Prison Labor & Economics
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Key Findings
Critical data points synthesized across multiple research collections. Tap a card for the full finding, GPS commentary on why it matters, and its source.
Georgia is one of a shrinking number of states that pays incarcerated people nothing for their labor. All regular prison work assignments — kitchen labor, laundry, janitorial, groundskeeping, facility maintenance, construction — are unpaid. There is no state statute requiring any compensation for incarcerated workers, and GDC has no published pay scale for regular work assignments.
With regular work unpaid, people in Georgia prisons earn nothing from it to buy what they need, so those costs shift to their families.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.If Georgia has approximately 47,000 incarcerated people and half (23,500) work an average of 6 hours/day, 250 days/year, at the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hour, the value of that labor would be approximately $256 million per year.
Even as a rough estimate built on assumed headcounts and hours, the figure shows unpaid labor is a large economic benefit to the state, alongside the commissary profit this topic documents.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.Georgia extracted $18.76 million in commissary profit in 2024 alone — money taken from families of people who work for free.
Commissary profit is the second half of the loop GPS documents: the state gains from unpaid labor, then gains again when families pay for necessities the state does not provide.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.Georgia prisoners are forced to purchase basic necessities at commissary markups of 83% to 1,150% above retail prices, funded almost entirely by their families.
GCI generated approximately $64 million in revenue in FY2023. Workers in GCI operations typically receive either no pay or nominal pay (a few cents per hour to a few dollars per day, depending on the program). Georgia law does not require payment for prison labor.
An 1881 legislative investigation found that approximately 1 in 4 convicts died each year in Georgia's convict leasing system.
Georgia's unpaid prison labor today traces back to a leasing system with deaths on this scale, a continuity the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute has itself acknowledged.
Our reading of the finding above. It is not part of the source.A Wage of Zero, Written Into Law
Georgia is one of roughly seven states that pay incarcerated workers nothing for regular prison jobs — a group that also includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas (#1822, #8230). All regular work assignments are unpaid: kitchen labor, laundry, janitorial, groundskeeping, facility maintenance, and construction. There is no state statute requiring any compensation, and the Georgia Department of Corrections publishes no pay scale for regular assignments (#1803). The majority of working prisoners perform institutional maintenance and receive $0 (#3471, #3391).
The legal architecture is old and explicit. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (#1808), and Article I, Section 1, Paragraph XXII of the Georgia Constitution mirrors that exception, providing the authority to compel labor without pay (#1809). Georgia law does not require payment for prison labor, and workers in Georgia Correctional Industries operations receive either nothing or nominal pay of a few cents per hour to a few dollars per day, depending on the program (#3474, #3422).
The unpaid workforce is large. The Georgia Department of Corrections estimates that approximately 80 percent of able-bodied incarcerated people participate in work programs of some kind, with the vast majority receiving no wages (#3494, #3403). Nationally, average prison wages run $0.13 to $0.52 per hour in the states that pay anything at all (#1847) — between 1.8 and 7.2 percent of the federal minimum wage, or zero in Georgia's case (#1850). Only about 1 percent of state correctional budgets nationwide goes to incarcerated worker wages (#1844).
Even the exceptions are narrow. Georgia participates in the federal Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, which requires prevailing wages for private employers, but up to 80 percent of those wages can be deducted for taxes, room and board, victim restitution, and family support (#3475, #1848, #3395), and the program covers only a tiny fraction of the population (#1823). Nor do the ordinary protections apply: courts have held the prison work relationship is "primarily penological" rather than economic, so the Fair Labor Standards Act does not cover incarcerated workers (#1882); the National Labor Relations Act gives them no right to unionize (#1884); they are not classified as employees under Georgia law unless working for private gain, leaving them outside OSHA (#1883); on-the-job injuries trigger no workers' compensation (#1885); and there are no overtime protections (#1886).
Compliance is enforced by the conditions of confinement themselves. Seventy-six percent of incarcerated workers nationally report being required to work or face punishment (#1843). Documented coercive mechanisms include solitary confinement, loss of visitation, loss of commissary access, denial of good-time credits, denial of parole, transfer to harsher facilities, and loss of housing assignments (#1855). The Georgia Parole Board considers work history in parole decisions — meaning refusal to work for free can lengthen a sentence (#1856).
Georgia Correctional Industries: The State's Unpaid Manufacturer
Georgia Correctional Industries was established by the General Assembly in 1960 as a public corporation, moving the state from overt chain gangs to a bureaucratized industrial program while preserving compelled, uncompensated labor (#1821). Today it operates approximately 21 manufacturing plants producing furniture, signs and license plates, cleaning chemicals, mattresses and bedding, clothing and textiles, metal fabrication and welding products, and printing services (#3472, #3392), and it employs approximately 1,000 incarcerated workers daily across Manufacturing, Food Service, and Agribusiness (#1824).
