Policy & Advocacy

The Legislative Record: Reform, Reversal, and the Bills That Died

Georgia's modern criminal justice policy has two distinct eras, and the contrast between them is the most useful frame for understanding where advocacy stands today.

The first era began in April 2011, when H.B. 265 created the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform for Georgians — a group with bipartisan representation from all three branches of government — along with the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice Reform ([#14364], [#19164]). State leaders sought support through the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, a public-private partnership jointly funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance ([#19165]). The flagship product was H.B. 1176, signed by Republican Governor Nathan Deal on May 2, 2012, after passing unanimously in both chambers ([#14356], [#19137]). Its provisions took effect July 1, 2012, with select drug-possession changes phased in through 2014 ([#14357]).

H.B. 1176 did concrete things. It raised the felony theft threshold from $500 to $1,500, raised the felony fraud threshold from $500 to $1,500, and raised the felony shoplifting threshold from $300 to $500 ([#14359], [#14361], [#14360]). It created two degrees of burglary, cutting the maximum sentence for second-degree burglary from 20 years to 5 years for a first conviction ([#14358]). It created degrees of drug possession based on weight, reduced minimum and maximum sentences for all drug weights, and removed drug possession from the recidivist statute ([#14362]). It created new degrees of forgery and allowed some fourth-degree forgeries to be charged as misdemeanors ([#14363]). The stated goals were to focus prison space on the most serious offenses, strengthen probation and alternative sentencing, relieve local jail crowding, and improve performance measurement ([#14391]).

The results were measurable. Prison commitments for offenses affected by the bill declined 13 percent, and probation commitments fell 9 percent ([#14322], [#19146]). Mean prison and probation sentence lengths declined for most offenses, and initial trends showed declines in time served ([#14404]). Deal-era reforms reduced the share of Black Georgians experiencing incarceration from 62 percent in 2009 to 53 percent in 2017 ([#3062]), and the state's prison population fell 6 percent between 2012 and 2015 ([#2112]). The era demonstrated that decarceration could be bipartisan and led by a conservative Republican governor ([#3956]).

The second era's legislative spine was reorganization and supervision reform. H.B. 310 created the Department of Community Supervision, signed May 7, 2015 and operational July 1, 2015, consolidating felony parolees, felony probationers, select juvenile offenders, and oversight of misdemeanor probation entities ([#6397], [#20274], [#8925]). H.B. 328 in 2015 extended parole eligibility to certain non-violent drug offenders sentenced as recidivists to terms of at least 12 years ([#6462]). Senate Bill 174, signed May 9, 2017, created behavioral incentive dates and a commutation provision requiring the Board to consider commuting sentences for split-sentence offenders who completed twelve consecutive months of parole supervision ([#14369], [#2696], [#8482]). Act 226, also in 2017, codified graduated sanctions for technical violations, capped technical-violation revocations at no more than 120 days for failure to pay or report, strengthened ability-to-pay inquiries, and prohibited pre-hearing arrest warrants when the sole basis for revocation was failure to pay ([#6439], [#6440], [#6425]). Senate Bill 105, signed May 3, 2021, allowed early termination of felony probation after three years ([#3217]) — a reform estimated to save $34 million annually ([#3220]), though the eligibility criteria require three years served, no new arrests other than minor traffic offenses, no revocations in the prior two years, and payment of all financial obligations, restitution, and court fees ([#6463]).

Since 2019, the record has been more mixed and the failures more consequential. House Bill 714 (2019), which would have capped total restrictive housing at 90 days per year absent a demonstrated danger and prohibited consecutive periods in restrictive housing, did not pass ([#20816], [#20873]). House Bill 126 (2023), which would have codified out-of-time appeals in response to Cook v. State, passed the Georgia House 172–1 and the Senate 46–7 — near-unanimous bipartisan support — and died because the Senate passed its substitute at 12:15 a.m. on sine die, the last minutes of the session, leaving the House no time to vote ([#4022], [#4023], [#4024], [#4025], [#4405]). As of March 2026, no equivalent legislation has been enacted ([#4022]). House Bill 1504 (2022), which would have created an independent Office of the Department of Corrections Ombudsman, died on April 4, 2022; no independent prison oversight bill has passed the Georgia General Assembly ([#8091], [#19769], [#19770], [#19773]). SB 25, the Parole Transparency Act, died in committee ([#5772]). No compassionate or geriatric release legislation was introduced or passed in the 2026 session ([#5773]). No bill has been introduced in the past five sessions to amend the statutory definition of "victim" to include incarcerated persons ([#7259], [#7355]). Georgia has taken no legislative action to provide free calls or further reduce prison phone rates ([#1762]).

What did pass in recent years matters. HB 176, signed May 14, 2025, codified out-of-time appeals and created a grace period for people whose appeals were dismissed because of Cook v. State to refile before June 30, 2026 — but it does not address the judicial narrowing of O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) or O.C.G.A. § 17-9-4 ([#4053], [#4401], [#4054], [#4070]). The Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration Compensation Act, added to SB 244 and signed the same day, pays $75,000 per year of wrongful incarceration plus $25,000 per year on death row, adjudicated through the Office of State Administrative Hearings, with a three-year filing deadline ([#4460], [#4461], [#2277], [#4496]) — making Georgia the 39th state with exoneree compensation ([#3808]). The Survivor Justice Act (HB 582), sponsored by Representative Stan Gunter (R) and signed May 12, 2025, passed both chambers with only three dissenting votes, allowing abuse history as evidence at trial and sentencing and creating a retroactive resentencing pathway ([#5123], [#2189], [#2191], [#2190]). Georgia also banned the shackling of pregnant prisoners and solitary confinement for pregnant and postpartum women through the Dignity Act (HB 345, 2019) ([#5116]); established first-ever funding equity between circuit public defenders and district attorneys through HB 1391 in 2022 ([#4194]); and moved in the opposite direction on medical care with SB 185 (2025), which banned gender dysphoria treatment for incarcerated people and was permanently struck down by a federal judge in December 2025 ([#5126], [#6040]).

