. Let judges consider circumstances, age, rehabilitation potential—not apply one-size-fits-all sentences that ignore science.

Repeal the 1996 parole abolition. Restore parole eligibility for the six deadly sins currently serving 100% with zero hope. Give people something to lose and incentive to change.

Eliminate the 90% policy. Return discretion to the parole board to assess current risk, not punish past behavior forever.

Reform the recidivist statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7). Fourth-offense mandatory maximums with no parole make no sense when research proves older offenders pose minimal risk.

Make all reforms retroactive. California and Mississippi prove this works. People serving decades under these failed policies deserve reassessment based on current risk, not 1990s panic.

Half-measures won’t fix this. “Tweaking” laws that increase violence and crime is still choosing violence and crime. The academic evidence doesn’t support reform—it supports repeal.

Georgia can keep spending $1.6+ billion annually on policies that make communities less safe, or it can follow the evidence. There’s no middle ground here.

The Cost Analysis Reveals Staggering Burden

Georgia’s prison population tells the financial story. From 1990 to the 2011 peak, the population more than doubled. Despite modest declines after 2012 criminal justice reforms targeting non-violent offenders, the population has rebounded—growing 7% from 2021-2023 and approaching 54,000 inmates today. ¹²

The state operates the fourth-largest prison system in the nation.

Corrections budget data shows the fiscal impact. From 1997-2007, during Truth in Sentencing implementation, Georgia’s annual corrections expenditures increased by $335.2 million per year—a cumulative $3.35 billion increase in annual operating costs over the decade.

Recent budgets continue climbing: $1.12 billion (FY 2022), $1.32 billion (FY 2024), $1.48 billion (FY 2025), and a proposed $1.62 billion for FY 2026. The FY 2022 to FY 2026 trajectory represents a 44% increase in just four years, signaling a return to pre-reform growth patterns.

Conservative estimates place total corrections spending from 1995-2025 at approximately $30.6 billion. This uses documented budget data but doesn’t capture the full picture. Additional costs not in these figures include:

• County jail operations (over $500 million annually)
• Probation and parole supervision ($150-170 million annually)
• Capital construction (multiple billions in prison building)
• Court system costs ($200-300 million annually)
• Federal prison costs for Georgia residents

Including these related criminal justice expenditures, the total system cost approaches $40-50 billion over three decades.

The human cost multiplies these figures. If Georgia’s policies increased recidivism by even 10 percentage points, with approximately 15,000 releases annually, that creates 1,500 additional recidivists per year. At three-year average return stints, this produces 4,500 extra prison-years annually. At $30,000 per inmate-year, this recidivism premium costs $135 million annually, or $2.7 billion over 20 years—costs that wouldn’t exist under more effective policies.

Georgia’s cost per inmate ($29,600 based on FY 2025 budget) remains relatively low compared to the national average ($33,274). ¹³ But low per-inmate costs reflect understaffing and inadequate conditions rather than efficiency.

Georgia compensates for high populations by employing fewer staff per inmate and paying lower wages—precisely the factors that produced the constitutional crisis.

October 1, 2024: The Day Federal Investigators Exposed the Crisis

On October 1, 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice released findings from its three-year investigation that shocked even seasoned criminal justice observers. The 94-page report detailed systematic Eighth Amendment violations through “deliberate indifference” to conditions the DOJ called “among the most severe violations” uncovered in their nationwide investigations of prison systems. ¹⁴

The violence statistics are horrifying. From 2018-2023, 142 homicides occurred in Georgia prisons—7 in 2018, escalating to a record 35 in 2023. The rate increased 95.8% between the first three years and the latter three years. The first five months of 2024 alone saw 18 confirmed or suspected homicides.

Georgia’s 2019 homicide rate of 34 per 100,000 incarcerated people was nearly triple the national average of 12 per 100,000. Since 2019, rates have increased further.

Beyond homicides, investigators documented over 1,400 reported violent incidents across 24 prisons in a 16-month period from January 2022 to April 2023. Nearly 20% involved weapons. Over 45% resulted in serious injury. More than 30% required offsite medical treatment.

Sexual abuse allegations numbered in the hundreds annually—653 (2019), 702 (2020), 639 (2021), and 635 (2022), with only 35 of 456 documented allegations substantiated in 2022. The DOJ emphasized these numbers likely underrepresent actual violence due to underreporting, inadequate supervision, and fear of retaliation.

The staffing crisis forms the backbone of the constitutional violations. Correctional officer vacancy rates paint a picture of systemic collapse: 18% (2018), 49.3% (2021), 56.3% (2022), and 60% by April 2023—representing over 2,800 vacant positions.