The product list maps onto specific facilities: license plates at Telfair State Prison (#1896), shoes and boots at Autry State Prison (#1897), cleaning and maintenance chemicals at Dodge State Prison (#1898), eyeglasses and optics at Hays State Prison (#1899), printing and binding at Phillips State Prison (#1900), metal furnishings and grills at Walker State Prison (#1901), and garment and linen manufacturing across Autry, Central, Hancock, Hays, Lee Arrendale, Pulaski, Smith, and Washington State Prisons (#1895).
Food is the largest operation. Georgia Correctional Industries serves over 39 million meals annually (#1825, #5839), distributes an average of $1.8 million in food monthly (#1827), and produces over 40 percent of the food items used in prisoner menus under the Georgia Grown label (#1828, #5841). Its agricultural arm manages over 13,000 acres (#1829, #3473, #5840) — including Rogers State Prison Farm in Reidsville at 9,400 acres with 1,200 head of beef cattle, a 450-sow pork operation and a 175-cow dairy (#1830); Joe Kennedy Farm in Lyons at 2,600 acres (#1833); Lee Arrendale State Prison Farm at 596 acres (#1831); and Dooly State Prison Farm at 125 acres (#1832). Surplus is sold to other state agencies (#3473).
By statute, Georgia Correctional Industries retains 25 percent of its profits for employee bonuses and self-investment and deposits the rest in the state's General Fund (#1834). The revenue figure the organization is usually described by is approximately $64 million in fiscal year 2023 (#3394). That number sits in open contradiction with a commercial estimate of roughly $5 million in annual revenue attributed to ZoomInfo (#1835) — a gap GPS reads as evidence that outside estimates capture only external sales and miss the internal value of goods consumed inside the prison system. Current audited production and revenue figures are not public; the most recent published fact sheets date to 2019–2020 (#1902).
Who Captures the Value: Counties, Cities, and the State
The clearest measure of what unpaid labor is worth is what it would cost to buy. If roughly half of Georgia's incarcerated population — 23,500 people — worked an average of six hours a day, 250 days a year, at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, the labor would be worth approximately $256 million annually (#1866). That is an estimate, and GPS labels it as such, but the direction is corroborated by the institutions receiving the work.
County and municipal governments are the main beneficiaries. Georgia counties receive an estimated $100 million or more in value annually from unpaid prison labor for road crews, maintenance, and other public works (#3396, #3495). No facility illustrates this better than the Muscogee County Prison in Columbus, the state's largest county work camp, which officials say saves the city approximately $17 million to $20 million annually (#1836). The director of the Georgia Public Works Department, Pat Biegler, said the prison labor system saves her department approximately $140,000 per week — over $7.2 million annually from that single department (#1839). Warden Dwight Hamrick described the facility's "top priority" as providing prison labor to the Columbus Consolidated Government (#1838).
Pay at Muscogee is instructive: incarcerated people working in sanitation, golf course maintenance, recycling, and landfill operations receive approximately $3 per day, while those in facility maintenance, transportation, and street beautification receive nothing (#1837). Georgia is unusual in maintaining a separate system of county prisons, distinct from county jails, that house state-sentenced people and lean heavily on labor for road maintenance, public building upkeep, parks, agriculture, and disaster response (#3477). Those county programs are less regulated than state programs and have drawn repeated complaints about conditions and treatment (#3419). The Georgia Department of Corrections also runs community work details — litter cleanup, grounds maintenance at public buildings, cemetery maintenance, disaster cleanup — for local governments and nonprofits, with no compensation to the workers (#3476).
One widely repeated claim does not survive comparison with the state's own budget documents. The NAACP and reform advocates have said Georgia's cost per prisoner is approximately 39 percent of the national average and speculated the gap is attributable to unpaid labor (#1840). But Georgia's fiscal year 2025 per-prisoner cost is roughly $27,664 to $31,489 against a national average near $33,274 (#1842) — a gap of under 20 percent, not 61 percent. Unpaid labor is real and enormous; it is not the explanation for a 39 percent cost differential, and GPS treats the 39 percent figure as unsupported.
The Second Extraction: Commissary Pricing
Because the state does not adequately feed, clothe, or supply people it holds, incarcerated Georgians must buy necessities — and the commissary is a monopoly. In 2024 alone, Georgia extracted $18.76 million in commissary profit (#1857), money taken largely from families of people who work for free. GPS's investigation of 20 high-volume staples documented markups of 83 to 1,150 percent above retail prices (#1807, #373), with a parallel analysis putting the range at 67 to 1,150 percent (#1909).