The Reform Agenda: What Advocates Are Asking For

Georgia Prisoners' Speak's own legislative program is organized around what the organization calls Vision 2027, which identifies six priority reforms for a proposed Georgia Post-Conviction Justice Act ([#4032]). The core strategic insight behind the package, as GPS frames it, is a shift from asking for new rights to asking legislators to enforce rights that already exist in Georgia law ([#4031]). The framing becomes: Georgia law already says habeas relief shall be granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice — we are asking you to enforce your own law. And: the Georgia Supreme Court, not the legislature, narrowed these statutes beyond recognition ([#4031]).

On post-conviction remedies specifically, GPS's model legislation proposes five elements: a statutory definition of "miscarriage of justice" for O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d); clarification that the exception overrides all procedural bars including the four-year deadline; amendment of § 17-9-4 clarifying that "void for any cause" includes constitutional violations; reversal of Harper v. State by statute, codifying the Chester interpretation; and codification of out-of-time appeals, finishing the work of H.B. 126 ([#4033]). Two alternative amendment texts for § 17-9-4 have been drafted, the second reading: "Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to distinguish between a void conviction and a void sentence. A criminal judgment that is void for any cause, whether as to conviction, sentence, or both, is a mere nullity" ([#4085], [#4101], [#4113]). The package also proposes that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "shall not be deemed waived solely because the petitioner failed to raise such claim in a motion for new trial or on direct appeal" ([#4214]), and that a petitioner raising ineffective assistance in habeas have the right to appointed counsel if indigent ([#4215]). Related research supports Bill 1 — full repeal of the habeas corpus statute of limitations ([#4258]) — and Bill 6, the Georgia Fair Plea Act ([#4302]).

The separation-of-powers framing is deliberate. As GPS describes it, the argument transforms the legislative ask from "please give prisoners more rights" to "please reclaim your authority over your own statutes" ([#4114]). That framing appeals across the political spectrum because it speaks to institutional prerogative rather than ideology: when the judiciary effectively amends a statute by overriding its plain text, every legislator's work product is diminished ([#4119]). A currently incarcerated person contributing to GPS's research put the underlying absurdity this way: "How strange is it that you can't invoke 17-9-4 to challenge a void criminal conviction while Title 17 is 'criminal procedure.' Yet you can challenge a void sentence anytime without invoking anything" ([#4082]).

On decarceration, GPS proposes a 20 percent population reduction target — from 50,000 to 40,000 people within three years — which it projects would improve the correctional officer-to-prisoner ratio from 1:14 to 1:11 ([#3951]). It proposes second-look sentencing with judicial review after 15 years, applied retroactively, per Model Penal Code recommendation ([#3961]), and an independent GDC Inspector General ([#3960]). On reentry, GPS advocates expanding transition center capacity from 2,344 beds to at least 7,000, serving approximately 50 percent of annual releases ([#2173]), and increasing vocational education funding from $172,000 to at least $15 million — 1 percent of the GDC budget — with a goal of 5 percent within three years ([#2174]).

On prison economics, the reform platform is unusually granular. An investigation into commissary pricing recommends maximum markups of 10–15 percent over retail for essential healthcare items such as pain relievers and feminine hygiene products ([#474]); 20–25 percent over retail for basic hygiene and dignity items ([#475]); and 30–35 percent over true wholesale for food staples ([#476]). It recommends that basic hygiene items be provided free in adequate quantities ([#483]), that over-the-counter pain relievers be dispensed at clinic levels for documented need ([#484]), that excess commissary revenues by law fund educational programs, re-entry services, victim restitution, or inmate welfare funds rather than general correctional operations ([#486]), that the sale of promotional samples and travel-sized giveaway products be banned ([#487]), that comparison charts showing commissary prices against Walmart retail be posted in housing units ([#488]), and that whistleblower protections cover staff or vendors reporting pricing irregularities ([#489]). All would be overseen by an independent board including auditors, family advocates, and procurement experts ([#485]).

On communications, GPS's monitor-not-block proposal is notable for requiring no legislation at all. The argument rests on O.C.G.A. 42-5-18, which prohibits unauthorized phones rather than phones as such — the operative phrase is "without the authorization of the warden or superintendent or his or her designee" — and on the fact that all 13 Georgia Transitional Centers have allowed personal cell phones since July 1, 2016 ([#5453], [#5443]). The proposed three-phase strategy: a single-facility pilot, then data publication, then system-wide expansion ([#5471]). The Commissioner issues a policy directive, wardens formally authorize registered devices, phones are logged by IMEI, SIM, and carrier, the Managed Access System routes authorized devices through AI monitoring, and unauthorized devices remain blocked ([#5454]). The estimated marginal cost is $5–7 million ([#5475]), a premium of roughly $90–100 per inmate per year over blocking ([#5459]). The summary argument GPS makes: "For an additional $90 per inmate per year — less than the price of a single contraband phone — Georgia can switch from a system that produces no intelligence and record violence, to a system that catches scammers, intercepts hit orders, prevents suicides, maintains families, and saves $73 million in reduced recidivism" ([#5472]).

Other proposals round out the agenda. On heat, GPS recommends a statutory ceiling for the 2027 session modeled on Texas's county-jail standard: state correctional facilities must maintain housing-area temperatures between 65°F and 85°F, with a phased timeline such as 2027–2032 ([#6378]). On healthcare financing, GPS supports the federal requirement that states suspend rather than terminate Medicaid during incarceration, effective January 1, 2026 ([#5727], [#2134]). On conviction integrity, it recommends a hybrid statewide commission combining a North Carolina–style independent body — eight members appointed by the Chief Justice and Governor — with mandated local conviction integrity units and a Texas-style exoneration review function ([#4487]). On prosecutor accountability, it proposes removing prosecutorial discipline from the State Bar's general grievance process and creating an independent oversight board that excludes the Attorney General from its governance ([#4548]), an Independent Post-Conviction Review Authority structurally independent of both the Attorney General's office and district attorneys ([#4549]), and annual reporting by the Attorney General's Post-Conviction Litigation section documenting habeas petitions received, grounds asserted, dispositions, and any cases in which the office became aware of evidence suggesting a wrongful conviction ([#4550]).