As of late 2024, approximately 2,985 correctional officer positions remain vacant out of 5,991 budgeted positions—still nearly 50% empty. ¹⁵ Twenty facilities reported vacancy rates over 60%, with twelve exceeding 70%. Valdosta State Prison reached 80% vacancy.

Turnover compounds the crisis. The annual rate hit 47% in fiscal 2022. Most damning: 82.7% of new correctional officers leave within their first year of employment. ¹⁶

Officers work mandatory 16-hour shifts, five days a week. Single officers supervise two buildings simultaneously—up to 400 beds. Priority 1 (critical) posts sit vacant regularly. Housing units go completely unsupervised for sustained periods. Officers cannot conduct required rounds, searches, or wellness checks.

Georgia’s correctional officer salaries—$40,000-$44,000 starting depending on facility security level—rank among the lowest in the nation. Neighboring Alabama and Tennessee pay $45,000-$50,000. Recent raises ($5,000 in 2022, $2,000 in 2023) haven’t closed the gap or stopped the exodus.

One correctional officer was killed in October 2023 at Smith State Prison. A food service worker was murdered in June 2024 at the same facility. The Telfair State Prison warden was stabbed in March 2024 during a disturbance.

The DOJ found that severe understaffing allowed gangs to seize control. With over 14,000 validated security threat group members and inadequate supervision, gangs control entire housing units, assign beds, extort inmates, and operate criminal enterprises.

District attorneys report that “the proportion of violent crimes originating in prisons has increased,” with multiple federal RICO indictments targeting prison-based criminal operations. Since 2022, authorities have confiscated 37,000 contraband devices, averaging 1,300 monthly. Over 27,000 weapons were recovered from November 2021 to August 2023.

Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke summarized the findings bluntly: “Our findings report lays bare the horrific and inhumane conditions that people are confined to inside Georgia’s state prison system… People are assaulted, stabbed, raped and killed or left to languish inside facilities that are woefully understaffed.”

U.S. Attorney Ryan K. Buchanan added: “Time in prison should not be a sentence to death, torture or rape.”

2024 proved even deadlier. Georgia Prisoners’ Speak documented 100 homicides in Georgia prisons during 2024—nearly triple 2023’s record of 35 documented by the DOJ. The official GDC count reported by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution lists only 66 homicides—a 34-death discrepancy the state either misclassified or concealed. This pattern mirrors the falsified reporting that led Federal Judge Marc Treadwell to hold the GDC in contempt, stating bluntly: “The Court has long passed the point where it can assume that even sworn statements from the defendants are truthful.” Total mortality reached 333 deaths in 2024—nearly one person dying per day—demonstrating that federal intervention warnings have not stemmed the crisis.

The Causal Connection: Policy Created Chaos

The link between Truth in Sentencing policies and Georgia’s prison crisis is not speculative—it’s documented in the timeline and visible in the incentive structure.

Nearly 10,000 incarcerated persons in Georgia are serving life sentences or life without parole. For the remainder of the population, the average sentence is approximately 26 years. The 1995 two-strikes law has sent thousands to permanent imprisonment. The 1996 parole abolition and 1998 90% policy mean that even those not serving life face decades with minimal release prospects.

By 2023, 56% of Georgia’s male prison population was incarcerated for violent crimes—up from 51% in 2016. This modest 5% increase “does not explain the dramatic rise in violence” over the past five years, the DOJ noted. But the concentration of long-sentence, no-parole inmates creates a powder keg.

The incentive mechanism explains the dysfunction. When inmates have realistic parole prospects contingent on good behavior and program completion, they have something to lose. Kuziemko’s research showed that parole-eligible inmates committed fewer infractions and participated more in rehabilitation programs.

When parole is eliminated or pushed beyond realistic horizons, why follow rules? Why participate in programs when the outcome is identical either way? Why not join a gang for protection when you’ll be in prison for decades with no staff protection?

The lack of incentives creates the conditions for gang recruitment, violence, and predation.

Understaffing creates the opportunity for violence, while lack of parole removes the incentive to avoid it. The DOJ found that “without adequate supervision, incarcerated people are at greater risk of violence and other harm due to unchecked gang activity, assaults, extortion, and access to weapons and drugs.”

Gangs fill the power vacuum created by absent staff, offering protection and structure that the state fails to provide. But they do so while operating criminal enterprises and enforcing their own brutal order through violence.