The structure is a two-tier markup. Vendors charge the state inflated "wholesale" prices, then the state charges incarcerated people 54 to 323 percent more on top of those already-inflated costs (#378). Georgia pays vendors 22 to 465 percent more than legitimate institutional wholesale markets charge comparable bulk buyers (#447). Ramen costs incarcerated people $0.90 per packet against $0.15 to $0.31 at Walmart (#370) — a 350 percent markup from true wholesale to shelf (#379). Generic ibuprofen sells for $4.00 per 20–24 tablets that retail for $0.40 to $0.48 (#371, #385). Bar soap runs $1.10 to $2.25 against $0.08 to $0.14 institutional wholesale (#390). An 8-count box of tampons costs $3.40 to $4.25 against $1.20 for a generic equivalent, a markup of 183 to 254 percent on a product the facility could supply (#398) — an estimated $330 to $460 in excess cost over a five-year sentence (#439).
The pricing is strategic rather than uniform. Items families can comparison-shop (shampoo, toothpaste) sit at or below retail, while items whose wholesale cost is invisible (soap, toothbrushes) carry extreme markups (#430). Hot sauce is priced 22 percent below Walmart (#431) and toothpaste at retail (#428) — proof, GPS's investigation concluded, that fair pricing is possible (#429). Protein staples tell the other side: peanut butter at $5.60 per jar against $2.18 retail (#396) and tuna at $2.70 to $3.20 against $0.98 (#395) — the items people most need to supplement inadequate meals are the ones marked up hardest (#435).
In November 2025, Georgia raised commissary prices an average of 30 percent, pushing projected annual extraction above $60 million (#1858, #1859). GPS documented 153 items where vendor prices fell but the Georgia Department of Corrections maintained or raised the price to incarcerated people, pocketing an estimated $420,000 from that manipulation alone (#1860). Estimated total excess extraction across all commissary purchases is $8 million to $15 million annually compared with fair pricing models (#472). Families routinely send $100 to $300 per month for food and hygiene (#939); research in Science Advances found median direct support of $172 per month, about 6 percent of household income (#1861), and national family spending on commissary, phone calls, and necessities is estimated at $5.6 billion annually (#1864, #899).
Where the profit goes is not public. Commissary and telecom commissions flow into "Inmate Welfare Funds" — opaque accounts used as shadow budgets outside legislative appropriation oversight (#935). GPS requested the Georgia Department of Corrections' welfare fund records and was quoted $88,944 for the search (#1892, #1903).
From the Lease to the Commissary: A Continuous Economic Logic
Georgia's modern system descends directly from convict leasing, and the economics have been consistent. In 1866, one year after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the General Assembly authorized the governor to lease state prisoners to railroad companies and other private enterprises (#1816, #3427). The first contract granted 100 Black prisoners to the Georgia and Alabama Railroad for $2,500 (#1816). By 1868 the system was formalized by statute (#3428); in 1874 the state leased all its convicts to three major companies (#3461); in 1883 it leased them for 20-year terms to three companies (#3416). Within three years of the 1866 law, all 393 state prisoners had been leased to lay over 450 miles of railroad track (#1817).
The human cost was extreme. An 1881 legislative investigation found that approximately one in four convicts died each year (#3446); the death rate among Georgia convicts reached roughly 16 percent in 1876 (#3462); the Dade Coal Company's Cole City mines exceeded 10 to 15 percent in some years, with men working 12 to 16 hour shifts in cramped, poorly ventilated shafts (#3440, #3439); and Matthew Mancini found some camps above 20 percent annual mortality (#3501). The exact death toll between 1870 and 1910 is unknown because record-keeping was deliberately poor (#3447). Contemporary annual mortality in Georgia custody is approximately 0.3 to 0.5 percent (#3498, #3404) — a comparison worth stating plainly, because it marks the distance traveled and because it does not make the current system benign.
The beneficiaries were the state's political class. Joseph E. Brown, former Confederate governor and U.S. Senator from 1880 to 1891, profited enormously from convict labor through his Dade Coal Company operations (#3430, #3374). James W. English, mayor of Atlanta from 1881 to 1883, presided over the Chattahoochee Brick Company, which used hundreds of convicts to produce the bricks that built much of Atlanta's infrastructure (#3434, #3436). Brown, Alfred H. Colquitt, and John B. Gordon — the Bourbon Triumvirate — dominated Georgia politics from the 1870s through the 1890s, all three deeply invested in convict leasing, and used their power to block reform (#3431, #3375). Alex Lichtenstein found that convict leasing generated more revenue per capita for Georgia than any other state function in the 1880s and 1890s (#3500).