Post-Conviction and Wrongful Conviction: A System the Chief Justice Calls 'a Mess'

Georgia's post-conviction system was not always restrictive. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1967 was enacted specifically to expand the scope of post-conviction relief and modify the state's waiver doctrine ([#2338]). What followed was a sustained four-decade contraction. Between 1973 and 2004, the Georgia legislature enacted six restrictive statutes and the courts issued five decisions that collectively transformed habeas corpus from "a broad and effective postconviction remedy into an attenuated remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances" ([#4555], [#4591]). The sequence matters: a 1973 statute barred claims omitted from an initial petition, effectively punishing indigent petitioners for their inability to identify all viable claims without legal assistance ([#4560]); a 1975 statute introduced the cause-and-prejudice standard ([#4561]); a 1982 statute abolished non-constitutional habeas claims under Georgia law and replaced the 1967 Act's high waiver standard with the full cause-and-prejudice test ([#4563], [#4564]); a 1986 statute imposed the first-ever habeas deadline in Georgia ([#4565]); and 1999 statutes abolished appeals of right for habeas petitioners and restricted in forma pauperis filings ([#4566], [#4567]). The 2004 statute was the most consequential, imposing a one-year deadline for misdemeanor challenges and four years for felony challenges, with anyone whose conviction became final before July 1, 2004 given until July 1, 2008 for felonies ([#4569], [#2333], [#3748]).

The absence of legislative history for the 2004 deadline has become an argument in itself. The law was enacted without a committee report documenting the need, without documented floor debate, without an impact study, without analysis of affected petitions, without a stated reason for the four-year period, without consideration of an actual innocence exception, without comparison to other states, and without input from innocence organizations, public defenders, or wrongful conviction scholars ([#4246]). As GPS frames it: the absence of legislative history is the argument — a law that permanently bars innocent people from relief was enacted without any consideration of that consequence ([#4259]).

Georgia is now the outlier. Texas imposes no statute of limitations for state habeas petitions ([#4228]). California applies a reasonableness standard rather than a strict deadline ([#4227]). New York's motion to vacate has no strict time limit ([#4229]). Illinois exempts actual innocence claims from its three-year deadline ([#4230]). North Carolina has no general time limit for non-capital cases ([#4231]), and Vermont no fixed statutory deadline at all ([#4232]). Georgia's four-year deadline has no safety valve for actual innocence, newly discovered evidence, or constitutional violations discovered after the deadline — while even the federal Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, enacted two years earlier with extensive committee testimony and floor debate, preserves an innocence gateway ([#4223], [#4224], [#4247], [#4226]). Georgia is also one of the few states that does not guarantee the right to counsel in habeas proceedings, leaving most people to navigate complex constitutional law pro se ([#2311], [#2344]). Successive petition bars make second petitions nearly impossible even with new evidence ([#2315]), and procedural default bars claims not raised on direct appeal even where the defendant had no lawyer or did not know the issue existed ([#2314]).

On March 3, 2026, Chief Justice Nels Peterson issued a concurrence in Sanders v. State that amounts to an extraordinary invitation for legislative action. "Georgia's post-conviction litigation system is a mess," Peterson wrote. "It's a mess in large part because of a series of well-meaning but short-sighted decisions this Court made over the course of several decades" ([#3732], [#4116]). And: "In short, the system is broken. We did a lot of the breaking. But it will require legislative action to fix it" ([#3734]). Peterson identified the mechanism precisely. Simpson v. State (1982) required ineffectiveness claims to be raised in motions for new trial with no legal authority cited ([#3737]). Garland v. State (2008) held that new counsel must be appointed to handle those claims ([#3739]), and In re Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 (2013) barred that counsel from the same public defender circuit ([#3740]). The result, Peterson noted, is that rules which are "simply creatures of decisional law, not interpretations of the Georgia or United States Constitutions" can be changed by the legislature ([#3743]). Georgia is an outlier on this: the federal government and most states leave ineffectiveness claims for habeas, per Massaro v. United States ([#3742]). The costs are borne broadly — district attorneys' offices must divert resources from prosecuting crimes to relitigating the same issues for years on motions for new trial ([#3744]), and public defender offices must stretch limited dollars to provide multiple lawyers for a single direct appeal ([#3745]). And the system "prioritizes ineffectiveness claims (which have a low success rate) in exchange for imposing serious costs" while making preserved trial court error — which has a higher success rate — harder to litigate ([#3803]).

A legislative study committee prompted by Peterson's remarks began work in 2026, conducting hearings over the summer and considering whether to take appeals off the Georgia Public Defender Council's plate and establish a separate office ([#21479]). Sarah Gerwig of Mercer University School of Law told the committee that recent appellate rebukes indicate a lack of oversight and minimum competency standards in the council's appellate division, and that a separate, larger team of dedicated attorneys and support staff would reduce reliance on contract attorneys ([#21480]). The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reviewed more than 30 public opinions and orders in which Georgia judges declared criminal appeals abandoned for lack of proper argument, upheld convictions and sentences, sent cases back to trial courts for new lawyers or self-representation, and alerted authorities including the State Bar of Georgia ([#21451]). GPDC Executive Director Omotayo Alli opposed the split in an October 1 letter, arguing appeals "should remain within the council, where the appellate infrastructure, the statewide reach, and the accountability already exist" ([#21470]).

The accountability structure that emerged from this system has a visible gap. Georgia created the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission by Senate Bill 92, signed May 5, 2023 — an eight-member commission with removal authority over every elected or appointed district attorney and solicitor-general ([#4592], [#4593]). The commission's six statutory grounds for discipline and its institutional orientation are directed at prosecutors who fail to prosecute, not prosecutors who prosecute wrongfully: it does not specifically address Brady violations, Rule 3.8 violations, wrongful convictions, failure to review old cases, or coerced pleas ([#4616]). Senate Bill 332 in March 2024 removed the requirement for Georgia Supreme Court approval of the commission's rules after the court declined to approve them in November 2023 ([#4609], [#4608]). And the Wrongful Conviction Compensation Act, while significant, applies only to people already exonerated — it does nothing for people still inside the system trying to prove their innocence ([#4628]). Georgia has built a commission to punish prosecutors who don't prosecute enough and a fund to compensate people after they prove their innocence, but has done nothing to help innocent people prove their innocence in the first place ([#4629]). On May 14, 2025, Governor Kemp signed both HB 176 and the Compensation Act — the state simultaneously acknowledged harm from eliminated out-of-time appeals, created a payment mechanism for wrongful convictions, and left every other barrier to proving innocence intact ([#4631]). Conviction integrity review exists in only 3 of Georgia's 159 counties ([#4403]); Texas has at least six active conviction integrity units ([#4445]). Georgia also lacks the forensic accountability mechanisms adopted by comparator states: no forensic science commission, no junk-science writ statute, and no innocence inquiry commission ([#7442]).