The aging, hopeless population exacerbates costs. Thirteen percent of Georgia’s prison population is over 55—inmates who cost far more to house due to healthcare needs but pose minimal public safety risk. Research consistently shows that older offenders have extremely low recidivism rates. Yet Truth in Sentencing laws keep them incarcerated for decades past the point where they pose threats.

One prison provides evidence that illuminates the problem. The DOJ noted that Walker State Prison, a smaller facility with better staffing and programming, shows “that larger-scale improvement is possible with an appropriate strategy and sufficient resources.”

Walker demonstrates Georgia’s crisis stems from policy choices, not inevitable outcomes. The difference is funding, staffing, and—critically—inmates who retain some hope and incentive for positive behavior.

Georgia Is an Outlier—And Not in a Good Way

Sixteen states have abolished discretionary parole entirely, and Georgia plus several others received F grades from the Prison Policy Initiative’s 2019 comprehensive parole system evaluation. Only Wyoming received a B-, the sole state to earn above a C+. ¹⁷

But Georgia’s problems go beyond just abolishing parole—the state combines the harshest sentencing with the most inadequate prison conditions.

Prison conditions follow a clear geographic pattern. U.S. News Best States rankings for corrections outcomes place New Hampshire, Maine, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Utah, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Connecticut in the top ten. The bottom ten consists of Wyoming, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, Arizona, Georgia, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana—with Louisiana ranking dead last. ¹⁸

New England and Western states dominate the top; Southern states dominate the bottom.

DOJ investigations have targeted the worst systems. Alabama’s investigation, opened in 2016 with a lawsuit filed in 2020, found a homicide rate 600% above the national prison average and 165% occupancy in some facilities. Mississippi’s investigation found 30-50% staff vacancies and gang domination. Louisiana faced a 2024 lawsuit over routinely detaining people past legal release dates.

The DOJ characterized Georgia’s violations as being “among the most severe” in this already-troubling group.

The correlation between cost and quality contradicts conventional wisdom. Alabama spends $14,780 per inmate and has the deadliest prisons in America. Georgia spends $19,977 and faces DOJ constitutional violation findings. Massachusetts spends $284,976 and ranks in the top five for corrections outcomes. ¹⁹

Low cost per inmate doesn’t indicate efficiency—it indicates dangerous understaffing, inadequate healthcare, crumbling infrastructure, and constitutional violations.

Georgia’s incarceration rate of 881 per 100,000 people (including prisons, jails, immigration detention, and juvenile facilities) is higher than any independent democratic country on earth. ²⁰ The U.S. national rate is approximately 541 per 100,000—already the world’s highest—meaning Georgia exceeds even this by 63%.

With the fourth-largest state prison population nationally (after only Texas, California, and Florida), Georgia’s scale of incarceration is staggering.

Built on the Superpredator Lie

Understanding how Georgia enacted such punitive laws requires examining the moral panic that swept America in the mid-1990s—the same panic detailed in our previous investigation about lead poisoning.

In 1995, Princeton professor John DiIulio coined the term “superpredator,” predicting 30,000 new “young juvenile criminals so impulsive, so remorseless that they can kill, rape, maim without giving it a second thought” would emerge by 2000. ²¹

The term spread like wildfire through media. Politicians responded predictably. In January 1996, Hillary Clinton called gang members “kids that are called superpredators” who lacked remorse and needed to be “brought to heel.” Nearly every state toughened juvenile justice laws.

The predictions proved catastrophically wrong. Juvenile violent crime rates began declining in 1995—the same year as the predictions—and fell 26% during the 1990s. No crime wave materialized.

As DiIulio later admitted, the predictions were “as far off as one could possibly get.” In 2012, he signed an amicus brief to the Supreme Court calling the superpredator theory “the most damaging and erroneous myth propagated in the 100-year history of the juvenile justice system.”

But the damage was done. Federal legislation created the Truth in Sentencing Incentive Grant Program, offering states up to $10 billion to require violent offenders serve at least 85% of sentences. ²² By the end of the 1990s, 41 states plus DC had implemented some form of Truth in Sentencing.

Crime rates declined throughout the decade regardless of whether states had Truth in Sentencing laws—because, as our previous investigation revealed, crime was declining due to the removal of lead from gasoline, not because of mass incarceration.

The policies were unnecessary. Worse, they were counterproductive.

The Racial Dimension: Environmental Injustice Becomes Criminal Injustice

Black Georgians represent 31% of the state’s population but comprise 61% of the prison population—an incarceration rate 2.7 times higher than white Georgians. ²³

Among prisoners serving life without parole, 73.9% are Black—one of the highest rates nationally. Under Georgia’s two-strikes law, prosecutors invoked mandatory life sentences against 16% of Black defendants facing second drug convictions but only 1% of similarly-situated white defendants, resulting in 98.4% of prisoners serving life under this provision being Black. ²⁴

This connects directly to our previous investigation. Lead exposure from gasoline emissions disproportionately affected Black communities due to residential segregation and proximity to highways. The 1976-1980 survey found Black children had 50% higher average blood lead than white children.