The racial design was explicit. Georgia's Black Codes — vagrancy laws, contract enforcement statutes, enticement laws — were built to funnel Black Georgians into the system (#3373, #3429). The convict population was roughly 90 percent Black while the free population was approximately 45 percent Black (#3382, #3452), and Black convicts were preferentially leased for the most dangerous work, with some operations explicitly requesting "Negro convicts" (#3383). Douglas Blackmon estimates that 100,000 or more Black Americans were forced into labor through the criminal justice system across the South between 1865 and 1945, with Georgia a primary state (#3499). Today the prison population is approximately 60 percent Black against 33 percent of the state population (#3402, #3493).
Georgia abolished convict leasing in 1908 under Governor Hoke Smith, among the last Southern states to do so, driven by Progressive Era reform, labor-union lobbying against competition from convict labor, and public outrage (#3460, #1819). The chain gang replaced it and retained the worst features — chained men under armed guard, mobile cages, whipping, high disease and death rates (#3465, #3387) — until the last chain gangs disbanded around 1945 (#3469). Georgia Correctional Industries followed in 1960 (#1821). Many modern prisons sit on or near former convict camp and plantation sites, some on land used for forced labor for over 150 years (#3418). The Georgia Budget and Policy Institute's assessment is blunt: the current system "maintains much of the same captive labor and treatment towards incarcerated Georgians" as the leasing and chain gang eras (#1881).
Resistance, Reform, and What the State Will Not Disclose
Incarcerated Georgians have fought these conditions directly. In 1951, prisoners at the Buford Prison Rock Quarry severed their own heel tendons to protest conditions; 30 more broke their own legs with sledgehammers (#1820). On December 9, 2010, people in at least seven state prisons launched what was then the largest prison work stoppage in United States history (#1868, #1869), organized over months using contraband cell phones (#1870). It was multiracial, nonviolent, and coordinated across facilities (#1872), and it lasted six days (#1871). The strikers issued nine demands, beginning with a living wage for work, and including education beyond the GED, decent healthcare, nutritional meals, and just parole decisions (#1873). The state responded with lockdowns, shut-off hot water, confiscation of phones, transfers of suspected organizers, and tactical squads (#1875); guards at Macon and Hays were reported to have beaten prisoners with hammers (#1876), and seven guards were arrested in February 2011 (#1877). The strike inspired the 2016 and 2018 national strikes (#1878, #3491), and as of 2026 every one of the nine demands remains unmet (#1874).
Legislative reform has moved elsewhere but not here. Eight states have removed the slavery exception from their constitutions — Colorado (2018), Utah and Nebraska (2020), Alabama, Oregon, Tennessee and Vermont (2022), and Nevada (2024) (#1810, #3409) — and Georgia has taken no action, with no bill advancing and no ballot question (#1814). HR 1530, the "Ending Slavery in Georgia" amendment introduced in 2026, would strike the exception from Article I, Section I; it needs a two-thirds vote in both chambers to reach voters (#3483, #1887). The Georgia Department of Corrections and the corrections industry oppose it, arguing prison labor provides job training and that eliminating compulsory labor would raise costs (#3423, #3488). Alabama's experience is a caution: it removed its exception in 2022 and has yet to implement wages, with litigation continuing (#1911). Congresswoman Nikema Williams has co-sponsored the federal Abolition Amendment, which would require ratification by 38 states (#1815, #1888). California's Proposition 6, which would have banned forced prison labor, was rejected by voters in 2024 (#1812).
The evidence base itself is a battleground. The Georgia Department of Corrections does not publicly report how many people work in which roles (#1904), how many are punished for refusing work (#1905), or how many are in the prevailing-wage program and what deductions apply (#1906). Total hours and municipal savings across all Georgia counties using prison labor are unavailable (#1907). Georgia Correctional Industries' current revenue and production data are not public (#1902). Revenue from phone, tablet, and email charges is not disclosed (#1908). GPS's welfare fund request was quoted at $88,944 (#1892). What the record does support is a set of remedies with demonstrated effect: capping markups at 10 to 25 percent over retail for healthcare and hygiene items and 30 to 35 percent over true wholesale for food staples (#474, #475, #476), providing menstrual products and basic hygiene free (#482, #483), publishing vendor costs and retail comparisons (#488), and creating an independent pricing oversight board (#485). San Francisco eliminated commissary markups entirely; the lost revenue was about $500,000 a year, just 0.17 percent of the sheriff's budget, and the impact was described as "minimal" (#984).
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