Parole, Sentencing, and the Case for Decarceration

No single statistic captures the scope of Georgia's policy shift more sharply than the collapse of parole. In 1993, the state's parole rate was 70 percent. By fiscal year 2024, the grant rate for people serving life sentences was 4.5 percent ([#3937]). Parole releases dropped 42 percent over five years, from 9,455 grants out of 24,738 cases considered in 2019 (38 percent) to 5,443 grants out of 19,328 cases in 2024 (28 percent) ([#3316], [#3317]). Since the pandemic, the Board has released 34 percent fewer people and held 44 percent fewer hearings ([#2763]).

The statutory architecture explains much of it. Georgia abolished parole for all offenses committed after 1996 ([#1161]). The 1995 "Seven Deadly Sins" law (SB 441) eliminated parole for seven serious violent crimes ([#2724], [#3232]). HB 1059 in 2006 increased the parole eligibility threshold for life sentences from 14 years to 30 years for crimes committed after June 30, 2006 ([#2726], [#3234]); eligibility for offenses committed before 1995 was seven years ([#2694]). The Board's self-initiated 90 percent policy, implemented in January 1998, requires service of 90 percent of a court-imposed prison term before parole is possible for certain violent crimes; from implementation through fiscal year 2001 the Board rendered 8,664 decisions under its provisions, and since 1998 only 44 exemptions have been made ([#11120], [#11099], [#11002]). Georgia took $82 million in federal truth-in-sentencing grants between 1996 and 2001, which incentivized longer sentences and reduced parole ([#2721]). For a person serving life, denial triggers reconsideration at least once every eight years, on a schedule the Board itself sets ([#2693], [#12137], [#8884]). One trace of the earlier system survives in GPS's historical data: the Parole Board's own 1998 annual report, as recorded in GPS's historical series, logged 743 total life decisions that year — 691 denials and 52 grants, only 19 of which came at first consideration.

What remains is a compassionate and geriatric release apparatus that advocates on both ends of the political spectrum have judged inadequate. Georgia's Medical Reprieve under O.C.G.A. Section 42-9-43(b) requires that a person be "entirely incapacitated" from a progressively debilitating terminal illness, with expected death within 12 months, requiring assistance with two or more daily life functions or completely immobile, and at extremely low risk of physical threat — a standard among the most restrictive nationally ([#5733]). The process is written-request only: the Board decides by majority vote on a written record, with no hearings ([#5734]). Families Against Mandatory Minimums gave Georgia failing grades on both mechanisms in October 2022, calling the medical reprieve criteria "unnecessarily and cruelly strict" and noting there are no public statistics or policies for parole due to disability or advanced age ([#5740]); when FAMM requested data on parole due to disability or advanced age in August 2021, the Board said "no documents responsive" ([#5739]). Between 2001 and 2020, Georgia granted 1,224 medical reprieves total — roughly 61 per year — with 25 granted in 2019, 41 in 2020, and 53 in fiscal year 2021 ([#5737]). Georgia's constitution grants the Board authority to parole anyone aged 62 or older, and O.C.G.A. Section 42-9-43(c) allows parole for "any aged or disabled persons," but no published criteria, process, or statistics exist for this authority ([#5738], [#5774]). Twenty-three states plus the District of Columbia have elderly or geriatric parole statutes; Georgia is not among them in practice ([#5756]). Comparators have moved further: Maryland's HB 1123 in 2025 established geriatric parole for people 65 and older who have served 20 or more years and expanded medical parole ([#5784]); Illinois's Joe Coleman Medical Release Act defines medical incapacitation to include dementia and any diagnosable condition unlikely to improve that prevents more than basic self-care ([#8261]); Texas's Medically Recommended Intensive Supervision program is limited to severe medical or mental conditions and does not guarantee release even when medical requirements are met ([#8266], [#8267]). Iowa is the only state with no official form of compassionate release at all ([#8262]).

The safety record of early release contradicts the political caution around it. The federal government released more than 11,000 elderly and medically vulnerable people under the CARES Act; 17 were arrested for new crimes — 0.15 percent — and eight returned for new criminal conduct, with the Bureau of Prisons concluding that recipients "recidivated no more or less than comparable people in home confinement, and even less often post-release" ([#5751]). The federal First Step Act produced 4,560 or more releases through compassionate release provisions ([#5777]).

GPS's fiscal case rests on the same evidence. Releasing 10,000 people — a 20 percent reduction — at an average cost of $31,612 per person per year would yield $316 million in annual savings ([#3948]). Presumptive parole for people 55 and older with automatic review could release 2,000 to 3,000 people and save $120–140 million per year at $60,000–$70,000 per person ([#3942], [#3943]). Broader scenario modeling projects $66.3–$99.4 million annually for 1,000–1,500 people aged 65 or older with 20 or more years served; $132.6–$198.9 million for 2,000–3,000 people aged 60 or older with 15 or more years; and $198.9–$331.5 million for 3,000–5,000 people aged 55 or older with 10 or more years ([#5767]). The broader national evidence base supports decarceration: the United States reduced its prison population by 25 percent between 2009 and 2021, from over 1.6 million to under 1.2 million, while crime continued to fall ([#3908]); the Brennan Center's analysis of 40 years of data from 50 states and the 50 largest cities found increased incarceration had a negligible effect on crime since 2000 ([#3914]); New York halved its prison population between 1999 and 2023 while violent crime fell 28 percent and the state closed more than 12 prisons ([#3917], [#3918]). Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina achieved 14–25 percent reductions — 23,646 fewer people — with no adverse public safety effects ([#3923]), and Alaska, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont reduced prison populations by more than 50 percent from peak levels ([#3925]).

GPS's own legislative vehicle for parole reform is SB 25 with presumptive release language. Even a 15–20 percent parole rate for people serving life sentences, against the current 4.5 percent, would release thousands ([#3959]). But SB 25 remains pending and was not addressed by the $600 million spending package ([#3898]), and the version introduced as the Parole Transparency Act died in committee ([#5772]). Legislative proposals to expand the use of sentencing alternatives have a long Georgia pedigree. A 1978 National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice study of split sentences and shock probation recommended establishing a task force of affected parties to develop statutory legislation and operating policies for expanded use in Georgia ([#14434]), and noted that a 1967 analysis by Barkin argued that once a person can be trusted to remain in the community, "no appreciable benefits can be derived from committing the offender to a short period of incarceration" ([#14430]).