Lead poisoning served as a mechanism converting structural racism into individual brain damage, which was then punished through racially disparate mass incarceration. Environmental injustice produced developmental harm, which produced criminal justice disparities—a causal chain the superpredator narrative reversed, blaming effects while ignoring causes.

The communities most harmed by lead exposure were then most heavily incarcerated under Truth in Sentencing laws, creating a double victimization.

States That Reversed Course Show Another Path

While Georgia’s Truth in Sentencing laws remain largely intact, several states have reformed or repealed similar policies with positive results.

California’s Proposition 36 (2012) reformed the state’s Three Strikes Law through a ballot initiative that passed with nearly 70% support. The reform modified the law so life sentences were only mandated if the third felony was “serious or violent.” Applied retroactively, over 3,400 people have been freed from life sentences. ¹⁰

The recidivism rate among those released was just 2%—dramatically below the 16% state average. The reform generated $10-13 million in initial savings, with $1 billion projected over ten years. It became the first ballot measure in U.S. history to reduce sentences retroactively.

Mississippi’s Justice Reinvestment Initiative began with HB 585 in 2014, which modified the state’s 1995 Truth in Sentencing law that required all offenders serve 85%. The reform expanded parole eligibility for nonviolent offenders to 25% or 10 years. ²⁵

Results included a 10% decline in prison population (2014-2017), 17% decline in admissions, $266 million in projected savings through 2024, and a 5% decline in overall crime rate (2014-2016). Mississippi showed the steepest prison population decline of all Justice Reinvestment Initiative states.

Georgia’s own 2012 reforms through HB 1176 provide evidence that change is possible. The legislation restructured sentences for drug and property offenses. ²⁶ The prison population declined 3.5% from the 2012 peak, and annual prison commitments fell 17.4% from 2010-2016.

Notably, crime rates declined while the prison population decreased—contradicting the theory that mass incarceration drives public safety.

However, these reforms did not touch the Seven Deadly Sins, parole abolition, or 90% policy—leaving the core Truth in Sentencing structure intact.

Key Lessons From Successful Reforms

First, Truth in Sentencing does not improve public safety. States without these laws saw similar or better crime declines than states that enacted them. Research shows no deterrent effect from longer sentences, and removing rehabilitation incentives increases recidivism.

Second, the cost burden is massive. California and Mississippi saved hundreds of millions through reforms. Georgia’s continuation of unreformed policies continues costing over $1.5 billion annually and rising.

Third, retroactive application is critical. California and Mississippi applied reforms retroactively, maximizing cost savings and fairness. Laws that only apply prospectively take decades to show full effects.

Fourth, political viability is achievable. California’s Prop 36 passed with 70% support; Mississippi’s reforms had broad bipartisan backing. Coalitions including law enforcement, district attorneys, civil rights groups, and fiscal conservatives can unite around evidence-based reform.

Fifth, reforms require ongoing commitment. Georgia returned for second-round Justice Reinvestment reforms; Mississippi passed follow-up legislation in 2018 and 2021. Reform is a process, not a one-time event.

The Economic Devastation Beyond Prison Walls

Beyond direct correctional costs, Georgia’s Truth in Sentencing laws have created cascading damage across families, communities, and the state’s economy.

Sixty-five percent of families with incarcerated loved ones cannot meet basic needs due to court-related costs. The average family debt from fines and fees exceeds $13,000. ²⁷ When a father is incarcerated, family income drops 22%; even after release, income remains 15% lower.

Communication costs compound the burden: Georgia received over $8 million in 2019 from contracts with for-profit phone companies, with prison calls costing up to $2.10 for 15 minutes.

People with prison records miss out on more than half of future income they might otherwise have earned. ²⁸ Over 48,000 legal barriers bar people with records from occupations. Georgia is one of seven states that do not compensate incarcerated people at all for the vast majority of prison jobs.

Over 249,000 Georgia citizens—3.25% of the voting age population—are denied voting rights due to felony convictions, more than 190,000 of them on probation or parole. Black Georgians are over twice as likely as non-Black Georgians to lose voting rights.

Forty percent of Georgians have arrest or conviction records, facing discrimination in employment. One in six Georgia jobs requires an occupational license, with people with records facing barriers even for old, pardoned, or expunged offenses.