Oversight: The Body Georgia Has Not Built

Approximately 20 states plus the District of Columbia have an external, independent prison oversight body. Georgia is not one of them ([#8106], [#8040], [#4662]). No independent prison oversight bill has passed the Georgia General Assembly ([#8091]).

The legislative history is specific. House Bill 1504, introduced March 3, 2022 by Representatives McLaurin, Schofield, Beverly, Mitchell, Kennard, and others, would have created an Office of the Department of Corrections Ombudsman and a legislative Corrections Oversight Committee, with the ombudsman serving a six-year term removable only by the Governor for good cause and the department required to provide requested records within 20 days ([#8091], [#19769], [#19770], [#19771]). BillTrack50 lists the bill as dead as of April 4, 2022 ([#19773], [#19774]).

In 2024 the Senate ran its own process. SR 570, adopted February 27, 2024 by a 53–0 vote, created the Senate Supporting Safety and Welfare of All Individuals in Department of Corrections Facilities Study Committee, chaired by Majority Whip Senator Randy Robertson (R-Cataula) ([#8080]). The committee adopted its final report unanimously on December 13, 2024 ([#8081]) — and explicitly declined to create an independent oversight body, with Chair Robertson characterizing oversight and several other proposals as "redundant" ([#8082]). A separate suggestion by Senator Bearden to have the Georgia Bureau of Investigation investigate all in-custody deaths did not make the final list ([#8083]). Committee member Senator John Albers said, "Oversight is provided by regular committees, subcommittees and study committees, and I'm not sure we need to create yet another level [of bureaucracy]" ([#19744]). The committee's adopted recommendations concentrated on staffing, mental health, and facility conditions rather than transparency or independent review ([#7965], [#5283]).

What the committee did recommend was operational. It called for converting all existing facilities and constructing all new facilities as single-person, single-cell facilities ([#2975], [#7583]); advocating that the federal government allow state prisons to use cell phone and drone jamming technology ([#2976], [#5534]); increasing mental health services for both incarcerated people and staff ([#2977]) with an 8 percent pay increase for behavioral health counselor positions ([#3195]) and expanded counselor capacity ([#3194]); prioritizing hardening of existing facilities ([#2980]); leveraging public-private partnerships to expand capacity ([#2982]); asking the Georgia Department of Audits to review all contract renewals for the past five years for a pattern of runaway costs by any vendor ([#7584]); investing in officer recruitment and retention and implementing a pay study for all GDC employees ([#7585]); and Commissioner Oliver's recommendation that the state limit future correctional facilities to a maximum capacity of 1,500 people ([#7529]).

The models Georgia has declined to adopt are well-documented. Washington created the Office of the Corrections Ombuds, an independent agency in the Governor's office with statutory access to department facilities and records ([#7991]). Its ombuds sits within the office of the governor and reports directly to the governor, exercising powers independently of the secretary, serves a three-year term, and may be removed only for neglect of duty, misconduct, or inability to perform duties ([#8055]). The statute grants "reasonable access to department facilities, including all areas which are used by inmates, all areas which are accessible to inmates, and to programs for inmates at reasonable times," including photographing and video recording ([#8056]); it makes correspondence with the office confidential and privileged in the same manner as legal correspondence and bars any discriminatory, disciplinary, or retaliatory action for communicating with the office ([#8058]). It also protects the grievance process: the statute expressly states it "does not require inmates to file a complaint with the ombuds in order to exhaust available administrative remedies" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ([#8059]). Washington's enabling statute frames oversight explicitly as a tool to "effectively reduce the exposure of the department to litigation" ([#8104]). Notably, no subpoena power exists in the Washington statute — the ombuds relies on mandatory production timelines — and a Georgia bill should add subpoena power from the Minnesota model ([#8060], [#8063]).

Other states offer complementary design features. Maryland created the Office of the Correctional Ombudsman by SB 134 (Chapter 836, Laws of Maryland 2024), an independent unit with authority to review complaints, inspect, and make recommendations ([#7985]); it sits in the Office of the Attorney General ([#19807]), and agencies must respond in writing within 45 days to ombudsman reports ([#19803]). New Jersey created the Corrections Ombudsperson under the 2020 Dignity Act, with an advisory board ([#7992]), an independent office in but not of the Department of the Treasury reporting to the Governor, with a five-year term ([#7683]); the ombudsperson "shall be vested with the authority to conduct both scheduled and unannounced inspections of any part or all of the facility at any time" ([#8061]), and may release reports without approval from any entity outside the office ([#8062]). Hawaii's five-member Correctional System Oversight Commission uses a capture-resistant appointment model, with members appointed by the Governor, Senate President, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice, and chairperson of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ([#8064]). Virginia makes grievance data a statutorily mandated, published data stream held by a body independent of the corrections agency, directing the office to "establish a statewide, uniform system to collect and analyze data on deaths in custody, sexual and physical assaults, restorative housing, staffing, visitation, and grievances" ([#7984]). The federal government moved in July 2024: the Federal Prison Oversight Act, led by Georgia's congressional delegation — Senator Jon Ossoff and Representative Lucy McBath — created an independent Department of Justice Inspector General inspection regime with risk-scored, more frequent inspections for higher-risk facilities, and an ombudsman for the Bureau of Prisons, both with public reporting to Congress ([#8092], [#7986], [#4663], [#2963]). It covers only the 122 federal Bureau of Prisons facilities, not Georgia state prisons ([#8092]). It passed with strong bipartisan support and endorsements from Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Prosperity, and CPAC — a coalition template ([#8093]). In July 2025, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees included language directing the Bureau of Prisons to fully implement the Act, including by creating the ombudsman office ([#19796]).

Why Georgia has not moved is not a mystery. The Board of Corrections consists of 19 members — one from each congressional district plus five at-large — all appointed by the Governor to staggered five-year terms ([#8077]). The Board conducts no independent inspections, employs no monitors, and appoints the very official it would notionally oversee ([#8078]). GDC internal investigation reports are classified as confidential state secrets and privileged under law unless declassified in writing by the Commissioner ([#8079]). GDC compiles grievance data internally under SOP 227.02 but withholds it publicly; its public "Research and Reports" portal carries no grievance counts, dispositions, or rejection rates ([#7987], [#7936]). And as GPS's comparative analysis puts it, the named Georgia obstacle is that neither GDC nor the Governor's office has supported an independent office, and enabling legislation is required ([#7702]). A credible Georgia office covering 114 facilities and roughly 53,000 people would need an estimated $8–10 million per year — 0.42 to 0.52 percent of GDC's fiscal year 2025 budget ([#8101], [#8102]). The design criteria are well established: independence from the agency, mandated routine inspections, unfettered access including unannounced entry, adequate resourcing, mandatory public reporting, varied information-gathering methods, an agency duty to respond, and focus on treatment, health, safety, and civil rights ([#8054], [#6562]). One cautionary note from abroad: the United Kingdom's HM Inspectorate of Prisons "cannot enforce" its findings — a structural limitation Georgia should design around by pairing inspection with an enforcement or reporting mandate ([#7697]).

The gap is not abstract. Marquis Reshawn Jefferson died May 11, 2022, at Washington State Prison; GPS's registry lists the cause as homicide and his age as 26. His brother obtained documents showing the prison was so understaffed that no one was watching the dorm when he was attacked — no one noticed until other incarcerated people carried his body to the door ([#1439]). No independent body investigated whether that death was preventable, and the Senate committee's rejection of Senator Bearden's proposal for Georgia Bureau of Investigation review of all in-custody deaths means the current arrangement persists.

The unresolved federal route is the pending Department of Justice investigation. The October 2024 findings report included 82 minimum remedial measures organized into short-term and long-term categories covering strategic assessment, staffing and supervision, incident response and investigations, classification and housing, contraband and security threat group management, facility conditions, sexual safety, public transparency, and use of data ([#2637], [#8088]). Among them: a recommendation that GDC bring all facilities within 90 percent of currently allotted posts, a 10 percent or lower correctional officer vacancy rate ([#2638]). The Department advised that 49 days after issuance, the Attorney General may initiate a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act if state officials have not satisfactorily addressed concerns ([#2636]). GDC publicly rejected the findings as reflecting a fundamental misunderstanding ([#8090], [#5762], [#5282]). Only 3 of the 82 remedial measures address programming — substance abuse, graduated housing with programs, and programs for community return — with no mandates for education, vocational training, cognitive-behavioral programming, GED, or college ([#5286]). And the restrictive-housing findings, which would ordinarily contain population, duration, and per-facility figures obtained by compulsory process, have not been released ([#19311]). The Civil Rights Division has been largely dismantled under the current administration, leaving federal enforcement of the October 2024 recommendations uncertain ([#76]). Meanwhile, the $600 million state spending package carries no independent oversight mechanism: Georgia has no prison ombudsman, no independent inspector general for corrections, and no public reporting requirement on spending or outcomes ([#3888]).

Money: The Spending Surge, the Programming Gap, and Who Pays

In January 2025, Governor Brian Kemp called for more than $600 million in additional corrections funding ([#3137], [#6839]), based on a Guidehouse assessment conducted by The Moss Group and Carter Goble Lee ([#3256]). The package allocated $458 million in fiscal year 2025 and $144 million in fiscal year 2026 for infrastructure ([#3257], [#3258]), and included a 4 percent salary increase for correctional officers to achieve parity with neighboring states ([#3138], [#3263]). The amended fiscal year 2025 budget, signed in March 2025, carried $345.9 million in total new GDC funding ([#3519]). The fiscal year 2026 budget added a $200 million corrections increase approved by the General Assembly, which was $75 million above the Governor's recommendation ([#3535]). In total, the legislature approved $634 million in new corrections spending — $434 million in amended fiscal year 2025 plus $200 million in fiscal year 2026 — the largest corrections funding increase in Georgia history ([#5197]). GDC's total funds in the amended fiscal year 2026 budget are $1.80 billion ([#2422]); Georgia spent $1.62 billion on corrections in fiscal year 2026 ([#73]).

What the money does not fund is the central finding of GPS's accountability analysis. The $600 million does not fund population reduction — no parole expansion, geriatric release, or reclassification — does not fund parole reform, classification and housing overhaul, sexual safety and PREA compliance, evidence-based gang management, incarcerated people's direct needs, or independent oversight ([#3889]). The spending is overwhelmingly directed at operational fixes such as staffing, repairs, and technology rather than the structural reforms both the Department of Justice and independent experts identified as necessary preconditions for meaningful change ([#3901]). Guidehouse recommended but Kemp did not fund: expanded retention incentives such as child and family care benefits and bonuses, structural reforms to gang management, meaningful population reduction strategies, and parole reform ([#3890]). The AJC noted that the recommendations "speak directly to some of the DOJ's concerns — particularly staffing and facility conditions — but not others, including sexual safety and the management of gang members" ([#3704], [#3705]). The proposal nonetheless included $40 million for planning and design of a new prison, a new 3,000-bed prison behind Washington State Prison, 446 additional private prison beds, four 126-bed modular correctional units, a five-person "Tiger Team" for locks and security electronics, and emergency facility repairs ([#3706]). As the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute's Ray Khalfani observed: "Georgia's accelerated pace of prison spending is in tandem with its accelerated pace of growth in criminal legal system policies that place more Georgians under carceral control and debt" ([#3886]). The Southern Center for Human Rights was blunter: "Pouring more money into a system without implementing solutions that prioritize decarceration is merely putting a Band-Aid on the problem" ([#3887]). The Georgia Council on Criminal Justice Reform, created under Governor Deal in 2013 and once a national model for evidence-based reform, saw its influence wane after Deal left office in 2019 ([#3891]), and the Kemp administration reversed the Deal-era justice reinvestment trajectory, adding $214 million in GDC spending over two years ([#2169]).