The Time to Act Is Now—Because No One Else Will

The DOJ’s October 2024 findings documented constitutional violations “among the most severe” ever found nationwide. Georgia had 49 days to respond. That deadline passed nearly a year ago. 

Then the political landscape shifted. The Trump administration gutted any chance the DOJ would file the threatened lawsuit. Federal intervention—the hammer that forced Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana to reform—isn’t coming. The federal government that documented 142 homicides, 50% officer vacancies, and systematic constitutional violations has walked away.

Georgia is on its own. And that means Georgians must demand what federal courts will not impose.

Why This Makes Reform MORE Urgent, Not Less

Without federal oversight, Georgia’s prison crisis will worsen. The accountability pressure that kept officials minimally responsive is gone. The 100 homicides in 2024—triple 2023’s record—show the trajectory. Violence is accelerating, not stabilizing. 

The DOJ findings don’t disappear just because enforcement does. The peer-reviewed research proving Truth in Sentencing increases violence and crime doesn’t become false. California’s 2% recidivism among reformed Three Strikes releases doesn’t suddenly turn into failure. The $40 billion wasted over three decades doesn’t become a success story.

The evidence remains devastating. Only the political will is missing.

For Georgia Citizens and Families

Use Impact Justice AI to generate professional, evidence-based letters to Governor Brian Kemp, your state legislators, and the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. This free tool has generated over 15,000 messages from advocates. With federal pressure gone, state-level pressure is the only lever left.

Target your own representatives specifically. Generic advocacy doesn’t move officials. But constituents with evidence showing their district’s tax dollars fund policies that increase crime? That gets attention.

Key messages to send:

• Point to the DOJ findings as proof of crisis, even if enforcement won’t come
• Cite Kuziemko’s research showing Georgia’s own data proves these policies backfire
• Note California’s 2% recidivism vs. Georgia’s failures
• Emphasize fiscal insanity: $40 billion spent, violence tripling
• Demand repeal of Seven Deadly Sins mandatory minimums
• Call for restored parole eligibility for aging, low-risk prisoners
• Require retroactive application of any reforms
• Insist on transparent mortality reporting (not the falsified numbers earning contempt citations)

Build coalitions. Criminal justice reform passes when strange bedfellows unite: fiscal conservatives appalled at waste, civil rights advocates opposing racial disparities, law enforcement wanting evidence-based policy, families bearing the financial burden, and faith communities seeing the moral crisis.

Make this a 2026 election issue. Every Georgia legislator faces voters. Ask candidates: “Will you vote to repeal Truth in Sentencing laws that peer-reviewed research proves increase crime?” Record their answers. Share them widely.

For Legislators: Lead or Get Replaced

Federal courts won’t save you from voter anger over wasted billions and preventable deaths. This is now YOUR crisis to solve.

The math hasn’t changed:

• Academic research: TIS increases violence 15%, reduces rehabilitation 14%, raises recidivism 8%
• California’s reforms: 2% recidivism vs. 16% average, $1 billion saved
• Mississippi’s reforms: $266 million saved, 5% crime decline, 10% prison population drop
• Georgia’s current path: $1.6+ billion annually, 100 homicides in 2024, triple the national prison murder rate

Voters reward evidence-based criminal justice reform. California’s Prop 36 passed with 70% support. Mississippi’s reforms had broad bipartisan backing. You’re not leading courageously—you’re following voters who already reached this conclusion.

The question isn’t whether Georgia will reform. The trajectory is unsustainable. The question is whether you lead reform while taking credit, or get blamed for obstruction when crisis forces change.

Model legislation exists. California, Mississippi, and other states provide templates. Copy what works.

For Criminal Justice Advocates: This Is Winnable

Federal enforcement is gone, but state-level reform is more politically viable than ever. Why?

1. The evidence is overwhelming. You have peer-reviewed research, DOJ findings, successful state models, and fiscal insanity ($40B wasted) on your side.

1. The crisis is undeniable. One hundred homicides in 2024. One person dying per day. Officers fleeing 82.7% within one year. Even defenders of the status quo can’t pretend it’s working.

1. Reform coalitions are proven. Mississippi united fiscal conservatives and civil rights advocates. California built 70% voter support. Georgia can replicate this.

1. Legislators fear being blamed for waste and death. Position them as choosing between leading reform or owning the crisis.

Strategic focus areas:

Build the fiscal conservative coalition. $40 billion wasted. $1.6 billion annually. Aging prisoners costing $60-80k/year in healthcare while posing minimal risk. This isn’t compassion—it’s basic math. Find Republican budget hawks who hate waste.

Highlight officer safety. Correctional officers are victims of these policies. Fifty percent vacancies mean officers work mandatory 16-hour shifts supervising 400 inmates alone. One officer murdered in 2023. Connect with officer unions and families.

Emphasize victim safety. TIS increases recidivism 8%. That means more victims of released prisoners who are MORE dangerous because rehabilitation was eliminated. Frame reform as pro-victim.

Use the DOJ report everywhere. Just because the Trump DOJ won’t enforce doesn’t mean the findings disappear. “Among the most severe constitutional violations nationwide” comes from career prosecutors and investigators, not political appointees.

Target winnable legislative districts. Don’t try to flip the entire legislature. Identify 5-10 swing districts where representatives face 2026 challenges. Make TIS reform a campaign issue there. Success in key districts creates momentum.

For Media: The Federal Angle Is Dead—But The Story Got Bigger

Old story: “DOJ threatens Georgia, state must respond”

New story: “DOJ documented catastrophic crisis, then Trump gutted enforcement. Georgia prisoners trapped in constitutional hellhole with no federal rescue coming. State legislators now solely responsible.”

This is MORE compelling, not less. Federal abandonment makes state indifference more damning.

Coverage angles:

“One Year After DOJ Findings, Violence Worsens” – Track deaths since October 2024. Interview families. Show federal warnings were accurate predictions.

“The $40 Billion Nobody Wants to Talk About” – Follow the money. Where did it go? What could that build? How many teachers’ salaries? How many hospitals?

“California’s 2% vs. Georgia’s Chaos” – Comparative piece showing jurisdictions that reformed vs. those that didn’t. Let data tell the story.

“Falsified Data Continues After Contempt Citation” – GDC’s reported 66 homicides vs. GPS’s documented 100. Judge Treadwell said he can’t trust sworn statements. Has anything changed?

“Officers Fleeing Jobs Where 82.7% Quit in First Year” – Human interest piece on correctional officer crisis. These aren’t policy debates—these are people in danger.

Interview the experts: Get Ilyana Kuziemko (Princeton), David MacDonald (Arizona), Rick Nevin on record about Georgia. Make them explain in plain language why these policies make crime worse.

Track 2026 legislative races. Which candidates support reform? Which defend status quo? Create voter guides. Make this an election issue.

For People Inside Georgia Prisons: Document Everything

GPS is your voice. The DOJ documented your reality, then abandoned you. But documentation doesn’t disappear. It builds the case for state-level reform and future litigation.

What to document:

• Violence: dates, times, locations, victims, perpetrators, officer presence/absence
• Medical neglect: denied treatment, delayed care, preventable deaths
• Gang control: who runs your unit, what staff know, how contraband flows
• Falsified reports: when incidents happen but paperwork shows something different
• Program denial: rehabilitation opportunities that don’t exist despite claims

Send information to GPS through family contacts, legal mail, or approved communication channels. Specific details with dates and documentation create accountability.

Grieve everything even knowing it’s futile. Future litigation requires exhausting administrative remedies. Your paper trail matters.

Participate in programs when available despite lack of parole incentives. When reforms come—and they will—courts will release those who demonstrated change. California’s 2% recidivism partly reflects screening for people who changed despite having no incentive.

Stay alive. One person per day dies in Georgia prisons. Survival is resistance. Reformers need you here when change comes.

The Bottom Line: State Action Is Now the Only Path

Federal intervention was always unlikely—governments rarely intervene in other governments without political will. That will is gone. The Trump DOJ won’t file the threatened lawsuit. No federal judge will impose oversight. No consent decree is coming.

This makes state-level reform more essential, not less. The crisis won’t magically resolve. Violence is accelerating (35 homicides in 2023, 100 in 2024). Officers are fleeing. Gangs control housing units. Aging prisoners cost fortunes while posing minimal risk. The academic evidence proves current policies increase crime.

Georgia can choose:

Option 1: Continue current trajectory. Spend $1.6+ billion annually. Watch homicides rise. See more officers quit. Release prisoners who are MORE likely to reoffend because rehabilitation was eliminated. Ignore peer-reviewed research proving this approach fails. Own the resulting deaths, crime, and fiscal waste.

Option 2: Copy California and Mississippi. Reform Truth in Sentencing laws. Restore parole eligibility. Make reforms retroactive. Achieve 2% recidivism like California’s Prop 36 releases. Save hundreds of millions. Reduce violence by giving inmates something to lose. Follow the evidence instead of 1990s panic.

The choice is political, not technical. The research exists. The model legislation exists. Successful examples exist. Only political will is missing.