The programming line items make the skew concrete. Prison education represents 0.11 percent of the $1.8 billion corrections budget — $40 per person per year, or $0.11 per day, less than the cost of 45 ramen packets from commissary ([#5266]). The fiscal year 2026 budget allocated $805,000 for vocational education programs against more than $50 million for technology and security improvements ([#3537]). Budget language in the HB 974 Senate Appropriations Committee Substitute of April 4, 2026 directed GDC to "explore virtual high school options" as part of reducing the high school diploma program by $104,000 ([#6278]). Georgia bans financial aid for prison education — not by statute, but by a 1995 administrative regulation — and the HOPE Scholarship's $1 billion per year has excluded incarcerated people since 1995 ([#5242], [#5265]). Federal Pell Grants for incarcerated students were restored July 1, 2023, with programs expanding in 44 states; Georgia closed programs instead, including a Georgia State University program shut down in March 2024 ([#5267]). Nationally, college programs in prisons dropped from approximately 350 in the early 1990s to roughly 12 by 2005 after the 1994 crime bill eliminated Pell eligibility ([#4851], [#4668], [#1247]). The evidence for reversing course is strong: RAND Corporation's meta-analysis found correctional education participants 43 percent less likely to recidivate, with employment outcomes 13 percentage points higher and a return on investment of $4 to $5 per dollar ([#6146], [#7375]). Reducing Georgia's reconviction rate by 10 percentage points would equate to roughly 1,200 fewer reconvictions per year and about $40 million per year in avoided incarceration costs — more than fifteen times GDC's current annual rehabilitation programming spending ([#6145]). Providing postsecondary education to incarcerated people could cut state prison spending by up to $365 million annually ([#4670]). Yet Georgia's 30 percent recidivism rate remained virtually unchanged for a decade before the 2010s reforms despite a doubling of corrections spending, as the Georgia Council on Criminal Justice Reform itself acknowledged ([#7372]).

Families absorb the rest. Families pay approximately $1.91 billion on bail bonds, adjusted to 2025 dollars ([#985]). Roughly 65 percent of families with a loved one in prison were unable to meet their basic needs because court-related fines and fees sent them into debt of more than $13,000 on average ([#5789]). Georgia participates in the federal Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, which allows up to 80 percent of wages to be deducted for taxes, room and board, victim restitution, and family support ([#3395]); Georgia law does not require payment for prison labor at all, with workers in Georgia Correctional Industries operations typically receiving no pay or nominal pay ([#3422]). Georgia Code § 42-5-59 (2022) states that "an amount determined to be the cost of the inmate's keep and confinement shall be deducted from the earnings of each inmate" ([#8229]). Nationally, 48 states allow at least one category of pay-to-stay fees ([#8226], [#957]), and 26 states explicitly allow both room-and-board and medical fees for adults and youths ([#8227]); only California and Illinois have repealed fees for all categories ([#8228]). The reform evidence is that debt forgiveness is cheap: just eight reforms across six states lifted $2.6 billion in outstanding fine and fee debt, $431 million in driver's license reinstatement fees were waived, and $34 million in new reinstatement fees were prevented annually ([#8232], [#8234], [#8235]). Discharging one-time debt often comes at no revenue loss to governments, because the debt was unlikely to be collected ([#8233]).

The communications and commissary economy operates on the same logic. The Georgia–Securus contract specifies a commission rate of 59.6 percent of gross revenue paid to GDC, among the highest in the nation against a national average of roughly 43 percent ([#5393]). Commission-based contracts create an incentive for corrections officials to approve higher prices, since it directly increases facility revenue through percentage-based kickbacks ([#934]), and commissions flow into opaque Inmate Welfare Funds that agencies use as shadow budgets free from legislative appropriation oversight ([#935]). Nine prison systems can spend welfare fund money on capital projects such as construction and maintenance ([#8242]). Georgia appears locked into an exclusive vendor arrangement that costs taxpayers and families millions in unnecessary markups rather than competitive procurement ([#493]). San Francisco eliminated commissary markups; the loss of approximately $500,000 in annual revenue was found to have "minimal" impact — 0.17 percent of the sheriff's budget ([#984]).

Federal communications policy has lurched. The Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act, signed January 5, 2023, gave the Federal Communications Commission authority to regulate all prison communications rates ([#944], [#1695], [#8332]). In July 2024, the commission imposed phone caps of $0.06 per minute for prisons and large jails, first-ever video call caps of $0.11 to $0.25 per minute, and banned site commissions and ancillary fees ([#945]). Under a new Republican majority in 2025, the commission suspended the 2024 rules and approved higher "interim" caps — phone calls in large prisons from $0.06 to $0.10 per minute, small jails up to $0.18 per minute, plus a $0.02 per minute facility fee ([#946]). Commissioner Anna Gomez said the commission was "shielding a broken system that inflates costs and rewards kickbacks to correctional facilities at the expense of incarcerated individuals and their loved ones" ([#947]); Bianca Tylek of Worth Rises said the commission "bent to the will of the industry that has spent decades exploiting the basic human need of incarcerated people and their families" ([#948], [#1782]). At least nine states prohibit commission-based prison telecom contracts ([#949]), and California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Colorado have enacted laws requiring free communications in state prisons, jails, or both ([#950], [#1753], [#1004]). New York made prison calls free as of August 1, 2025 — the first state to do so administratively without legislation, at an estimated annual cost of $9 million ([#1757]). Missouri capped rates at $0.12 per minute in August 2025 ([#1760]). Georgia has taken no legislative action ([#1762]).

Public opinion is not the obstacle. ACLU polling conducted by Benenson Strategy Group in October 2017 found 91 percent of Americans support criminal justice reform, 71 percent agree that long sentences increase the chance of reoffending, and 84 percent believe people with mental health disabilities belong in mental health programs rather than prison ([#19069]). Pew polling of 1,200 likely voters in January 2012, along with Georgia, Missouri, and Oregon surveys, found broad support for shortening time served and reinvesting prison savings in stronger probation and parole supervision ([#1185]). The Alliance for Safety and Justice's Crime Survivors Speak 2022 survey found that by a 3-to-1 margin victims prefer accountability through rehabilitation, mental health treatment, drug treatment, restorative justice, or community service rather than prison alone ([#7333]).

The 2026 Elections as an Advocacy Window

Advocates have identified the 2026 Georgia statewide races as the most consequential near-term opportunity for prison policy ([#1546], [#2324], [#2365]). The reasoning is structural: the Governor appoints the entire Board of Pardons and Paroles, the Attorney General will negotiate any Department of Justice consent decree regarding prison conditions, and a legislature that has repeatedly declined to create independent oversight can be moved by statewide electoral pressure.