Federal pressure won’t create that will. Only Georgia voters can.

The question is whether you’ll demand evidence-based policy from legislators who work for you. Because nobody else will.

The Evidence Is Clear. The Choice Is Yours.

Georgia spent $40 billion implementing policies that peer-reviewed research proves make prisons deadlier and increase crime. The government permitted lead poisoning that damaged developing brains, then responded to the resulting violence with mass incarceration instead of addressing the environmental cause. Three decades later, 100 homicides occur annually in understaffed prisons where constitutional violations are “among the most severe” ever documented nationwide.

Crime declined because we stopped poisoning children’s brains with lead—not because we built more prisons. The academic evidence, successful state reforms, and basic biology all point to the same conclusion: Truth in Sentencing policies fail by every measure that matters.

California’s 2% recidivism among reformed Three Strikes releases versus Georgia’s triple-the-national-average prison murder rate tells you everything about which approach works.

The DOJ documented the crisis, then the Trump administration walked away. No federal intervention is coming. This is now Georgia’s problem to solve—which means it’s your problem to solve.

Visit gps.press for:

• Our complete investigation into how lead poisoning drove America’s crime epidemic
• Evidence-based tools to contact your legislators
• Documentation of Georgia’s ongoing prison crisis
• Research and analysis on criminal justice reform

Use Impact Justice AI to generate professional advocacy letters demanding reform.

The research exists. The model legislation exists. The successful examples exist. The only missing ingredient is political will—and only Georgia voters can supply that.

Act now. Because nobody else will.

Georgia Prisoners’ Speak is an investigative journalism organization documenting conditions inside Georgia’s prison system and advocating for evidence-based criminal justice reform. This investigation is the second in our series examining the real causes of America’s crime epidemic and the catastrophic policy responses. For Part 1 on lead poisoning and crime, visit gps.press/lead-poisoning-crime-epidemic-mass-incarceration. Contact: gps.press

Continue the Investigation

The Evidence Behind This Series

Lead Poisoning Drove America’s Crime Epidemic

Research Foundation: Comprehensive academic evidence showing how 8 million tons of lead from gasoline poisoned children’s brains, creating the crime wave—then policymakers blamed “moral poverty” and imprisoned millions instead of addressing the toxicological cause

America’s Hidden Crime: How the Government Poisoned a Generation

Part 1: How lead from gasoline created the crime epidemic that justified mass incarceration

THE FIGHT TO SURVIVE: INSIDE GEORGIA’S DEADLY PRISON CRISIS

GPS’s comprehensive investigation into the 330 deaths in 2024 (100 by homicide), gang control, and DOJ constitutional findings

When Warnings Go Ignored

How Georgia’s prison deaths aren’t accidents but policy choices—comparing California’s single death to Georgia’s 333

The Violence Truth in Sentencing Created

The Hidden Violence in Georgia’s Prisons

For every homicide, 12-18 are stabbed or beaten—nearly 1,200 violent incidents annually the state never counts

The Classification Crisis

How Georgia secretly packed four medium security prisons with close security inmates at 10x normal rates

From Kangaroo Courts to Chaos

Georgia’s disciplinary system punishes victims while protecting gang attackers

Unconstitutional: Georgia’s Extrajudicial Punishment

The violence and neglect inside exceeds sentences judges ordered—creating unconstitutional punishment

The Economic Exploitation Driving Desperation

Georgia’s Prison Commissary Extortion

Convenience store rejects sold at 300-1,000% markups for $47 million annually

Starved and Silenced

The 1,200-1,400 calorie daily crisis driving malnutrition and violence

Nutrition Neglect

How inadequate nutrition directly fuels aggression—and vitamin supplements reduce violence 37%

The Price of Love

Families spend 6% of household income monthly just keeping loved ones alive

What Reform Actually Looks Like

Prisneyland: What Prison Should Be

California’s Valley State Prison achieved zero homicides through education and rehabilitation

Decarceration as a Solution

Evidence-based approach to reducing overcrowding while improving safety

A Tale of Two Prisons

Norway’s 20% recidivism vs. Georgia’s failures—proving humane treatment works

Fixing Georgia’s Parole System

Comprehensive plan tying parole to rehabilitation and accountability

A Second Chance for Georgia

The Second Chance Parole Reform Act of 2026—legislative pathway to reform

Take Action Now

How a Simple Tool Is Helping Georgians Fight Back

Impact Justice AI has generated 15,000+ messages to lawmakers demanding reform

Georgia’s 2026 Legislative Session

SB 25 and current opportunities to push for parole transparency and reform

1. Georgia Department of Corrections, “Truth in Sentencing in Georgia” Standing Report, https://gdc.georgia.gov/document/standing-special-analyses/standing-report-truth-sentencing/download[↩]
2. Kuziemko, Ilyana, “How Should Inmates Be Released From Prison? An Assessment of Parole Versus Fixed Sentence Regimes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 1 (February 2013): 371-424, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs052[↩]
3. MacDonald, David C., “Truth in Sentencing, Incentives and Recidivism,” The Review of Economics and Statistics (2024), https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01538[↩]
4. Georgia Department of Corrections, “Sentencing Legislation Fact Sheet,” https://gdc.georgia.gov/document/fact-sheets/sentencing-legislation-fact-sheet/download[↩]
5. Prison Legal News, “Georgia Parole Board’s 90% Policy Ruled Ex Post Facto,” 2003, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2003/apr/15/georgia-parole-boards-quot90-policyquot-ruled-ex-post-facto/[↩]
6. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Truth in Sentencing: Availability of Federal Grants Influenced Laws in Some States,” Report GGD-98-42, 1998, https://www.gao.gov/products/ggd-98-42[↩]
7. Sabol, William J., et al., “Influences of Truth-in-Sentencing Reforms on Changes in States’ Sentencing Practices and Prison Populations,” Urban Institute, 2002, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195163.pdf[↩]
8. America’s Hidden Crime: How the Government Poisoned a Generation, Then Imprisoned Them for It, https://gps.press/government-lead-poisoning-created-crime-wave/[↩]
9. GPS Research: Lead Poisoning Drove America’s Crime Epidemic, https://gps.press/lead-poisoning-crime-epidemic-mass-incarceration/[↩]
10. Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project and NAACP Legal Defense Fund, “Prop 36 Progress Report,” 2013, https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/ThreeStrikesReport_v6-1.pdf[↩][↩]
11. Kuziemko, Ilyana, “How Should Inmates Be Released From Prison?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 1 (February 2013): 371-424, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs052[↩]
12. Georgia Budget and Policy Institute, Annual Budget Reports for Georgia Department of Corrections, https://gbpi.org/overview-2025-fiscal-year-budget-for-the-georgia-department-of-corrections/[↩]
13. Vera Institute of Justice, “The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010-2015,” https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends[↩]
14. U.S. Department of Justice, “Investigation of Georgia Prisons,” October 1, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/findings_report_-_investigation_of_georgia_prisons.pdf[↩]
15. Corrections1, “Nearly Half of Georgia Corrections Officer Positions Vacant,” 2024, https://www.corrections1.com/prison-staffing/nearly-half-of-ga-corrections-officers-positions-vacant[↩]
16. The Marshall Project, “Prison Violence Soars as States Face Correctional Officer Shortage,” January 2024, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/01/10/prison-correctional-officer-shortage-overtime-data[↩]
17. Prison Policy Initiative, “Grading the Parole Release Systems of All 50 States,” 2019, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/grading_parole.html[↩]
18. U.S. News & World Report, “Best States Rankings: Crime and Corrections,” https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/rankings/crime-and-corrections/corrections[↩]
19. Vera Institute of Justice, “The Price of Prisons,” https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends[↩]
20. Prison Policy Initiative, “Georgia Profile,” https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/GA.html[↩]
21. Equal Justice Initiative, “The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later,” https://eji.org/news/superpredator-myth-20-years-later/[↩]
22. Brennan Center for Justice, “The Complex History of the Controversial 1994 Crime Bill,” https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/complex-history-controversial-1994-crime-bill[↩]
23. The Sentencing Project, “Georgia Should Restore Voting Rights to Over 249,000 Citizens,” https://www.sentencingproject.org/fact-sheet/georgia-should-restore-voting-rights-to-over-249000-citizens/[↩]
24. ACLU, “Submission to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Racial Disparities in Sentencing,” 2014, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_submission_0.pdf[↩]
25. Pew Charitable Trusts, “Mississippi 2014 Corrections and Criminal Justice Reform,” https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2014/05/21/mississippi-2014-corrections-and-criminal-justice-reform[↩]
26. Urban Institute, “Assessing the Impact of Georgia’s Sentencing Reforms,” July 2017, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/91731/ga_policy_assessment.pdf[↩]
27. Probation Info, “The Economic Impact of Mass Incarceration,” https://www.probationinfo.org/economic-impact/[↩]
28. Brennan Center for Justice, “Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings,” https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/conviction-imprisonment-and-lost-earnings-how-involvement-criminal[↩]