The record, however, is thin. Of more than 30 statewide candidates, only 3 have detailed prison reform positions: Jake Olinger (Republican, Governor), Josh McLaurin (Democrat, Lieutenant Governor), and Tanya Miller (Democrat, Attorney General) ([#3962]). The four leading Republican gubernatorial candidates — Burt Jones, Rick Jackson, Chris Carr, and Brad Raffensperger — have collectively offered zero positions on prison conditions, parole reform, GDC oversight, or the Department of Justice investigation, despite $700 million in spending with worsening outcomes ([#3963]).

Olinger has the most detailed reform platform of any candidate. It includes appointing Parole Board members who will increase grant rates — including a formerly incarcerated person — requiring written denial explanations, automatic review for old-law sentences, mandatory timelines, an Independent Oversight Office, mandatory quarterly public reports, unannounced inspections, modifying or repealing Truth in Sentencing, reducing mandatory minimums, expanding earned time credits, reclassifying low-level felonies, capping commissary prices, and paying a minimum wage for prison workers ([#3974], [#3991]). He opposed the $600 million prison spending package, saying, "Georgia doesn't have a 'prison space problem.' Georgia has a failed policy problem" ([#3975], [#3976]).

McLaurin has the most documented legislative record on prison reform of any statewide candidate. He co-chaired the 2021 House Democratic Caucus committee investigating the prison crisis; sponsored voting rights restoration for felony convictions through HB 101, HR 28, and SB 179, affecting approximately 200,000 people; voted against SB 63 (cash bail expansion) and SB 79 (fentanyl sentences), one of only three senators to oppose the latter; regularly attends Parole Board meetings; and opposed new prison construction. His mentor is Stephen B. Bright of the Southern Center for Human Rights ([#3984], [#3986]).

Miller is the most reform-oriented Attorney General candidate. A former prosecutor in the Fulton County Homicide Unit and Crimes Against Women and Children and now a civil rights attorney, she pledges to "decrease the amount of people entangled in our criminal justice system," is committed to healthcare for incarcerated people and parolees, stands "firm against efforts that would criminalize lower income, young, and Black Georgians," and would negotiate a Department of Justice consent decree ([#3989], [#3990]). She is the only Attorney General candidate to have addressed the consent decree responsibility ([#3992]). Chris Carr, by contrast, would negotiate that decree as Attorney General but has taken no position on it, and his stated goal is to make Georgia the "toughest state in the nation on crime," with support for mandatory minimum expansion and 53 sheriff endorsements ([#3971], [#3973]).

The Democratic gubernatorial frontrunner, Keisha Lance Bottoms, has relevant experience — as Atlanta mayor she banned cash bonds for city ordinance violations ([#3977]) — but has not prioritized prison reform in the 2026 campaign, with no specific positions on prison conditions, parole reform, GDC oversight, sentencing reform, or the Department of Justice findings ([#3964]). Burt Jones has an exclusively punitive record: he led passage of SB 44 (2023, gang mandatory minimums), SB 63 (2024, expanded cash bail), fentanyl mandatory minimum increases, and SB 185 (2025, the transgender prisoner care ban), with more than 60 sheriff endorsements and no positions on prison conditions, parole reform, GDC oversight, rehabilitation, the staffing crisis, or the Department of Justice findings ([#3965]). Blake Tillery, Senate Appropriations Chair, led the budget process for the $600 million prison spending and authored SB 39, the transgender prisoner care ban, with 62 sheriff endorsements and no prison reform positions ([#3981]). Rick Jackson — a healthcare executive whose company, Jackson Healthcare, has more than $3 billion in revenue — entered the race late in February 2026 with $50 million in self-funding and has offered no positions on prison healthcare or conditions despite the financial stakes in the $432 million GDC health budget ([#3967]). Geoff Duncan, who switched from Republican to Democrat for the 2026 race, sponsored SB 441 (the Criminal Record Responsibility Act) and passed hate crimes legislation in 2020 ([#3980]). On the Republican side, Brenda Nelson-Porter is the only Lieutenant Governor candidate with prison reform positions; she advocates that prison food is "insufficient" and calls for Senate study committees on nutrition and medical care, making parole more accessible for trade program participants, a "#ParoleeConnect" rideshare program, and earned time credits for literacy programs ([#3983], [#3996]).

Cell phone jamming has become a live campaign and policy issue independent of the reform debate. Attorney General Chris Carr led a 22-state coalition calling for federal action on jamming in January 2023 ([#5513]), sent a letter to the Federal Communications Commission on the issue in June 2024 ([#5514]), led a 31-state coalition urging Congress to pass H.R. 2350 and S. 1137 ([#21216]), and in January 2026 led a 23-state coalition ([#5516], [#5414]). The commission adopted a jamming proposal on September 30, 2025 ([#5515]); its Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to deauthorize subscriber operation of contraband wireless devices inside correctional facilities so that department of corrections jamming would not violate section 333 ([#21342], [#21343], [#21372], [#21374]), and proposes defining a "jamming solution" as "the deployment of RF transmitter(s) within a correctional facility to prevent contraband wireless devices from establishing or maintaining a connection with a network" ([#21344]). Georgia's own legislation moved in parallel: the Governor signed a signal jammer bill on May 11, 2026, assigned Act 495 ([#21298]); separate legislation, Act 388 (HB 1230), revises restrictions on unmanned aircraft near places of incarceration, permits violating drones to be treated as contraband, allows mitigation measures, and takes effect July 1, 2026 ([#21273], [#21274], [#21275]). The counterargument from advocates is that this is a category error: "Cell phone jammers don't stop violence. They don't protect officers. They don't respond to riots, stabbings, or medical emergencies. Staff does. You can't jam your way out of a staffing crisis" ([#5365]). Georgia's own Managed Access System cannot see the content of calls or messages on contraband phones — it can only identify and block device signals ([#5473]) — while VOIP technology bypasses carrier-based blocking and phones are replaced faster than they can be blocked, through drone delivery and staff smuggling ([#5441], [#5442]). Georgia has already contracted with LEO Technologies for AI-based phone monitoring using speech-to-text, semantic analysis, and machine learning, a system that has solved cold homicides, prevented suicides, disrupted trafficking, and built RICO cases ([#5469]). As GPS frames the choice: blocking gives you a phone number; monitoring gives you a criminal case ([#5470]).